ISRAELI'S ARMS OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100150030-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: October 17, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/29 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000100150030-5
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,jacl~ Anderson
Ti ~ ~~:?y~??T,T~~'t~',T ?OST
17 O~Tn3~~. 198?
Israel's Arms Operation
The United States has interests in the Middle East
that aze so vital to the security of the nation that
presidents since at least Harry Truman have made
clear they'll go to any lengths-including war-to
protect the U.S. position there.
And U.S. strategists realize there's only one mili-
tary force powerful enough to block Soviet designs on
the Middle East. That's the Israeli army. This is a
major reason (along with domestic political consider-
ations) why American presidents have tended to bite
their tongues when Israel pursues courses that are
not exactly to the White House's liking.
The ease with which the Israeli tail has wagged the
U.S. dog over the years is made clear in highly classi-
fied documents that have been shown to my associ-
ate, Da]e Van Atta.
They reveal the serene self-confidence that succes-
sive Israeli governments have displayed in their deal-
ings with the United States over arms supplies.
For example, one set of top-secret documents re-
veals that for several years after the Yom Kippur war
of October 1973, the United States had no idea of the
extent of Israeli arms purchases. Finally, ahigh-level
group was put together to dig out this information.
The task force pulled together "the many threads of
Israeli operations in the arms transfer area, and the
total picture indicates just how well-organized their
system is-and how little we have understood, let
alone controlled, what. has happened in the past," ac-
cording to atop-secret document.
The Israelis' plea has been that they need U.S.
weapons to offset the Arabs' overwhelming military
advantage. This has been successful even though U.S.
military analysts have ridiculed the claim.
For example, before the Israeli invasion of Leba-
non in 1978, the U.S. experts said Arab ca;ihilities
had "fallen" and Israeli capabilities were "up. 'Their
analysis concluded, correctly: "There is no question
that the Israelis would win." The same assessment.
was made in the month before the Israelis' invasion
of Lebanon last June, rendering ludicrous Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon's complaint to Washington
just before the attack that Israel needed more arms
to defend itself against the Arabs.
Past minutes of a secret meeting of the National
Security Council show that U.S. officials have not
been fooled by the Israelis' poor-mouthing. Those
present "generally agreed that there is no military
rationale for the Israeli arms requests, and that they
should be considered primarily in the political con-
text."
One top-secret State Department report shows how
commonplace the Israelis' pleas for speedy delivery had
become. Commenting on a cable from Tel Aviv, the re-
port said Israel had complained "that delivery of weap-
ons has been slowed, either through bureaucratic bun-
gling or by deliberate policy-and asks which, along
with the usual demand for quicker response."
The high cost of expedited delivery never seemed to
I~~other the Israeli government. For example, according
to one approved arms list, accelerated delivery of hun-
dreds of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles doubled the
price to more than $100,000 apiece.
The Israeli influence may have peaked, though. Even
before the latest Lebanon invasion, shish-level Penta-
gon official wrote in a report that istael's clout in Con-
gress was "slipping badly." He speculated that .this was
due "to a weary state 'of mind over the Israeli lobby
(and) an enhanced. understanding of the necessity for
an evenhanded policy in the Mideast."
The official added: "I am optimistic that we may have
turned the corner in our special relationship v~th lsraeL
United States interest9 may be first for a change."
c~1982. UnlLed YeaWre SynAlcatt
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/29 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000100150030-5