AMERICA'S SECRET WARRIORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000200830009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 10, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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3' I~RTI ~...~ I;PP~~ x>;~rsw>~lc
012 Pf.GP~~ 10 October 1983
America.'s Secret W
Under V~'illiam Casey, the CIA is back in business w~
n a string of Turk-
I ish cities and towns,
agenu of the Central In-
telligence Agency have
arranged covert support
for Iranian exile groups
sceking the overthrow
of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence. "They keep us in the dark and feed us
a lot of manwe."
The most dramatic showdown so far
came this past summer when the House
Intelligence Committee voted to cut off all
funds for further covert support of the anti-
Sandinist contra rebels in Nicarag~tia-a
largely symbolic act, since the Senau never
Two thousand miles away, in the Pakistani
cities of Peshawar and Islamabad, other
undercover operatives are coordinating the
Bow of money and materiel vital to rebel
tribesmen battling Soviet invasion troops
across the border in Afghanistan. The agen-
cy also supplies secret aid to friendly forces
in Chad. Ethiopia, Angola and the Sudan-
and h2s launched the massive campaign of
espionage, air strikes, propaganda and oth-
er support fcr s now notorious "secret war"
against tb a leftist Sandinista regime in I~Tica-
rag~tta. Clean}?, the cloaks and daggers have
come out of cold storage at CIA headquar-
ters in Langley, ~~ a. For better or worse, the
Company is back in the business of covert
action-azth a global scopeand an intensity
of resowces unmatched since iu heyday 20
years ago.
Under the most urlikeh~ director of cen-
tral intelligence in the agency's history-a
mumbling, often maddening tax lawyer and
businessman named William J. Casey (page
40}-the CIA has found its ranks expanded,
redirected and re-energized for coven con-
frontation with hostile forces around the
world. Case.' also has streamlined basic
analysis and reporting functions, helped
swaddle the agency in a cocoon of contro-
versi2] neR secrec_~? orders and moved it
forcefull}? into two areas of stepped-up na-
tional concern: the fight to keep tons of
deadly drugs from coming into the United
States each year and the battle to keep
scores of critical high-tech advances from
being pirated out. Casey's ability to get
things done sums in large part from his
close and frequent contact with the presi-
dent (at least two meetings each week, plus
frequent phone conversations) and with fel-
low members of the cabinet (Casey is the
first DCI with cabinet rank).
`Mushroom: Still, the increase in covert
action has raised old questions about the
wisdom, proprien~ and e$ectiveness of
American intelligence activities. Critics on
and off Capitol Hill say Casey shows an old
cold warrior's insensitivity to the potential
embarrassment and diplomatic danger that
secret missions always pose--and a high-
handed disregard for the role of congres-
sional oversight in this most sensitive area.
"W e are like mushrooms," says California's
Democratic Rep. Norman Mineta of the
YY~IIV Mth~m~--N[~vs.~[ER
THEDCI ATLANGLEY.?.4 co[~enclientele
concurred. The national debate will flare
again in the next few weeks as Congress
begins to consider the nation's 1984 inulli-
gence budget, which is reported to have
grown at a rate of ] 7 percent annually for
the past three years, factor even than Penta-
gon spending, to regain the level it held
before big cutbacks began back in l 9 i ~. The
prospecu for making any substantial cuu in
the face of new Soviet aggressiveness-both
the shoodown of a Korean Air Lines jet-
liner and Moscow's hostile rejection of the
latest U.S. arms-control proposals (page
26}-"are not promising," concedes com-
mittee chairman Edward Boland of Massa-
chusetu. Dubious, too, are prospecu for a
events vita] to ow national security inur?
ests, a capability which orily the United
States among major powers has denied it-
self," it proclaimed, in pointed reference to
the decimation of CIA undercover ranks
under President Jimmy Carter and CIA
Director Stansfield Turner (operatives were
pared down to perhaps. 300 from a high
point of thousands in the early 1960s).
