SCHOLASTIC UPDATE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 4, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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4e
STAT
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T E A C H E R S' E D I T I O N
APRIL 4, 1986 ? VOL. 118, NO. 15 (ISSN 0745-7065)
Cover of Student Edition:
New Worries for America's Secret
Agencies"
CONTENTS
ABOUT THIS ISSUE
The press called 1985 "The Year of the Spy." It was a slight misnomer-the
Justice Department made fewer espionage arrests in 1985 (11) than in 1984
(14). Still, the arrest trends are encouraging-or ominous, depending on your
point of view. "If you catch a lot of spies," CIA chief William Casey says in this
issue's UPDATE interview, "that can show that your intelligence service is bad.
And if you don't catch any, that can show it's bad, too."
The Director jests. Clearly, he is nothing but proud of the intelligence commu-
nity he heads. He has reason to be. As he points out, governments around the
world have arrested or deported hundreds of Soviet and East European spies over
the past 12 months. Accurate intelligence has permitted the U.S. to thwart scores
of terrorist actions. And morale is high at the CIA, the government's fastest-
growing agency, which is striving for higher levels of professional analysis.
Nonetheless, controversy swirls as furiously as ever about the nation's secret
agencies. One reason is surely the average American's healthy distrust of secrecy
among public servants. Another reason is the dissatisfaction many citizens feel
over some of the CIA's covert actions, past and present.
UPDATE's editors have designed this issue to acquaint your students with
these controversies and with the way the intelligence community works. The
package of articles, interviews, and charts, assembled by Associate Editor David
Goddy, is unique. Like other issues of UPDATE, this one provides a classroom
service that you can find nowhere else. -The Editors
"Spy Chief William Casey Looks at the Secrets Trade"
(Interview): The need to beef up U.S. intelligence ... 10
"Spies and Counterspies: 210 Years of Controversy"
(History): Shifts in public attitudes ....................... 12
"Ten Whose Top Concern Is the Nation's Security"
(Shapers): Profiles of intelligence insiders .............. 15
"Soviets Agents Seek High-Tech Secrets" (Economics):
For the Soviets, crime pays ................................ 17
"How the Soviet Union Spies on the World" (World):
Inside the KGB and its military arm, the GPU ......... 18
"New Force in Espionage: Greed Replaces Ideals" (So-
ciology): Why spies spy .................................... 20
"A Counterspy's Codebook" (Wordpower):......... 22
"Pre-Test" (T-2), "Post-Test" (T-7), "Skills" (T-8)
"Spy War Scoreboard" (DataBank): Charts and graphs
on U.S. intelligence ........................................... 2
"Tae Need for Secrecy in an Open Society" (Over-
view): The need for oversight follows ...................... 3
Special Report: The U.S. Intelligence Community
"Twelve Agencies That Take the World's Pulse":
Introduction, organization chart ............................. 4
"The Secrets Chasers": Central Intelligence Agency 5
"The Eavesdroppers": National Security Agency .. 6
"The Spy-Catchers": The FBI ......................... 7
"Lawmakers vs. the CIA on Covert Operations": 8
Sept. 6
Sept. 20
Od.4
Oct. 18
Nov.1
Nov. 15
Nov. 29
Dec. 13
Jan. 10
Jan. 24
Feb. 7
Feb. 21
Mar. 7
Mar. 21
Apr. 4
Apr. 18
May 2
May 16
ISSUE DATES FOR THIS YEAR
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SCHOLASTIC UPDATE PRE-TEST
(Use with this week's UPDATE on the U. S. Intelligence Community)
The U.S. Intelligence Community:
Uncovering the "Secrets" of Other Nations
"...Intelligence [about foreign affairs] remains a vexing and complicated affair
simply because it is not altogether clear whether the American people and their
political elite have decided that they really need and want a secret intelligence
service.
"Certainly, accurate and detailed information is desired about the state of the
world in general and intentions of potential antagonists in particular. But there is
often reluctance to provide the conditions in which a service of this kind can
function effectively. This refers above all to the issue of secrecy: offical secrecy
runs against the American grain and is believed to be a threat to the American
way of life, particularly as embodied in the Bill of Rights."
- Walter Laqueur in A World of Secrets (italics added)
General Directions: On the line to the left of
each statement, write the letter of the choice
that best completes the statement or an-
swers the question.
A. U. S. INTELLIGENCE
Base your answers on the excerpt above.
- 1. The term political elite refers to U.S.
political (a) parties; (b) journalists; (c) lead-
ers.
2. The author suggests that the Bill of
Rights (a) contains ideals of the American
way of life; (c) protects official secrecy; (b)
opposes official secrecy.
- 3. The italicized sentence in the passage
means that some Americans (a) aren't inter-
ested in what other nations are doing; (b)
have mixed feelings about using secrecy to
gather information about others; (c) don't
want to pay the costs of intelligence-gather-
ing efforts.
B. TRUE (T) OR FALSE (F)?
- 1. The head of the CIA is
the President's Cabinet.
a member of
__ 2. The head of the CIA also oversees all
other U.S. intelligence agencies.
- 3. By law, the CIA must make public its
annual budget.
- 4. The CIA today is one of the fastest-
growing federal agencies.
- 5. The present-day CIA was formed by
President John F. Kennedy's Administration
(1961-63).
C. MATCH 'EM!
Column A
a. counterintelligence
b. covert operation
c. mole
d. SIGINT
e. cryptology
f. cover
g. ferret
Column B
- 1. intelligence
means
- 2. an agent who
before spying
collected by technical
up
long
- 3. an activity sponsored by a government,
but not done in its name
- 4. the study of secret codes
- 5. spying to uncover spies
D. IN OR OUT?
Check (,/) each department that is NOT
part of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
- 1. Department of Energy
- 2. Department of Agriculture
- 3. Department of State
- 4. Naval Intelligence
- 5. Department of the Treasury
- 6. Department of the Interior
E. WRITE IT!
On the back of this paper, write a para-
graph explaining why you agree OR disagree
with the last sentence of the excerpt at the
top of this page.
The Teachers' Edition of Scholastic Update (ISSN 0745-7065: in Canada, 2-c no 9226) is published biweekly during the school year. 18 issues, by Scholastic Inc. 730 Broadway, New York, NY 10003-9538 for $19.00 per year. Second-class
postage paid at Monroe, OH 45050-9998 and at additional mailing offices POSTMASTERS: Send notice of address changes to Office of Publication, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Box 2700, 351 Garver Rd., Monroe, OH 45050-2700. Each
Teachers' Edition includes a copy of the student edition and is supplied at no extra cost n, each teacher subscribing as follows: 10-39 subscriptions. I copy. 40-69, 2 copies: 70-99, 3 copies: 100-129, 4 copies: I extra copy for each 30 additional
subscriptions. Communications relating to subscriptions should be addressed to SCHOLASTIC UPDATE. PO. Box 644, Lyndhurst, NJ 07071-9985. Canadian address: Scholastic-TAB Publications. Ltd.. Richmond Hill, Ontario L4C 3G5. Listed
in Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. Available on microfilm through Xerox University Microfilms, Inc. 300 N Zeeb Rd , Ann Arbor, MI 48106 Also available on microfiche through Bell & Howell Micro Photo Division, Old Mansfield
Rd . Wooster. OH 44691. Printed in U.S.A Copynght ? 1986 by Scholastic Inc. All Rights Reserved. Material in this issue may not be reproduced in whole or in part in any form or format without special permission from the publisher.
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LESSON 1
Special Report: The U.S. Intelligence Community
Content (Special Report, pages 4-7)
A unique, in-depth look at U.S. intel-
ligence agencies. With growing staffs
and budgets and an increasing influ-
ence on U.S. policymaking, they
leave some observers uneasy about
their covert operations.
Objectives. With this feature, you can
ask students to (I) identify the sepa-
rate roles of the CIA, NSA, FBI,
NRO, and other intelligence agencies;
(2) give examples of open and covert
intelligence-gathering operations; (3)
evaluate the need for and the impact
of covert activities by U.S. agencies.
Introduction. 1. Ask students to
complete the following statement in
their own words: Most workers in
the field of intelligence spend their
time -."
As students compare and discuss
answers, help them to identify any
"James Bond" stereotypes they may
have. You might want to tell students
that, in the 1980s, most intelligence
workers spend their time processing
and analyzing data. UPDATE's Spe-
cial Report explains this work.
2. See the Pre-Test on page TE-2.
Questions to Guide Reading. 1.
Why does the U.S. have several intel-
ligence divisions'? 2. Who controls
what our spies do in secret?
Diagram-Reading Activity. Display
the Poster on the U.S. Intelligence
Community in this week's Teachers'
Edition (pages TE-4 and TE-5). At the
same time, have students examine a
similar diagram on page 4 of their
Student Edition.
Sample questions for reviewing the
basic elements of the diagram:
1. What branch of the government
runs U.S. intelligence operations?
(Executive)
2. Apart from the President, who has
the highest post in U.S. intelligence?
(Director of Central Intelligence)
3. How many Cabinet departments are
directly involved in U.S. intelligence?
(State, Defense, Treasury, and Ener-
gy)
4. What does the makeup of the intel-
ligence community reveal about na-
tional security priorities? (Encourage
students to draw inferences based on
the departments and branches repre-
sented.)
Guided Reading Activity. Students
not previously familiar with the work
of the National Security Agency
should find the following questions a
guide to the article about the NSA:
a. What event in the 1980s revealed
the type of work done by the NSA?
(Soviet downing of the Korean Air-
lines jet)
b. What three jobs were given to the
NSA in 1952? (To intercept and de-
code foreign communications, to pro-
tect U.S. codes and communications,
to protect U.S. computers from tam-
pering)
LESSON 2
210 Years of Controversy; and an Interview with
CIA Director William J. Casey
Content (History, pages 12-14; plus
Interview, 10-11). It took a long time
for the U.S. to accept the need for
government spies. DCI William Casey
tells UPDATE readers why spies are
needed today.
Objectives. With these features, you
can ask students to (1) trace the major
steps in the development of America's
intelligence system; (2) evaluate argu-
ments for increased secrecy surround-
ing U.S. intelligence operations.
Introduction. Take a "YES-NO"
poll of students. Should U.S. intelli-
gence chiefs, reporting to no one else
but the President, be allowed to:
a. Plan a secret invasion of a Commu-
nist nation?
c. How was the NSA involved in the
Falklands Islands war in 1982? (NSA
broke Argentina's code)
d. Why is NSA Director William
Odom sometimes called the most
powerful U.S. intelligence chief?
(Distribution and size of staff and
budget)
e. What worries non-government crit-
ics of the NSA? (NSA's ability to
eavesdrop on phone calls)
f. Why do some government experts
worry about the NSA? (NSA has diffi-
culty in analyzing all data that it col-
lects)
Discussion Activity. To help students
integrate the contents of the individual
articles in the Special Report, suggest
that they skim each article for material
on ONE of the following themes.
Modern Technology in U.S. Intelli-
gence
Covert Activities and the "Cloak"
of Secrecy
After checking the data they consid-
er significant, discuss some basic is-
sues implicit in this material: (1) Does
modern technology cause as many
problems for U.S. intelligence-gather-
ers as it solves? (2) Should covert
intelligence-gathering be more regu-
lated than it is? (Can it be more regu-
lated?)
Evaluation. Ask each student to
RATE EACH of the following aspects
of intelligence-gathering on a scale of
I (GREAT JOB) to 4 (AWFUL JOB).
Conclude by discussing trends in stu-
dents' ratings.
Covert operations abroad
Secret intelligence-gathering abroad
Code-breaking
Intelligence analysis
b. Take part secretly in a plot to over-
throw the head of a Marxist state'?
c. Give military and economic aid to
rebels fighting a pro-communist gov-
ernment?
d. Infiltrate an enemy nation to learn
its military plans?
Students who answer "YES" to a,
b, and c, will probably point to the
labels "Communist" and "Marxist"
in justifying their answers. But focus
their attention, too, on the notion of
these agencies reporting to no one but
the Executive Branch.
Ask: Is Executive oversight of spy-
(Please turn to page TE-6)
APRIL 4, 1986 ^ TEACHERS' EDITION/3
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THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUN
T he United States intelli
-
gence community has
12 main parts, all shown on
this chart. As the arrows in-
dicate, information-the life-
blood of intelligence-flows
two ways. The U.S. Presi-
dent and other top policy-
makers request data from
the agencies, which send
back reports and briefings.
The 200,000 people who
work for these agencies
share one goal. They pro-
vide U.S. policymakers with
"information about the ca-
pabilities, intentions, and
activities of foreign powers,
organizations, or persons
and their agents," according
to a 1981 executive order.
The National Security
Council (NSC), an advisory
group, meets with the Presi-
dent to hammer out U.S.
positions on urgent matters.
The Director of Central In-
telligence (DCI), who coor-
dinates all intelligence activ-
ities, speaks for the entire
intelligence community at
NSC meetings.
The Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI), the intelli-
gence community's sole
law-enforcement agency,
combats other nations' espi-
onage efforts inside the
U.S.-a task the CIA per-
forms abroad. Various exec-
utive departments collect in-
AGENCIES OF THE U. S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Responsible for "signals intelli-
gence"-intercepting communications,
breaking foreign codes. Protects secu-
Top-li
urger
rity of U.S. communications.
Reconnaissance agency that deploys
and manages U.S. spy satellites.
(DCI)
Presid
telligei
Nation
whose:
ous in-
Collects, produces, coordinates military
intelligence.
ill
'o gyn. v
telligence that helps them I
do their lobs.
Ili
Conde
cover
alyze:
graph
techn~
tellige
speci;
terint(
in co(
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CIA CHIEF
WILLIAM CASEY
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Four years
of great
performances
will win you
the ultimate
Academyaward.
It's demanding. It's grueling.
There's no tougher way to earn a degree than
at the Air Force Academy.
For four years, we insist you perform at
your best. In everything from academics to
athletics.
Only the best people making their best
efforts will do. (In fact, most of our
people are medically qualified for pilot
training.)
Obviously, not everyone can make it. But the
rewards are enormous for those who can.
Here's what the Academy provides:
Tuition, room and board. Medical and dental
care. An allowance for uniforms, textbooks and
incidental expenses.
Even a monthly pay allotment for personal use
that increases as you advance in class.
Best of all, after four years of discipline, effort
and commitment, you win this gold bar. The bar that
distinguishes you as an officer in the United States Air
Force. The ultimate Academy award.
So if you're a high school junior and have what it takes
to perform at your best, go a degree better at the Air
Force Academy.
To find out more, call us toll free at 1-800-423-USAF
(in California 1-800-232-USAF). Or ask your high
school counselor about application procedures.
