A KING IN DANGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140082-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: May 15, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90
Y
ART I CL~ ---~-
OiA PAC' ' ~ _ ~
TH1=' WASHINGTON POST
15 M.ay 1983
Jack Anderson
A Kind in Dander
U.S. policy toward Morocco's King'
Hassan has grown more openly cordial ~
during the Reagan administration, with
the aim of strengthening an old and
trusted ally. But this may prove to be a
mistake. In the subtle world of Arab
politics, Uncle Sam's warm embrace
could be the kiss of death for Hassan.
It's known as the "Sadat syndrome,"
after the late Egyptian president, who
lost popularity among his countrymen
and other Arab states by becoming too'
cozy with the United States.
There is also the possibility that
Hassan may not be getting much in re-
turn forsisking his credibility at home.
Recent U.S. assurances may have
misled the king into believing he'll get
more military aid than the United
States is, in fact, ready to deliver.
Much of the U.S. aid has gone to
help Morocco in its dragging, six-year
war against the leftist Polisario rebels
fighting to force Hassan to give up the
Western Sahara, which he seized in
1980. Though the Polisarios have suf-
fered serious setbacks recently and are
in no position to win, many U.S. ana-
lystsdoubt that Hassan can win either.
Officially, the United States is neutral
in the conflict. But sources told my as- ;'
sociates, Donald Goldberg and Dale Van
Atta, that the Reagan administration'
has been far from neutral. For example: '
? Delivery of cluster bombs has
been expedited for use in the desert
war.
? U.S. training and military equip-
menthave been provided.
? American Embassy officials, in-
cluding Defense Intelligence Agency
personnel, regularly accompany visit-
ing U.S. delegations to the Western
Sahara war zone.
? The United States has even given
the Moroccans intelligence information '
on the Polisarios' movements in the
Western Sahara.
The result of all this, sources say, is
exaggerated Moroccan expectations of
U.S. support and a distrust of our in-
tentions by other nations in the region.
A secret CIA profile of Hassan de-
scribes agrowing estrangement be-
tween the king and his subjects. Where
once he would ride a white horse
through the crowds at'refigious observ-
ances, he rarely makes such vulnerable
public appearances now.
The reason is simple: a series of close
calls during the 1970s.
In 1971, his top generals tried to kill
Hassan during his birthday celebra-
tion. Aloyal major, Muhammad Ouf-
kir, foiled the coup attempt.
A year later, three Moroccan Air
Force F5 fighters tried to_ shoot down
Hassan's plane as he was returning
from a trip to France.
The once-loyal Oufkir was impli-
cated in that 1972 plot, and may have
been executed, though the official ver-
sion is that he committed suicide.
Hassan has been understandably sus-
picious of his military leaders ever since.
Last Jan. 25, Gen. Ahmed Dlimi, the
king's longtime chief of security, was re-
ported killed in a car accident; but key
witnesses apparently disappeared and
evidence was suppressed. A few days
later, another of the king's aides was
killed under equally mysterious circum-
stances. Western intelligence sources
speculated that Hassan, habitually sus-
ceptible to rumors, was Purging his top '.
military command in fear of another '
coup attempt.
Certainly the king has become more
security conscious and less tolerant of op-
position. Many who made the mistake of
rind bars. the monarch are reportedly be-
Suspicion and distrust permeate the
royal entourage. "Rivalry and the jousting
for position often pit family against
family in the royal court, and intrigue
and rumors abound," the secret CIA pro-
file notes. "As the king is influenced by
this gossip, the atmosphere is often such
that efficient f'unctioning~at the top level
of the bureaucracy is simply smothered."
Despite the soaring cost of food And
oil imports and the country's appalling
unemployment-one out of three adult
males is without ajob-Hassan still
lives like a king. Corruption among
Moroccan officials is endemic.
In short, Hassan is vulnerable
enough to criticism without being em-
barrassed by public displays of affec-
tionfrom the Reagan administration.
And secret Pentagon and congres-
sional assessments question whether
Morocco is the strategic keystone that
justifies U.S. support of Hassan. in
their view, Morocco is a useful but not
absolutely vital transit base for the
U.S. Rapid Deployment Force.
There is a real danger that the ad-
ministration's open support for Hassan
may cost him his throne.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100140082-9