,~'f31~:~'T~'~ZI
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A~?TI~~. APP~RED
On PAG,~_
NEWSti,'~..~C
10. October X983
R'ith gruff controversial William J. Casey (]eft) at the helm, ?tbc
agenc}~ hay sponsored large-sca]e "specia] aetiviti~" in Iran,
ASghanistan, Ethiopia, Thailand and Nicaragua (right). But
covert operations under way than at any time since the 196Gs
America's S~erset Warriors: The QA Reborn
73c cloaks and daggers have been brought out of cold storage at
Ronald Reagan's Central lntclligence Agenc~~: Afar a sharp
decline in clandestine work during the 1970x, tbereare now more
than 1,000 CIA undercover specialists-arid more CIA-backed
Congress is distwbed. As Casey goes aboutthe task of surngthen- ,
ing the C1A and plugging its Jcaics, serious doubu remain about
the propriety and eSectiveness of clandestine operations. Pnge3& ,
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ON PAGB~- 10 October 1983
America.'s Secret Warriors
Under ~~~illiam Casey, the CIA is back in business with a new set of missions.
n a strin? of Turk-
ish cities and towns,
zgcnu of t.be Central In-
telligence Agent}? have
zr-, angcd coven suppon
for L-a.nian exile groups
seeking the overthrow
of Ayatollah F:homeini.
Permanent Select Committee on Inulli-
gence. "They keep us in the dark and feed us
a ]ot of manure."
Tbc most aramatic showdown so far
came this past summer caber, the House
lnt.elligence Committee voted t.o cut o~ all
funds for further coven suppon of the anti-
Sanainist contra rebels in I~~icaragua-a
largely symbolic act, since the Senau never
Two thousand mils away. in the Pakistani
eiti~ o,` Peshawar and Islamabad, other
undercover opc~tiva are coordinating the
Sow of money and materiel vita to rebel
tribesmen bztzling Soviet invasion troops
across the border in ASghanistan. Tne agen-
cy also supplies secret aid m friendly forces
in Chad_ F_thiopiz, Angola and tine Sudan-
and hz< launched the massive campaign; of
espionage, ai- s~-ikes, propaganda and ot:n-
c support for a Doer- notorious "secret war"
against the )efas: San einistzregime in ?~ic~-
ragt3~ CleZrh~, the cloaks and aag?ers havc
come out of cold stora?c at CiA beadottzr-
trrs in Lang]e~?, ~~~ For better or worse, the
Comisanv i~ back in the business of CC+vcn
SLDOn-with a global SCOpeanO an mtenstty
of resources t:nasubcd since its heyday 20
years ago. - -
Under toe most unlikely dir~tor of cen-
trd intelligence in the agency`s histor,-z
mumbling. o`t.en maddening tti: lawyer and
businessnzn named V.'illiam J. Czsev (page.
4~1-tbc CIA has fount iu ranks czpandcc,
reflirett.~ and re-energized for coven con-
frontation.R;tb hostile ford around the
work Cues ako bas streamlined basic
analysis znd reporting functions, helper;
swada)e tIIe zgenc}? m a cocoon of conuo-
versial neF scrret_y orders and moved it
forcefully into two arcz< of supped-up na?
Donal concern: the tight to keep tons of
dcad)~~ 6rugs from coming into the United
States eact v~ and the battle to keep
scores of c-iti~l high-t.ecb advances from
being pirates out Casey`s ability to get
think done stems in large pan from his
close and fr~ueat contact with t.be presi?
dent (at least two meetings each week, plus
frequent phone conversations) and a~tb fcl-
loa~ members o` the cabinet (Casey is the
first DCI F-itb czbinet rank).
?riushrooms: Still; the increase in coven
action hz< rzised old questions about the
R?isdom_ propriet.? and eSectivrness of
Amerir'r' inlL.Illgcnct activities. Critics on
and o5 C:~itol fiiL say Cuev shows an old
cold wa_;iOr'S insrnsiU~~n? to the potential
embarrassmcn: and diplomaric danger that
secret missions always pose--and a high-
handed disregard for the role o` congres-
sional ove.-sight in this most sensitive arm.
"w a are lii:c mubrooms." says California's
Democratic Rep. lvorman Mineta of the
concurred. Tbc national debau will 5arc
again in the next fca? weeks as Congress
begins to consider the nation's 19?4 int.elli?
grnce budget, which is reported to havc
groan at a rau of 1 i percent annually for
the past three years, faster even than Penta-
gon spending, to regain the level it held
beforebig cutbacks began back in I9 i~. The
prospetu for making any substantial cuu in
the face of new Soviet aggressiveness-both
the shoodown of a Korean Air Lines jet-
liner and Moscow's hostile rejection o` the
latest U.S. arms-control proposals (page
26}-"s.rc not promisin?." concedes com?
mitue chairman Edp?ard Boland of Massa-
chusctu. Dubious, too, arc prospccu for a
proposal by Georgia's Democratic Rep.
