LEGACY OF THE TUPAMAROS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130105-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 105
• Publication Date: May 6, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130105-4
1- :TICLE AP?LA.RED
P.StNCTOid POST
6 3a v 1984
Tack Anderson
Leacv of the Tunamaros
For a group that never counted more than 3.000
hard-core members, the Tupamaro terrorists of
Uruguay left a substantial and terrible legacy, not
only in their homeland but in Latin America and
Western Europe as well.
The Tupamaros' impact on Uruguay was both per-
verse:-and pervasive. Their terrorist acts created a
crisis, .which enabled the Uruguayan military to seize
contr ol in 1973, transforming what had been Latin
America's most solid democracy into another reprec-
sive.militaN dictatorship. The "Switzerland of South
America" became just another banana republic, its
proud history of more than 100 years of civilian rule
ignored in the reaction to the Tupamaroviolence.
Even today, when Uruguay is beset with 15 percent
unemployment and staggering economic troubles, the
specter of the Thpamaros has cwt a pall over the ef-
fort to return the government to civilian control.
Hat, did such a tiny number of young people from
the. Uruguayan middle and upper classes achieve
such a sinister influence over a country of 3 million?
They began like many ultimately disastrous groups
throughout history, as idealists, determined to cleanse
Uruguay's affluent, complacent society of corruption
and indifference to the needy.
Taking their name from Thpac Amaru, an Inca
prince who fought the Spaniards in the 18th century,
the well-intentioned young rebels became Robin
Hoods, robbing from the rich to give to the poor.
But their romantic efforts failed to catch fire, so in
19'70 the impatient, fn ated Thpamaros turned v6-
cious27hat was the year they murdered Dan Mitr-
ione,the U.S. adviser to the Uruguayan police. Others
were .killed or kidnapped, including the British am-
bassador, who was held for eight months in a cage 6
feet long and 2 feet wide.
In their two-year reign of terror, the Tupamaros
committed more than 300 bombings and assaults.
They- became famous throughout the world, and as
their notoriety spread, other youthful terrorist
groups sprang up in imitation. The earliest German
terrorist gang called itself the Tupamaros of West
Ber Th, and in this country the Weathermen
claimed the Uruguayans as their inspiration.
In its operations against the T upamaros, the Uru-
guayariarmy soon learned it was dealing with a well-
or?ani?ed terrorist group with modem equipment and
facilities at its command. Cuba had been training the
terrorists since 1968, when the Thpamaro leader made
a personal deal with Castro. It took the army several
year., to break the Tupamaros, after capturing their
leader and imprisoning many more. The rest fled.
A secret State Department cable tell what hap.
pened next "After the failure of the urban insurgen-
cy, several hundred Thpamaros went to Cuba During
the mid-1970s, Cuba provided some of them with
training in military and terrorist tactics, weapons and
intelligence. Several-of these former Tupamares sub-
sequently assisted Cuba in running .intelligence
operations in Europe and Latin America:"
Tupamaro volunteers fought in the Cuban-or-
ganized "Internationalist Brigade" that helped the
Sandinistas overthrow Anastasio Somoza in 1979
and seize power in Nicaragua. And one secret CIA
report notes that several Tupamaros were identi-
fied as participants in a Cuban-sponsored terrorist
convention in Mexico City last October.
Meanwhile, the country the Tupamaros left be-
hind languished under stern military r We- Thou-
sands of political prisoners were interned; 900 are
still in prison.
Yet during most of that period, according to a CIA
analysis, the "bast majority of Uruguayans viewed
economic growth and domestic tranquillity as greater
priorities than a return to political normalcy"
But fresh winds were blowing across the Rio de is
Plata from Argentina. I sent my associate Dale Van
Alta to Montevideo to find out what was going on
One expert he talked to was U.S. Ambassador
Thomas Aranda Jr. Like many U.S. and Uruguayan
sources, Aranda predicted that Argentina's free elec-
tions will encourage Uruguayans to push even more
strongly for a return to civilian government.
The restlessness showed itself early-in noisy
demonstrations, some of them in the saucepan-bang-
ing Chilean tradition. Then in January, the first gen-
eral strike in 11 years shut Uruguay down.
Nevertheless, the negotiations for general elections
this November and a presidential election next
March have broken down. The military appears to be
digging in. And one of the generals' strongest arguing
points is the legacy of fear bequeathed to their coun-
trymen by the Tupamaros.
Sff&, Untted Feature 8ynafnte
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130105-4