GLOBAL SHOWDOWN: THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL WAR PLAN FOR 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100310004-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 359
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 24, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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SPECIAL
REPORT
GLOBAL SHOWDOWN
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JULY 24, 1985,
Executive Intelligence Review
Global Showdown:
The Russian Imperial
War Plan for 1988
Prepared by an EIR Task Force
Criton Zoakos
Webster Tarpley
Rachel Douglas
Clifford Gaddy
Konstantin George
Luba George
Linda de Hoyos
Laurent Murawiec
Jeffrey Steinberg
Edith Vitali
Vivian Zoakos
Copyright ? EIR Research, Inc., 1985.
This report and its contents are for the
clients of Executive Intelligence Review
and are not available for general distri-
bution. Reproduction of all or part of the
contents without explicit authorization
of the publisher is prohibited.
Executive Intelligence Review
P.O. Box 17390
Washington, D.C. 20041-0390
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Contents
Part 1: The Soviets Have Already Declared War on the U.S.A. 1
1.1 The Two Qualitative Facets Of Soviet Strategic Mobilization
Under the Operational Ogarkov Plan 3
1.2 Soviet Doctrine on the War-Economy 17
1.3 Soviet Conclusions from World War II 27
1.4 The 'Maximum Option' of the Ogarkov Plan: Winning
Thermonuclear War 30
1.5 The Soviet Military Command for World War III 33
Part 2: Soviet Imperial Motives 65
2.1 Soviet Imperial World-Domination by the 1990s? 67
2.2 The History of the Soviet Imperial Tradition 73
2.3 Imperial Soviet Russia and the Chaldean-Byzantine Model of
Empire 114
2.4 The Andropov Dynasty: 'Stalin's Children' 129
Part 3: Soviet Imperial Objectives 139
3.1 Redrawing the Political Map of the World 141
3.2 The Northern Flank 145
3.3 The Imminent Knockout of NATO's Southern Flank 156
3.4 Germany-The Key to Europe 164
3.5 The Socialist International-Comintern 'Popular Front' 175
3.6 Syria and Israel Within the Soviet Strategic Sphere 182
3.7 China vs. Japan and Vietnam, Under Soviet Strategic
Hegemony 190
3.8 The Anglo-American Liberal Establishment and Its Penetration
by Soviet Intelligence 199
Part 4: The Build-Up of Soviet Absolute Superiority 205
4.1 The Soviet Military Build-Up's Two-Fold Role 207
4.2 Active Defense: The Soviet 'Star Wars' Program 227
4.3 Passive Defense: Survival After War 235
4.4 The Build-Up of the Soviet War Economy 242
4.5 The U.S. and Soviet Economies Since MAD 260
4.6 What Are 'Acceptable Losses' for the Russian Command in a
Global Nuclear War? 265
4.7 The Religious Factor: Call to Arms for 'Holy War' 268
Part 5: Soviet Strategic Sabotage and Assassination Programs 275
5.1 Andropov's Rise in the KGB: Warsaw Pact Enters International
Drugs-and-Terrorism Business 277
5.2 Soviet Surrogates Provide 48 Months of Pre-War Assassination
and Sabotage 284
Part 7: Keys to U.S.A. and NATO Counter-Strategy 293
Appendix 301
Maps 341
Index 363
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Preface
by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
The report you are now reading is, up to the present time, the only
comprehensive documentation of the current Soviet strategic threat avail-
able publicly in any language. Every fact listed has been cross-checked
with leading authorities in NATO and other countries. Each evaluation
of those facts has been reviewed with a dozen or more leading experts
from the same roster of authoritative specialists. There has been almost
no disagreement on facts bearing upon Soviet capabilities, and most agree
that the period 1987-89 is the most probable point at which Soviet
military superiority will reach the point at which Moscow might win and
survive a "first strike" thermonuclear assault against the United States.
Among the experts, there is a somewhat varied estimate as to how the
Soviets might choose to exploit their military advantage, but no signif-
icant disagreement on the rate of growth of that advantage, and little
disagreement on Moscow's near-term strategic aims. Most are profoundly
alarmed by that wishful, "Neville Chamberlain-like," blindness to in-
contestable military facts of the threat, which prevails among most leading
political circles and governments of the NATO countries.
Beyond that point, some disagreement has been expressed. All agree
on the urgency of the situation, and also agree that present NATO policies
are disastrously inadequate to cope with the threat. Most agree that the
present monetary and economic policies of NATO countries are a strategic
disaster in terms of their effects, but there is some disagreement on the
subject of alternative monetary and economic policies, and limited con-
currence, so far, on the best choice of approach to related political
problems of policy-shaping among the Western Allies.
Despite some disagreements with some of EIR's monetary, economic,
and political recommendations, among the experts consulted, they are
more or less uniformly delighted that EIR has committed itself to pub-
lication of this present report.
The key problem is, that the official strategic estimates of the NATO
governments, especially the United States', have no correspondence to
the crucial facts collected by official military and intelligence services.
The facts seem to vanish somewhere in the process, between the collecting
of intelligence and the final version of officially adopted estimates. Instead
of starting from the facts, official estimates start from some wishful doc-
trine, such as Henry A. Kissinger's popular, but fraudulent insistence
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EIR Special Report/Global Showdown
that "the Soviet empire is crumbling." Facts which can be arranged to
support such wishful views are arranged accordingly; facts which directly
contradict those views vanish mysteriously during the process of writing
and editing the official estimates.
Senior officials grumble, stating privately that the official estimates are
so much garbage, while complaining that they are obliged to work in
support of currently official estimates which they know to be willfully
falsified. This problem is most acute in Britain, the U.S.A., and France.
In the U.S.A., policy is written in the U. S. State Department, and the
U.S. military and intelligence services are instructed not to circulate
reports which might offend the State Department. In Britain, the Es-
tablishment rules, to similar effect. Everywhere, diplomacy and the "arms-
control mafia," dictate policy and strategic perception to both government
and to credulous parliamentarians, including the present majority of the
U. S. Congress. Those old enough, compare the present situation to the
days of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, and the popularity of Ber-
trand Russell's peace movements of the 1938 period. Today, as in the
days of Adolf Hitler's march to war, the Allied governments and political
parties are once again sleeping.
The slogan in most of official Washington today, is "Don't annoy me
with facts; my mind is already made up for me."
For obvious reasons, this report has been designed as the strategic
assessment which should be available to every military and intelligence
official and member of Congress, the report which should be available,
but which government so far fails to produce. In this form, it is also the
form of report which every thinking and influential citizen must possess
now, to help him or her in shaping the selection and policies of admin-
istration officials and members of Congress.
Many senior military and intelligence officials, individually, will be
delighted with this report, and will hope that the circulation of the report
helps to blow the lid off the absurd, official estimates presently circulating.
Yet, officially, those officials probably will be ordered to disassociate
themselves from support for this report. Privately, they will agree, en-
thusiastically; officially, probably, they will appear to stay in line with
currently official policy, methods, and procedures. Such are the bureau-
cratic practices in official Washington, today, by which officials advance
and protect their careers, by appearing to "stay in line" with policies
which they know privately to be absurd and violently contrary to the
most vital interests of the United States.
It is the unfortunate reality of political processes in the United States
today, that good intelligence can be supplied only through private chan-
nels, such as EIR. So, by filling part of that vacuum, EIR has developed
as what more than one official has described as "one of the world's best
private intelligence services." This report is much more than a quality
publishing effort; it is the fulfillment of our implicit duty, as both world-
citizens and patriots, to aid in the defense of Western civilization, against
the menacing new Genghis Khans of the Soviet imperial forces.
As to the quality of this report, there are features of the report, on
monetary, economic, and political policy, which are legitimately debat-
able, on condition that the debate is a serious and thoughtful one. There
can be no legitimate opposition either to the array of facts, or to the
general strategic estimate presented. It is the best picture of the strategic
threat currently available from any published source.
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1. The Soviets Have Already
Declared War on the U.S.A.
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1.1. The Two Qualitative Facets of
Soviet Strategic Mobilization Under
the Operational Ogarkov Plan
At present, the Soviet Union is in a full-scale pre-war mobilization, with
the objective of acquiring all capabilities needed to survive and win a
full-scale thermonuclear-led assault against the United States, according
to the Ogarkov Doctrinal War-Plan, by approximately 1988. The eco-
nomic mobilization in progress is best characterized as an overlay of two
complementary general policies. These two, overlain, policies we have
designated as Plan A and Plan B, respectively.
Plan A, signifies the aspect of the current economic mobilization gov-
erned by a Soviet version of "systems analysis," the portion of the mo-
bilization based on mobilization policies of practice in place prior to 1983.
Plan B, signifies a new dimension of Soviet mobilization policy, which
was made visible in Soviet war-planning during the 1983-84 period, and
has been implemented on a massive and accelerating scale immediately
following General Secretary Gorbachov's installation in office. Fairly
described, Plan B represents a virtual revolution in Soviet economic policy
of practice. The intent of its addition, is to forestall any U.S.A. move
to a "crash program" method of implementation of the Strategic Defense
Initiative. It introduces to Soviet practice, "science-driver crash-program"
methods of rapid technological upshifting of Soviet production in general.
What we have named Plan B, is based significantly on Moscow's ex-
haustive study and monitoring of the writings of U.S. economist Lyndon
H. LaRouche, Jr. As far as we are able to determine thus far, this
monitoring of LaRouche is centered within the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences. The Soviets fear that the Reagan administration might adopt the
reforms in economic policy proposed by LaRouche and his associates.
Soviet planners associated with Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and General
Secretary Gorbachov, are purging the Soviet apparatus of the so-called
"Brezhnev Mafia," at an accelerating rate, in the effort to bring a Soviet
imitation of LaRouche's "crash program" doctrine into effect.
The relevant Soviet strategic estimate is broadly as follows.
Option A: If the United States continues the monetary, economic,
and defense-budget policies now in force, by 1988, the Soviet empire
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will have the degree of strategic superiority needed to launch, sur-
vive, and win a general "first strike" assault against the United States
with degrees of losses acceptable to the Soviet command, on con-
dition that the U.S.A. does not adopt a "launch on warning" doc-
trine. For this case, Plan A is sufficient for Soviet war-economy
mobilization.
Option B: However, in the case, that the United States not only
adopts "launch on warning," but also unleashes those changes in
monetary, economic, and budgetary policies needed for implemen-
tation of an SDI "crash program," Plan A would fail.
If the Soviets knew, that the U.S.A. had adopted a "launch on warn-
ing" doctrine, then a Soviet "first strike," a crucial feature of the maximum
option under the Ogarkov Plan, would not be possible as early as 1988.
At the earliest, Soviet "first strike" would be postponed to the 1990s,
awaiting the deployment of a more advanced generation of Soviet BMD
than is projected for deployment by approximately 1988.
If Soviet ability to survive and win a general war is postponed from
the 1987-89 interval to the 1990-92 interval, as U. S. "launch on warning"
would tend to have this effect, and if the U. S. also turns to a "crash
program" implementation of SDI, Soviet Plan A war-economy mobili-
zation would be disastrous for Moscow's ambitions. On this account, the
Soviet planners are introducing Plan B rapidly and most forcefully at this
time.
The relevant Soviet fear is: the cultural resistance to rapid technological
program within much of the Soviet population, often labelled the "peasant
problem" in Soviet production, would mean that even a scientifically
inferior United States could outpace the Soviet economy technologically
under the condition that the U.S.A. changed its present monetary and
economic policies in the manner required for transforming the SDI into
a "crash program." The Soviets are deathly fearful of the projected rate
of increase of U. S. economic and technological prowess under revival
of precedents of the 1939-43 mobilization and the pre-1966 phase of the
U. S. aerospace program, a U. S. return to "pre-McNamara" defense pol-
icies.
Therefore, the current Soviet push to activate Plan B.
On the surface, Plan B takes the form of a massive purge of Soviet
bureaucrats, to appoint industrial managers who are committed to forcing
Soviet workforces to accept very high rates of adaptation to technological
progress. This takes the form most visible from the scope and depth of
the current barrage of policy-statements from the highest levels in Mos-
cow, of introducing the managerial methods of the Soviet's high-tech-
nology military industries, especially the aerospace and nuclear sectors,
into the management of firms generally.
Samples of recent Soviet policy-declarations to this effect are cited
below.
Included in the Appendices of this Special Report, is a reprint of
Lyndon LaRouche's keynote address of June 15, 1985, on the principles
of "science-driver crash programs," to the Krafft Ehricke Memorial Con-
ference of the Schiller Institute. That address summarizes the methods
by aid of which, the United States could transform the SDI's imple-
mentation into a "crash program," the methods which the Soviets fear
and seek to emulate.
Soviet administration has been long familiar with certain important
features of successful "crash programs." Soviet knowledge and past practice
of "crash programs" depended greatly on captured documents and veterans
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of the German Peenemunde Projects. The Soviets employed thousands
of veterans of those Projects; without these captured German scientists
and engineers, the postwar aerospace and thermonuclear-fusion accom-
plishments of the Soviet military would not have been possible. The
grafting of captured German science and scientists, onto Pasteur Institute-
trained Academician Vernadsky's Atom Project, identifies the essence
of Soviet knowledge and experience in this connection.
Soviet interest in LaRouche's work is twofold.
On the one count, President Reagan's March 23, 1983 announcement
of an SDI policy congruent with LaRouche's earlier specifications, came
at a time that leading Democratic Party circles had solemnly assured
Moscow, that the President was efficiently blocked from taking such
action. Consequently, Moscow exaggerated greatly LaRouche's influence
on the President, to the degree Moscow worked together with its U.S.
collaborators, including NBC-TV and the Anti-Defamation League, to
orchestrate early 1984 demands that the President publicly distance him-
self from LaRouche.
More generally, and more accurately, Moscow recognized that La-
Rouche's work as an economist had opened up new dimensions of insight
into the causal relationship between scientific progress and increases of
economic growth-rates. Obviously enough, although LaRouche has pro-
vided the first successful theory for such programs, successful "crash pro-
grams" existed long before the circulation of LaRouche's discoveries. The
existence of a competent theory of "crash programs" is merely an im-
portant, and very practical advancement in present-day knowledge. Al-
though Moscow lists "LaRouche" as a "dangerous principled adversary,"
whom it wishes to destroy, this is not the first time that Moscow sought
to learn as much as possible from those it seeks to destroy.
Moscow hates LaRouche on another relevant count. In analyzing Mos-
cow's explosive rejection of the President's offer of March 23, 1983,
LaRouche and his collaborators, beginning May 1983, published docu-
mentation of the Soviet political-philosophical outlook which caused this
particular form of response. This documentation of the Soviet imperial
doctrine of "Third Rome," is summarized in this report, below. Much as
it hates the publication of this documentation, Moscow knows better
than any other authority, that this documentation and the associated
evaluations offered, are absolutely correct. LaRouche et at. have, in other
words, revealed some of the innermost "family secrets" of the Soviet
ruling class (the Nomenklatura) to Moscow's adversaries. This public
exposure, the Soviets hate. Yet, Moscow recognizes that LaRouche et
al. have put their index fingers on the kernel of the economic and
administrative problems of the Soviet empire, the so-called "peasant
problem."
This touches one of the most important facts about the character and
internal problems of Soviet society, facts which most official U.S. in-
telligence agencies and private think-tanks usually ignore, and sometimes
deny to exist. This Special Report presents essential background on the
point in a later section. We refer now only to as much as is indispensable
for understanding what we have named Soviet Plan B.
Briefly. We of Western Europe and the Americas, have inherited a
cultural tradition, the Augustinian Judeo-Christian tradition, which is
in every way vastly superior to the Byzantine tradition in Russia and
other Byzantine-dominated sectors of Eastern Europe. As part of this,
because our tradition places the emphasis in all matters on the creative-
scientific and related potentialities of the individual human mind, and
locates individual merit in the fostering of scientific and technological
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progress, the Augustinian heritage supplies society with a vastly superior
potential for not merely new and profound scientific discoveries, but also
for rapid adoption of the technological benefits of those discoveries in
production and other leading features of daily practice of the society as
a whole.
Although the heritage of classical Greek language and culture within
the Eastern Roman Empire, is essentially the same as the Augustinian
current of Western European culture, the open conflict between Western
and Eastern Europe since the time of Charlemagne, is the deep root of
the East-West conflict in Europe and the Mediterranean ever since.
For example. Russia itself is a Byzantine creation. "Rus" is a Swedish
name for the various tribes subjugated by the Scandinavian Varangians,
Varangians who were themselves clients of Byzantium, the same Scan-
dinavians deployed by Byzantium against Charlemagne's order and against
the British Isles as part of Byzantium's efforts to obliterate Western Eu-
ropean Christendom.
The characterization of the Soviet state as "Marxist," is essentially an
absurdity. The truth begins to be clear, once we examine the so-called
"socialist" reforms of the Emperor Diocletian, the Diocletian who was
the patron of Constantine, and who shifted the seat of the Roman Empire
to the East. If we compare the organization and philosophical outlook
of Soviet society today with the form of "socialism" imparted to Byzantium
by the Diocletian reforms, and study this connection in the light of the
history of Eastern Europe since Cyril and Methodius, Russian "socialism"
is more than 1,000 years old.
So, today's Soviet ruling class views history. The Soviets see Moscow
as the successor to the cities of Rome and Constantinople, as the capital
of a world-empire, and consciously, explicitly trace the precedents for
the planned Russian world-empire to such Mesopotamian precedents as
the Persian Empire. The Soviet ruling class, the Nornenklatura, is a ruling
bureaucracy in the tradition of the collections of families composing the
ruling bureaucracies of the Roman and Byzantine empires; it is a bu-
reaucracy modelled on the Roman legions' military cult of Mithra, under
Augustus and his successors. It is a society ruled by a triad of bureaucracy,
military, and recently reemergent Russian priesthood.
Soviet ideology is "oriential socialism," in that specific sense: the
imperial socialism of an empire ruled by one "superior race," the "Great
Russians" of Muscovy.
In Russian history, eastern and western Europe are political and re-
ligious divisions of Europe dating essentially from Charlemagne, as mod-
ified after Charlemagne by the extension of Catholic influence into Poland.
In Russian history, Poland, Bohemia, Croatia, and to a lesser degree
Hungary, mark the intrusions of Western Christendom into the domain
of eastern Europe. The conquest of Western Europe, through making
Germans the satrapal pawns of Soviet imperial influence, and the de-
struction of the power of the United States, is the essence of Soviet
strategic outlook today.
This perspective on Germany's role as a Soviet client-state, has been
explicit Soviet strategic doctrine since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
On this account, the modern form of the strategic conflict between
eastern and western Europe dates from the 1439-40 A. D. Council of
Florence, at which time Muscovy became the bastion of eastern coun-
teroffensive against the Augustinian doctrines affirmed at that Council
of Florence. Any contrary view of the strategic issues, is superficial to
the point of converging upon absurdity.
This cultural foundation of Soviet strategic outlook has been a perpetual
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crisis inside Russia since the rise of the Romanovs. Repeatedly, enlight-
ened Russian leaders, such as Peter the Great, Alexander II, Count Witte,
and Lenin, have emphasized, that Russia could not become a world-
power without assimilating Western science and technology to a large
degree. Yet, the introduction of Western science and technology collides
directly and bloodily with a "Russian peasant soul," a "peasant soul"
which embodies the characteristic features of an Eastern, anti-Western
religious and philosophical outlook. Consequently, for Russia to become
a world-power, either Western European culture must destroy itself from
within (as we have done to a large degree since the middle 1960s launching
of the "post-industrial countercultural shift"), or the Russian population
must be induced to accept a large degree of "cultural paradigm-shift,"
bringing the intrinsically inferior Russian culture up to the level of the
hated Western European culture.
The result of this conflict is the schizophrenia exhibited by the plans
of the Russian "Nazi," Fyodor Dostoevsky, for establishing a Russian
"Third Empire" ("Third Reich"). Dostoevsky, much like Hitler, saw the
need to combine Russian-style mystical irrationalism with the apparatus
of a military-industrial power developed in Siberia. Marshal Nikolai Ogar-
kov expresses the same conflict today. He is fairly characterized, as the
equivalent of a mad Dostoevsky who has nonetheless qualified as an
honors graduate of the Prussian General Staff: militarily super-rational,
but also mystically irrational. So, one might say of the presently ruling
Suslov-Andropov dynasty in Moscow: They are the reincarnation of the
Brothers Karamazov, with a nineteenth-century Prussian General Staffs
attention to military-industrial thoroughness.
The prospect of a U. S. "crash program" implementation of the SDI,
brings this underlying conflict within Soviet society to a most acute form.
They can not match the U.S.A. to the degree their strategic perspective
requires, unless they rudely confront the "peasant problem" in production,
unless they confront directly cultural hostility to rapid rates of techno-
logical progress in methods of production, a hostility which is endemic
in the "Russian soul." Hence, their rage against the SDI is of a fury
comparable to the most violent propaganda of the World War II period.
A "crash program" implementation of SDI obliges Moscow to impose a
key aspect of Western European values upon the Soviet population in
general. In terms of the present institutions of Soviet society, this means
a resumption of the methods of the Stalin period.
We restate this very important point.
From the time of the Swedish (Varangian) creation of Russia (Rus)
out of assorted primitive tribes, until the rise of the Romanovs, the
Russian priesthood was Greek in name and Byzantine in culture. The
efforts of the Romanovs to orient Russia's cultural development toward
Western Europe, unleashed a violent backlash by the forces of the "Old
Believers" (Raskolniki), the mystical, anti-Westernizing forces centered
around, and steered by, the Russian monks linked to Mount Athos.
These Raskolniki revolts, which reached a peak of bloody confrontation
during the period of Peter the Great, persisted in such later forms as the
famous Pugachov insurrection, the Russian terrorist and other populist
insurgencies against Czar Alexander II, and the Russian Revolution of
1917. V. I. Lenin himself, stated his recognition of the fact, that the
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was to a large degree a revival of the
Pugachov insurrection of the eighteenth century.
The most concentrated form of the issue, separating East from West,
is the East's rejection of the "individual soul" as Augustinian Judeo-
Christian culture defines the "individual soul." The East believes in the
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"collective soul" shared among the persons belonging to a specific body
of common "blood and soil." In Western Europe, the Dostoevskyian
"blood and soil" and "Third Roman Empire" dogmas of the Nazis, are
the best known and simplest illustration of the echoes of Russian ideology
into the West.
So, as Hamilton's anti-Adam Smith American System of political
economy typifies this policy, we in Western European culture place em-
phasis of merit upon the individual person's commitment and capacity
to discover and to implement advances in science and technology. Eastern
European culture places the emphasis of merit on "traditional ways";
Eastern European culture has a mystical hatred of technological progress,
which it tends to regard as sacrilege against the local "blood and soil's"
choice of mother-earth-goddess.
Here lies the most immediate cause for the bloody violence which
erupts in Russia, whenever one faction attempts to "impose" rapid rates
of technological progress upon the Russian people generally. It must
never be forgotten, in such conflicts, both factions are equally "Russian."
Even among the pro-technology factions, only a fraction is morally and
philosophically committed to scientific and technological progress; the
factions rallied behind the cause of technological progress have been
dominated by those who adopt such progress with moral reluctance, as
a strategic imperative of the East-West conflict. Fyodor Dostoevsky's
writings on this role of technological progress, offer a most convenient
insight into the implications. The pro-technology factions subordinate
their blind instinct against technological progress to known strategic
imperatives; the more ignorant Russian masses resist technology with the
force and dedication of that same blind instinct. The result is bloody
violence, bloody repression of one Russian faction by the other. The
oriental mysticism and romantic sentimentality, which is the Russian
character under other circumstances, assumes among all factions the form
which mysticism and romantic sentimentality always assume when en-
ergized by irrationalist rage.
Partly, they hate the SDI because it spoils their plans of imperial
conquest; this is the rational component of Soviet babbling against "mil-
itarization of space." More profoundly, they hate the SDI, because they
regard its implementation as forcing them to return to Stalinist methods
of mobilization of the Soviet labor-force as a whole. They see themselves
so forced, because they are absolutely committed to a war-winning margin
of military superiority over the United States; as Soviet officials have
said publicly, repeatedly, during recent years, they can not accept strategic
equality with the United States; they must have absolute superiority. In
face of even a modest rate of development of the U.S. SDI, the gaining
of absolute Soviet military superiority means a Soviet war mobilization
which is massive not only in scale, but also massive in terms of rates of
forced technological progress.
Recent changes in the levels of understanding of "crash programs"
The economic among leading circles of the Soviet Academy of Science, are based chiefly
science of Soviet on accelerated studies of the economic writings of LaRouche over a known
period of approximately 15 years. Although the evidence available is
war-plan `Option B' fragmentary, and the conclusions legitimately drawn from that evidence
necessarily limited in scope, the evidence demanding certain broad but
extremely important evaluations is conclusive in nature. It is based on
an accumulated pattern of actions by highest level Soviet and East-bloc
institutions since 1971-72.
Initially, during the 1968-70 interval, Soviet institutions viewed
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LaRouche and his associates as a novel and potentially important phe-
nomenon, to be explored, to determine whether this phenomenon could
be penetrated and played to Soviet advantage. Soviet-deployed "sleepers"
were sent into LaRouche's environment. Approximately 1971, East Ger-
many-controlled ("Stasi") operations under Soviet direction launched a
series of operations aimed at destroying LaRouche's influence in Western
Europe and disrupting LaRouche's associations in the Americas. These
Stasi operations were run during 1972-74 in conjunction with the Palme-
Brandt faction of the Socialist International, and elements of British
intelligence, including the London Tavistock Institute, which were then
and now heavily penetrated by Soviet intelligence. As early as 1974, it
was indicated by Soviet officials, that these operations were run with
knowledge and direction from the highest levels of the Soviet command.
The most recent phase of Soviet-directed operations against LaRouche
and his associates was launched during April 1983, on decisions made
at the level of then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko; most of
the remaining "sleepers" assigned to penetrate the association were ac-
tivated for counter-operations against LaRouche, and a massive campaign
by leading elements of the Soviet news-media was launched, from spring
1983 into spring 1984, together with leading Soviet fellow-travelers in
the U. S. news-media, Democratic Party, and elsewhere.
Soviet estimates of the work of LaRouche and his associates as "very
dangerous" and as a "principled adversary," center around the estimate
by highest levels of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, that LaRouche's
own work in economic science represents an important new development
in economic science, and is at the same time the most competent analysis
of the U.S. and Western economies currently available. On this account,
chiefly, LaRouche is officially described in the Soviet news-media as the
"ideologue of late-capitalism."
Excerpts of 1983-85 Soviet statements on LaRouche and his associates,
are supplied in the Appendices.
In the lexicon of Soviet dogma, "ideologue of late-capitalism" signifies
the Soviet estimate, that economist LaRouche has presented a more or
less comprehensive basis for reviving and saving the capitalist system.
For example, at a recent, high-security Paris conference of world-wide
Communist parties, June 12-13, 1985, Moscow reinstituted the old Com-
munist International (Comintern). The featured theme of this confer-
ence, was the Soviet presentation of the thesis, that the United States
had entered a new general economic depression, which would be the
"final crisis of capitalism." Moscow assumes, that unless there is a sudden
change in the monetary and economic policies of the OECD countries,
the capitalist system is now in a "final stage of collapse." Moscow views
LaRouche's proposed reforms as a set of means for saving capitalism from
collapse, and thus depriving Moscow of the delights of a "final collapse
of capitalism."
Moscow considers LaRouche "very dangerous," because it fears that
LaRouche's proposed reforms are competent. Moscow views LaRouche's
February 1982 proposal of what is now called the U. S. Strategic Defense
Initiative, as both military competent, and also as a form of military-
economic mobilization which could save the capitalism system through
a new "crash program" like the 1939-43 war-economy mobilization under
President Franklin Roosevelt.
Soviet officials have stated, that they view LaRouche as philosophically
a Catholic, whose criticisms of Marx's Capital from this vantage-point
constitute the basis for a "neo-capitalist" revival.
From Moscow's standpoint, LaRouche's work does in fact appear as a
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rigorous critique of Marx's work from a Catholic philosophical standpoint,
the standpoint of St. Augustine, Nicholas of Cusa, et al. From the Eastern
standpoint in religion and philosophy, Western Christian traditions,
excepting Gnostic tendencies introduced to Western churches, is the
same thing to Russians as Catholicism in general; despite the doctrinal
and related differences among Western European currents of Judaism,
Catholicism and Protestantism, the common features of these currents
are those which the Russians more or less accurately identify as Augus-
tinian.
Respecting economics, in Soviet Russia today, there are only two
general currents of thought: more or less "orthodox" Marxism on the one
side, and the post-1966 growth of Cambridge "systems analysis" on the
other. LaRouche's axiomatic criticisms of Marx's errors define LaRouche
in Russian eyes as a "revisionist," to be debated from the standpoint of
a more or less "orthodox" Marxism. However, the failures of Soviet
systems analysis, and the failures of the econometricians of the West,
have conditioned some among present-day Soviet circles to accept as
"scientifically legitimate," any criticism of Marx's economics on points
Marx employs some of the same premises as the Cambridge systems
analysts.
Therefore, from the Soviet standpoint, if LaRouche's economics works,
as they are inclined to believe it does, they hate LaRouche as much on
this account as they hate his efforts to introduce the SDI to the military
policies of OECD nations. The Soviets do not wish the Western nations
to adopt any technology which might work to the strategic advantage
of the Western alliances. Just as hatred of U.S. SDI does not prevent
the Soviets from developing ballistic missile defense full-speed for their
own forces, so, hatred of LaRouche's "neo-capitalist" economic science
does not discourage the Soviets from studying and copying as much as
might be to Soviet advantage.
Present Soviet views on the exceptional competence of LaRouche's
contributions to economic science, date from about 1980-81. Their at-
tention was focussed on the fact that a first-approximation application
of the LaRouche-Riemann Method, to computer-based economic fore-
casting, had been consistently accurate, whereas all other Western fore-
casting services of governments and private agencies alike, had been
discredited by events. The Soviets, too, had employed "Western" systems-
analysis methods for their economic forecasting, and these had failed just
as the econometricians of the West had failed. It was the fact that the
LaRouche-Riemann forecasts were computer-based, which particularly
attracted Soviet attention during this period; they tend to be impressed
more by mathematics than by principled issues of scientific method, and
have an increasing fascination with computer technologies and their
applications.
It was the highest levels of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, especially
the mathematics and physics sectors in the orbit of Academician Alek-
sandrov, which manifested the greatest degree of concentrated interest
in the LaRouche-Riemann Method. Naturally, the U.S.A. -Canada In-
stitute and related sectors were also interested, but it was the mathematics
and physics sectors which are known to have concentrated upon the
detailed features of the Method itself.
It has been clear, through statements by Aleksandrov and other rel-
evant circles, since the close of the Brezhnev period, that during the
process of consolidation of the factional position of Suslov's heirs of the
currently ruling "Andropov dynasty," Soviet policy-making has moved
toward replacement of the old industries "mafia" by managerial cadres
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from the military-industrial sector. The planning of purges to accomplish
this was already adopted by spring 1982, purges delayed during the Cher-
nenko period, set fully into motion immediately by Gorbachov's accession
as party leader. The skyrocketting barrages of statements to this effect,
by Aleksandrov and others, since March 1985, sampled in this Special
Report, do not signify the sudden eruption of a newly formed policy:
they are the unleashing of a policy already adopted no later than spring-
summer 1982.
There can not be a competent appraisal of the emerging "Plan B"
aspects of current Soviet war-mobilization policy, without comparing
ongoing shifts in Soviet policy with the central features of the published
material on the LaRouche-Riemann Method. What the Soviets have
been studying over the years, is most conveniently summarized in
LaRouche's 1984 textbook in elementary mathematical economics, and
in a series of articles appearing in the Executive Intelligence Review's weekly
news magazine. From the standpoint of commonplace errors of assumption
of U.S. econometricians, the most crucial points to be considered, in
evaluating current directions in Soviet policies, are as follows.
U.S. econometrics today, is immediately a combined by-product of
the work of Professor Wassily Leontief, on input-output analysis, merged
with the analysis of systems of linear inequalities which grew up through
the influence of the late John von Neumann and Operations Research.
The most important incompetencies of econometrics today are either
explicitly or implicitly arrayed in von Neumann's and Morgenstern's
Theory of Games & Economic Behavior.
The first general error of modern econometrics, is the adoption of the
notion of "marginal utility," as this was developed, first, in Jeremy Ben-
tham's "felicific calculus," and elaboted on that basis by J. S. Mill, Jevons,
and Marshall. This assumes that the relative price paid for an object or
service converges statistically (ergodically) upon an equilibrium-price; it
assumes that the only value to be considered in economics is the con-
vergence of price, as a reflection of marginal utility, upon such an equi-
librium-price, in an "indefinitely extended n-person game."
The second major fallacy, is that dogma introduced most authorita-
tively by von Neumann, that the solution of all problems of analysis in
economies, could be accomplished by stating input-output expressions
of the Leontief type as systems of linear inequalities.
The third, more subtle fallacy, is the analysis of economies solely in
terms of changes in quantities and prices of inputs and outputs, without
examining the impact on the economy of transformations internal to the
processes of production as such.
Consider the third of these fallacies first.
It is easily shown, that military expenditures as such do not contribute
to increase of the productivity of labor, and are not either producers'
goods or households' goods. Therefore, it appears to be the case, that
military expenditures constitute economic waste, simply a depressive tax
upon the economy as a whole.
Yet, throughout the nineteenth century, and twentieth century to
date, the greatest rates of progress in per-capita wealth of economies have
appeared as by-products of war-economy mobilizations! The recovery of
the U. S. economy from the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the more
recent 1959-66 recovery under mobilization of aerospace programs, are
characteristic examples of this.
Where lies the answer to this paradox? It lies in the fact, that war-
economy mobilizations subsume mobilization of higher rates of techno-
logical progress in weapons-systems and in investment in production for
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producing weapons-systems. In this respect, war-economy mobilization
forces rapid advances in investment in productive processes, in an energy-
intensive, capital-intensive mode. The acceleration of technology of
capital-goods production, and the spill-over of this advancement in cap-
ital-goods technologies into production in general, causes rises in pro-
ductivity in the non-military-goods sectors of production.
In other words, any "cost-benefit analysis" treatment of merely the
addition of military-output requirements to an economy, is intrinsically
an absurd form of analysis. We must consider the technological impact
of increases in military production upon the increase of productivities in
the economy in general.
In all cases, the primary thing to be considered, is not simply inputs
and outputs as such. The most powerful impact upon an economy, is the
impact of technological progress upon the process of production itself.
Translate this into the language of Soviet strategic doctrine. In pre-
viously established Soviet doctrine, Plan A doctrine, military production
is treated as a drag upon the economy. Therefore, Plan A thinking reasons,
if one power cranks up to full-scale war-economy mobilization, and a
comparable opposing power does not, the weakening of the first power
by such war-economy mobilization can be compensated only by either
victorious warfare or other capitulation by the opposing power. If Plan
B follows the LaRouche-Riemann Method on this point, then the power
whose war-economy mobilization is at the higher technological level,
can sustain such a mobilization indefinitely, constantly gaining in margin
of economic advantage over the other. In economic terms, a full-scale
war-economy mobilization, is a source of cumulative economic superi-
ority, not weakening, on condition that the principle of a "science-driver"
variety of "crash program" is adopted.
There lies the practical implication of the difference between Plan A
and Plan B. There lies the feature of recent and current Plan B-type
Soviet policy-statements, which must have first rank in evaluations.
In other words, if Soviet policy follows Plan A, the likelihood of warfare
is at the greatest during approximately 1988. At that point, the Soviet
war-economy mobilization will have peaked, and the religious mobili-
zation leading into the 1988 celebrations will also have peaked. According
to a version of Soviet strategic doctrine based on Plan A, the Soviet
Union must launch a full-scale war against the United States by ap-
proximately 1988. After 1988, according to Plan A reasoning, the relative
advantage to the Soviets will erode at an accelerating rate, unless NATO
military capabilities and economies collapse of their own weight.
What, then, if the U.S. shrewdly focuses upon Soviet ideology re-
specting acceptable losses to the Soviet empire's Great Russian master-
race, by adopting an operational policy of launch on warning, directed
at Great Russia and choice Siberian targets? Even if the Soviets won the
war otherwise, the losses associated with such victory become "unac-
ceptable." This buys the U.S.A. several years of postponement of Soviet
attack, until, as we have already indicated, Moscow deploys a "second
generation" quality of strategic ballistic missile defense. Assume also,
that the U.S. revises its monetary and economic, as well as military-
budget policies, to foster a general economic recovery and increased SDI
expenditures. Under that condition, the logic of Plan A appears to be
problematic for the Soviets.
Against that contingency, Moscow is obliged to begin shifting rapidly
from Plan A to Plan B. In that case, then 1988 is no longer a maximum
point of relative strength for Moscow, but, rather, the date of maximum
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strength is shifted to a later date, to a critical point during the early to
middle 1990s.
That critical point is rather simply defined. Let X, Soviet total ca-
pability, be greater than Y, the total capability of the NATO alliance.
Let the exponent of growth-rate for X be designated by "a," and let "a"
be less than the exponent of growth for Y, "b." The point at which the
absolute margin of growth of Soviet capability ceases to be greater than
the absolute margin of growth for NATO capability, is a critical value.
