DID AMERICA HAVE TO DROP THE BOMB?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100010007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 4, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100010007-6
K
WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1985
Did America, Have to Drop t e om .
Not to End the War,
But Truman Wanted
To Intimidate Russia
By Gar Alperovitz
T HE AMBASSADOR HAD just had a
long private meeting with President
Harry S Truman, in office less than
six weeks following the death of Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Truman had told him two ex-
traordinary things: First, if all went well, the
United States would soon possess a weapon
of awesome and hitherto unknown power.
Charging him with "utmost secrecy,"
Truman revealed something "which I have
not told anybody" - that he had decided to
postpone negotiations with Stalin on 'the
shape of the postwar world until he knew for
sure whether the weapon really worked.
"I was startled, shocked and amazed," Jo-
seph E. Davies, former U.S. envoy to the
Soviet Union, wrote in his diary on May 21,
1945 after the meeting. In an asterisked
footnote he added: "Uranium - for reason
of security I will have to fill this in later."
On July 16, the first atom bomb was
tested successfully at Alamogordo, N.M. On
July 17, Truman sat down to talk with Stalin.
And on Aug. 6, a bomb would fall on Hiroshi-
ma, ultimately killing an estimated 130,000
Japanese and changing the world.
Now, 40 years later, revelations based on
privately held and previously classified infor-
mation continue to illuminate the complex
decision-making that led to the destruction
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Most Americans assume the reason Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki were destroyed was
simply to prevent a costly invasion of Japan.
However, the newest documents have
strengthened the theory that other consider-
ations - especially the new weapon's im-
pact on diplomacy towed the Soviet Union
- were involved.
The'invasion of -Japan - which President
Trutnah claimed might cost up to a million
casualties - was scheduled to begin on Nov.
1 with a landing on the island of Kyushu,
with a full invasion in the spring of 1946.
(Documents of the time suggest that many
planners foresaw far fewer casualties.)
It by the mid-summer of 1945 Japan
was in a very
way. How allied in-
nce un ers
a st ua on a
the time was etas a
mare rf fo Erie
American and British Combined Chiefs of
to pu c in 1
e increasing effects of sea blockade
and cumulative devastation wrought by
strategic bombing . . . has already rendered
millions homeless and has destroyed from 25
percent to 50 percent of the built-up area of
Japan's most important cities. . . . A condi-
tional surrender . . . might be offered by
them at any time... .
The Japanese code had been broken early
in the war. Faint peace feelers appeared as
early as September 1944.
In July, Secretary of the Navy James V.
Forrestal's diary described the latest cables
as real evidence of a Japanese desire to get
out of the war. . . "
Forrestal was referring to a message from
Togo to his ambassador in Moscow instruct-
ing him to see Molotov before he and Stalin
left to meet Truman at the Potsdam Confer-
ence. The Japanese envoy was "to lay before
him the emperor's strong desire to secure a
termination of the war."
Forrestal noted that "Togo said further
that the unconditional surrender terms of
the Allies was [sic] about the only thing in
the way... .
Discussion of surrender was also under-
way through a channel in Switzerland. In a
recently discovered memo dated Ma ` 12,
William Donovan, director o the ice of
trategic Services, told Truman t at an-OSS
source had "talked with Shunichi Kase. the
Japanese minister to witzerland. . . . Kase
.eIpressed a wish to help arrange fora cessa-
tion of hostilities. .
Donovan reported the same judgment as
that contained in the intercepted cables - a
slight change in the surrender formula
seemed only remaining issue: "One o
the ew provisions . . . would be the reten-
tion of the emperor......
id, top U.S. officials understand the im-
port of the cables? There was, to be sure,
the- possibility that the initial feelers were
without substance. However, Truman's
diary,. discovered in 1978, terms the key in-
tercepted message "the telegram from Jap
emperor asking for peace."
dm. William D. Leahy, who served as
chief of staff to the president and
presided over the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, wrote in his diary in mid June that "at
the present time . . . a surrender of Japan
can be arranged with terms that can be ac-
cepted by Japan and that will make fully
satisfactory provision for America's defense
against future trans-Pacific aggression." Af-
terwards, Leahy would reflect that "the use
of thin barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was of no material assistance in
our war against Japan ... .
Likewise, Eisenhower would later state
that "it wasn't necessary" to hit the Japa-
nese "with that awful thing." On July 20,
1945, in front of Gen. Omar Bradley, he ad-
vised Truman of his objections.
There is some confusion as to precisely
how other top military figures felt, particu-
larly in the crucial last month before Hiroshi-
ma. There is no doubt, of course, that they
approved planning for an invasion.
The important question is whether by July
and early August military planners still be-
lieved an invasion would be required if the
atomic bomb was not used.
