SPIES IN WASHINGTON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000201250015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 4, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1.1
THE INMAN FILE
Bobby Ray Inman
Back in 1975, when
was director of Naval
Intelligence, he was
invited by some Sen-
ate staffers to come up to
Capitol Hill and discuss the
Soviet threat. The invitation
proved to be more compli-
cated than it appeared, as in-
vitations to spies often do
.. but let Inman tell the
story himself:
"After the . meeting, a
staffer asked me to lunch. We
went to a little restaurant on
A he back side of the Hill, and
two characters slid into the
seats next to us. They started
talking to me, suggesting that
if their companies got some
contracts, they could be of
great help to the Navy. I was
just beginning to get incensed
when one of them said, -'By
the way, I work for you."'
Inman was flabbergasted.
The man -was -Edmund Wil-
son, a hulking former CIA
agent who belonged to the se-
cret Naval Intelligence organ-
ization known as Task Force
157, whose members gathered
intelligence about harbors
around the world. While I
working for Task Force 157,
Wilson had managed to-be-
come a rich man, Owning a
Virginia horse farm, among
other things
He would go on '
.
to procure illegal explosives A. known as MCC that is
for Libyan terrorists and at- racing the Japanese toward
tempt to have some people the next generation of super-
assassinated, but that's an. computers. When Inman re-
other story. tired last year as deputy di-
"I went back to the office," rector of the Central Intelli-
Inman says, "and asked, gence Agency, he probably
'Who is this guy?' That day I had more varied experience
decided to terminate Wilson's in. analytical intelligence than
contract." Inman had already anyone. Though not a Naval
decided to do away with Task Academy graduate, Inman
Force 157, to meet the Navy's
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
4 December 1983
BY JAMES COMAWAY
James Conaway is a staff
writer for The Washington
Post Magazine.
worked his way up through
budgetary requirements, but Naval Intelligence to become
the meeting with Wilson con- a four-star admiral, was
vinced him that the decision named deputy director of the
was sound. `Later -and Defense Intelligence Agency
Inman smiles the gap- in 1976 and then became the
toothed smile so familiar to youngest director ever of the
congressional committees and secretive, monolithic Na-
intelligence operatives- tional Security Agency.
Wilson blamed me for a lot
of his troubles." He tried to retire in 1981,
Inman was Wilson's an. with 30 years of military ser-
tithesis, principled to a fault, vice, but President Reagan
and so physically unassuming personally asked him to take.
t h a t as a c t ild he was often the number - two job under
beaten up, in east Texas CIA director William Casey.
schools (until he helped two Inman agreed, but left the
brawny classmates with their CIA a year later, to critical
homework and learned the acclaim from congressmen
value of bodyguards). and soldiers alike, some of
Today Wilson is in prison whom feared that American
and Inman is drinking Cali- intelligence was losing one of
forma riesling in the first- ! its most valuable assets.
class cabin of a Boeing 727 Inman resisted interview-
streaking between Washing- era while in government, but
ton and Austin. "The thuht decided to talk about intelli-
crossed my mind," he says, gence-gathering for the aim-
gazing at his wan reflection in pie reason that "it's an im-
the blackened window of the Portent subject " His views
aircraft, "that Wilson might on the men and the machines
try to do me harm." in the business are instruc-
tive. Former CIA director
nman is a civilian now, William Colby says Inman
the director of a consor- "had all the jobs and never
tium of electronics and let the bureaucracy get in his
computer companies way ... He respected the
congressional prerogative, but
was also concerned with
keeping the necessary se-
crets."
"He's a consummate pro-
fessional and a highly moral
individual," says George
Carver, who was deputy of
national intelligence in the
CIA in the mid-1970s, now a
senior fellow at the George-
town Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
"Bobby Inman has always.
been an extremely articulate
and able advocate of the true
net interests of whatever
agency he represented."
That is a fair description of
a good spy.
"Articles saying that I'm a
master spy are pure garbage,"
Inman says. "I've never run a
clandestine operation. ' But
I've been an avid user of what
they produce."
Disputes over covert action
were cited as the reason
Inman left the CIA; however,
differences between him and
Casey reportedly arose from
personality conflicts, rather
than philosophy, and the
natural differences between
generations. Casey was drop-
ping spies into Nazi Germany
when Inman was a Texas
whiz kid.
Computers are as es-
sential to the govern-
ment Inman worked
for as they are funda-
mental to his new en-
deavor, in a world where pri-
vate enterprise and govern-
ment service often overlap.
His competitors might well
be uneasy, given the admi-
ral's vita.
Inman insists he is no
longer in the business: "I'm
not using any clandestine or
technical sources to deter-
mine what the Japanese are
doing. I do know that wher-
ever I go to speak, there are
substantial Japanese in at-
tendance."
