LOS ANGELES TIMES ARTICLES

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4, Sec. II
LOS ANGELES TII'S
19 June 1981+
The White -House staff is agonizing over this Ivanov 'Antonov, a Bulgarian* airline -executive
..question: What if Italian prosecutors prove Soviet ? whom Agca is said to have identified as.one of the
complicity in the attempted assassination of Pope secret policemen directly involved in the assassina-
`:John Paul II? How should President Reagan react? Lion plot, were to testify that the Bulgarians got
Journalist Claire Sterling, who has -followed the their orders from Moscow?
case closely, reported the _ other* day that State If persuasive evidence of this sort were offered, it
Prosecutor Antonio' Albano has filed a still-secret is hard to see how Reagan could avoid "a harsh '.
Mort charging that the'Bulgarian secret services denunciation of the Soviet Union. It is equally hard
,.recruited Mehmet Ali?Agca; the'would-be Turkish -to see how the President could then meet at the .
assassin, to. kill the Pope and thereby weaken the summit with Soviet leader Konstantin U: -Chernen-
Solidarity movement in Poland. ko in the near future. ,..:
g. 'The prosecutor-` according'' t&:the *report,. has The White House hopes that the problem won't
recommended the_ indictrrient and -trial of three arise. The Administration is trying to, get arms
Bulgarians and six Turks, including Agca, for control talks going again, 'and is angling for an
conspiracy: ?to 'kill . the Pope. Judge Ilario Martella, eventual summit. About the last thing that the"
'Whose investigation under Italian law has covered Reagan team needs is for-.the time bomb ticking
the same ground, will rule next month on-whether a away in Rome to go off:
trial should go forward.-_-But if it does, should.the President denounce the
Government' officials' say that they have' no Russians in vintage Reagan rhetoric and accept the
reason to.doubt the accuracy of Sterling's report.. , inevitable damage to U.S.-Soviet relations? Should
Western experts-on Soviet' Bloc :- affairs . have -he blast the Bulgarians but try to let the Russians
,,AI,. ays assumed that the Bulgarian secret police are off the hook? Or should he dump the whole blame
under the direct 'control of the Soviet KGB. The onto the late Yuri V. Andropov, who was boss of the
-Italian prosecutor's report does not , mention the KGB when' the attempted assassination too1 place,-
KGB, but It" implies prior Soviet knowledge and and ostentatiously pretend that the new' leadership
approval of_the assassination attempt.* had nothing to do with it?
:As long as Bulgarian involvement depends only If events in'an Italian courtroom pose'the question
on the testimony of Agca, and Soviet complicity in stark and unavoidable terms, there is no easy
remains. speculative,', the Reagan Administration answer to this excruciating' moral and political
faces no particular problem. But what if Sergei dilemma. -
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ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGELES TINES
ON PAGE 4, Sec. II 28 May 1984
:Overt Cutoff on Covert Aid
".Now that the House of Representatives has voted
" to cut off funds for the Nicaraguan rebels being
,supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, the
:.&ragan Administration should accept the decision
and find more acceptable ways to bring about policy
changes in the Sandinista government.
The House voted 241 to 177 last week to deny a
t21-million supplemental appropriation that the
Administration had sought for the contras, as the
anti-Sandinista rebels are known. Key Republican
..members, at the request of President Reagan, had
- linked aid for the contras to a supplemental
appropriation of $61 million in military aid for the
.government of El Salvador. Administration officials
`irlaim that progress in El Salvador's war is not
possible unless the arms flow from Nicaragua to
..Salvadoran rebels is cut off by the contras.
But the Administration's rationale does not fit the
facts. While the Sandinistas clearly provide some
'.aid and comfort to the guerrill as in El Salvador, the
Salvadoran rebels have enough arms and popular
'.'support inside their homeland to fight effectively, on
their own. For better or for worse, El Salvador's
-problems can be solved only in El Salvador, not by
-pursuing illusory subversives in a neighboring
.-country. -
` The Administration's rationale for helping the
contras also does not jibe with what contra leaders
' say. They say flatly that they want to overthrow
the Nicaraguan government. Overthrowing gov-
.,ernments is not the kind of activity in which the
United States should be involved.
--.-Finally, the Administration's rationale does not
-jibe with what the Sandinistas think the United
.S!stes is up to. The Sandinistas believe that the
.r."oictras are merely the spearhead of yet another
U.S.. military intervention in Nicaragua, and have
used this paranoid fear to portray themselves as
~,`de?enders of their homeland against Yanqui aggres-
sion.
2he .contra attacks also. give the Sandinistas an
excuse to dismiss all dissent against the government
as subversive and CIA-inspired, even when it
comes from legitimate sources like the Roman
Catholic Church and the independent newspaper
La Prensa.. This is especially dangerous, because
even ineffective contra attacks could give the San-
dinistas an excuse to limit free debate and cam-
paigning before Nicaragua's elections in November.
Those elections will give Nicaraguans their first
real opportunity to pass judgment on the results of
the Nicaraguan revolution. The Somoza dictatorship
that was overthrown in 1979 was widely detested,
so few people in Nicaragua would vote for a return
to the old days. But it is less clear that all
Nicaraguans are happy with the Sandinistas and
their Marxist experiment in governing. It is vitally
important that the November elections be as open
and as unfettered as possible. Reagan claims that
this is what he wants, but those words would ooze
cynicism- if U.S. funds allowed the-..contras to
interfere with the campaign or voting. ' *
Once the contra money runs out, the Administra-
tion wilt have other, more potent, tools at its
disposal to deal with the Sandinista government.