This is indicated better, by assuming, as is the normal case, that the
growth-rate exponents "a" and "b" are not linear, and that "b" increases
more rapidly than "a": In other words, a U.S. mobilization "takes off'
as did the 1939-43 mobilization. Once NATO's economies reach the
critical value corresponding approximately to 1943, the rate of growth
of NATO's power will accelerate relative to the rate of growth of the
Soviets, on condition that the Soviets do not introduce an effective
"cultural paradigm-shift," away from deeply-embedded Eastern cultural
matrices during that interval.
Given, such broadly obvious distinctions between Plan A and Plan B
varieties of policy-making, the practical question is circumscribed: How
do we measure choices of investment in such a way as to obtain the
optimal Plan B type of effect? The first step, is to throw away all "systems
analysis," and "analysts": Economies do not function in the mode implied
by solutions to systems of linear inequalities; every decision based on
such fallacious methods will be an absurd decision. Economic processes
are characteristically "non-linear."
Restate the practical question: How can we calculate the estimated
increases of growth of productivity resulting from a choice of investment
in improved technology? This obliges us to discard every British, Swiss,
and Viennese economist, from the Physiocrat Quesnay, through Smith,
Bentham, Malthus, Ricardo, Marx, the Mills, Walras, Say, Pareto, Mar-
shall, Keynes, Friedman, Hayek, and so forth. We must return to the
source of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's American System of
political-economy, the establishment of economic science by Gottfried
Leibniz.
LaRouche's principled contribution to economic science, centers around
his improvement in Leibniz's definition of "technology," an improvement
based on the work of Karl Gauss, Dirichlet, Weierstrass, Riemann, and
Cantor. From this standpoint, the measure of increase of productivity
and the military criteria of increases of firepower and mobility, have a
precise mathematical correlation. This correlation is based upon a math-
ematical measurement of technology, a measurement accomplished by
resituating Leibniz's original definition of technology within a Rieman-
nian hyperspherical function: In other words, the notions associated with
synthetic-geometrical construction of a Riemann Surface. This is indi-
cated within LaRouche's elementary mathematical-economics textbook,
as amplified in such published sources as his EIR items on "Artificial
Intelligence" (May 14, 1985) and exposing the fallacies of Leontief's
featured piece in the June 1985 Scientific American (EIR, June 10, 1985).
`Crash program' methods
The general theory of "science-driver" forms of "crash programs," is out-
lined in the Krafft Ehricke memorial address included in the Appendices.
A few supplementary remarks, echoing the discussion period during that
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conference, are most appropriate here, as bearing upon evaluation of
those features of Soviet policy which coincide with, or tend to coincide
with, Plan B.
In ordinary scientific research, scientists construct instruments for ex-
perimental work, chiefly, in collaboration with tool-makers skilled in
development work. This used to be accomplished, chiefly, in machine
shops associated with university and other laboratories, until the foolish
introduction of line-item budgeting of such work, such that experimental
work is usually delayed by months or years, while the scientists seek to
win authorization for a line-item budget from among various govern-
mental or private-grants institutions. These silly methods of budgeting
have been one of the more important brakes against scientific progress,
especially over the recent quarter-century since the Hoover Commission's
proposed increase in the bureaucratization of government.
A weapon is essentially a scientific instrument adapted for military
usage; so is a new type of machine-tool. Let us imagine that we take two
steps. First, we junk the line-item budgeting of scientific research, and
return to the sensible practice of budgeting only the staffing and equipping
of the research-institution as a whole, and not the detailed activities
within it. Second, for purposes of military development, we supply sci-
entists with use of budgeted sections of generalized production-capacity
in the economy as a whole. In this second feature, we budget only the
indicated portions of capacity as a whole, and budget the use of these
portions of capacity only for a species of materials or instruments, rather
than some specified material or instrument.
For example. The SDI is most usefully defined as based upon a complex
of species of technologies, species which are assorted as a whole into two
general classifications, primary and auxiliary. The primary classes are
controlled high-energy plasma-reactions, coherently directed beams, and
optical biophysics. The auxiliary technologies, are those required to de-
liver, aim and fire the primary technologies. On this basis, we know in
advance, at least in practice, the kinds of materials and instrumentation
we shall require for yet-unspecified kinds of applications of these tech-
nologies.
What we wish to avoid, is the situation in which our scientists prove
that a certain sort of instrument for military uses can be produced, but
in which we do not have available the kinds of production facilities
needed to produce the materials and instruments this design requires.
Therefore, we assign manufacturers to allot some comer of their total
capacity, to mastering the production of one or more of the varieties of
materials or instruments we shall require. In other words, once we have
determined the need for a specific sort of material or instrument, we have
a working group in some industry qualified to work up a material or
instrument to the level of specifications required.
Once we have produced a prototype of some instrument, we use the
the lessons we have learned in producing the materials and instruments
for that prototype, to launch expanded general production of such ma-
terials and instruments.
That is the first-approximation of a "science driver" variety of "crash
program." What we have done, in such a case, is to expand the instru-
ment-making resources of the scientific laboratory, beyond the scope of
the machine-shop attached to that laboratory, to the effect of making
production as a whole increasingly the machine-shop in which scientific
research works.
This is key to understanding the reasons that such a "crash program"
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takes the form of an accelerating rate of growth in quality and scale,
from initially small beginnings.
This process subsumes a spread of new materials, instruments, and
skills, from the initial interface between scientists and corners of pro-
duction, into production more generally. This is the "spill over" of the
new technologies into production generally. In other words, the "spill
over" does not occur in the form of taking completed new designs from
the isolated laboratory into production; the "spill over" is organic, is the
effect of increasing the relative scale of production directly under the
influence of the combined fundamental research and development work
of scientific teams, by integrating manufacturing with laboratories en-
gaged in fundamental research.
In this way, scientific research directly transforms the processes of
production, in an energy-intensive, capital-intensive mode. This impact
is mediated chiefly through the tool-making aspect of capital-goods pro-
ducing, such that the rate of increase of productivity tends to be in
proportion to the capital-intensity of investment in production generally.
This rarely occurs in larger-scale private manufacturing firms, even
technology-intensive firms. Something like it tends to occur more fre-
quently among newly formed small firms, created by scientists and en-
gineers motivated more by a passionate commitment to a scientific principle
than to precalculable rates of profit. It occurs, otherwise, only through
commitment of governments, either in warfare or preparations for warfare,
in which the risk of losing war, or the cost of unacceptable levels of
warfare damage, outweigh the ordinary considerations of precalculable
profitability.
This behavior of private entrepreneurs is ultimately very silly. There
has never been a case in modem history of industry, that a new scientific
principle was not most generously profitable, provided sufficient breadth
and professional staffing of the investment were supplied. Expressed in
terms of statistics, it ought to be U. S. policy, that the employment for
research and development in physical and biological technologies ought
to be about 10% of the total employment of the labor-force, perhaps
15%. If this investment in employment were made, adequately supported,
and utilized, the resulting rate of increase of productivity of the labor-
force as a whole would exceed the highest rates in modern history. The
result would be, that the economy functioned in something like a "sci-
ence-driver" "crash program" mode all of the time. However, with rare
exceptions, practice in that direction occurs only under the pressure of
perceived military expediencies.
This is the direction in which Plan B aspects of current Soviet policy
are moving. Technically, from the standpoints of both physics and eco-
nomic science, those efforts portend the highest rates of economic growth
in the Soviet Union so far. The impediments to such an effort are chiefly
cultural, as we have indicated here already, cultural impediments with
potentially profound political implications for Soviet society as a whole.
In the meantime, we must assume that the acceleration of Soviet urgency
and confidence in its military imperatives, will overwhelm the cultural
opposition, such that cultural resistance may impede success, but not
prevent it entirely.
Our remarks on the nature and theory of a Plan B approach, here,
should not be taken to imply that the Soviets are fully committed to the
theory of practice which we have outlined here, nor are we estimating
the probable net result of opposing cultural resistance and present efforts
to force through a "science driver" approach. Our task here, is to alert
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readers to this important aspect of current Soviet policy of practice, and
to insist that existing U. S. governmental studies of the Soviet war-plans
and economy must be replaced by methods appropriate to the close study
of both Soviet policy and shifting Soviet capabilities.
All those who echo Henry A. Kissinger, in babbling the falsehood,
that the "Soviet empire is crumbling," and so forth, should be disregarded
or jailed, as proper statutes may prescribe for such cases. Soviet society
is by no means "crumbling"; it is the NATO alliance which is already
crumbling, as we note in such cases as recent developments in Greece
and Scandinavia, and the threat that Willy Brandt's Soviet-allied Social-
Democratic forces might come to power in Germany, and pull Germany
rapidly out of the U. S. alliance.
There are sources of troubles inside the Warsaw Pact, and in Soviet
society itself. Soviet society is inherently a very violent society, whose
culture prescribes periodic convulsions. Plan B efforts will increase the
potential for such convulsions, as we have indicated. However, the
likelihood that either the Warsaw Pact or Soviet society itself will begun
to crumble internally very soon, is so small as to be almost non-existent
under present conditions. NATO threw away national-independence
potentialities in Eastern Europe repeatedly: Germany 1953, Hungary and
Poland in 1956, Berlin 1961, and Czechoslovakia 1968. The classical
counteroffensive policy for Soviet attack through East Germany, to sweep
into Poland and declare the national sovereignty of that nation's existing
government, is not a practical alternative in the present correlation of
forces. True, assuming that the Soviet empire was extended to domination
of the nominally independent satrapies of today's Western Europe, as
well as the Middle East, the Soviet empire must crumble eventually, as
all oligarchical empires of the form of the Mesopotamian models have
crumbled internally in the past. Those who speak wishfully of such as
early-future prospects, under present correlations of forces, are doubly
dangerous, as they sow Neville Chamberlain-like complacency among
us, and prompt the Soviets to desire war more urgently, as the alternative
to Western meddling in the internal order of Eastern Europe.
In the present term, our attention to troubles within the Soviet empire
must be less wishfully ambitious, more precise, and more practical. It is
important to watch closely the frictional impulses of cultural and policy
conflicts, impulses not likely to cause the Soviet empire to crumble during
the forseeable future, but impulses which will affect greatly the way in
which Soviet policy and performance shift marginally during the period
ahead. The cultural and policy conflicts arising in the overlay of Plan A
and Plan B are the best choice of benchmark for such observations and
analysis.
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1.2 Soviet Doctrine on
the War-Economy
In no area can Soviet intentions to go to war be more precisely gauged
than in that of the economy. Soviet military strategy, extending back
to Sokolovskii, prescribes that there can be no strategy for war without
a strategy for a war economy.
Without a sufficiently advanced economy, capable of being fully mo-
bilized to meet the demands of the armed forces, it is impossible to wage
modem war. This is the basic principle of the Soviet doctrine of war
economy.
As we shall document below, this emphasis on the economy and
economic mobilization capability was one of the foundations of the work
of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii and his team which developed the elaborated
Soviet strategy for fighting and winning a global thermonuclear war,
published as the book Military Strategy in 1962. But it is also the foundation
of the present Soviet strategy expounded by Marshal of the Soviet Union
Nikolai Ogarkov-what we refer to in this report as the Ogarkov Doctrine.
This documentation of Soviet statements on war economy will also
make clear how and why the Soviet High Command under Ogarkov was
instrumental in bringing to power the Andropov Dynasty for the specific
purpose of completing the crucial final preparations for victory in World War
III.
In Ogarkov's most extensive public version of his war strategy, a 1982
booklet entitled Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland, he identified the
following dilemma for the Soviet planners of offensive nuclear war. In
World War II, only a tiny fraction-perhaps as little as 10%-of all of
the economic resources expended in combat had been produced before
the war started. The other 90% were produced in the enormous economic
mobilization carried on during the course of the war.
But that was World War II. Today, argue the Soviet military planners,
a world war will almost certainly be much, much shorter. With ther-
monuclear weapons of mass destruction, and intercontinental missiles as
delivery vehicles, the war may be decided in the first few minutes or
hours of war. If so, there will be no time to make up for what is lacking,
for what is not already in place and deployable before the war ever breaks
out.
It is obvious, then, that the side which is capable of the maximum
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pre-war economic mobilization will have enormous advantages over its
adversary. However, here is where the problem arises. A maximum war
mobilization is a state that cannot be maintained indefinitely. The max-
imum war mobilization is like that at the height of World War II: In
Soviet terminology, it is when "the entire country has been transformed
into a single camp of war, where everything and everybody goes for
victory." And in the case of total, global war, the shorter it is, the more
intense the mobilization must be. Nothing that might contribute to a
margin of victory dare be left outside the mobilization, "kept in reserve"
for some future that will never come unless victory is won.
In other words, the dilemma is how to mobilize as much and as far as
possible in peacetime, without overextending the mobilization so as to
undermine the very basis of the economy and society.
Ogarkov formulates the problem as follows:
As we know, it is inefficient to maintain armed forces in peacetime
in the same fully deployed conditions as will be required in the event
of war. Economically, no state can afford to do this, nor is there
any particular need to do so. For this reason, in our country under
conditions of peaceful construction, as indeed in other countries, a
certain portion of the armed forces are kept in a constant state of
readiness, i. e., they have a full complement of personnel and military
hardware, while the rest are ready for rapid mobilization. Hence, a
high degree of combat-readiness of the troops is inconceivable with-
out well-organized mobilization training, aimed at ensuring that they
can be quickly converted from a peacetime to a war footing. If the
aggressor unleashes a war, the trained personnel and combat-ready
equipment assigned to formations and units have to be available on
short notice, immediately. For this reason, the task of constant
readiness for immediate mobilization of the troops, and early tran-
sition of the armed forces and the entire national economy from a
peacetime to a war footing, are of special and urgent importance to
the state.
...The beginning and the course of World War II introduced
further changes into the concept of mobilization, and to an even
greater extent revealed the direct link which connected the mo-
bilization and deployment of the armed forces with the transition
of the entire economy to a war footing and the reorganization of
the political, social, scientific, and other institutions of the state.
The greater part of the economy and resources of the state were
enlisted for the purpose of ensuring immediate war needs. It is
sufficient to cite the following example. In the last war, around 90%
of the material needs of the armed forces of the belligerent countries
were provided by production which took place after the war had
already begun, as a result of the mobilization of the economy. What
emerged as the most important problems in this respect were the
shortening of times for mobilization and ensuring that the economy
could be converted to a war footing in a planned manner.
In former wars, as we know, the question of mobilization was not
so acute. The weapons systems which countries had at their disposal,
and the relatively low degree of mobility and maneuverability of
their troops, even in the case of a surprise attack, were essentially
incapable of disrupting the mobilization of the army, and even less
so of predetermining the course and outcome of the war.
Under modem conditions, the situation has changed radically.
The element of surprise played a definite role already in the Second
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World War. But today it has become a factor of utmost strategic
significance. The question of the early and rapid transition of the
armed forces and the entire national economy onto a war footing,
as well as that of their mobilization on short notice, has become a
considerably more urgent matter. For this reason, providing the
forces with trained manpower and combat-ready equipment, and
the early transition of the economy to provide output according to
wartime schedules, dictate the necessity of carrying out clear-cut,
well-planned measures already in peacetime and of conducting co-
ordinated action by party, soviet and military authorities locally.
The full and qualitative fulfillment of all these measures will to a
great extent determine the success of the organized entry of the
armed forces into the war and the utter defeat of the aggressor.
The Soviet solution
To solve this dilemma of war economy mobilization, Soviet military
strategy has developed a two-fold approach.
1) On the one hand, the military command must ensure at all times
that economic decisions are taken with a view to a future war in mind.
In other words, the mobilization will be extended backward, in advance
of the outbreak of war, as far as possible, and be built up successively.
This involves long-term measures of force development such as hardware,
various defensive measures such as decentralization of vital industries and
civil defense programs, and an overall direction of science and technology
to benefit the defense sector.
2) Secondly, there will still be certain measures that must be "saved
for the last minute." These concern economic measures that simply cost
too much to maintain constantly. This category includes certain infra-
structural programs (construction of key rail lines and highways in areas
of military importance that cannot be used economically), strategic stock-
piling of perishable foods, conversion of plants for arms, etc.
The general term the Soviets use for describing this approach to a war
economy is that of building in a "surge production capacity" into the
economy, i.e., on the basis of a "normal" level of war economy that can
be sustained more or less indefinitely, the next step is to add a very
specific program for a short-term massive shift and build-up.
A.N. Lagovskii
These aspects of the theory of war economy were elaborated already in
the 1950s by Soviet strategists, most notably by the founder of the modem
Soviet doctrine of war economy, A.N. Lagovskii. In 1957 then-Colonel
Lagovskii was appointed as head of the newly-established Department of
War Economy at the Soviet General Staff Academy. In that capacity,
Lagovskii set up a curriculum for the subject as an on-going part of the
work he was simultaneously doing in a group under the Chief of General
Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskii, to develop a new
Soviet strategy for nuclear war.
Lagovskii's elaboration of the theory of war economy was not only
included in Sokolovskii's book, Military Strategy, but Lagovskii himself
also wrote a separate textbook for the new curriculum. This textbook,
entitled Strategiya i ekonomika (Strategy and the Economy), was published
in 1957. With startling frankness, this 200-page book discusses 1) how
the military high command ("strategy") has to take control of the economy
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and economic planning, 2) the vital issue of what must be done in
peacetime to prepare for war, 3) a whole array of necessary measures to
protect the Soviets' own economy, such as the building of strategic
reserves, duplication of industries, building underground plants, etc., and
4) not least, how the high command must thoroughly map out the U. S.
economy, including its weak and strong points, with conclusions about
which industries can be influenced (destroyed) in peacetime, which ones
will be prime nuclear targets, and which ones should be saved for later
use by a victorious Red Army.
The quotes below concentrate only on points 1) and 2), and even
these are but a fraction of what Lagovskii states on these topics. But the
following should indicate the essence of the modem Soviet strategy of
war economy.
An advanced economy is the precondition for victory
Soviet military science has elaborated the far-reaching depen-
dence of modem war on the economic factor. Without a sufficiently
advanced economy, which can fulfil all the demands of the armed
forces, it is impossible to wage war today. A strategic plan which
oversteps the bounds of the country's economic potential will be an
adventure. A strategy which lacks an adequate economic basis must
necessarily fail.
The military command must run the economy
Today, as never before, strategy must systematically and thor-
oughly investigate all scientific and technological achievements as
well as [the nation's] economic potential... .
However, as we know, potential is not yet reality. One has to
know how to translate potential into reality, that is, one has to
elaborate both a theory of war economy for war and carry out per-
sistent efforts for the development of that economic potential... .
...In order to be able to meet [the] needs of the army and navy,
the economy must, already in peacetime, prepare itself in all respects
for the armed defense of the country.
Strategy bears great responsibility for the economic preparation
of the country for a war. Above all, it has to determine the needs
of the armed forces for the initial period of the war. These needs
must be constantly adjusted in accordance with the new potential
offered by the progress of the national economy, the achievements
of science and technology, the course of the process of force de-
velopment and the new principles of military art.
... Strategy has to compare the economic potential of its own
country with the estimated needs of the armed forces and, in the
interest of national defense, determine the directions in which the
various branches of industry must develop as well as the rate of
development required to attain the required capacities.
Strategy has to exert its influence on all economic problems which
are connected with support of combat actions of the armed forces
as well as their build-up in the period of preparation for war and
during war. Strategy is duty-bound to advise the State in economic
matters which bear upon the defense capability of the nation.
Rapid mobilization of the economy
One highly important factor in evaluating economic potential is
the possibility of rapid mobilization of all branches of the economy
for the needs of war and of far-reaching utilization of economic
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reserves. Today, the strength of a nation is also dependent upon
how long it takes to expand its economic potential in correspondence
with the military-political situation... .
The rapid and comprehensive mobilization of all economic re-
serves is primarily dependent upon the economic system of a country.
The main qualitative feature of the economic potential is the struc-
ture and organization of the national economy. The socialist system
of planned economy has in this respect great advantages over the
capitalist economic system.
Components of economic potential
Let us once again summarize the most important elements of
economic potential: the size of a country's population, taking into
consideration its cultural level and political and moral state- the
economic system; the capacity of heavy industry; the productivity
of labor and its developmental trends; raw materials; import de-
pendency; density and size of the transportation network; the level
of development of agriculture and its areas of specialization; the time
required for mobilization of all branches of the economy; the pos-
sibility of utilization of economic reserves, and the state of the
material reserves in the country.
Modern wars represent a severe test for a country's economic
potential. They reveal whether or not that potential is capable of
providing the nation with all means that are necessary for successfully
waging armed struggle. In the Great Patriotic War, the socialist
economic system of the Soviet Union managed to rapidly convert
the entire economic might of the state to meet the needs of war to
annihilate the enemy. The experiences gathered in this war in the
utilization of economic potential furnish valuable guidelines for as-
sessing the potential of the Soviet Union in the event of a new war.
They show the path toward further strengthening of the defense
capacity of the Soviet homeland and toward the creation of a mighty
foundation for the material and technology equipping and supply
of the Soviet army. A constant investigation of the economic po-
tential of our own country provides the military command with data
on the means which can be placed at their disposal for carrying out
combat actions, on the possible extent of combat actions in the
initial period and in the later periods of the war, as well as the time
at which strategic operations can be launched. A precise study of
economic potential and the comparison of the economic potential
of the country with the needs of the army in war, make it possible
to take measures for the crash development of one particular branch
of militarily vital production or for building new means of com-
munications.
The nation's economic potential has to be utilized even in peace-
time as rationally as possible for the construction of the armed forces.
Mobilization in peacetime
... For strategy, it is very important to elaborate its own rec-
ommendations for the direction in which the economy should de-
velop, so that the most favorable conditions for the mobilization of
the armed forces and for their development and deployment, can
be created. Therefore, strategy must, already in peacetime, exert its
influence to prepare the economy in the manner required in case
of war to supply the army and navy with everything it needs for
armed struggle.
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The composition of the means required for warfare must likewise
be determined already in peacetime. In solving this highly respon-
sible task, strategy plays the leading role. In the course of the war,
military art can, on the basis of the experience its acquires, relatively
quickly change its principles, and, similarly, the troops can relatively
quickly implement new tactical methods and new demands on op-
erational art. But things are different as far as the economy is con-
cerned: Production facilities cannot react so quickly to the demands
of the troops for provision with other war materiel and other ar-
maments than the customary ones. The conversion of industry, even
the partial conversion of the production program and the introduc-
tion of a new technology, is a complicated matter that demands a
great deal of time. For this reason, the means and methods of
conducting a possible war have to be determined in time and carefully
thought through in close connection with the potentials of the
national economy and its perspectives. Here, too, we see one of the
most important tasks of strategy. It has to foresee the course of
development of warfare as well as the possible changes in the methods
of warfare and hence the changes in the needs of the troops. Of
course, strategy is not capable of of predicting all new demands of
the armed forces in a long war. However, strategy is duty-bound to
determine in advance the needs of the armed forces with respect to
types and quantity of technical means and armaments for the initial
period of the war, be it only a single year. This survey of the needs
of the armed forces is necessary in order to determine the point at
which the economic preparation of the country for the armed struggle
should begin.
Geographical distribution
The geographical distribution of the productive forces and es-
pecially that of heavy industry, the leading branch of the economy
and the foundation of the defense capacity of the nation, is under
present conditions of exceptional political, economic, and strategic
importance. . . . Economic potential is the basis for conducting
modem wars, and this potential is the main target for the enemy's
armed impact on the rear... .
Under present conditions, the individual parts of the advanced
economic base, especially the industrial plants, must be distributed
throughout the country in such a way as to provide the most favorable
preconditions for production during the war.
In setting up new plants, the question of their defense against air
attack must always be taken into consideration. In determining the
geographical location of an industrial facility, both economic and
military interests have to be taken into account. Sometimes, eco-
nomic interests have to take second priority if they run counter to
strategic considerations... .
.. The same production, the same component or machine must
always be produced in more than one factory in more than one area.
A product must always be produced in many different plants.
Science and technology
The furious development of science and technology have much
to offer to modem armaments and can thereby influence the methods
of conducting war. This is why strategy is interested in the successes
of science and technology.
If strategy is in a position of seeing far in advance, and if it does
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not lag behind the economic development of the country, then the
arming of the army can be rapidly developed. The level of devel-
opment of science and technology today offers real possibilities,
which occasionally are bigger than might have been foreseen some
years ago. However, to move from the stage of prediction in the
area of arms development to the design phase and from there to
serial production, is a long road, often one that takes years. For this
reason, it is important for strategy to be constantly up-dated with
regard to the achievements of science and technology, in order to
be able to utilize the latest developments in all areas of science for
its purposes. But beyond that, strategy can and must also exert its
influence to push scientific and technological research in directions
that benefit the military.
Under the conditions of the stormy development of science and
technology, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to utilize the
experience of the Second World War for a future war; this is why
the ability of strategy to foresee the development of technical means
of struggle, the build-up of the army and navy, and the methods of
conducting armed struggle, take on increasingly greater importance.
Labor power and labor productivity
The early preparation of a complete inventory of labor power
resources for the event of war is of great economic and military
significance. Strategy is interested in completing the mobilization
of the armed forces in a short period of time by drafting population
contingents... .
Strategy has to inform itself of one further factor which exerts
substantial influence on the labor power requirements of the national
economy, viz. the increase of the productivity of labor. This factor
is important not only from the standpoint of an additional increase
of goods of society, but also for supplying additional personnel to
the armed forces. As is known, an increase in labor productivity
means that less labor-time is needed for the production of a product,
i.e., fewer workers are needed for the production of the same amount
of products. The workers thereby freed from production may either-
if the existing equipment so permits-be deployed to increase pro-
duction of relevant products, or be assigned to different jobs, or in
case of war, be drafted into the army or navy.
Preparing the theaters of war
The comprehensive preparation of the theaters of war is, under
current conditions, a distinctive feature of the general war-prepar-
edness of a country. Strategy is highly interested in this factor because
it sees in it a necessary and important condition for the success of
concentration and deployment of troops in the event of war, and
for the success of initial military operations and perhaps even the
entire campaign.
On the extensive territories of future strategic fronts, that is, the
potential theaters of war, various kinds of relations may develop
among neighboring states in peacetime. For this reason, interna-
tional relations are one of the most important elements in deter-
mining the measures to prepare the scope and succession of work
in the prospective theater of war.
... Such measures might include the establishment of a network
of airfields, rail lines, highways, and pipelines, as well as the con-
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struction of water routes for intensive traffic as well as the construc-
tion of electricity plants and power lines... .
...The preparation of the theaters of war must in case of emer-
gency be carried out to some extent "at the expense of the general
economic development of the territory... .
In individual cases, military and economic interests may even
diverge widely from one another. For instance, it is more advan-
tageous to build one big electric power plant than several smaller
ones. First of all, construction is cheaper, and secondly, the pro-
duction costs of electricity produced in a large power plant are lower.
However, this question has to be solved by looking at both the
requirements of air defense and securing the needs of the troops,
the national economy, and the population for electric power in war.
From this standpoint, it may turn out in certain circumstances to
be more expedient to build a network of small power plants which
can be connected to the power grid of the relevant area. Often the
interests of strategy and the economy can also diverge in the con-
struction of transportation routes... .
The military issues orders
A comparison of our initial quotes from Marshal Ogarkov on economic
mobilization with those from Lagovskii should illustrate the continuity
of Soviet strategy for war economy from the 1950s until today. In the
case of Ogarkov, there is a direct link. As a major-general in 1958,
Ogarkov was in the first class to take Lagovskii's new course at the General
Staff Academy. The book from which we have quoted above was the
textbook Ogarkov used.
In Ogarkov's writings in the 1980s, he draws on another aspect of
Lagovskii and Sokolovskii: the immediate, urgent measures that have to
be taken, in addition to long-term direction of the economy. Ogarkov
writes in his 1982 booklet Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland:
In the interests of raising the defense capacity of the country, it
is more urgent than ever before that the mobilization of the armed
forces be coordinated with the national economy as a whole, es-
pecially in the use of human resources, transport, communications
and energy, and in ensuring the reliability and survivability of the
entire vast economic mechanism of the country. In this connection,
there must be a constant effort to find ways to improve systems of
cooperation among enterprises which produce the basic types of
weapons, and to make them more autonomous with respect to energy
and water supplies, provide them with necessary stocks, and create
an equipment and materials reserve. Further improvement has to
be made in the actual system of mobilization readiness of the national
economy on the basis of the principle that a close interrelationship
between the mobilization readiness of the armed forces, the national
economy, and civil defense is the most important condition for
maintaining the defense capacity of the country as a whole on the
requisite level.
The concentration of all forces to attain the goals posed, taking
into account the extraordinarily changed conditions of modern war
and the complexity of mobilization, is impossible without a reliable
system of centralized leadership of the country and the armed forces.
Our country has some experience in this respect. The State Defense
Committee, as well as the defense e ommittees in the cities of the
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front zone, which had been created in the years of the Great Patriotic
War, proved their value to the full extent. In a modern war, should
the imperialists unleash one against us, it goes without saying that
we will require an even higher degree of concentration of leadership
(command) and, obviously, not only in the front regions, as was
the case during the past war. In this connection, a significantly
greater role will also be played by the corresponding local agencies
which in the event of war might have to head up all efforts connected
with the solution of mobilization tasks and tasks of territorial defense,
as well as with the implementation of measures such as civil defense
and so forth.
The year before Ogarkov graduated from the General Staff Academy,
Colonel Semyon Kurkotkin had completed the same course of study.
Today, Kurkotkin is a deputy defense minister and Chief of Rear Ser-
vices-i.e., in charge of all logistics-for the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces,
a post he has held since 1972. In March 1983, Kurkotkin was promoted
by Yuri Andropov to Marshal of the Soviet Union. In fall 1984, only a
few weeks after Ogarkov had personally taken charge of implementing
the final phase of setting up the command structure for war against the
West (see section 1.5), Kurkotkin wrote an article in the military daily
Krasnaya Zvezda urging the same economic mobilization measures as
Ogarkov had previously done. The article titled, "The Experience of
History and the Present Day: Economic Potential in Action," appeared
in Krasnaya Zvezda, Oct. 19, 1984.
...The Great Patriotic War confirmed anew and with absolute
conviction that the socialist planned economy, in combination with
its scientific management, opens possibilities which no capitalist
state has or can have. The socialist planned economy possesses a
unique mobilization capability and survivability which permits it to
react operationally to a changing situation and rapidly implement
a reorganization. For instance, the transition of the German econ-
omy onto a war footing took nearly six years, that of the U. S. about
two years. Our country was able to carry out a mobilization of the
economy in the course of a single year.
. In the 1939-41 period the Central Committee of the Party
and the Soviet Government adopted several important resolutions
on questions of strengthening the defense capacity of the country.
These included, for instance, decisions to convert existing and build
new aircraft factories, and to produce T-34 tanks. As a result, the
production capacity of our aircraft industry and of Soviet tank con-
struction were nearly 1.5 times greater than the corresponding ca-
pacities in Germany by the summer of 1941.
Simultaneously with the development of the war industry, state
reserves, and mobilization stocks of food and vital strategic materials
were created at high rates.
Thus, on the basis of the overall growth of economic potential,
the material basis of national defense capacity was strengthened.
This work was carried out in complete correspondence with Lenin's
conclusion that without the most serious economic preparation, it
is impossible to conduct a modem war.
The economic potential of a state, once brought into play, be-
comes the most important factor of victory in war, provided that it
is utilized in a purposeful manner and with maximum efficiency.
...In the nearly four decades separating us from the end of the
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Great Patriotic War, the economic and scientific-technological po-
tential of the U.S.S.R. has grown many times over.
...The course of imperialism towards material preparation of a
new world war and the sharply increasing threat of nuclear war on
their part compel the Soviet Union to do everything necessary to
further strengthen its defense capability.
As a result of the measures that have been taken, the mobilization
capability and the survivability of our economy are being raised.
The planned, rational siting of productive forces is of utmost im-
portance in this respect. The strengthening of our defense might is
aided by the further development of existing, and creation of new,
territorial-industrial complexes, the improvement of infrastructure,
and its centralization on a nationwide scale.
The economic preparation of the country to rebuff imperialist
aggression calls, as is known, for the accumulation of strategic re-
serves and the all-round development of all types of transportation.
The improvement of the war economy potential and its efficient
use, and close cooperation among the fraternal socialist countries
on matters of war economy, are emerging as a particularly urgent
problem.
...The significance of the transport sector in relation to the war
economy is extraordinarily great. At the present time, the long-
range orientation of its functioning is towards mechanization of
loading and unloading operations and the introduction of advanced
methods of freight transport. For instance, the introduction of con-
tainerization and packetization will permit an increase in produc-
tivity of labor by 3-5 times, free a large number of people, and
cheapen transportation.
Thus, at the very point when one element of the preparations for a
war countdown-the structure of command-and-control-was being put
into place by Marshal Ogarkov, another spokesman of the military High
Command issued the military's demands to the politicians to get moving
on the urgent question of the economic mobilization. Indeed, in what
might be construed as a direct threat that if the politicians could not
move fast enough on the economic mobilization, the army was there to
step in, Kurkotkin concluded his article with the following remark:
Of course, the problem of the effective use of the economic
potential of the country in the interest of strengthening its defense
capacity and reliable defense of the achievements of socialism will
be solved with the most active participation of the entire personnel
of our Armed Forces, especially the military cadres of the army and
navy. And this is only natural. Warfare has its own internal structure
and logic of development, and its own mechanism of quantitative
and qualitative changes. And that mechanism has to be ready to
receive the "services" of the economy and of scientific-technological
progress.
A few weeks later, on Dec. 11, 1984, Mikhail Gorbachov-rather
than General Secretary Chernenko-delivered the main speech at the
"All-Union Scientific-Technological Conference on Implementing the
June 1983 Central Committee Plenum Resolutions." There, Gorbachov
announced that the new Soviet goal was to "lead the world" in science,
technology and advanced industry by the "beginning of the next mil-
lennium."
Ogarkov, Kurkotkin et al. had themselves a leader who was going to
tackle the problem of "putting economic potential into action" in a serious
way.
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1.3 Soviet Conclusions from
World War II
As the previous section on the Soviet doctrine of war economy has
already shown, modem-day Soviet military thinking is even today based
to a large extent on drawing lessons from World War II. For the Western
observer, it is often difficult to appreciate to what degree Soviet military
thinking is dominated by that experience.
References to "the lessons of the Great Patriotic War," as the Soviets
call their part of World War II, are constant and pervasive in the Soviet
press. To take a most recent and typical example, the front-page editorial
in the Soviet armed forces daily Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on June 22,
1985 was headlined: "History Teaches Vigilance" (which, by the way,
is also the title of the newly published booklet by Marshal Ogarkov,
reviewed in Soviet publications in early June). The Krasnaya Zvezda
editorial is full of phrases like the following:
Vigilance-precisely this is the lesson of the history of the Great
Patriotic War, which began by the perfidious attack by Hitler Ger-
many on the Soviet Union forty-four years ago. And it is vigilance
that is demanded by the complex and dangerous situation on the
international scene as it has emerged in our own day.
Or, as the conclusion of the editorial:
Unremitting vigilance and the necessity of raising combat readiness
constitute the holy duty of Soviet soldiers to their Motherland and
to their people. This is the lesson of history.
Implicit in such references to "the perfidious attack of Hitler Germany"
is of course the admission that the Soviet Union was indeed not prepared
for the enemy's attack in 1941. Usually, that admission remains only
implicit-since frank confession of past errors is hardly a characteristic
feature of Soviet historians-but occasionally, in especially authoritative
writings, direct references are allowed.
One illustrative example of such frankness was provided in the article
written for the anniversary of the end of the war in the government daily,
Izvestia, on May 7, 1985, by the Chief of General Staff, Marshal Akh-
romeyev. His article was entitled "The Great Victory and Its Lessons."
...On the eve of the war, the Communist Party of the Soviet
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Union correctly evaluated the growing threat of war. In the complex
prewar situation, the party did all it could to avert war, and at the
same time, it strengthened the country's defense capability. The
enemy's perfidious attack caught the Soviet Union at a time when
many of the defense measures had not yet been completed.
...The victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in
the Great Patriotic War holds many lessons. Our sacrifices were
great, but the outcome of the war taught us a great deal. From it,
we have drawn important military-political conclusions and learned
the necessary lessons. The significance of these conclusions and
lessons is permanent and they are particularly topical in present
conditions.
... Historical experience has taught us that in view of imperi-
alism's aggressiveness, utmost vigilance is called for. It is necessary
to constantly keep an eye on its intrigues, to analyze the developing
military-political situation, to bear in mind its dangerous trends, to
expose the possible nature of a future war that imperialism may
unleash, and on the basis of this, and exercising great foresight, to
resolve defense tasks and purposefully build and train the Armed
Forces. We remember what the miscalculations and errors committed
on the eve of the Great Patriotic War cost us. In present-day con-
ditions, in view of the sides' large quantities of nuclear and other
weapons, it would be considerably more difficult to rectify omissions
while war was in progress.
