U.S. AND SOVIETS FLEXED MUSCLES IN '80 FACEDOWN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100160030-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 3, 2012
Sequence Number: 
30
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 23, 1981
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000100160030-4.pdf94.82 KB
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Si Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RD u ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGEr ~.-_-, J.S. and Soviets Flexed Muscles In '80 Eicedown Locked in secret Pentagon files are the startling details of a Soviet- American facedown over [ran in Au- gust, 1980, a confrontation so fraught with risk that it produced rumblings of nuclear reprisals, :tl ,. The Soviets began building --up their forces along the Iranian border in 1980. According to Soviet intel- ligence cables intercepted by the Na- tional Security Agency, the Kremlin anticipated a U.S. military move against [ran in October, 1980. The intercepted cables indicated that as early as July the Soviets had THE WASHINGTON POST 23 October 1981 ing a mock national Soviet invasion of [ran was held in the transhorder area. A complex, theater-level com mand, control, and communications system was deployed and tested; contingency plans were. developed, evaluated and updated; and high- level commanders and staffs. re- hearsed roles in an invasion scenar- io." Evidently, ? this was, intended as a warning to Carter to abandon his "October, coup," a term that kept recurring in the Soviet cables to de- scribe the expected U.S. action in Iran. .. . Carter had taken the precaution of asking the Defense Intelligence Agency to "study and report on pos- sible Soviet military reactions to var- ious scenarios in which the United States forces have . invaded Iran." detected preparations by the United me UtA conctuded? that the Soviets States for military action in [ran. would intervene. ' The cables alerted Soviet outposts that then-President Carter was plan- ning an "October coup" in [ran and warned that the Soviet Union would have to meet force with force. As a show of strength, the Krem- lin bolstered its military forces on the Iranian border and put them through some ominous exercises. These were described by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in a top-secret the D[A warning and the Soviet maneuvers apparently . persuaded Carter to give up the idea of a mil- itary operation against Iran. He called upon the joint chiefs, however, to- prepare various military options in case the Soviets carried out an invasion of [ran. One ominous proposal, called the "limited strategic option," would have authorized the commander of fare confined to Iran, critics warni?d, was a dream that could turn into a nightmare. Even as the Soviet juggernaut was staging its mock invasion of Iran, I reported on Aug. 18, 1980, that Car- ter was preparing to attack Iran. "The ostensible purpose," I wrote, "is to rescue the [American) hostages, but the operation would also exact military retribution. The question of publishing this classified material was the thornier because it dealt with military oper- ations still in preparation. But I hoped to restrain Carter, whose course, I warned, "would risk war with the Soviet Union." A Soviet- American confrontation over Iran, I warned, "could become the opening- skirmish of World War.III." My associate Dale Van Atta learned that the National Security Agency had picked up intercepts that dealt with a massive Soviet buildup on the Iranian border. Ire- ported on Sept. 22 that Russia had "at least 23 divisions in position to move into Irate..,.. What has alarmed U.S. analysts more than the quantity of the Soviet buildup near Iran is the quality of the forces, ar- rayed there." . , The White House denied my.re- ports. But the important thing was that the incendiary action was carr- celed, a dangerous confrontation was avoided and the American hostages eventually, were returned. report: the ldapid Deployment Force to use "In August, 1980, an unusually 19 nuclear bombs delivered by B52 long and complex [Soviets General bombers against invading Russians.. Staff-controlled post exercise featur- But the idea of limited nuclear war, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100160030-4