The most-important is financial leverage-Even if, as
statistics indicate, the Nicaraguan economy is
perilously weak, that is no reason to presume that
the Sandinistas are immune to economic pressure. If
anything, they may be especially receptive to
positive economic incentives from the Administra-
tion, such as an offer to reopen U.S. markets to
Nicaraguan sugar and other commodities.
During floor debate on the Administration's
Central American aid package, Rep. William S.
Broomfield (R-Mich.), who ushered it through the
House, accused Reagan's critics of pursuing a
"hypocritical, contradictory and counter-
productive" policy in Central America. Broomfield's
strong words were aimed in the wrong direction.
They describe exactly what is wrong with the
Administration's policy toward Nicaragua.
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ARTICLE APPEARED
G:; ?AGE 7, Sec.- II
LOS ANGEL 'S TD- ES
19 April 19B1
~ng~?ess Roils, ForeigmPolicy Waters
By P. H. TERZIAN
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.I'.),
no stranger to melodrama, need not fear for
is reputation. His abrupt resignation as
rice camp man of the Senate intelligence
Committee in protest over the CIA's failure
to keep the comrrJttee "properly" informed
snout its activities in Central America has
made huh a congressional hero of sop s.
Resignations on principle are as rare as
dismissals for cause in Washington. Moyni-
han r e.-rands us that in politics as in boxing it
may be better to go down swinging than to
hang on the ropes and be beaten silly.
And yet, was it worth the trouble? Of all
the foreign-policy issuer that could be
-profitably debated on Capitol Hill, a breach
of eticueue seems somehow inappropriate
for a hold self-sacrifice. Even the breach is
now disputed. Some senators contend that
..they were properly informed; others deny it
The House claims to be satisfied , the Senate
complains that it was not "fully" briefed by
-the CLk. and Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-
_A_:1:.), c a.rr an of the committee, is an-
royed t:^a; :i is
i.fo:mation was not "cur
-
fi Goldwater's language was suitably
scue; the only .1,ing left is for the
..crats to demand a special prosecutor.
Of course, cong-essional barons are con-
geni _'ty cf,ended, and there is little that
Ronald Reagan or any President can regu-
larly do to mollify the egos or soothe the
feelings of several dozen Claghorns and
TThrottlebottoms. The legislative sense of
self-ir portance is no idle mood. The Senate
does not call itself the world's greatest and passed the odious McCairan Ac: ?to
deliberative body for nothing. restrict unwelcome iz migration. The Sen-
Nor does it cavil at translating its indig na- ate resoorse to 'Hitler was an af`-nation of
tion. into action-and if there has ever been American neutrality and the Nye Commit-
any routine danger to the foreign policy of tee's well - publicized incantations about
the Republic, it is the prospect of congres- "mercl=nts of death."
sional interference. Indeed, it it difficult to Even in the bipartisan high tide of the
resist the conclusion that the congressional Cold War, Congress persisted in annual
role in modern times has been almost scrutiny of the Bricker Amendm ent, which
.;;consistently baleful. Certainly its current would have severely restricted the Presi-
determination to bend Central American 'dent's treaty-making powers and enjoyed
policy to its petulant will is in character. the warm support of the American Bar Assn..
The separation of powers is bound to And kicking itself in anger at the end of the
generate conflict, and the smooth workings Vietnam War, the Senate punished the
of government will always depend on the innocent with the War Powers Resolutio.l,
skills and scat-sm nship of people in all thereby usurping the P-esident's constitu-
branches. But does Congress have a creative tional powers of military action.
role to play in foreign policy? Sometimes. Now, as the United States is challenged in
Has it used .its powers and resources to its own hemisphere, it is consultatjor, (or the
advance the national interest? Not really. It lack of it) that spurs Capitol Hill to action. It
has habitually reduced foreign policy to the should not be any surprise that the exercise
ingredients of partisan dispute or provincial of privilege awakens tong. essional interest:
concern, and, while keeping its responsibili- The legislature canp3t conduct foreign
ties ill-defined, has grown increasingly policy, nor does the Constitution suggest
jealous of its prerogatives. that it should. What Congress is supposed to
To be sure, the wisdom of presidential do it does in sufficient quantity.
government has not always been self- Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1&S5 that
evident Thirty years ago Dwight D. Eisen- : Congress "can violently disturb, but it
bower was to be congratulated for-protect - cannot often fathom, tit ?aters of the sea in
ing 'White House documents from the which the bigger fish of the civil service
inquiring hands of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy. Ixn and feed. Its dragnet stirs without
Today, as Sam Ervin used to say, "executive cleansing the bottom."- That was true
privilege is executive poppycock." Who can when he wrote it, and it remains true a
deny our luck that Franklin D. Roosevelt century later.
defied an isolationist Congress to prepare for
-tale Axisthreat-and supply Britain in its hour
of need?
Now, such shadowy substances as inter-
national law and Third World approbation
P. H. Ter tan is an
page. - -
are.invoked to protest Reagan's policies in
Central America and the Caribbean. Part of
this is politics-as-usual: One Presidents
sober vision is another's military vainglory..
We now know that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee of the 1930s was
obtuse, and that Secretary of State Dean
Acheson was entitled to complain some
years later that "what the executive brings
is initiative, proposals for action; what the
legislature brings is criticism, limitation,
modification or veto."
Can we learn from hindsight? It seems
reasonable to suppose .that the Senate
persists in its obtuseness, and that the
popularity of certain measures, or the
apparent will of Congress, may not ulti-
mately serve the needs of the nation.