As these examples show, the official Soviet calls for "vigilance" and
"readiness"-at least those which are part of the public propaganda-
are invariably framed in the context of a message that "we must not
allow ourselves to be caught off guard." In the 1950s, during the era of
Soviet inferiority in strategic nuclear weapons, this may have been a
serious concern. Today, however-and this is overwhelmingly clear from
the case of Soviet doctrine on war economy mobilization as we examined
it in the preceding section-"preparedness" does not refer to the case of
a possible surprise attack by the enemy nearly as much as it does the
careful, methodical putting into place of the economic and military
resources and the command structure required for an offensive nuclear war
against the West.
Since 1945, Soviet military doctrine and strategy has evolved through
four principal stages, culminating in the present version-the Ogarkov
Plan. By examining both the official statements of Soviet strategy as
published by the Soviets themselves, as well as the quantity and quality
of the Soviet military, technological and economic build-up since the
war, we can date these phases as follows:
1) A first postwar phase extending from 1945 to 1953. The break was
not determined, as one might think at first glance, by the death of Stalin,
but by the successful first test of the hydrogen bomb. This remains as a
principle today: Soviet military strategy evolves in relation to global
military events, not internal shifts in personalities and leadership.
2) The second phase of Soviet military doctrine began in 1954 and
lasted until the first half of the 1960s. During this time, as the Soviet
armed forces were being massively equipped with strategic and tactical
nuclear missiles, a strategy for nuclear war-fighting was elaborated, and
that strategy-known as the Sokolovskii Doctrine-began to have a clearly
visible influence on Soviet force development and economic and tech-
nological directions.
3) From roughly 1962-65 through the early 1970s, Soviet military
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doctrine passed through its third postwar stage. Following Sokolovskii's
prescriptions, the U.S.S.R. for the first time achieved parity with the
United States in respect of both quantity and quality of key strategic
weapons systems. While the conventional build-up was also massive, the
emphasis was on strategic weapons for intercontinental war with the
United States.
4) Beginning in the 1972-75 period, the Soviet command proceeded
toward the goal of attaining a clear superiority over the West in quality
of offensive weapons systems, as well as in the development of defensive
weapons based on "new physical principles" which would reduce the
vulnerability of the Soviet Union in a nuclear war. The success of these
efforts in the initial part of this phase clearly persuaded the Soviet lead-
ership that by around 1987-88 the U.S.S.R. would have achieved a
margin of superiority that would enable it to wage, survive and win a
nuclear war. In terms of strategy, the Soviet Union concentrated during
this phase on developing a war-fighting and war-winning capability for
all options, from a maximum all-out global war to limited, "surgical-strike"
possibilities.
In a later section, we will be examining in detail the systematic process
involved in this fourth stage, the process by which the Ogarkov Plan
has been, and continues to be implemented. However, before doing that,
let us present to the reader the goal toward which this process is directed:
the ability to carry out the "maximum option" in the Ogarkov Plan.
What would global thermonuclear war look like as directed by the
Soviet High Command?
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1.4 The `Maximum Option' of
the Ogarkov Plan:
Winning Thermonuclear War
The scenario of global thermonuclear war, the "maximum option" of
Marshal Ogarkov's war-fighting plan, does not begin with any particular
incident, or with any incident at all. It begins one fine day, perhaps on
a holiday weekend, when the decision has been taken by the Soviet
military-political high command, that the Soviet empire will achieve its
objectives by force of arms.
"The element of surprise," states Soviet Defense Minister Marshal
Sokolov, "has always played a certain role. Today, however, it has become
a factor of greatest strategic significance. And we are obliged to take
strict account of this." Like the previously cited calls for vigilance, So-
kolov's statement full well applies to Soviet offensive plans, which would
unfold something like this. Each of the weapons used and steps described,
which occur with virtual simultaneity, has either already been tested by
the Soviet Armed Forces or is in the advanced stages of development.
minus 48:00 A large Soviet naval detachment, led by the cruiser
"Kirov," sails into the North Atlantic. The ships surge through the
Greenland-Iceland-U. K. gap in such numbers and with such speed, that
NATO monitors lose track of some. Among them are Yankee class,
Delta-Ill and Delta-IV class nuclear-powered submarines, armed with
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the Akula-class sub
with its long-range cruise missiles; they move toward the Atlantic coast
of the United States, joining the submarines normally stationed there.
The U.S. State Department describes the moves as "routine maneuvers."
minus 24:00 Soviet spetsnaz forces in place in Western Europe deploy,
unnoticed, for sabotage actions against key NATO military airfields and
Pershing-II missile launchers.
00:00 Soviet ground-based lasers and ASAT weapons attack U. S. early-
warning satellites, destroying some and blinding others.
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00:00 The Yankees, Deltas and Akulas, off both coasts of the conti-
nental United States, fire their missiles.
00:00 Giant Typhoon-class submarines, armed with SS-N-20 missiles,
leave their berths at Murmansk, to take up positions under the Attic
Ocean ice.
00:00 Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are
launched from Soviet Central Asia on trajectories going up over the
North Pole, the shortest route to targets in the United States.
00:00 SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) are fired at
concentrations of U.S. nuclear missile submarines, detected by sensors
on the Salyut space station. SS-20s in the Western U.S.S.R. aim at
submarines in the Mediterranean, North or Baltic Seas and the Atlantic
Ocean; SS-20s in the Soviet Far East fire into the North Pacific; and
SS-20s in Afghanistan strike at the U.S. Indian Ocean base, Diego
Garcia.
00:00 Soviet Su-24 fighter-bombers fly out of the western Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe to inflict a massive air strike against NATO command
centers and military targets in Western Europe. SS-21, SS-22 and SS-
23 missiles are fired from Eastern Europe, against other NATO targets
of the same type. A combination of nuclear and chemical weapons is
employed, designed to limit blast and fire damage to areas the Soviets
intend to occupy.
00:03 Missiles from the first barrage of SLBMs explode over and in
the U.S. coastal cities, including Washington, D.C., Boston, New York,
Baltimore, Norfolk, Va., and New Orleans.
00:06 High-altitude nuclear explosions over the United States, from
the first barrage of SLBMs, further disrupt satellite and ground com-
munications, by the generation of electro-magnetic pulse (EMP). U.S.
Minuteman missiles are "pinned down" by the nuclear explosions oc-
curring above them.
00:08 Further nuclear explosions from the first barrage destroy or cripple
the North American Air Defense headquarters in Colorado and the
Strategic Air Command post in Nebraska. The U. S. bomber fleet, its
airfields under attack, is unable to take off.
00:15 More SLBMs, fired from the off-coast submarines, explode over
targets in the continental U.S., continuing the pin-down effect.
00:20 The heavy Soviet ICBMs, fired from the U.S.S.R., begin to
explode on target, destroying the pinned-down Minutemen in their silos
and levelling American cities. Seventy-five to 125 million people in the
United States are killed in this and the previous barrages.
00:30 The SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers in the Soviet
Union, having been reloaded, fire a second barrage at the United States.
03:00 Soviet ground forces, equipped with vehicles and clothing for
operation in areas saturated by atomic-biological-chemical (ABC) weap-
ons, move swiftly into the Federal Republic of Germany.
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24:00 The United States, its military infrastructure and ports destroyed,
is unable to transfer any forces for the defense of Europe.
36:00 The Soviet high command demands that the United States
surrender, or face the destruction of surviving cities and industries by
barrages of missiles from the Soviet submarines standing by under the
Arctic ice.
2 Wks The Soviets finish occupying the continent, including Spain
and the British Isles. (Maps 1-6.)
This is the sequence of actions the Soviet command is organizing itself
to perpetrate. In the next section, we will examine, how advanced these
preparations are.
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1.5 The Soviet Military Command
for World War III
On Dec. 22, 1984, the Soviet military daily, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star),
in its obituary for deceased Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, dropped
an intelligence bombshell. By the order in which it presented the signers
of Ustinov's death announcement, Krasnaya Zvezda confirmed for the
first time that the Soviet Union had during the fall of 1984 set up four
Wartime High Commands of the Soviet Armed Forces, covering every
"strategic direction" representing the general strategic axes of advance
by the Red Army in war contingencies ranging from all-out war to regional
and local wars of the Soviet Armed Forces.
At the same time, that inconspicuous list of signers of the Ustinov
obituary also settled, for any competent observer, all speculation about
the whereabouts of former Soviet Chief of General Staff, Marshal of the
Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov, who had been regarded by the over-
whelming majority of "Sovietologists" as "demoted and disgraced" since
his transfer from the General Staff post in September. Krasnaya Zvezda
made it clear that Ogarkov was the commander-in-chief of the most
important of the new commands, that of the Western Strategic Direction.
But most important of all, the Krasnaya Zvezda notice, by confirming
that these wartime commands are operational, served notice to the West
that the Soviet Union considers itself in an immediate pre-war situation,
if not in the initial phases of war.
Later in this section, we will examine these new commands in detail,
but for the moment, let us merely clarify the information so obliquely
provided by Krasnaya Zvezda.
For the first time since World War II, the Soviet Union now has four
High Commands at a level between that of the Supreme High Command
and the military districts:
1) the High Command of the Western Strategic Direction, HQ in
Minsk and Lignica (Poland), commanded by Ogarkov;
2) the High Command of the Southwestern Strategic Direction,
HQ in Kiev, commanded by General of the Army Ivan Gera-
simov;
3) the High Command of the Southern TVD (Theater of Military
Actions), HQ in Tashkent, commanded by General of the Army
Yuri Maksimov;
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1972-75
SALT and ABM:
Soviet strategy
enters a new phase
4) the High Command of the Far East TVD, HQ in Chita, com-
manded by General of the Army Ivan Tret'yak.
To this date, still only a small minority of so-called "Sovietologists"
have recognized this dramatic reorganization of the Soviet command.
Most, defending their initial misassessments that Marshal Ogarkov had
been "demoted" in September 1984, also failed to note that at the same
time that Ogarkov "disappeared," the most extensive restructuring of top
field commands since the war had occurred in the Red Army. No fewer
than 12 of 20 commanders of military districts and "Groups of Forces"
(the name for Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany, Poland, Czech-
oslovakia and Hungary) were replaced late in 1984.
But above all, the "Sovietologists" failed to view this dramatic com-
mand restructuring and establishment of new offensive strike commands
in light of the entire chronology of post-1975 Soviet military build-up
and reorganization-a process which, if systematically reviewed, proves
irrefutably that the Soviet leadership is completing the final phase of
putting into place a capability to wage and win global thermonuclear
war or any conflict with the West at any level below that threshold.
We present such a chronology below.
In 1972, when the United States, under the stewardship of Henry
Kissinger, stupidly allowed itself to be locked into the SALT Treaty and
ABM Treaty trap, the Soviet Union confidently turned what previously
had been an overriding desire-a comprehensive R & D and war pro-
duction program to achieve overwhelming strategic superiority, and si-
multaneously effect decisive "theater" margins of superiority in Europe
and Asia-into an actual strategic doctrine.
There are two major causal nodal points in the past 25 years of Soviet
strategic build-up. The first was the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
after which-the period of the Sokolovskii Doctrine-the Soviet leadership
embarked upon an accelerated program of missile development and de-
ployment, to achieve strategic parity with the United States.
This goal had been achieved by 1972 at the latest. The SALT and
ABM Treaties of that year provided the political precondition-indeed
the golden opportunity-for the Soviet leadership to begin an even more
accelerated program of strategic weaponry and necessary war preparations
over a term of 15 and perhaps 20 years, whose culmination would yield
undisputed, overwhelming Soviet strategic and theater superiority, si-
multaneously.
To better understand the mind-set of the Soviet military leadership
during this critical 1972-75 conjuncture, a brief review of what was going
on-or, better said, what was not going on-in the United States is
needed.
The United States had completed production and deployment of the
land-based Minuteman missile systems, and submarine-based Polaris mis-
sile fleet. And that was that. No new generation of missiles was anywhere
near serial production. There was talk of starting a new generation of
land-based missile called MX, which could also be made mobile. The
debate on the MX went on, and on, and on. Now, in 1985, the first
puny batch of some 40 or 50 will, one hopes, soon be in service-with,
however, no reload capability, as is the case with all U.S. missile systems.
There was a lot of talk about producing the next generation of nuclear
missile submarine, the Trident. Thanks to Kissinger and Carter, that
program is years behind what it could have been.
The Soviet leadership did the exact opposite. To test whether the
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U. S. A.'s SALT "Nuclear Freeze" would hold, the U.S.S.R. in 1972
began to develop a new generation of intercontinental submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM), known as the SS-N-20, with nine warheads
and an 8,300 km range, and a new monster class of submarine to go with
it-the 25,000 ton Typhoon class.
Not only did the U.S.A. do nothing militarily. Politically, Watergate
finished off Nixon. A Kissinger administration continued under Lame
Duck Gerry Ford.
1972: First signs of the Ogarkov Team
When the SALT and ABM treaties were signed in 1972, one of the
members of the Soviet delegation who could be proudest of his accom-
plishments was General of the Army Nikolai Ogarkov. Ever since he
had been brought onto the Soviet General Staff in 1968, one of Ogarkov's
functions had been that of head of the Office of Strategic Deception. In
that capacity, he made sure that the entire SALT negotiating process
served the purpose of concealing real Soviet strength and intentions
while duping the United States into disarming itself in strategic arma-
ments.
Given the importance of the SALT/ABM Treaties, and Ogarkov's
role in them, we can say that in a sense 1972 marks the beginning of
the coming into being of the Ogarkov War Plan.
Another good reason for beginning our chronology in 1972 is that it
is in this year that the first crucial posts in commanding positions are
assumed by generals (later to become marshals), who have ever since
been core members of the Ogarkov War Plan Directorate. In 1972, the
key post of Chief of the Rear Services, who will oversee the Soviet and
Warsaw Pact build-up and modernization of logistical capabilities, prep-
aratory to launching war, is given to General Colonel Semyon Kurkot-
kin. Thirteen years, and many thousands of tons of logistics' capability,
and thousands more modernized kilometers of rail and road later, Kur-
kotkin-now Marshal of the Soviet Union-is still directing the Rear
Services.
In 1968, the General Staff Academy had resumed a program of nine-
month academic and theoretical courses (suspended under Khrushchov
in 1959), given to generals and promising senior officers. Kurkotkin was
one of the attendees of that special 1968 General Staff Academy course.
Also in 1972, the Strategic Rocket Forces get a new commander-in-
chief, General of the Army Vladimir Tolubko. Thirteen years and many
new missile types later, Tolubko-now Chief Marshal of Artillery-still
directs the Strategic Forces. Marshal Tolubko, like Marshal Kurkotkin,
was a graduate of that special 1968 General Staff Academy course.
1973: A new strategy textbook is planned
In 1973, the Defense Council of the Soviet Union appoints a new head
of the General Staff Academy, General of the Army I. Ye. Shavrov.
One of Shavrov's first acts is to assemble a special team at the Academy
whose task is to write a new textbook on military strategy. The idea is
to update and revise the previous doctrine set forth in Marshal V.D.
Sokolovskii's book, Military Strategy, first published in 1962. The new
strategy will be based on the notion of how to achieve, and exploit,
Soviet military supremacy in the post-SALT era.
Shavrov himself is the editor of the new book. Gen. Lt. V.N. Karpov,
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head of the Department of Strategy at the General Staff Academy, leads
the group of authors, which includes Generals A.K. Zaporozhchenko,
K.K. Belokonov, V.V. Solovyov, Ye. D. Grebish, and Colonels N.N.
Kuznetsov and I.F. Yermachenko.
April 1973
As the General Staff group begins its work, the April 1973 Central
Committee Plenum makes some very important changes in the com-
position of the Politburo of the Soviet Union. These changes will later
have great implications for implementing the new strategic doctrine in
the U.S.S.R. Added to the Politburo are Foreign Minister Andrei Gro-
myko, Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko, and a man who had
known Ogarkov for 30 years-the Chairman of the Committee for State
Security (KGB), Yuri Andropov.
1974-75: The new strategic doctrine is finalized
In 1975, the project to produce an updated version of Sokolovskii's
Military Strategy is completed. But, in contrast to Sokolovskii's work,
which had shocked the West when it was made available here shortly
after publication, the 1975 textbook is kept secret; its contents will never
be officially revealed.
In a rare comment on even the existence of this fundamental exposition
of Soviet war strategy, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, then Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff and now Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, writes
that it contains "new views on the nature and methods of waging war,
and also of strategic actions of the services of the Armed Forces."
Though the 1975 strategy textbook has been kept secret, later events
will make its contents transparent. The 1975 book will function as the
blueprint for what has transpired ever since. The most important authors
will form the core of the Ogarkov "think-tank" that continually updates
Soviet strategy for nuclear war. The dictates and goals set out in their
1975 textbook remain the goals and dictates governing the Ogarkov War
Plan to this day.
Marshal Ogarkov's `think-tank'
By 1985, the think-tank-the "brains" behind the Soviet strategy for
fighting and winning a global thermonuclear by 1988-includes the
following individuals (ranks and posts as of 1985):
1) Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of the
General Staff.
2) General of the Army V. Varennikov, First Deputy Chief of the
General Staff.
3) General of the Army A. Gribkov, First Deputy Chief of the
General Staff and First Deputy CINC of Warsaw Pact Forces.
4) Admiral N. Amel'ko, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
5) Marshal of Artillery Ye. Boichuk, Chief of the Main Directorate
for Nuclear War Planning of the General Staff.
6) General of the Army M. Kozlov, head of the Voroshilov General
Staff Academy.
7) General Colonel V. Karpov, senior faculty member of the Gen-
eral Staff Academy.
8) General Lieutenant A. Sokolov, senior faculty member of the
General Staff Academy.
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9) General of the Army G. Obaturov, head of the Frunze Military
Academy.
The hardware build-up: mobility and flexibility
In 1975, at the same time that the new Soviet doctrine for the 1980s
has been finalized, the Soviet Defense Council makes a series of crucial
decisions regarding some of the hardware that the strategy entails. This
year, the U.S.S.R. begins simultaneously to develop a new generation
of land-based ICBMs, a new generation of short- and medium-range
missiles, and serial production of a new intermediate-range missile, the
SS-20. Despite the variations in range and size of these missiles, they all
have one feature in common: they are mobile.
Thus, in 1975, development proceeded with the:
SS-24 ICBM mobile missile, housed on railway cars;
SS-25 ICBM mobile missile, at least 460 launchers by end 1986;
SS-20 IRBM mobile missile;
SS-22 MRBM mobile missile;
SS-23 MRBM mobile missile;
SS-21 SRBM mobile missile;
The new strategic doctrine calls for all new land-based missiles to be
mobile, not only for maximal deployment flexibility, but also for maximal
cheating flexibility. There is no way to say that the Soviets have only
"x" number of SS-24, or SS-25 missile launchers. Needless to say, these
new missiles, as with previous stationary models, were all designed for
cold launch, i.e., rapid-fire reload capabilities. Every half hour, another
missile can be fired.
The mobile missile is ideal for rapid transport-the Soviets' giant new
Antonov-124 transport aircraft, presented publicly in 1985, can take an
entire SS-20 and fly it to, say, Cuba, or, Vietnam, or Angola, and the
SS-20 is installed with its mobile launcher in a matter of a few days.
This is just one of many variations made possible with the new generation
of mobile missiles in every range category.
Thus, all at once, sweeping decisions are made regarding 1) a vast
increase in number-and, above all precision-of ICBMs to be fired
against the U.S.A. in that awesome first hour of thermonuclear war; 2)
the introduction of a whole series of precision theater nuclear missiles
(ranges of 120 km, 500 km, and 1,000 km) of both short and medium
range, for use in theater conflicts in Europe, against China or Japan,
and/or to give the theater ground forces the maximal "Hour 1" precision
thermonuclear strike capability. In short, to take out as many NATO
military and logistical targets, surgically as possible. What's left is mopped
up by the invading ground forces.
For the first time, the Soviet Ground Forces would be acquiring (which
now they have) a 1,000 km radius of action for their nuclear missiles,
thus vastly expanding their effectiveness.
The military leadership decides also to accelerate the build-up of the
theater amphibious landing capability, especially for the Baltic.
One of the benefits of the SS-20 program would be to greatly enhance
the Soviet Union's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. With the
United States having frozen or delayed its Trident program, an IRBM
missile is added to the Soviet arsenal, with three warheads and a range
which could guarantee, once detected, destruction of U.S. Polaris missile
submarines.
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1976-77
Promotion of
Ogarkov
April 1975
With a Soviet "green light," North Vietnam attacks South Vietnam,
and within a few months, South Vietnam is taken. Vietnamese-aided
Pathet Lao do the same in Laos, and Cambodia is taken by the Pol Pot
forces.
Summer 1975
The Soviet Union gives the go-ahead and finances and arranges air
transport for a massive Cuban troop deployment into Angola. With
Cuban troops, the MPLA takes Angola.
March 1976, Moscow
The tempo of the Ogarkov War Plan mounts, encouraged to a degree
previously thought impossible, when the Soviet leadership is told in
March 1976 by a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations emissary of
Averell Harriman, who visits Moscow that month, that one Jimmy
Carter will definitely win the Democratic Party nomination, and go on
from there to be elected President of the United States.
March 1976, Moscow
The Soviet Communist Party's 25th Congress elects two new members
to the Politburo. They are Dmitrii Ustinov, since 1941 the leader of
the Soviet war industry program, and, the young and tough leader of the
Leningrad Party, Grigorii Romanov. Romanov will later, at a June 1983
Central Committee Plenum under Yuri Andropov, be named Central
Committee Secretary, and be placed in charge of war industry.
April 1976, Moscow
Newly elected Politburo member Dmitrii Ustinov is made Defense
Minister of the Soviet Union, following the death of Marshal Andrei
Grechko. The New York Times publishes a front page article, asserting
that Ustinov, as a "civilian," is a "dove."
July 1976, Moscow
While the United States is celebrating its bi-centennial, the "civilian
dove," Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov is promoted to Marshal of the
Soviet Union.
Jan. 6, 1977, Moscow
General of the Army Nikolai Ogarkov is made Soviet Chief of the
General Staff.
Jan. 14, 1977, Moscow
General of the Army Nikolai Ogarkov is promoted to Marshal of the
Soviet Union.
February 1977, Moscow
Timed with Ogarkov's assumption of his new post, the tactical journal
of the Soviet Ground Forces, Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), with its
February issue, begins a year-long series of articles written by both young
division commanders and more senior generals. The articles, which carry
the thematic heading of "the High-Speed Offensive," all emphasize two
points: 1) the need for the adoption for a war-fighting strategy with top
priority emphasis on the mounting of a surprise attack against the U.S.A.
NATO adversary; and 2) the mounting of a high-speed, deep-penetration,
blitzkrieg attack.
The doctrine of the high-speed, surprise-attack offensive is further
elaborated as being the doctrine for the conduct of the ground and air
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1978
Reorganization of
the Air Defense
forces in both global conflict, and in every imaginable level of theater
conflict, ranging from continent-wide to local surgical strikes.
Many of the authors of that 1977 ground-breaking series of articles in
Voyennyi Vestnik, who in 1977 are division commanders, by 1983 will
become the front line commanders of Soviet armies in East Germany-
i.e. of the key Soviet blitzkrieg spearhead troops.
March 1977, Moscow
The Soviet Politburo decides to ally with Ethiopia, and airlift Soviet
military equipment and tens of thousands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia,
in the Ogaden War against Somalia. This marks the inception of adding
Coptic Ethiopia to the Soviet Union's clients. General of the Army
Vasilii Petrov, First Deputy CINC of the Ground Forces, is sent around
May 1977 to Ethiopia to command the Soviet intervention, and run the
Ogaden War.
Summer 1977, the Baltic
The 1975 decision to massively beef up Soviet amphibious capability
for theater operations, is first tested in large Baltic amphibious landing
maneuvers. From this point on, large-scale Baltic amphibious maneuvers
become a regular feature of annual Soviet maneuvers.
Autumn 1977, somewhere west of the Urals
The first unit of SS-20 mobile IRBMs (range 5500 km with 3 warheads)
is deployed.
The first unmistakeable confirmation that the Soviet Armed Forces
are being reorganized into Theaters of Military Actions (TVD) for war-
time, is supplied by the fact that a complete reorganization of the Troops
of National Air Defense (PVO) is begun. The 10 PVO Air Defense
Armies are reorganized into 5 PVO Air Defense Armies, corresponding
to 5 TVDs.
Most important of all: Each of the 5 new PVO Air Defense Armies
will be placed under the direct command of a commander-in-chief of the
TVD. The reorganization of the air defense command is completed by
1981, and its completion directly follows the very extensive wave of
command changes in the Ground Forces that occur in December 1980,
which we will amply document as our chronology proceeds.
November 1978, Moscow and the Far East
For the first time in postwar history, a unit of Soviet naval infantry
(marines) is stationed permanently in the Kurile Islands. These islands,
seized from Japan in 1945 by the Soviet Union, are the easiest stepping
stones for invasion of Japan itself.
The same month, a new Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Mutual Assis-
tance is signed, granting the U.S.S.R. base rights at the former U. S.
naval and air bases of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. Cam Ranh Bay is
acknowledged by all defense authorities as the best naval anchorage in
all Southeast Asia.
As events early in 1979 will show, both the stationing of the marines
on the Kuriles and the preparations for basing of Soviet forces in Vietnam
are the first steps to a massive Soviet expansion of its presence in the
Far East, and to a concomitant reorganization of the Soviet command
for this important Theater of War.
Nov. 27, 1978, Moscow
One Mikhail Gorbachov is summoned from Stavropol to Moscow by
top Kremlin ideologue and political godfather to both Andropov and
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1979
From the Far East to
Afghanistan
Gorbachov, Mikhail Suslov, to become the new Central Committee
Secretary for Agriculture. From this point on, Gorbachov is no longer
in the provinces, but at the center of developments in Moscow.
January 1979
The Vietnamese army enters Cambodia. Cambodia is freed from the
Pol Pot genocide, but, a permanent Vietnamese occupation begins. Viet-
nam has Laos also under de facto military occupation. All of Indochina
is de facto a "Greater Vietnam."
Feb. 17, 1979, Southeast Asia
China invades Vietnam to, in the words of Deng Hsiao Ping, "teach
Vietnam a lesson." China's invasion fails, with heavy Chinese losses.
The Soviet Union utilizes the war to move forward its global war plans.
March 1979, Moscow and Chita
Gen. Army Vasilii Petrov, First Deputy CINC of the Soviet Ground
Forces, is dispatched from Moscow to Chita, in Siberia, to set up the
High Command Far East (HCFE). The HCFE, which had existed briefly
at the end of World War II, was reactivated during the Korean War,
and then became dormant after the Korean War ended in July 1953.
The setting up of the HCFE and the parallel restructuring of the Air
Defense Armies into the Theater Strike Commands, mark the first phase
of what will unfold, by 1984, into a completed Wartime High Command
structure.
Equally ominous is the fact that the HCFE, headquartered deep in
Siberia, is designed as an alternative command and survival center for the
U.S.S.R. in the event of nuclear war.
March 1979, Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam
With the reactivation of the High Command Far East, the first Soviet
naval units arrive at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. This marks the start of
permanent Soviet use of their newly acquired overseas Pacific naval base.
September 1979, Moscow
Volume 7 of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia is released from the printers.
The new volume contains an article, "Military Strategy," signed by Mar-
shal Ogarkov. This is the most extensive and authoritative statement
on Soviet military strategy to be published openly since Marshal Soko-
lovskii's book with the same name, which had appeared in three editions
in the 1960s. Ogarkov follows the basic principles laid down by Soko-
lovskii, but adds significant new theses regarding the use of theater forces
in combination with and independently of strategic forces. Members of
Ogarkov's "think-tank" (see list of names under "1975") write other key
articles: e.g., Gen. Col. Karpov writes on "Questions of Strategic Com-
mand and Control," and Gen. Army Kozlov on "Questions of Strategy."
Ogarkov will write later articles and booklets addressing issues of strat-
egy, but the published versions will give only broad outlines of his think-
ing, never the detailed plans. The details will for the most part only be
seen after they have been put in place.
Nov. 27, 1979, Moscow
Mikhail Gorbachov is promoted to candidate member of the Politburo.
November 1979, Tashkent
General Colonel Yuri P. Maksimov is promoted, on the eve of the
Afghanistan invasion, to commander of the Turkestan Military District.
In late 1984, when the creation of Ogarkov's Wartime High Commands
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is announced, Maksimov will be revealed as the Commander-in-Chief
of the High Command of the Southern TVD.
Dec. 29, 1979, Afghanistan
The Red Army invades neighboring Afghanistan. This is the first time
since World War II that the Soviets have invaded a non-member of the
Warsaw Pact. The invasion army will remain in Afghanistan as a per-
manent occupying force, increasing its strength as time goes by, and
building a network of fighter-bomber and missile bases targeting the
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.
During the entire occupation, the Red Army uses Afghanistan as a
combat training ground, testing new hardware and tactics and, perhaps
most important of all, creating a new generation of of battle-tested com-
manders. Once again, just as occurred in 1939-40 when the U.S.S.R.
invaded neighboring Finland, the Soviet Union fights a "little war" to
prepare itself for a probable future major war.
1980
Strengthening
of the Ground
Forces
October 1980, Moscow
Mikhail Gorbachov becomes a full member of the Politburo.
December 1980, from Berlin to Vladivostok
A dramatic rapid-fire series of command changes in the Soviet Ground
Forces begins, lasting through January of the next year. One more big
step is taken in the implementation of new Theater Commands.
In early December, Gen. Army Vasilii Petrov, having completed the
initial phase of setting up the High Command Far East, is called back
to Moscow to succeed Gen. Army Ivan Pavlovskii as CINC of the Ground
Forces. Gen. Army Vladimir Govorov succeeds Petrov in the Far East.
At the same time, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG)-
the Russian spearhead troops for the invasion of West Germany-is
thoroughly shaken up. The CINC of the GSFG, Army Gen. Ye. F.
Ivanovskii, trades commands with the commander of the Byelorussian
Military District, Gen. Col. Mikhail M. Zaitsev. The Chief of the Po-
litical Directorate of the GSFG, Gen. Col. I.S. Mednikov, is switched
with the political commander of the Baltic Military District, Gen. Col.
I.A Gubin.
Zaitsev brings with him a group a younger commanders who had in
1977 elaborated and tested the "High Speed Offensive." Most of these
commanders will be rotated into Afghanistan to given them combat
experience and then be brought back to the GSFG. The advent of the
Zaitsev team in East Germany signals a massive upgrading and strength-
ening of the Soviet Forces in East Germany. (See section 3.4 on Ger-
many).
In January 1981, the commander of the Central Group of Forces (in
Czechoslovakia), Gen. Col. D.T. Yazov, is made the commander of the
Central Asian Military District, replacing Gen. Col. P.G. Lushev, who
takes over the flagship Moscow Military District command from Govorov.
Lushev's political directorate chief in the Central Asian MD, Gen. Col.
M.D. Popkov, is made the Chief of the Political Directorate of the entire
Ground Forces.
February 1981
1981 The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
The military men February 1981 represents a virtual revolution in the formal status of the
Soviet military in politics. A series of generals are promoted to either
become politicians full, or, candidate membership on the Party's Central Committee. At
the same time, another striking form of political upgrading occurs in
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1981: an across-the-board promotion of the generals who in late 1984
will become the commanders of the Wartime High Commands onto the
corresponding regional Politburos. This pattern had begun with the pro-
motion of Kiev Military District commander, Gen. Col. Ivan Gerasimov,
to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.
The 26th Party Congress appoints the following army generals as full
members of the Soviet Central Committee, with an Ogarkov War Plan
"twist." (Note, that six years after the 1975 turning point, and well into
the phase of active war preparations, there is a very heavy emphasis on
appointing field commanders to the Central Committee.)
1) General of the Army Grigorii Salmanov
At the time Commander of the Transbaykal Military District.
At present, assumed to be holding an important wartime com-
mand function, with his actual whereabouts unknown. A veteran
field commander.
2) General of the Army Mikhail Zaitsev
Then, as now, Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany. A field commander of spearhead invasion
troops.
3) General of the Army Pyotr Lushev
Till December 1980, commander of the Central Asian Military
District. Since then, till the present, commander of the flagship
Moscow Military District.
4) General of the Army Vladimir Govorov
He was, since the big December 1980 restructuring, Marshal
Vasilii Petrov's successor as Commander-in-Chief of the High
Command Far East. The Commander of a wartime high com-
mand. From 1972-1980, Govorov was commander of the Moscow
Military District. He is now a Deputy Minister of Defense in
Moscow.
5) General of the Army Anatolii Gribkov
First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces, and ex-
officio First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet General Staff.
Gribkov is a member of Marshal Ogarkov's unofficial "think-
tank."
6) Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr Koldunov
Commander-in-Chief of the PVO Air Defense Forces, from 1975,
and spanning the 1978-81 reorganization of the PVO Air Defense
Forces.
The 26th Party Congress appoints the following Army generals and
Navy admirals as candidate members of the Central Committee.
1) General of the Army (since March 1983, Marshal) Sergei Akh-
romeyev
Ogarkov's First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff. The
Andropov June 1983 CC Plenum will promote him to full mem-
bership in the Central Committee.
2) Colonel General Mikhail Popkov
The Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces.
3) General of the Army Mikhail Sorokin
Commander of the Leningrad Military District from 1976 till
November 1981. His new post has never been announced. As-
sumed to be holding, in 1985, an important wartime command
post, possibly that of Commander-in-Chief of a Northwest Strike
Command, under Ogarkov, or, in a high staff function with
Ogarkov.
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4) Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin
Since July 1977, the commander of the U. S. S. R.'s main nuclear
submarine strike force, the Northern Fleet; at the end of 1981,
Chernavin promoted to the post of First Deputy Commander-
in-Chief of the Navy; the No. 2 man in the Soviet Navy.
5) Admiral Vladimir Sidorov
Named Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1981.
6) General of the Army Yuri Maksimov
Then Commander of the Turkestan Military District, and since
late 1984, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wartime High Com-
mand, Southern TVD.
7) General of the Army Dmitrii Yazov
Till December 1980, Commander of the Soviet "Central Group
of Forces" in Czechoslovakia, then Commander of the Central
Asian Military District. In mid-1984 he will become the Com-
mander of the crucial Far East Military District.
8) Colonel General Mikhail Druzhinin
Chief of the Political Directorate of the High Command Far
East, from its inception in March 1979; first under Petrov, then
after December 1980, under Govorov, and after mid-1984, under
General of the Army Ivan Tret'yak.
The regional Politburos take on a wartime look
In 1981, following the precedent already set by General of the Army
Ivan Gerasimov in 1980, when he was made a member of the Ukrainian
Politburo, leading generals are placed on the Politburos of regional Com-
munist Parties. In Gerasimov's case and that of Gen. Army Yuri Mak-
simov-named to the Politburo of Uzbekistan-the appointments place
these generals in the top political leadership of the regions which geo-
graphically will in 1984 become their wartime Theater of Military Actions
(TVDs).
In addition, General of the Army Yevgenii Ivanovskii is named to
the Politburo of Byelorussia, and General of the Army Dmitrii Yazov is
named to the Politburo of Kazakhstan.
Two milestones on the road to war
The reorganization of the Soviet air defense (PVO) command, begun
under Ogarkov in 1978, is completed.
Sept. 4.12, 1981, Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the
Baltic Sea
In the largest combined amphibious and airborne maneuvers ever held
in the Baltic, the Soviet Union tests a major component of a European
surprise attack. The mammoth exercise is called Zapad-81-Russian for
West-81.
The Zapad-81 maneuvers are significant not only for their size and the
speed with which they were executed, but also because they mark the
first time that both ground and airborne forces from two or more adjoining
military districts (in this case, troops drawn from the Byelorussian and
Baltic Military Districts) in the Soviet Union are simultaneously in-
volved, along with the Baltic Fleet and its naval infantry (marine) units.
Leading the simulated airborne assaults is the elite 103rd Guards Air
Assault Division, with an entire regiment which had participated in the
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
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To this day, the Soviet High Command has been extremely pleased
with the "pay-off' provided by the Zapad-81 maneuvers in respect to the
1975 decision to embark on a large program of reinforcing amphibious
and airborne landing capability.
As recently as June 23, 1985, one can read in a front-page editorial
in Krasnaya Zvezda, the following passage:
"The ability to master complex, modem technology was demonstrated
by the exercises Zapad-81 and Druzhba-84. Both these maneuvers proved
that, on the ground, in the air, and on the seas, he will win, who has
mastery of his weapons."
The continuing importance of Zapad-81 for the airborne forces was
underlined on June 10, 1985, when the commander of all Soviet Airborne
Forces, Gen. of the Army Sukhorukov gave a high order to the 103rd
Airborne Division. He praised the unit for one outstanding performance
above all others: Zapad-81.
And regarding the build-up of amphibious landing capability, there is
no doubt that Zapad-81 is a milestone: That exercise was the debut of
the Soviet Union's first landing ship dock, the Ivan Rogov. This huge
vessel can carry a battalion of Soviet marines, with all their equipment
and vehicles. With two helicopter decks and space for three Lebed class
air-cushion vehicles (a maximum speed of 100 km/hr), a powerful assault
force can be shuttled onto shore at a speed never before seen in warfare.