He looks like the class vale-
dictorian, twisting a Univer-
sity of Texas ring around his
finger while deflating some
notions about spies and tech-
nology. ,N=
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He says it will take an-
other 10 years for computers
to pick vital bits of informa-
tion out of human conversa-
tions and to translate Ian-
es.
No, computers at the Na-
tional Security Agency do not
listen in on millions of tele-
phone transmissions, ran-
domly collecting intelligence.
People are still required for
that endeavor.
Machines are not taking
over the earth: "I don't know
where the limits to technolog-
ical advance are, but I sus-
pect they have to do with the
human imagination. There
are limits to what we can
imagine machines doing,
rather than on the machines
themselves."
To Inman, the gathering of
intelligence-including clan-
destine gathering-is an ab-
solute necessity, if an ambig-
uous one. --
"The moral complexities
that challenge the clandestine
services are greater than
those of other agencies. Con-
vincing a foreigner to become
a clandestine agent, to betray
his country, is difficult. Is it
morally acceptable to read
other people's mail?
"Laws apply. to all citizens,
but in reality the law doesn't
extend to the citizens of other
countries. You look to a dif-
Clandestine collection isn't
bad, but you must have an
infrastructure to make sure
people aren't moonlighting."
Inman travels a lot, but
never to communist coun-
tries: "The temptation to
grab me might be too strong
to resist." .
mericans betraying
secrets to the Soviet
Union is not as trou-
bling to Inman as
their reasons for
doing so. "In the 1930s, it was
ideology. People thought they
were working for a better sys-
tem. Now they sell secrets to
support a life style."
The change is reflected in
the Soviet looking glass, but
with an important distinc-
tion: "Spies in Russia used to
be interested in money. Now
they want to help us because
they're disillusioned with
their own system. It's an en-
couraging sign...
"There have been very
major successes in our under-
standing the Soviet weapons
systems, economy and poli-
tics. The political stuff is the
hardest of all to get.
"Decisions in the Soviet
Union are made by a few peo-
ple, and those around them
are so well cared for, part of a
privileged society, that they
day is excellent. We know in
specific detail what they have
in military capability, how
the weapons are used and the
people trained. A lot of this
comes out of competitive
analysis. You can be misled
by your own assumptions-
the value of challenging those
assumptions can't be over-
estimated." Hence the
United States developed dif-
' ferent intelligence agencies
within various departments, a
system modeled on Britain's.
Asked to name the best in-
telligence organization in the
world, Inman squirms a bit.
"It depends on what has to be
accomplished," he says. "If
depth of knowledge of the
immediate environment is
the objective, then the Israe-
lis are probably the best.
"The Soviets are the larg-
est in manpower they have
three times our manpower-
but they have corruption
around the edges. They also
have the problem of internal
security. The United States
has the lead in technical col-
lection and analysis. Dealing
with closed societies has
forced us to be good at it."
He praises the British for
2,
mesh; Inman remains in-
scrutable on . the subject,
speaking of the role of direc-
tor of Central Intelligence in
general terms only- "The DCI
is supposed to orchestrate,
but that's not a clear charter.
In the past there have been
conflicts among the depart-
ments-turf issues, who gets
the money and who gets the
president's ear."
There are other kinds of
competition-over expertise,
for instance. "The overt
human 'observers versus the
technical collectors. Human
intelligence always has the
potential for error. Clandes-
tine agents must always ask
the question, `Has my source
been doubled?' There are
areas of deception in techni-
cal intelligence or the inter-
preter may not understand
the context of a recorded
conversation. With images
[photographs], the inter-
preter may not know when to
look at them. No good ana-
lyst wants to be dependent
on one source. He wants
human input, signals and im-
agery. None of these are
going to put the others out of
business."
ferent set of standards-.-how
to acquire knowledge that
will help this country protect
its interests, preferably
peaceful.
"There are limits, things
you have to be careful of. We
should not be involved in as-
sassinations-murder is mur-
der. I am prepared to subvert
for knowledge, but not for
killing. Wilson was a bad
apple---a classic one. The
complicated part was his
ability to sustain old friend-
ships and work off them."
- Wilson might still be there
if it weren't for Inman "After
all the auditing, Wilson had
slipped through. Later, at
CIA, I asked the same ques-
tion: `Who is this guy?' Now
aren't going to be affected [by am Man for man, they're very
efforts to subvert them]. We gam"
have never consciously given Inman says he left the CIA
up on human intelligence because he had wearied of
there, but because it is so dif- government service but says
ficult to get things ;a -closed that he and Casey were in
society, we are forced to general agreement about the
spend great sums for tiny bits need to rebuild the agency.
of information. Soviet re- Casey whirled through the
search and development is place, made judgments and
hard to get at Economic quickly established a dialogue
with the White House. That
analysis is spotty. But even- could have taken months,"
tually they add up to some-,
significant. Inman says. "The woe king
"Our capabilities for de- relationship among the intel-
tecting major Soviet opera-' ligence agencies is the best it
tions outside its borders are has been in years. Casey's not
excellent. They are mostly interested in collecting turf." -
electronic, but we never un- Observers say Inman's and
derestimate the human cross- Casey's personalities did not
check. Our ability to follow
Soviet military activity day to'
their macroview. "They look
at the whole world. Other
than us and the Russians,
'they're the only country to do
hat everyone
wants to know, of
course, is whether
or not being a spy
is fun.