Wyche Fowler Jr. to require advance con-
gressional approver) of all maior coven oper-
ations. "Many in Congress don't want to
havc that authority,'' says Arizona Rep.
Bob Stump, ~ Republican member of Bo-
)and's committee, which might havc to
share the blame for a mission gone awry.
A return to coven action was forecast in
the 1980 platform of the Republican Pam'.
"We will provide our gov~ent with the
capability w help infiuenec international
. Jean ti,.,r~o--6.~1..or~
NICARrlGU~f: Anri-Sandinism tontros
evenu vita) to our national se~urin? inur-
esu, acapability which only the United
States among major powers has denied. it-
seL~," it proclaimed, >n pointed reference to
the deeimavon of C1A undercover ranks
under President Jimmy Garter and C1A
Director Stansfield Turner (operativ~c were
pared down to perhaps 300 from a high
point of thousands in the early . 1960s).
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tion costing between 55 million and 5 i mil-
lion-Drone that is designed to undermine a
foreign government). The total under Casco
is already 12 to 14, seven or eight of them
considered major, although administratior,
policy now encourages use of the term "spe-
cial activities" instead of "coven action.''
The number of covert operatives has risen to
more than 1,000, many o,` them retired or
cashiered agency vcurans who have been
hired back on a contract basis because so fey.
experienced operators remain at the agency.
So eager was Casey to get the coven boil d-
D..+o 6u~nm-~orn~et
IRAA': Support for anti-Khomeini exiles
up under way, well-placed sources report,
that within weeks of taking office the admin-
istration had approved plans developed un?
der Carer for assisting anti-Khomeini
forces. Less than a month leer there was an
O1': for early planning of operations in Libya
and Nicaragua (although insiders say the
~..r~w.b~.ck so? secret war was instigated largely by the then
CHAD: A fight ngninsr Libyan incursion Sxretary of Stau Alexander Haig and As?
The contrast w~tb the Caner wars could
not be more clear. In that period, the House
lntelligcncc Committee was informed of
two or three major covert operations, or
"findings," each year (congressional watcb-
>-"'" ?~ ._y; `~ dogs ciassifj? as "maior" any covert op~ra-
sistant Sccretar}~ Thomas 0. Enders).
Some necessarily skeuhy details on C1A
operations undo Casey:
^ Central Amrri~ In one of the agency's
most exposed undercover missions, coven
operatives are spending an estimated 580
million to direct a widesprrdd w?ar against
the regime in Nicaragua-helping to supply
some 10,000 troops in the Se1c, conducting
air strikes and espionage raids against in-
stallations within Nicaragua and maser~
minding s varier}~ of propagandz activities
to destabilize the Sandinistas. All this is
coordinated from liS. operational crnurs
in Honduras, Costa Rice and El Salvador.
Airlifu of ammunition, medicine and other
supplies are noR' being Sown to the retxLc
from San Salvador in Salvadoran C-4 i
transpon planes, l~'EWSWEEK'S Robert Ri?
yard has lcamed; American pilou have
noR~ been replaced by Salvadorans. The
goal, U.S. of5ciais say, L "to get those
Nw Wn~ele.-~y~k SLR
T-HAIZ.AJt'D: ?n~ing to stop zhe opium crop
guys to hustle." The CiA, Stau Depan?
merit and Pentagon all agree the guerrilla
have no more that, six months-perhaps
only threF-to prove tbei* "rebellion" can
spr ead successfull~? throughout Nicaragua.
"Tbc Sandinistas can wait forever, but Con-
gress won't," says one U.S. o~cial.
"Our position is that we don't turn ac-
knowledge that the CIA is in El Salvador."
says the U.S. Embassy's depun~ chief of
mission there, l::enneth Bleaklev. but sever-
al lower-ranking Stan Dcpan:mcnt ofncers
with experienec in the country say that CIA
operations go beyond the Nicaraguan e5on
to operations involving El Salvador iuelf-
covcrtsuppon fortbc country's weak politi-
cal .parties and electoral process and a
"propaganda and disinformation cam?
paign" in the Salvadoran press aimed at
"convincing the civilian population that the
guerrillas, not the Army, arc the real bad
guys," according to one source.