. It is useful to remember that it was the
Senate, not the President, that kept the
United States out of the League of Nations
ass stani editor of this
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A-RE CLE A.:I ~EARE? LOS ANGELES Tb,!ES
O PAGE Li Sec II
18 April 198+
Taking Can Terrorists
;,'Sometime soon the Reagan Administration will
send to Congress a package of anti-terrorism
legislation that may dispel some of the mystery
about how it plans to deal with this increasingly
dangerous form of warfare. What little is known so
Ier.about National Security Decision Directive 138
raises some disturbing questions.
On April 3 President Reagan signed a secret
directive calling for a get-tough policy on inter-
national terrorism. According to Times staff writer
Robert. Toth, the directive envisions intensified
intelligence-gathering efforts, including higher pay
for informers and improved communication with
other governments on terrorist information.
"I'he policy also calls for the training and
employment of special paramilitary teams to com-
bat terrorists under the direct control of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. These teams could be used not only
t_o fight terrorist attacks as they occur-and, when
appropriate, to carry out reprisals-but also to carry
out "preemptive" operations. It's the preemptive
aspect that is perpleain and of-conceln.
.Let L'her e be no mist.ake: Terrorism is a dirty,
`
appalling form warfare that grows more danger
ous each year. Overall . terrorist activity.. has
iii eased fourfold in a decade.
jLa_st year alone well over 600 people died in
attacks by international terrorists. Many victims
were American. ranging from the 241 servicemen .
kilted by a truck bomb in Beirut -to diplomats and
servicemen gunned down in foreign capitals.
Innocent bystanders are often part of the carnage.
Terrorism is the largest single worry hanging..
over this summer's Olympics in Los Angeles.
Today's most dangerous terrorists are not hot-
eyed idealists gone "round the bend," but those
trained and directed by governments-Libya and
Iran being the major cases in point. Other countries
serve as terrorist training bases.
Civilized countries cannot let terrorists have their
way. The countries must do what they can, separ-
ately and in concert, to identify terrorists, control
their movements across borders, punish those who
maim and murder in the na_rne of higher politics, and
lean hard on governments that help them.
Common sense tell; you that if a government has
solid evidence of a planned act of terrorism it must
move to prevent it. But how far does the new
presidential directive go in this direction? How
tightly will the White House control its para thtary
forces? What form of congressional oversight will
be exercised? Will preemptive action be used only
to head off a specific terrorist act, or also to destroy
camps or_sa?e _ho s that are known (o:-mergly
believed) to be used by terrorists?
pert on terrorism -know that it is -almost
impossible to get reliable information from inside a
terrorist organization. Yet without such evidence
.preemptive strikes could be made against theivrong
people in the wrong places. One false move and the
program could be dead, with terrorism home free
Congress has an obligation to answer these and
other questions before it agrees to start this new
chapter in the battle against terrorism.
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t=_I/L:E APP EA-~c.
Sec. II
LOS A_.GELES TI?2 S
16 April 1;^
istressing Signals
President Reagan and his policy -makers are
? giving private signals that they remain con~.mitted
to the policies that they have been following in
Central America and are confident that they will be
able to continue along that course once Congress
cools off and comes to its collective senses. That is a
;most disturbing attitude.
The most disturbing element is the evidence that
public support in official Washington for the peace
initiative of the Contadora nations-Mexico, Vene-
zuela, Panama and Colombia-is not matched in
private. There appears to remain a paternalistic
view that the Reagan Administration knows best.
"We've been winning the war in Central America
but losing all our battles in Washington," a State
Department official told Times reporter Doyle
'McManus.
But that State Department official was wrong, and
so are the President and all around him who remain
convinced that the United States, by sponsoring its
own campaign of CIA terrorism against Nicaragua
and: by pouring more military aid into El Salvador,
can . resolve the terrible problems of Central
. merica, let alone "win" something.
?- - The war being waged in Nicaragua by the CIA-
sponsored contras has no more legitimacy than the
g oerrilla ca-mpaign in El Salvador sponsored by the
Sancinistas of Nicaragua- Both are destructive,
,giverting desperately needed resources from im-
_poverished people. Both prolong violence and post-
pone peaceful settlement, imperiling fledgling dem-
ocratic procedures-including national elections in
May-in El Salvador and in November in Nicaragua.
The continued flow of arms from Nicaragua to the
rebels in El Salvador is cause for concern. It cannot
be ignored any more than the U.S. intervention in
Nicaragua can be concealed. Both are contrary to
accepted principles, for it is evident that imposition
of a Marxist regime in El Salvador is the goal of the
Sandinistas and overthrow of the Marxist regime in
Managua is the objective of the CIA
Despite the outcry raised in Congress last week
over the CIA's mining of Nicaragua's harbors,
Administration officials say that they will stick to
their "game plan" in Central America. The main
reason for this single-minded determination, they
insist, is that their many critics in Congress and
elsewhere cannot offer a better policy, a viable
alternative.
But there is another course appropriate to the
problem-a course respectful of the binding treaties
that control relations in this hemisphere, a course
supported by virtually every nation. That is the
21-point peace plan of the Contadora Group. It is a
plan agreed to by the principals. Diplomats of those
nations are al )York drafting implementing treaties.