"Yea," says Inman, after
some deliberation, "as an in-
tellectual challenge, stringing
together fragments of data,
seeing how it affects policy
and tactical decisions. Occa-
sionally knowing that you
made a difference. You have
to be interested in events in
the outside world for it to ap-
peal to you. There are people
down in the trenches [at CIA
headquarters in Langley]
who have spent their lives
there ... an expert on some
port, for instance. You can't
reward them with money."
Smiley's people.
"The trade craft is still
humans dealing with
humans." ^
they have control built in. -
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE `0?
WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
4 December 1983
What to do when someone you meet at a cocktail party
ff
o
ers you a special guided tour of the Soviet Union
Phillip A. Parker, who is deputy
assistant director of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation for the intelli-
gence division, is one of the FBI's top
counterspies. This is an abridged
transcript of an interview conducted
by Lawrence Meyer, a staff writer for
The Washington Post Magazine.
Meyer: How many foreign spies
are there in Washington and in the
United States?
Parker. I can't give you an exact
amount. That is information we don't
give out
Q: Can you give me a rough num-
A It's
mean by foreign spies. Those who are
here operating against the interests of
the United States? They're the-ones
that we're interested in.
Q: Okay.
A: Looking at all of the countries
we put in that category, we've got
about 3,000 people. About a third of
those are involved in intelligence ac-
tivities here.
Q: Are you only interested in
pe .
pie from Eastern Bloc countries or
Eastern
Bloc countries?
A: Again, it's only those who are I
acting against the interests of the
United States.
Q. Which of the countries you're i
interested in has the most spies?
A. I think it's easy to see that, if
you look at the presence of those
countries who are hostile to the
United states and you look at their
size.
Sanitized Copy Approved
AN INTERVIEW BY LAWRENCE MEYER
Q: We're talking about the Soviet
Union?
A. Sure.
Q: Do you consider the Soviet
Union and the satellite countries to
be a unit in terms of their activities,
or are there distinctions among
them?
A. The KGB certainly has a great
influence on the services of the other
bloc countries.
Q: Within that group of countries
are there some that are more danger-
ous than others?
A I wouldn't say that
I think we should get on to what
you are talking about when you say
"spy" A spy is someone who is
trained in his country to go out and
collect information, as opposed to
someone who is recruited who then
becomes a -spy. A recruit is an agent
for a specific intelligence officer.
Q Do you find situations where
someone who has been trained in in-
telligence-gathering will come into
this country not representing himself
to be what he is-a Russian, for ex-
ample, but appearing to be English,
for example, with a British passport?
A. Yes, we have them. There's no
question about them coming in, but
to go into any further detail would be
impossible. I can't tell you.
Q. How serious is the problem now
of Soviets and other Eastern Bloc .
agents recruiting Americans who are
in industry to sell industrial secrets
that have some security component?
A. High tech is certainly a main
goal now. They're working very hard
on it. There has been such a damned
els, just in S computer chips, etc.-and-not
area there are h . Siv~ allo eyes
springing up all over the place. So yes,
that is probably one of the most fer-
tile fields as far as their recruiting of
Americans is concerned,
But I don't think they're having
great suds.
Q: Despite the fact that recently
there have been a few, well-publicized
cases of instances where they've been
able to secure information?
A: These instances get a lot of
publicity because of the money in-
volved, the damage that's done to the
companies. Notwithstanding these re-
cent cases, I wouldn't say they're hav-
in
g any more success than they've
had in the past
information. in ge8 classified
. Q: What are the most vulnerable
points in Washington, in terms of
places that they're interested in
penetrating for information)
A: There's a difference between
vulnerability and interest The Pen-
tagon certainly is a point of extreme
interest. It's probably one of the least
vulnerable because of the briefings
they (Pentagon officials] give their
people.
I think Capitol Hill is certainly a
high interest point Vulnerability is
very low because the people who are
involved in classified information are
briefed. They know what the prob-
lems are when someone from a hostile
area approaches them.
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Q. Can you give me a rough profile
of what the average Soviet agent
would be like in terms of age, marital
status, his life-style while he's here,
where he lives, etc.?
A: Age, anywhere from 25 to 45;
married, maybe a couple of kids.
Maybe one here in the US., one back
home going to school
Q: What would the agent's nomi-
nal job be?
A: Anything from an attache to a
counselor. It runs the gamut. One of
the first things that you would look at
would be [the diplomat who says],
,
"Don't call me at the embassy, the
people there don't speak English very
well and might not be able to get you
through to me. Don't come to the em-
bassy, don't come to my office."