^ ~~* ~., Supplying about 5100 mil?
lion in anal and ammunivon to the Afghan
rebel groups, agency undercover operatives
work through contacu in Pakistan and con-
duiu in the Middle East. Intelligence
watchers say the C1A has also stepped up
operations within Pakistan to keep tabs
~i.~~~~'
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.3.
on-anc props under-the pro-American unfonunatc)y, expcn in the supply and ligence Estimat,es," says one administration
militar~? regime of President Mohammad training of clandestine military operations. "consumer" of these vita) agency reporu.
Zia u]-Haq (page 4 5). T7ic C1A also applied stron? pressure for an "He has tried to make them shorter, blunter
^ fin. The CIA is providin? support for increase of the Anne's Special Forces- i and more time)} ."
Iranian ezile< in Turkev w?bo continue to often, in the past, a prime source of paramil- Up to Date: CIA analyse now pound out
work for rile avatoliah's overthrow'. Pre- itan' expertise for the Company (page 46j. 50 lvIE's a vent instead of the doaen that
stimabl~? tber brin? intelligence from Iran Also difficult to obtain were the wide I were done before. And there is less bicker-
back across the larger unguarded border, range of secs support services and "pro- i mg amon? the various agencies of the inul?
and the.' m2v be useful u agenu o.* sources prietary" companies that the Company ' lig~~ community, insiders say. because
should they ultimateh? succeed and raur,~ once could call on in an instant: two full- ;Casey ha< found ways to give more promi?
to their homeland. Iranian exiles in France fledged commercial airlines, several banks nence to dissenting views. Aware of com?
are re~:eivinc similar CIA support. in the United States and abroad, at least one ' peting sources of inulligence, including the
^ !~fi-i~ Tae agency provides intelligence major international arms company and a ; news media, Casey has also created a w'cek-
aswell u over , aid and trainin? to the forces vanery of cover operatons in such useful l?' Waub Rcpon and an even wort up-
figbtin? LioyaL incursions into Chad. fields as import-export. This shortfall ea- to-the-minute "n~pescn~t memorandum"
Training. arms and financial assistance tie plains the embarrassing details about U.S, that reports unexpected developmenu im?
also given to tnilita~? forces in F.tbiopi~, eottipmrnt that turned up in so tnanv early mediau}y w the president and other top
Angoiz and the Sudan. Two coven oiler- storm about the contra forces in Nicara? ofneials?
aeons were aborted beC2tLCe of strong con- gun. W ell-placed sowces told NEwcv/EEK In general. the agency's predictions Lave
gressional apposition, NEwcvrEEK has that the CIA simply could not obtain and bean earn and accurau on important mat?
learned: ~ plan to provide anus for anti- ship to Ccnt,-a1 America the kind of un? ters: the elevation of Soviet leader Yuri
Libyan forces in Mauritiu_c and for oppo- tracreble materiel-Belgian, Cinch, West Anoropov and his subseAUent health pro's
nmtc of svongman M?Am**~u I:adaafi in? German or captured Soviet stocks-gnat -lens: the Libyan invasion of Clad, the res-
side Libya iueL`. normally provide cover in such situations. ignation of lsraei Prime Minisur Mena?
. Asia Tne CIf., ?~'Ewcu~EEK ha< con- Accoroin? to these sources, the Unit.ed~ cbem Bergin and thr imt,osition o` martial
firmed, helped Rath communications vain- Static Las now arr$ngeb for Israel to feed law- in Poland. But one Washington ofncial
ing and inuliiecncc gathering for raids b~ the CIA-supported guerrillas with eouip- Complains that the C1A predicted fu great-
Tbaiiand's military forces against heroin meat captured iz Lebanon. Foreign inulii? er resistance'by the Polish people than actu-
production anc processing centers in tbei- genccscrViceshaveagrneraliypositiveview ~~? ~~~' and there was even more
own Country and across the border in of Casey's rebuilding efforts, but they are embarrassment w?br-n Israeli forces pressed
Burma. Tnc agency also is working with the still wary of tine wcakeneo and fun-rigged fu deeper into Lebanon than they had
Chinese to supply arms to the forces of sine of CIA intelligrnce networks where 'promised. "Tbc analyse did write that thc~?
forv~c; Camboaian ruler Po) Pot, now wag- the}? still exist.. -~ - (the Israelis i would go fw-?thr. than anyone
ing hit-and-run attacks on the current Sai? lndcpendeat In pan ?te compensau for expectec," one inulligenec expcn recalls,
Bon-supported regime. the Company's reduced resources in coven 'but they were fairly )ow key.