They hope to have them ready by the end of this
month. This initiative by the nations themselves
contrasts with-Washington's disinterest and:*hat
appears to be rio more than cynical exploitation by
Nicaragua itself. The Contadora process could be given immediate
impetus by the U.S. government with a unilateral
renunciation of armed intervention in the affairs of
Central American states. That would respect a basic
element of the Contadora plan. It would challenge
Nicaragua to match its cornraitment to democracy
at home and non-intervention abroad with deeds. It
would provide a respite in the fighting as a step to a
cease-fire,, essential to the Contadora process. And
it would respect the mood evident in the votes in
recent days of 281 House members and 84 senators.
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AP:ICLE ?APPEL_ED LOS A.iMELES TIl?S
O;i PAGE 6, Sec.- V 10 April 193li
Betrayal by America
The single-minded determination of the Reagan
Administration to impose its wishes in its own way
on Nicaragua has left the United States isolated, an
outlaw in the world community. The reputation of
tSe, nation is at stake, and with it Washington's
influence in the free world. Worse, the policy
jeopardizes the fragile structure of international law
and order that 'has painstakingly been constructed
ii the 40 years since World War ii
-At the heart of the controversy is President .
Reagan's commitment to force against Nicaragua.
He has sought to justify the terrorism that he
finances as necessary to frustrate the terrorism of
Moscow and Havana against neighboring states. But
he'has failed to persuade others that there is virtue
is what he has been doing. And he has allowed the
terrorism to get out of control, damaging ships of
several nations with no apparent forethought of the
corseouences. So it was no surprise that he found
himself alone in the U.N. Security Council last week
when the council called for an end to the mining of
Nicaraguan harbors. Among those voting against
the United States were China, France, Egypt, the
Nreetherlands, Pakistan and Peru. One trusted friend
and' ally, Great Britain, abstained on the vote,
but made clear its opposition through private
channels.
' Iy ow this arrogation of power by Reagan has been
extended to the World Court, with the assertion that
the United States will not accept the jurisdiction of
the court on matters relating to Central America for
two years, lest Nicaragua convert the court into a
propaganda platform. That is a terrible lesson to
teach the world about the legal process, about the
respect within the United States for the law and for
civilized procedures.
This corruption. of principle is all the more
appalling because it also stands condemned by the
Contadora nations, the four peacemakers of the
Americas that have again pleaded for an end to
foreign intervention.
There are questions that go beyond the law. The
murderous campaign on land and the harbor-
mining program sponsored by the U.S. government
in Nicaragua are wanton disruptions of the economy
of a desperately impoverished nation. The United
States has the dollars, the firepower and the
resources to maintain the disruption, to defy inter-
national opprobrium, as long as it wants to, but the
results need to be seen for what they are-over-
whelmingly counterproductive. Fresh suffering is
being imposed on a population too long brutalized.
The democratic opposition finds itself under new
repression-a repression justified by the Sandinista
regime in the name of national security. Leeitimate
onnosition now can be conveniently dismissed as
another manifestation of the Central lntellhgence
Agency's camnai?n of terror. Censorship orLa
Prensa is once again heavy. The risks of rigging the
November- election are enhanced, but also the
probability that the Sandinistas will need no tricks
to win.
There is an alternative to the policy' being
pursued by the White House. That alternative has
been spelled. out by the Contadora nations and
agreed to by all key states of the region. It is a plan
of peace through negotiations. But the plan has
received only lip service from Washington as the
Administration pursues a policy clearly aimed not
only at containing the Marxism of the Nicaraguan
revolution but destroying it as well
A campaign of terror is no way to persuade the
Americas that there is an alternative to the
blandishments of Havana's ideologues. The tyranny
of Reagan's present policy and his flagrant neglect
of the rule of law are a betrayal of what the United
States can bring this hemisphere in leadership, in
principles, in freedom.
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ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGMES TINS
ON PAGE 6, Se.c. II 2 April 1981+
Nicaragua Tightrope
The latest escalation in the Central Intelligence
Agency's covert war against Nicaragua-the min-
ing of the country's major ports-is the riskiest
tactic so far in a campaign that has always been a
mistake and that now is downright dangerous.
The Reagan Administration has allowed the CIA
to provide financial and logistical support to
anti-Sandinista guerrillas operating out of Hondu-
ras and Costa Rica for almost three years, with no
substantial results. The attacks carried out by the
so-called contras have done little to weaken the
Sandinistas. If anything, the MA's not-so-secret
war has helped the most ardent revolutionaries
strengthen their grip on Nicaragua. It has given the
most extreme Sandinistas an excuse to crack down
on internal dissent, and has increased their popular
support by allowing them to pose as nationalists
standing up to Yankee pressure.
The contras have never been a serious military
threat to the Sandinista government. The Sandinis-
tas worry about them chiefly because they believe
that, the guerrillas are the spearhead of a larger
invasion force that will eventually try to overturn
the Nicaraguan revolution-a force that they expect
will include troops from the United States.
The Administration denies that it is trying to
overthrow the Sandinistas, and insists that it wants
only to pressure them into modifying their rigid
revolutionary stance-to cease their harassment of
the Roman Catholic Church, the press and rival
political parties, and to stop providing aid and
comfort to rebel guerrillas in El Salvador.
But mining harbors goes beyond putting pressure
on a hostile government.: It is a direct attack on a
nation's economic lifeline. In the case of Nicaragua
it is an especially harmful tactic, because the
nation's economy is particularly weak and heavily
dependent on exports and 'imports. So far none of
the ships damaged by the primitive but effective
magnetic mines placed in Nicaragua's ports by the
contras were on military missions. Four, including a
Soviet ship, were trade tankers carrying commodi-
ties like oil and molasses. Another was a Dutch
vessel dredging a harbor.