Q: These are people who are his
contacts, taking him at face value?
A. This is a person you might meet
at a cocktail party one night. He gives
you his name and his overt position.
If he feels you might be able to give
him information he's looking for, hell
continue trying to meet you. Hell
take you out to lunch and develop
you over a period of time,
They have plenty of time. Theyll
stay here for three to four or five
years. The relationship develops.
He'll be asking you certain things
which may sound completely innocu-
ous. Your opinions on world trade, for
example. And if you've got access to
classified information, there will
eventually - be requests for help in
.some way. It's a patient, professional
development of a relationship. And if
he thinks you have needs that he
could fulfill such as money, travel to
the Soviet Union, any sort of favor
that he could do for you, he would do
it. Eventually he would expect some
sort of return for that.
Q. Let's say that I was interested
in going to the Soviet Union and I
had a position in some agency, one,
that might or might not be consid-
ered to have security-related infor-
mation, and I accepted a favor. I've
said, "Sure I'd love to go see the
Soviet Union." What would he do
then?
A: He would probably work out
some sort of exchange program so
that you could make the trip either
free or at very low expense. He might
even arrange to be over there when
you got there. Give you a beautifully
guided tour. Get you in to meet some
people you wouldn't normally meet.
Take you to places that people nor-
mally wouldn't get in to see. Do all
sorts -of favors for you there. And
show you a very good time.
Q. And during all of this, I am un-
aware that he really wants some-
thing from me?
A: He probably has received some-
thing of value from you whether you
thought it was of value or not. He was
tasked to get that information by the
center...
Q. The center?
A. The center is headquarters back
in Moscow.
Q. The KGB?
A. Any intelligence-gathering or-
ganization.
Q: Have I gotten permission from
my superiors to go over on this thing?
A: If you're dealing in classified in-
formation, you should have told your
employer that you were going. 'You
would be briefed by the security offi-
cer. You would be, depending on the
level, briefed and then debriefed on
your return.
Q. So I'm going. There is nothing
clandestine or secretive about my
trip. I'm really not a candidate for
extortion or blackmail if rue done all
this.
A. No, not at all. However, if he
finds that you have some particular
trait that he feels can be exploited in
the Soviet Union, there is a good pos-
sibility that they would try that. It
depends on the assessment of you
that he has developed over a period of
time. And they're going to look at it
and 'their psychologists examine his
write-ups on you and try to say where
the weak link is in this guy.
It doesn't have to be blackmail. If
they're going to use blaclanail such as
entrapment, sexual or alcohol-related
or whatever, that will be done over
there. They don't use that here.
That's not done in the States
2-,
when you get back, your feeling of ob-
ligation to this guy may have in-
creased. This has happened in the
past. And when that question is
asked, when he asks you for some-
thing classified or sensitive, that's
when 99.9 percent of American citi-
zens say this guy is up to no good and
they pick up the phone and call us. or
csll their security officer or whomev-
er. Its that one-tenth of I percent
that wind up going along.
Q You discourage people from
having those kinds of contacts and
accepting those kinds of favors from
Soviets for that reason.?
A. No, we don't discourage it. We
just want them to know what the
potential problems are.
Q: Getting back to the typical
agent while he's in this country. You
said before that he had to have a lot
of time. How do they spend a day?
Doing what?
A. You would probably see the guy
coming into his overt job, sitting
down for awhile and then disappear-
ing. He would go into an office, the
intelligence area within the embassy,
and sit down and do his reports.
Check up on his tasking from the cen-
ter and see what is needed. They
spend relatively little time with the
job they are ostensibly set up to do.
Q: That would be the cover job. Is
that a job where they have any real
responsibilities? "
A: Some do work or seem to be
very good at their overt job, their
cover jobs. Others don't even pretend
to take part in that job. They don't
have any contact with other diplo-
matic establishments.
Q. Where do they live? Do they
live in the compound or do they live
out in the community?
A. Both. We have them living
within the compound and also living
out on the economy.
Q: How can you spot a spy? And
are there women who are spies?
A: I can't answer either of those
Why not.2 questions. That would be going into
AProbably because they' can't how we conduct our investigations. If
control it as well. They don't have the I told you that, then it would change
capability of taking photographs of some of the things we look at.
you in bed with whomever over here. Q: Let's say that I was in counter-
They do in their own back yard. Nor- surveillance, and we were onto some-
mally though, this would be just ' a one whom we had identified as a spy.
-
routine trip. Nothing untoward takes How does that work?
? place. You have a great time. But
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A. okay. First thing: There ain't
no such thing as 8 to 4. We work half-
days, from 7 to .7. From either direc-
tion. Q: No overtime?
A: We do get some over. We get
what is called administratively un-
controllable overtime. You get com-
pensated extra for that amount. It
works out to about $2 an hour or
something.