AIR FORCE ACADEMY AIM HIGH
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New Worries
for
America 's
Secret
Agencies
The FBI seized this computer equip-
ment just hours before it was to be
passed to Soviet buyers. Keeping Sovi-
ets from U.S. technological secrets is a
major focus of U.S. counterintelligence.
Editor of this issue: David Goddy
Cover illustration by Mark Fresh
UPI)ATE?
April 4, 1986 ^ Vol. 118, No. 15
2 DataBank: Spy War Scoreboard
Charts and graphs explain why it's hard for the U.S. to keep secrets, where
U.S. spies are most likely to snoop, and what U.S. intelligence agencies do.
3 The Need for Secrecy in an Open Society
Few Americans dispute the need for secret agencies. Yet most insist on
safeguards to keep secret agencies from going their own way.
Special Report: The U.S. Intelligence Community
4 Twelve Agencies That Take the World's Pulse
An introduction to the U.S. espionage establishment.
5 The Secrets Chasers
The agents and analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency.
6 The Eavesdroppers
The code-breakers at the National Security Agency.
7 The Spy-Catchers
The counterspies at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
8 Lawmakers vs. the CIA on Covert Operations
How Congressional committees oversee the intelligence community.
10 Spy Chief William Casey Looks at the Secrets Trade
In an exclusive UPDATE interview, the Director of Central Intelligence
explains why stepped-up efforts to counter Soviet espionage are a must.
12 Spies and Counterspies: 210 Years of Controversy
The history of espionage in the U.S., from 1776 to 1986, reveals some radical
shifts in public attitudes about spying.
15 Ten Whose Top Concern Is the Nation's Security
Profiles of insiders who know as much as anyone about how the U.S.
intelligence community works, and why the nation's safety depends on it.
17 Soviets Agents Seek High-Tech Secrets
The Soviets are masters at industrial espionage, which enables them to save
enormous amounts on the research and development of new technologies.
18 How the Soviet Union Spies on the World
Soviet leaders command a worldwide spy network to steal foreign secrets and
crush dissent at home. Its driving force: deep suspicion-of everyone.
20 New Force in Espionage: Greed Replaces Ideals
Spies-in the U.S. and in Communist bloc nations-rarely act out of ideologi-
cal reasons anymore, experts say. Cash and threats are the new motivators.
22 A Counterspy's Codebook
A glossary to help you tell a mole from a ferret and HUMINT from SIGINT.
NEXT TIME (April 18): "South Asia: India and Her Neighbors." From
Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, the Indian subcontinent is embroiled in conflict. How
does the region's history shape its present problems? What is the U.S. role in the
area today? Why must India's prime minister walk a tightrope to keep peace in his
nation? Look for answers in UPDATE's survey of "the other Asia."
Maurice R. Robinson, founder of Scholastic Inc., 1895-1982
EDITORIAL s Eric Oatman, Editors Peter M. Jones, David Goddy. Mann Christopher, Associate Editors s Patricia Issas, Art Editor as Sonia Kane, Production Editor s
Elnora Bode, Chief Photo Editor s Deborah Thompson, Photo Researcher ? Anthony Wayne Smith. Special Consultant s Patricia Conniffe, Teaching Guide Editor s
ADMINISTRATION s Dale Moyer, Editorial Design Director s Jane Fli.gel, Production Directors Lucy Evankow, Chief Librarian s Scott Trelmel, Permissions
SCHOLASTIC UPDATE (ISSN 0745-7065; in Canada, 2-c. no. 9226) Is published biweekly during the school year. IS issues, by Scholastic Inc., 730 Broadway. New York. NY 10003-9538 for 84.95 per year.
82.97 per semester, for 10 or more subscriptions to the same address; 1-9 subscriptions, each: 88.00student, 819 Teachers' Edition, per school year. Single copy: 81.00 student. 82.25 Teachers'; special issue:
81.75 student, 83.00 Teachers'. Second-class postage paid at Monroe, Oh 45050-9998 and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTERS: Sand notice of addraas chasers to Omca of Publication, SCHOLAS-
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pobWher.
APRIL 4, 1986 ^ 1
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DATABANK
SPY WAR SCOREBOARD
WHY IT'S HARDER FOR THE U.S. TO KEEP SECRETS
MORE PEOPLE HAVE AM TO BM... MORE DOgAYIBIR8 ARE ClA8Sfi~
19.6 million
1984 4.2 million
e ense Department Employees: 2.4 million
Defense n ra or mp fees: 1.2 million
they overnment Employees: 400,000
Source:
Security Agency':_ _ -$10 billion 65,000
e sn a intelligence A
$0.5 WUbn___6,
Total, All U.S. Intelligence: billion 200,000
PROFILE OF 46 SPIES: 1975-86
12 million
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=MEE
OVERVIEW
THE NEED FOR SECRECY
IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
Americans are of two minds about the nation's intelligence
agencies. They realize they're necessary. Yet they also recognize
the threat they pose to the principle of openness in government.
L ast August, three secret photos of a
Soviet shipyard turned up in a
British defense magazine. The photos
had been taken by a U.S. KH-11 spy
satellite, one of two that op-
erate anywhere from 150 to
300 miles above the earth.
The release of the photos
raised important questions
about the role of secrecy in
a free society. Those ques-
tions serve as a backdrop to
this issue of UPDATE,
which takes a hard look at
the way U.S. spy agencies
ferret out other nations' se-
crets and protect our own.
The photos-one of
which is reprinted here-
created a sensation. They
gave people outside U.S.
secret agencies a glimpse of
a U.S. spy satellite's ability
to keep tabs on the Soviet
military. More importantly,
however, they showed a nu-
i
f
clear-powered a
rcra
t cam-
er-the Soviet Union's
first-under construction.
This new class of carriers
will give the Soviet navy an
unprecedented reach.
issues into focus. For one thing, it
showed Americans how difficult it is,
in a society as open as ours, to keep
any secrets under wraps. Morison is
First Amendment in its central pur-
pose of protecting public debate about
issues of public importance."
Yet, too much openness about mat-
ters of national safety can be danger-
ous, too. Even people who side with
Morison's lawyers realize that. John
A. Walker, arrested last year, sold the
Soviets information about the U.S.
Navy's most sensitive codes. That in-
formation, intelligence experts say,
may have cost the lives of U.S. troops
during the Vietnam War.
Still, many Americans have a lin-
gering fear that government secrecy
could serve as a shield for incompe-
tence or misguided policies. In 1973,
U.S. President Richard
Nixon tried to hide evi-
dence of wrongdoing be-
hind the shield of "execu-
tive privilege." When the
courts removed that shield,
Nixon resigned from office.
In large part, observers
say, the current controversy
over the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's covert op-
erations stems from fear of
excessive government se-
crecy. CIA chief William
Casey recently defended
such actions in an interview
with UPDATE Associate
Editor Maura Christopher.
"Sometimes," he said,
"our national interest re-
quires an option that falls
between sending a diplo-
matic note and going to
war." He also pointed out
that the CIA can act only if
it informs the two Congres-
sional committees that over-
In 1984, a U.S. spy satellite spotted the stern (top arrow) and
bow (bottom arrow) of a partly-built Soviet aircraft carrier.
The man who leaked the photo to the press is now In jail.
The man who released the photos,
Samuel Morison, was a civilian intel-
ligence expert with the U.S. Navy.
Morison described himself as a patri-
ot-a man who hoped the photos
would convince Americans of the
need for military spending hikes.
But government lawyers who prose-
cuted him last October under a 1917
espionage law saw him differently.
They described Morison as no better
than a spy-someone who endangered
the nation's safety by leaking secret
documents to the press. A jury agreed
with that description. Morison is now
serving two years in prison.
Morison's case brought some tough
one of 25 U.S. citizens arrested for
espionage during the past two years.
Also, the case reminded Americans
of the potential perils of government
secrecy. Americans pride themselves
on their freedom to debate their gov-
ernment's goals and methods. They
believe that the most responsive gov-
ernments perform their duties in day-
light, where they can be judged.
THREAT TO DEBATE
Morison's lawyers complained that
their client's conviction would encour-
age the opposite practice-more se-
crecy in government. They called the
government's use of the espionage
law to stop press leaks a "threat to the
see U.S. intelligence agencies. The
committees don't always support the
actions. (See Interview, page 10, and
Government, page 8.)
Such questions never trouble our
major adversaries-the Soviets. Their
society is a closed one, where little the
government does is carried out in full
view of Soviet citizens. (See World,
page 18.) That's why U.S. intelli-
gence organizations have to work so
much harder than their Soviet counter-
parts to uncover political and military
secrets. It's also why the U.S. must
spend billions of dollars every year to
gather the sort of intelligence data that
the Soviets can pick up simply by
reading U.S. newspapers.
APRIL 4, 1986 ^ 3
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SPECIAL REPORT / GOVERNMENT
TWELVE AGENCIES THAT
TAKE THE WORLD'S PULSE
To the nation's leaders, intelligence
is detailed, inside information
about the world that helps them make
crucial decisions. The job of the na-
tion's intelligence agencies is to gath-
er that information and deliver it to
U.S. leaders when they can really use
it-not afterwards.
To do that job, the U.S. relies on a
community of 12 intelligence organi-
zations. All are part of the Executive
Branch, and all serve the President.
The Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) coordinates all intelligence ac-
tivities.
In this special report, UPDATE ex-
amines the nation's most influential
intelligence agencies-the Central In-
telligence Agency, the National Secu-
rity Agency, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. It also takes a close
National Security Agency (NSA)
Intercepts communications, breaks
foreign codes. Protects security of
U.S. communications and
computers.
National Reconnalsance Office
(NRO)
Deploys and manages U.S. spy
satellites.
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Collects, produces, coordinates
military intelligence.
Army Intelligence
Navy Intelligence
Air Force Intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence
U.S. leaders rely on the na-
tion's intelligence community
to give them inside informa-
tion before, not after, they
must make crucial decisions.
look at the role of the U.S. Congress
in making sure that these spy and
counterspy units stay within the law-
and remain subject to public scrutiny.
The intelligence community has
enormous resources at its disposal.
Experts estimate that, all told, it di-
rectly employs about 200,000 people
and spends perhaps $20 billion a year.
Relatively little of its people and mon-
ey goes for the sort of "cloak-and-
National Security Council
(NSC)
Top-level group advises
President on urgent policy
questions.
Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI)
Chief intelligence adviser to
President & NSC. Coordi.
nates U.S. intelligence ef-
forts. Directs CIA.
FF1
CC Central Intelligence Agency
on ucts secret intelligence
efforts and covert actions
abroad. Collects and ana-
Iyzes foreign intelligence.
Develops new technology.
dagger" spy operations made famous
by movies and books.
BIG EYES AND EARS
Today's typical intelligence worker
sits behind a desk or a computer ter-
minal, trying to make sense of hun-
dreds of pieces of information about a
foreign situation or fast-changing is-
sue. And most of his freshest informa-
tion comes not from a human spy or
informer, but from the "Big Eyes"
and "Big Ears" of the vast U.S. net-
work of spy satellites and electronic
listening posts.
Despite their resources, these ana-
lysts and their bosses serve policy-
makers who are rarely satisfied. "I
don't know what kind of intelligence I
need," one Secretary of State report-
edly said, "but I know when I get it."
Non-defense Departments
and Agencies
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)
Conducts counterintelligence inside
the U.S. and, under special
circumstances, outside the U.S., in
coordination with the CIA.
State Department
Maintains Bureau of Intelligence and
Research that gathers political and
some economic intelligence.
Energy Department
Openly collects data on foreign
energy matters.
Treasury Department
Openly collects economic data on
foreign nations.
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T he Soviet tanker Lu-
gansk sailed into Nica-
ragua's Puerto Sandino har-
bor-and hit a mine. The
explosion, in March, 1984,
also blew a hole in U.S.
policy.
The mine had been plant-
ed by rebels working for the
U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency. CIA aid and train-
ing of the rebels, known as
THE SECRETS CHASERS
the contras, was an open
secret. But top Members of .
the U.S. Congress, angered
that the agency had not
bothered to tell them about the min-
ing, said it had gone too far. Earlier,
Congress had cut off U.S. military aid
to the contras and outlawed actions to
topple Nicaragua's leftist government.
Undercover operations such as the
harbor mining have kept the CIA at
the center of controversy since its cre-
ation in 1947. But covert actions, as
such efforts are called, are only part of
what the CIA does.
SPIES AND COUNTERSPIES
As the nation's top intelligence
agency, the CIA conducts all secret
spy and counterspy operations outside
U.S. borders. It collects and analyzes
intelligence information for the Presi-
dent and his advisers on the National
Security Council. And the agency's
boss, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, also heads the entire U.S. in-
telligence effort.
Spying is just one of the ways the
CIA collects information on what's
happening throughout the world. Most
of its workers are highly trained ana-
lysts in areas such as foreign politics,
science, and economics. They use a
host of high technology gadgets, from
satellite cameras to long-range micro-
phones. They also rely on "open" or
public sources-radio, TV, newspa-
pers, scholarly journals, maps, even
train and bus schedules.
In the 1970s, the U.S. Congress
clamped down on the CIA following
public revelations that it had spied on
U.S. citizens and conducted assassina-
tion plots, secret wars, and coup at-
tempts. Officials phased out some 800
staffers who directed spies and man-
aged other intelligence projects.
CIA headquarters outside Washington
in Langley, VA, where most of its huge
staff of analysts and case officers work.
Agency morale plummeted.
But under William J. Casey, its
chief since 1981, the CIA is flush with
more influence, money, and workers
than it's had since since the 1960s.
One big reason is Casey's close per-
sonal ties to U.S. President Ronald
Reagan. As the first intelligence direc-
tor to become a member of the U.S.
Cabinet, he has gained a major say in
shaping U.S. foreign policy.
Casey's buildup, experts say, has
made the CIA the fastest-growing
agency in the U.S. government. Over
the past five years, the agency's bud-
get is said to have increased by 25
percent a year, to an estimated $2
billion. Its payroll is estimated at
some 18,000 people, many of them at
the CIA's sprawling suburban head-
quarters in Langley, Virginia.
For Casey, rebuilding the CIA's
world wide spy network has been a
top priority. Sophisticated technology,
experts say, is no substitute for an
agent on the scene. CIA case officers
recruit most of the agency's spies
among officials of foreign govern-
ments. Chief targets are Soviet-bloc
intelligence or military agents, who
are often lured by CIA promises of a
Western lifestyle. That's how, CIA
officials say, Soviet living standards
give the U.S. an edge in convincing
members of the Soviet spy agency,
the KGB, to defect.