The most worrisome aspect of the mining tactic is
the possibility that it will be construed by the
Nicaraguans as an attempted blockade, which is an
act of war under international law. -So far the
Sandinistas have shown restraint in fighting back
against the contras. But the serious economic
problems that. will be caused by an effective
blockade could provoke them to move against
Honduras and other neighboring nations that have
helped the United States support the contras.
A Honduran-Nicaraguan war would further
complicate the Central American crisis, adding to
bloodshed and making it even harder for Latin
American nations to settle Central America's wars
and rebellions among themselves. The presence of
U.S. military personnel in Honduras also raises the.
specter . of the United States being dragged,
wittingly-orunwittingly, into a regionwide-conflict
Some officials in the Reagan Administration think
that it would be easy for the United States and its
allies in Central America to overthrow the Sandin-
ista government by force. They are foolishly
optimistic. ? .Certainly Nicaragua would--not be
another Vietnam, but it would not be another
Grenada, either. All available evidence indicates
that a military campaign against the Sandinistas
would be bloody and prolonged. It would alienate
our important friends in Latin America and cause
deep political divisions in this country.
By escalating its pressure against the Sandinistas
to the level of a blockade, the Reagan Administra-
tion is being needlessly provocative and increasing
the chance of direct U.S. involvement in a regional
war in Central America. The Administration should
call off the CIA and use more subtle and, in the long
run, more effective means-creative diplomacy,
economic leverage and moral suasion-to deal with
the Sandinistas.
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ARTICLE APPEARED LOS AiiGELES TIl S
ON _ AOr z v_4 11 March 1984
Mix-up of Strategies?
The Senate Appropriations Committee was right country's March 25 presidential elections. U.S.
to reject a hurried Reagan Administration request officials have promoted the elections as a key step
for S21 million in covert aid for anti-Nicaraguan toward creating a stable democratic government in
rebels in Central America. It should do the same . El Salvador, and they fear that the gueriil]as
this week with another questionable request, this . fighting to overthrow the government will try to
one for a substantial increase in .military aid for :I.,-. disrupt the vote by force.
El Salvador. :-. _ - _: - . .... But correspondents in El Salvador, as well as
:-Why the Nicaraguan guerrillas, who are fighting professional military observers, report that there is
the Sandinista government from bases.inRonduras -no evidence that government forces face any kind
with -assictance' from-- the:=:Centre "Intelligence "~'of -supply crisis. Salvadoran military units are
Agency, suddenly.. need . more 'aid -was not fuily _' ; 'proceeding with.regular field operations,.and are
explained. That,, along' with' the Administration's"'.~ making preparations to defend the elections in case
demon to rush the request through Congress.by.. the guerrill
as renege on their pledge not to disrupt
amending a- totally "Unrelated appropriations .bill .the
voting. If there are local shortages of ammuni-
designed to help poor.,Americans - pay for home, tion, spare parts, field rations or other supplies, they
heating, troubled Republicans as well as Democrats'
may be contrived-reflecting the historical tenden-
on the committee. That is why Republican Sens. cy of commanding officers in all armies to stockpile
Mark 0. Hatfield of Oregon,'Lowell P. Weicker 3r. supplies and underreport what they have available
of Connecticut -and Warren B. Rudman of New in hopes of getting even more.
Hampshire helped vote the amendment down..- - -If -there were shortages, Secretary of State
::Those Republicans, and the other members of they George P, Shultz and other Reagan Administration
committee, should be doubly skeptical next week if *.: officials should have started warning'' Congress
the Administration follows through with 'its an='"about them weeks ago. There is no question that
flounced intention to attach an amendment to" Congress will have to debate sending more-military
provide more than $93 million in" military aid for' aid to El Salvador before the end of the summer.
El Salvador to'another avpropriations'biIl designed ~1 But nobody : could blame" the 'Administration for
to pay for emergency-food relief fat several African wanting to bave such controversial issues as aid for
countries Some Administration -*-officials are even'El'.Salvador and the rebels in Nicaragua out of the'
suggesting that they will tie.. covert. Nicaraguan _ way before the presidential "election- -campaign
funds to that. bill,.too, in a second effort to ram the .. begins in earnest
proposal through Congress. It is hard to shake the notion that the Administra-
'?-Tne official explanation of the need for emergen- ? lion's emergency request for military supplies for
cy aid for El Salvador's security forces is Reagan.!.: El Salvador and the Nicaraguan rebels has more to
Administration concern that those forces might run' do with political strategy in the United States than
low on amm~.uvtion and other supplies before that with military strategy in Central America.
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ARTICLE AP? :ARM
OIN PAGE II-6 -
LOS ANGELES TD'S
10 Februe-ry 1931+
T
acaragna: Letthe People Judg'e
The .Sandinistas have _.talked.- about holding--. society. They-cite the movement toward elections
elect1ops in Nicaragua, ever since 1979, when they
led the popular uprising ,'that overthrew :dictator
na,laslo Somora Until this week there'.wastittle
acton2d match the talk
T'hai changed on Wednesday,: when3he-2tiicara-
guan Council of State, which is controiledy the
Sanstas,publishedthe details of a proposed law
as one indication that U.S. pressure is working. But
even if the strategy has been useful to some extent,
if does more harm than good.