As 1982 begins, two of the key components of Marshal Ogarkov's
1982 reorganization plan have been completed: 1) All national air defense
Ogarkov presents his forces (PVO) have been restructured to fit future Theater Commands,
and 2) for the first time ever, Soviet forces on the land, in the air and
plans in writing at sea have been tested in a single, giant maneuver-Zapad-81. Now,
with the results of both new elements fully evaluated, Ogarkov decides
to put in print his own concrete plans for the overall reorganization plan.
In 1982 he publishes a book-called that by the Soviets, although it is
in fact only a 71-page pamphlet-entitled Always Ready to Defend the
Fatherland.
As modest as it seems in size, it is a sensational price of writing. It is
the most extended piece ever published by Ogarkov and it will remain
so until June 1985. Above all, never before has he stated so clearly that
what the General Staff under his direction is actually working on is an
entirely new level of command and control-that of the High Command
of the Theater of Military Actions (TVDs). The 1982 booklet also signals
a phase in which Ogarkov writes more and more frequently in the military
and other press of the Soviet Union, repeating many of the same ideas
each time, but also showing a marked sense of greater urgency, that the
changes he is implementing must be ready in time.
As a collection, this series of articles is extensive. We present below
only some of the most important selections from various different sources,
breaking our normal chronology temporarily in order to follow Ogarkov's
thinking from 1982 to 1984.
First, one of the essential passages from the 1982 Always Ready to
Defend the Fatherland (here and below, the emphasis is added):
The experience of past wars testifies convincingly to the fact that
the emergence of new offensive systems inevitably and always leads
to the creation of corresponding means of counteraction, and ul-
timately to the development of new means of waging battles, larger
engagements, operations and war as a whole. For instance, the rapid
development of tanks, airplanes and submarines was accompanied
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by an equally rapid development of anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-
submarine systems and appropriate modes of defense against these
types of weapons and military hardware, and eventually, new forms
and modes of military actions.
This is fully applicable to nuclear missile weapons as well, the creation
and rapid growth of which compelled military-scientific thought and
practice to actively elaborate ways and means of countering them.
The emergence of means of defense against weapons of mass de-
struction in turn dictated the necessity of improving offensive nuclear
missiles. All this confirms the conclusion that the continuous strug-
gle between offensive and defensive weapons, i.e., arms and military
hardware, is one of the foremost sources of development of warfare
as a whole.
At present, dialectical contradiction is particularly visible in such
a complex process as command and control. At one time it used to
take years to prepare a military campaign; in World War II, front
operations were in preparation for months. In present conditions,
when the probable adversary disposes over weapons systems that
would allow him to deliver surprise strikes and carry out high-speed
maneuvers and regrouping of troops, no more than several weeks
or even a few days can be allotted for such preparations. For this
reason, under conditions of the increasingly dynamic nature of mil-
itary actions and the differences in each particular military situation,
commanders and staffs must display greater flexibility and effective-
ness of leadership than ever before.
In another section of the booklet, Ogarkov clarifies this notion of a
change in command and control. He explains that as warfare has evolved,
the scale of military actions that are centralized under a single command
has grown: from single battles and engagements by individual armies, to
more sustained activity by groups of armies-the World War II "front
operation"-and then to the late-war phase of multiple and simultaneous
front operations. In the postwar period, argues Ogarkov, even these
gigantic operations have become outmoded. He explains:
Today, the command of a front may possess weaponry (rockets,
missile-carrying aircraft, long-range aviation, etc.) whose combat
capabilities go significantly beyond the framework of front opera-
tions. The mobility and maneuverability of troops has increased
immensely, the times required for concentration of shock groupings
have been reduced, and the conditions and means of solving op-
erational and strategic tasks by formations of the branches of the
armed forces have changed. And with the creation of strategic
nuclear forces, the higher military leadership has acquired the pos-
sibility of substantially influencing the attainment of the strategic
military-political goals of the war. As a result, the previous forms
of utilizing the formations of the branches of the armed forces have
already to a large extent ceased to correspond to modem conditions.
Thus, the role of the basic operation of modem war can evidently
no longer be ascribed to the front operation, but only to a form of
military actions on a greater scale-that of the strategic operations in
a theater of military actions. In the course of such an operation, each
front (fleet) can conduct two or more front operations in succession,
with only brief pauses or none at all.
This description of the new "strategic operation in a theater of military
actions"-a TVD, to use the Russian abbreviation-fits the course of
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the Zapad-81 maneuver to a "T." In Soviet planning, each peacetime
military district and each fleet will be converted into a "front" in war.
A group of such fronts constitutes a TVD. The two military districts
(two wartime "fronts") and one fleet (a third wartime "front") partici-
pating in Zapad-81 were in fact practicing a "strategic operation in a
TVD"!
Ogarkov continues, and seems to indicate that more training will be
necessary before the new capability is perfected:
All this convincingly reaffirms the importance of conducting all
scientific investigations of the processes and phenomena of warfare
on a solid Marxist-Leninist methodological ground. Only under such
conditions will they yield effective results. The party teaches us to
boldly free ourselves from the shackles of inertia or provincial in-
terests, to quickly notice the sprouts of the new and the progressive,
and yet at the same time not to lose touch with reality, but to draw
conclusions thoughtfully, without undue haste, on the basis of having
comprehensively tested them in practice, for practice is the criterion
of truth.
Thus, as late as 1982, Ogarkov apparently feels he has plenty of time
to carefully build up capability for the Ogarkov Plan. He can even warn
more eager colleagues against "undue haste." In 1983, however, it will
be Ogarkov himself who urges utmost speed in implementing the plan.
The difference between 1982 and 1983 is, of course, March 23, 1983:
U. S. President Reagan's announcement of the SDI.
In his first published statement after President Reagan's March 23
announcement-an article in the May 9 issue of Izvestia, Ogarkov shocks
the West by unveiling now the full extent of his plan. In an emergency
comment on Ogarkov's article, Lyndon LaRouche writes in the EIR that
"it has been a long time since any major power announced in the press
that it has a definite war-plan against another power, especially a war-
plan implied to be ready to go into operation as early as this year. That
is exactly what the author of the article, Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal
Nikolai Ogarkov, did."
Here is what LaRouche was referring to:
Forty years have passed since the Great Patriotic War. In that
time, radical quantitative and qualitative changes have occurred in
military affairs. Military art does not stand still. And a new war, if
it is unleashed by the imperialists, will differ sharply from the last
one.
Since the 1950s the decisive means of armed struggle has been
nuclear arms. The arsenal of various kinds of nuclear warheads and
delivery vehicles accumulated in the world now totals may tens of
thousands. Such quantitative changes have led to qualitative
changes-that which was possible to achieve by nuclear arms 20-
30 years ago has now become impossible for the aggressor. A dev-
astating nuclear counter-strike awaits him!
At the same time, there is an accelerated improvement of existing
strategic and operative-tactical weapons systems and the creation
of new such systems based on the latest achievements of electronics
and other engineering sciences. Significantly improved automated
systems of command and control of troops and equipment, and new
highly-effective conventional weapons systems are being developed
and introduced. The scope of such systems is also being significantly
expanded. In the U.S., for example, space-based military attack
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systems and weapons complexes based on new physical principles
are being created. All this will naturally influence the character of
a possible war, and the forms and methods of preparation for and
conduct of modem operations and battle.
For this reason, it is important not merely to recall the lessons
of the past war and the conclusions of military art of those years,
but most important-on the basis of experience acquired, to see and
understand the perspective of development of military affairs in the future,
and dialectically, creatively think though the changes occurring in the
means and methods of armed struggle and to take timely and appropriate
measures to further raise the combat-readiness of our land and naval
forces. [Emphasis in the original.] Narrow-mindedness and a stub-
born, mechanical and unreflective clinging to old ways is dangerous
under modem conditions.
Taking into account the changes occurring in military affairs and
the aggressive preparations of the United States and its allies, there
must be an especially well-considered and harmonious development
of the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces, the fighting arms and
special forces, as well as modernization and improvement of the
organizational structure of the forces and command and control
organs.
In a new war, should the imperialists manage to unleash one, it
will be impossible to contain military actions within any limited
scope, as the strategists from Washington maintain. It will inevitably
encompass all of the territories of the combatant states. It will be
difficult to distinguish the combat front from the home front. The
methods of solving tasks may also be different, especially in the
beginning of the war. It is this that dictates the specific role and
significance of the initial period of the war under modem conditions.
The experience of the initial operations of the Great Patriotic
War has already introduced serious corrections in previously pre-
vailing views. In 1941 large-scale operations developed all at once
on a vast front, with deep penetration, and they were conducted
with extremely decisive goals.
Now the situation in this respect has become even more com-
plicated. Most imperialist states constantly have various long-range
weapons of enormous destructive force in a combat-ready state.
Already in peacetime, they maintain highly mobile armed forces
units capable of immediately beginning military action without ad-
vance deployment. This determines the unprecedentedly tense and
demanding character of operations in the initial period of the war
and demands from the defensive side, in the very first hours, clear-
cut and active operations to repulse the attack. Under present-day
conditions, such operations may be of decisive significance, as is
demonstrated by the experience of local wars. This requires a pro-
found analysis and comprehensive study of the aggressive prepara-
tions of imperialism and its true military doctrines and conceptions.
This will permit the timely detection of the possibility of unexpected
actions and the new means and methods of armed struggle which
might be used by the aggressor.
The experience of the last war showed the extreme importance
of command and control of the land and naval forces for the suc-
cessful conduct of military actions. How, the demands on military
command and control of the Armed Forces in operations on land,
at sea and in the air, the demands of their consistency, reliability
and operative nature have acquired a qualitatively new character.
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Decisions will be made in short periods of time, missions will be
carried out in a matter of minutes, and the art of fulfilling them
will be highly demanding. This brings about the necessity of having,
in peacetime, organs of command and control which could imme-
diately go into action at the outbreak of war without a lengthy period
of reorganization.
To this end our Armed Forces are constantly raising the combat-
readiness of our troops and staffs as well as the field, air, and naval
training of the personnel. The organizational structure of the land
and naval forces and the command and control bodies are being
improved.
Later that same year, Ogarkov becomes more explicit on the comand
and control question. In Izvestia of Sept. 23, 1983, he writes:
Taking into account the aggressive direction of the military prep-
arations of imperialism, the development and training of the Soviet
Armed Forces at the present time are being carried out on a qual-
itatively new level. In accordance with this, the system of operative,
combat, and political training of the army and navy is being made
more precise. Modem, complex military hardware and weaponry are
being successfully mastered, and there is a constant search for more
effective methods of their use. The organizational structure of the
Armed Forces is being constantly upgraded. On all levels, we are
introducing a new system of command and control and elaborating a
more effective organization of all types of support functions.
At the same time, the troops of the Soviet Armed Forces un-
derstand quite well that we cannot rest on past accomplishments,
that the advent of new means of armed struggle demands the constant
upgrading of existing and development of new forms of combat
actions, and that we require bold experiments and solutions, not hes-
itating to break with outdated traditions, views and theses.
The next spring-again, on the occasion of the anniversary of the
end of World War II, although this time in the military daily Krasnaya
Zvezda-Ogarkov talks explicitly about the changes in warfare that will
occur as a result of beam weapons technologies. And he is even more
urgent in his call to test out the Red Army's new structure and systems.
From Krasnaya Zvezda, May 9, 1984:
...the stormy development of science and technology in the
postwar years has created the real precondition for the appearance,
in the immediate future, of . . . previously unknown types of weapons
based on new physical principles.... They will be reality in the very
near future, and to ignore this fact would already now be a serious
mistake. But this in turn will necessarily alter existing notions re-
garding the means and methods of armed struggle and, indeed,
regarding the military might of the state.
...It goes without saying that all of this must constantly and
profoundly be analyzed, generalized, and taken into account in the
practice of construction of our armed forces.
Taking this into account, the technical equipping and the or-
ganizational structure of our armed forces, and their command and
control are being implemented in such a way as to ensure that they
are always prepared under any circumstances to deliver an immediate
counterstrike to any aggressor. Such a capability must be guaranteed
under all circumstances... .
The tasks of military force development and training of our armed
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1983
Ogarkov's generals
become marshals
forces are being resolved on the basis of a comprehensive and pro-
found analysis of the current military-political situation and devel-
opment of the means of armed struggle. For that reason, our military
personnel must not merely copy, but creatively use the experience
of the past and enrich it. They must constantly perfect the training
and organizational structure of the forces and for this purpose boldly
conduct a scientific inquiry, taking into account the constantly
occurring changes in warfare and must, if necessary, take justified risks.
It is better to test out new forms in peacetime than to look for them in
the course of a war. Indeed, today, there will be no time for that.
March 23, 1983, Washington, D.C.
U.S. President Ronald Reagan announces that the United States will
begin a program for beam-weapons ballistic missile defense.
March 25, 1983, Moscow
Soviet party boss Yuri Andropov promotes four of his four-star generals
to the rank of marshal. At the time, all of the new appointments are
regarded as surprising. However, subsequent events will show that this
group of four, together with Ogarkov, constitutes the core group in the
Soviet High Command which is designated to complete the final phases
of preparation of the Soviet military command for a global showdown,
and will be the men who form the actual war command.
We present below a brief sketch of the past careers and present functions
of these five men.
The Soviet High Command for World War III
Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Vasilevich Ogarkov
Born on Oct. 30, 1917 in the Kalinin Oblast (region) of Russia.
Presently the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Strategic Direction
for the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.
Ogarkov joined the Red Army in 1938, graduating from the Moscow
Kuibyshev Military Technical Engineer Academy in 1941. He was sent
immediately to the engineer troops on the Karelian Front. This marked
the beginning of 42 years of close collaboration with Yuri Andropov.
During these years when the young Ogarkov was fighting in Karelia,
Andropov was the head of the Karelian Komsomol (Young Communist)
organization.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Ogarkov served for several years on
the staff of the High Command Far East, which was re-established during
the Korean War. There, Ogarkov received first-hand experience in the
functioning of a theater command, experience which he would draw on
30 years later, when he was to set up similar theater commands for the
new age of nuclear war. From 1953 to 1959 Ogarkov remained in the
Far East, on the staff of the command of the military district.
After graduating with a Gold Star from the General Staff Academy
in 1959, Ogarkov served in senior command positions in the Western
military districts of the U.S.S.R. and in the Group of Soviet Forces in
Germany.
In April 1968 Ogarkov's career took a dramatic turn when he was
brought onto the General Staff to head up its most important subdivision,
the Main Directorate for Operations. According to Soviet sources, the
function of Ogarkov's directorate was "determination of the goals of Soviet
military actions, distribution of troops and hardware, methods of combat
actions, coordination of forces, and assignment of missions to troops."
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Already a candidate member of the Central Committee since 1966
and promoted to full member in 1971, it was clear at an early stage that
Ogarkov was a likely candidate to succeed Marshal Sokolovskii as the
formulator of Soviet war doctrine and planning for the 1970s and 1980s.
That role was confirmed on January 6, 1977, when he was named Chief
of the General Staff and promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union a
week later. It is also intriguing to note that Ogarkov received the Order
of Hero of the Soviet Union in 1977. That order is always reserved as
a symbol of recognition of actual accomplishments, not as a mere token
of status; its being awarded to Ogarkov that year would indicate that the
work he had performed at the General Staff prior to becoming its chief
was of utmost importance. As our chronology indicates, it was in the
crucial years around 1975 that the present war strategy of the Soviet
Union was elaborated.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Fyodorovich Akhromeyev
Born on May 5, 1923. Present function: Chief of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.
Akhromeyev was only the First Deputy Chief of General Staff when
he was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1983. Since the
presence of such a high-ranking officer in that post was unprecedented
in the history of the Red Army, it is clear that Akhromeyev was already
then being designated as the future Chief of General Staff. Two months
after his promotion to Marshal, he was made a full member of the Central
Committee of the CPSU.
Akhromeyev was a battalion commander in the army in World War
II, even though his officer's training had actually been at a naval academy.
After the war, he graduated from the Moscow Malinovskii Tank Acad-
emy. He rose in the ranks of the tank troops to become a division
commander in 1965. In 1967 he graduated from the General Staff Acad-
emy (awarded a Gold Star), and after several senior commands in military
districts (including the Far East Military District), he was brought onto
the General Staff in 1974. Since that time, Akhromeyev has been Marshal
Ogarkov's most trusted lieutenant.
Akhromeyev received the order of "Hero of the Soviet Union" in
1982.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilii Ivanovich Petrov
Born on Jan. 15, 1917 in the Chernolesskoye/Prikumsk district of the
Stavropol region. Present function: First Deputy Minister of Defense of
the U.S.S.R.
Petrov was promoted to his present post at the beginning of this year,
after having served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of
the U.S.S.R. since December 1980. He was a battalion commander and
deputy chief of staff of a division during the war. In 1948 he graduated
from Frunze Military Academy.
Petrov has had extensive experience in the Far East: From 1954-61
he was chief of staff and then commander of the elite Pacific Guards
Motorized Rifle Division in the Far East Military District. He then became
head of the 5th Combined Arms Army in Ussuriisk. From 1966-76 he
was chief of staff and then commander of the entire Far East Military
District. With that background, he was a logical choice in early 1979,
when he was sent by Marshal Ogarkov to re-establish the High Command
Far East. He remained there for a little more than a year-and-a-half before
being named CINC of the Ground Forces in December 1980.
In the middle of these stints in the Far East, however, Petrov was
entrusted with another highly significant mission. In the spring of 1977,
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he was dispatched to Ethiopia to command the Cuban and Ethiopian
ground forces and their supporting Russian and East German fighter and
fighter-bomber squadrons in the effective crushing of the Somalian in-
vasion of the Ogaden desert region of Ethiopia. In leading this classic
"out of area operation," Petrov worked closely with Yuri Andropov, then
head of the KGB.
Although Petrov is no longer commander of the ground forces, it is
likely that he would in fact be the man who would coordinate and control
the actions of all ground, air and air defense forces in the implementation
of the Ogarkov Plan for global war against the West.
Since becoming a First Deputy Defense Minister, Petrov has appeared
more often in public, including before Western TV cameras. So far, his
performances have tended to corroborate the description of the vain and
arrogant Petrov once given by the Ukrainian dissident Gen. Pyotr Gri-
gorenko, who at one time worked under Petrov: "Vasilii Ivanovich is a
quick-thinking and very self-assured man. He has a very high opinion
of his own talents, and as a result he often makes rash decisions. And
God save anyone who tries to oppose his decisions."
Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Konstantinovich Kurkotkin
Born on Feb. 13, 1917 in the Moscow region. As the Chief of Rear
Operations of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces since 1972, Kurkotkin is the
man responsible for the immediate prewar and wartime command of the
Soviet war economy.
Kurkotkin's 1983 promotion to marshal was especially surprising, since
the rank of marshal is extraordinarily high for the formal status of the
Rear Services commander. The promotion therefore indicates the in-
creasing importance attached to this function, especially by Ogarkov
personally.
Kurkotkin has served in the Red Army since 1937. During the war he
had both leading political posts and combat command posts up to the
brigade level. He graduated in 1951 from the Moscow Malinovsky Tank
Academy and in 1958 from the General Staff Academy. During the 1950s
and 1960s he served in various senior field commands, including that of
First Deputy CINC of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Right
before being appointed Chief of Rear Services, Kurkotkin was the com-
mander of the Transcaucasus Military District. In that capacity, he was
also a member of the Central Committee, and for a brief period, the
Politburo, of the Georgian CP. One of his associates on the military
council of the Transcaucasus MD was Geidar Aliyev.
Chief Marshal of Artillery Vladimir Fyodorovich Tolubko
Born on Nov. 25, 1914 in Krasnograd in the Ukraine. His present
function is Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet strategic nuclear missile
arsenal, known as the Strategic Rocket Forces.
Tolubko graduated from tank academies before World War II and then
saw combat at the Leningrad, Kalinin and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, including
during the occupation of Belgrade and Budapest. He rose to the post of
deputy chief of staff of a corps and regimental commander by the end of
the war.
Tolubko graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1950 and was
promoted to General Major shortly afterwards. During the 1950s he held
various senior field commands, including in the Group of Soviet Forces
in Germany (GSFG). From 1960-68 he was the First Deputy CINC of
the Strategic Rocket Forces. From April 1968 to May 1969 he was
commander of the Siberian Military District, and from May 1969 to April
1972 the commander of the Far East Military District.
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Since 1972 he has been the CINC of the Strategic Rocket Forces.
Tolubko was awarded the order of "Hero of Socialist Labor" in 1976.
June 1983, the Soviet Navy
Directly following the Andropov-convened June 1983 Central Com-
mittee Plenum, the Soviet Union begins a mass program to convert at
least 25 of its attack, submarines into cruise missile submarines, each
outfitted with at least 20 3,000 km-range nuclear cruise missiles. The
conversion program embraces minimally all 18 Victor III class submarines,
one old Yankee class ballistic missile submarine, all six modem Sierra
class submarines, and the one very modem Mike class submarine in active
service at that time.
Thus, in the course of the next two to three years, the Soviet submarine
fleet will jump from a long-range cruise missile strength of zero, to around
500! These long-range cruise missiles will be added to Soviet long-range
offensive nuclear capability, with a substantial portion of the cruise missile
submarines deployed off the U.S. coast.
September 1983, Sakhalin and Moscow
A combat pilot from the Soviet air defense forces of the High Command
Far East shoots down the KAL-007 airliner, killing 269 civilian passen-
gers. In Moscow in the ensuing days, a press conference is held in which,
for the first time since World War 11, the military speaks for the Soviet
State. The press conference, televised worldwide, is conducted by Marshal
Ogarkov.
The 1984 chronology shows a dramatic-and, quite frightening-
1984 qualitative leap in the intensity of Soviet war preparations. It is the year
The first year of of transition in the Soviet armed forces from "standard" peacetime com-
mand and control order of battle, to newly created and staffed Wartime
maneuvers to perfect High Commands.
Operationally, maneuvers suddenly erupt on land and on the seas, of
a global blitzkrieg a type and scope never before seen. All are conducted with a realism
not seen before, and clearly bear the stamp of one prime purpose-
perfecting the myriad components of the surprise attack invariant, the
crucial feature to all the option levels of the Ogarkov War Plan.
For the first time, the execution of first strike components of the
Ogarkov Plan, such as the launch of missiles from submarines off the
U. S. coast, to destroy the White House, the Pentagon and remaining
U. S. command and control centers-in plain English to kill our civilian
and military leadership, starting with the President-are tested. We are
not talking, as in 1962, about a nuclear strike from Cuba, with Florida
having a five-minute warning, but our capital of Washington D.C. having
a five-minute warning. In 1984, the "strategic decapitation" of Wash-
ington is rehearsed with wartime realism. The same realism characterizes
huge Soviet summer maneuvers along the borders of West Germany and
Austria.
In 1984, the 1975 decision to build mobile, precision missiles across
the board, bears operational fruit. The Red Army is equipped with the
SS-21, SS-23 and SS-22 mobile, precision short- and medium-range
Euromissiles. The final testing and beginning of crash program level serial
production of the mobile land-based ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25, oc-
curs. The program of refitting some 25 attack submarines with 3,000 km-
range cruise missiles, to add a massive new nuclear barrage component
to the sub fleet stationed off the U.S. coast, is in full swing.
The Soviet maneuvers of 1984 are of a type and on a scale never
witnessed before. On land, in the European, or Western, Theater, and,
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globally, at sea, the army and fleet begin rehearsing and perfecting their
assigned roles in the Ogarkov War Plan. The focus is on perfecting the
art of surprise attack, for the maximum knock-out of U.S. and NATO
forces in the first hour of war, under the plan's "Maximum Option."
During 1984, Ogarkov's Western Theater forces (the Soviet forces
stationed in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the
Western U.S.S.R.) of the spearhead first echelon, and the "next wave,"
second echelon, are brought up to wartime supply requirement levels in
armor, artillery, vehicles and equipment, and munitions and fuel. By
year's end, the theater missile modernization program (SS-21, SS-23,
SS-22) is concluded.
Similarly, the forces in the Western Theater-Europe-engage in
maneuvers to perfect limited theater military options, such as the seizure
of West Germany, or one region (Schleswig-Holstein or West Berlin) of
Germany, in a surgical strike. On the Southern Flank, the classical limited
option would be the seizure of the Turkish Straits; on the Northern
Flank, the seizure of northern Norway (Finnmark) and/or Spitzbergen.
The ground forces' maneuvers culminate from June 28-July 5 in the
largest military maneuvers by far (in size and geographical range) staged
by Soviet Ground and Air Forces since the end of the war.
On July 4, in a manner never seen before, troops from 11 Soviet
divisions in East Germany, all stationed in proximity to the West German
border, simultaneously leave their barracks, and move off in full combat
regalia toward the West German border-exactly as they would have
when war begins-and conduct exercises very close to the West German
border. The maneuvers are staged exclusively by Soviet units, a point
of political, as well as military significance. The Soviets accompany the
maneuvers with a wave of propaganda, accusing Bonn of "revanchism"
and violation of the July 1945 Potsdam Agreements; the Russians main-
tain that the Potsdam Agreements give them "victor rights" to militarily
intervene into West Germany, to crush "Neo-Nazism" or any "threat"
emanating from West Germany.
In the spring of 1984, in the North Atlantic, the Soviet Northern
and Baltic Fleets, and naval aviation bombers, position themselves in
their wartime "blocking screen" to protect the nuclear missile submarine
component of the Ogarkov Plan first strike, against U. S. attack sub-
marines and carrier task forces. For the first time, the Soviet submarines
stationed off the U.S. coast with their "pin down" and strategic decap-
itation barrage assignments, participate in a realistic wartime exercise.
To sum up, in 1984, with the new model of surprise attack maneuvers,
with the operational stationing of the precision Euromissiles, with the
stationing of ballistic missile submarines off the U. S. coast, and with the
final go-ahead to produce and deploy the new generation of mobile
ICBMs; the Soviet Union moved past the point of no return into a
wartime mode.
We now show with the Soviet forces on the ground, at sea, and on
the missile testing ranges in Northern Russia and Kazakhstan, the 1984
countdown chronology of that shift-past the point of no return--into
a wartime mode.
The hardware and the command for blitzkrieg
Early 1984, the Soviet Forces in East Germany
A five-year period of massive re-equipping and war stockpiling of am-
munition and fuel, etc. is capped with the stationing of the new mobile
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short- and medium-range missiles, the SS-21, SS-23, SS-22, with all the
Armies of the GSFG.
The Armies of the Soviet Forces in East Germany, the "GSFG," after
several years of massive reinforcement in tank, armored vehicle, artillery
and missile strength, are placed under the command of the generals who
were the leaders of the 1977 Voyennyi Vestnik "debate," which decided
in favor of a doctrine of surprise attack and high-speed offensive.
These include Generals Pyankov, Lobachev, and Shein, all central
authors in the 1977 Voyennyi Vestnik series. By early 1984, all are serving
as commanders of Soviet Armies in the GSFG.
The blitzkrieg commanders-a profile
Guards General Major G.A. Lobachev:
Lobachev was brought, hand-picked, to the GSFG in December 1980,
by the GSFG's new Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Mikhail
Zaitsev. In 1967, Lobachev had been a tank unit commander in a Mo-
torized Rifle Regiment of the Rogachev Guards Motorized Rifle Division
in the Bylorussian Military District. The commander of that division was
Zaitsev, who later went onto command the Byelorussian Military District,
before moving over to command the GSFG in December 1980. The
Rogachev Division received high awards and praise for distinguishing
itself during the DNEPR exercise of 1967, observed by Brezhnev and
then Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko.
In 1976, Lobachev was named commander of the elite Taman Guards
Motorized Rifle Division-the "Showpiece Division"-of the Moscow
Military District. In early 1977, when Ogarkov became Chief of the
General Staff, Lobachev was chosen to launch the Voyennyi Vestnik series
(February 1977) praising the virtues of the "high speed offensive" and
surprise attack.
Lobachev, in his February 1977 article, stressed the importance of a
Soviet precision nuclear strike to open the attack in the European theater,
a nuclear strike which would throw "the enemy off balance," destroy
"vital nuclear means of delivery.... [and] communications centers."
Then, the "high-speed offensive" would "occupy crucial areas of strategic
importance," and lead to the enemy's "political collapse."
Lobachev emphasized the need for "high rates of advance" after smash-
ing the enemy on "narrow sectors of breakthrough," adding: "Our tank
and motorized rifle units now possess greater firepower and strike capa-
bility, are extremely maneuverable, and have highly efficient means of
command and control." If Lobachev could write that in 1977, one can
imagine what "firepower and strike capability"-given the new Euro-
missiles and all the other modem arms and equipment-now exist for
the Soviet Armies.
Lobachev now (mid-1985) commands an Army of the GSFG.
Guards General Lieutenant Boris Yevgenevich Pyankov:
In the late 1960s, like Lobachev, Pyankov was also a unit commander
in the Byelorussian Military District. He then went to the Frunze Military
Academy and graduated with a Gold Medal. He was then posted to the
Transcaucasus Military District to command a motorized rifle division.
In February 1976, he commanded this division in Transcaucasus ma-
neuvers, where he "defeated" a strong attacking force in poor weather
and difficult mountainous terrain. The maneuvers were observed by then
Defense Minister Grechko, and then First Deputy Chief of the General
Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov.
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Under Ogarkov's tutelage, Pyankov was selected to attend the Soviet
25th Party Congress in Moscow as a "military delegate," and later in
1976, to attend the General Staff Academy. He left the General Staff
Academy in 1979, and-shortly before the invasion of Afghanistan-
was named commander of an Army or a Corps in the Central Asian
Military District, where he stayed through Spring 1983.
He is now commander of the GSFG's spearhead 3rd Shock Army,
headquartered at Magdeburg, an all-armored force of four tank divisions.
Guards General Lieutenant B.P. Shein:
Shein was, during the 1977 Voyennyi Vestnik series, a colonel and
commander of a tank division of the Soviet Central Group of Forces, in
Czechoslovakia. He contributed the article to the series which gave a
detailed analysis of the "role of surprise" in the "high-speed offensive."
He stressed "initial surprise" and made the automatic linkage to Lo-
bachev's stress on the initial nuclear strike.
In late 1979, shortly before the invasion of Afghanistan, Shein was
transferred to the Turkestan Military District, and remained in the Af-
ghanistan theater of operations till early 1983. He now commands an
Army of the GSFG.
Practicing the art of blitzkrieg
January 1984, the airspace over East Germany, Poland, and the
Western Soviet Union, during the long winter nights
Large formations of Soviet bombers, fighter-bombers, interceptors, and
Mi-24 attack helicopters, engage in a very heavy schedule of winter
night-flying, and, low-level flying over long distances over land and water
(the Baltic). A lot of invaluable-and crucial for invasion flight pat-
terns-experience is gained. One by-product is a high number of air
crashes.
February 1984, East Germany
Large, unannounced exercises involving more than 60,000 Soviet and
East German troops are held in East Germany. The exercises, which
conclude in field training areas near the West German border, feature
simulated wartime river crossings of the Elbe. These wide river crossings
become a feature of all Soviet exercises in East Germany, Czechoslovakia
and Poland.
March 1984, Bulgaria and the Black Sea
Russia and Bulgaria hold the Soyuz-84 Maneuvers. The maneuvers
simulate a surprise attack seizure of the Bosporus and Dardanelles by the
Soviet and Bulgarian Armed Forces. This is a critical testing of one of
the many "surgical strike" options in the Ogarkov Plan. It would also
form one of the invasion routes in the European Theater that would
accompany the Ogarkov Maximum Option.
March 27-April 5, 1984, the Atlantic Ocean, North Sea and the
Baltic Sea
The largest naval maneuvers since Okean-75 are held, involving the
Northern Fleet based in Murmansk, and the Baltic Fleet. Speed of "break
out" from Murmansk and the Baltic is perfected, but far more important,
the simultaneous coordination of the two most modem classes of nuclear
missile submarines, the Delta-III and Typhoon, in the Barents Sea; the
ASW and SAM, and anti-ship function of the surface warships of both
fleets, and of Soviet Backfire bombers and other naval aviation (num-
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bering in the hundreds) against NATO air forces, carrier forces and
nuclear attack "hunter killer" submarines; and-for the first time ever
in a maneuver setting-the nuclear missile and cruise missile submarines
in place off the U.S. coasts since the late autumn of 1983. These latter
simulated their "pin down" barrage against U.S. land-based nuclear mis-
sile sites.
April 1984, the South China Sea
For the first time ever, Soviet carrier task force naval maneuvers are
held in the South China Sea, near Vietnam and the permanent Soviet
overseas naval and air base at Cam Ranh Bay. The exercises are led by
the Kiev class carrier, the Minsk. Another "first" for the maneuvers is a
landing by Soviet marines from a landing ship dock, of the Ivan Rogov
class, the "Aleksandr Nikolayev," on the Vietnamese coast south of
Haiphong.
Late June 1984, Western Hungary, very near the Austrian border
Soviet, Hungarian, and Czech units, totalling over 60,000 troops,
begin the Danube-84 maneuvers. They exercise very close to the Austria
border, and remain there for some days after the official termination of
the maneuvers-something which had never previously happened.
June 28-July 5, 1984, on a Front covering East Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, the Baltic Sea, the Baltic States, Byelorussia, and
the Carpathian Military District
The Soviet Union holds its biggest maneuvers ever since the war:
Druzhba-84. Only Soviet troops take part. For the first time, a surprise
attack at "front" level against West Germany is thoroughly rehearsed,
not only by field units, but at all staff levels, from Moscow HQ, to first
and second echelon HQ, to wartime invasion staff HQ. This exercise
marks the direct transition to the Wartime High Commands which will
be established under Marshal Ogarkov in the autumn.
On the climactic day of the exercises, July 4, 11 of the 12 Soviet
divisions in East Germany stationed near the West German border,
simultaneously leave their barracks, and go into combat maneuvers, very
close to the West German border.
The exercises are unique also in that they include simultaneously, large
ground forces' deployments, large airborne troop paratroop drops (one
airborne division) and amphibious landings by naval infantry in the
Baltic.
Summer 1984, Plesetsk Missile Testing Grounds
The first test phase of the SS-X-26, the heavy solid-fueled ICBM
successor to the huge SS-18, begins at Plesetsk. Missile base areas under
consideration for the SS-X-26 include Verkhnay, Saida, Novosibirsk,
Omsk, and Tyumen.
End of August 1984, Moscow
The Soviet Defense Ministry announces tests of a 3,000 km range
land-based cruise missile. The type, called the SSC-X-4, has a speed just
under the speed of sound.
September 1984, Czechoslovakia
Large Warsaw Pact exercises-Shchit-84 (Shield-84)-are held in
Czechoslovakia. Over 60,000 troops take part, drawn from the Soviet
forces in Czechoslovakia, Czech units, and units from East Germany,
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and a staff contingent from Romania. Soviet
airborne troops, based in the U.S.S.R., also take part, as had been the
case in the big summer maneuvers.
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September 1984, the Northwest Pacific Ocean
Tests of both land-based and submarine-launched ICBM missiles begin
at an accelerated rate, with the target zone in the mid-Pacific. There is
a clear pattern of using the tests to perfect the precision accuracy of the
ICBMs.
The tests begin on September 1 v ith a test firing of the mobile, railway-
housed precision ICBM, the SS-24, which in wartime would contain
between 20 and 30 warheads. The SS-24 hit with precision accuracy,
its designated target.
Other heavy rounds of such missile tests will take place in December
1984, and again, in May 1985.
September-October 1984, the Sea of Okhotsk
The Soviet Navy conducts its first ASW exercise with a carrier task
force led by a Kiev class carrier, the "Novorossiisk," in the Sea of Okhotsk.
The Sea of Okhotsk, a Soviet lake between the Russian-occupied Kuriles
and the Soviet Far East mainland, is the Pacific launching area for Russian
nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The Novorossiisk is accompanied by
one Kara class ASW cruiser and one Kresta II class ASW cruiser.
Late 1984, Tyuratam Test Silos in Kazakhstan
The first silo tests of the monster ICBM, the SS-X-27, are conducted
at the Tyuratam test silos in Kazakhstan. Actual flight tests of t'Tie SS-
X-27, which is bigger than they SS-18, are scheduled for later this year.
Late November 1984, Soviet Pacific Fleet HQ, Vladivostok
The first missile range ship ever built for the Soviet Navy, the 30,000
ton Marshal Nedelin (named after the pre-1962 Marshal who headed
the Strategic Rocket Forces) arrives in Vladivostok to join the Pacific
Fleet. It began active deployment in the Central Pacific, during series
missile tests from Dec. 6-15. From now on, it will he regularly stationed
in the missile firing zones in the Central Pacific, for each new series c f
ICBM, SLBM, and IRBM tests.
The Marshal Nedelin, though officially classified as a support ship, is
heavily armed with modern SA-N-8 (the same SAM armament as is on
the Kirov, for example) SP,M missiles.
Late 1984, early 1985
Russia begins stationing of the SS-25 fully mobile ICBM, the fir st of
the new generation planne,3 in 1975, to assume ready status. 9y th< end
of this year, (1985) the toi_al minimal program for the stationing c ,f 460
SS-25 ICBM launchers, eztch with at least 4 missiles, will he comp leted.
A crash production progrz~m has been underway to meet this dea dline.
Late 1984, early 1985
The first Tu-20 Bear f bombers and Tu-22M Backfire boml ,ers are
outfitted with the AS-15 supersonic nuclear air launched cruise missile.