Despite all rile adm;n;ctration r2ietoric operations. the Reagan administration also Similarly, says one eam;n;ctration intelii-
about the aamage done by leaks of secret has encouraged the development of a top- Bence o~cizl. the C1A produced a fu:
info:-mation, the operations aimed 2t Nicb? secret and totallt~ independent Army lnu)- ,amount of w?a.-nin? about the builoing
ragua. Libys and Afghanistan have been ligrnce Support Acvviry (A.ISA), about threat tc Egyptian leader Anwu Saaat
relat+ve)y inin)~~ disguises. And in the cases which even many intelligence watchdogs in "but it never penetrated-it wasn't done
of Libya acid Niczragiia, some intelligence Congress were unaware tuitil an aceidenta) forcefully rnougb to overcome the boss`
veterans bane been surprised'b~ the coordi- mrntion of it during bearings earlier this love aSair with Sadat." Somc critics fear
nation o` cover: aCU\~tie5 with highh vlsi- year. AISA was reponed}y formed for Com- that U.S. ties to rcgim~ in Saudi Arabia.
hie naval maneuvers. All of w$icb leads mando-style missions and support iz the Jordan ono the Philippines could also blind
SOmt 10 suspect Supposed)' SecTCi missions wake of the disastrous joint military at- the C1A or it_c masers to maior upheavals in
are valued in pan for their contributior. to tempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran- those countries in the near futwe.
the hud-nosed image Pracident Reagan an effort made more difficut because the Te further upgrade iu analysis and re?
wants for U.S. foreign policy. CIA did not have a single agent left on the porting, t:nc C1A Las supped up recruiting
wbauver the motives beaind Casey's gTOUnd iL that counm?. Although Casey for specialise ir. high technology and area
coven operations: mounting them has sera- himself has refused to answer questions on studies, especiall} the Third World-and
otuly s~sined the C1A's depleted rc- -the subiect, some adtninisvation ofiiciaL the nation's college campuses arc r~spond~
sources. "T-nc single biggest consuatnt to ~y the CLA auector has assigned the group ~? R'ith more enthusiasm, or at least toier-
Casey's plans was the lack of competrnt, a number of coven missions. ancc, than they have for decades. "I still
trainer manpower," says one knowledge- If the rebuilding of the C1A's own cloak- don't agra w7th what they do, but for those
able sourer. Since the preparation and post- and-dagger capabilives is a long-term proc? people who arc inclined to work for them,
boning of undercover operators u a process ess, however, Casey Las pressed ouickly to they should be allowed to interview," says
that takes years, the director of clandestine improve the Company's ability to analyu University of Wisconsin senior Jay Todd
services-a 5l-year-old professions] named and interpret the overwbclming flood of Pinkert. Today's tight lob market helps the
John Stein-w2< virtually detached to reor? inulligencr that pours into it from spysou]- CiA, but it often must compete for bright
g-anize 2 recnaitment and training opera- lies, radio inureepu and an impressive ar? studmu witL well-payin? inurnavona)
tion. Casey, meanwhile, w?ac forced to Beck ray of other elecuonic and human inulli? banking firms, mu)tinationa) corporations
short-term contracts with some o` the 800 Bence collectors (ELI1~'T and HUMIN'T in and high-tech industries.
veterans of coven operations w?ho had been CIA parlance). "Casey has good instincu
]et go bcrw?~n l 9 i?and l 484-few of tticm, on the process of producing National lnul? '~~~'~~~
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WlN SOME, LOSE SOME: A SCRAPBOOK
The new CIS set up after world
War II, drew on the men and ez-
penence o: Vflliarr, Donovan's
Otf~ce of Strateoic Services.
The aoency was fly
inc hioh with Spvine
missions over the So-
vie; Urnon by U-2 jets
(below) unti' one of
therm-flown by Fran?
cis Gary Powers-
was shot down in
1960. t; was embar-
rassed aoain by the
abon,ve 196'. Bay
of Pics assault on Fi?
del Castro and sever.
o~ futile murder plots
aoainst him.