We try to use as many. investigative
techniques as possible. And I really
can't get into how we do that. I un-
derstand the interest in the question
and I'm sure some of the hostile offi-
cers that we're investigating would
like to know, too. ^
3
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ne hundred thirty-
seven miles above
Brest, on the Russian
ARTICLE AppD
,ON PACE
4 December 1983
WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
S
BY LAWRENCE MEYER Or, if speed and not clarity
is the first priority, the KHII
Lawrence Meyer is a staff f can send back information
writer for The Magazine. that can be translated into
border with Poland, T Until the middle of
floats a satellite the the lath ronti?v
size of a ous. it VAMM 4 GdLu- I spying had a per-
era with an extraordinary spot ....et;r., If 1..0
an
nter rise at
e
rected to present sweeping -
depended
or to focus on a epended on putting a
detail Let's suppose that' man (or woman) in
now the satellite, a a ular particular place at a partic-
right KH11, or "Keyhole," has time.
been directed to send back All that changed with the
invention of
on a Soviet troop f the camera and
buildup. Precisely speaking, the. harnessing of electricity,
two developments that have
i
i
'
tt
ng
t transm
the satellite isn
made picture but numbers, in the e human spies not only
form of electronic impulses, unnecessary in many cases
which are relayed to a coin- but also useless in others, In
the age
puter. The computer then of instantaneous
satellite communication and
translates those numbers
high
back into electronic impulses - resolution, radio - re-
back into be projected on a mote - controlled cameras,
that
James
screen as a picture ames Bond has had to move
The computer can also corn- ! over h i ts, make rooersor. anthe
d
rte for atmospheric computer programmers
co who
conditions, movement and ., are on the cutting edge of
poor light to produce a Pic- modem espionage. At the
ture clearer than what the moment, the quintessence in
camera originally saw. How ' moment, the n it the ening
clear? Certainly clear enough reconnaissance satellite al-
to read the numbers painted ways up there, watching , with
on asphalt in a parking lot. eyes that can see in the dark,
Clear enough, some say, to listening to sounds the ear
distinguish between the
cannot of Iranian mullahs' ,py satellites have their
beards (allowing identifica- own mythology. The subject
tion of them) or to read the is so sensitive that an official
license number of a Politburo of the Central Intelligence
mer6er.'s sedan. Not clear Agency declined to discuss
enough, -despite what some the capabilities of intelligence
say, to read the headlines in satellites or even to officially
Pravda while Ivan stands in a acknowledge their existence.
line in Red Square.
Nevertheless, the United _photographs in a matter of
States does have a variety of minutes, hours or days 7n
spy satellites in space at any place of film, the camera uses
moment, part of the esti- I millions of light-sensitive
mated 4,500 now circling the diodes that translate the in-
earth. tensity of light they receive
America's most significant into numerical impulses sev-
satellite is the. KH11, which , eral times a second. These
weighs about 14 tons, is 40 or impulses are then transmit-
ted back to Earth either di-
50 feet long and about 10 feet rectly or through a relay
in diameter. Keyhole satel- satellite and then fed into a
1Etas stay up for about two computer. Each of the 4 mil-
years and are believed to be,
1capable of both visual and lion impulses is then con-
electronic surveillance, mak- verted back into light and
ing pictures of ground ac- Projected in separate ele-
tivity as well as interce pting
and forwarding electronic sig-
nals picked up in outer space.
The KH11 has a camera
with a focal length of 20 feet
or more (which does not
mean that the lens is that
long. It's done-literally-
with mirrors.) A 20-foot focal
length gives roughly 120
times greater magnification
than the 50mm lens that is
standard with many 35mm
cameras. The satellite can be
directed to a particular loca-
tion, and the camera can be
instructed to record particu-
lar views-either wide-angle
or close-up. The image can be
recorded on film, processed
on board the satellite and
sent back to Earth in a tiny
reentry vehicle either for a
midair rendezvous with an
Air Force plane or to be
picked up by a Navy ship.
ments called pixels on a video
display tube to create some-
thing like a commercial tele-
vision picture, but much
sharper in focus and defini-
tion.
Sound can also be used to
produce photographs. That is
the principle behind syn-
thetic aperture imaging
radar, which transmits sound
waves from an airplane or
satellite to the ground. The
variation in intensity of the
reflected waves can, when fed
into a computer, produce a
I picture of the Earth below.
Details of this picture can be
read by an expert in much
.CONTINUEQ
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the same way that a radiolo-
gist can read an X-ray. The
advantage of synthetic aper.
ture imaging radar is that it
can operate regardless of
Lighting conditions, although
moisture and radar reflective
material can frustrate radar
imaging.
Surveillance from outer
space is only half the game.
The increasing use of micro-
wave communication, which
sends extremely high fre-
quency radio waves between
two points, has increased the
possibility for satellite inter- '
ception. The reason is simple.
