MIDEAST ADVICE DOESN'T ALWAYS BENEFIT REAGAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140052-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: July 26, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140052-2
ARTICLE PrURW- WASHINGTON POST
W #A;Z_, -L-1- 26 July 1983
Mideast Advice
Doesn't Always
Benefit Reagan
The Reagan administration has
suffered some embarrassing setbacks
recently in the Middle East. The
president's optimistic "peace initi-
ative" for the region has stalled. Sec-
retary of State George P. Shultz's
shuttle diplomacy hasn't even been
able to work out the withdrawal of
Israeli and Syrian troops from Leb-
anon.
Part of the. problem is that the
president gets conflicting reports
from diplomats and intelligence
agents in the field. This information
is screened by the president's top
advisers, who tend to pass on only
what he wants to hear-information
that makes his predetermined pol-
icies or campaign promises look
good.
Top-level reports are also the
product of a committee mentality-a
consensus, with no rough edges to
irritate a president or nag him with
doubts. The president, in turn, is
persuaded to approve plans that
have little chance of success.
The president's advisers, for ex-
ample, confidently predicted that
.Jordan's King Hussein would sup-
port the Reagan peace initiative. I
disputed that rosy assessment in a
column last December. Sure enough,
Hussein refused to join in the Rea-
gan plan, effectively killing it.
More recently, the administration
pushed through a troop withdrawal
agreement with Israel that depended
on Syrian cooperation. The White
House seemed to think Syrian Pres-
ident Hafez Assad would agree to
end his years-long occupation of
eastepi Lebanon. On April 29, I
warned that this was unlikely. Assad
has shown no indication that he will
pull his troops out soon-or ever.
One reason for the administra-
tion's embarrassing misinterpreta-
tion of Assad's intentions may be the
soothing syrup it was fed by the U.S.
Embassy in Damascus. A secret
cable to the State Department in
early January demonstrates serious
misjudgment of the Syrian dictator
by our experts on the scene.
The secret cable, examined by my
associate Lucette Lagnado, gave
Washington advance. knowledge of
the Syrian-Soviet -decision to deploy
top-of-the-line Soviet missiles in
Syria. "U.S. intelligence community
believes Syria is preparing at least
two sites for surface-to-air missiles of
type SA5," the cable states, "and
SA5 equipment will soon be shipped
to Syria from the U.S.S.R."
But the embassy took this omi-
nous development calmly. "We
doubt that the installation of SA5s
will make the Assad regime -~mvre
`adventuresome,' " the cable said.
Yet with super Soviet missiles to
back him up, Assad remains at least
as "adventuresome" as he has always
been. He has threatened a new .war
with Israel. He has ignored :.pleas;
from other Arab nations to pull his I
troops out of Lebanon. He has. en- 1
couraged Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization extremists against Ya'ssei
Arafat. And he is suspected of .back:
ing major terrorist attacks, including
the bombing of the U.S. Embassy-in
Beirut.
Incredibly, the embassy condoned
the presence of Soviet personnel
manning the SA5 missiles, suggest-
ing that they would be a restraining
influence on Assad. .?
What worried the embassy ; most
was a pre-emptive strike against-the
missiles by Israel. The embassy
urged Washington to restrain the
Israelis from such a move.
The embassy experts at least
showed some appreciation of Assad's
troublesome tendencies when ' they
commented on the possibility-that
Israel would ask the United States to
make an approach-in diplomatic
jargon, a. demarche-to warn,-.the
Syrians against installation of the
Soviet missiles. .
"We believe no U.S. demarche to
the Syrians ... would be able to' pre-'
vent the installation," the embassy
warned. The experts were right: The
United States did protest-in vain. '
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140052-2