NEW FRIEND VS. OLD ALLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100160130-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 130
• Publication Date: February 8, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100160130-3
ARTICLE t~~i+-~
0~1 P~1G~_C ,~.,,._
,jack Anderson)
THE WASHINGTON POST
8 February 1981
1`~ew ~'ri~~c~ ~s. ~~~ ~~
Alexander Haig, a smooth operator: j
with a martial air who nevertheless has
the brains and guile to be a superb secre-
tary of state, will get an early test of his
diplomatic skills -when he- tries to set
U.S. policy in North Africa..:
He must figure out how to cultivate a;
new friend, Algeria, without alienating
an old one, Morocco. The two neighbors
--conservative,- monarchical Morocco
and left-leaning, socialist Algeria-have-
long been at odds politically.,
Their ~ hostility also involves a vast
stretch'-= of 'valuable-. desert called the
Western Sahara Morocco's claim to this
tract has been contested for five years by
the-Polisario national .liberation move-?
meat? These leftist `guerrillas get their
strongest outside support from Algeria.
Before the Iranian hostage crisis, the:
U.S.`choice was simple enough. Morocco's:
King ? Hassan ; was a staunch American
ally who risked the enmity of other Arab ~
leaders to ,support the Camp David ac-
cords. Algeria, on the other hand, chan-
neled arms and aid from the Soviet_
Union. to_ the Polisario_guerrillas. This
provoked Hassan Ito ? divert American
military-aid into the ~Vestern Sahaza, de-
spite legal strictures that required ivlo-.
rocoo to use the arms for defense only.
But things have changed. The United
States is suddenly in the middle. The Al-
gerians, who- volunteered then diplo-
matic services in the negotiations that
led to-the- American hostages' release;
became heroes overnight.. That puts
Haig in a bit of a hind: Morocco is ~
clamoring -for more U.S. weapons-an
action that would obviously offend Alge-;
ris. As one expert put it to my associate
Dale Van Atta: "Should we embrace the-
prodigal son more than the son who has
been good to us for years?,'.
The appearance of ingratitude toward
our new_friend must be weighed against
the danger to our old ally. The desert
war has sapped -Morocco's resources, ~
caused internal discord and seriously
weakened Hassan's once-stable regime.
Algeria's. responsibility for the Western
Sahara independence movement has
helped bring Hassan to this sorry state. .'
"Algeria has provided Polisario guerril-
las with arms, training, some military ad-
visers and a few regular army units, as well
as a logistics base and sanctuary," atop- ..
secret CIA document reports. The support
is doubly valuable, the report notes, be-
cause "the Algerians are experts at desert
guerrilla warfare, drawing on their years of
e:~,nerience against the French"
The points are reiterated in another
CIA analysis, which says: "The [Polisaz-
io] Front depends mainly-on'Algeria for
arms, training, supplies and financial
support; some Algerian military person-_
nel are accompanying the guerrillas ins
combat operations. A substantial in-I
crease in guerrilla operations could only'
occur as part of an Algerian move."
As powerful and popular as they are,
the guerrillas' ability to wage a waz of
attrition against Morocco would evapo-
rate "without direct Algerian support,"
the CIA experts conclude.
Hassan must find a way to end the in-
creasingly unpopular war. And for him,
the only acceptable way is to beat the_ I
guerrillas in the fceld, giving himself the i
upper hand in any peace negotiations. ~
Faced with the predicament of an old
and valued ally, the State Department
has come down on the side of Hassan-
however much it offends the Algerians-
and has indicated its intention to sell
Hassan more than 100 "tanks. To lessen
the bad public-relations effect, State has
sought to portray the Algerians' help
with the hostages as the repayment of an
old debt, rather than the incurrence of a -
new one. Reminders were floated around-
that in the 1960s John F. Kennedy, both
as a senator and as president, spoke out
on behalf of the Algerians in their strug-
gle for independence from France.
Interestingly enough, the Algerians
. themselves publicly recalled the Kennedy
connection, commenting graciously that.
"good begets goad." The remark suggests
that the Algerians consider their debt of
honor repaid. And as pragmatic politi-
cians, they are probably under no illusions
that sentiment or gratitude will outweigh
the United, States' longtime commitment ~
to King Hassan--certainly not with Haig
Homing things.... i:~
. ?1981, Uolled Feature s7ndtcate. InC
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100160130-3