The AS-15 will also be outfitted on the new long-range supersoni c Black-
jack bomber.
Late 1984, early 1985
During 1984, Cam Ranh Bay is built up into a major Sovie :t overseas
naval and air base. By tl.ie end of 1984, about 30 Bear and Badg er bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft, including 20 bombers, are stati oned there
permanently, along with 14 MiG-23s. At any one time, herv peen 20 and
30 Soviet warships and navy supply ships are using the has e, including
6-8 surface warships. including 2 Frigates on the average, and 5-6 sub-
marines. One battalion of Soviet marines is there to guard the facilities,
along with SAM units.
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Soviet `maskirovka': Ogarkov is `demoted'
Sept. 6, 1984, Moscow
Moscow announces that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov has been "relieved
of his duties as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the
U.S.S.R. in connection with his transfer to a new post." The new Chief
of the General Staff is Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev.
Ogarkov's disappearance triggers a wave of speculation in Western
media to the effect that Ogarkov has been "demoted" on account of his
"hawkish views."
The authors of the present report write, in contrast, that it is unthink-
able that Ogarkov has been removed by the political leadership in Mos-
cow. In the EIR issue dated Sept. 25, 1984, we outline Ogarkov's program
for 1) a centralized war economy, 2) development of new weapons systems
"based on new physical principles"-i.e. beam weapons, and 3) the
reorganization of the Soviet command. On that basis, we conclude: "In
short, the most important economic and military changes in the Soviet
Union have been done under the guidance of Ogarkov. It is unlikely
that he would be demoted just at the point that the reorganization process
is to be completed." Our hypothesis is rather that by giving the appearance
of having lost position and power, Ogarkov is engaging in the same sort
of strategic deception-what the Russians call maskirovka-that he suc-
cessfully practiced back in 1968-72 when he, as a consultant to the Soviet
SALT delegation, duped the U.S. into disarming itself right before he
launched the massive Soviet build-up.
We explain: "If maskirovka is also the explanation for Ogarkov's dra-
matic step-down, it would be yet another case in which present-day
Soviet policy has taken a cue from Russia's Byzantine past: In 1564, Czar
Ivan Grozny (The Terrible) made a show of `abdicating' and withdrew
to the town of Aleksandrov outside Moscow. He demoted himself to
`Prince of Moscow,' while setting up a puppet `Czar of All Russia,' to
whom he pretended to render homage. Meanwhile, from his fortified
palace in Aleksandrov, Ivan built up his power to unprecedented heights."
In the end, even Ivan's enemies begged him to return-and so he did,
to unleash purges and carry out "reforms" of unprecedented scale and
scope.
Oct. 12, 1984, Kiev
A report carried in Krasnaya Zvezda states that a group of military
school graduates, meeting at the headquarters of the staff of the Kiev
I vlilitary District, are "addressed by Gen. Lt. V. Osipov, commander of
the Kiev Military District." There is no mention of the fate of the former
district commander, although this is the real significance of this little
it em: The previous commander was one of the top generals of the Red
Army, Gen. Army Ivan Gerasimov, and he has been removed from the
too command post he has held for nearly 10 years.
Thus, another top commander has mysteriously "banished." Later events
wit I show that his disappearance is very much linked to that of Ogarkov.
Oct.. 13, 1984, Helsinki
Soviet Politburo member Grigorii Romanov, visiting Finland, replies
to a; ournalist's question regarding the fate of Ogarkov. "Marshal Ogarkov
comr.nands the Soviet Union's largest Western force," says Romanov.
Oct. 13, 1984, East Berlin
Marshal Ogai kov arrives in East Berlin for a meeting with the East
German leader Erich Honecker. Ogarkov is received with honor. The
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following day, the East German party newspaper Neues Deutschland carries
a front-page photograph of the allegedly "demoted" marshal standing
beside Honecker.
November 1984
The political journal of the Soviet military, Kommunist vooruzhonnykh
sil, carries an article by Ogarkov on World War II. The article places
particular emphasis on Josef Stalin's Headquarters of the Supreme High
Command-the Stavka-and on "Stavka representatives, and Chiefs of
the General Staff during the period of the Great Patriotic War: G.K.
Zhukov, A.M. Vasilyevskii, B.M. Shaposhnikov and A.I. Antonov."
It begins to dawn upon a growing, though still tiny, number of astute
observers that there are, indeed, striking parallels between the careers
of Marshals Zhukov and Ogarkov. Zhukov, it is recalled, was the Chief
of the General Staff when the Nazis invaded the U.S.S.R. on June 22,
1941. At that critical and desperate moment, rather than keep his top
marshal in Moscow, Stalin dispatched Zhukov to the front to intervene
directly. Ogarkov, it is hypothesized, may be performing the same func-
tion today.
If so, it will be confirmation that the Soviets regard the present situation
not as a "prewar period," but as already the initial phase of war.
Dec. 22, 1984
Nearly hidden, in a long list of other signers, the name of "N. V.
Ogarkov" appears in the obituary for deceased Soviet Defense Minister
Dmitrii Ustinov in Krasnaya Zvezda. Ogarkov's name is paired with that
of B.P. Utkin, just as I.A. Gerasimov is matched with V.S. Rodin,
Yu.P. Maksimov with A.I. Shirinkin, and I.M. Tret'yak with M.I.
Druzhinin.
Now there can be no doubt: Since Tret'yak and Druzhinin are known
to be serving as commander-in-chief and chief political officer in the
High Command Far East, these must be the paired names of the com-
manders-in-chief and political commanders of four previously secret Thea-
ter High Commands.
The mystery of Ogarkov's whereabouts is finally answered-albeit in
incredibly Byzantine fashion-by the Soviets themselves. The same goes
for the fate of former Kiev commander, Gerasimov.
At the same time, closer study of the list of names of military district
commanders and political chiefs on the same obituary shows that the
creation of the High Commands is being accompanied by a radical re-
organization of commands on the next lower level, that of the military
districts and equivalent "Groups of Soviet Forces" abroad. No fewer than
12 of the 20 commanders at this level have been replaced! The complete
list of district command changes that can be deduced to have occurred
on or around the Ogarkov "disappearance" is the following (abbreviations
used: MD = Military District; CDR = Commander; CINC = Commander-
in-Chief; FDC = First Deputy Commander; COS = Chief of Staff):
1) Baltic Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Col. S.I. Postnikov
New post: CDR Transbaikal MD
New CDR: Gen. Col. A.V. Betekhtin
Old post: COS Odessa MD
2) Byelorussian Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Army Ye. F. Ivanovskii
New post: CINC Ground Forces of U.S.S.R.
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New CDR: Gen. Col. V. Shuralev
Old post: FD CINC Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
3) Central Asian Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Army D.T. Yazov
New post: CDR Far Eastern MD
New CDR: Gen. Col. V.N. Lobov
Old post: FDC Leningrad MD
4) Far Eastern Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Army I.M. Tret'yak
New post: CINC High Command Far East
New CDR: Gen. Army D.T. Yazov
Old post: CDR Central Asian MD
5) Kiev Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Army I.A. Gerasimov
New post: CINC High Command Southwest
New CDR: Gen. Col. V.V. Osipov
Old post: FDC Belorussian MD
6) North Caucasus Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Col. V.K. Meretskov
New post: Soviet representative to the Warsaw Pact
New CDR: Gen. Col. V. V. Skokov
Old post: Unknown
7) Siberian Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Col. N.I. Popov
New post: CDR Turkestan MD
New CDR: Gen. Col. V.A. Vostrov
Old post: FDC Far Eastern MD
8) Transbaikal Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Army G.I. Salmanov
New post: Unknown
New CDR: Gen. Col. S.I. Postnikov
Old post: CDR Baltic MD
9) Turkestan Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Army Yu.P. Maksimov
New post: CINC High Command South
New CDR: Gen. Col. N.I. Popov
Old post: CDR Siberian MD
10) Ural Military District
Old CDR: Gen. Col. I.A. Gashkov
New post: Chief of a General Staff Directorate
New CDR: Gen. Col. N.F. Grachev
Old post: FDC Carpathian MD
11) Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia)
Old CDR: Gen. Col. G.G. Borisov
New post: Unknown
New CDR: Gen. Col. V.F. Yermakov
Old post: Unknown
12) Northern Group of Forces (Poland)
Old CDR: Gen. Col. Yu.F. Zarudin
New post: Unknown
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New CDR: Gen. Lt. A.V. Kovtunov
Old post: COS Central Asian MD
1985
All maneuvers under
wartime commands
Moving to overwhelming strategic and
theater nuclear superiority
We are now in 1985, a turning point on the road to war. The Soviet
Wartime High Commands have been established, and all Soviet military
exercises in 1985 are under wartime command and control. Wartime
command and control, and the critical surprise attack function, are under
constant rehearsal and perfection. The 1985 round of summer exercises
begins in western Czechoslovakia near the West German border. In what
will become the "norm," they are personally overseen by the Wartime
Commander in Chief, Marshal Ogarkov, and are launched with no prior
preparations, visible to Western Intelligence.
The naval component of the Ogarkov Plan, conducts large-scale re-
hearsals of that Plan, for the first time in the Pacific Ocean. Much more
ominously, grand-scale "Pin Down" barrage exercises are held in the last
week of June by some 24 Soviet submarines, from battle stations off the
U. S. coast.
1985 marks another-frightening-turning point. The comer is turned
by the Soviet Union from wide to overwhelming strategic and theater
nuclear superiority. This turning point transformation embraces the years
1984 and 1985.
Before 1984-85, there were no mobile SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs sta-
tioned.
Before 1984-85, there were no submarines with long-range cruise mis-
sile capability.
Before 1985, there were no operational SS-21, SS-23, or SS-22 pre-
cision Euromissiles.
By the end of 1985, the Soviet Union will have at least 460 operational
SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers.
By the end of 1985, the Soviet Union will have over a hundred
operational SS-24 mobile ICBM launchers. Each SS-24 can contain up
to 30 nuclear warheads.
By the end of 1985, the Soviet Union will have at least 25 attack
submarines equipped with some 20 cruise missile launchers each. Thus,
some 500 nuclear cruise missiles, of 3,000 km range, capable of hitting
the United States.
The Soviet Union already has its full complement of SS-21s, SS-23s,
and SS-22s in place. The same holds for the SS-20, nearing completion,
with a minimum of 500 launchers.
March 1985, the Sea of Okhotsk
The first ship of the new Krivak III Class, the Menzhinsky (named
after the head of the KGB predecessor, the OGPU, from 1926-34), a
large patrol ship, arrives at the Nakhodka Naval Base on the Sea of
Okhotsk, where it will be stationed. Its purpose is to patrol the Sea of
Okhotsk, the Pacific launching pad for Nuclear Ballistic Missile Sub-
marines, against surface or underwater intruders.
March 31-April 16 1985, the Pacific Ocean
The Soviet Navy conducts its first mid-Pacific extended ASW exer-
cises. The exercises are a first, as realistic as possible, rehearsal of the
Pacific Ocean deployed component of the Ogarkov Plan's first hour of
war, strategic bombardment of the United States, and key U.S. Pacific
military and naval facilities.
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In a manner similar to the April 1984 huge Atlantic naval exercises,
a Kiev Class carrier task force, led by the Novorossisk, the most modem
of the Kiev Class on active Fleet deployment, simulated ASW detection
and defense against U. S. Nuclear Attack Submarines whose wartime
mission would be to seek and destroy the Soviet Nuclear Ballistic Missile
Submarines, stationed in the Sea of Okhotsk.
The main area of the exercises was from 900-1,400 miles NW of U.S.-
owned Midway Island, where the carrier task force formed a screen
between Midway and the Sea of Okhotsk.
With the Novorossisk were three Kara Class ASW Cruisers, one Kresta
II Class ASW Cruiser, one Krivak Class ASW Missile Frigate, and two
oilers.
April 13, 1985, the Black Sea
The Kharkov, the fourth and last of the Kiev Class ASW carriers, is
undergoing sea trials, and will officially join the Soviet Northern Fleet
this year.
April 1985, the Soviet Forces in East Germany
British Intelligence assessment, reflected in the 1985 United Kingdom
Defense White Paper, is published, that confirms that the Soviet blitzkrieg
spearhead forces, the 20 Divisions grouped in five Armies, stationed in
East Germany, already have on hand sufficient stocks of arms, ammu-
nition, and fuel in all categories, to conduct 60-90 days of warfare. The
British Intelligence estimate for 1980, was a 30-45 day stockpile.
April 1985, the Soviet Forces in East Germany
A new pipeline-laying brigade, with the most modem pipeline-laying
machinery, joins the Soviet GSFG in East Germany. Its function is to
supply Soviet troops in wartime with fuel by pipelines going to the front.
May 1985, Shindand, southwestern Afghanistan
It is confirmed that the large, expanded Soviet Air Base built at
Shindand, in southwestern Afghanistan, is not only a forward base for
long-range Su-24 fighter-bombers, but, also already houses 12 SS-20
launchers, targetting the U.S. Indian Ocean Naval and air base at Diego
Garcia and U.S. Nuclear Missile Submarines stationed in the Indian
Ocean.
May 23-June 6, 1985, Mediterranean and North Atlantic
A Soviet carrier task force of eight ships, led by the ASW carrier Kiev,
leaves the Mediterranean and proceeds through the Bay of Biscay and
English Channel to the North Sea-Shetlands area for ASW exercises.
The Kiev led Carrier Task Force also contained two Kresta II Class
ASW Cruisers, one Krivak II Class ASW Missile Frigate, three modem
Sovremenny Class destroyers with 110 km-range anti-ship missiles, and
one modified Kashin Class destroyer.
The Kiev, the first of its class, had just completed a two year refit and
modernization in a Black Sea shipyard.
May 26-May 31, 1985, Czechoslovakia, near West Germany
Soviet-Czech ground and air maneuvers, overseen by Marshal Ogar-
kov, take place. They are held very close to the West German border,
begin with no prior visible preparation, and are designed to rehearse a
surprise attack.
This maneuver marks the inception of a phase of Warsaw Pact exercises,
where an attack with no prior visible physical signs that would tip it off,
is to be rehearsed.
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June 4, 1985, the air space over the Baltic
A very large one-day exercise involving Naval Aviation Backfire and
Bear Bombers, some equipped with AS-15 Cruise Missiles, from Baltic
bases in the Soviet Union, fighters, fighter-bombers and Soviet SAM
units based in East Germany and Poland, is held over the Baltic, East
Germany and Poland. At least 1,000 sorties are flown by some 500 Soviet
combat aircraft of different types.
A massed force of Backfire and Bear Bombers flew out over the Baltic,
and then, over the East German island of Rueggen, abruptly turned 90
degrees southeast, and landed at air bases in East Germany and Poland.
The exercises were designed to rehearse Soviet attainment of air su-
premacy over the Baltic and East Germany during the critical first hours
of war. Destruction of NATO Air Forces is one of the crucial conditions
that must be fulfilled to allow the rapid, unimpeded advance of the Soviet
blitzkrieg armored and mechanized formations through West Germany.
June 1985, Murmansk
The ASW carrier Kiev arrives in Murmansk, the Northern Fleet HQ,
resuming its station, after a two year refit and modernization at a Black
Sea shipyard. With the arrival in Murmansk by the end of 1985 of the
newest of the Kiev Class ASW carriers, the Kharkov (now undergoing
sea trials in the Black Sea), the active duty ASW carrier strength of the
Soviet Northern Fleet will jump from zero on Jan. 1, 1985, to two at
the end of 1985.
Final week of June 1985, Hungary, near the Austrian border
Warsaw Pact exercises Danube-85, with a total of 60,000 Soviet, Hun-
garian and Czech ground and air force units take place near the Austrian
border.
End of June 1985, off the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts
Large-scale exercise of Soviet Nuclear Ballistic Missile and Cruise
Missile submarines stationed off the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts. At
least 24 submarines are reported involved, in this dramatic rehearsal of
the five minute warning "Pin Down" barrage of U.S. missile bases, and
a submarine-launched strategic decapitation of Washington, D.C. and
other leadership and command centers.
Final week of June 1985, the Norwegian Sea and North Pacific
Timed with the "Pin Down" barrage launched by Soviet submarines
off the U.S. coast, global Soviet naval maneuvers begin, including task
forces operating in the Norwegian Sea and the North Pacific.
July 1985, Moscow
As we go to press, sources in Moscow have said that Marshal Ogarkov
will become First Deputy Defense Minister and replace Kulikov as CINC
of Warsaw Pact Forces. Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany, Army General Mikhail Zaitsev, and his top political
officer, Gen. -Col. Aleksei Lizichev, have been transferred to as-yet un-
specified commands. Lizichev, reportedly, will replace Gen. Yepishev as
Armed Forces political officer.
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2. Soviet Imperial Motives
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2.1 Soviet Imperial World-Domination
by the 1990s?
If the United States continues the recent and present trends in monetary,
economic, diplomatic, and defense policies, it is more or less certain that
Moscow will have established its position as capital of a world-empire
by the early to middle 1990s. True, if the United States were to repudiate
the malthusian, "post-industrial-society" flaws its present monetary, eco-
nomic, and defense-budget policies, the Soviet drive for world-empire
would be at least delayed, or even halted permanently. However, the
kinds of changes in policies needed to prevent Soviet victory, are changes
which the Reagan administration and the Congress have so far refused
to consider, changes which prevailing opinion in Washington insists,
would never be allowed to occur.
The authors of this report are not as pessimistic as these observations
might suggest. U.S. policies can be altered as needed, altered suddenly
and drastically; it has happened in past U.S. history, and the kinds of
conditions under which such abrupt changes do happen are erupting now.
The point is, unless and until the United States wakes up and changes
its foolish ways in monetary, economic, diplomatic, and defense-budget
policies, the United States is doomed to an early strategic humiliation,
either through military defeat, or surrender to avoid military conflict.
Given a continuation of the present trends in U.S. policies, the defeat
of the United States would occur most probably during an interval of
approximately five years, 1987-93. True, a new "missile crisis" could erupt
earlier than 1988, under special circumstances. There are effective actions
available to the United States which might postpone the confrontation
to a point beyond 1993. However, if we limit our calculations to facts
of fundamental Soviet interest and relative capabilities of adversary forces,
the interval 1987-93, appears the probable point of decisive strategic
confrontation, with the period 1988-89 the most probable.
In the preceding chapter, we have emphasized that two sets of estimates
of Soviet capabilities must be composed: the first according to what we
have designated as Plan A, and a second estimate taking into account
the added consideration which we have designated as Plan B. Plan A
estimates the capabilities generated by Soviet war-mobilization for the
case that the economic mobilization is approximately "linear." In this
first case, we take two factors of expansion into account: 1) Increase of
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the percentile of the Soviet economy devoted to a war mobilization; 2)
Extension of technologies of the military sector of Soviet production into
the civilian sector. In the second instance, we add a third "factor": rising
Soviet productivity of labor, resulting from forced-draft ("science-driver
crash-program") rates of assimilation of successively more advanced tech-
nologies into Soviet industrial output in general.
The crucial distinction between Plan A and Plan B, is that under Plan
A conditions, Soviet war moblization would peak approximately 1988-
89, and would have retrogressive impact upon Soviet economic potential
after approximately that point; whereas, under successful implementation
of the recently-activated Plan B, there would be no such assymptotic
limit to Soviet war-economy mobilization. Therefore, 1988-89 is the
most probable point of strategic confrontation under Plan A, but a some-
what later dating is consistent with Soviet interests if Plan B prevails.
EIR's calculation of such probable timing, is based chiefly on several
overlapping classes of considerations:
1) Soviet Russia's culturally embedded imperialistic commitments,
identified in the present chapter of the Special Report;
2) Soviet strategic doctrine, identified in the preceding chapter;
3) The rate of current Soviet development of the relative military
capabilities required to meet the requirements of the "Ogarkov
Plan's" maximum war-fighting option, as that Plan is described
in Part 6 of this Special Report;
4) The present rate of internal collapse of the economic, political,
and military capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance;
5) The possibility of merely delaying the point of potential Soviet
thermonuclear attack on the United States, to as far beyond
1989 as 1993, by means which change recent U. S. policy-trends
only marginally, is indicated in Part 7.
Thus, in this Special Report as a whole, we present both Soviet intent
and capabilities. In the present Part, we summarize the culturally deter-
mined nature of Soviet imperial intent.
Cultural imperatives of the East-West conflict
With relatively minor adjustments, the strategic conflict between the
Atlantic Alliance and Soviet empire today, is merely a continuation of
a division within Europe and the Mediterranean region dating from the
furthest eastward advance of Western Christendom under Charlemagne
(Map 9). Under Charlemagne and the Othonian emperors, power in
Europe was divided chiefly into three parts: Western Europe, Byzantium,
and Byzantium's ally and later successor, Venice. Up through the Empress
Maria-Theresa, Western Europe was extended somewhat beyond Char-
lemagne's realm, into as far west as Roman Catholic Poland in the north,
and the Catholic regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
In this approximately thousand-year period, the emergence of Russia
is shaped primarily in three phases: 1) The Byzantine client-state of
Varangian Russia, into the Mongol subjugation; 2) The shift of the center
of Russia from Kiev Rus to Muscovy, under the Mongol satrapies; 3) The
establishment of Moscow as the projected capital of a "third and final"
world-wide Roman Empire, beginning 1440-53 A.D., and consolidated
by Ivan the Terrible's adoption of the hereditary title and pontifical
trappings of "Caesar" (Czar).
The name "Russia," is derived from the Swedish name for the Varangian
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colonies, "Rus." Into the sixteenth century, the ruling class of Russia
was essentially Swedish, a nobility which shared its relatively decreasing
power over Rus with a Greek monastic priesthood. The "Russification"
of Russia begins to be an acccomplished fact with the rise of the Ro-
manovs: Peter the Great's reforms of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy,
defeat of the Swedes, and adoption of the industrialization program pro-
vided him by Gottfried Leibniz, is the consolidation of the beginnings
of modem Russia. Successful Venetian intervention into Russia, during
the second half of the eighteenth century, overthrew Peter the Great's
reforms, and plunged Russia's social and intellectual development back-
wards, but also increased Russia's power in Europe, by turning Russia's
principal drive southward and eastward, into the Balkans, the Caucusus,
and Siberia (Maps 10-19, "Expansion of Russia under Peter I and His
Successors").
Until 1914-18, the principal checks to Russian imperial impulses were
the rise of industrial Germany in the north, the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires in the south, and the British-led "Great Game" in
the Middle East and Subcontinent. In this connection, the Ottoman
Empire is correctly seen as a Venice-sponsored, 1453 A.D., bringing of
the Ottoman dynasty to power as a continuation of the Byzantine Empire,
with Venice establishing its own empire in regions of the Adriatic and
the portions of Greece which the Ottomans awarded to Venice in payment
for Venice's delivery of Constantinople to the Ottomans (Map 20, "The
Eastern Mediterranean Before and After 1453 A.D.").
The failures intrinsic to Venice's efforts to use Russia as the ruler of
Europe, according to the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, led into the orches-
tration of the first World War, through which the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires were destroyed, and Germany weakened to a great
degree. The second World War destroyed Germany as a major power in
Europe, and cleared the way for Russian imperial power as soon as the
remaining obstacle, U.S. power, was removed. Venice's ancient goal,
of destroying the kind of impulse toward civilization established under
Charlemagne, was nearly completed.
The conflict between Augustinian Christendom and the Eastern Em-
pire, which assumed its general modem form under Charlemagne, is an
expression of an older conflict. European history begins with the emerg-
ence of classical Greece out of the dark age of illiteracy which had erupted
in the Mediterranean near the close of the second millenium B.C. The
political history of European civilization begins with Solon's constitu-
tional reforms at Athens, at the beginning of the sixth century B.C. The
East-West conflict in Europe begins with both the wars between Greece
and the Persian (Achaemenid) Empire, and the conflict within Greece
itself, between the republican institutions of Solon's Athens and the
Lycurgan slave-society at Sparta. The enemies of civilization within Eu-
ropean history, are modeled on the combined forms of the Persian Empire
and Sparta, including the Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine empires,
and the influence of Venice.
The conflict between Charlemagne and Byzantium, including Byzan-
tium's Scandinavian-centered barbarian instruments in northern Europe,
was both a continuation of the earlier wars between the traditions of
Solon and the Babylonian model, and of the presently continuing war
between St. Augustine's Christianity and the evil political, religious, and
legal traditions of the Roman Empire.
The form of Roman Empire confronted by Charlemagne and his suc-
cessors, is the "socialist" form of that Empire established by the reforms
of the Emperor Diocletian, as continued and consolidated by Diocletian's
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protege and successor, Constantine. The modem Soviet empire is mod-
eled upon the Diocletian "socialism" of Byzantium in all axiomatic fea-
tures.
Almost instinctively, most U.S. strategic evaluations leave these most
crucial historical facts out of account. The most conspicuous fault in
modem U.S. intelligence and related policy-shaping practices, is the
ignorant, short-sighted "pragmatism," which has emerged as the char-
acteristic American ideology. It other words, the essence of the American
ideology, is the foolish, blind assertion, that "we Americans are practical
people, who abhor any sort of ideology." We dumb Americans generally,
ignore or even deny that cultural legacies transmitted over many gen-
erations, even thousands of years, have an underlying influence on be-
havior of peoples which is more or less decisive in shaping the major
events of contemporary history. We foolishly insist, that our own notions
are merely reflections of contemporary "common sense." Since we are
blind to the degree our own behavior is governed by transmitted cultural
influences, we fail to recognize the fact that it is cultural influences
dominated by traditions as old as centuries or longer, which shape the
behaviors of peoples and nations generally. This pride in our ignorance
of such matters, renders Americans generally very poor historians and
worse strategists. Thus, it is our record of performance in the affairs of
the twentieth century, that the United States wins general wars, but
infallibly loses the peace which follows the wars.
In the conflict now menacing us, this flaw in our national character
is potentially a fatal one. Most emphatically, the important feature of
Soviet policy is not "Marxism," or some particular goal of a current Soviet
hierarchy; the most important feature of Soviet policy is the Russian
character, as the imperial drive was embedded in the Russian character
in the course of developments extended over approximately 1,000 years
of Russian history. These governing influences in the Soviet population's
character today, are centered around the East-West conflict we have
identified, and around that kind of "blood and soil" dogma embedded in
the Muscovite character, that racialism of the Muscovites which will not
let itself rest until the Great Russian race has ascended to that same
degree of rule over peoples which was attributed to the imperial Romans.
Up to the point that even Soviet victory in war would mean the virtual
end of the Muscovite race, the Soviet Empire will risk terrible war, if
war is the only means by which the remaining obstacle to Soviet imperial
rule, the United States, might be destroyed.
Any strategic assessment which fails to assimilate the imperialist im-
perative embedded in Muscovite culture, is a wrong strategic assessment.
Russian behavior must be measured by the yardsticks of Russian culture,
not the inappropriate yardsticks of Polish or any other branch of Western
culture. Russian racialist, religious hatred of the Polish people, is one of
the clearest symptoms of the Russian character on this account. "Purges"
in Soviet society, are not symptoms of a "crumbling Russian empire";
they are symptoms of Russian culture in its most self-confident and resolute
moods. To understand what the Soviet population accepts as a credible
definition of vital national interests, and to understand the natural Soviet
disposition to act according to such perception of self-interests, one must
understand the present, oligarchical form of Russian society historically,
culturally.
Any strategic assessment which omits those considerations, is intrins-
ically an incompetent assessment.
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The economic factor in Soviet Grand Strategy
The Soviet commitment to full-scale war mobilization at this time, is
based chiefly on a Soviet estimate that the capitalist world is in the
process of plunging into a "general breakdown-crisis." This means to
them, that a collapse of the U.S. dollar in a new monetary crisis, and
an ensuing deep economic depression, is the singular moment of oppor-
tunity for catching U.S. power at its weakest. It means also, that they
dare not wait, to afford the United States the opportunity to recover
from such a crisis. They expect that the period 1987-89 will find the
United States at its weakest moment. Therefore, they have timed their
war-mobilization to match that 1987-89 interval.
The Soviet government's strategic economic estimates, are known to
emphasize: 1) The spiraling rise in the ratio of indebtedness to income
throughout the capitalist sector; 2) The collapse of physical output-levels
throughout the developing sector, Western Europe, and the United States,
both a) in absolute quantities, and b) per-capita rates of output. The
1985-88 period is currently, the period during which the Soviet govern-
ment expects the collapse of the economies of the capitalist sector to
parallel the 1931-34 period of the 1930s Great Depression.
However, although the Soviet government is convinced that this eco-
nomic collapse is built into the economies of the United States and its
allies at this time, the government also recognizes and fears the potential
of the U.S. economy to recover under measures similar to those taken
under President Roosevelt during the 1939-43 period. Therefore, that
government is obliged to assume, that a U. S. monetary crisis, by dis-
crediting the U.S.A.'s present monetary and economic policies, will
remove those policies as obstacles to Roosevelt-echoing recovery mea-
sures.
By this logic, were Moscow to postpone its war mobilization to peak
at a 1995 date, for example, instead of 1988, 1995 might be a point at
which U.S. economic and military strength would be increasing, rather
than collapsing. So, Moscow's war plans are aimed to catch the United
States at its anticipated point of greatest military weakness and political
demoralization, and in the midst of the vacillation which must be ex-
pected to characterize the period of the 1988 presidential election-cam-
paign.
Documentation: Interview with Fidel Castro in Folha de Sdo Paulo,
June 2, 1985-see Appendix.
The religious factor
1988 is also the year of massive Soviet state celebration of the thousand-
year existence of the Russian Orthodox Church. During the period of
those celebrations, the presently rising religious fervor in the Russian
population will reach approximately its peak.
The Soviets learned from experience of the early phase of World War
II, that:
1) Never again must Russia enter a general war except in a state
of full-scale mobilization in depth, adequate to survive and win
such a war with losses deemed acceptable price of victory;
2) The majority of the Russian population will not mobilize to fight
a war unless that population is mobilized to fight in the name
of the Russian Orthodox Church.
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Thus, by Plan A criteria, as a gridding of Soviet literature and practice
indicates this to be the policy of the Soviet planners, the several-fold
significance of the year 1988 is:
1) Relative Soviet military superiority over the U.S.A. will not
only be at a peak, but Moscow will be situated to win a "first-
strike"-led war against the United States, on condition that the
U. S. has not adopted a "launch on warning" counterstrategy,
and that the United States lacks deployment of some significant
degree of ballistic missile defense.
2) The economy of the United States will be in the steepest rate
of decline, and the political demoralization within the Western
command at a relative maximum.
3) The Soviet population will be at a relative maximum degree of
religious fervor for "Holy War" against the United States.
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2.2 The History of the
Soviet Imperial Tradition
When nations have existed for a long and glorious time, they cannot
break with their past, whatever they do; they are influenced by it
at the very moment when they work to destroy it; in the midst of
the most glaring transformations they remain fundamentally in char-
acter and destiny such as their history has formed them. Even the
most daring and powerful revolution cannot abolish national tra-
ditions of long duration. Therefore, it is most important, not only
for the sake of intellectual curiosity but also for the good management
of international affairs, to know and understand these traditions.
Francois Guizot
The dominant ideology in the Soviet imperial bid for world domination
is certainly not Marxism, Leninism, nor any species of historical or
dialectical materialism. The ruling doctrine of Soviet imperial ambition
is rather an insane cult belief, which sees in the present Soviet Empire
the direct heir of the defunct Roman and Byzantine Empires, and thus
the modem representative of a tradition that goes back to Babylon and
beyond. This hideously irrational cult belief ascribes to Russian power
the apocalyptic mission of purging the world of the heretical contagion
of Western European Platonic humanism, best exemplified by the nation-
building of Charlemagne and by the fifteenth-century Golden Renais-
sance of Italy.
This cult doctrine, dating back to the decades between the fall of
Constantinople to the Turk in 1453 and Columbus's voyage to the New
World in 1492, is that of Moscow as the Third Rome-which is indis-
pensable for an understanding of Soviet Russian grand strategy in today's
world.
The Kremlin's messianic imperialism is founded on the idea that Mos-
cow will be the Third Rome, center of universal empire. The bearer of
the cult of the Third Rome has been not so much the Russian state or
the state security apparatus, although they have played their part. Moscow
the Third Rome is rather the hallmark of that evil priesthood for the
propagation of pagan cults and human degradation, known as the Russian
Orthodox Church. Today a resurgent Russian Orthodox Church, on the
eve of its thousandth anniversary, is proposing to harness the formidable
resources of the Soviet Empire, the greatest military power seen in world
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history, for the purpose of subjugating the world to the Third Rome (Map
21).
Thus, less than forty years after the cataclysm of the Nazi Master Race,
the Herrenvolk, humanity is once again threatened by an immensely
powerful clique of fanatical madmen-more powerful than the Nazis
could ever have dreamed of. In reviewing the origins of the Third Rome
in the conflict between Western-Augustinian and Slavic-Byzantine civ-
ilizations, we will be looking into the minds of the composite Hitler that
runs the Kremlin today, and will be sifting through the most primordial
cultural impulses that impel Marshal Ogarkov, General Secretary Gor-
bachov, Politburo member Aliyev, Patriarch Pimen, and the rest of the
Nomenklatura. For, it is from the cultural paradigm associated with the
Third Rome, that these gentlemen derive their criteria of judgment,
world outlook, even their most intimate sense of personal identity and
will.
Insight into Soviet affairs begins with the realization that we are in
fact dealing here with a different civilization with a cultural paradigm
all its own. The entire course of Russian history, including most em-
phatically the current "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," has been
profoundly influenced by the heritage of the Byzantine or East Roman
Empire. That Byzantine Empire, with its capital in Constantinople, per-
sisted for a full thousand years after the extinction of the Roman Empire
in the West. What is today referred to as the Byzantine Empire called
itself simply the Roman Empire, and in fact embodied an even more
refined system of genocidal evil than the one presided over by Augustus,
Tiberius, Caligula, and the other early emperors in the West. Even after
the fall of Byzantium, many of its imperial functions continued to be
exercised by the Venetian Republic, which lasted until the time of Na-
poleon.
The different cultural geometries of the Latin-Germanic West and the
Slavic-Byzantine East must be grasped despite the fact, that each of these
civilizations derives from the earlier Graeco-Roman classical civilization.
The decisive difference is that whereas in the Byzantine sphere, the
traditions of the decadent Roman Empire were taken over directly and
lived on in their full virulence, in the West we witness a new beginning
through the work of St. Augustine and his circle, who, basing themselves
on Plato, laid the basis for Charlemagne's founding of a new state that
would uplift humanity from the Dark Ages. Western civilization would
be appropriately called Augustinian civilization, since this great African
was its indispensable architect. On the Byzantine side, the founders
include the emperors Aurelian, Diocletian, and Constantine.
The East-West conflict of today is best elucidated by the fact that the
Slavic-Byzantine civilization, from at least the time of Charlemagne, has
seen its primary world-historical mission not in some positive achievement
of its own, but rather in the merciless destruction of the Western-Au-
gustinian paradigm. The unprecedented missile buildup of the Third
Rome in our own age presages the coming fulfillment of this task.
The dominant schools of Sovietology and Kremlinology, the ones
patronized by Averell Harriman, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, and
Zbigniew Brzezinski, are all bankrupt on precisely these crucial points.
The same dupes and traitors of academe who babble of the crumbling
Soviet Empire also are firmly agreed that the Soviet Union began in 1917
as a total transformation of the hitherto existing Russian society, the
"wooden Russia" of monasteries, troikas, and samovars, to which they
ascribe a highly positive value. In this way, the actual dynamic of Mus-
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The Byzantine
paradigm
covite imperialism is hopelessly obscured, and the practical outcome of
this faked analysis is support for old-fashioned, pre-communist Great
Russian nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church, precisely the
most dangerous imperialist elements in the Soviet ruling combination.
An example of such highly suspect incompetence is the recent study,
Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia, by Suzanne Massey. Pres-
ident Reagan, at the suggestion of the White House Palace guard, read
this book and met with its author on Sept. 28, 1984, just before his
meeting with the then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Massey's
view of Russian history is dominated by a series of foreign invasions,
from the Mongols in the thirteenth century to Napoleon at the beginning
of the nineteenth (and by extension, Hitler). The result is a paranoid
fear of outside aggression, which in turn impels Russian rulers to build
up an immense military apparatus, of the type seen today. Newspaper
accounts suggest that the President was struck by the vivid and romantic
descriptions of foreign invasions that are the high-points of the book.
Other Soviet experts remarked at the time that this sort of historiography
renders precious service to Moscow's public relations apologetics, but the
same is true of virtually all publications on the subject.
Among the earliest recorded inhabitants of what is today Russia were
the Scythians, of whom the Greek historian Herodotus assembled a profile
back in the fifth century B.C. The Scythians were in the habit of drinking
the blood of their enemies, flaying them, scalping them, and sometimes
sewing the scalps together to provide themselves with garments. Hero-
dotus notes also that the Scythians "never, by any chance, wash their
bodies with water." Most interesting is the xenophobia of the Scythians,
which lives on unaltered among the Russians unto this very day. "They
studiously avoid the use of foreign customs, not only therefore will they
not adopt those of each other, but least of all Greek usages, as the
example of Anacharsis, and afterwards of Scylas, sufficiently demon-
strated," writes Herodotus, referring to two prominent Scythians who
were murdered by their own people because they had adopted foreign
customs. (Herodotus, Cary translation, p. 262.)