Double agents, who work for two
or more nations at once, are a constant
worry. Last fall, for instance, the CIA
suffered a costly embarrassment when
a former KGB agent, Vitaly
Yurchenko, defected back
to the Soviet Union. The
agency had hailed Yurchen-
ko's defection as a major
success.
The CIA has also focused
its beefed-up resources on
analysis. The agency's bud-
get for analyzing intelli-
gence data is up 50 percent.
Good analysis, experts say,
is a painstaking process of
organizing many different,
often conflicting, pieces of
information. The CIA is-
sues reports on everything from Soviet
military strength to population growth
in developing nations.
COVERT REVIVAL
But nowhere is the CIA's new sta-
tus clearer than in the agency's revival
of covert action. Such projects are
meant to influence foreign events
without official U.S. involvement.
The agency is said to be engaged in at
least six major covert operations
abroad and up to 50 smaller projects.
For example, the CIA is said to have
spent at least $80 million to build up
the Nicaraguan contras, who are
fighting that nation's communist-led
government. In Afghanistan, it is
channeling an estimated $75 million a
year to Moslem rebel groups fighting
Soviet troops, which have occupied
their nation since 1979.
Some critics fear that the CIA is
now too involved in making policy.
David McMichael, a former CIA ana-
lyst, claimed in an interview with
UPDATE that the Reagan Administra-
tion had distorted CIA data. The dis-
tortions, he says, made it seem as if
Nicaragua was sending arms to leftist
rebels in El Salvador. McMichael in-
sists that CIA reports never said that.
Such accusations point to a serious
danger, some say. Intelligence is
meant to serve as a guidepost for poli-
cy decisions. When top policymakers
change or ignore intelligence, they
may make unwise decisions.
CIA backers discount such fears.
The agency is finally back on its feet,
they argue, and that is what really
bothers its critics.
-Lourdes Rosado
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THE EAVESDROPPERS
W hen an off-course Ko-
rean Air Lines jetliner
was shot down in Soviet air
space in 1983, Soviet offi-
cials claimed they knew
nothing about it. Outraged,
U.S. President Ronald Rea-
gan moved quickly to prove
the Soviets guilty of down-
ing KAL Flight 007 and
killing all 269 civilians
aboard. Within days, U.S.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpat-
rick appeared before a
shocked U.N. Security
Council with top-secret evi-
dence. U.S. listening posts
in Japan had recorded the
exchange between the Sovi-
NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, MD, where communica-
tions intercepted by secret listening posts are deciphered.
et fighter pilot who downed Flight 007
and the commander who ordered him
to fire.
FINGER ON THE PULSE
The U.S. recording provided a rare
public glimpse into the work of the
National Security Agency (NSA), the
nation's biggest secret agency. 'The
NSA operates a worldwide network of
listening posts, antennas, and comput-
ers that gather the bulk of U.S. intelli-
gence. Experts say its equipment is
capable of eavesdropping on virtually
every international cable, radio signal,
and phone call. "The NSA is the most
important intelligence gathering agen-
cy we have," says Lieutenant Colonel
John Buchanan of the Center for De-
fense Information. "It has its finger
-on the [world's] pulse."
The NSA does much more than lis-
ten, however. Created in 1952 as a
separate agency inside the Defense
Department, it has three main jobs.
One is to intercept foreign communi-
cations signals, and break codes meant
to keep them secret. Another job is to
protect the secrecy of U.S. codes and
communications, including vital links
to U.S. submarines and strategic mis-
sile defenses. The agency's third job
is to protect the vast array of govern-
ment computers against tampering.
In plain terms, the NSA is responsi-
ble for breaking and making codes.
The agency considers cryptology-the
study of codes-so important that it
runs the National Cryptologic School
to train experts. In intelligence jargon,
6 ^ SCHOLASTIC UPDATE
communications signals are known as
SIGINT, for signals intelligence.
Intercepted signals from around the
world are relayed to NSA headquar-
ters at Fort Meade, MD. There, rows
of machines print them out. Then the
signals go to mathematicians and lin-
guists, who work to decode them with
the help of banks of sophisticated
computers. Without these experts,
most NSA data would be useless.
One NSA worry is that a nation will
adopt a more complex code for its
communications. Today's computers
can devise codes that are virtually un-
breakable. During the 1982 war be-
tween Great Britain and Argentina
over the Falkland Islands, the NSA
broke Argentina's code. But, soon af-
ter, Argentina found out and switched
to a tougher code.
MOST POWERFUL CHIEF
Nearly everything about the NSA is
classified. So, one way experts mea-
sure the agency is by its size. The
NSA is estimated to employ about
65,000 people-up to 24,000 at its
headquarters alone. Most workers
come from the military, and are as-
signed to the agency's listening posts
around the world. Maintaining that
network is costly. The NSA is said to
spend up to $10 billion a year-possi-
bly half of the entire U.S. budget for
intelligence. These massive resources
may make the NSA's director, Lieu-
tenant General William E. Odom, the
most powerful U.S. intelligence chief.
The NSA's ability to eavesdrop on
U.S. citizens worries many
critics. "The NSA is not
supposed to listen to do-
mestic calls," says David
Morrison, an analyst at the
Center for Defense Infor-
mation. "But they have
been. "
NSA officials say such
fears are exaggerated. In
the U.S., the agency re-
quires court permission to monitor a
U.S. citizen's calls. Abroad, it needs
the okay of the U.S. attorney general,
who must decide that the NSA target
may be a foreign agent. Only U.S.
citizens in touch with foreigners who
are being watched run much risk of
being overheard. And, experts say,
computers can't monitor human
speech. For that, the NSA must rely
on workers to transcribe conversa-
tions, which is very time-consuming.
THE ANALYSIS GAP
What most worries many experts is
the gap between collecting informa-
tion and analyzing it. According to
U.S. Congressional experts, about 85
percent of the intelligence the U.S.
collects comes from technical sources.
But, they say, the agency's analysts
lack the manpower and resources to
keep up with the data flow. In fact,
NSA chief Odom warned in 1982 that
"the big intelligence failures of the
1980s and 1990s are likely to be in
analysis." The problem is that the
agency finds it easier to win budget
approval for expensive hardware than
for intelligence efforts by humans,
known as HUMINT.
Is the NSA correcting that weak-
ness? Few people outside the agency
are likely to find out. "The NSA is
super-secret," an aide to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence told
UPDATE. "There's so little any-
body's willing to say. I don't want to
get caught saying anything to do with
the NSA." -Deborah Sussman
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Barbara Walker had lived
with the secret for 16
years. Her former husband,
John Walker, was running a
spy ring for the Soviet
Union. In November, 1984,
she finally made up her mind
to turn him in. So, she called
the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation. Months later, the
FBI arrested her ex-hus-
band, his brother, a family
friend, and her 22-year-old
son.
For the FBI, the Walker
case was the high-point of its
busiest spy-catching year
since World War II. Most
U.S. citizens know the FBI
THE SPY=CATCHERS
FBI agents carrying evidence to the trial of Arthur Walker,
who was convicted of stealing U.S. secrets for a family spy
ring. His brother, John Walker, sold them to the Soviets.
as the government's famed crime-
busting arm that catches bank robbers,
kidnappers, and mobsters. But today's
FBI is concentrating more agents and
resources than ever on catching spies.
The FBI has responsibility for all
anti-spy efforts, known as counterin-
telligence, within the U.S. (The CIA
fights anti-U.S. spying abroad.) To do
the job, the FBI relies mostly on its
own investigations. Cases springing
from a sudden tip are rare.
FOLLOWING UP TIPS
"Every day, some people do call in
claiming to know a spy, but very few
of those calls lead to something,"
says Bill Carter, an FBI spokesman.
Still, the bureau follows up on every
call it gets. In the Walker case, it was
several weeks before an agent inter-
viewed Barbara Walker at her home.
Only then did the FBI pay serious
attention to her claims.
William Webster, the FBI's chief,
calls its usual strategy of catching
spies the "spiderweb" approach. The
bureau carefully watches anyone it
suspects may want to buy classified
information. Most suspects are foreign
diplomats or business executives. If
someone with access to U.S. secrets
contacts the foreign suspect, the FBI
increases its surveillance to find out if
an illegal deal is in the works.
The FBI works to nab the U.S.
"contacts." "Selling your country's
secrets is an evil deed," Webster re-
cently testified before the U.S. Con-
gress. "Those who do it deserve to be
caught and punished."
The FBI won't say how much mon-
ey it spends on counterintelligence or
how many agents it assigns to it. But
sources in Congress say'its spy-catch-
ing resources have tripled since 1981.
Others say the bureau may be devot-
ing 20 percent or more of its yearly
$1.2 billion budget and its 8,956
agents to counterintelligence. The FBI
has also added sophisticated comput-
ers that can cross-reference tips and
collect information.
FBI officials say their increased
spending is paying off. More than half
of the 46 spies the U.S. caught be-
tween 1975 and 1986 were nabbed in
1984 and 1985. "From the results of
the last two years it appears that the
FBI is doing a good job catching
spies," says Alan Adler, a researcher
at the Center for National Security
Studies. "But there's no real way of
judging since we don't know how
many spies are out there."
GETTING TOUGH
Experts also credit a tough new pol-
icy for the quick rise in spy arrests.
Since 1981, President Reagan has in-
structed the FBI to arrest and prose-
cute all spies it finds. In the past,
officials hushed up many spy cases,
believing that publicity could hurt
U.S. interests. Instead, the FBI would
often try to persuade a spy to work
secretly for the U.S. as a double
agent. In return, the bureau would
drop criminal charges. "The new pol-
icy of arrests every time is aimed at
deterring other Americans
from spying," Adler told
UPDATE.
Some critics worry that, in
their zeal to catch spies, FBI
agents investigate and harass
many innocent Americans.
For example, the FBI inves-
tigated Samantha Smith, the
Maine schoolgirl who wrote
a letter to Soviet leader Yuri
Andropov and visited the
U.S.S.R. as his special
guest. Smith died in a plane
crash last year, but the FBI
refuses to release its file on
her. "The Smith file is still
classified for national securi-
ty reasons," a bureau
spokesman said recently.
Members of Congress who investi-
gate complaints against the FBI say
they believe the agency only rarely
violates citizens' rights. "There are a
few isolated incidents, but in general
the Bureau has not overstepped its
bounds," says U.S. Representative
Don Edwards of California, who
heads the subcommittee on such mat-
ters for the House Judiciary Commit-
tee.
BROAD SUPPORT
Many say the FBI's record success
in 1984 and 1985 resulted from broad
government support for efforts to stop
the loss of U.S. secrets. "Congress is
behind Webster and what he's doing
to make counterintelligence more ef-
fective," an aide to Edwards told UP-
DATE. That kind of backing, experts
suggest, is what's needed to keep the
FBI's spy-catchers well-equipped and
on their toes.
The more spies that the FBI snares,
they say, the more that lawmakers
will come to see spying as a real dan-
ger. "We may look back on this past
year as the time in which a new con-
sensus emerged in American politics
on the need to improve counterintelli-
gence," says Roby Godson, a profes-
sor at Georgetown University and an
authority on intelligence issues. If
1985 was the "Year of the Spy,"
Godson and other experts say, the
FBI's work may well make the 1980s
into the "Decade of the Spy-catchers."
-Clare McHugh
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GOVERNMENT
LAWMAKERS VS. THE CIA
ON COVERT OPERATIONS
The CIA and Congress agree in most areas-except covert
operations. The key reason, experts say, is that many in Congress
oppose the Reagan Administration's foreign policy goals.
L ast fall, Washington observers
opened their morning newspapers
and shrugged at the reports of a new
round of angry charges on Capitol
Hill. The U.S. Congress's intelligence
committees and William Casey, the
Director of Central Intelligence, were
quarreling again.
This time, Senator David Durenber-
ger (R-MN) complained that Casey's
Central Intelligence Agency lacked a
"sense of direction." Casey, in turn,
accused Durenberger of carelessness:
The Senators who oversee the CIA,
Casey said, had placed sensitive intel-
ligence sources at risk.
As usual, aides on both sides man-
aged to smooth their bosses' ruffled
feathers within a few days. Still, the
rift raised questions about Congress's
ability to oversee U.S. spy agencies.
The public depends on the intelligence
committees to keep an eye on the
agencies. But Members of Congress
worry that they don't always get the
full story from CIA officials. When
that happens, they warn, they can't do
their job.
Until Congress created these com-
mittees, virtually no one-in or out of
government-looked over the CIA's
shoulder. So much secrecy, critics
said, was unhealthy. Investigations in
the mid-1970s revealed that the agen-
cy had broken U.S. laws, spied on
citizens, and considered assassination
plots against several foreign leaders.
Many Members of Congress vowed
that the agency would never again op-
erate without strong checks on its
power. So, in 1976, the Senate set up
a committee to oversee the CIA and
other U.S. intelligence organizations.
The House of Representatives set up
its panel a year later. The committees'
main job is to review intelligence
spending and activities. The commit-
tees also grade the CIA's perfor-
mance.
The agency's report card, however,
remains largely classified. Just as the
CIA guards its secrecy, the oversight
committees hide much of their work
from public view. The members work
in secret, and hearings are held in
soundproof, heavily guarded meeting
rooms.
For the most part, suggests one in-
telligence expert, committee members
and intelligence officials work togeth-
er smoothly. "There are some areas
of disagreement," says Roy Godson
of Georgetown University. "But there
are many areas that are free from
strife. The relationship is much better
than the newspapers suggest."
AGREEMENT ON STRENGTH
One reason for smooth relations is
that both sides agree on the need for a
strong U.S. intelligence system. Bet-
ter intelligence can help the U.S.
combat spying at home and terrorism
abroad. Congressional oversight also
helps boost the CIA's image in the
eyes of a suspicious public. "It's very
important to the public that the people
have a way of checking on the intelli-
gence agencies," Godson told UP-
DATE. "The oversight committees
establish the agencies' credibility."
Only one area of CIA operations-
covert actions-still touches off bitter
debate. Covert actions are secret at-
tempts to shape events or politics of
other nations or regions. Most covert
actions are minor, almost routine pro-
jects. For example, a CIA case officer
may suggest that a foreign newspaper
editor write an editorial with a pro-
U.S. slant. The intelligence panels
okay such actions with a nod. It is
other covert actions-the ones that ap-
pear to be undeclared wars or major
foreign policy actions-that cause
some committee members to balk.
One question members often ask is
whether the U.S. has the right to inter-
One much-disputed proposal to plug
leaks of CIA plans is to conduct lie-
detector tests of all who see such secrets.
fere in another nation's politics. "Just
because there is tension between se-
crecy and openness doesn't mean you
should never undertake covert opera
tions," says Jay Peterzell, a specialist
with the Center for National Security
Studies, a private research group.