Adm. Ernest J. King, commander in chief
of the U.S. Fleet, had for much of the war
argued that naval blockade would secure un-
conditional surrender without an invasion.
The top Army air forces commander, Gen.
H.H. "Hap" Arnold, said unconditional sur-
render could be won by October. He outlined
the devastation that would hit the Japanese
population, with its enormous casualties.
"Japan, in fact, will become a nation with-
out cities, with her transportation disrupted
and will have tremendous difficulty in hold-
ing her people together for continued resist-
ance."
Precisely how the leading Army figure,
Gen. George C. Marshall, felt is not entirely
clear. On the one hand, Marshall pressed
forward on invasion planning, but he also
urged changing the surrender formula and,
as we shall see, advised of the importance of
a Russian declaration of war.
As for the troops in the field: "Every indi-
vidual moving to the Pacific," Marshall said,
"should be indoctrinated with a firm deter-
mination to see it through."
0 nce the new weapon had been
proven, the military leaders went
along with the president's decision to
use it. But this fact has often led subsequent
observers to confuse approval with the ques-
tion of whether, as Eisenhower put it, the
weapon was still deemed "mandatory as a
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measure to save American lives." Strategy
for the bomb was in any event largely han-
dled outside the normal chain of command
by the president and his advisers.
Did the president understand the possibil-
ity that the atomic bomb was not required to
prevent an invasion? On this question there
is much dispute. However, the documents
now available make it very difficult to be-
lieve he did not.
First, Truman was repeatedly advised that
a change in the unconditional surrender for-
mula allowing Japan to keep the emperor
seemed likely to end the war. There is also
documentation - from the diaries of Secre-
tary of War Henry L. Stimson, acting Secre-
tary of State Joseph C. Grew and from Brit-
ish Prime Minister Winston Churchill -
confirming that the president did not regard
such a change as major. And in the end, of
course, he did make such a change after the
bomb was used.
It is sometimes argued that the Japanese
military would have prevented a surrender
had the atomic bomb not been used. But this
argument usually assumes there would have
been no change in the surrender formula.
Given the right terms, as Leahy put it, "We
were certain that the Mikado could stop the
war with a royal word."
Of course, the president preferred not to
alter the terms if possible.
The idea that the atomic bomb had to be
used to avoid an invasion turns on whether
or not there were other options.
As early as September 1944, Churchill felt
the Japanese might collapse when Russia
entered the war. On May 21, 1945, Secre-
tary of War Stimson advised of the "pro-
found military effect" of Soviet entry.
In mid June, Marshall advised the presi-
dent that "the impact of Russian entry on
the already hopeless Japanese may well be
the decisive action levering them into capitu-
lation at that time or shortly thereafter if we
land in Japan."
A month later the Combined British-U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the Russian
option at Potsdam. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay
summarized the Combined Intelligence
Staffs' conclusion for Churchill: "If and when
Russia came into the war against Japan the
Japanese would probably wish to get out on
almost any terms short of the dethronement
of the emperor."
Did the president also understand the ad-
vice that the Russian declaration of war was
likely to bring about capitulation?
After his first meeting with Stalin on July
17, 1945 - three weeks before Hiroshima
- the president noted in his diary:
"He'll be in the Jap war on August 15th.
Fini Japs when that comes about."
I t is clear that the president preferred to
end the war without Russian help, but
that does not mean that he had no alter-
native but to use the atomic bomb. We now
know he rejected Russian help for political,
not military. reasons.
The original planning date for Russian
entry into the war was Aug. 8. Hiroshima
was bombed on Aug. 6 and Nagasaki on Aug.
9.
The person for whom the linkage between
the atomic bomb and strategy towards Rus-
sia was most direct was Secretary of State
James F. Byrnes - Truman's chief adviser
both on diplomacy and on the atomic bomb.
Byrnes was a complex, secretive, even
devious politician. In his diary Truman refers
to him at this time as "conniving."
There is unmistakable evidence that
Byrnes tried to rewrite the historical record,
in part by destroying documents, in part by
literally rewriting the private diaries of his
assistant, Warren Brown - and passing
them off to official government archivists as
authentic.
In any case, Forrestal's diaries, show
Byrnes "most anxious to get the Japanese
affair over with before the Russians got
in...." It was also Byrnes who formally
proposed that the bomb be targeted on a facr
tory surrounded as closely as possible by
workers' housing to achieve maximum psy-
chological effect.
Ambassador Davies, who was "shocked,
startled and amazed" when told of the-deci-
sion to postpone talks with Stalin, was dis-
turbed by "Byrnes' attitude that the atomic
bomb assured ultimate success in negotia-
tions . . . ." On July 28, 1945 Davies
warned him that "the threat wouldn't work,
and might do irreparable harm."