The first Russian centers, like Kiev, were created along the Dnieper
River, which was a route of communication between the Byzantine Em-
pire and its mercenaries in Scandinavia, whence the warlike Normans
conducted their missions of conquest against the enemies of Byzantium.
The steppes and forests were populated by Finns, and later by the Slavs.
About A.D. 700, the Slavs came under the domination of a Viking
people known as the Varangians, as legend recounts. These Vikings called
the land Rus, and when one of them emerged as the uncontested ruler,
his name turned out to be Rurik. Etymological speculation has it that
Rus means simply "the Earth," and that the dynasty of the Ruriks or
Rurikids are legendary "earth kings." If this is so, Matushka Rus', Little
Mother Russia, would turn out to be nothing other than Mother Earth
herself (Map 22).
The central fact of Russian history is the decision made in 988 by
Prince Vladimir to convert from his previous pagan beliefs to the Or-
thodox Christianity purveyed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, himself
an appendage of the Byzantine Emperor. Vladimir's conversion came as
part of a package deal that also included his marriage to the Byzantine
princess Anna, the sister of the two co-emperors of Byzantium, Basil and
Constantine. With that, the Greek Orthodox faith, the church founded
by the "Isoapostolic" Emperor Constantine, became the official and oblig-
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atory state religion for all of Vladimir's subjects in the Kievan Rus. At
the same time, Vladimir became at least in theory the political satrap
of the Byzantine Empire.
Vladmir, whom the Orthodox today call a saint, had a harem of more
than 800 concubines, and is described by a German chronicle of the
period as a fornicator immensus et crudelis-perhaps something of a rapist.
Other chronicles relate that before chosing Orthodoxy, Vladimir carefully
examined Judaism (which had been recently embraced by his neighbors,
the Khazars), Islam, and Roman Catholicism (recently chosen by Poland
and Hungary). He is said to have turned down Mohammed because of
his belief that Russians need hard liquor, which that faith would have
precluded.
Rusi est vesel piti,
Bez nego ne mozhet biti,
he commented: "Russians enjoy drinking, without which they cannot
live" (Fitzroy McClean, Holy Russia).
From this time onwards, Russian development would be determined
by the Byzantine Imperial model. Today numerous incompetent Soviet-
ologists of the Kissinger school attribute features of the Russian regime,
like state control of the means of production, or totalitarianism, to the
recent, 1917 imposition of "Communism." In reality, both of these and
much more are a slavish copy of the Byzantine Imperial system as it
existed more than one and a half millenia ago.
The founders of this brand of communism were not Marx or Engels,
but Roman Emperors like Aurelian, Diocletian, and Constantine. In
particular Diocletian, who lived from A. D. 245-316, is in a strong position
to claim the title of founder of Communism in the East.
The Roman Empire did not collapse in A. D. 476. In reality, the entire
empire, East and West, went to pieces totally during the period between
A. D. 200 and 300. This was a period of chaos, anarchy, internal coups
d'etat and subversion, and external invasions by the barbarians, out of
which emerged a new imperial structure which borrowed heavily from
the practice of the Sassanian dynasty of Persia, of the Ptolemeic regime
in Egypt, and from other oriental despotisms. This new system was even
more sinister than the one that had prevailed from Augustus to the year
A. D. 200, and it was this new system that persisted over the thousand
year Reich of Byzantium, and continues, to shape Russian civilization
down to the present day.
Thus, if the Soviet Empire of our time is a totalitarian military au-
tocracy, the roots of this lie not in communism, but in Byzantium.
Totalitarianism
Diocletian's reforms created an oriental despotism of the most pervasive
type, in which all aspects of life were most minutely controlled by the
state. This was most evident in economic matters. The Codex Theo-
dosianus of Roman and Byzantine law documents the obligation of every
citizen to provide compulsory public service in the guild or corporation
in which his father served. This was a class society, in which class status
was inherited and enforced by administrative sanctions: No one was
allowed to change his station or way of making a living. At the same
time, the practice of each corporation or guild was rigidly fixed, also by
imperial decree, according to "ancient custom." The affairs of shipmasters,
breadmakers, charioteers, cattle and swine collectors, limeburners, wood
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transporters, and others were prescribed in adamant detail. This amounted
in practice to an outlawing of any form of technological innovation,
which would have interfered with the stability of the guilds and the value
of their property, which could not be tranferred or otherwise changed.
Diocletian imposed a crushing and complicated tax system, with pay-
ments in kind prescribed for commodities which the imperial state re-
quired. The tax burden was so heavy that vast areas of land became the
property of the state through tax default. Large parts of the population
became tax debtors to the state, and were forced to become serfs on the
public lands. Under Diocletian, free labor in agriculture virtually dis-
appeared in favor of hereditary serfdom, with the serfs being bound to
the land and owned by the imperial state-a situation very similar to
that in Russia in the seventeenth century, under the Romanov dynasty,
and not unlike the Soviet collective farm system today.
Diocletian was also responsible for the celebrated Edict on Maximum
Prices of A.D. 301, the most systematic attempt known in the ancient
world to impose state control on economic activity. The decree sets
maximum prices for a list of hundreds of commodities, including gold.
But it also prescribes maximum wages for artisans, lawyers, and other
trades and professions.
Most remarkable is the demagogic attack on capitalists, plutocrats,
and producers, with which this "Communist" Emperor justified his edict:
If, indeed, any self-restraint might check the excesses with which
limitless and furious avarice rages-avarice which with no thought
for mankind hastens to its own gain and increase, not by years or
months or days but by hours and even minutes-; or, if the general
welfare could endure undisturbed by the riotous license by which
it, in its misfortune, is from day to day most grievously injured,
there would perhaps be left some room for dissimulation and silence,
since human forebearance might alleviate the detestable cruelty of
a pitiable situation. Since, however, it is the sole desire of unres-
trained madness to have no thought for the common need and since
it is considered among the unscrupulous and immoderate almost the
creed of avarice, swelling and rising with fiery passions, to desist
from ravaging the wealth of all through necessity rather than its
own wish; and since those who extremes of need have brought to
an appreciation of their most unfortunate situation, can no longer
close their eyes to it, we-the protectors of the human race-
viewing the situation, have agreed that justice should intervene as
arbiter, so that the long-hoped-for solution which mankind itself
could not supply might, by the remedies of our foresight, be applied
to the betterment of all . . . for we think it far better that the stains
of intolerable depredation be removed from men's minds by the
feeling and decision of the same men whom, as they daily plunged
into more and more serious offenses and turned, in their blindness,
to crimes against the state, their grievous iniquity had charged with
the most cruel inhumanity, the enemies of individual and state... .
For who is so insensitive and so devoid of human feeling that he
cannot know, or rather, has not perceived, that in the commerce
carried on in the markets or involved in the daily life of the cities,
immoderate prices are so widespread that the uncurbed passion for
gain is lessened neither by abundant supplies nor by fruitful years;
so that without a doubt men who are busied in these affairs constantly
plan to control the very winds and weather from the movements of
the stars, and, evil as they are, they cannot endure the watering of
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the fertile fields by the rains from above which bring the hope of
future harvests, since they reckon it their own loss if abundance
comes through the moderation of the weather. And the men whose
aim it always is to profit even from the generosity of the gods, to
restrain general prosperity, and furthermore to use a poor year to
traffic in harvest losses and agents' services-men who, individually
abounding in great riches which could completely satisfy whole
nations, try to capture smaller fortunes and strive after ruinous
percentages-concern for humanity in general persuades us to set
a limit, our subjects, to the avarice of such men (Emperor Caesar
Gaius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus, Edictum de Maximis Pretiis,
in Tenney Frank, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome).
This document has more to do with the present Russian system than
The Communist Manifesto. Notable is also the death penalty that Dio-
cletian imposed on those who tried to circumvent his norms.
Totalitarianism was enforced by a massive growth in the imperial
bureaucracy, with a reorganization of the province structure and the
creation of a plethora of new bureaucratic posts and office staffs for total
top-down administration of all facets of life. At the top was the emperor,
or rather four co-emperors, two Augusti amd two subordinate Caesars
who would succeed them, flanked by Politburos like the Consistorium
and consilia sacra. Then there were hierarchies of iudices, duces, prae-
torian prefects, praeses, equites, and so on, all organized into a ranked
table called the Notitia dignitatum, which corresponds directly to the
Russian Nomenklatura used from the time of Peter the Great to the present
day.
Militarism
The announced purpose of all these reforms was imperial defense. In the
Edict Diocletian writes: "we, who by the gracious favor of the gods have
repressed the former tide of ravages of barbarian nations by destroying
them, must guard by the due defenses of justice a peace which was
established for eternity" (Ibid., p. 311). Diocletian nearly doubled the
number of legions, which went from 33 to 60, and built the military
highway known as the Strata Diocletiana, which went from Damascus
through Palmyra to Sura on the distant Euphrates. Taxation, adminis-
tration, and the compulsory unpaid services of subjects in economic affairs
all went for the imperial military machine.
Autocracy
Diocletian copied the Persian imperial model, where the emperor was a
god. An earlier emperor, Aurelian, had pioneered in this area, calling
himself "Deus Aurelianus, Imperator Deus et Dominus Aurelianus Au-
gustus." Diocletian, who came of humble background in the Dalmatian
coast of Illyria, today's Yugoslavia, became not just pontifex maximus,
or chief priest of the official state mystery cult religion, but a "son of
gods and creator of gods," with the title of Jovius, meaning Jupiter.
Diocletian was "a true autocrat, an emperor-god who wore the imperial
diadem. Oriental luxury and oriental ceremonial were introduced at his
court. His subjects, when granted an audience, had to fall on their knees
before they dared to lift their eyes to view their sovereign. Everything
concerning the emperor was considered sacred-his words, his court, his
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treasury; he himself was a sacred person" (A. A. Vasilyev, History of the
Byzantine Empire, p. 62). The court ceremony was called the Adoratio
of the emperor, who was always pictured equipped with a nimbus, or
halo, like a saint. Eunuchs were introduced at the court.
Diocletian spent most of his time in what is today Turkey, then called
Nicodemia, and only visited Rome once. He oriented the empire towards
the East, a process that would be furthered still more by his successor
Constantine, who set up his capital on the shores of the Bosporus at the
eastern limit of Europe.
Under this totalitarian system, all aspects of human activity-politics,
economics, religion, and thought-were regarded as departments of the
imperial state. The imperial state ran the economy for military purposes.
The patriarch was at the head of the imperial church, but the deified
emperor was its sacral leader, thus establishing the Byzantine idea of
caesaropapism, with all power in the autocratic emperor. The church
was a special, powerful department of the state bureaucracy.
This idea dominates Russia today, where the state religion merges
Russian Orthodox idolatry with the cult of Stalin. There has never been
a civilian or secular form of government in Russia. Lenin is taught to
school children as a good spirit who intervenes to help those who are in
difficulty, and almost all the Russian emperors, including Ivan the Terrible
and now Nicholas II, are numbered among the saints of the Russian
Orthodox Church.
In the Augustinian West we are accustomed to distinguish: 1) the
nation state per se, with its governing functions; 2) civil society, composed
of companies and corporations, trade unions, churches, associations,
clubs, and other social institutions; and 3) the individual in his or her
own private sphere. Slavic-Byzantine civilization, however, has always
dissolved all three of these levels into the state, which in turn is always
imbued with religious and cultist overtones. Any institutions in society
which are not part of the state must be crushed, and ideas produced
outside of the state bureaucracy are a threat to the state monopoly on
intellectual life. The individual does not exist, but is rather swallowed
up in the collective soul of the state or the "people." Any Russian who
offers you his personal opinion is a liar; no Russian is allowed to express
any such thing. This is "Communism," as founded by Diocletian.
Vladimir brought all this to Russia, and above all he brought the
Orthodox Church, the mystery cult religion of Byzantium. Orthodoxy
is a thinly disguised variant of oriental paganism, in which the Virgin
Mary (theotokos) retains the key characteristics of the Magna Mater,
Cybele, Isis, Shiva, and the other Great Mothers concocted by oligarch-
ical priesthoods over the millenia. For Orthodoxy, man is a worm who
has no hope of ever approaching God through faith and good works in
the real world, but only through mystical contemplation. Since mankind
cannot be raised to the level of divinity, divine mysteries must be brought
down to earth, especially through attempts to duplicate the Transfigu-
ration of Christ in one's own monkish cell. This is the tradition of the
hesychia, or inner calm and quietism. It later became the theology of the
monasteries of Mount Athos, the holy mountain, the Venetian-Byzantine
command center for the East over the last thousand years.
The Greek Orthodox Church joined by Vladimir of Kiev was not yet
formally separated from the Roman Catholic Pope in Rome, since the
definitive exchange of anathemas and excommunications between the
Pope and the Greek Patriarch would come somewhat later, in 1054. But
Orthodox theology had already repudiated the decisive theological and
political commitment of those Western European humanists who had
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Augustine and the
Filioque
fought for the survival of civilization in the West after the extinction of
the Roman Empire there.
In a word, Orthodoxy had already rejected the Filioque.
The Filioque is the centerpiece of St. Augustine's concept of the Holy
Trinity, and thus represents the concept upon which the whole of Western
civilization has been based. "The West" is not a geographic concept, but
rather indicates those areas in which the Filioque prevailed. "The East,"
by contrast, refers to those areas which rejected the Filioque out of fealty
to the Byzantine Emperor and to the Greek Orthodox Church.
St. Augustine developed his theology of the Filioque in his works De
Trinitate, Tractatus in Joannis Evangelium, and Contra Maximinum Ar-
ianum. In the second on these works, Augustine poses the question of
the procession of the Holy Spirit: "Some may ask whether the Holy Spirit
proceeds also from the Son." Augustine answers: "Why should we not
believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, since he is the
Spirit of the Son also" (Migne, Patrologia Latina, p. 1,888 ff.). This,
Augustine argues, is proven in Scripture when Christ breathed the Holy
Spirit on the disciples in the Pentecost. "What else did that breathing
signify except that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him?" "The Holy
Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son, and from the Son
to the creatures . . . but he proceeds at once from both." For Augustine,
the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son (or, expressed
in Latin, ex Patre Filioque procedit).
The theological point involves the question of whether God is present
in each and every concrete human individual as a divine spark, divine
quality, or participation to some measure in the divine. If the Holy Spirit
proceeds from Christ as well as from the Father, and since Christ breathed
that Holy Spirit on His Church, each human being has access to the
divine reason of the Holy Spirit as Logos. The Filioque provides the
exclusive basis for real human knowledge, and thus for efficient human
action on the order of nature and on the political world. It is the divine
quality of Man thus guaranteed, which allows him to supplement God's
initial act of creation with Man's own continuous creation during the
course of history.
The denial of the Filioque, by contrast, destroys the Trinity. According
to Augustine, the single difference between the Father and the Son is
that the Father begets the Son, whereas the Son is begotten by the
Father. But all their other qualities are exactly the same. If the Son is
deprived of the full procession of the Holy Spirit/Logos, he is no longer
God at the same level as the Father, but some inferior being. Thus,
without the Filioque, the Trinity is destroyed in favor of some version
of the Arian heresy, which boils down to the attempt to deny the full
divinity of Christ.
The Greek view of the matter is seen in these excerpts from the De
Fide Orthodoxa of the Eastern theologian and church father John Da-
mascene: "[We believe] in one Father, the principle and cause of every-
thing ... Father of only one by nature, his Only-Begotten Son ... and
Projector of the most Holy Spirit.... The Holy Spirit proceeds from
the Father. For this is the teaching of Holy Scripture... We also believe
in the Holy Spirit ... who proceeds from the Father and rests in the
Son ... proceeding from the Father and communicated through the
Son.... The begetting of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit
are simultaneous.... Therefore, all that the Son and the Spirit have
is from the Father, including their very existence. Unless the Father
exists, neither the Son nor the Spirit exists. And unless the Father
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possesses a specific quality, neither the Son nor Spirit can possess it... .
We do not speak of the Son as a cause. We speak of the Holy Spirit as
from the Father and call him the spirit of the Father. And we do not
speak of the Spirit as from the Son, although we call him the Spirit of
the Son" (Migne, Patrologia Graeca, pp. 94, 805 ff. ).
For present purposes, the political significance of the Filioque must be
considered more than its strictly theological impact. It should be clear
that under the Byzantine system, all power and reason had to proceed
from the divine emperor only, and that these qualities had to be denied
to the human individual in the name of order and stability of the imperial
system. The denial of divine qualities to the mass of humanity has made
the rejection of the Filioque the common platform of all oligarchical forces
coming into contact with Christianity in any way, and not just of the
Byzantine or Soviet Empires.
Denial of the Filioque leads to the doctrine that Stalin is always right
(the Logos proceeding only from the Father), and that all individuals
must be directed in all their actions by an omniscient state planning
authority like the Gosplan or the Oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible. The
alternative is the Western system, seen in the Prussian Auftragsprinzip or
assignment principle, in which the individual is given a large area of
initiative to solve problems that emerge in the course of carrying out
overall policies with which the individual politically agrees.
Thus, the Filioque creates the concept of the individual, who in turn
participates in both freedom and necessity, and must accept responsibility
for both. This idea of the exercise of individual reason has always excited
the hatred of Byzantium and its successors. It is the key to the fight
between Western freedom and Soviet totalitarianism today.
As a result of Augustine's colossal authority as the pre-eminent Church
Father of the Latin West, the Filioque concept was assimilated by nu-
merous writers, including Boethius, Fulgentius, and many others. In these
areas, this concept was so pervasive as to be virtually universal.
In 589 at the Spanish church council of Seville, which was presided
over by Leander, the elder brother of Isidore of Seville, the Visigoths
under King Reccared renounced Arianism and accepted Augustinian
Roman Catholicism. In his first speech to the council, King Reccared
declared that "the Holy Spirit also should be confessed by us and taught
to proceed from the Father and the Son." At Toledo, the Filioque was
inserted into the Credo or creed of the Western Church, adding the
word "Filioque" to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed which had pre-
vailed previously.
The full political importance of the Filioque and of its insertion into
the creed became evident during the time of Charlemagne. Charlemagne
King of the Franks and his councilors, above all Alcuin, strove to create
a progressive humanist state out of the wreckage of Roman collapse and
barbarian invasions. In so doing, they used the writings of Augustine as
manuals of statecraft and theology. Charlemagne inevitably came into
violent conflict with the Byzantine Empire, a conflict that increased
when Charlemagne was crowned emperor by Pope Leo III, thereby break-
ing the Byzantine monopoly on a legitimate state form anywhere in
Christendom.
The hallmark of Carolingian theology is the Filioque. Alcuin, who was
of English origin, wrote of "the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father
and the Son in an ineffable manner." In 802 Alcuin wrote a treatise
entitled De Fide sanctae et individuae Trinitatis, a work grounded totally
in Augustine. The Filioque was the centerpiece of the Libri Carolini, a
summa theologica of the Charlemagne regime, which remarks on the
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subject that "the whole Catholic Church believes that he [the Holy
Spirit] proceeds from the Father and the Son." The Filioque was included
in the creed as it was intoned and sung in the chapel of the Emperor at
Aachen.
The Filioque had become the battle cry and political slogan in the fight
for civilization against Byzantine decadence and oligarchism. The By-
zantine attempt to refute and destroy the Filioque was led by the sinister
Photius, the Patriarch of Constantinople from 858 to 867 and then again
from 878 to 886, who also, and not by coincidence, brought Orthodoxy
to the Bulgarians, and thus prepared for its reception in Russia. Photius
was determined to fight a doctrine that posed such a potentially lethal
threat to the Byzantine system, and issued an Encyclical full of violent
attacks on the Filioque as a doctrine, as an addition to the creed, and
on those who supported these.
The substance of Photius' argument is that if the Holy Spirit proceeds
from both Father and Son, this introduces two causes into the Trinity,
whereas there is room for only one cause. Photius' argument never gets
beyond the level of formal-logical trickery. All the more violently does
he anathematize his Carolingian opponents: "Where have you learned
this fact which you assert? In what Gospel have you found this word?
To what Council belongs such blasphemy? Who will not stop his ears
at this blasphemy? It stands in battle, as it were, against the Gospels."
(Patrologia Graeca 102, 728-29, nos. 15 and 16)
Photius repeated these arguments in a letter written to the Patriarch
of Aquilea, which dates from 883 or 884. He later developed them at
greater length in a work called the Mystagogia, in which he counterat-
tacked Ratramnus of Corbie and other Carolingian writers who had
answered his original Encyclical. The Council of Worms, convening in
868, had reaffirmed the Filioque and had issued a warning to the Greeks.
Among the participants was Bishop Anno. Photius had also held his own
council in 879-880, at which the papal legates had sold out the Filioque.
In the Mystagogia Photius brings forward a new parade of arguments
on the procession of the Holy Spirit, some of which are most revealing:
"Just as the Son is born of the Father and lives unchangeable in himself,
preserving his dignity of Son, so also the Most Holy Spirit proceeds from
the Father and lives unchangeable in himself, preserving his faculty of
proceeding from the Father. Thus, the Spirit, coming forth from the
uncaused Father . . . [retains] the eternal character of his procession. So
also the Son, who is born of the uncaused Father, would not know how
to be the origin of any birth or any procession. . . . He would not know
how to distort his privilege of being Son by introducing some new relation"
(Patrologia Graeca 102, 324 and 326). Here the oligarchic intent of
degrading the Son and, through Him, all of humanity, is evident.
At the same time Photius tries to defend the Byzantine Fiihrerprinzip
in the realm of theology. He argues in effect, that if anyone other than
Stalin is allowed the faculty of initiative, then this undermines Stalin's
prerogatives. He also asserts that procession from the Son can be of no
benefit: "If the procession of the Spirit from the Father is perfect, and
it is, because it is a perfect God who proceeds from a perfect God, what
then does procession from the Son add? If it adds something, it is necessary
to state what it adds. . . . This theory is absolutely of no usefulness,
neither for the Son, nor for anyone . . . there is no way he can gain
from it." As for Augustine's authority, Photius suggests that the works
quoted by the Carolingians may be forgeries.
With the fight against the Carolingian heritage led by Photius, East
became East, and West West. The tragedy of Russia was then Vladimir's
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988 choice of the East, which ought to be lamented as a calamity rather
than celebrated, as the Soviet Empire is now preparing to do.
The Mongol domination:
The Golden Age of the Russian Orthodox Church
During the 20 years leading up to 1240, the Kiev Rus came under the
increasing pressure of the Mongols, who until 1223 were under the
leadership of Genghis Khan (the "ruler of the world"). The Mongols
were at this time a tool of Venice. The Venetian political intelligence
services, without equal anywhere in the world, provided the Mongol
leadership with the most precise information concerning the troop and
other dispositions of the Mongols' intended victims. This secret intel-
ligence advantage of the Mongols was the decisive component in the
development of their reputation for military prowess and invincibility as
they moved to attack Europe during the first half of the 1200s. The first
large-scale clash between the Prince of Kiev and the Mongols occurred
at the River Kalka, near the Sea of Azov, in 1223, and resulted in a
crushing victory for the Tartars. In 1240, the Mongols razed Kiev to the
ground and slaughtered its inhabitants. For the next century and a half,
most of Russia was dominated by a Tartar Empire called the Golden
Horde, which had its capital near the later city of Stalingrad (Volgograd).
Mongol rule was based on the exacting of a very onerous tribute in
the form of cash payments to the Mongol Khan. Attempts at rebellion
were crushed with great bloodshed, but otherwise the Mongols controlled
Russian affairs by making the various Russian princes their satraps, and
also by making use of the institutional services of the Russian Orthodox
Church, for which the Mongol domination, the age of Appanage Rus',
was truly a Golden Age of growth and power. The church entered into
a type of symbiosis with the Mongol Khanate, enjoying special powers
and privileges. The top prelate of the Orthodox church enjoyed a status
something like that of the Greek Patriarch under the Ottoman Empire,
in which he served as the Ethnark of the Christians. In addition, the
Mongols had great respect for the Russian prelates, whom they considered
to be the best shamans and medicine men available anywhere in their
vast domains.
The era of Mongol domination saw the unprecedented growth of Or-
thodox hesychast monasticism in the Russian lands. Hesychasm is the
form of mystical irrationalism that was developed during the sixth century
A. D. by St. John of the Ladder at the Monastery of St. Catherine of
the Sinai, in what is today Egypt. This monastery was founded under
the Byzantine imperial regime of Emperor Justinian and his Empress
Theodora. Hesychasm was based on oriental models, especially Daoism
and Zen Buddhism. Hesychia means inner calm or quiet, and was sought
by the monks through mystical contemplation and exercises which were
supposed to replicate for the individual the Transfiguration of Christ.
The hesychast uses various devices to immerse himself in the "divine
darkness," in the "cloud of unknowing" and to talk to God in an ecstatic
trance. One such device is the so-called "Jesus prayer," in which the
name of Jesus is attached to every breath that the monk takes. Another
is literally the contemplation of the navel, since it was here that the
union with God was thought to take place. Barlaam of Calabria, a Greek
linked to the Dante-Petrarch network, ridiculed the Eastern monks as
omphaloscopoi because of this habit of gazing at their belly buttons.
By the time of the Mongol domination of Russia, hesychasm had
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become the very special stock in trade of the pan-orthodox monastery
of Mt. Athos the Holy Mountain in Greece, where the leading hesychast
of the period was St. Gregory Palamas (1296-1359), who guided the
hesychast party to total victory in a factional altercation in the Byzantine
state and church bureaucracy.
Thus it came about that the monasteries founded in Russia during the
Mongol domination were based most explicitly on the doctrine of By-
zantine hesychasm. These monasteries were controlled in their operations
by Mt. Athos, and generally served the purposes of the Venetian political
intelligence agencies. Especially the fourteenth century, the heyday of
monastery foundation, was marked by a great outburst of hesychasm in
Russia.
One center of this monastic revival was Zagorsk, where in 1337 a
Muscovite nobleman turned priest, St. Sergius of Radonezh, founded the
celebrated monastery of the Holy Trinity, which became the principal
home base for further projects in monastery foundation in a vast area
through the course of the fourteenth century. During the hundred years
after the creation of the Holy Trinity in Zagorsk, about 150 monasteries
were founded, reaching as far north as the Solovetskii Monastery on an
island in the White Sea. St. Sergius became known as the "Builder of
Russia."
These monasteries became the center of elaboration of everything that
can be lumped under the heading of "Russian culture." They developed
the strenuous six-hour liturgy of the Russian church, its hagiographies
of the lives of saints, its school of Byzantine icon painting, its charac-
teristic music, and the like. All of these were founded on the basic world
outlook of the unwashed, mystical, apocalyptic monks, which saw in
reason and rationality a form of materialism, or the surrender to the
things of this world, and thus sin and depravity. Irrationality was equated
by the monks with piety, and this they were determined to cultivate,
using their hesychast apparatus as a prime asset.
The attitude of the Russian Orthodox to the Mongols is perhaps best
shown by the famous Alexander Nevsky, Prince of Novgorod, who sub-
mitted to the Tartar yoke without ever having been formally militarily
defeated. Alexander paid his tribute and urged his fellow princes to do
so. But although Alexander Nevsky was obedient to the Mongols, he
waged pitiless war against the Western powers, including Swedes, Teu-
tonic Knights, and Lithuanians. Thanks to the public relations apparatus
of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexander Nevsky became a Russian
national hero of the Mongol era, celebrated also because he kept out the
Roman Catholic powers who would have harmed Orthodoxy. Alexander
duly became a saint of the Russian church. In 1942, to celebrate the
seven hundredth anniversary of Alexander's victories, Stalin instituted
a Soviet military decoration named in his honor.
Moscow was first fortified in 1156, at a time when Novgorod was
already a large trading center and Kiev a European city of the first rank.
Moscow began its ascendancy when the Russian church selected the
Princes of Moscow as its chosen instruments. In the early fourteenth
century the Metropolitan of Russia was nominally based in Kiev and was
in fact something of a vagabond. In 1326 the Metropolitan chose Moscow
as his official residence, and advised the Moscow prince that if he were
to build a church and dedicated it to the Virgin, and bury the Metropolitan
there upon his death, Moscow would be magnified beyond all other
Russian cities, and the future Metropolitans would help the Muscovite
princes to defeat their foes. Shortly thereafter, in 1339, we pick up the
first notes of the Imperial theme in Moscow, with a scribe comparing
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the prince of Moscow with the Byzantine Emperors Constantine, Justi-
nian, and Manuel Comnenus. By this time the Grand Prince and the
Metropolitan of Moscow were adding "Of all Rus'," or "Of all the Russias"
to their titles.
But none of Moscow's new pretensions would have been possible with-
out the permission of the Mongol overlords. In the year 1328 Ivan Kalita,
or Ivan the Moneybag, was recognized by the Tartar Khan as the Grand
Prince of Muscovy. The moneybag was an allusion to the special role of
the Prince of Moscow as the principal tax collecting agent for the Mongol
Khan. Collecting tribute for the Tartars from the other Russian princes
was combined with a role of policing them in case of any revolts against
the Tartars, which the Muscovites often joined in putting down.
Thus, out of the Mongol Dark Age there emerged an immensely
stronger Russian Orthodox Church, with the Grand Prince of Moscow
representing the political-military concretization of that Orthodox power.
Later Moscow was to play a leading role in the Venetian-controlled
process of removing the Tartar yoke. The Venetians, who had helped
to create the vast Mongol Empire, now determined to collapse it. The
overthrow of the Mongols coincided with the final, decisive war between
Venice and Genoa, the two greatest world powers of the time, which
was the War of Chioggia, which reached its climax in the Genoese siege
of the Venetian lagoon in 1379 and 1380. The year 1380 saw the first
signal victory of Moscow over the Tartars at the battle of Kulikovo field
on the Don. Muscovite military preparations had been aided this time
by St. Sergius, and the Muscovite commander, Grand Prince Dmitrii,
won a decisive victory and the honorific title of "Donskoi." Interestingly
enough, a Genoese detachment fought on the side of the Mongols against
the Muscovites at Kulikovo field.
The emergence of the full-fledged doctrine of Moscow the Third Rome
began during the middle of the fifteenth century. Everything once again
revolved around the Filioque, this time as the centerpiece of efforts of
humanists from the entire world to defeat the growing power of the
Ottoman Empire, better called the Ottoman dynasty of the Byzantine
Empire, whose tradition it continued. These humanists also sought to
defeat Venice, which was using the Turks in a geopolitical attack on the
Italian Renaissance. These were the issues that dominated the Ecumenical
Council that convened in Florence in 1439.
The Council of Florence:
Russia rejects the Renaissance
The Council of Florence was the supreme moment of the Italian Golden
Renaissance, uniting one of the most distinguished gatherings of hu-
manists the world has ever seen. Their project was to transform the course
of history, exporting the Golden Renaissance to all points of the compass,
and dealing a fatal blow to oligarchical forces in East and West. The
Council of Florence was based on a principled ecumenicism: The Eastern
and Western churches were to be united on the basis of the acceptance
of the Filioque by all participants. This would provide the platform for a
general political alliance of Christendom against the Turks. In particular,
the Medici dirigistic system of economic development was to be intro-
duced everywhere in a crash program to stem the Ottoman advance. At
the time, the final Turkish assault on Constantinople was imminent.
Defeating the Turks would defeat the Venetians, and open the door to
the general economic and cultural uplifting of humanity.
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Grand Prince Dmitrii won the title "Donskoi" after
leading the Moscovites to victory over the Tartars
in the 1380 battle of Kulikovo field on the Don.
This project was received with more violent rejection in Moscow than
in any other place in the world, and Moscow glories in this rejection to
this day, founding upon its benighted backwardness the patent of its
imperial ambition.
The Council of Florence was attended by the Byzantine Emperor, John
VIII Paleologus, by the Patriarch of Constantinople Joseph II, accom-
panied by some two dozen archbishops and metropolitans from the East,
including Bessarion of Nicaea, later a Roman cardinal, and the philos-
opher Gemisthos Plethon. The proceedings in Florence were sponsored
by Cosimo de' Medici, and attended by Pope Eugenius IV. Cardinal
Nicolaus Cusanus was involved in the preparations on the Latin side, as
was Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the future humanist Pope Pius II. In-
cluded in the Orthodox delgation was the Metropolitan of Moscow,
Isidore, who was a Greek by birth. Isidore developed during the theo-
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logical and doctrinal debates of the council into a strong and active
supporter of the Union of the churches.
The Grand Prince of Moscow in those years was Vasili II, called the
Dark or the Blind, since his eyes had been gouged out by some of his
relatives in the course of a power struggle. At the time that Isidore set
out for the Council of Florence, Vasili was young and ignorant, and very
much a creature of the Orthodox priesthood. The Orthodox were opposed
to the idea of an eighth ecumenical council, since they contended that
the seventh council had given them the true faith, signed, sealed, and
delivered. Vasili grudgingly granted his permission for Isidore to go to
the council, but bid him farewell with a threat: "You are going to the
Eighth Council, which should never take place according to the rules
of the holy fathers; when you return from it, bring us back our ancient
Orthodoxy which we have received from our ancestor Vladimir . . . bring
us nothing new and strange, for whatever you will bring to us that is
new will displease us." This is the version given by the Tale of Isidore's
Council, a chronicle of these events composed after the fact by the priest
Simeon, who opposed the Church Union.
In Florence, the prelates of East and West endorsed the project of
Union. The Patriarch was reconciled to the cause of unity and died a
short time after, and his tomb can be seen today in the Church of Santa
Maria Novella. But a part of the Eastern delegation opposed the Union.
Among them was Mark, Metropolitan of Ephesus, and Abraham, Bishop
of Suzdal', in Russia.
The Decree of Union, Laetentur Caeli (Let the Heavens Rejoice), was
issued on July 6, 1439. This Decree states:
In the name therefore of the Holy Trinity, of the Father and of
the Son and of the Holy Spirit, with the approval of this holy
Council of Florence, in order that this truth of the faith be believed,
received, and professed by all Christians, we define that the Holy
Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, and that the Holy
Spirit has its essence and its being at the same time from the Father
and the Son, and proceeds from each as from one cause and single
source.
We declare that that which is said by the holy doctors and fathers,
namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the
Son, means to make known that the Son also, just like the Father,
is according to the Greek expression a cause, and according to the
Latin expression a principle, of the existence of the Holy Spirit.
And because all things which are of the Father have been given
by the Father to his only begotten Son in engendering him, except
for being the Father, the Son receives eternally from the Father, by
whom he is eternally engendered, this: that the Holy Spirit proceeds
from the Son.
We define additionally the explanation given by these words 'and
from the Son' [Filioquej to be for the purpose of declaring the truth,
and to have been added legitimately and reasonably to the symbol
by what was then urgent necessity.
Moscow was at this time a village of log huts huddled together on a
vast plain. Isidore returned there on March 19, 1441, wearing the red
hat of a cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, and carrying a Latin
cross before him. When he held mass at the cathedral, he replaced the
declaration of fealty to the Greek Patriarch with the name of the Roman
pontiff. After the service, in the words of the Second Sophia Chronicle,
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"Isidore ordered the proclamation of the decisions of this apostate eighth
council . . . that is, of the sugar-coated falsities of the Latins; all this in
order to remove Christendom from the Divine Revelation." This included
the Filioque, as well as the use of unleavened bread in the mass, which
the Greeks taught was the Apollinarian heresy, the denial of the human
nature of Christ. Upon hearing all this, the chronicle's relate, Grand
Prince Vasili, a true defender of the Orthodox faith, saw that the "wolf-
like" Isidore was a heretic, refused to accept a benediction from him,
and soon after that decreed the ouster of Isidore from the Metropolitan
See of Moscow. Isidore was then arrested and jailed in the Chudov
monastery, awaiting trial. This hostile reception for Isidore had of course
been prepared in advance, most probably in Venice, where the Russian
delegation had passed on its way home. Here certain key members of
that delegation went into open revolt against Isidore and his support for
the Union of the Churches. Isidore was thus lucky to get out of Moscow
alive. Isidore was in Constantinople fighting the Turks when the city
fell, but escaped and died in Rome.
But Vasili the Blind had been well briefed by his Orthodox controllers,
the tools of Mount Athos and of Venice. His vicious, spiteful repudiation
of the Decree of Union guaranteed the continued degradation of the
Russian population as a mass of pathetic heathens, thralls of the Orthodox
priesthood. The civilization of the Italian Renaissance, the luminous
Quatrocento Florentine world of Cusanus, Brunelleschi and Leonardo,
never reached Moscow.
Venice had won an important battle in its war against the Renaissance,
and the Russians are paying for it to this day. Such rabid rejection of
the most advanced form of civilization yet attained anywhere in the world
is indicative of the wellsprings of blind chauvinism and xenophobia that
lurk in the shadowy corners of the Russian soul.
Since all the other powers had accepted the Council of Florence, it
became the opinion of the Orthodox true believers that Russia had
emerged as the only land of the true faith, the only truly Christian country
in the world.