St$nts As~**Y*~: Roben Gates, 39, the ; Canfliczs: Case}? also ha_c vo)tutteered the
aecncy's fast-rising dcpun? director for in- ~ CLAandothcrU.S.inulligenccagenciesfor
tclligence, i~ tning to ma):c up with status more active dury than ever in the nation's
what he ezanot provide ir, pay envelopes. war on narcotics, and this too mzy ]cad to
lncrczsing)y be has let the exper L~ a~he oon~GU. The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
a>1-itethe ana]vicesbrief the arim;n;ctsation's cation. for example, refuses to provide ';
top policvmaktrs personally. "I knoR~ ana- cover for CIA agenu. Beyond that, the
h~sLc R~bo can walk out of Dere and double peoplebest able to get sensitive militan~ and
their salznes." szvs Gates. 'But when one political information out of closed countries
of ow people goy alone to brief the scene- ~ like Iran or Afganistan a.Te sometimes those
tzry of stau or an assistant secre?,ary. that ~ adept at taking narcotics oui as well. On
can last z long time." ~evera] occasions in recent wars, tbeJustice ,I
Tbc demand for people a~th technical I Depanment and .Drug Enforcement Ad?
backgrounds is prompted both by the agcn? ministration have pursued maioF drug-traf- ~
cy's oR~n inereasing)v sophisticated collec- I be suspect^~-onl~? to learn, late in the game.
taon capabiii~es and by Czsev's decision to that as valuable paid assets of tic C1A they
maketbeprev~tion ofhigh?tecb espionage 'acre virt:ual)v untouchable.
a top pnorirr. The ClA bz< developed z Still, Casey has concluded that the na?
massive date base on the methods by which von's drug problem iS fully as serious as itc
Iron G1ut2in operatives obtain mtical plans national-securityy concerns. He wen sus-
and eauipmentfrom U.S.firms and has used pecu that international commutusm vies
this information to raise consciousness or, a~tb Ntafia capitalism in mobilizing much
the issue among domestic research-and-de- of the world's drug trade. "we think we've
veiopment firms and allied intelligence sere- tornnfied that;" says the DCI. "W e can't
ices. "They responded, naturally, to their prove is in court" The danger in focusin~
oa'n sectt-iry interesu," says Case}?, chor- the intelligence agrncies on these actaviti~ i
ding ovc the expulsion from Europe and is that they may be carried will.:-Hilly into ~
Japan of more than )00 enemy inulligence theprovinceofdomesticoperationsandlav.-
agenu, most of whom were caught stealing enforcement.
high t~hno)ogy. "The biggest setback the The same danger shadows the C1A's
KGB ever had," the CIA boss claims. lntel? stepped-up coununnulligence campaign.
ligence ofneials szy that their increasing Under Ca_cey, the agency is free of the non.
involvement with high-tech America-the productive,self-destruc>jvemolehunting of
boner to cnvap Soviet spies and safeguard years past-when entire careers were made
U.S. scientific secrets-R?ill not result in or broken in the choice between which of
improper domestic surveillanec or infiltra- severe) Soviet defectors to believe about the
tionofA.mericanbusiness.Butsomeouuide existence or nonexistence of a high-]eve)
critics of the agency fear that excesses in this Soviet agent wtthtn the C1A. Any such
arc2 are inr~table sleeper agent high in the Company 20 years
~~UIIIIED FRU1T . CDXP.1.!(Y
~,t CDNTRk~IhiFRVFhUOh
_ -. ~XTR~NJ~R~,
Waminos aoainst intervention did not stop
tfie Ch:, trom enoineerinc the ouster of Gua?
temalan President Jacobo hrbenz in t95n l9 i 1 during his SEC Casey insists that "I haven't called a broker
confirmation bearings, when Sen. ~'ilL'am in 20 years." but in 3 my he finally relented
Proxmire rebuked him for mislcadinc and agreed to set up a blind trust.
Congress on the details of the plagiarism This behavior bore all the marks of Ca-
suit Ten years later he made the same sey, the risk-taking businessman. He took
mistake. Six months after being unani? his chances-and lost. What gives his crit?
mously confirmed as CIA chief, Casey: ies pause is that they will likely never know
under pressure from the Srnate lntelli_ what other risks this restless, de5ant man
grnce Comm.itue, amended his financial is titittg now that he holds the most srnsi-
stat.cmcnu to add 70 former clirnu be said rive job in tine United States government.
he simph? forgot to list, among them the )O1tA77iAT f.1.TER ovth N]CHO].AS }IORROCR
gOVC1T1mrn1S Of Sotlth KOTCa and lnoone' +n ~.uhia~on and SIiAwT DOHER'T'Y is NewYori.
sin. The overall content suggesu skillful
sophistry: asked on the personnel fonn:
"Have you ever bern an attorvey for a
foreign government?", Casey answered,
"Neither I nor my firth currcnt]y represent
any foreign government."
