OLD ENEMIES UNITE AGAINST KREMLIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170110-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 11, 2012
Sequence Number:
110
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 12, 1980
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170110-4.pdf | 113.06 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170110-4
RTIGLE A _Fr
ON PAGE
JACX ANDERSON
THE WASHINGTON POST
12 April 1980
Old Enemies Unite ainst Kre
The Kremlin's decision to invade Af- these often clumsy diplomatic moves, as may not have realized that what' ice,
ghanistan was not reached without some CIA reports illustrate. down well in Kabul is likely to raise the-
serious misgivings, U.S intelligence, Afghan= Prime Minister ; Mohammad roof in Islamabad," a CIA topseCret:
analysW report. One of the-Soviet strate- Daoud was ousted by his cousin and umbra report observes.
gists' principal concerns was the possibil- brother-in-law, King Zahir Shah, in 1963 The Soviets' clumsy attempts to bring
ity that the aggression might unite.the because of -his "authoritarian methods their Moslem neighbors together- in,
the adverse economic effects of his Sovietdominated "collective security'
tile Moslems of Pakistan and Af and
1on
ho
.
g
s
ghanistan - and. this is precisely what tough policies toward Pakistan," the CIA failed. But their military aggression sde
has happened. review notes. ceeded, ironically., in uniting the tradi= .
"Only such a military action could fi- But when Daoud was recalled in 1973, tional enemies - against the Soviet.
nally have pushed those diverse factions 1{ the situation "began to worsen sharply," Union.
together," said one State Department ex- according to the CLA. "He began at once Hello, Central One of the GTe'q
pert who has monitored the situation for to increase sharply agitation on the molt jealously guarded secrets is the tut-
years. Thiel may turn the possibility of a Pushtunistan question." listed "panic number" it maintains fot'se=
Vietnam-style quagmire for the Russians Shortly after his return, the CIA began lected personnel to call in an emergency..
into a reality, he added. picking up reports that he "has trained Unfortunately for the dignity of the
There has been bitter emnity between and equipped Pakistani dissidents to / agency, practical jokers often give out
Afghanistan and" Pakistan? for example, carry out sabotage on the Pakistani side the supersecret number for laughs or.
over Pushtimistan, the two Pakistani " of the border." Though he denied this personal convenience. Women employes,
provinces that border on Afghanistan. publicly, Daoud admitted to CIA sources for instance, have been known to We it
As a secret CIA historical overview that he would give "sanctuary and finan- out to unwanted, over-amorous dates as
noted, theAfhans had "long claimed that cial assistance" to Pakistani dissidents in their home. telephone number. ,'Tile
these provinces, whose people are ethni- the two disputed provinces. eager swain. winds up talking to a CLk
closer to Afghanistan's dominant Daotud's overtures to India further exa- case officer,,' who answers "Security
tall
y
Pushtun tribal than to most Pakistanis, `_ cerbated this country's relations with Pa- Force,." and is coldly unsympathette.to
should -be granted autonomy or; self-de- kistan. So strong was the antipathy to- the caller's complaint of, passion be-
termination." ward Pakistan that Daoud, and even the trayed.
The Pushtunistan dispute was visceral,
according to one source, and erected an
emotional barrier that no Afghan or Pa-
kistani leader could safely breach.. The
hostility between the two nations might
have continued indefinitely if the Soviets
hadn't marched into Afghanistan.
"Russia's . aggression has cemented
them in a way that nothing else could
have done," a CIA analyst told my associ-
ate Dale Van Atta.
The Soviets' o military aggression
marked the failure of longstanding,
heavy-handed attempts by the Kremlin
to gain dominance over Afghanistan by
indirect means, and the Pushtunistan
issue was usually the sticking point in
- two Soviet puppets who succeeded him Annoying drunks nave also had it
after he was assassinated in 1978, held . totted off on them as a "hot number,"
back from they Russians' "pet concept," and are told bluntly that not only is'Lulu
an Asian collective security system in not back in town, she was never there at
which the Soviet Union was to be. the all. Occasionally, ordinary fumble-fin-
dominant partner. gered citizens dial the number by'acc
A bumbling Soviet diplomat, Alexan- dent:
der Pusanov, contributed to the Afghan- - They ' even. answered when nij ' "M
Pakistani differences when he suggested porter James Grady called at I1?.30 one
to the Pakistani ambassador in Kabul night. Grady assured the case officer and
"that Pakistan make territorial conces- the CIA spokesman who called the-next
sions to Afghanistan in the interests of day that we had no intention of publish-
mutual harmony." ing "the number. Obviously, the agency
Word of this got back to Islamabad, can't have the number changed:-'It
and the Pakistanis were not impressed wouldn't do for some poor spook out in
by Pusanov's attempt to blame the gaffe ' the field to dial it in desperation.'.. a and
on aninterpreter's mistake. ..`Pusanov get a recording.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170110-4