The chronicles of the period reflect on the one hand the idea that the
Paleologue Byzantine Emperor had become an apostate, and on the other
the inchoate notion that an imperial mission for Moscow may now be
looming on the horizon. One chronicler adresses the Paleologue Emperor:
"0 great sovereign Emperor; why did you go to them? What were you
thinking of? What have you done? You have exchanged light for darkness;
instead of the Divine Law you have received the Latin faith; instead of
truth and righteousness, you have loved flattery and falsity. Formerly you
were the agent of piety, now you are the sower of evil seeds; formerly
you were clothed by the light of the Heavenly spirit, now you are clothed
in the darkness of unbelief' (From Selections from the Holy Writings against
the Latins and the tale about the composition of the Eighth Latin council).
The first notes of the Moscow Imperial Theme are also in these Russian
chronicles of the Council of Florence. Here Vasili the Blind, although
strictly speaking no more than a grand prince or grand duke, is referred
to as "the white Tsar of All Russia." Vasili is the "New Constantine,"
the "great, Sovereign, God-crowned Russian Tsar."
In his chronicle of these events, the Orthodox monk Simeon reflected
above all the defamation of Florence and the self-righteous exultation
touched off among the Orthodox unwashed of the Russian monasteries
because of the actions of Vasili II. He concludes his Tale of Isidore's
Council with the following:
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Moscow the Third
Rome
Rejoice oh pious Grand Prince Vasili, for you have confirmed the
Russian land in faith; truly you have placed on your head the crown
of holy baptism.
Rejoice, Orthodox Prince Vasili, for you have confirmed all your
priests; they who were naked, you have confirmed....
Rejoice, Orthodox Prince Vasili, you have stifled the Latin heresy
and would not let it grow amongst Orthodox Christians... .
Rejoice, Orthodox Prince Vasili, the confirmer of Orthodoxy and
of all the Russian lands . . . the joy and the happiness of the Divine
Church and of all Orthodox Christians... .
Rejoice, Orthodox Grand Prince Vasili Vasilievich, beautified by
the crown of the Orthodox Greek faith, and with you rejoice all
the Orthodox princes of the Russian land... .
Rejoice, Prince Vasili, for you are renowned in all the Western
lands and in Rome itself; you have glorified the Orthodox faith and
the whole land of Russia (In Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People,
New Haven, 1961, p. 37).
In 1448, Vasili II ordered all of the bishops in his realm to elect a
new metropolitan to replace Isidore. With that, the Russian Orthodox
Church came into being as an autocephalous church under its own
metropolitan, quite indepedent of the wishes of the Greek Patriarch in
Constantinople. That Patriarch was considered by the Russians to he in
the grip of the devil, for he was still bound by the Florence Decree of
Union his predecessor had signed, although he refused to promulgate the
Union in his church of Hagia Sophia.
Then, on May 29, 1453, the Turks entered Constantinople, killed
the Emperor, sacked the city, occupied the Hagia Sophia, and took the
Greek Patriarch prisoner. The end of the Eastern Roman Empire at the
hands of the murderous Ottomans gave rise to a wave of general con-
sternation and terror in Europe, but this consternation certainly was not
shared by the Russians. Instead, they regarded the destruction of Tsargrad,
the old imperial city, with Schadenfreude and self-righteous complacency.
Such, they felt, were the fruits of subjugating oneself to the Roman
heretics: the destruction of the Eastern Empire was in the Russian view
the vengeance of God against those who had betrayed his true faith
through their compacts with the Western apostates. The Turks were
merely the instruments of a justly merited and inevitable divine retri-
bution. Russia, they concluded, had been confirmed in its status as sole
homeland of the true faith.
Centuries before, at the Council of Chalcedon, Constantinople had
been declared the New Rome or Second Rome. From the point of view
of imperial legitimacy, that Second Rome had now ceased to exist, just
as the original Rome had in A.D. 476. What took place at this point,
according to the messianic theoreticians of Muscovite imperialism, is a
process of translatio imperii, or transfer of the seat of empire, and thus by
definition of the capital of the world, since the empire in theory at least
embraces all lands of the planet.
In 1472, Ivan III, the son of the Orthodox champion Vasili the Blind,
arranged to marry Sophia (or Zoe) Paleologue, the niece of the last
Emperor of Byzantium. This marriage was set up with the help of the
Venetian Pope Paul II, who had cared for Sophia as his ward for over
ten years. Members of Sophia's entourage came to Moscow with letters
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Ivan III, the first to take the title of Russian Caesar
(Tsar), inaugurated Byzantine imperial rule based
out of Russia.
from the Venetian Signoria which certified Sophia as the true heiress to
the Byzantine throne (a matter about which there was some doubt), and
specified that the man who married her would in effect become the
Byzantine Emperor. The dynastic succession that underpinned the Third
Rome was thus of Venetian manufacture, and Venetian influence in
Moscow increased still further through the large number of Venetians
who came to Russia in Sophia's retinue. Grand Prince Ivan began to call
himself Tsar (Caesar) or Emperor, and adopted the double-headed eagle
of Byzantium as the symbol of the Russian monarchy. Ivan also began
to call himself autocrator (samoderzhets), the precise Byzantine term for
one-man imperial rule.
With so much Venetian encouragement, the imperial theme now
became the ruling obsession of the political theoreticians and mytho-
graphs in the Moscow monasteries. A legend was dusted off to the effect
that the insignia of empire that had once belonged to Nebuchadnezzar
of Babylon had been taken to Byzantium and thence to Kiev, with their
magical powers now devolving upon Moscow. In the closing years of the
fifteenth century we find the fanciful pseudo-history "The Legend of the
Princes of Vladimir," (Skazaniye o Knyazyakh Vladimirskikh) which invents
a hitherto unknown brother of the Roman Emperor Augustus, called
Prus. This fantastic Prus, says the chronicle, had been sent by his brother
the emperor to the banks of the Vistula to introduce imperial order into
eastern Europe. Prus thus became the founder of Prussia. Fourteen gen-
erations later, the Slavs invited a descendant of Prus to become their
ruler, and this turns out to have been none other than the legendary
Rurik, the alleged founder of the Kiev dynasty of which St. Vladimir
was a representative. The message here is clear enough: The Tsars of
Moscow are genealogically and dynastically the legitimate heirs of the
original Roman emperors. Now only an historical or eschatological doc-
trine was needed for the translatio imperii to be consummated.
The model for this new doctrine was provided by a certain Dmitri
Gerasimov, who in 1492 composed a work called "The Legend of the
White Cowl." In the course of this story a character representing the
old Roman Pope Sylvester makes the following prophecy: "Ancient Rome
fell from glory and the Christian faith through pride and willfulness: In
the new Rome, which is Constantine's city, the Christian faith similarly
is perishing through the oppression of the sons of Hagar. But in the Third
Rome, which stands in the land of Russia, the grace of the Holy Ghost
has shone forth; and know, then, that all Christian men in the end will
enter into the Russian kingdom, for Orthodoxy's sake."
"The Legend of the White Cowl" brought Rome to Russia, but not
specifically to Moscow, for indeed Gerasimov was thinking of Novgorod
as the new world center. Moscow the Third Rome required a more specific
investiture.
Not surprisingly, this was provided by a monk: by Filofei of Pskov,
whose name is sometimes transliterated as Philotheus or Philotheos. Pskov
was a commercial republic, a smaller sister of Novgorod. Filofei lived in
the monastery of St. Eleazar in the years after 1510, when Grand Duke
Vasili III of Moscow had added Pskov to his domains. Of Filofei it is
known that he wrote five letters to contemporaries, especially to gov-
ernment officials and to rulers. The most interesting of these letters are
one to a certain Moscow government official resident in Pskov, one
addressed to Vasili III, and one to the latter's son, Ivan IV (later "The
Terrible").
The content of Filofei's letters is the systematic exhortation of the
rulers of Moscow to implement the God-given status of their city as the
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Third Rome. In his letter to the official, whose name was M. G. Misjur'-
Munexin, Filofei notes that some 90 years have gone by since the de-
struction of Byzantium, and that empire has not been restored. The
Greeks, writes Filofei, "betrayed the Greek Orthodox faith to the Latins."
The Latins are heresiarchs, and Filofei recalls that the crucifixion of
Christ was a joint atrocity of the Jews and the (west) Romans. Despite
this, the Roman Empire is eternal, because Our Lord was born and
registered under Roman rule.
Filofei then goes on: "I would like to say a few more words about the
existing orthodox empire of our most illustrious and most high ruler. He
is, in the entire world, the only tsar of the Christians, the ruler of the
holy, divine throne of the Holy, Ecumenical, and Apostolic Church,
which exists, instead of the Roman and Constantinople Church, in the
city of Moscow which God has saved, as the church of the holy and
famous Dormition of the most pure Mother of God. This church alone
shines on the entire globe brighter than the sun. For know, you lover
of Christ and lover of God: All Christian empires have ceased and have
come together in the One Empire of our Ruler, according to the prophetic
books: that is the Russian Empire [roseiskoe tsarstvo]. For two Romes have
fallen, but the third one stands, and a fourth there shall not be" (adapted
from texts in Hildegard Schaeder, Moskau Das Dritte Rom, Darmstadt
1957, after texts in V. Malinin, Starets Eleazarova monastyrya Filofei i ego
poslaniya, Kiev, 1901). This prophecy is accompanied by suitably apoc-
alyptic imagery borrowed from the Revelation of St. John the Divine.
In his later and most celebrated letter to the Grand Prince Vasili III,
Filofei gives the classic, definitive exposition of the cult doctrine of
Moscow The Third Rome:
I write to you, the Most bright and most highly-throning Sov-
ereign, Grand Prince, orthodox Christian Tsar and lord of all, rein-
holder of the Holy ecumenical and Apostolic Church of God of the
Most Holy Virgin . . . which is shining gloriously instead of the
Roman or Constantinopolitan [one]. For the Old Rome fell because
of its church's lack of faith, the Apollinarian heresy; and of the
second Rome, the city of Constantine, the pagans broke down the
doors of the churches with their axes. And now there is the Holy
synodal Apostolic church of the reigning third Rome, of your tsar-
dom, which shines like the sun in its orthodox Christian faith, pious
tsar, as all empires [tsardoms] of the orthodox Christian faith have
gathered into your single empire ... you are the only tsar for the
Christians in the whole world.
Do not break, o Tsar, the commandments laid by your ancestors,
the Great Constantine and the blessed Vladimir, and the God-
chosen Iaroslav, and the other blessed saints, of which root you
are. . . .
Listen and attend, pious Tsar, that all Christian empires are
gathered in your single one, that two Romes have fallen, and the
third one stands, and a fourth one there shall not be; your empire
will not fall to others, according to the great Evangelist. (Ibid. )
The rest of the letter is devoted to a denunciation of crimes of sodomy
being carried out in monasteries.
This insane cult belief, spawned by Venetian intelligence among the
hesychasts of the Russian monasteries, and transmitted by those mon-
asteries into the whole body of Russian culture, remains to this day the
program of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the Muscovite state.
The Russians, the only ones in the world who have kept the true faith,
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will one day compel the world into an universal empire for the purpose
of purifying and purging the decadent "putrid" West and the other way-
ward races influenced by the West. For this pervasive cult, Russian
territorial claims include the entire world.
Thus, in 1547, Ivan the Terrible, strong in the teaching of the monk
Filofei, assumed the official title of Tsar, Emperor. The Russian Empire
was proclaimed as the direct successor of the Second Rome, Byzantium.
In 1589, the Muscovites prevailed upon the Patriarch of Constanti-
nople, who was engaged in a fund-raising tour through their territories,
to elevate the Metropolitan of Moscow to the full status of a Patriarch
of the Russian Orthodox Church. As the Greek Patriarch performed the
ceremony, he uttered the words of Filofei of Pskov: "Since the old Rome
fell because of the Apollinarian heresy, and the Second Rome, which is
Constantinople, is possessed by the godless Turks, thy Great Russian
Tsardom, pious Tsar . . . is the Third Rome ... and thou alone under
heaven art called the Christian Tsar in the whole world for all Christians;
and therefore this very act of establishing the Patriarchate will be estab-
lished according to God's will."
Vasili III's interpretation of the Third Rome included the Byzantine
proprietary theory of law, which specified that the state, the land and
the people were all the property of the tsar. This is documented by the
testimony of Baron von Herberstein, who was twice ambassador of the
Holy Roman Empire to Moscow during this period. Von Herberstein
wrote of Vasili III: "He holds unlimited control over the lives and property
of all his subjects. None of his councillors has enough authority to dare
oppose him or even to differ from him ... they openly declare that the
Prince's will is God's will ... all the people consider themselves to be
kholops, that is slaves to their prince." (In Fitzroy McLean, Holy Russia,
p. 32.)
The next Tsar was the imperial Ivan the Terrible, an instructive
example of a Russian ruler who was steeped in the culture of the Russian
monasteries, and who considered himself to a very large degree to be a
monk. One Harrimanite writer on the subject has this to say about Ivan
the Terrible: "Ivan was in his own rather strange way a deeply religious
man and also a strong upholder of the doctrine of the Third Rome."
(McLean, p. 38). Several years into his reign, at the end of 1564, Ivan
left Moscow and transferred his residence to the Monastery of the Holy
Trinity and St. Sergius at Zagorsk. He announced that he was abdicating
as Tsar because of the intrigues of the Boyars or feudal noblemen. Ivan's
move into the monastery of Zagorsk is known in Russian history as his
Hegira, and bears comparison to Marshal Ogarkov's ouster from the post
of Chief of the Soviet General Staff in favor of his new post as commander
of the western theatre of war. Ivan said that he might be willing to resume
the Tsardom, but only in exchange for life and death powers over all of
his subjects. These were granted, leading to the unspeakable orgy of
massacres and death by torture that followed. Ivan killed his enemies by
boiling them in oil, by sewing them into bearskins and having them torn
to pieces by hounds, by frying them in giant frying pans constructed for
this purpose. Ivan customarily passed from the direct personal supervision
and devising of torture and executions, to religious devotions and acts
of penance, to sexual orgies of rape and sodomy. One piece of Ivan's
handiwork was the total destruction of the city of Novgorod, in which
about 60,000 people were massacred.
Most important, Ivan the Terrible founded the so-called Oprichnina,
a new state within the state, apart from the existing institutions, and
under the direct personal and dictatorial control of the Tsar himself. The
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The Old Believers
Oprichnina had its own physical boundaries, its own form of government,
and its own secret police, the Oprichniki, who went around slaughtering
those whom they designated to be the enemies of the Tsar, and who in
turn were often slaughtered by the Tsar. The Oprichnina on the one
hand resembles the SS state of the late Nazi regime. It has proven a
durable institution in Russian society, foreshadowing the KGB-militarized
economy of today.
Ivan created a monastery of his own near Zagorsk, of which he himself
was the "Abbot." He enjoyed composing music for the Orthodox church
liturgy. He always gave lists of his victims to the monks after he had
dispatched them, so that prayers might be said for their souls. In other
ways Ivan recalls Diocletian. Ivan used the Oprichnina to set up a cen-
tralized state with a standing army, and with fixed classes, especially serfs,
all of whom owed specific services to the imperial autocrat. Ivan used
the army to wage wars in the service of Moscow the Third Rome, capturing
Kazan from the Tartars, and also pressing towards the shores of the Baltic,
and becoming embroiled in wars with Livonians, Swedes, Lithuanians,
and Poles.
Ivan murdered his own son, the heir to his imperial throne. He ob-
viously prefigures another monkish Oprichnik of our own century, the
former seminarian of the Georgian Orthodox church, Stalin. Neverthe-
less, Ivan the Terrible is today a saint of the Russian Orthodox Church.
During the last years of the sixteenth century, the Russians expanded
their colonization of Siberia, building forts on the River Ob in 1596 and
shortly thereafter the Yenisei. By 1639, Muscovite power had reached
the Pacific, and eventually advanced as far as San Francisco. This advance
went on inexorably even during the Time of Troubles, the period of
Polish invasion and dynastic chaos that took up the close of the sixteenth
century and the first decade of the seventeenth.
In February 1613 the zemskii sobor or assembly of the Russian lands
elected Michael Romanov as Tsar, thus inaugurating a new imperial
ruling house. The real ruler for the first decades was the Patriarch of the
Russian Orthodox Church, Fyodor Nikitich Romanov, the father of
Michael. The leading feature of the opening years of the new dynasty
was the consolidation of universal serfdom as the normal condition for
peasant labor in the Russian Empire. This uniform regime of serfdom
came at a time when free labor was already the rule in the West. Earlier,
in 1606, there had already been a serf revolt, joined by Cossacks and
others, led by the escaped slave Ivan Bolotnikov, who devastated large
areas during an abortive march on Moscow. Bolotnikov was the founder
of the modem Russian tradition of class war, the peasant revolt or jac-
querie, but on the titanic scale suitable to the Russian steppes-the
tradition that later gave rise to the Bolshevik Revolution itself.
Michael Romanov was succeeded in 1645 by his adolescent son, Alexis
the Gentle, whose decree of 1649, the Ulozhenie, completed the total
enserfinent of the Russian peasantry, bound urban taxpayers to remain
in the locality in which they were registered, and introduced the concept
of political crimes to the inventory of Russian totalitarian thought. Alexis'
reign was to be marked by the great schism or raskol within the Russian
Orthodox Church, which introduced a new involution into the doctrine
of Moscow the Third Rome. This great religious and political revolt was
brought about by the Patriarch whom Alexis appointed, Nikon.
Soon after his elevation to the Patriarchate in 1652, Nikon decided
to embark upon a series of reforms of the liturgy of the Russian Church,
which he said had become corrupt through an accretion of errors over
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the course of the centuries. Nikon enjoyed the position of Grand Sov-
ereign, in effect a kind of co-tsardom with Alexis. His personal ambitions
went in the direction of theocracy, with Nikon occupying the number
one post. In this, he recalls Photius, who also argued that the Patriarch
was supreme. From his monastery outside Moscow, which he called the
New Jerusalem, Nikon promulgated a series of liturgical changes which
elicited a massive, raving rebellion in church and state.
Nikon was undoubtedly well aware that his "liturgical reforms" would
produce the whirlwind of revolt to which they in fact gave rise. He was
undoubtedly familiar with the Bogomils, a sect of the Bulgarian Empire
that gave rise in the West to the Cathars or Albigensians. He may have
been instructed by controllers in Venice or at Mount Athos to carry out
his reforms in order to re-invigorate, by means of the inevitable mass
revolt, the monastic tradition of other-worldly irrationalism and fanat-
icism. Such controllers may have wished to create a current of Orthodox
integrists to counterpose to the Westernizing and modernizing tendencies
that the Romanov dynasty would later promote, above all in the person
of Peter the Great. All of this, but above all the representation and
celebration of mass insanity and the rejection of the paradigm of Western
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civilization, was accomplished through Nikon's provocation of the schism
of the Old Believers, or Raskol'niki.
The Nikonian liturgical reform was premised on the idea that Russian
practice was corrupt, and that Greek Orthodox practice was older and
purer. Nikon brought in new prayer books in which the spelling of the
name of Jesus was changed. He ordered that the sign of the cross not be
made with two fingers, according to the Russian tradition, but rather
with three fingers, on the Greek model. He altered the direction of
processions around the church, and the number of Hallelujahs to be
chanted at certain points in the liturgy. He stipulated that the eight-
pointed Russian cross be replaced with the four-pointed Greek cross. He
decreed that all Russian churches built in the future had to have five
domes.
Remember that the basic credo of the Third Rome was that Constan-
tinople and the Greek church had fallen because they had betrayed the
true Christian faith by their dealings with the apostate Latins. Now Nikon
was proposing to change some rather sensitive parts of the Russian liturgy
to make them conform to Greek models. As Archpriest Avvakum, one
of the most important spokesmen for the Raskol'niki was later to write,
upon receipt of Nikon's circulars, "hearts froze and legs began to shake."
The general conclusion was that the minions of Antichrist, or Antichrist
himself, had seized control of the Russian Church, that the earthly
repository of the true faith was now in danger, and that the definitive
corruption of the pure Russian faith might occur, in which case the
apocalypse would be at hand.
All over Russia monks, parish priests, bishops, metropolitans, serfs,
Cossacks, and others rushed to join the party of the Raskol'niki, those
who violently rejected the Nikonian reforms. These Old Believers are
called in Russian the Starovery or Staroobradtsy, and collectively the
Starina. The Old Believers insisted on the pre-Nikonian liturgy, and
quickly encountered the massive repression of the Tsarist regime. Hundreds
of thousands, if not millions, fled from the populated areas of Russia into
the wilderness, with large communities of Old Believers quickly appearing
on the lower Don and the lower Volga Rivers, as well as in the Ural
mountains. Some penetrated even further, into the Siberian taiga. As
Avvakum had said, "It behooves us to secede and flee in the season of
the Antichrist." Soviet ethnologists discovered one small community a
few years ago which had never heard of the Second World War, because
it had lived in total isolation from the rest of the world. Other Old
Believers felt that the coming of Antichrist was to be expected at any
moment, and an undetermined but very large number of them committed
mass suicide on the Jonestown model (certainly more than 20,000),
arguing that it was better to die at once than to look on the face of the
Antichrist. One Old Believer put it this way: "I would take a burning
brand and set fire to the city; how joyous it would be, if it were consumed
from end to end together with old and young, so that the seal of Antichrist
could not be laid on any of them" (Alexander V. Soloviev, Holy Russia
[The Hague, 19591, p.34). One of the stories the Old Believers concocted
during their wanderings in the wilderness was the Legend of the Invisible
City of Kitezh, afterwards made into an opera by Rimsky-Korsakov.
The Old Believers fragmented at once into a myriad of contending
sects and sectlets. After the initial martyrs had gone to their rewards,
the Old Believers discovered that they had no bishops consecrated in
the approved Orthodox apostolic succession who could ordain priests.
In response to this state of affairs, some sects chose to be priestly (po-
povtsy), and accepted runaway "Nikonian" priests after these latter had
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undergone a type of ritual purification to put off their cloak of apostasy.
The more radical priestless sects (bezpopovtsy) would have nothing to do
with any Nikonian, and decided they would have to get through the
short interval before the convening of the Last judgment without the
help of clergymen.
Dramatic resistance against the Nikonian reforms emerged at the So-
lovetskii Monastery, located on an island in the White Sea, near the
Arctic Circle. In the narrative of Raskol'nik leader Epifanii, upon hearing
of Nikon's innovations, "in the Solovetskii Monastery the holy fathers
and the brothers began to grieve and to weep bitterly and to speak in
this fashion: `Brothers, brothers! Alas, alas! Woe, woe! The faith of
Christ has fallen in Russia, just as in other lands, through Christ's two
enemies, Nikon and Arseni"' (Crummey, p. 10). By 1666 the monks
were in open revolt. When Archimandrite Sergei of the Iaroslavskii
Monastery arrived to enforce the Nikonian dispensations, the assembled
monks replied thus: "We are attentive to the Tsar's decree and are in all
matters obedient to him, but the orders concerning the confession of
faith and the three-finger sign of the cross . . . we do not accept and do
not want to hear, and we are all unanimously ready to suffer." The leader
of the Solovetskii uprising was a the former abbot of the Savvinskii
Monastery, who held up his hand in the three-fingered Greek position,
and exclaimed, "that instruction-that we are ordered to cross ourselves
with three fingers-is Latin tradition, the seal of the Antichrist" (Robert
0. Crummey, The Old Believers and the World of Antichrist, Madison and
London, 1970, p. 19).
The monks of the Solovetskii Monastery held out until 1676. In 1673
they decided no longer to pray for the tsar. After the defeat of the serf,
Cossack, and Old Believer revolt of Stepan Razin had been crushed, the
Solovetskii monks sheltered many of the fugitives. The population of
the White Sea regions sided to a large extent with the monks, and sent
them food. At the end almost 200 monks were slaughtered when the
monastery was sacked. A number escaped to tell the story of the revolt,
which quickly became a legend among serfs and Raskol'niki. It cannot
be sufficiently stressed that from the time of the schism onward, the
monasteries were hotbeds of open or latent sympathy with the Raskol'nik
point of view, to which the monks gravitated at once, especially later
on under Peter the Great.
One recent writer sums up the Weltanschauung of the Old Believers
as follows: "The liturgical reforms, one of the products of the nascent
internationalism of the court circle, ran counter to the widely held
attitudes usually summarized in the loosely tied bundle of historical con-
ceptions known as the Third Rome doctrine. In their attacks on the
liturgical reforms, Avvakum and the other Old Believer spokesmen from
among the parish clergy and the monks repeatedly stressed that, after
the apostasy of the first Rome and of Byzantium, only Moscow preserved
Christian orthodoxy.... For the Old Believers, the issue was simple,
at least on the surface. If Ivan IV and his subjects had possessed the true
faith, then no detail of the dogma or the ritual of his time could be
changed. And what worse fate could befall the Russian church than to
change its practices to conform to those of the apostate Greeks?" (Crum-
mey, p. 12).
Here, in his own words, is a statement on the theme of the Third
Rome made by the Old Believer ideologue Avvakum at the Russian
Raskol'nik-the Old Believers are the key to Rus-
sian Cchurch council of 1667, which was called to judge the issue of Nikon
insanity and the rejection of the paradigm of
western civilization. and Nikon's reforms in the presence of a group of Eastern patriarchs:
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The last word they said to me was, "Why are you so stubborn? All
of Palestine-and the Serbs, the Albanians, the Wallachians, the
Romans, and the Poles-all of them cross themselves with three
fingers and only you remain obstinate and make the sign with five
fingers. That is not fitting!" And I answered them for Christ as
follows: "Ecumenical teachers! Rome has long since fallen and lies
prostrate, and the Poles perished with them, and are the enemies
of Christians to the end. Among you Orthodoxy has become mottled
because of the violence of Mehmet the Turk-and one must not
be amazed at you: You have become powerless. And so henceforth,
come to us to study, for, by the grace of God, we have autocracy.
Before Nikon the apostate, in Russia, under our pious princes and
Tsars, Orthodoxy was complete, pure, undefiled, and the church
without uproar. Nikon, that wolf, and the Devil ordered us to cross
ourselves with three fingers: But our first pastors crossed themselves
with five fingers and likewise gave their blessing with five fingers
according to the tradition of the holy fathers, Meletius of Antioch,
the blessed Theodorite, Bishop of Cyrene, Peter of Damascus, and
Maxim the Greek. Likewise the local council of Moscow under Tsar
Ivan ordered us to cross ourselves and give the blessing, putting our
fingers together in that way (Crummey, p.12).
The Old Believers were an integral part of the emergence of the full-
blown Russian tradition of class war and social upheaval. In the year
1667 a band of Don Cossack bandits under the leadership of Stepan (or
Stenka) Razin made their way from the Don to the Volga and thence
to the Caspian Sea and the Ural River, recruiting Cossacks, Old Believers,
and runaway serfs as they went. They made a detour into Persia, and by
1670 were ascending the Volga towards Moscow, where panic broke out,
since Razin had declared war against those he branded as the oppressors
of the Russian people: landowners, merchants, and government officials.
A specially assembled army under foreign officers defeated Razin, who
was captured and put to death in Moscow in 1671. His army dispersed
into marauding bands that were tracked down and annihilated, but only
after much effort.
Among Russian peasants, the legend of Razin still persists, including
in the form of a folk song. The legend says that on the lower Volga there
is a hill sacred to Razin, and that if you climb that hill at midnight, you
will learn Razin's secret, the secret of class war.
Many Raskol'niki had suspected that Nikon was not the true Anti-
christ, but that this title were better bestowed on Tsar Alexis himself.
From the year 1666 onwards, the expectation of a "sensuous Antichrist"
became overwhelming. With the advent of Peter the Great, all Ras-
kol'niki agreed that the Tsar was indeed the Antichrist. Peter carried on
a program of Westernizing reform, partly under the influence of Leibniz
and of his academy movement. Naturally the Raskol'niki were violently
hostile to any Western importations. They were against Western science,
Western geometry, and Western ways of doing things. Technological
improvements were equated in their eyes with sin.
Peter traveled in the West, a thing unthinkable for any tsar up to that
time, and brought back German, Italian and Dutch experts to carry on
his crash program for economic development of Russia. Peter moved the
capital from Moscow to his newly constructed Western window at St.
Petersburg, which in the eyes of the Old Believers and the monks certified
Peter's betrayal of the Third Rome prophecy. Later in his reign Peter in
effect abolished the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church,
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Emelian Pugachov-proclaimed himself Tsar Pe-
ter III.
and replaced the Patriarch with a government organ, the Synod, under
the leadership of a functionary with a German title, the Oberprokuror.
The Patriarchate stayed abolished until after the fall of the Romanov
dynasty in 1917, when a new Patriarch was elected on the very eve of
the October Revolution. All of these changes brought the rage of the
fanatic Raskol'niki to an absolute paroxysm.
Much later, in the 1780s, Catherine the Great sought to carry out a
variant of the Third Rome through what she called her Greek project.
The centerpiece of this plan, which Catherine developed together with
her lover, Prince Potemkin, was the creation of a new Byzantine Empire
in the Balkans and Asia Minor as a Russian puppet state, with Con-
stantinople to be garrisoned by Russian troops and the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles to be open to Russian shipping. The designated emperor of
this new Byzantium was Catherine's great-grandson, who appropriately
received the name of Constantine. This Greek Project restated a number
of leading motives that had been developed by the Orlov family during
preceding decades, especially in regard to Russia's need for warm-water
ports.
Despite her own pursuit of the Third Rome, however, for the Old
Believers Catherine was just one more representative of the Antichrist
of the Romanov dynasty. In the 1770s there were the first signs of revolt
among the Don and Ural Cossacks, among whom Raskol'niki were heavily
represented. In 1773 a Don Cossack by the name of Emelian Pugachov
proclaimed that he was the true Tsar Peter III, a previous husband of
Catherine whom the tsarina had in reality liquidated somewhat earlier
in the game. The Pretender Pugachov created a bizarre version of the
Imperial court around his own person, assembled an army of Cossacks,
Raskol'niki and serfs, and advanced up the Volga towards Moscow in
the midst of the largest serf rebellion ever seen. Pugachov's targets were
officers, officials, merchants, priests, and landowners, all of whom he
executed as soon as they were captured. The comparison to the Bolshevik
Revolution is once again quite obvious. The October Revolution emerges
in retrospect merely as the largest of the Raskol'nik-Cossack-serf revolts
of the Romanov dynasty, with the important difference that Lenin and
the Bolsheviks succeeded in seizing power in Moscow and in the rest of
Russia.
Pugachov was defeated by an imperial army under General Alexander
Suvorov, who began inflicting the most savage reprisals on all those who
took part in the uprising. Suvorov hunted down Pugachov and captured
him, and the Cossack-Raskol'nik leader was dismembered in a public
square in Moscow in January 1775, at about the same time as the outbreak
of the American Revolution. For years after the death of Pugachov
himself, the Imperial government systematically liquidated all those who
had taken part in the rebellion. Entire villages were razed to the ground,
and gibbets with dangling corpses were silhouetted against the horizon
as a warning to the peasantry and the dissenters. This colossal uprising,
which was the greatest in Europe in the century before the French Rev-
olution, left a heritage of bitterness and hatred which was still smouldering
under the surface in 1905 and in 1917. As for the Cossacks, they were
regimented as a military unit of the Imperial government, from which
distilled a part of the officer caste of the Empire. Ogarkov derives from
this tradition; furthermore, Gorbachov himself and Russian Republic
Prime Minister Vorotnikov are alleged to be of Cossack, and therefore
of Raskol'nik, stock.
The Old Believer mentality asserted that the West was the enemy, as
it had been from time immemorial. The specific Old Believer twist was
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The nineteenth
century
in the notion that the Romanov dynasty and the top hierarchy of the
Russian Orthodox Church had themselves sold out to the West, and
therefore had to be overthrown to permit the restoration of the Tsardom,
the people, and the Third Rome in the pristine spiritual purity in which
they had existed before 1613. For this, the Old Believers argued, a
revolution and class war were necessary.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many of
the Raskol'niki who had migrated into the wilderness peripheries of the
Russian Empire, returned to their holy city of Moscow. Peter III and
Catherine II chose not to persecute Old Belief per se, but only political
sedition. Many of the Old Believers who came back to Moscow prospered
as salesmen, teachers, factory managers, light industrialists, and the like.
Their position in the sweatshop-based Moscow textile industry was very
strong. Reports of the Tsarist authorities in the nineteenth century stress
that the number of Old Believers was in continuous expansion. The
estimate may be ventured that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
the Old Believers amount to at least 15% of the total population of the
Russian Empire.
Many Raskol'niki became secularized, or even atheists, but they per-
sisted in the idea that the Romanov state was illegitimate, and that the
official Russian Orthodox Church was a gang of heretics. They wanted
the state to wither away into a church, which would allow Holy Russia
to carry out her assigned mission as the Third Rome. Secularized Old
Believers made up a considerable portion of the Narodniki populists, and
of the People's Will, the society that blew up the reforming Tsar Alex-
ander II, who for the Raskol'niki was but another incarnation of the
Antichrist. Indeed, secularized Raskol'niki were a sizable part of the
recruiting base of all Russian nineteenth-century radical movements,
including most emphatically the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party
in both its Menshevik and Bolshevik factions. Apart from the well-known
penetration of the Bolsheviks by the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana,
at the highest level (Stalin was a notorious Okhrana agent at the be-
ginning of his career), many Bolshevik leaders, like the "God-maker"
faction of Bogdanov and Lunacharskii, had been trained at the Bene-
dictine center on the Italian island of Capri. The violent attacks on the
church made by the Bolsheviks during the 1920s are entirely consistent
with the outlook of Raskol'nik irrationalists, especially of those coming
from the priestless sects.
The Russian monasteries-and again, many of them shared the outlook
of the Old Believers-were systematically repressed during the reign of
Peter the Great. Of the 2,000 monasteries that had been in operation
at the end of the seventeenth century, only 318 surivived in 1764. But
from this low ebb, comparable in some ways to the first two decades of
the Bolshevik regime, the monastic movement was destined to stage a
powerful comeback, determining the Russian culture of the nineteenth
century and creating the cultural paradigm of the Bolshevik revolution.
Yesterday Russian propaganda told us: I am Christianity-tomorrow
it will tell us: I am Socialism. -Jules Michelet, 1851
The starting point for this new monastic revival was the Venetian-
Orthodox command center of Mt. Athos. Its mystical and irrational
textbook was the Philokalia of Saint Nicodemus, the Hagiorite of the
Holy Mountain (1748-1809). The Philokalia was an anthology of hesy-
chast writers from the fourth to the fifteenth centuries, with special
emphasis on the Jesus prayer. Other key personalities of the monastic
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upswing included Paissus Velikhovskii, who came to Russia from Mt.
Athos in the eighteenth century to spread the line of repudiating sec-
ularism and worldliness in favor of the asceticism of the early desert
fathers, the hermits and stylites of the East. Paissus founded a number
of new monasteries in Moldavia and southern Russia. Following in the
footsteps of St. Benedict, Paissus developed a monastic rule (regula) all
his own. Paissus' rule was characterized by its extreme severity, which
was based on the notion of the monk as a hermit in the wilderness. The
monasteries where the austere rule of Paissus was in force usually took
the title of pustyn, or desert, rather than lavra or other earlier terms.
Other fanatical protagonists of the monastic revival included Tikhon of
Zadonsk, and later, Seraphim of Sarov.
Seraphim of Sarov expanded the role of monasteries as controllers for
secular intellectuals, who came to the monasteries for periodic spiritual
retreats and visits. Each visitor was assigned to a specific starets, or elder
of the monastery. The most significant example of this role of the mon-
asteries is that of Optina Pustyn, which exerted a virtually single-handed
control over Russian literary production in the nineteenth century. Op-
tina controlled the leading Slavophile Ivan Kireevsky, who later came
to the monastery to live. Other followers of the Optina elders were the
novelist Count Leo Tolstoi, scion of a family that traditionally exerted
a powerful influence over the Okhrana, and the novelist Fyodor Dos-
toevsky, the most influential of all the Slavophiles of the nineteenth
century. The character of the monk Father Zossima in Dostoevsky's
Brothers Karamazov is a composite of Father Ambrose, the monastic starets
whom Dostoevsky visited for guidance at Optina, and of Tikhon of
Zadonsk, whose writings Dostoevsky thoroughly studied. Another spir-
itual visitor to Optina Pustyn was Vladimir Solovyov, one of the most
sophisticated and insidious of the literary apologists for Russian mysticism.
Because of this predominant role of the Russian Orthodox monks, the
Russian literature of the entire nineteenth century after the passing of
Pushkin and his circle, takes on the character of a titanic revolt against
Reason, with the typical apocalyptic Third Rome themes, messianism,
and other-worldly mysticism occupying center stage.
The Third Rome ideology of the first half of the nineteenth century
is best profiled through some observations on the Slavophiles, who to-
gether with their co-thinkers, the Westemizers, dominated Russian in-
tellectual life in this period. The principal Slavophile writers included
Khomiakov, Ivan Kireevskii, the brothers Konstantin and Ivan Aksakov,
Yurii Samarin, and others, all profoundly influenced by the Russian
Orthodox Church. Herzen, a so-called Westernizer, once admitted that
the basic outlook of both Westemizers and Slavophiles was the same.