Contra activity gives the most radical Sandinistas
.an.excuse 1.0 push for repression against dissidents
in the country: ? Rebel violence has *.been? used to
discredit the. many sincere critics of the Sandinistas
setting forth rules for elections to -take'place next ..-who remain in Nicaragua-and who look 3.o elections
year. -Under the law. Nicaraguans would; vote'for a'- as .a .chance. to offer their people a constructive
president, vice president and 90-member Constitu- alternative to the rigid revolutionary, fervor of the
ent Assembly to rewritt the nation's constitution. - -Sandinistas. CIA involvement with the contras gives
The proposed law is-due to be approv'ed..by. the . '-the Sandinistas a perfect opportunity to ~~ray
Council -of State within- two weeks. ,But.,4oubts: , Lhermselves as nationalist heroes defending their
persist. that an. election will be held, because some cn n riu;aain TIS. ng?gc~i n. And as long as the
key Sa,dirusta leaders have warned that voting will . contra activity continues, the Sandinista leaders
be delayed if there is any threat to Nicaragua's who do not want elections will have a strong
stabii -either widespread terrorism by anti- argument for blocking them.
govern +.ent? . rebels, the so-called contras; or pan,;...-'The Reagan Administration should give the
inyasib6by a foreign power. That seems reasonab) e. Sandinistas breathing room. tighten the CIAs leash The last~-thing that a state under siege, orxine that on the contras; and watch for the next ste' s toward
believes.that it is under siege, wantstodois:tinker .the long-promised Nicaraguan?-elections. Doing so
with its fo: m of government =- ?'w- ;-` would involve .no -.; isk. The rebels . pose no real
What worries the Sandinistas about the contras is.- threat to the: Sandinistas, and a new strategy would
not the problems that they cause, but their ties to - deprive the Sandinistas of their only real extuse for
the United States. The contras receive barely-secret : delaying elections.
'aid-from the Central Intelligence Agency, and the - It is important that free and open elections be held
.Sandinistas fear that the CIA's covert war is a in' Nicaragua as soon as possible, for they would give
-prelude to a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua. .Given the-- - the people of that country a clear opportunity to
' sae_ .history of past U .S. interventions in that judge the Sandinistas and their revolution. Allowing
country, the Sandinista fears are rational. the people of Nicaragua to freely .express their will
Reagan Administration -officials insist that.they -.. should _be .-foremost in the minds of all those who
,'do not want to overthrow the Sandinistas,-only:to .:claim to care about Nicaragua's future-whether
.rod. {hem .into loosen ng =their grip. on:Nicaraguan. theysitin Managua or in Washington.
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ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGELES TIMES
ON PAGE,., 6 February 299L
Horror S1Or7
In all decency, the U.S. government should move
promptly to settle the-long-pending lawsuit brought
against it by nine Canadian citizens who were the
unknowing subjects Of medical experiments 27
years ago in a Montreal hospital.
This is a horror story that came to tight seven
years ago, and the horror has never ended for the
victims. The Central Intelligence =Agency secretly
funded a .25-year experiment in the controj_QUhe
human mi . Involved were several medical re-
search institutions alid government hospitals in the
United States and Canada. . -
Without their knowledge; selected patients in the'
Montreal hospital were given heavy doses of LSD. A
member of the Canadian Parliament, David Orli-
kow, first learned of the experiments in newspaper
accounts. His wife .had entered the Montreal
hospital'for treatment of depression during the time
of the experiments. She said that she had been given
doses of hallucinogenic drugs, and,,in.the 27 years
since, she said that she has been unable to
concentrate and even now is unable .to read .an
entire magazine article.. Another victim, according
to a report in the New York Times,. said_that the'
experiments left her with no memory oaf the births
bf her four children.
The 'Canadian government had not shown much
interest in the suit until after the case was discussed
recen0y : on a nationwide Canadian television
'program. The Canadian embassy in Washington
'then -sent a note to the U.S. State Department
'asking the United States to give relevant documents
to the attorneys for the nine Canadians. Foreign
Minister Allan J. MacEachen of Canada said that he
was considering an appeal to the International
Court of Justice in The Hague in behalf of the
t jects of the experiments. His statement was
'considered a move to persuade the United States to
settle the suit, which was filed in federal court in
Washington, seeking $1 million for each victim.
The evidence is plain. There is no way to
reconcile the CIA-sponsored medical exverimepls
on.unknowing subjects.with conduct worthy oLthis
nation. They never should have been permitted, and
the U.S. government should meet its obligation to
negotiate a settlement without dragging the victims
'through the ordeal of long and tortuous legal
proceedings.
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ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGELES TIMES
ON PAGE=-- 29 December 1983
Blunt Indictment
The deep misgivings that the Pentagon has felt
from the beginning about U.S. military involvement
an Lebanon shine through unmistakably in its report
on the October massacre of Marines at Beirut
.airport. That report, prepared by a five-member
commission -headed by retired Adm. Robert L. J.
Long, stands as yet another blunt and. informed
challenge to a Reagan Administration policy that, in
the 15 months since its inception, has been so
mercilessly hammered and confounded by events
.that it can now be said to have lost all focus and
`relevancy.
The Long Commission is unsparing in its criti-
cisms of local Marine commanders in Beirut and
higher-ups in the chain of command for failing to
take better protective measures "in the light of
.,the deteriorating political-military situation iri
Lebanon." But the commission also blames the
Reagan Administration for its inability to respond
to changing conditions in Lebanon that steadily
placed the Marines in greater peril. Why there
`was not more vigorous action taken to defend the
Marines, what policy considerations may have
.dictated a continuation of a low-profile stance in
,spite of manifestly increasing dangers-these
remain among the most urgent of unanswered
:questions.