Tnisc Casey`s failure to establish a blind
trust for his financial holdings also stirred
resrntment in Congress-and jokes at the
whiu House that C1A real]y stood for
"Casey lnvesting Again." N on etbdess. t:h e
sttiu charging him with misrepresentavon t beviewed as media pressure,-and to avoid
have.hare)y n~eked huh. ~ a repeat of the hundreds of thousands of
rroL, the s-,an. Casey favored the dollars in]ossesinct:razdbytheb]undering
b2re-knue'!`]e:d approach. Coup trap- blind trust he set up ~hik at the SEC. So he
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PraUicing hisJree-S-x?inging style
sc-~pu shoo that during aplagiarism -
stilt against his publishing firm in the
Czr]c' 1 ?bOs. lour settled out of tour
.be told the opposing attorne} , "If
vot:'re not ~ gentleman I'm going to
kick your ass." wnrn he moved to ~ ,,,-?T__,__ ,,
pon bank and under secretary of
stau for economic s?airs.
Badr~zled: It was during his SEC
tenure that Casty became enmeshed
in the Ro'txn ~%esco case, a Watergate
sidelight featuring charges that finan?
tier Vesco o5cred S200,000 to the
Nixon re-election campaign in a.n cf?
fon to stop r: major SEC investigation
of him. Caccy hz< lone been involve
in GOP politics-in 1966 be even ran
unsuccessfully for Congress. After
outbic the Japanese government for
house o~~ F.mbass~ Row-they, re-
sponded t0 the seller's worries Over
bon? to break tbt news Rath z simple:
"TeL them to remember Pearl Har?
bor." LiAC Joseph P. keened}?,
another hard-boiled millionaire
invGCtO; turned s~urives regulator;
Casty won solid marks at the SEC-
and late as bead of the Expon?Im-
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NATIONAL AFFAIRS
A~w'Sti+'f~C
10 October 1983
Green Grow the Green Berets
In ~ packed training
room just a grenade's toss
from Fon Bragg's Smoke
Bomb Hill, ] 00 young
men wauD inuntly as
their instructor explains
the workings of the Q%est
German MP-5 submachine gun. Nearb}?, 43
OLberS Sii In Silence, s~~T?Ttg LO OCC1Dher an
enq.iess strczm of coded raaio messages. And
70 miles away in the gilds of the Uwbarne
Forst, hundreds practice hand-to-hand
combat, land navigation and other survival
skills. 1n all some 1,500 solaiers are noa
training to be able t.o do "anything, anytime,
anyplace, anyhow "-the cred o of the United
States Army Sp~ial Fords.
The Sp~ial Forces arc not airxt empioy?
ees of the C1A But historicall\?. a< C1A
clandestine opcatiom expand sc do the
Green Berets-a.nd toda_~~, after a decade in
disarray' and aisreput.e, they are back iL
svengti^.. Tne ranks of Green Bcreu. dep)a-
ed to just =,600from a peak of 1:,000 in the
laze 1960s. are bung boosted to 5.000. T'hei*
~.+tm~ r d has been reorganized un der a n ca'
special operations unit at For Bragg in
Favettevilie. N.C. Most important, their
leaders insist that the unbolt' alliance with
the CL;-in Vietnam the Beret ofun
worked under tbeagenc~'s convoi-u gone
forc~~G : lDrv arc prot~t~ by a rcdcfine.d
zed in~~olabie chain of command. "The
says of doing is on a handshake are ovr.,"
says Coi. Joseph Cincotti, director of the
Special Ford Scboo' at For Bragg.
"T-wings zre now controlled at the highest
)eveL ... anti nothing is done without ap-
proval a~ito a memo attached."