Microwave transmissions
move in a straight line and
don't stop at the point of re-
ception on the ground. They
continue traveling out into
space where they can be
picked up by electronic intel-
ligence satellites, which can
then relay the transmissions
back to a ground station for
recording, deciphering if nec-
essary and analysis.
The Watergate break.
in introduced the
American citizenry
to the rituals and
practice of wiretap-
ping and bugging. But unpro-
tected conversations carried
by microwave--and that is a
large_-percentage of. long-dis-
tance as well as local tele-
phone calls--can be inter-
cepted without putting any-
thing on a line. Microwave
transmissions move
unimpeded through the air,
capable of ground reception
by anyone with the right
equipment (which is com-
mercially available) and the
right location (in the line of
transmission).
Realizing the vulnerability
of telephone calls to intercep-
tion, the FBI has embarked
` upon a campaign within the
federal government to make
phone conversations secure.
The problem - is serious
enough that Genera] Tele-
intercepted by a competitor, mission of any impulses.
who used the technical data "Thy rooms cost $10,000 to
to formulate his own position, $20,000 and who wants to
armed with the knowledge of spend all day in a metal
what the unsuspecting Texas room," said one expert, who
firm was doing. As a result, did not wish to be identified
the Texas firm narrowly lost The next best solution is to
several hacontracts t was habefore real- j mencase etal dea~md equipment t itself in
izing happening.
Nye (who sells only advice The electronic age not only
and not equipment) advises has increased the vulnerabil-
clients, including nonsecurity itY of communications to es-
agencies of the federal gov- Pionage, but has also pro-
ernment, to purchase en- vided a new target for spies:
phone & Electronics Corp. which, in turn, transmitted quency interference would be
and the federal government its negotiating position back to work 'in a completely
have made a film demon- to its representative in Alas- metal-encased room that is
strafing the ease with which ka. The transmissions were grounded to prevent trans-
phone conversations can be
intercepted. In one scene, a
simple panel truck, loaded
with electronic gear, positions
itself in line with what ap-
pears to be a private compa-
ny's microwave transmitter,
locates the frequency that the
company is transmitting on
and records the conversa-
tions.
The electronic age of
spying has more than one
Achilles heeL J. Michael Nye,
a security consultant for gov-
ernment and private industry
who has studied the question
_ for the U.S. government, con.
tends that vast amounts of
information that ought to be
classified-including govern-
ment crop forecasts, financial
information and internal re-
ports on organized crime in-
vestigations-are being
transmitted in a way that
makes that data available to
unauthorized recipients- who.
might still find it useful. The
information can, in some in-
stances, be intercepted ille-
gally by simply fording the
telephone closet in the build-
ing where the information is
being sent or received; locat-
ing the wires over which the
information is being trans-
mitted; placing "alligator
clips" on those wires and at-
taching them to a - wireless
microphone (also commer-
cially available); and setting
up a listening post a few
blocks away to record the
transmissions.
Private industry as well as
the government is vulnerable.
Nye cited the case of a Texas
firm that spent large sums of
money to research oil reserves
on Alaska's North Slope. The
data gathered in Alaska were
transmitted back to the firm,
crypting and other devices to
make the information they
transmit more secure. But
even when encryption is used
to code the message, elec-
tronic communications
equipment-electric type-
writers, computers, word pro-
cessors, printers and even cal-
culators-are susceptible to
electronic eavesdropping
without any kind of physical
intrusion into the place where
they are located. According to
an electrical engineer who'
works in the security field,
"Any piece of electronics that
operates radiates informa-
tion." The letter a secretary
types on an electric type-
writer can be.simultaneously
reproduced in another room,
floor or building by a spy who
has the right equipment
Every time an electric type-
writer key is struck, the ma-
chine gives off an electronic.
impulse (known as radio fre-
quency interference). The
same holds true for comput-
ers, word processors, electric:
printers and even calculators.
This phenomenon, known in
the intelligence community
as "Tempest," allows a SPY
with the right equipment to
monitor those distinctive im-
pulses and translate them
back into the original letters
or numbers. .
A multimillion-dollar in-
dustry has grown up around
Tempest. The most complete
protection against radio fre-
electronic hardware and soft-
ware. "Spies" in the elec-
tronic age can be representa-
tives of foreign companies as
well as of governments trying
to get technical or trade se-
crets to use to their advan-
tage. The Soviets, as well as
other Eastern Bloc countries,
are particularly interested in
obtaining technological
know-how that they are
denied by American law.
n the Byzantine world of
espionage and cotmterin-
telligence, the capabilities
of one side's technology
are of vital interest to the
other. In 1978, a former low-
level CIA clerk was arrested
and convicted of selling a
technical manual for the
KH11 to the Soviets.