"But it's hard to write this into law."
Peterzell also warns that covert ac-
tions, if managed badly, risk drawing
the U.S. into war. "It's a slippery
slope between paramiliary action and
going to war," he says. "We might
sooner or later find we have to send in
troops to back up our [covert] activi-
ties. "
Most often, however, members of
the intelligence committees object to
covert action because they don't like
Administration's foreign policy.
"People who don't approve covert ac-
tion don't approve the politics behind
it," says George Carver, an expert at
Georgetown University's Center for
Strategic Studies.
Carver, for one, argues that many
who oppose an aggressive U.S. action
in Central America would approve
such an effort elsewhere. "If we were
going to do a little covert action to
give [South Africa's president] Pieter
Botha a shove toward reforming apart-
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heid," he told UPDATE, "they'd be
all for going." Carver is a former
high-level intelligence officier.
The current political controversy
swirling around U.S. covert opera-
tions in Nicaragua supports Carver's
point. Since 1981, the U.S. has aided
rebel groups, known as the contras,
that are fighting that nation's leftist
government. Most intelligence panel
members who oppose covert aid to the
contras are Democrats. They also tend
to oppose the Reagan Administra-
tion's overall policies in Central
America. "The way to [block] the
policy is to protest the covert aid,"
says Godson. "They do not want to
give aid to the contras whether it is
secret or not."
The CIA doesn't need Congress's
permission to begin a covert action.
So, the only way Congress can stop
covert activities it doesn't like is to cut
off the funding, protest to the Presi-
dent, or pass a law forbidding certain
uses of covert aid.
In 1982, for instance, Congress
banned any covert aid meant to help
overthrow Nicaragua's government.
President Reagan, however, managed
to persuade Congress to give $27 mil-
lion in non-military aid to the contras.
President Reagan recently asked for
$100 million in covert aid for the con-
tras-$70 million in military aid, and
$30 million in non-military aid. But
he faced stiff opposition.
signed in protest. Later, he returned to
his post.
But, before the furor died down,
press reports revealed another sur-
prise. In early 1983, the CIA had
printed a manual that urged the con-
tras to kill and kidnap Nicaraguan of-
ficials. These two episodes, commit-
tee members complained, showed that
the CIA had ignored Congress's ban
against trying to overthrow Nicara-
gua's government.
LACK OF TRUST
The CIA's reluctance to keep Con-
gress informed show a lack of trust on
both sides, outside observers say. The
result: Congress worries that it never
has the full story, while the CIA fears
that Congress is the source of leaks to
the media.
Last November, for example, the
Washington Post reported on its front
page that the CIA planned a covert
operation to weaken the government
of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadha-
fi. This leak killed the plan, which
many-even in the CIA-said was too
risky. Administration officials sug-
gested that Members of Congress
leaked the news.
On the other hand, Members of
Congress say Administration officials
leak secrets to the media more often
than they do. Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
has called the Reagan Administra-
tion's record on leaking "the worst
ever" compared with earlier Presi-
dents' administrations.
One case in point, Leahy says, is
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.
Since 1982, the U.S. has supplied Af-
ghan rebels with $75 million worth of
military equipment each year. The re-
bels are fighting Soviet troops, who
have occupied their country for six
years. In May, 1983, top Reagan
aides leaked the U.S. role to the me-
dia to demonstrate the President's
tough anti-Soviet stance. In answer,
the Soviets stepped up their assault,
heightening the war.
ADVANCE NOTICE
Such deadlocks have occured fre-
quently in recent years. The 1974
Hughes-Ryan Act required the CIA to
tell Congress in "a timely manner"
about its covert activities. "Congress
thought this meant in advance, and the
CIA thought this meant before the end
of time," says Peterzell. In 1980,
Congress changed the act. It now says
the CIA must inform the intelligence
committees of its actions in advance.
On paper, this relationship seems
clear. But in real life, says Peterzell,
"The committees only get information
by pushing hard for it, and even then
they may not get all of it."
In early 1984, for instance, the two
oversight panels were enraged to learn
through news accounts that the CIA
planted mines in Nicargua's harbor.
Many Members of Congress called the
mining an act of war. The Senate
committee's vice-chairman at the
time, Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), re-
SMOOTHING RELATIONS
Despite some lingering hard feel-
ings, the CIA and Congress appear to
be resolving their differences. Last
month, the CIA gave Congress an out-
line of its future plans for the first
time ever. U.S. officials also suggest
using polygraph tests on government
employees as a way to plug leaks.
Less far-reaching is a suggestion to
combine the two intelligence commit-
tees. "Congress must reduce the num-
ber of people with access to secrets,"
says Larry Sulc, head of the Nathan
Hale Institute, a research group. "Not
that they hand out information, but it
is the nature of politicians to talk too
much. "
Such approaches, however, are
patchwork solutions. The only way to
solve the tensions over covert actions,
suggests Godson, is for the Presi-
dent's team and Congress to agree on
foreign policy goals. But few observ-
ers expect this to happen any time
soon.
Contra rebels have depended mostly on secret CIA aid to wage their fight against
Nicaragua's leftist government. The CIA link has sparked a continuing battle be-
tween President Reagan and the U.S. Congress, which has cut off most aid.
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INTERVIEW
SPY CHIEF WILLIAM CASEY
LOOKS AT THE SECRETS TRADE
In an exclusive interview, the nation's intelligence director says
stepped-up efforts to counter Soviet espionage are a must. "The
need to protect national security,' he argues, "is absolute."
William J. Casey, 73, first tasted
espionage work during World
War 11. He coordinated French resis-
tance fighters, then rose to head U.S.
secret intelligence operations in Eu-
rope. An expert on tax law and a self-
made millionaire, Casey held a num-
ber of top U.S. posts in the 1970s.
In 1980, Casey managed Ronald
Reagan's successful Presidential cam-
paign. Soon after, he was appointed
Director of Central Intelligence. Asso-
ciate Editor Maura Christopher re-
cently spoke with Casey at CIA head-
quarters in Langley, Virginia.
Update: What is the goal of U.S. in-
telligence?
Casey: It is to collect and evaluate
information to see what is happening
around the world that can affect our
national interests. This is becoming
increasingly important, because the
world is becoming more interdepen-
dent. There are new military threats,
huge arsenals of weapons being built,
terrorist organizations, and people
stealing our technology. We need to
protect ourselves against these things.
ADVISING THE PRESIDENT
Update: As Director of Central Intel-
ligence, you have three roles. You ad-
vise the President, you head the CIA,
and you oversee the intelligence com-
munity. Which is the most important?
Casey: They are very much interrelat-
ed, but it all boils down to being
[chief intelligence] adviser to the Pres-
ident. That is the most important.
Running the CIA is a managerial job.
Running the intelligence community is
a coordinating job. There are 11 addi-
tional [organizations] in the intelli-
gence community. I am chairman of
the National Foreign Intelligence
Board, which pools information from
all of them into National Intelligence
Estimates. I see to it that these are put
together for the President.
10 ^ SCHOLASTIC UPDATE
William Casey is widely credited with
rebuilding the CIA, in part by promot-
ing first-rate agency staffers.
Update: One of the purposes of intel-
ligence is to guard against surprises,
but world events often seem to catch
the U.S. by surprise. Why?
Casey: Everybody gets surprised. But
I don't think we have had a meaning-
ful, significant [surprise] in the last
five years. You have surprises be-
cause intelligence is not perfect.
Update: What about terrorist attacks?
Casey: Any terrorist who decides to
act doesn't advertise it. You've got to
be very lucky to catch all or even a
large portion of them. We frustrate
terrorist attacks by learning about
them and taking action. Over the last
year, we've [prevented] about 200 ter-
rorist attacks. Sometimes we whisk
the target out of the country, or we put
a protective guard around the place.
Update: Many people view espionage
as cloak-and-dagger spying. Is it?
Casey: I don't want to disillusion any-
one, but [spying] isn't the main part of
intelligence work. Most of our people
have advanced degrees. There are an-
alysts, scientists, and economists in-
volved. They take information and sift
it to see what it adds up to.
We spend a lot of money collecting
information. We'll put a camera
somewhere that picks up a lot from
open sources. There are apparatuses
that pick up sounds, electronic pulses,
or seismic signals of underground ex-
plosions. We do have people who deal
with people around the world who
want to help us. Sometimes they are
called spies. But there are many more
people involved in analyzing the in-
formation than in collecting it.
CATCHING MORE SPIES
Update: Why are we hearing so much
about enemy spies? Are their numbers
growing, or are we catching more?
Casey: There's one unusual thing
about counterintelligence: If you catch
a lot of spies, that can show that your
intelligence service is bad, and if you
don't catch any, that can show it's
bad, too. We have been catching
many more spies in the past two
years. That's because we've been suc-
cessful in learning about.other espio-
nage activities. More important, over
the last two or three years there have
been 200 Soviet and East European
spies arrested or kicked out of nations
around the world. That's a big loss for
them. Then there are a number of very
high level defectors who have asked
for refuge here. That's pretty bad for
hostile intelligence services, because
the defectors usually have a lot of
information to give us.
Update: Are the Soviets sending more
agents into the U.S.?
Casey: They have had, for some time,
a big, sweeping effort to get our blue-
prints, our technology, and our so-
phisticated products. They can learn
from them and copy them. That's a
very big activity.
Update: The CIA tracks espionage
abroad. The FBI tracks it in the U.S.
How do you coordinate your actions?
Casey: We work together very close-
ly. If we get a lead on somebody who
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is coming into this country, we pass it
over to the FBI. And it works the
other way. They have liaison people
at our headquarters, and we have them
at theirs. There used to be some fric-
tion, but that was washed away long
ago.
Update: How successful have enemy
spies been in gathering our secrets?
Casey: They have learned a lot about
our technology and our military se-
crets. First, they are working in an
open society. They can come here and
roam around
All they have to do is
.
buy a newspaper, or go to the Con-
Record office. Material is
gressional
available for the asking. They have
the problem of sorting through it. I
don't know if I envy them.
Update: What are their gains worth?
Casey: They're worth billions of dol-
lars a year [to the Soviets]. If they had
to develop, by research and testing,
some of the technology they are able
to steal from us, it would cost them a
great deal of money.
Update: How much damage have re-
cent spy cases caused to the U.S.?
Casey: It takes a while to determine
how much damage a spy has caused,
because you don't know how they use
the information. We think codes were
broken, and we think [the Walker spy
ring, which sold Navy secrets] gave
them communications information.
We probably lose more information
through the media by unauthorized
leaks. Then there is Aviation Week &
Space Technology magazine, which
covers this technology. We have to
run a big operation to get this sort of
information from closed societies. All
their spies must do is buy a magazine.
COUNTERSPY EFFORTS
Update: How successful have we been
in penetrating Soviet spy operations?
Casey: We know they get very ner-
vous, so we don't like to brag about
that. I can tell you one thing: We
always want to have more success.
Update: What is being done to pre-
vent further espionage losses?
Casey: We have increased the
strength of the FBI. We've come clos-
er to placing the kind of restrictions on
travel for hostile diplomatic personnel
that they place on us. We were pretty
loose on that. We've improved our
security and our counterintelligence
capability.
Update: More than 4 million people
Poring over maps is part of the careful
process of analyzing intelligence data to
produce reports for policymakers.
have access to U.S. classified infor-
mation. Would cutting their numbers
solve our security problems?
Casey: Probably not entirely. We've
been reducing security clearances
somewhat, but there is a big problem.
Intelligence is useful because it is
used. If you restrict it too severely,
you take some value away. But if you
use it too widely, you make it vulnera-
ble. We aim for the right balance.
Update: How valuable are lie detec-
tor tests in preventing spying?
Casey: They are very valuable. They
help us to investigate. But we never
act on the polygraph needle alone.
The polygraph is a guide to show
[what] a person is a little unsure
about. Then we ask questions. Of the
people we don't hire because they are
security risks, we catch 90 percent in
the give-and-take of interrogation. Af-
ter the needle flicks a little, they admit
that they have done something.
Update: Should the U.S. expand its
use of such polygraph tests?
Casey: I don't think we have to ex-
pand it. We should use it more aggres-
sively and focus our effort. I don't
think we have to polygraph everybody
in the world. We may want to poly-
graph people who have access to very
secret information. Or people who-
when a story gets out that shouldn't-
had that story. But testing should be
selective, not wholesale.
Update: Where do you draw the line
between the government's need for se-
curity and the public's right to know?
Casey: The need to protect security is
absolute. A lot of time, people classi-
fy information that isn't important.
But if something is essential to nation-
al security, I don't think any unautho-
rized person has the right to know.
Update: What about possible govern-
ment intrusions on citizens' privacy?
Casey: We gather all of the informa-
tion we can within certain limitations.
We can't poke in on American citi-
zens-our work is abroad. The FBI
can poke in on American citizens, if it
has reasonable cause.
Update: What lures U.S. citizens to
spy for foreign nations?
Casey: Lots of things. There was one
guy in San Francisco who was lured
by sex. Some people are angry at their
country, and they do it for that reason.
The Walkers were lured by money.
That's the big reason.
COVERT OPTIONS
Update: Why does the CIA carry out
covert actions?
Casey: Sometimes our national inter-
est requires an option that falls be-
tween sending a diplomatic note and
going to war. By law, the President
can authorize such steps. The two
committees of the U.S. Congress are
briefed, and we carry out these activi-
ties. We don't, however, go around
assassinating people.
Update: What do you say to people
who believe that it's improper for the
U.S. to undertake covert actions?
Casey: I disagree with them. The So-
viets have a huge, worldwide appara-
tus that carries out propaganda, smug-
gles arms, and stirs up trouble, while
keeping their hand hidden. If we
couldn't respond to that, we would be
disarming ourselves against a whole
range of threatening activities.
Update: You criticize the Congressio-
nal committees which oversee the
CIA. Why?
Casey: Oversight should be done qui-
etly, discreetly. Going out and spout-
ing in public is a breach of confi-
dence. It can damage our intelligence
capabilities and the confidentiality
needed to deal with other nations.
Update: The CIA has recovered from
years of low morale. What changed?
Casey: Our people realize the Presi-
dent is supporting them, and that Con-
gress is supporting them. Their infor-
mation is sought after. They respond
to that challenge. Ten years ago, Con-
gress was kicking them around, and
the media was kicking them around.
Ronald Reagan turned that around.