But the CIA wz< only one of the Greer,
Bcrcu' problems. Although formed to train
and fight alongside inaigenous troops, in
Vietnam the Gran Berets were plunged
increasingly into aired action. "There a?as
less patience," says a retired Special Ford
colonel. "'If the Victnamesc rzr,'t shoot his
rise, I'll do it,' was the attitude" Tne Green
Bereu also alienated rcgulzs Army brass
with tbci* freewheeling arrogance. "Lieu-
tenant colonels would butt beads 87th Spe-
cial Forces captains and lose," says a Green
Beret major. "Those colon els are now gener-
alsmaking Army poll cy."
AJur the Species] Forcec returned from
Vietnam in 19 i 1, the Green Beret ttniu wue
fragmrnt.ed among five different Arm v com-
mands. Now Ronald Rcagan's official poli-
cy on unconvrntional warfaze has restored
them to a central role assisting U.S.
allies in brush fires from Nicaragtla to
the P ersian Gulf.
Modern recruitment efforts-while re-
taining a touch of the did macho appea)-
svess a quicur brand of professionalism.
"The days of the size ~2boot and the size 2
bead are gone." says Giacotti. "Our solaiers
know they don't have to go clean out a bar to
prove themselves." In fa t, Special Forces
rexruiu now come from the top . percent of
Army volunteers and average higher on
Arm v aptitude t.csu than required t.o qualify
for Ofricers Cannidate School. Some veter-
ansfear the demands on this new generavon
of rexruiu are near impossible. "Tats job
dcmanas a guy with political sensitivit}?, an
awareness of what's going on in the world, a
guy who is responsible f or his acrions,"says a
retired Greer. Bcrct colonel. "And he has to
beabrave son of a biuh as well."
The training is aimed at making that paz?
lay possible. Those who survive the initial
phase are funneled into an inunsive pro-
gram in one of 5ve skill area'-.flemolition,
weapons, communications, medicine or
inulligence. Tbc course, the leaders sap,
rc5ecu al] the lessons of the last two decades.
"~'~'c understand the importance of civil
affai-s and political artiviry," says Maj.
Bober, Kinzer Jr., who beads tite intensive
phase. "The business about winning hearts
and minas is, in fact, true." Tne advanced
intelligence and operations course is so dc?
manding that local colleges give sine creaiu
for it, and expertise in foreign languages is a
requisiu ac well. "VJe can't go in thereas the
ugly Am eri can an d sa y, "a' a are here to sa ve
you'," says ~Ja~-rant Ofncer Ben Pezts. who
has a master's degree in inurnational reL-
vonsand teaches tbecourse.
Paneace: But Green Beret 1~dcrs are not
so sure that the nat;on at large understands
the folly of being stampeded into the type
of ouick fix that helped to undermine the
Special Forces iL Vietnam-or that Amen-
ranc have the patience for long-urn solu-
tions. "Tbccommunisudon'thavcanvtimc
franc for their goals; their patience is as-
tounaing." says Spezia] Forces Capt. Pat-
rick Snvdr.. "Americans want ever~2hing
right noa~." Ultimauh?, of course, it is poliD?
ciaas i.nfiuenced by those impatirnt Ameri-
canswho wilt dietau bowtbe Special Ford
arc uses. Meanwhile, Green Beret leaders
recognize the urgent nxd to restore a once
proud image. "We're a hell of a }ot betur
than the record shows:" says Cincot~, "but
~we'D never be able to come from under that
till we have a \~cton?. V,%c despu-ate)y need a
victory somewhere.."
M~.R}: STARR vitb \'INCET.7 COPPOLs.
at Fon brace
Di^n?Roric Ithasbexnalong Special Forces training ar Fon Bragg.- 'The dogs o1 doing it on o handshake are over'
road bark. Tac exalted status
bestowed on the Special Forces
by Sohn F. F.ennedv was souan-
de7odduring a de: tide of misad-
venture in Southeast fists,
~wbere they frequea~y served as
point men for assassinations
and orbs CIA-assigned airry
work. "~ e were COmm111td t0
work aztb people who were not
as professions) a5 we were,"
sans one Greco Beret veuran
a~tb typical bitterness. Twat of?
5cer reMa1L being sent w de-
svov ~ ?: or th Vietna.mcsc radio
station the CLA allegedly had
pinpointed in Laos. The Green
Beret team found nothing-
and w?ac ambushed on the way
back. R'bcn the sun~vors
reached Saigon. the CIA man
inurrupter, the debriefing res.
Sion, pointing at the map: "Oh,
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