One of the more intriguing sections of the
:commission's report cites "Policy decisions" for the
failure to rovide effective "human intelligence" to
the local Marine commander. It recommen that
Defense Secretary Caspar W Weinberger establish
"all-source intelligence support" for military com-
manders in high-risk areas. The suspected and
really ineavlicable absence of such intelligence in
Lebanon is thus confirmed. What m= new ho
eavlained, by Weinberger or the President is why
there were pohcy-meaning~oli tical-decisions not
to seek out and use all intelligence resources as
were available.
The Long Commission urges the Pentagon to
draw up alternatives to the continued deployment
of the Marines in Beirut. It implies, in other words,
that the Marines should be pulled out, not least
because even now it finds that security measures
are inadequate "to prevent continuing significant
attrition .. .
The President this week accepted -the ultimate ,
responsibility for what befell U.S. forces in Beirut in
October. The clear danger remains that, the United
States, if it retains its forces in Lebanon, will
continue to suffer casualties, for no good purpose,
even -whim facing the risk of deepenini involve-
ment in a country that is by no means one of its vital
interests. The responsibility for that would also and
inescapably be the President's. Surely the time has
come for him to admit the failure of a policy, and to '
act to forestall further American loss.
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ARTICLE AP?rhRED LOS ANGELES TD- MS
ON PAGE 16 November 1983
Reassessing Policy on Gays
The time has comeyfor'the federal government to the clearance after . 10 years when government
reassess its out-of-date policy against granting investigators discovered his homosexuality during a
security clearances to homosexuaLs. The case that background check on another TRW employee.
could have been made in the past that homosexuals The federal government banned homosexuals
might be more easily blackmailed into betraying from many jobs in the. early.1950s. Policies have
government secrets-to avoid being.publicly identi- been changed-or tossed out by., courts-in most
fled has been undermined by the openness of many areas except the military and' national security.
homosexuals and the tolerance developing in the Green's case illustrates the problem with any
society around them. assumptions about a person's vulnerability because
The injustice in the government policy was never of. his or her sex life, no matter its orientation. It is
more apparent than in the case of John W. Green, time for the government to drop a prohibition that is
who says that he never hid his sexual preference no longer valid, and to evaluate potential security
and yet held a special clearance while managing a risks on* an individual bass rather than on. a
top-suet project at TRW Inc. until 1981. He lost stereotype that is now outdated.
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 November 1983
Intelligence Bumble
-It is clear now that it was not only the American
people, their representatives in Congress and the
public's eyes and ears in the news media that were
kept largely uninformed about what was going on in
Grenada for most of last week. The military forces
that were called on. to invade the tiny Caribbean
island also had their share of ignorance and
upcertainty to contend with.
The problem was not that information was
deliberately withheld from those required to do the
fighting. The problem was that the information that
they were given proved incomplete and inadequate.
Reagan Administration officials heatedly deny that
there was any intelligence failure in the planning or
execution of the Grenada operation. But the facts as
they have trickled out, now that the Administration
has eased its arrogant effort to control the flow of
news, make nonsense of that assertion.
What the facts show is that there was a. shocking
absence of both' basic information and timely
tactical intelligence about Grenada. Given this
dearth, it may have been only sheer luck that U.S.
troops did not suffer significantly higher casualties
than they did as they moved to secure the island.
'Item. Apparently the troops of the initial landing
force were provided - with nothing better than
photocopied tourist maps with which to orient
themselves and locate' military objectives. More
complete and up-to-date maps, an essential tool of
warfare, became available only when a Cuban hoard
of.them was captured. - .
.?Jtem. It took * nearly a week for - the U.S.
gdvernment to figure out how many Cubans really
were on Grenada. The first estimate of around 600
was very nearly doubled after a few days, whether
on the basis of the opposition that was encountered
or on a misreading of captured documents isn't
clear. The-result in any case was a quick summoning
of substantial backup units to augment the U.S.
forces that had already been landed. By the end of
the week the Administration 'found itself in the
embarrassing position of having. to tacitly accept
Havana's own claims that there were fewer than
800 Cubans on Grenada.:. .
ot knowing for sure how. many Cubans there
were or how they were armed helped lead at first to
air". underestimation of the 'degree of military
opposition that was expected. In the end American
casualties fortunately turned out to be relatively
light, and credit must also be given the armed forces
for the care that they. took to avoid inflicting
casualties on Grenadian civilians. The one exception
came with an attack on a mental hospital that was
not marked and around which some Cuban troops
were active. Proper preliminary. intelligence,
though, would have identified the building for what
it was and perhaps helped spare its inhabitants.
The paucity of sound intelligence is especially
inexplicable in the light of the anxious attention that
the Reagan Administration has for so long been
calling to Grenada. That concern predates by far the
bloody coup that last month toppled the Maurice
Bishop regime. And it predates the subsequent
chaotic conditions that the Administration cited, in
justification for the invasion, as imperiling Ameri-
can lives and interests.
Months ago President Reagan himself went on
television to display aerial photos of the lengthy
airfield that the Cubans were building on Grenada.
He attributed a sinister military purpose to that
construction, and maybe he was right. But if the
Administration's suspicions were deeply aroused, if
the alarm bells-were ringing in Washington, why
weren't more intelligence resources devoted to,
keeping current with what was going on in
Grenada? Why-was there, after the invasion, such
seeming confusion or surprise over the extent of
Cuban involvement on the island and 'the military
buildup that was discovered there?