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HISTORY
SPIES AND \COUNTERSPIES:
210 YEARS OF CONTROVERSY
Protected by vast oceans, the U.S. was a latecomer to world
espionage. But its role as a global power has forced U.S.
policymakers into an uneasy reliance on intelligence agencies.
' n 1929, U.S. Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson was astonished
to learn that his department was run-
ning an espionage operation. The
agency, known as "the Black Cham-
ber," had been set up 12 years earlier,
during World War I. Since then, with
the aid of Western Union and other
cable companies, the Black Chamber
had,secretly-and quite illegally-in-
tercepted and decoded messages sent
by at least 18 foreign governments.
During sensitive naval disarmament
tlemen," he declared, "do not read
each other's mail."
The story of Stimson's outrage has
amused foreign diplomats ever since.
Even in Stimson's time, espionage
was largely accepted as a fact of life.
It may be illegal, but nearly every
government spies on its enemies and
allies without worrying if it's right or
wrong.
Stimson, however, expressed a tra-
ditional American distrust of spying.
U.S. citizens have always taken pride
U.S. officials displaying spy plane photos at the U.N. Security Council during the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The photos show launch sites for Soviet nuclear
missiles being assembled. The crisis ended with the missiles' removal.
talks in 1921, the Black Chamber had in their nation's open society, where
deciphered dispatches that revealed people are free of government surveil-
the bargaining strategy of Japanese lance. On the other hand, as a global
diplomats. Using that inside informa- power, the U.S. must know as much
tion, U.S. negotiators won greater re- as it can about the plans and strengths
ductions in Japan's fleet of battle- of its potential enemies. Striking the
ships. proper balance between these conflict-
But Secretary Stimson was far from ing needs has long been a problem for
pleased by these achievements. He an- Washington policymakers, as this
grily ordered the Black Chamber to look at U.S. intelligence history
shut down its operations and disband shows.
its small staff of cryptologists. "Gen- Generations of schoolchildren have
12 ^ SCHOLASTIC UPDATE
learned that one of the greatest heroes
of the American Revolution was Na-
than Hale-a spy. While George
Washington battled to defend New
York, he sent Hale to scout behind
British lines disguised as a school-
teacher. Hale was captured and
hanged the next day.
The textbooks usually didn't men-
tion that, in 1776, soldiers considered
espionage a shameful side of warfare.
Hale was the only officer in his unit
willing to volunteer for such a dishon-
orable duty. A more common attitude
toward spying was the public's horri-
fied view of Benedict Arnold, one of
Washington's generals, who sold bat-
tle plans to the British. Ever since,
Arnold's name has stood for treason.
FEW FOREIGN THREATS
For most of U.S. history, the na-
tion's leaders didn't bother to develop
a large intelligence network. Bordered
by vast oceans and located far from
the intrigues of Europe, the U.S.
didn't face a serious foreign threat to
its security until World War II. The
Army and the Navy each maintained
tiny, inadequate intelligence depart-
ments. Many U.S. Embassies had
military attaches, who were supposed
to observe foreign military activities.
But these attaches learned little infor-
mation that was useful-except, crit-
ics said, the gossip they overheard at
embassy dinners.
On December 7, 1941, America
would pay dearly for inadequate intel-
ligence. Early that morning, a U.S.
Navy listening post intercepted and
decoded a Japanese radio message dis-
closing that war with the U.S. would
soon begin. But because of poor com-
munications links, the decoded mes-
sage didn't reach the U.S. commander
in Hawaii for another 16 hours. That
was seven hours too late to warn of
the Japanese sneak attack on the naval
base at Pearl Harbor. The attack,
which destroyed most of the U.S. Pa-
cific fleet, was one of the greatest
intelligence failures in history.
Henry Stimson, now Secretary of
War, at last realized that he was not
dealing with gentlemen. His War De-
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As Secretary of State in 1929, Henry
Stimson said codebreaking was improp-
er. In wartime, he changed his mind.
partment promptly created a top secret
"Special Branch," which intercepted
and analyzed enemy communications.
MAGIC, the Special Branch's code-
breaking team, fed a daily stream of
information to Allied commanders.
AIDING RESISTANCE FIGHTERS
In June, 1942, President Franklin
Roosevelt set up America's first fully
coordinated intelligence agency, the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Its
chief was William "Wild Bill" Dono-
van, a hero of World War I and a
diplomat. Under Donovan, the OSS
conducted a wide range of covert op-
erations, including psychological war-
fare. It also coordinated aid to resis-
tance forces in Europe and Asia that
fought to free their nations from Nazi
and Japanese rule.
President Truman dismantled the
OSS at the end of World War II in
1945. But only two years later, grow-
ing Soviet-American tension spurred
Congress to pass the National Security
Act, which created the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
Some Members of Congress feared
that the CIA might develop into a
secret police force. So, lawmakers
barred the new agency from carrying
out counterspy work within the U.S.
That job was reserved for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. At first, the
CIA was assigned only to coordinate
U.S. intelligence activities and evalu-
ate information collected by other
agencies.
But, as the Soviet Union tightened
its grip on Eastern Europe, the CIA
hired former OSS agents to conduct
William "Wild Bill" Donovan, who led
strategic intelligence in World War II,
inspired a generation of CIA officials.
covert operations against hostile gov-
ernments. Within just a few years, the
CIA had more than 5,000 employees
involved in covert actions. In 1953,
the agency toppled an unfriendly re-
gime in Iran and replaced Shah Reza
Pahievi in power. The following year,
CIA agents helped overthrow an elect-
ed but pro-Communist government in
Guatemala.
Not all CIA operations during the
Cold War succeeded. In April, 1961,
about 1,200 Cuban political exiles
landed at Cuba's Bay of Pigs in an
attempt to overthrow its pro-Soviet
leader, Fidel Castro. CIA officers,
who backed and trained the invaders,
predicted they would be joined by un-
derground fighters inside Cuba. But
the uprising never occurred, and the
invasion was crushed.
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
The CIA was able to repair its dam-
aged prestige a year later, during the
Cuban missile crisis. At first, U.S.
intelligence officers discounted re-
ports that the Soviet Union was plac-
ing nuclear missiles in Cuba. But John
McCone, the chief director, had a
hunch that "something new was going
on." He ordered aides to take another
look. Sure enough, U-2 spy planes
soon produced photos of Soviet mis-
sile bases under construction. Armed
with CIA evidence, President John F.
Kennedy forced the Soviets to with-
draw their missiles before they were
targeted at the U.S.
Infighting between military and ci-
vilian intelligence officials caused se-
rious problems during the Vietnam
During Allen Dulles's term as CIA chief
(1953-1961), his brother, John Foster
Dulles, was Secretary of State.
War of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Some military men feared that reports
of large North Vietnamese forces
might suggest that the U.S. was mak-
ing little progress in the war. So, they
reduced official estimates of enemy
troop strength-with disastrous re-
sults. North Vietnam's devastating Tet
Offensive in January, 1968, caught
U.S. and South Vietnamese forces
badly off guard.
DAMAGING BLOWS
The most damaging blows to the
U.S. intelligence community came in
the 1970s. Several former CIA em-
ployees were tied to the notorious Wa-
tergate scandal that eventually caused
President Richard Nixon to resign in
1974. They had directed Republican
campaign workers who broke into
Democratic Party headquarters at
Washington's Watergate building.
Later, the press reported that the
agency had helped to overthrow Sal-
vador Allende, a Marxist who had
been elected president of Chile. And,
in 1974, the New York Times uncov-
ered evidence that the CIA had illegal-
ly kept hundreds of American citizens
under surveillance, including many
who had opposed the Vietnam War.
Such abuses provoked Congress to
step up its oversight of the CIA and its
fellow intelligence agencies. Now, co-
vert operations abroad must be ap-
proved by the President and reported
to Congressional committees.
In 1975, three high-level govern-
ment panels investigated the CIA. The
most influential was a Senate commit-
tee headed by Senator Frank Church,
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who called the CIA "a rogue ele-
phant." The Church Committee re-
vealed that U.S. agents had consid-
ered plots to assassinate Fidel Castro
and Patrice Lumumba, a leader of the
African nation of the Congo before it
became Zaire. But, the committee
concluded, "no foreign leaders were
killed as a result of assassination plots
initiated by officials of the U.S."
CUTTING BACK
Under President Jimmy Carter, CIA
director Stansfield Turner sacked 800
workers in counterintelligence and co-
vert operations. He beefed up intelli-
gence gathering by technical means,
such as spy satellites. Agency morale
fell, especially when a leftist newslet-
ter and several former CIA agents
publicly, and often falsely, named in-
dividuals as CIA agents. Some 200
intelligence officials reportedly asked
for early retirement.
Critics also blamed the CIA for a
long string of intelligence failures.
The North Korean attack on
South Korea (1950), the
Soviet invasion of Czecho-
slovakia (1968), the Yom
Kippur War in the Middle
East (1973), India's first
nuclear explosion (1974)-
all of these had taken the
CIA by surprise.
Also, intelligence had
sometimes been misused for
political purposes. In the
late 1950s, American ana-
lysts warned that the Sovi-
ets had more intercontinen-
tal nuclear missiles than the
U.S. Democrat John Ken-
nedy hammered away at the
"missile gap" issue in the
1960 Presidential cam-
paign. Actually, photos tak-
en by U-2 planes proved
that the Soviets had few
long-range missiles. But
Republican President
Dwight Eisenhower could
not release those photos
without revealing that the
U.S. was sending illegal re-
connaissance flights over
Soviet territory.
A similar controversy
erupted in 1977, when Pres-
ident Carter publicized a
CIA report that predicted a
world oil shortage and soar-
14 ^ SCHOLASTIC UPDATE
U.S. intelligence officials misjudged Ira-
nian militants, who toppled the Shah in
1979 and later seized the U.S. embassy.
ing fuel prices in the mid-1980s. Car-
ter hoped to win support for his ener-
gy policies, but critics slammed his
use of intelligence for political gains.
And the report turned out to be quite
wrong. The world now faces an oil
glut, and gasoline prices are tumbling.
In Iran, U.S. intelligence underesti-
mated resentment toward the Shah,
who fled the country in early 1979.
The CIA also failed to warn U.S. poli-
cymakers of the November, 1979, sei-
zure of the U.S. Embassy in Iran's
capital, Tehran. Yet Iranian militants
had briefly captured the Embassy
months earlier.
EASING THE RULES
These failures convinced many that,
in its rush to end intelligence abuses,
Congress had clamped down too hard
on the CIA. In 1980, President Carter
declared that "we need to remove un-
warranted restraints on America's
ability to collect intelligence." And,
in 1981, President Reagan issued
A SAMPLER OF CORNED SPIES
SAKE 1945, the U.S. Justice Department has prosecuted 80 people
for espionage. Here's what 15 of them were caught doing-end
how the courts punished them.
1945: Emanuel Larson, U.S. State Dept. China expert, gave data
on China to a U.S. magazine. Fined $500.
1949: V.A. Gubitchev, Soviet employee of the United Nations,
got Justice Dept. secrets from his American girlfriend. Fifteen-
year prison sentence suspended on condition he leave U.S.
1950: Julius and Ethel Rosenberg helped pass atomic secrets to
Soviets. At much-debated trial, said they were framed. Executed.
1957: Rudolf Abel, Soviet agent, got U.S. Defense Dept. secrets
from American informants. Prison sentence: 45 years. Was later
traded to Soviets for captured U.S. U-2 pilot Gary Powers.
1965: Robert Thompson, trained as a spy in Moscow, joined the
U.S. Air Force, spied from 1957-63. Prison, 30 years.
1977: Christopher Boyce, clerk at a defense contractor, sold spy-
satellite data to Soviets. Prison, 40 years.
1978: Ronald Humphrey, U.S. Information Agency employee,
passed data to Vietnam-to win his Vietnamese girlfriend a
permit to leave Vietnam, he claimed. Prison, 15 years.
1983: James Harper, Jr., sold Poland missile defense data for
$250,000. Life imprisonment.
1984: Karl Koecher, Czech agent and former CIA analyst, passed
CIA data to Czechs and Soviets. Life imprisonment.
1984: Michael Tobias, U.S. Navy enlisted man, tried to sell
secret Navy codes to Soviets for $1,00,000. Prison, 20 years.
1985: John Walker, former U.S. Navy employee, ran profitable
spy ring selling Navy secrets to Soviets. Life imprisonment.
1985: Sharon Scranage, CIA clerk, gave identities of U.S..agents,
in Ghana to Ghanaian lover. Prison, five years; plus two years
probation and 1,000 hours of community service.
1985: Lary Wu-Tai Chin, retired CIA analyst, passed secrets to
China. Facing life imprisonment, he committed suicide.
eased rules for data collec-
tion and covert operations.
It may sometimes be un-
fair to speak of CIA "fail-
ures." As historian Mark
Lowenthal points out, we
cannot "expect omni-
science from intelligence."
It is a very inexact science.
The CIA usually must work
with incomplete informa-
tion, often gained from
questionable sources.
During Vice President
George Bush's stint as CIA
director in the mid-1970s,
he authorized a revealing
experiment. Two teams of
analysts were asked to as-
sess Soviet military capaci-
ties and intentions. The
teams were given exactly
the same data, but they
reached radically different
conclusions.
That experiment shows
that intelligence can only
offer educated guesses to
U.S. leaders, not guaran-
teed certainties. "Unfortu-
nately," Lowenthal writes,
in Washington there is usu-
ally "little support for anal-
ysis that says `maybe' or
`subject to change.' "
-Jonathan Rose
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SHAPERS
TEN WHOSE TOP CONCERN
IS THE NATION'S SECURITY
The nine men and one woman featured here deal
in secrets and security. Their decisions on goals
and methods guide the actions of the U.S. intelli-
gence community.
Four of the people presented here are key insid-
ers whose organizations gather intelligence on the
world. All but one work behind a wall of secrecy.
In fact, the U.S. has never admitted that Edward
Aldridge's National Reconnaissance Office exists.
Such secrecy often troubles the panels that oversee
the agencies. Sen. Dave Durenberger's committee
Vice-Admiral John M.
Poindexter, 49, was
tapped as National
Security Adviser to
President Reagan last
December. A nuclear
physicist and career Navy
man, he is considered an
"insider's insider." As
the U.S. President's main
foreign policy adviser, he
keeps a low public
profile, but is said to be
blunt in his advice to the
President. Poindexter
earned wide praise last
year for masterminding
the U.S. interception of a
jet carrying the hijackers
of the cruise ship Achille
Lauro.