The former clerk, William
Kampiles, sold the manual to
the Soviets for $3,000. Ac-
cording to one source, the
Soviets, prior to obtaining the
manual, "had not noticed
what the function of that
satellite was. The Soviets
didn't understand the func-
tion of that system. They
were leaving things in the
open." Prior to the loss of the
manual, this source said,
American intelligence was
able to see "real time," that
is, actual pictures of Soviet
activity, rather than having
to draw inferences from vis-
ible evidence left after the
fact The loss of the KH11
manual was described at the
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time as "irreparable." This
source, asked to evaluate the
damage done to American in-
telligence, described it as
"devastating."
The Kampiles case was
closely studied at the time by
congressional committees
concerned about what ap-
peared to be lax security ar-
rangements at the CIA. But
the; case also demonstrated
something else. No matter
how sophisticated the tech-
nology, how superior its capa-
bilities are to humans', the
system is still vulnerable to
the flesh-and-blood spy on
the ground. Loose lips can
still sink ships.
This pair of photographs illustrates state-of-the-art
computer technology that can convert barely visibile
information in a photograph into easily seen, detailed
images. A similar technology is probably utilized to
create highly detailed photographs from images
gathered by the cameras aboard spy satellites.
3
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A similar process was employed in the deblurring shown in this pair of photographs. The camera
was in motion when the photo at left was snapped. A computer program estimated how fast the
camera was moving and corrected for it, creating the enhanced image shown at right.
The ultimate spy technology is in your mind
The heart and soul of modern espionage is the computer,
which can store vast amounts of information, sort through
what it knows in fractions of a second, absorb huge quanti.
ties of data and make the right decision in an instant.
Because of the huge volume of communications traffic
that intelligence organizations attempt to monitor, anything-
that can help them separate the wheat from the chaff has a
strong appeal. During the Iranian hostage crisis, Verbex, a
Massachusetts-based research and development firm was
contacted by a government agency wanting to know if com-
puters could be programmed to recognize the word "hos-
tage," when spoken in eight languages in any of the thou-
sands of worldwide electronic conversations American intel-
ligence is monitoring every minute. The answer then was
"No." The answer now would be a qualified "Yes," but it
takes about six months to do the work necessary for a com-
puter to have the capability to recognize a particular word.
Because the focus of intelligence interests can change daily,'
however, the practical application of this technology is still
limited.
A fundamental problem of computers- or rather for per-
sons working with computers-is mastering the language.
William 0. Baker, former president of Bell- Laboratories
and an adviser to the National Security Agency, observes
that humans think in natural language and therefore can't
be sure that thoughts are being -properly translated when
they are converted into language the computer can use.
Baker adds, "We look forward to the time when you'll be
able to put in rather simple words and, of course, numbers
-the things you want to be worked over-and the program
of the machine, the logic and memory of the machine will
then respond."
Although Baker, for one, does not think that it will be im-
possible to keep secrets in the future, he does say it will be-
come increasingly difficult. "The demands of society for
rapid communication, for rapid interchange of knowledge
... will become so compelling and the breadth of informa-
tion-through the media largely-is going to be so broad
that secrecy will no longer play the compelling part that it
used to. The reason is that somebody will find this out some
other way, so why should a government go through a lot of
trouble, or a corporation, to seek secrecy when the whole
flood of knowledge is so great around the world that some-
body will get it some other way anyhow?"
What is the ultimate imaginable espionage technology in
Baker's opinion? "Telepathy." ^
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I
ARTICLE A?
On PAGE
.BT LEE MICBUEL IUTZ
Lee Michael Katza last arti-
cle for -The Magazine con-
cerned an inventor who envi-
sions self-cleaning clothing.
SEARCHING FOR THE
SPIES.OF- M
TO ORR
mong the 500 college
men and women with
firm handshakes at
the "Challenge ~'8~/"
job fair, D. J. Em-
manuelron, a 20-year-old eco-
noraics and French major
from Washington and Lee
University wearing a blue suit
and a "yes, ma'am" demean-
or, was a hot prospect for re-
Miter Cecelia Velar Walker.
She was spending a tiring
morning in Lynchburg, Va.,
170 miles from her home of-
fice, fielding questions from
waves of ultrapreppie stu-
dents who knew virtually no-
thing about her firm except
that - it was hiring. When
young D. J. (Dwight Jr.)
stuck out his hand, Walker,
who works for a powerful in-
ternational firm known sim-
ply as "The Company," broke
into the guarded smile of a
major league baseball scout
who has discovered -a young
Fernando Valenzuela in a
sandlot baseball game.
Twelve years ago, Walker
was a Pittsburgh secretary.
Then a recruiter plucked her
away to suburban Virginia
with promises of a career she
has never regretted. D. J.
'Emmauelson now ap-
proached her with a delicious
list of analytical and language
skills, and she didn't want
him to get away. "You in all
probability would make a
great candidate for our career
training " Walker
burbled. program," h anytime.
Collect.