U.S. intelligence services can't be everywhere,
and they can't know everything. But they can be
expected and certainly should be required to make a
considerable effort to gather fundamental informa-
tion about a place that the President has told the
American people caused him deep concern. It was
clearly too late to start assembling that information
once the American civilians on Grenada were
presumedly placed in jeopardy and orders for the
invasion were given. '
Still, the Administration claims that there was no
intelligence failure. Perhaps in the narrow sense it
is right. For if no major effort was made to gather
intelligence about Grenada, then plainly no subse-
quent failure need be acknowledged.
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r -I APPEARED LOS ANGELES TD 'S
?:,C~ .25 October 1983
,_,ealing Up Government
Congress will now have time to hold hearings on
the broadest government attempt at censorship in
oar history. That is the most significant aspect of
the Senate vote last week to block for six months
the.censorship directive that President Reagan put
into effect last March without consulting Congress.
The directive would impose lifetime censorship on
more than 100,000 government officials who handle
sensitive information. Under the-scheme, govern-
ment employes with access to -classified information
would . have to sign an agreement to, submit -to
pre-publication review all -written material that
t_`rey plan to make public whether or not it Contains
classified material. During their government ca-
reers.and for the rest of their lives they would be
under the thumb of a government censor. Even
:c:ion based on their experience in government
vcu d have to be submitted to the-censor, whose
criers could be enforced by court injunction.
Nothing like this has ever been attempted.by a
prior administration, and the censorship directive
not only violates the First Amendment rights ofgovernment officials but, more ominously, also-
undermines the public's right to be fully informed
on matters of grave consequence to the nation.
Would it make sense for officials of a prior
Administration not to be able. to comment on the
current situation in Lebanon without submitting
their statements -for' approval to . the Reagan
Administration?' Th e mere' thought is absurd. The
Reagan order, intended to guard sensitive informa-
tion, is so extreme that it itself is a threat to national
security because it would deprive the public of
access to a 'broad range of views necessary for
informed public debate. .
The action of the Republican-controlled Senate
gives Congress two opportunities: first, to examine
every aspect of the censorship directive, and,
second, to write into law, if necessary, a carefully
defined policy that protects secrets without under-
mining the first Amendment. The present directive
is simply unacceptable.
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ANTI L_ A? " :E LOS A1GM,ES TDrMES
ON _-?G- 24 October 1.983
War in the Shadows
For the second time in three months the House of
Representatives has voted to cut off covert U.S..aid
tolne rebels fighting the Sandinista government of
N ca agua This time the Reagan Administration
should accept the rejection of its hostile policies
toward Nicaragua, and try more constructive moves.
toward the Sandinistas.
The House first voted in July to stop the Central
tntelhigence Agency from helping the contras Ohio
want' to overthrow the Sandinista regime, but' the
action was not followed up by the Senate, where -a
Republican ;.majority is more sympathetic -to-'the
Administration than is .the Democratic-controlled
House.. Since then-theUTA's war. against 'Nicaragua
has.;grown larger and more -ggressive. Recent
reports indicate that the agency has even Whelped
plan con1rn sea and air raids against Nicaraguan
communications and oil-storage facilities.
But the latest vote cannot be ignored. By a
227-194 margin the House voted to delete aid to the
conirus from the Intelligence Authorization Act for
1984. Even if the Senate does not include a similar
provision in its funding bill, the issue will have to be
resolved by a joint conference committee Thistime
the Senate should go along with the House and stop
the covert assistance, offering in its. place .open
support to countries that feel imperiled by . the
Sandnistas-CostaRica, El Salvador and Honduras.
.Reagan Administration officials insist that the
coritrc rids help cut-the flow of arms to leftist
guerrillas in El Salvador, but that arms flow has
been negligible for some time. It.looks' more and
more as though the Administration's, real goal in
Nicaragua is to overthrow the Sandinistas, an aim
distasteful to the American public. It remembers,
better than the CIA's secret warriors apparently do,
the long-term failures caused bypast U.S. covert
actions in Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs and Chile.It
also finds it morally reprehensible,.to_ overthrow
another government, even one that the United
States rightfully judges to be misguided.
:Despite their many failings, the Sandinistas still
command popular support in Nicaragua. They came
to power on the crest of a popular uprising against a
hated dictator, Anastasio Somoza, whose family was
.propped up .by. the United States for two genera-
tions. ,And, while- -the Sandinistas have alienated
many of -their original supporters by .trying to -turn
Nicaragua into a -rigid Marxist state-harassing the
Roman Catholic--Church, limiting freedom of the
'Press, stifling. political opposition and militarizing
.tbe..nation. far-beyond its legitimate needs-they
have. not brutalized their people as Somoza did. So
any -hostile. action that the United States takes
against their government only generates more
support for the.Sandinistas by making them appear
to be anti-Yanoui nationalists.
Whether the Reagan, Administration likes it or
not,.the days when. the United States could have its
way completely in Latin America-covertly or
openly-are.past; this country is going 'to have to
live with' he Sandinis-as. And whether the Sandin-
?istas like it or not, they are going to have to live
with the United States as the dominant.power in the
Western.:.hemisphere. That reality is -the best
argument for both nations trying to reach an
understanding based on mutual self-interest.
..But before any accommodation can be reached,
the CIA's war 1ri the shadows must' end. All
evidence indicates that it served its stated pur-
pose-persuading the Sandinistas that the United
States will prevent them from exporting revolution
to ..neighboring countries. To push the ? covert
campaign any further now-when both the Nicara-
guans and this country's Latin American allies in
the Contadora Group are working their R ay toward
a diplomatic settlement to the fighting in Central
America-would beg more trouble, not bring peace.
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