Byrnes was particularly worried that if the
Russians entered the Japanese war they
would get control of Manchuria and north
China. He was also concerned about Eastern
Europe. Roosevelt had selected Byrnes -
his "assistant president" at the time - as
the leading public advocate and defender of
the famous Yalta agreement which promised
democracy and free elections in Eastern Eu-
rope.
T hough at Yalta Byrnes participated in
cutting the teeth out of language that
would have made the agreement more
than a statement of general intentions, re-
cent research indicates he hoped the atomic
bomb would enforce in practice what had
been signed away in principle.
According to atomic scientist Leo Szilard,
who met with Byrnes on May 28, 1945 -
10 weeks before Hiroshima: "Mr. Byrnes
did not argue that it was necessary to use
the bomb against the cities of Japan in order
to win the war. . ." Byrnes "was concerned
about Russia's postwar behavior.
"Russian troops had moved into Hungary
and Rumania; Byrnes thought it would be
very difficult to persuade Russia to withdraw
... and that Russia might be more manage-
able if impressed by American military
might.
"I shared Byrnes's concern ..." Szilard
observed, "but I was completely flabber-
gasted by the assumption that rattling the
bomb might make Russia more manage-
able...."
Q2.1 ,
There is no evidendfByrnes used the
atomic bomb as an explicit threat, but a
month after the Potsdam meeting with
Stalin, **,example, Stinson talked with him
at the White House, and noted in his diary:
"I found that Byrnes was very much against
any attempt to cooperate with Russia. His
mind is full of his problems with the coming
meeting of foreign ministers, and he looks to
having the presence of the bomb in his pock-
et, so to speak, as a great weapon.. "
Byrnes, who previously had been senator
from South Carolina, was on very intimate
terms with the president. He had, in fact,
acted as Truman's mentor when he went to
the Senate from Missouri. Roosevelt had
also seemingly selected Byrnes to be vice
president in 1944, switching only at the last
minute to Truman.
One of the reasons Truman made Byrnes
secretary of state was that this move put
Byrnes next in line of succession for the
presidency after Truman moved, up from
vice president.
On May 3, 1945, Truman also asked
Byrnes to be his representative on the "In-
terim Committee" studying atomic strategy
- and there were numerous meetings be-
tween the two men throughout the summer.
Truman and Byrnes left Washington to-
gether on July 7 to meet with Stalin at Pots-
dam, where Stinson complained that Byrnes
was "hugging matters pretty close to his
bosom."
Before the Potsdam conference Truman
was also advised by Stimson: "We shall prob-
ably hold more cards in our hands later than
now." During the conference Truman was
enormously bolstered by the successful
atomic test. "Now I know what happened to
Truman yesterday," Churchill observed. "I
couldn't understand it. When he got to the
meeting after having read this report [of the
atomic test] he was a changed man."
"He told the Russians just where they got
on and off and generally bossed the whole
meeting."
He also told Stalin that America had de-
veloped a powerful new weapon, but did not
specify that it was atomic.
There are still many unanswered ques-
tions about the decisions made during
the month before Hiroshima. How-
ever, there is little doubt about some things.
Had the United States so desired, either the
forthcoming Russian declaration of war or a
change in the surrender formula (or both to-
gether) seemed likely to end the war without
the atomic bomb. There was also plenty of
time to use the weapon if these options
failed in the three months before the Kyushu
landing.
"The historic fact remains, and must be
judged in the aftertime," Churchill subse-
quently observed, "that the decision
whether or not to use the atomic bomb . . .
was never even an issue." It is possible that
top policy makers, especially the president,
simply wanted to leave no stone unturned to
end the war.
ti"
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However, in view of what we now know
about Japan's attempt to.surrender, military
factors alone appear inadequate to explain
the choice.
As historian Martin Sherwin put it, the
idea the atomic bomb would help make Rus-
sia manageable both in Asia and in Europe
was an important consideration - "inextri-
cably involved."
In mid-May America's leaders had post-
poned negotiations with Stalin, basing their
strategy on the assumption the bomb would
strengthen their hand. Thereafter, some of
those most intimately involved in diplomacy
- unlike some of the top military figures -
apparently were either unable or unwilling
to understand the significance of the June
and July information on Japan's collapse.
The evidence that diplomatic considera-
tions were very important is especially clear
in connection with the president's closest ad-
viser, Byrnes. Nevertheless, 40 years after
the fact some government documents still
remain classified. It may be that when these
are finally released - perhaps when still
other diaries are discovered - we will know
the full story.
Gar Alperovitz is the author of "Atomic
Diplomacy: Hiroshima & Potsdam, "a revised
edition of which has just been published.
3
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