At a small table between ' Healthy young man or
the C&P Telephone Co. and woman to devote his/her life
the: Colonial Williamsburg to secret agency for govern-
Foundation, Walker-who is meat wage scale, No experi-
attractive, middle-aged and once necessary: we provide up
refused to permit her photo- to two years of paid training.
graph to be taken-sat under Foreign language aptitude a
a "Central Intelligence Age- : plug overseas living ezperi-
cy" signpost searching for the mce desirable.
spies of tomorrow. Trying to': 'Must have good sales per-
downplay the James ; Bont1.; . sonality to talk foreign na-
stereotype, sbe.monotoiamaks into betraying their
repeated a standard speech e uII y. Flexible enough to
designed to cut off the ques- arm a wide range of people,
Split
tions about karate training; tial in order to cork ten"
"We are an overseas ntelli- order to work 'cover'
gence-gathering agency . lob. Applicants must-he abeo-
Although
s last with tionqg
a fraternity highly patriotic "es .~
dangerb was.
toga party that lasted until 4 of final orders.
a.m., he thought: the CIA "You must be willing to
relocate to Washington for
"might be a lot of fun. I think training and spend 70 per-
there's a lot of subversion and cent of your time in random
things going on in other coun- overseas posts throughout the
tries." workL Some danger, but
In the pragmatic 1980x, mostly lots of paper work. Be
CIA recruiters are welcomed prepared to be secretly evalu-
with open arms on college ated during training . and
throughout
your entire ca-
puses. They offer coveted
jobs that start in the $20,000 reer. You will receive no
range, and no-one asks ques- recognition outside the com-
tions about the overthrow of ley for your work. No mar-
governments in ;hike g majors or 407 types.
WASHINGTON POST MAGAZI
4 December 1983
-Forget the John Ie Came
ecording to intelli- novels.
gence sources, a "If this sounds like a good
realistic CIA intelli- career opporhInIty, write
gence officer want ad Central Intelligence Agency,
could read some- Washington, D.C. All appli-
thing bike: "Help Wanted: cants are subject to an exten-
sive badtgrouna mvestigation.
and will be required to take a
lie detector test on such sub-
jects as whether they have
ever used drugs or if they
have had a homosexual ex-
erience. The CIA is an equal
opportunity employer."
The CIA's own solicita-
tions in pamphletaand care-
fully worded advertisements
simply refer to "challenge
and opporumity" abroad.
As far as real-life spooks'
are concerned, James Bond
can keep his Aston-Martin.
He's in British intelligence
anyway. While saluting
American spies who perform
such heroic mtoligenee-gath- -
Bring Acts in hostile terrain as
`dying tiny airplanes in bad
weather and landing On a
strip the size of a postage
stamp, ' former CIA director
Wrih'am Colby emphasized
intelligence life does not imi-
tatethe movies.
"The American intelli-
gence officer does not leap
over the wall of the Kremlin
and vault into the Politburo's
headquarters," explained
Colby. "He finds a Soviet
citizen and convinces him it's
in the best interests of his
country and mankind" to dis-
creetly pass Soviet secrets to
the .encans.
After talking with, Colby
and other intelligence hands,
one could conclude the ideal
,officer would possess the ac-
quisitive skills of John D.
Rockefeller, the fatherly
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is age of Marcus Welby, the
psychological insights of Sig-
mund Freud and, above all,
the persuasiveness of Dale
hum," notes the ex- , getting the
foreign agent used to providing infor-
rnation that is dental to his own
country's interests for a fee
.
Carnegie. "It's what a good A capable spy must Inspire _
salesman does, a good father dente. "There has to be avery toss
does and a good technician -ing relationsW to age nervous
does," seid Colby. "All those traitors, says the former CiA man.
human qualities" are vital to Sometuaes, officers get so dose to
information collecting. their. agents they are said to be "in
"If you want to be exact," love" with them. This could tam out
said Ed Harris, a retired 31-- to be a bit tricky if there actually is a
year CIA veteran, "it's being double operation and his agent toe
a gbod spy master." The out to be a foreign spy the
American overseas officer is United States bogus infiormation. "An
the manager of a team of intelligence officer is coostauitIly as-
local spies who are the real seeing his agents," am the framer
agents "He has to be a good spy, who wowed under deep one in
assessor and manipulator of spats from Bnaril to Japan. "A good
people," Harris pointed out.
" F s outright re- distance maintain a obje~c-
oreign agents tivity as possz'ble" when Avorting
are cleared in advance back to the home office in Mg-Tam
through CIA headquarters in "He's where the scbjzophrenia
McLean. Most of them are develops," said the ex-agent. "Soine-
paid in cash by the coord'mat- one who wears his feelings on his
ing American spy, preferably sleeve might find it difficult to main-
throughindirect methods tain a Jekyll and Hyde re ationship."
are not in currency. An The stereotypical CIA offioc is
American intelligence doer an Ivy legg