5 ENERGY AIDES LAUDED DESPITE SECURITY FAULTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 26, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140009-0
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAOF
5 Energy Aides
Lauded Despite
Security Faults
Five senior Energy. Department
officials have been identified by con-
gressional investigators as responsi-
ble for a. serious lack of security at
government-owned nuclear plants.
Their fate: they have been given
achievement medals and generous
bonuses.
Rep. John D. Dingell (D-Mich.),
chairman of -an investigating sub-
committee, wrote recently to Energy
Secretary Donald P.Hodel to com-
plain: "This is a curious reward and
punishment system."
The House investigation was in-
spired by my report on the inade-
quacy of security measures at sen-
'sitive research facilities that produce
defense-related-nuclear material. To
see how vulnerable the plants were
to terrorist attack, I hired a helicop-
ter to.fly one of my associates back
and forth at low altitudes over the
.Savannah River nuclear plant in
South Carolina. The overflight was
never challenged.
Dingell's year-long, secret inves-
tigation concluded that DOE offi-
cials deliberately misled Congress
and the White House regarding se-
WASHINGTON POST
26 November 1983
curity at the nuclear facilities. Yet
five key officials singled out by Din-
gell's investigators for blame re-,
ceived over $115,000 in bonuses and
merit awards.
How was this possible? Simple
enough: internal DOE documents
show it was a case of bureaucratic
incest in which the officials gave
each other the high achievement rat-
ings that won them the awards. My
associates Indy Badhwar and Tony
Capaccio have seen House docu-
ments that identify the- five DOE
officials, the actions they took that
drew congressional criticism and the
rewards they received. Dingell's let-
ter identifies them as:
? merman Roser, assistant secje-
tarv or defense pro. ams. Accordi
to one report, he was responsible for
deep-sizing an independent assess-
ment ram conducted by a team
of terrorist experts, former CIA and
FBI a ents and Army RE-mandos
that was severe crib o his se-
ms. He was also accused
of misleading a House subcommittee
about security at the DUE acs es.
ce1980 Rosen iias co a more
than $35,000 in bonuses anawards,
including one from President a-
? Troy Wade, principal deputy
assistant secretary. He was Roser's
"point man" who recommended scut-
tling the embarrassing assessment
program. Since 1981 he has received
more than $32,000 in bonuses and
merit awards; he also received a sill
ver medal this year.
? James Culpepper, deputy .assist,-
ant secretary for security. He was
responsible for a report to the pre*
ident on the status of safeguards at
the nuclear plants, a report the Gen-
eral Accounting Office characterized
as "misleading." Since .1981 he hat
won more-than $20,000 in awards..:
? Ralph Caudle, director of the
Office of Safeguards. He continued
to assure Congress that security was
adequate when, according to a corn.
mittee report, "this was not true, a.4
documents in his files clearly indi
sated." Caudle got a silver medal this
year and has received about $15,000
in awards.
? Robert Morgan, rrianager of tine
Savannah River operation. He tool
part in suppressing the critical se=
curity assessment and was accused
of misleading Congress about safety
at the facility. Last January a new.
DOE assessment of Savannah River
found safeguards to be a "shambles
Since 1981 Morgan has received
more than $26,000 in awards, and
this year he was given a gold medal.
The House investigation found'
some shocking security -lapses: ser.N
sons and alarms that didn't work;
guards who couldn't shoot; guards
who, in one exercise, "fired on one,
another rather than the [mock] att
tacking force," and a guard unit that
responded to a mock attack 16
minutes after the attackers had left,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140009-0