Sen. Dave Durenberger
(R-Minn), 51, head of
the Senate's Select
Intelligence Committee
since 1985, is a lawyer
who once served as a
U.S. Army Intelligence
officer. Elected to the
Senate in 1978, he is the
first Minnesotan in more
than 50 years to lead a
Senate committee. A
moderate conservative,
he has traded public
barbs with CIA chief
William Casey over the
agency's hush-hush
policies. He advocates
open debate of
intelligence issues and
more long-range planning.
is sure to air its worries at coming hearings on
Robert Gates, tapped to be the CIA's No. 2 chief.
Two others profiled here are the nation's chief
spy-catchers, responsible for tracking enemy
agents and putting them behind bars. Their re-
cord-setting pace in the past two years has height-
ened public awareness of the spy problem.
Missing here are the foot soldiers of intelligence
work. They include analysts who puzzle over raw
data, and the spies-some human, some electron-
ic-that do their work hidden from view.
Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-
IN), 54, has been
chairman of the U.S.
House Intelligence
Committee since 1981. A
liberal who's served his
rural Indiana district for
21 years, Hamilton says
intelligence is a top
priority, but covert action
should be a last resort.
He wants more debate
among intelligence
analysts, even if their
reports contradict U.S.
policymakers. He also
promises that his panel
will be "very tough" on
intelligence agencies'
requests for more
money.
Lt. Gen. William
Odom, 53, has directed
the National Security
Agency (NSA) since last
April. A career military
man from Tennessee, he
is known as "a hardliner
toward the U.S.S.R."
His experience includes
stints as an Army attache
in Moscow and teaching
Soviet government at
West Point. As head of
the top-secret NSA, he
commands a worldwide
network of high-tech
listening posts. His
agency is under pressure
to trim its big spending,
estimated at up to $10
billion a year.
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Edward C. Aldridge,
Jr., 47, is said to head
the super-secret National
Reconnaissance
Organization (NRO),
which operates U.S. spy
satellites. Officially, he
has been Under Secretary
of the Air Force since
1981. Before that, he
was a manager with top
defense contractors. At
the NRO, he oversees a
budget of some $2.5
billion. The explosion of
the space shuttle
Challenger means new
headaches for the NRO,
which was counting on
the shuttles to put spy
satellites in orbit.
Anne L. Armstrong, 58,
has headed the
Presidential Foreign
Intelligence Advisory
Board since 1981. A
Texan and former
Ambassador to Great
Britain, Armstrong
served as a top aide to
Presidents Nixon and
Ford. First set up 30
years ago, the board
makes sure the President
gets an independent
review of the U.S.
intelligence effort. Its 14
members include former
top foreign policy
makers. Critics say its
influence on intelligence
issues is limited.
James Geer, 46, has
been the FBI's Assistant
Director in Charge of the
Intelligence Division
since last June. In plain
terms, this 20-year
agency veteran is the
nation's chief spy-
catcher. Under President
Reagan, the FBI's
counterintelligence
budget has tripled. But
Geer's agents must
monitor the moves of
about 1,600 Soviet-bloc
spies in the U.S., and
they are able to check up
on only a fraction of the
4.2 million Americans
who have access to
classified information.
Lt. Gen. Leonard
Perroots, 52, appointed
Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency
(DIA) last October, has
been an intelligence
expert for over 30 years.
As head of the DIA,
organized in 1961,
Perroots oversees the
collection and analysis of
military intelligence.
Many consider his
agency's reports as
important and influential
as those of the CIA.
Officially, the DIA
doesn't have spies of its
own, but its attach6s
have been caught in
undercover work abroad.
Morton Abramowitz,
53, was named to head
the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) last
year. A former U.S.
Ambassador to Thailand,
he acts as a link between
the agencies that gather
intelligence, such as the
CIA, and the diplomats
and officials who use it.
His bureau analyzes data
and produces detailed
reports on current events
and long-range trends.
The INR also reviews
U.S. intelligence actions
to make sure they're in
line with U.S. foreign
policy.
John Martin, 48, has
been chief of the Internal
Security Section at the
Justice Department since
1973. His office works
closely with the FBI and
other agencies to track
down and prosecute
national security crimes,
and he makes the first
decision on whether to
prosecute a spy. He has
won credit for speeding
up cases without
embarrassing agencies
which have been spied
on. New laws which
keep U.S. secrets out of
public trial records help
his attorneys win cases.
-Deborah Sussman
16 ^ SCHOLASTIC UPDATE
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ECONOMICS
SOVIET AGENTS SEEK
NIGH-TECH SECRETS
The Soviet Union's efforts to gain advanced U.S. technology have
made it the world leader in industrial espionage. By stealing
secrets, it has managed to avoid years of costly research.
Amos Dawe, a Singapore business-
man, obtained $50 million worth
of credit from the Singapore branch of
the Moscow Norodny Bank in late
1974. Soon after, he was in San Fran-
cisco, CA, arranging deals worth
nearly $11 million to buy three small
U.S. banks for the Soviets.
Dawe's dealings looked suspicious
to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
officer based in Singapore. The CIA
man leaked details to a Hong Kong
newsletter, which published an article
about them. The deal to buy the U.S.
banks collapsed. The Soviet bank
withdrew its funds, and Dawe was hit
with a flurry of lawsuits. Today, he is
in a Hong Kong prison, serving a five-
year sentence for fraud.
The Dawe scheme was not unusual,
U.S. intelligence officials say. It was
part of the Soviet Union's wide-rang-
ing effort to gain access to advanced
U.S. technology. Taking over the Cal-
ifornia banks, for instance, would
have enabled the Soviets to learn
about computer companies that the
banks made loans to.
Rumors accusing certain corpora-
tions, research groups, and scientists
of stealing trade secrets have long cir-
culated in the business world. For
years, Japanese firms were top sus-
pects. But the Soviet Union's zeal to
close its technological gap with the
West has made it the global leader in
industrial espionage.
LOOKING FOR SHORTCUTS
Throughout the world, Soviet offi-
cials are constantly on the lookout for
new information that will help boost
their economy and military technol-
ogy. They're especially interested in
information that will provide short
cuts around expensive and time-con-
suming research. Top Soviet targets
include microchip designs, artificial
intelligence programs, genetic engi-
neering, laser devices, superplastics,
new metal alloys, and ion (charged
particle) beams.
"In most cases, they could proba-
bly make these things on their own,"
says Marc Greenfield, an expert on
Soviet computer technology at Colum-
bia University. "But it's easier and
cheaper to buy or steal them."
Soviet agents collect most of their
information legally. They read scien-
tific journals, attend meetings and
trade shows, buy samples of new
equipment, and engage in joint re-
search projects. But they also work
undercover, bribe or blackmail re-
searchers, steal data, and spread false
rumors.
A recent U.S. Defense Department
report listed some of the U.S. compa-
nies high on the Soviets' "shopping
list." Number one is General Electric,
a maker of jet engines, nuclear reac-
tors, and robot manufacturing systems
for guided missiles. Numbers two and
three are the Boeing and Lockheed
aircraft companies. Also on the list
are top electronics firms, including
IBM and Westinghouse Motorola.
U.S. officials view the Soviet focus
on high-technology with alarm. Since
the late 1970s, Assistant Secretary of
State Richard Perle has said, they may
have cut the U.S. lead from 10 years
to three. Western experts who have
examined Soviet weapons and com-
puters say that many Soviet items are
direct copies of U.S. hardware.
In recent years, the U.S. and other
Western nations have taken steps to
block the flow of high-technology
data to the Soviet Union. The Soviets
responded by stepping up illegal oper-
ations to get that data. They set up
hundreds of "dummy companies" in
Western Europe to buy advanced
American equipment. Some of these
"dummy companies" have tied into
computer networks as a way of tap-
The Justice Department seized these
computer items in Santa Clara, CA, be-
fore they were passed to Soviet buyers.
ping sensitive data.
U.S. officials have also tried to put
more pressure on businessmen who
sell equipment to the Soviet Union-
sometimes legally, sometimes not.
Such businessmen argue that, if the
U.S. doesn't sell technology to the
Soviets, others will.
FOOLISH OPENNESS
Several Soviet defectors point out
that their former homeland benefits
economically from the latest Western
research without paying for it. One, in
fact, called Americans "fools" for
making such information available.
However, many Western scientists
argue that, by the time the Soviet
Union adopts U.S. designs, they are
already out of date. The only way to
gain a real advantage, these scientists
say, is by conducting-not stealing-
advanced research.
Depending on U.S. technology car-
ries other risks for the Soviets, too.
"The last thing they want to do,"
Marc Greenfield told UPDATE, "is
to steal a mainframe computer to
guide their missiles and not know how
it works."
But it doesn't pay to underestimate
the Soviets, some analysts warn. Past
experience has shown that "borrow-
ing" ideas in one area of research has
often helped them surge ahead in an-
other. -Michael Cusack
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NOW THE SOVIET UNION
SPIES ON THE WORLD
Soviet leaders command a worldwide spy network to steal
foreign secrets and crush dissent at home. Like the czars of old,
they see threats to their security everywhere they look.
Screaming in wide-eyed terror, a
man strains at the wire binding
him to the stretcher. But the wire
holds, digging deep into his flesh. The
furnace doors part. Two attendants
step aside. The stretcher glides for-
ward on metal rails. The scene is
gruesome. For a traitor to Soviet mili-
tary intelligence, there is only one
way out-up the chimney.
Viktor Suvorov, a Soviet
defector, recalls viewing
the film of this execution as
part of his spy training. The
film's message was clear,
Suvorov writes in his book,
Inside the Aquarium. Spies
who do their jobs well are
rewarded with good pay,
travel, clothes, and luxuries
not available to ordinary
citizens. For those who be-
tray secrets, less pleasant
rewards await. Suvorov,
who faces a death sentence
as a Soviet traitor, is now in
hiding in Britain.
Espionage of every
kind-industrial, military,
and political-is a serious
subjected for centuries has engendered
qualities such as suspicion and skepti-
cism on the part of ruler and ruled
alike. "
Today's Soviet espionage forces
would dwarf those of the harshest
czars. Their exact numbers are known
only to a few Soviet leaders. But the
size of the spy bureaucracy is said to
thousands of informants across the
country watch for and report the mis-
deeds of their fellow citizens.
Finally, there are the KGB espio-
nage specialists in foreign countries.
Estimates put their numbers at up to
20,000 in the U.S. and its allies in
Western Europe. Still more are as-
signed to other nations around the
world. Most Soviet spies are disguised
as diplomats, journalists, or trade offi-
cials.
Western experts believe that be-
tween one third and one half of all
Soviets living and working abroad
have espionage assignments. If
they're correct, that would
mean at least 290, and up to
500, Soviets in the U.S are
doing double duty as spies.
The U.S. is trying to cut
back on the number of So-
viet spy-diplomats working
inside its borders. Last
month, it ordered the Sovi-
et, Ukrainian, and Byelo-
russian Missions to the
United Nations to cut 105
people from their combined
staffs. The Ukraine and
Byelorussia, republics of
granted separate member-
ships at the U.N.'s found-
ing in 1945.
Officially, the Soviet
Union says the KGB spends
Arkady Shevchenko, left, and Vitaly Yurchenko are spy war
veterans. Shevchenko, a former U.N. official, spied on Soviet
diplomats before defecting to the U.S. Yurchenko, a top KGB
agent, fled to the U.S., then changed his mind and fled home.
business in the Soviet Union. Soviet
leaders command a vast spy network
at home and around the world. The
reason, Western experts agree, is that
they see danger everywhere they look.
HISTORY OF SUSPICION
Secret police units have flourished
under the Communists, who took
power following the revolution of
1917. But Soviet spying is not a child
of communism. It has a long and infa-
mous history, beginning in the late
1500s. "Its pedigree dates back as far
as Czar Ivan the Terrible's secret
army," says Walter Laquer, author of
a new study of espionage, A World of
Secrets. "The kind of political rule to
which the Russian people have been
be enormous. Laquer estimates that
perhaps a half million workers toil for
the KGB, the Soviet Union's chief
spy organization. In Russian, the ini-
tials KGB stand for "Committee for
State Security."
Not all KGB people are "cloak-
and-dagger" types. At least 200,000
are border troops. Some 120,000 oth-
ers serve in special military units. Of
the rest, 60,000 work at KGB head-
quarters in Moscow and at offices
around the nation.
The Soviet Union also can call on
another another 250,000 people who
serve in its "MVD" Security Forces,
who can be quickly assigned to the
KGB for "internal security" jobs. In
addition to all these, hundreds of
about $3 billion a year. Like the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, howev-
er, the KGB keeps secret most of its
budget. Some Western experts put the
KGB budget as high as $20 billion.
THE SUPER-SECRET GRU
Still, the KGB doesn't include all
of the Soviet espionage effort. Hidden
from view until recent years was the
GRU, the Soviet military's intelli-
gence unit. The GRU is smaller than
the KGB, with about 50,000 employ-
ees at home and abroad. If the KGB is
secret, the GRU is super-secret. Sovi-
et defectors say that almost anyone
can apply for a job with the KGB. But
the GRU is so suspicious of outsiders
that it doesn't take applications. In-
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KGB headquarters in Moscow sits on Dzershinsky Square, named for the first Soviet secret-police chief. KGB agents are often
called "chekists," after Its first nickname, Cheka. KGB head Viktor Chebrlkov (inset) has been with the spy agency for 19 years.
stead, it selects new recruits without
their knowledge. Someone who ap-
plied for a GRU job would probably
face interrogation to find out how he
or she learned about the organization.
Most experts say the GRU and the
KGB are locked in a feud, or at least a
serious competition. One reason,
some say, is their different roles in
Soviet intelligence. Viktor Suvorov,
who defected from the GRU, says the
KGB's job is to "prevent the collapse
of the Soviet Union from the inside."
The GRU's job, on the other hand, is
to "prevent the collapse of the Soviet
Union from the outside."
DESTROYING DISSIDENTS
One way experts compare the two
agencies is by how they focus their
forces. The KGB devotes only a small
portion of its energy to foreign spy-
ing. Most KGB work is domestic. Its
job is to ensure the continued domi-
nance of the Communist Party. In the
1970s, the KGB reportedly detailed
25,000 agents to spy on and destroy
dissident groups inside the Soviet
Union.
Obvious targets are those who chal-
lenge the Party's authority. But the
Party also sees a disruptive influence
among religious Jews, Moslems, Bap-
tists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and unau-
thorized peace groups. They may be
watched by KGB agents and prosecut-
ed as threats to national security.
The GRU, meanwhile, focuses al-
most entirely on foreign military
threats. Its job is to collect technical
data about the U.S. and other nations.
It supervises spy ships, satellites, and
ground stations that intercept commu-
nications signals from foreign military
forces.
