THE BEAR'S TRAIL TO AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170153-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 153
• Publication Date: January 13, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

,, , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170153-7
ARTICLE APP3L,R!..D
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Jack Anderson
THE WASHINGTON POST
13 January 1980
The dear's Trail to
The world has caught only fleeting!
glimpses of the savage Soviet conquest of
Afghanistan. The television cameramen'
have been barred. But from secret intel-
ligence reports and eyewitness accounts,
I have pieced together the story.
The Soviet version-that its troops
were "invited" into Afghanistan-is a
hideous lie. The Afghans are a ruggedly
independent, fiercely nationalistic
people, accustomed to few restraints,
wary of strangers. Down through the
centuries, they have resisted the con-
trols of government.
They could not ignore, of course, the
Soviet bear on their northern border.
They maintained strong ties with
Moscow, accepted Soviet aid and sent
people to Russia for schooling.
Early in the 1970s, the Central Intelli- ,
gence Agency noted that "the Soviet
Union gives ideological indoctrination to
Afghan students and military officers
trained there." But the communist fever
never spread among the staunch Mos-
lems of Afghanistan. In fact, the Soviets'
couldn't even control the few Afghan
communists, who split into loose, rival
parties called Khalq and Parcham. The
latter was described by the CIA as "an
amorphous Moscow-oriented communist
political grouping," without any popular
support. One of its leaders was Babrak
Karmal, who has now been installed by .i
the Soviets as the puppet ruler.
The subversion of Afghanistan began
in 1973 while King Zahir Shah was in Lon-
don for medical treatment. His cousin
Mohammad Daoud declared the monar-
chy at an end and designated himself as
the head of a new democratic republic.
This didn't particularly upset the king,
who had wanted to abdicate anyway. In
the same spirit, members of his family
renounced their royal titles, and many
continued to serve in the government.
But Daoud's coup, according to the
CIA, was "led by left-wing military offi-
cers." As their share of the spoils, "Af-
ghan'leftists, although relatively few in
number, were given a significant role
in the government." The CIA also
warned that "many of the leftist offi-
cials were said to be affiliated" with the
pro-Soviet Parcham faction.
Not long afterward, related the CIA,
Daoud "began quietly to dismiss some
of the leftists." He was "suspicious of
the left's ties to the U.S.S.R." and "un-
easy about its relative cohesiveness."
Yet despite "Daoud's distrust of pro-
Soviet domestic elements," the CIA'
speculated, he was unlikely to let this
"damage Kabul's good relations 'with
Moscow, which stem from the Soviet
Union's geographical proximity and Af-
ghanistan's long-standing dependence
upon Soviet military and economic aid.
This dependence on Moscow also has
kept Daoud from moving more rapidly'
and harshly against leftists at home."
But the Kremlin, apparently, was not
so easily appeased. With reported
Soviet connivance, the rival Khalq and
Parcham factions formed an alliance'
and seized the government. Daoud was
murdered on the spot along with mem-
bers of his family. The Soviet assist-'
ance, according to reliable reports, in-
cluded the murder of a recalcitrant
communist leader by a KGB agent.
Khalq party leader Nur Mohammad
Taraki assumed the presidency, with
Hafizullah Amin as foreign minister.
The. Soviet favorite, Parcham faction
leader Karmal, had to settle for deputy-
prime minister.
During the intrigues and purges that
followed, Taraki banished the Parcham
heavies to diplomatic posts. Karmal
wound up as the Afghan ambassador to
Czechoslovakia. A few months later,
the Parcham diplomats were sum-
moned back to Kabul. They assumed
that Taraki intended to eliminate them
entirely. So they rifled the safes of
their various embassies and escaped
with an estimated half million dollars.
Karmal fled along with his mistress to
West Germany. But he soon returned
under Soviet protection to Prague. i
Taraki, meanwhile, dropped by the
Kremlin for consultations. He con-
spired with the Soviets to knock off his
prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, as the
scapegoat for Afghanistan's mounting
troubles. But the plot leaked to Amin,
who confronted Taraki. In an ensuing
gun battle, Taraki was cut down.
Amin was a vain, ruthless man who
alienated the populace. He once re-
sponded
to a report on the resistance to
his rule, according to one account, by
declaring with a shrug: "The state only
needs four million people." The popula-
tion at the time was 17 million.
The Russian bear swallowed Afghani-
stan in one gulp. The villainous Amin,
who had ruled by the gun, died by the
gun. To replace him, the Soviets in-
stalled Karmal.
Footnote: My associate Howard
Rosenberg has confirmed the CIA re-
ports through Afghan exiles, who re-
ceive regular messages from insurgent
leaders. The messages are carried by
couriers across the mountains into Pak-
istan where the word is quickly flashed
to supporters around the world.
c:9SO, United Feature Syndicate, Ina
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170153-7