The KGB-GRU division of labor
also shows in the kinds of events and
issues that each pays attention to. Vik-
tor Suvorov saw radically different
KGB and GRU views of former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter. The GRU, he
says, concluded that Carter was un-
likely to launch a nuclear attack
against the Soviet Union. So they paid
little attention to him. For the KGB,
however, Carter was a four-year head-
ache. The KGB saw his support for
human rights-and Soviet dissi-
dents-as a threat to Soviet stability.
Whatever their differences, the
GRU and KGB both focus their for-
eign spy energies on the U.S. Their
methods range from bribery and
blackmail to friendly talk. Their
agents visit singles' bars, men's clubs,
and expensive restaurants in Washing-
ton and New York in hopes of meet-
ing contacts who may let fall a crumb
or two of useful information.
SPYING ON CAMPUS
Soviet operatives also visit public
libraries to study reports on U.S. com-
panies. They attend science confer-
ences and seminars. They collect busi-
ness cards from engineers and
executives the way young boys collect
baseball cards.
One Soviet report on espionage in
the U.S., stolen by French agents,
listed 35 scientific conferences Soviet
observers had attended. Topics at
some meetings included missiles, en-
gines, radar, and lasers. The report
also named 60 U.S. colleges as scien-
tific and technical orchards ripe for
picking. Favored targets were Har-
vard, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), and the University
of California at Berkeley. The Soviets
conduct up to 20 percent of their U.S.
spying on college campuses, experts
say.
Whatever the source, a U.S. De-
fense Department report says the So-
viets spend about $1.4 billion each
year to steal high-technology informa-
tion in the U.S. A special "Institute
for Inter-Agency Information"
(VIMI) gets orders from the Soviet
defense industry and assigns the spy
chores to the GRU or KGB. It even
draws up budgets for the operations.
According to the report stolen by the
French, the Soviets say they've
snatched 10,000 pieces of hardware
and 100,000 documents of various
kinds from the U.S.
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet
General Secretary, recently told the
KGB and GRU to keep up the good
work and to prepare for "greater re-
sponsibility." In keeping with the tra-
ditional Soviet fear of enemies within
and without, Gorbachev said the spy
services' eternal duty is to "expose
enemy intrigues, to frustrate all kinds
of subversion, and to protect our
country's sacred frontiers."
-Peter M. Jones
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SOCIOLOGY
NEW FORCE IN ESPIONAGE:
GREED REPLACES IDEALS
U.S. and Soviet spy agencies face a common problem: lost
loyalties. More Americans are selling U.S. secrets for large sums.
And more Soviet defectors are fleeing to the West.
Nathan Hale, a 21-year-old Ameri-
can spy, was caught by the Brit-
ish on Sept. 21, 1776, and condemned
to death. As the hanging rope was
readied, Hale began a speech. Tradi-
tion has it that the speech ended with
these words: "I only regret that I have
but one life to lose for my country."
Today, a spy is more likely to re-
gret not asking for more money.
That's the conclusion experts draw
from the flurry of espionage arrests
that has shocked U.S. officials and the
American people over the past two
years. Greed, it appears, has replaced
idealistic belief in a cause as the spy's
prime motivator.
PRIZE RECRUITS
The world of 1986 is very different
than it was in Nathan Hale's time. But
spy services still prize recruits who
have the unswerving patriotism of ear-
lier days. A recent ad for the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency told job
hunters that its work "answers the
question: `What can I do for my coun-
try', 11
Soviet spy agencies
don't advertise for work-
ers. But, if they did,
they might make a simi-
lar appeal to young Sovi-
ets. "Both groups look
for people who are nar-
row in their perspective,
who willingly accept the
norms of their society in
foreign affairs and de-
fense policy," says Jef-
fery Richelsen, a profes-
sor at American Univer-
sity and an expert on
U.S. and Soviet intelli-
gence.
The growing problem
for spymasters on each
side isn't finding new
employees, but keeping
them loyal. Experts say the U.S. is
especially vulnerable to what they call
"non-professional" spies. These are
the workers in defense industries, the
military, or other federal agencies
who sell secrets to foreign agents.
Cash lures most such turncoats.
Testifying before Congress, Philip
Parker, a top FBI official, said that
foreign spy agencies try to "identify
[Americans] with financial or profes-
sional problems that might make them
vulnerable to exploitation." One CIA
source offered a harsher description.
The non-professional spies, he said,
were "greedy, emotional cripples."
One such case involved Richard
Miller, a 20-year FBI veteran. With
eight children, two houses, and a
failed investment in an avocado farm,
Miller could not live on his salary of
$40,000 a year. For a time, he sold
Amway products out of his car. A
perfect example of someone with
money problems, Miller was lured
into a love affair by Svetlana Ogorod-
nikov, a Soviet agent. At Miller's ar-
Soviet spies looking to buy U.S. secrets are taught that
rest, U.S. prosecutors said he had sold
a classified FBI document to Ogorod-
nikov for $65,000. A first jury dead-
locked 11 to 1 in favor of conviction.
As UPDATE went to press, a second
trial was in progress.
Miller's case is part of a new "buy-
a-spy" trend that worries many ex-
perts. Soviet agents use a careful
"carrot-and-stick" with most who
seem willing to pass along secrets,
says Dr. Louis West, a California psy-
chiatrist who has advised the U.S.
government on espionage issues.
"The carrot is more money for more
work," West told UPDATE, "and the
stick is the threat of exposure for work
already done."
CHANGING SPY CLUES
Money has always played a role in
spying. But, officials say, its influ-
ence in espionage today is making the
job of the FBI and other counterintel-
ligence agencies harder. The clues of
a spy threat have changed since the
days when political ideals, not dollars,
motivated spies.
In the 1920s and 1930s, many peo-
ple in the U.S. and Europe were in-
spired by ideals of social and econom-
ic equality described by Karl Marx, a
German philosopher. They believed
that the best hope for mankind's fu-
cans can be bought." Recent U.S. spy scandals, many feel, seem to
prove it. Typical targets are people with money worries.
ture lay in the kind of
society that Marxists in
the Soviet Union prom-
ised.
Marx called religion
"an opiate." But Marx-
ism itself acted like a re-
ligion for many of its be-
lievers. Their fervor
alarmed many Ameri-
cans, who feared that
Communists in the U.S.
were slowly infiltrating
the nation's institutions.
As early as January,
1920, the U.S. Attorney
General, A. Mitchell
Palmer, ordered the ar-
rests of thousands of
people who were sus-
pected of being Commu-
nists. In 1948, Alger
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Hiss, a former U.S. State
Department officer, was in-
dicted for perjury after de-
nying he had passed secret
papers to Communist spies.
Hiss was jailed.
In 1949, 11 leaders of the
U.S. Communist Party
were convicted of advocat-
ing the violent overthrow of
the government. All were
jailed. In the same year,
State Department experts
who had accurately predict-
ed the Communist victory
in China's civil war were
accused of having Commu-
nist sympathies. Many lost
their jobs.
that they are politically suspect or
have any money problems."
Today, counterspy efforts no longer
focus on "closet" Communists. Most
threats come from people who appear
to care little about politics. "These
are not Communists or people who
[are] committed to the abolition of
capitalism-quite the contrary," says
U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger.
Former U.S. Attorney General
Griffin Bell blames a "breakdown in
values and a looseness in general dis-
cipline " for the rising number of spy
cases in the U.S. "It's the `me' gener-
ation and [the attitude of] `I'll make it
on my own,' " he says, that causes
the selling of secrets for money.
BUYING AMERICAN
The Soviets know that Marxist
ideals no longer attract many Ameri-
cans. So, they have changed their ap-
peal to potential spies. According to
one Soviet defector, a Moscow espio-
nage manual says the average Ameri-
can "regards money as the sole means
of ensuring personal freedom and in-
dependence. " A former Soviet diplo-
mat in Japan, Stanislav Levchenko,
sums up the Soviet view in five
words: "All Americans can be
bought. "
The Soviet view is exaggerated.
But, U.S. experts say, it shows the
problem of spotting money-hungry
spies. "I'd say [today's spies] are
harder to detect in advance," profes-
sor Jeffrey Richelsen told UPDATE.
"A lot of these people don't get into
financial trouble until five or 10 years
after they're employed. Or it may be
after they retire. When they first take
a job, there may be nothing to indicate
BODY BLOW
Americans are not the only people
who sell secrets. Soviet citizens, in-
cluding spies, find life in the West a
powerful lure. In 1985, Soviet agents
in West Germany, Greece, Britain,
and Italy defected to the
West. "It's . . . a real
body blow to [them]," said
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT),
a member of the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelli-
gence. "They must be in
sheer panic over there."
U.S. glee soured after
one defector fled back to
Moscow. Still, it was a big
year for Soviet turncoats.
Some say the Soviet agents
defected because they
feared that their bosses had
prepared a loyalty test for
them.
Such cases suggest that
Marxist ideals have lost
much of their appeal even to Soviets.
"The defections mark Moscow's fail-
ure to instill Communism in the new
generation," says Zdzislaw Ruraz, a
former ambassador of Poland's Com-
munist government to Japan. Ruraz
should know what he is talking about.
He, too, is a defector.
-Peter M. Jones
F$ fillU u
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Arthur J. Walker, left, a retired Navy officer, was one of
three Walker family members convicted of selling military
secrets to the Soviets. He was sentenced to three life terms.
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WORDPOWER
A Counterspy's Codebook
U.S. SR-71 spy plane can fly 17 miles high at 2,000 m.p.h. It can evade enemy radar,
photograph 60,000 square miles in an hour, and spot a mailbox on a country road.
Case officer: An employee of an in-
telligence organization who provides
direction to a secret agent.
Clandestine: Secret or hidden.
Classified information: Data kept
from general circulation, usually to
protect national security.
Counterintelligence: Work intended
to uncover, prevent, or counter terror-
ist acts or clandestine intelligence ac-
tivities by other governments. Refers
also to the unit that performs such
work and the data obtained from it.
Cover: A false identity used by a spy,
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group, or base of operations to dis-
guise intelligence activities.
Covert action: An activity other than
intelligence-gathering conducted
abroad to bolster foreign policy goals.
The action is designed to mask the
role of the government behind it.
Espionage: The gathering of informa-
tion through clandestine means.
Ferret: U.S. spy satellite.
Human intelligence (HUMINT): In-
telligence collected by human and not
technical means. It includes data col-
lected by spies and military attachds
and through interviews of defectors,
travelers, and 6migrds.
Intelligence: Information about an en-
emy, a potential enemy, or an area.
Word also refers to the agency in-
volved in collecting such information.
Mole: A spy, often a double agent,
who sets up a cover often years before
beginning espionage operations.
National security: Safety of a nation
from spying, sabotage, or attack, and
measures taken to ensure that safety.
Reconnaissance: A survey designed
to gain intelligence information, espe-
cially of enemy territory.
Secret agent: A spy. Most CIA
agents are foreigners working abroad
under the agency's direction.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT): Intel-
ligence collected by technical means.
It includes intercepted communica-
tions (COMINT), coded and uncoded,
and also electronic intelligence
(ELINT) on air defense systems, sat-
ellite tracking stations, and the like,
derived by monitoring radar signals.
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TV NEWS
COVERING THE SHUTTLE DISASTER:
HOW THE NETWORKS
DEFINE BIG NEWS
by Dorothy Schauer
N ow do TV journalists decide
which stories deserve a three-
minute slot-and which deserve 20
seconds? How do they decide to pre-
empt an entire afternoon's program-
ming to cover a single news story?
UPDATE took those questions to
Dan Rather, the CBS News anchor,
two weeks after the January 28 disas-
ter of the space shuttle Challenger.
Shuttle launchings had become so rou-
tine, Rather's network hadn't even
bothered to cover this one live. We
asked him why.
"We were told by NASA [the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration] in the very beginning,"
Rather explained, " `The whole idea
of the shuttle is to make spaceflight
routine.' If it's supposed to be rou-
tine, then at what point do you stop
live coverage? At what point do you
stop coverage at all?
"We certainly had not reached the
point where we said to ourselves,
'The shuttle mission is not news,' "
Rather said. "We were at the point
where we said, 'Each shuttle launch is
certainly a news story to be covered in
our regularly scheduled newscasts.' "
ABC and NBC agreed. On January
28, only the Cable News Network
(CNN) televised the launch nationally.
Then, 73 seconds into the mission, the
shuttle's main fuel tank exploded,
blowing Challenger apart. All seven
crewmembers died in the accident.
Within minutes, the network news
anchors-Rather at CBS, Tom Bro-
kaw at NBC, and Peter Jennings at
ABC-were on the air. They stayed
there all afternoon and returned for
special hour-long reports that evening.
Rather had been watching the
launch in his office on closed-circuit
TV. "I saw a flash and some smoke,"
he recalled. "It was clear something
had happened, but I wasn't quite sure
what. Now, the wire services-Asso-
ciated Press, United Press Internation-
al, Reuters-are sometimes your best
bet for early, verifiable information.
But they didn't know what had hap-
pened, either. We had a decision to
make-whether to go on the air. As
soon as we established that the shuttle
did explode, the decision made itself.
We would go on and stay on, proba-
bly for quite a while."
Rather went on the air without
much to report beyond the fact of the
explosion. So, coverage consisted of
little more than 90 seconds of video-
tape on the explosion and lengthy
background material on the crew-
members, the mission, and NASA.
CIVILIAN ABOARD
Interest in this particular launch was
higher than usual. On board with six
trained astronauts was Christa McAu-
liffe, a social studies teacher, whose
presence had been the focus of much
pre-launch publicity.
Still, many wondered why the net-
works covered the Challenger disaster
more aggressively than, say, an air-
plane crash. Last December, a civilian
plane crashed in Newfoundland, Can-
ada, killing 248 army personnel and
eight crew members.
"[The Newfoundland crash] hap-
pened at a time and in a place where
nobody had live cameras," Rather
said. "At Cape Canaveral, we have
cameras and we have the capability of
'going live' at any time. At New-
foundland, you have to send people to
cover it. I think one Canadian camera-
man was near the scene at the time of
the Newfoundland crash.
"That's a consideration, not the
consideration," Rather continued.
`You also have to ask, 'How many
people will be interested? How impor-
tant is the story?' Sometimes you say,
Veteran journalist Dan Rather, 54, just
ended his fifth year as anchor and man-
aging editor of The CBS Evening News.
`Well, maybe people won't be inter-
ested, but in our judgment they should
be.' You also have to ask if we have
information about what happened and
photographs of it. All of this goes into
the decision-making process."
Audience viewing habits play a
part, too. "For special events cover-
age, like the Challenger story," Rath-
er said, "the following often happens:
One person sees it on TV, calls some-
body, and says, 'Hey, did you see
what happened?' Our sense was that
we should show the videotape once
every 15 or 20 minutes, so that new
viewers could be caught up on what
had happened and what was known."
On camera, Rather referred fre-
quently to a scale model of the shuttle.
He also had a team of reporters and
researchers working with him.
Excessive coverage? Nonsense,
Rather says. "Honest journalists
sometimes can differ about whether a
story deserves 'front-page' cover-
age," Rather told UPDATE. "No-
body but nobody had any doubt about
this story. The shuttle explodes. Any-
body worthy of the name journalist
would say that's a big story."
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PUZZLES
WORDSEARCH
The words on the list are hidden in the diagram. When you find them, circle
them. Each word runs in a straight line. Some of them run on a slant, or
L.1 C
N
U
0
C
B
M
backwards. (See CODE, in the example.)
Eleven letters will be left over. In order
they spell the term for a secret CIA
A D L
O
C
S
R
C
O
,
or FBI break-in:
K G B
I
S
E
Y
T
L
A
E
N
S
S
C
P
E
E
G
D
J
A
A
U
T
R
T
K
0
H
V
T
R
O
R
H
D
C
I
N
A
I
L
E
I
Black Chamber* Cryptology KGB
H R A
I
M
T
O
F
C
Chase D.C.I. Mata Hari*
P A L
L
C
Y
G
N
S
C.I.A. Ethics Mole
Classify FBI National Security Council*
W A R
F
B
I
Y
O
A
Code Ferret Nail
B Y F
I
S
S
A
L
C
Cold War* Invasion of Privacy* Tass
Trail
*Written as separate words in diagram.
CROSSWORD
*Staffed clues refer to the theme of
this issue.
ACROSS
*1. Israeli intelligence organization.
*4. Unintended transmissions of
information or news releases.
8. Choose, select.
*9. Country whose harbor CIA
mined in 1984.
13. Long Island, for short.
* 14. Washington, .
15. Her, in Berlin. .
* 16. Revolutionary spy who had
but one life to give for his
country.
2
3
S
6
7
1
1
9
10
II
12
13
4
15
4
29
16
25
17
21
18
26
19
22
20
27
23
28
30
31
32
33
4
35
36
37
38
39
*19. States: major western nation. *7.
*21. Secret listening devices in 10.
rooms or buildings. *11.
*22. Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (abbr.). *12.
*24. action (hidden, undercover). *13.
* 15.
27
Hunt
search for
.
,
.
29. Suffix used for enzymes.
30. Editor, for short.
*32. Nazi police force.
*33. Practice of spying.
37. Red, Black, or Yellow.
38. Yellow triangular traffic sign.
*39. agent (undercover spy).
17.
18.
DOWN *24.
1. Heal, improve, fix. *25.
2. Securities and Exchange Comm. *26.
*3. Defense Intelligence Agency. 28.
4. Gehrig or Piniella of the 31.
Yankees. 33.
5. Environmental Protection 34.
Agency. 35.
6. The Marx Brothers' "A 36.
Night the Opera." 37.
Watched secretly.
I, in Bonn.
American Civil Liberties
Union (abbr.).
Soviet intelligence agency.
detector.
Department: federal
agency that deals with for-
eign policy.
None of the
German name for Ohre, cen-
tral European river.
Belonging to the National Se-
curity Agency.
"You can on me."
Director of the C.I.A.
Predecessor of the C.I.A.
Break in on a telephone line secretly.
Beer barrel.
Scratch on a car.
Electric, slippery, aquatic creature.
Not happy.
and outs.
On the (broadcasting).
Southeast (abbr.).
SCRAMBLER
Unscramble the letters in each of the
four words listed below. Each word will
spell a foreign country. (Hint: each coun-
try is on a different continent.) Write the
names in the spaces provided. The circled
letters, when rearranged in the spaces at
the bottom, will answer the riddle.
Riddle: Spy equipment that the National
Reconnaisance Office might provide
agents on horseback.
Answers in your teacher's edition.
Puzzles created by Andrew Gyory.
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1
3L 7T4 iell A I I- Isk j : A ALJL
6, [U11-4JI-1 1A1 I , IT 'L
With the GI Bill Plus the Army College
Fund, you can earn 111 for college, with the
Army's special Two-Year Enlistment.
Here's how:
You contribute $100 a month towards your
education for the first twelve months. Then the
i ? . .?? ? '.:111 ?
? ? -?- . ... ? ? '~ 111
But you'll get a lot more out of your enlist-
ment than the money you can earn for college.
You'll have a chance to travel. To meet new
people. To get yourself into the best physical
shape you've ever been in.
Most important, you'll have an opportunity
to learn a lot about the world, and yourself,
before you get to college.
For information about the Army's special
jwoj~ar
? ? :11
Al~
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070002-6
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]TY: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS
U.S. President
Ronald Reagan
Security I nc NS '
3vel group advises President on
t policy questions.
or,
: Chief intelligence adviser to the
,ent & NSC. Coordinates U.S. in-
ice efforts as chairman of the
gal Foreign Intelligence Board,
members are heads of the vari-
telligence groups. Directs CIA.
acts secret intelligence efforts and
actions abroad. Collects and an-
3 military, economic, bio-
ical, sociological, scientific and
cal intelligence. Develops new in-
=e-gathering technology. Under
al circumstances, conducts coun-
a.Iligence activities inside the U.S.,
)rdination with the FBI.
and some economic intelligence.
to
Openly collects economic data on for-
eign nations. Secret Service protects
President against surveillance activities
of foreign nations.
Conducts activities inside the U.S.-
and, under special circumstances, out-
side the U.S., in coordination with the
CIA-to counter other nations' espio-
nage activities. Coordinates counterin-
telligence activities of all U.S. intelli-
gence agencies.
F u f v tlon (.FBI
NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES
AND DEPARTMENTS
part ent of Energy
De'
Openly collects political, economic, and
technical data on foreign energy mat-
ters.
a~ lent of the Treasury
Maintains Bureau of Intelligence and
Research that openly gathers political
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(Continued from page TE-3)
ing sufficient in a democracy? When
did the U.S. institutionalize spying?
Questions to Guide Reading. 1.
What kinds of world events seem to
demand secret intelligence operations
by the U.S.? 2. Is there any limit to
what U.S. intelligence agencies can or
must do?
Fast Quiz. Historian Jonathan Rose's
History feature identifies some suc-
cesses and several failures in covert
activities planned by the U.S. intelli-
gence community in recent decades.
Ask students to (1) identify each of
the following as a CIA "success" [S]
or "failure" [F] and (2) explain the
CIA's role briefly:
a. Bay of Pigs (F); b. Cuban missile
crisis (S); c. Watergate (F); d. late
1970s political climate in Iran (F).
Role-Playing Activity. Even for
William J. Casey, Director of Central
Intelligence, appearing before the U.S.
Senate Intelligence Committee.
classes not used to role-playing, the
fast give-and-take of this week's UP-
DATE Interview argues for having
two students (one, playing DCI's Wil-
liam Casey; the other, UPDATE's
Maura Christopher) read the feature as
a dialogue.
There are many discussion points
suggested by Casey's remarks. One is
his observation that money is "the big
reason" for the number of Americans
engaged in spying against their own
nation.
Debate Activity. See the Skills Re-
view page in this Teachers' Edition
(page TE-8) for an outline students
can use in researching and preparing
to debate a topic related to oversight
Evaluation. 1. Ask students to write a
brief summary of the role played by
each of the following in the develop-
ment of the U.S. foreign-intelligence
system: the Black Chamber, MAGIC,
the OSS, the National Security Act.
2. See the Post-Test on page TE-7 of
this Teacher's Edition.
You can help.
It takes three of us to keep track of all the teachers orders
that come in for Scholastic's 30 different magazines.
That's me, Joan Marcelynas, in the center. Art Stupar is
on the right; Warren Klotz on the left. It's our job to make
sure that enough magazines are printed for the teachers
and students who want them.
It's not easy, but you can help.
By reserving subscriptions now for next year, you give us
the time we need to see to it that your back-to-school issues
are in your hands when school begins. The summer
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Let us hear from you just as early as possible. It's the best
way we know to provide you with the top-quality service you
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ANSWERS
Crossword, p. 24
Across: 1. Mossad; 4. leaks; 8. opt; 9. Nica-
ragua; 13. L.I.; 14. D.C.; 15. sie; 16. Hale; 19.
United; 21. bugs; 22. S.A.L.T.; 24. covert; 27.
seek; 29. -ase; 30. ed.; 32. S.S.; 33. espionage;
37. Sea; 38. yield; 39. secret.
Down: 1. mend. 2. S.E.C.; 3. D.I.A.; 4.
Lou; 5. E.P.A.; 6. at 7. spied; 10. ich; 11.
A.C.L.U.; 12. G.R.U.; 13. lie; 15. State; 17.
above; 18 Eger; 20. N.S.A.'s; 23. lean; 24.
Casey; 25. O.S.S.; 26. tap; 28. keg; 31. dent;
33. eel 34. sad; 35. ins; 36. air; 37. S.E.
Wordsearch, p. 24
Horizontal: Council; Cold; KGB; D.C.I.;
Nail; Of; War; FBI; Classify.
Vertical: Code; Invasion; Tass; Mata; Securi-
ty; Cryptology; Ferret; Mole; Ethics; Chamber.
Diagonal: Chase; Privacy; Trail; National;
CIA; Black; Han.
Leftover Letters: Black Bag Job.
Scrambler, p. 24
Countries: Sudan; Israel; Ecuador; Portugal.
Riddle: "Saddle-lites."
Pre-Test, Page TE-2
A. 1-c; 2-a; 3-b. B. I-T; 2-T; 3-F; 4-T; 5-F. C.
1-d; 2-c; 3-b; 4-e; 5-a. D. Check # 2 and # 6.
E. Answers will vary. See the Special Report
and Interview features.
Post-Test, page TE-7
A. 1-b; 2-a; 3-b; 4-c; 5-b. B. Check # 3. (The
CIA was formed in 1947-and might not have
failed to predict the event. C. I-F; 2-F; 3-F (It
is a fact that it is estimated); 4-0; 5-0; 6-0. D.
Answers will vary. A major difference is that
the CIA works outside the U.S.; the FBI, with-
in. E. Any four of the following: (I) Identifying
needs and planning the intelligence operation;
(2) Collecting the data; (3) Processing the data;
(4) Analyzing the data; (5) Disseminating the
analysis of policy makers. F. 1-a (Signals Inter-
ception); 2-d (Central Intelligence Agency); 3-e
(National Security Council); 4-b (National Re-
connaissance Organization). G. Answers vary.
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SCHOLASTIC UPDATE POST-TEST
(Use with this week's UPDATE on the U. S. Intelligence Community.)
General Directions. On the line to the left of
each statement, write the letter of the choice
that best completes the statement or an-
swers the question.
E. SPY STEPS
List FOUR of the five major steps in the
intelligence-gathering cycle.
A. ESPIONAGE HISTORY
- 1. One of the earliest American spies was
(a) Nathaniel Greene; (b) Nathan Hale; (c)
Nathaniel Lyon.
- 2. The "Black Chamber" espionage
agency operated in the U.S. during (a) World
War I; (b) World War II; (c) the Korean Con-
flict.
- 3. The first large-scale foreign-intelli-
gence agency in the U.S. was the (a) ICC; (b)
OSS; (c) MAGIC.
- 4. In the 1970s it was reported that the
CIA had helped overthrow the elected Marx-
ist president of (a) Mexico; (b) Argentina; (c)
Chile.
- 5. Counterintelligence efforts within the
U.S. are under the direction of the (a) CIA;
(b) FBI; (c) DOD.
B. NOT A FAILURE!
Check (J the event(s) which did NOT pro-
voke criticism of CIA failures of intelligence.
- 1. India's first nuclear explosion
- 2. the Yom Kippur War in Israel
- 3. Hitler's invasion of Russia
- 4. the Korean Conflict
C. FACT (F) OR OPINION (0)?
- 1. The number of Americans with security
clearance increased during the 1970s.
- 2. Most Americans with access to secrets
work for the Dept. of Defense.
- 3. The National Security Agency is esti-
mated to have a larger budget than any other
U.S. intelligence agency.
- 4. The U.S. probably loses more classi-
fied information through leaks to the media
than through the efforts of foreign spies.
- 5. All government workers should submit
to polygraph tests.
- 6. "The need to protect [U.S.] security is
absolute." -Wm. Casey
D. A DIFFERENCE
What is a MAJOR difference between the
mandates of the FBI and the CIA?
1.
2.
3.
4.
F. LETTER MATCH
Match each phrase to the correct set of
letters. As a BONUS, write the words for
which each set of letters stands.
Column A
a. intercepted, coded data
b. runs all U.S. spy satellites
c. data obtained by human efforts
d. said to be the fastest-growing U.S. agency
e. integrates domestic, foreign, and military
policies for U.S. defense
Column B
- 1. SIGINT
2. CIA
- 3. NSC
- 4. NRO
G. COVERT: YES OR NO?
Read the following excerpt from this
week's UPDATE Special Report. Then use
the reverse side of this paper to LIST 3 argu-
ments FOR and 3 arguments AGAINST al-
lowing the CIA secret policy-making powers
such as the one reported here.
"The CIA is said to have spent at least $80
million [in a covert action] to build up the
Nicaraguan contras, who are fighting that
nation's Marxist-led government."
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SCHOLASTIC UPDATE SKILLS REVIE
(Use with this week's UPDATE on the U. S. Intelligence Community)
Using UPDATE to Prepare for a Debate
RESOLVED: All U.S. Intelligence Operations Should Be Subject to Congressional
(i.e., the Public's) Approval.
Do you agree or disagree with the above debate proposition? One way to develop your
position on this question would be to research and outline major ideas in this week's
UPDATE.
A. To locate and summarize data, fill in the following outline. (Some data has already
been outlined.)
B. Conclude by stating your position and summarizing your arguments.
QUESTIONS PAGES/ARTICLES MAIN FACTS/POINTS
1. What are the chief pp. 4-7, Spec. Re- CIA, FBI, NSA
U.S. intelligence
port; pp. 12-13, His-
gathering agencies? to feature
ry
What were they set
up to do?
2. What types of activi-
ties do these agen-
cies get involved in?
3. What arguments are p. 10-11, Interview,
offered for keeping Wm. Casey
these agencies' ac-
tivities secret?
4. What evidence is
there for making
these activities sub-
ject to the approval of
Congress?
5. Statement of my Position (FOR or AGAINST the Question RESOLVED Above): I
believe that
6. Summary of the ARGUMENTS I will use:
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