The Slavophiles were much influenced by Hegel and Schelling. They
pointed to the solution of social problems through a return to primitive
Slavic institutions like the agricultural commune or mir, which later,
under Stalin, reappeared as the collective farm. The Slavophiles also
glorified the artel, or artisan commune, as an alternative to the modem
factory. The Slavophiles condemned Reason as a Western perversion,
and recommended instead that all problems be solved by a zemski sobor,
or council of the Russian estates. In Western terms, they are a group of
solidarists and fascists, who added a powerful impetus to the growth of
fascist and solidarist ideas in the West. The roots of Dostoevsky's ide-
ological profile are very much in this group of writers and, as we have
seen, in the Optina elders who dominated the lot of them.
The first element in the Slavophile creed is an aggressive, imperialist
Third Rome chauvinism, based on the messianic, "disinterested" mission
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that the Russian people is called upon to carry out. Konstantin Aksakov
wrote: "The history of the Russian people is the only history in the world
of a Christian people, Christian not only in its profession of faith, but
also in its life, or at least in the aspirations of its life" (Quoted in
Riazanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles, p.74).
Brother Ivan Aksakov chimed in: "The Russian people is not a people;
it is humanity; it is a people only because it is surrounded by peoples
with exclusively national essences, and its humanity is therefore repre-
sented as nationality" (Riazanovsky, p. 121).
The issue dividing Russia from the decadent West is unerringly por-
trayed by the Slavophiles as the underlying theological question of the
Filioque, which the Slavophiles, in best Photian tradition, take straight
back to the time of Charlemagne. Here is an extraordinary summary of
the case from Khomiakov, the founder of the school:
Now let us betake ourselves to the last years of the eighth or the
beginning of the ninth century, and let us imagine a wanderer who
had come from the East to one of the cities in Italy or in France.
Pervaded by the feeling of ancient unity, and quite confident that
he is in the midst of brethren, he enters a church to sanctify the
last day of the week. Full of love, he concentrates on pious thoughts,
follows the service, and listens to the wonderful prayers which had
gladdened his heart from early childhood. Words reach him: Let us
kiss one another, that we may with one mind confess the Father,
Son, and the Holy Ghost. He is listening carefully. Now the Creed
of the Christian and Catholic church is proclaimed, the Creed which
every Christian must serve with his entire life, and for which, on
occasion, he must sacrifice his life. He is listening carefully,-But
this Creed is corrupted, it is some new, unknown creed! Is he awake,
or is he in the power of an oppressive dream? He does not believe
his ears, begins to doubt his senses. He wants to find out, asks
explanation. An idea occurs to him: He may have walked into a
gathering of dissenters cast away from the local church. . . . Alas,
this is not the case! He heard the voice of the local church itself.
An entire patriarchate, an entire vast world fell away from un-
ity. . . . By its very action (that is, by the arbitrary change of the
Creed) the Roman world made an implicit assertion that in its eyes
the entire East was not more than a world of helots in matters of
faith and doctrine. Life in the church ended for an entire half of
the church" (Riazanovsky, p 65).
Here we can note in passing a typical Russian Orthodox reversal of
the causal relations of the real world. The Filioque was advanced to rescue
human beings from slavery, but for Khomiakov it becomes a means of
shackling the entire East as helots.
The rest of the Slavophile polemic derives from the implications of
this central issue of the Filioque. For the Slavophiles, the cardinal sin of
the West has been its cultivation of Reason. The dichotomies they set
up always oppose the West as the realm of Reason to the East as the full
development of all faculties of the mind, primarily irrationalism and
insanity. Here is a sample from Ivan Kireevsky: ". . . the Roman church
in its deviation from the Eastern is characterized by precisely the same
triumph of rationalism over tradition, of outer reason over inner spiritual
comprehension. Thus the dogma concerning the Trinity was changed
contrary to the spiritual meaning and tradition, changed as a result of
an external syllogism, deduced from the concept of divine equality of
the Father and the Son" (Riazanovsky, p. 96).
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For Khomiakov, ". . . rationalism or the narrowly logical analysis be-
came the nature of the Western church, in contrast with contemplative
cognition, which was preserved in the East. Prayer, ritual, sacrament,
good works acquired, in the relationship of man to God, the nature of
merit and of exorcising power...." In Khomiakov's view, Western
rationality was the cause of the destruction of true religion there, "for
such is the nature of that logical mechanism, that `self-propelled knife'
which is called rationalism-once it is admitted into the heart of human
thinking and into the highest sphere of religious ideas, it must of necessity
cut down and crush everything living and unconditioned, the entire, so
to speak, organic vegetation of the soul, and leave nothing but a cheerless
desert behind it" (Riazanovsky, p. 92).
For Khomiakov, Reason was a hollow principle which could prevail
in the short run but then had to be overturned by the specific organic
genius of each people. Khomiakov held Reason in absolute contempt:
"The conditional, as the creation of reason . . . easily assumes the ap-
pearance of a shapely form, easily unites material forces around itself and
goes straight to its always one-sided goal. An invention of one locality
or of one people, it is easily accepted and adopted by others because it
does not bear the signs or the stamp of any locality or of any people. It
is a fruit of Reason, which is everywhere the same, not of the complete
organism, which is everywhere different. Its power and its seduction are
in its weakness and its lifelessness." Ivan Kireevsky shared that contempt
for Reason: "But this falling apart of the mind into particular forces, this
domination of reason over ther other activities of the spirit, which ul-
timately had to destroy the entire edifice of medieval learning, at first
had the opposite effect, and caused a development which was the more
rapid, the more one-sided. Such is the law of the deviation of the human
mind: the appearance of brilliance and the inner dimness" (Riazanovsky,
pp. 99-100).
The Reason deriving from the doctrine of the Filioque was in turn the
basis for the Augustinian concept of the individual. The Western in-
dividual was a target of special anathema on the part of the Slavophiles.
Here is Ivan Kireevsky once again: "The entire private and public life
of the West is founded on the concept of separate, individual indepen-
dence which assumes individual isolation. Thence the sanctity of the
external, formal relations, the sanctity of property and of conditional
enactments are more important than human personality. Each individ-
ual-a private person, a knight, a prince, or a city-is, within his rights,
a despotic unlimited individual, who is the law unto himself. The first
step of every man in society is to surround himself with a fortress, from
the depth of which he begins negotiations with other and independent
powers" (Riazanovsky, p. 98).
The Slavophiles hated all the Western nations, with the sole exceptions
of Venice and of Great Britain. For Germany they had the most attention,
and a horrible fascination, since they were attracted by German intel-
lectual life. It was easier for them to hate France, Spain, and Italy. Initial
Slavophile interest in the United States was soon supplanted by a special
form of hatred, reserved for the country that seemed to present many of
the features of the decadent West in their most radical and extreme form.
Here is a Slavophile profile of the United States from the pen of Ivan
Kireevsky, the pupil of Optina, for whom the United States carries with
it all the horror of an experiment in reason:
That experiment has already been made. What a brilliant future
appeared to belong to the United States of America, built on such
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a reasonable foundation, after such a great beginning!-And what
happened? Only the external forms of society, deprived of the inner
source of life, developed, and they crushed the man under the
external mechanism. The literature of the United States, according
to the reports of the most impartial judges, is a clear expression of
this condition. An enormous factory of talentless poems, without
a shadow of poesy; trite epithets signifying nothing and yet constantly
repeated; a total absence of feeling for everything artistic; an obvious
contempt for all thinking, which does not lead to material gains;
petty personalities without general foundations; puffed up sentences
with a most trifling content, a profanation of the sacred words,
humanity, fatherland, common good, nationality, to such an extent that
their use has become not even hypocrisy, but simply a recognized
stamp for selfish interests; a superficial respect for the external side
of the laws combined with most insolent violations of them; a spirit
of cooperation for private gains combined with an unblushing faith-
lessness of the cooperating individuals, and an obvious disrespect
for all moral principles, so that it is evident that at the basis of all
this mental activity lies the most petty life, cut off from everything
that lifts the heart above personal profit, sunk in the world of egoism,
and recognizing material comfort together with its subsidiary ele-
ments as the highest goal. No! If indeed a Russian is fated, for some
impenitent sins, to exchange his great future for the one-sided life
of the West, then I would rather fall into revery with the abstract
German in his involved theories; I would rather fall into indolence
until death under the warm sky, in the artistic atmosphere of Italy;
I would rather start whirling with the Frenchman in his impulsive,
momentary desires; I would rather turn into stone with an English-
man and his stubborn and unaccountable habits than I would suf-
focate in this prose of factory relations, in this mechanism of selfish
worry (Riazanovsky, p. 112-13).
For the Slavophiles, it is not Russia that hates the West; the Russian
people is totally free of any racial, national, or ethnic prejudice. In their
view it is rather the West that is responsible for existing tensions. Ivan
Aksakov writes: "It is time to realize that we shall not purchase the favor
of the West by any amount of willingness to please; it is time to understand
that the hatred, not seldom instinctive, of the West towards the Orthodox
Slavonic world stems from other, and deeply hidden causes; these causes
are the antagonism of the two opposite spiritual principles of enlight-
enment, and the envy felt by the decrepit world towards the new one
to which the future belongs. . . . The hatred of the West towards the
East and towards Orthodoxy is a traditional, instinctive, and peculiarly
spontaneous feeling and motive force in the history of the world" (Ria-
zanovsky, p. 83).
The Slavophiles thus had no doubt about to whom the future belonged.
A decisive and recurring theme of all their output is the coming apoc-
alyptic cataclysm of the West, a kind of literary prefiguring of the Ogarkov
plan of today. Khomiakov made this the theme of a celebrated poem,
paraphrased as follows:
Sadness, sadness comes over me! Thick darkness is falling on the
distant West, the land of holy miracles: Former suns become pale
as they burn out, and the greatest stars fall from the sky. . . . Woe!
The age has ended, and the entire West is covered with the shroud
of death. There darkness will be deep. . . . Hear then the call of
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Dostoevsky
fate, spring up in a new radiance, awake, oh somnolent East! (Ria-
zanovsky, p. 118).
We see here that the previous Old Believer view has been changed
in the important respect that now it is only the West, and not the entire
world, certainly not Russia, which is to be subjected to destruction. Once
again, Marshal Ogarkov agrees.
Paganism has always been at the heart of the Russian Orthodox Church
approach to religion. The Russian church was and is the mystery religion
of the imperial state, and has gathered into itself all of the pre-existing
cult forms, going back to Little Mother Russia and Mother Earth. Writers
who were active at the same time as the Slavophiles leave no doubt that
for them God is not a universal divine principle, but rather a tribal totem,
strictly limited to the Great Russian Master Race. One writer whose
ravings cast light on the subject is V. A. Zhukovsky, a leading court
poet during the reign of the oppressive and reactionary Nicholas I. Zhu-
kovsky was the tutor of the future Tsar Alexander II, who abolished
serfdom. The following is taken from a letter to a friend which appeared
in July 1848 in the magazine Russkii Invalid.
Meanwhile our star, Holy Russia, shines on high, shines undisturbed,
and may God preserve it from an eclipse. Holy Russia-this word
is coeval with Christian Russia. . . . Is there not marked more clearly
in it our particular union with God, as a result of which we have
received from our forefathers his wondrous name, the Rus God (Rus-
skii Bog, not the Russian God, (Rossiiski Bog . . . ) the way Oserov
ends his "Dimitry Donskoi." The Russian God, Holy Russia-such
names for God and fatherland no other European people has... .
The other expression of our people, Russian God, has a profound
historical meaning. . . . The expression Russian God conveys not
just our faith in God, but also a particular popular tradition about
God. He is from ancient times the champion of Russia, visible to
our ancestors at all times both good and bad, glorious and misera-
ble. . . . Russian God is in the same relation to our faith in God,
as Holy Russia is in relation to Russia. . . . This conception of the
Russian God . . . is derived by the Russian people out of the rev-
elation contained in its own history. It is a conception of a tangible
God, of a proven God, recognized universally without any propa-
gandizing. . . . It would be ridiculous to say: English, French, or
German God; but at the sound Russian God the soul is transported.
It is the God of our popular life in whom, so to say, there is personified
for us our faith in the God of our soul. It is the image of the heavenly
savior, visibly reflected in the earthly history of our people (Michael
Chemiavsky, Tsar and People New Haven, 1961, pp. 173-75).
With a pagan chauvinist credo of this sort, we have entered the world
of Fyodor Dostoevsky, a world that is all the more significant because it
was not the solipsistic creation of an isolated madman, but a very rep-
resentative phenomenon, typical of the inner life of whole strata of
monks, Old Believers, Orthodox faithful, Okhrana officials, and other
wretched denizens of the Russian Empire. And in the Soviet Union
today, Dostoevsky has been taken off the index, and is once more the
required reading of all cultural elites.
Fyodor Dostoevsky is the classic irrationalist fanatic of Moscow the
Third Rome in the modem era. Dostoevsky was born in Moscow in 1821
as the son of a resident doctor in a charity hospital. He lived on the
hospital grounds, and so was able to gain first-hand experience of the
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human wreckage generated by the strongly autocratic regime of Nicholas
1. His fascination with misery and misfortune is evident in many of his
writings. By the 1840s Dostoevsky was achieving some modest success
as an author. Then he fell in with a group of Utopian socialists and was
arrested by the Tsarist secret police. In 1849 he was subjected to a mock
execution, and after that spent almost a decade in various prison camps
and penal battalions in Siberia. His principal literary productions date
from the years between 1859 and his death in 1881. In addition to his
well-known novels (Notes from the Underground, Crime and Punishment,
The Idiot, The Possessed, and The Brothers Karamazov), his essay magazine
called The Diary of a Writer is a compendium of his political ideas.
Dostoevsky's work is remarkable in that it prefigures the essential ideo-
logical apparatus of German Nazism. In other words, Dostoevsky has no
trouble with either side of the Nazi-Communist coin.
In the Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky advances the classic territorial
demand of Third Rome Imperialism: "Constantinople must be ours." This
is explicitly placed in the framework of the messianic mission of the
Third Rome, which Dostoevsky explicates as follows: ". . . in the name
of what moral right could Russia claim Constantinople? Relying upon
what sublime aims could Russia demand Constantinople from Europe?
Precisely as a leader of Orthodoxy, as its protectress and guardian-a
role designated to her ever since Ivan III, who placed her symbol and
the Byzantine double-headed eagle above the ancient coat of arms of
Russia, a role which unquestionably revealed itself only after Peter the
Great when Russia perceived in herself the strength to fulfill her mission
and factually become the real and sole protectress of Orthodoxy and of
the people adhering to it. Such is the ground, such is the right to ancient
Constantinople. . ." (The Diary of a Writer, "My Paradox").
In the name of this Imperial mission, Dostoevsky exalts the role of
war and armed conflict. This theme is vehemently developed in pieces
written for the Diary during the Eastern crisis of 1877. Dostoevsky ad-
vances the case that war has a positive, therapeutic value, helping to
purge the social organism of toxins accumulated during intervals of peace.
Dostoevsky comments: "Believe me that in certain, if not in all cases
(save in the case of civil wars) war is a process by means of which
specifically international peace is achieved with a minimum loss of blood,
with minimum sorrow and effort, and at least more or less normal relations
between the nations are evolved. Of course, this is a pity, but what can
be done if this is so? And it is better to draw the sword once than to
suffer interminably. And in what manner is present peace, prevailing
among the civilized nations, better than war? The contrary is true: Peace,
lasting peace, rather than war tends to harden and bestialize man. Lasting
peace always generates cruelty, cowardice and coarse, fat egoism, and
chiefly-intellectual stagnation. It is only the exploiters of the peoples
who grow fat in times of long peace. It is being repeated over and over
again that peace generates wealth, but only for one tenth of the people,
and this one tenth, having contracted the diseases of wealth, transmits
the contagion to the other nine tenths who have no wealth. And that
one tenth is contaminated by debauch and cynicism" (Diary, April 1877).
It is instructive to bear such remarks in mind in pondering present
Soviet propaganda statements, in which the real content of the term
"peace" is very close to that assigned by Dostoevsky.
Dostoevsky is also certain that the Russian system is better suited for
war than the methods of the Western powers, militaristic and bellicose
though those may be. He makes the following comments in April 1877:
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Our principal strength is precisely in the fact that they do not
understand Russia at all-they understand nothing about Russia!
They do not know that nothing in the world can conquer us; that
we may, perhaps, be losing battles, but that nevertheless we shall
remain invincible precisely because of the unity of our popular spirit,
and by reason of the people's consciousness; that we are not France,
which is all in Paris; that we are not Europe, which is altogether
dependent upon the stock-exchanges of her bourgeoisie and the
`tranquility' of her proletarians which is being purchased-and this
only for one hour-with the last resorts of their local governments.
They do not comprehend and know that, if it be our will, neither
the Jews of all Europe nor the millions of their gold-not even the
millions of their armies, can conquer us; that if it be our will, it is
impossible to compel us to do something we do not wish, and that
there is no such power on earth which could compel us.
Here the instinctive populism of the Slavophile mingles with the
rhetorical notes of the Communist and with the anti-Semitism of the
Nazi. The Nazi-Communist Dostoevsky, since he is free of the cancer
of Reason that has consumed the putrid West, is blissfully unaware of
any contradiction, and indeed there is none.
Dostoevsky's political creed in further illuminated in his essay "My
Paradox," appearing in the Diary in 1876. The paradox is that Third
Rome Russian patriots, when they go to Europe, become leftists and
socialists, since they find that this is the most appropriate way of working
for the destruction of Europe. By contrast, a Russian conservative who
goes to Europe and becomes a conservative European, is not a good
Russian, but rather an enemy of Russia, since he has sold out his Moth-
erland. This piece reads like a manual for the foreign operations of the
KGB and the GRU, which to some degree it undoubtedly is.
Dostoevsky asks himself the rhetorical question, "You assert that every
Russian, turning into a European Communard, thereby forthwith be-
comes a Russian conservative." This, he replies, is too risky a conclusion.
He refines the point thus:
Russian European socialists and Communards are not Europeans,
and . . . in the long run, when the misunderstanding shall have
been dispelled and they know Russia, they will again become full-
blooded and good Russians. And secondly, . . . under no circum-
stances can a Russian be converted into a real European if he remains
the least bit Russian. And, if this be so, it means that Russia is
something independent and peculiar, not resembling Europe at all,
but important by itself. Besides, Europe herself is, perhaps, not in
the least unjust when condemning Russians and scoffing at their
revolutionary theories: It means that we are revolutionists not merely
for the sake of destruction where we did not build-like the Huns
and the Tartars-but for the sake of something different, something,
which, in truth, we do not know ourselves (and those who know,
keep silent). In a word, we are revolutionists, so to speak, because
of some personal necessity-if you please, by reason of conservatism.
Dostoevsky was also, as is well known, a publicist for the violent anti-
Semitic campaigns that swept across Russia during the closing decades
of the nineteenth century, in the form of the pogroms organized by the
oligarchical Black Hundreds, and in the form of the official policies of
the Imperial Interior Ministry which counted on eliminating Jewry in
Russia by forcing one third to emigrate, one third to convert to Ortho-
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doxy, and by liquidating the remaining third. In Dostoevsky's mind hatred
of Jews is mixed with his inchoate anti-capitalism and anti-Western
feeling, as well as with his fascist populism. These comments are from
the notorious essay "The Jewish Question" from March 1877:
Jewry is thriving precisely there where the people are still ignorant,
or not free, or economically backward. It is there that Jewry has a
champ libre! And instead of raising, by its influence, the level of
education, instead of increasing knowledge, generating economic
fitness in the native population-instead of this, the Jew, wherever
he has settled, has still more humiliated and debauched the people;
there humaneness was still more debased and the educational level
fell still lower; there inescapable, inhuman misery, and with it de-
spair, spread still more disgustingly. Ask the native population in
our border regions: What is propelling the Jew-has been propelling
him for centuries? You receive a unanimous answer: mercilessness.
He has been prompted so many centuries only by pitilessness for us,
only by the thirst for our sweat and blood. . . . The Jew is offering
his interposition, he is trading in another man's labor. Capital is
accumulated labor; the Jew loves to trade in somebody else's labor.
But, temporarily, this changes nothing. As against this, the summit
of the Jews is assuming stronger and firmer power over mankind
seeking to convey to it its image and substance.
It will be found that Dostoevsky was the decisive epistemological
influence on Friedrich Nietzsche, who referred to the older Russian writer
as his "beloved father." Alfred Rosenberg, the author of The Myth of the
Twentieth Century, the Nazi Party ideological handbook, carried out an
in-depth study of Dostoevsky. Here he found a concept of blood and soil
(pochva), which prompted the Nazi emphasis on Blut and Boden. He also
discovered, in novels like The Possessed, the theory of the superman for
whom everything is allowed, even the most heinous crimes. Moeller van
den Brueck, who translated Dostoevsky's works into German, coined the
phrase "The Third Reich" as the title for one of his books. His inspiration
had come from Dostoevsky's Third Rome.
For Dostoevsky, questions of imperialist politics were essentially the-
ological in their foundations. He wrote in the January 1877 issue of the
Diary: "If it wishes to live long, every great people believes that in it
and in it alone, is contained the salvation of the world; that it only lives
in order to stand at the head of all the peoples, to assimilate them into
itself and to lead them, in a harmonious choir, to the final goal fore-
ordained for them all." For Dostoevsky, this applied above all to the
imperial mission of Russia. His most developed statement on the nature
of this messianic Russian imperialism of the Third Rome is to be found
in his speech on Pushkin, which was delivered on June 8, 1880 at a
meeting of the Society of Lovers of Russian Literature, and which was
then published in the Diary.
This appreciation has very little to do with Pushkin, since the latter
most emphatically did not share Dostoevsky's outlook. Dostoevsky rather
uses Pushkin's genius for an ulterior political motive of his own. He
comments that Pushkin's foreign characters are in each case the most
authentic representatives of their national characters that can be found
anywhere, even in Shakespeare. This bespeaks an unmatched universality
on the part of Pushkin. Right, says Dostoevsky, and in this Pushkin is
typical of the whole Russian people, who have exactly such a universal
mission. And then . . . hold on to your hat:
Nay, I assert emphatically that never has there been a poet with
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such a universal responsiveness as Pushkin.... This we find in
Pushkin alone, and in this sense he is a unique and unheard-of
phenomenon, and to my mind a prophetic one ... since it is exactly
in this that his national, Russian strength revealed itself most-the
national character of his poetry, the national spirit in its future
development and in our future, which is concealed in that which
is already present-and this has been prophetically revealed by
Pushkin. For what else is the strength of the Russian national spirit
than the aspiration, in its ultimate goal, for universality and all-
embracing humanitarianism? Having become a fully national poet,
having come in contact with the people and their vigor, Pushkin
at once began to foresee their future destiny. In this he was a diviner
and a prophet... .
Indeed, at once we began to strive impetuously for the most vital
universal all-humanitarian fellowship. Not inimically, (as it would
seem it should have happened), but in a friendly manner, with full
love, we admitted into our soul the genius of foreign nations, without
any racial discrimination, instinctively managing-almost from the
first step-to eliminate contradictions, to excuse and reconcile dif-
ferences, thereby manifesting our readiness and proclivity to enter
into an all-embracing, universal communion with all the nation-
alities of the great Aryan races.
Yes, the Russian's destiny is incontestably all-European and uni-
versal. To become a genuine and all-round Russian means, perhaps
(and this you should remember), to become brother of all men, a
universal man, if you please. Oh, all this Slavophilism and this
Westernism is a great, though historically inevitable, misunder-
standing. To a genuine Russian, Europe and the destiny of the great
Aryan race are as dear as Russia herself, as the fate of his native
land, because our destiny is universality not by the sword but by
the force of brotherhood and our brotherly longing for the fellowship
of men. If you analyze our history after Peter's reform, you will find
traces and indications of this idea, of this fantasy of mine, in the
character of our intercourse with European nations, even in our
state policies. For what else has Russia been doing in her policies,
during these two centuries, than serving Europe much more than
herself? I do not believe that this took place because of the mere
want of aptitude on the part of our statesmen.
Oh, the peoples of Europe have no idea how dear they are to us!
And later-in this I believe-we, well, not we but the future Rus-
sians, to the last man, will comprehend that to become a genuine
Russian means to seek finally to reconcile all European controversies,
to show the solution of European anguish in our all-humanitarian
and all-unifying Russian soul, to embrace in it with brotherly love
all our brethren, and finally, perhaps, to utter the ultimate word of
great, universal harmony, of the brotherly accord of all nations
abiding by the law of Christ's gospel.
Dostoevsky was a worshipper of the Russian God, the tribal totem
mentioned earlier. His ideas on this point emerge most clearly in the
discussions between Shatov and Stavrogin in his novel,
The Possessed is a novel based on the Bakunin terrorist underground.
The starting point of the following exchange is the question of what
makes the Russian people the God-bearer. The speaker is Shatov: "The
purpose of every popular movement or motion, in every people and at
every moment of its being, is, exclusively, the search for God; its own
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God, only its own.... God is the synthetic personality of the whole
people taken from its beginning until its end. There never had been one
common God for all or many peoples, but each people had its own
particular one.... When the Gods are shared in common, then they
die and the faith in them, together with the peoples themselves, also
dies. The stronger the people, the more exclusive its God. There had
never been a people without religion, that is, without the conception
of good and evil and its own, unique, good and evil."
Stavrogin answers: "You have reduced God to a simple attribute of
nationality."
Shatov: "Reduce God to an attribute of nationality? ... on the con-
trary, I raise the people up to God. And could it be otherwise? The
people is the body of God. Every people only remains such while it has
its own God and while it rejects all other Gods in the world uncompro-
misingly; while it believes that with its God it will conquer and drive
from the world all the other gods. . . . A truly great people can never
be reconciled to a secondary role amongst humanity, or even to a primary
role, but only and exclusively to the first role. . . . But truth is only one,
and therefore, only one of the peoples can have the true God, even
though the other peoples have their own great gods. The only `God-
bearer' people is the Russian one...."
Stavrogin then asks Shatov whether he believes in God. Shatov an-
swers: "I believe in Russia, I believe in her orthodoxy-I believe in the
body of Christ.-I believe that the Second Coming will take place in
Russia-I believe-Shatov babbled madly.-But in God? In God? I-
I will believe in God."
Thus in the end, the idolater of the so-called Russian God reveals
himself to be an atheist. This is no surprise, since a God who is the
exuded essence of an ethnic group or people is no God, but a mere pagan
tribal totem, however much Dostoevsky may prate in other locations
about the universality of the Orthodox faith. The most characteristic
aspect of Dostoevsky's mental processes is that he is not troubled by being
an Orthodox atheist, a Christian pagan, a tolerant anti-Semite, a peaceful
warmonger, a brotherly imperialist, or a Nazi Communist. For him this
is the normal order of things.
Today's Soviet official propaganda is increasingly preoccupied with the
Stalin glorification of Stalin, who is the supernatural force presiding over today's
build-up of the military economy. Like a Roman Emperor deified after
his death, Stalin is the object of a state mystery cult, the Soviet Mars
of the Third World War. It is misleading to speak of the rehabilitation
of Stalin; Stalin was never really in disgrace, and in any case what is
happening today is his elevation to the level of a god.
The principle of Stalin's actual political career was nothing but the
cult of Moscow the Third Rome. The obvious comparison is with Ivan
the Terrible, whom Stalin admired greatly and with whom he compared
his own exercise of power. To attempt to explain any of Stalin's actions
in terms of the Marxist-Leninist categories with which they were packaged
for the edification of credulous gulls is the most absurd folly.
The young Stalin was shaped in a decisive way by the Georgian Or-
thodox Church. He first attended a church school, and then a seminary
for the training of priests. As he himself later commented, the seminary
experience made him familiar with Jesuit casuistry-scholastic methods
of lying. During this time Stalin began to identify himself with the
character of Koba in the novel The Untameable by Alexander Kasbegi,
a nineteenth-century romance about the Georgian liberation struggle.
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Stalin married a deeply religious woman, and at her early death he
complied with her request for a funeral according to the Orthodox rite.
The young Stalin was a terrorist and agent provocateur, and there is
no doubt that he was in the pay of the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana.
Stalin was active in the illegal fundraising program of the Bolsheviks,
and masterminded the 1907 robbery of the State Bank in Tiflis, during
the course of which 50 people were killed and wounded. Stalin directed
a protection racket to extort funds from shopkeepers and merchants in
Georgia. Stalin was also a pimp, running a chain of brothels, and a letter
exists showing that Lenin both knew of, and approved, this fund-raising
activity.
During the 1920s, Stalin opposed those who saw the 1917 revolution
as a kind of salto mortale in Russian history. Stalin himself emphasized
the continuity of that history, often repeating, "We are accountable for
the bad and the good in Russian history." In December 1927, Stalin was
at pains to deny rumors published in the Hearst newspapers in the United
States reporting a secret speech by Stalin advocating the speedy conclu-
sion of a concordat between the Soviet regime and the Russian Orthodox
Church. Stalin staunchly defended the "justified national pride of the
Great Russians."
Stalin's conversations with filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein show his deep
personal identification with Ivan the Terrible, especially with Ivan's
lifelong campaign to exterminate the boyars, the Russian feudal nobles
who were more or less independent of the central power in Moscow.
Stalin laughingly criticized Ivan the Terrible's habit of sending lists of
the names of his victims to the monasteries so that prayers could be said
for their souls. Stalin said that he would have used that time to massacre
even more boyars.
Stalin's equivalent to the boyars were the kulaks, the prosperous peas-
ants who had grown up under the aegis of Lenin's New Economic Policy
(NEP). In 1929, Stalin adopted the policy of "liquidation of the kulaks
as a class," which meant the slaughter and deportation of several million
peasants and their families, representing the most successful part of Soviet
agriculture. This went together with Stalin's decree for the forced col-
lectivization of agriculture, with all peasant being deprived of their hold-
ings and coerced into joining kolkhozes, or collective farms. This went
together with the policy of forced industrialization, which provided the
economic base necessary for twentieth-century warfare.
Starting in about 1935, Stalin began a policy of systematic impris-
onment and liquidation for certain categories of persons deemed "objec-
tively suspect" of collaboration with foreign powers against the Soviet
regime. This recalled very explicitly the Oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible.
Now, instead of the black-clad Oprichniki of the sixteenth century, it
was the Cheka-NKVD-OGPU-GPU-MGB-KGB succession that carried
on the arrests, show trials, and slaughter, under leaders like Yagoda,
Yezhov, and Beria. The wide-ranging, gratuitous murder of suspects, but
also the slaughter of the secret police themselves (called by Ivan the
Terrible "sorting folks out"), made the years of the Yezhovshchina un-
cannily resemble the Oprichnina. The internal butcher's bill of the Stalin
regime is in the neighborhood of 30 million dead.
Stalin's attitude toward the West was also the canonical Third Rome
one. He used the Communist Third International and its German party,
the KPD, to assist the success of Hitler because he viewed Hitler as anti-
Western, being especially impressed with the attacks on the Versailles
system, Britain, and France that were the dominant note in Nazi pro-
paganda and Hitler's personal demagogy. Stalin saw the Nazis as a force
to destroy the pro-Versailles and pro-Western SPD leadership, and later
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as a force to turn against the Western powers. Stalin is quoted as saying
in 1931: "Don't you believe . . . that if the National Socialists should
come to power in Germany, they would be so exclusively preoccupied
with the West, that we would be free to build socialism in peace here?"
The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939 was firmly grounded
on Stalin's side in the imperialist tradition of the Third Rome. It resem-
bled the Tilsit accords of 1807, negotiated on a barge by Emperor Na-
poleon and by Tsar Alexander I of Russia, while the hapless King of
Prussia paced and waited on the bank. Both deals gave Russia a free
hand east of a line of demarcation; both were directed against the British.
Stalin was the only national leader of 1939 who wanted general war,
and the Hitler-Stalin alliance was the crucial factor in allowing Hitler
to begin what was to become a world conflict. Russia became an ally of
Germany and a kind of associate member of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis.
The raw materials deliveries set up by Ribbentrop and Molotov pro-
vided the Nazi war machine with the sinews of war: oil, rubber, grain,
nickel, and other vital raw materials. Stalin's medium to long-term in-
tention was to use Hitler to batter the French, the British, and the minor
continental powers into submission, but at the same time to use the
German raw materials dependency on Russian deliveries (in the face of
the British sea blockade) to enforce satrap status on Hitler.
Stalin exerted pressure on Romania, which had oil, while the Nazis
kept a presence in Finland, which had nickel. On the occasion of Mol-
otov's last visit to Berlin on November, 1940, the Soviet government
expressed interest in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
Greece, Poland, Sweden, and the Skaggerak and Kattegat-the entrances
to the Baltic Sea between Sweden and Denmark. On November 26,
1940, Stalin told the German ambassador in Moscow that he would be
ready to join the Axis if he received the undisputed possession of Finland,
the right to occupy Bulgaria, with a land and sea base to command the
straits and overwhelm the Turks, and the area south of Batum and Baku
in the direction of the Persian Gulf, including Iran. He also wanted the
Japanese island of Sakhalin.
During the war, Stalin kept a channel open to the Nazi government
through neutral Stockholm, and contacts were esepcially active during
1942 and 1943. In December 1942, on the eve of Stalingrad, the Soviet
representative offered immediate separate peace on the eastern front, the
terms being status quo ante-the restoration of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
line. (See Peter Kleist, Eine Europdische Tragodie).
In June of 1943, Stalin was making new offers, summed up as follows:
The Soviets do not intend to fight one day, not even one minute,
longer than is necessary for the interests of England and America.
Hitler, in his ideological blindness, let himself be driven by the
intrigues of the capitalist powers into this war, which upset the
Kremlin in the decisive phase of its buildup plans. The Soviet Union
can, indeed, through the employment of its last resources and with
the help of deliveries from the U.S.A., offer resistance to the Ger-
man armies, and can perhaps even destroy them in a murderous
war. But then the Soviet Union, bleeding from its many wounds,
will face, over the corpse of an annihilated Germany, the shining
weapons of the Western powers, unblunted by any blows. Even now,
the Anglo-Americans have made no guaranteed declaration on war
aims, on territorial determinations, on the form of peace, etc. etc.
(Kleist, Eine Europdische Tragodie).
In September 1943, after the German defeat in the battle for the Kursk
salient, there was a new Soviet offer: "The goal of the Kremlin's nego-
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tiations is the restoration of the Russo-German borders of 1914, a free
hand in the straits question, German disinterest towards Soviet efforts
in all of Asia, and the development of extensive economic relations
between Germany and the Soviet Union" (Kleist). There are unconfirmed
reports of a Ribbentrop-Molotov meeting during the summer of 1943,
with a Soviet-Nazi separate peace as the key agenda item.
As U. S. Secretary of State James Byrnes and others have noted, the
Soviet catalogue of demands did not change from the Ribbentrop-Mol-
otov period to the Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam period. The Soviets continued
to demand the recognition of their sovereign hegemony over satrap states
in eastern Europe, including Poland, up to the 1939 line of demarcation
and well beyond it. Stalin demanded and got the division of Germany
into zones of occupation-which have proven to be permanent-and
also demanded his own Morgenthau Plan for the destruction and plun-
dering of the German economy, in the form of the demontage of factories
and their transfer to the Soviet Union, plus assigned shares of German
industrial production year by year.
In the Far East, Stalin was every bit as much the unabashed Third
Rome imperialist, demanding the restoration of territory and interests
lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, including Sakhalin Island, im-
perial concessions of Russian pre-eminent interest in Manchuria (like
the running of the Manchurian railroads), and possession of the port of
Darien and the naval base of Port Arthur. Stalin also slyly included on
his list the Kurile Islands, which had never been Russian, but which he
was determined to seize anyway.
The Soviet propaganda of the late Stalin era made no secret of the
Third Rome and Great Russian racist inspiration of Kremlin policies.
One historian sums up the case as follows: "The grandeur of Tsarist Russia
was trumpeted more stridently than it ever had been during the war.
The historians exalted every feat of imperial conquest: They presented
every act of violence once inflicted upon Russia's subject nations as an
act of emancipation and progress, for which the oppressed nations should
have been grateful. They hailed Catherine the Great and Nicholas I as
the benefactors and protectors of the peoples of the Caucasus and of
Central Asia; and they portrayed the leaders of those peoples, who resisted
Tsardom and struggled for independence, as reactionaries and British or
Turkish stooges. Schoolchildren were given a view of history as a single
sequence of wicked foreign conspiracies invariably foiled by their ances-
tors' vigilance and valor. No one was to doubt that Russia, and Russia
alone, was the salt of the earth, the cradle of civilization, the fount of
all that is great and noble in the human spirit. The Russians became the
pioneers, discoverers, and inventors of all those fears of modem tech-
nology which an ignorant or malicious world attributed to Britons, Ger-
mans, Frenchmen, or Americans. Day in day out, the newspapers filled
their pages with stories of miraculous Popovs or Ivanovs who had been
the first to design the printing press, the steam engine, the aeroplane,
and the wireless" (Isaac Deutscher, Stalin [New York, 1970], p. 603-4).
The ideological profile assembled here has been the dominant one in
Russian history. The Byzantine cultural paradigm by its essence is more
binding than the Western, Augustinian one. This ideological profile of
Russian imperialism has been operative in this century, even during the
times that its workings were somewhat subterranean, and there can be
no question that it is efficient today. It has been noted by a number of
writers that if we examine a Russian Orthodox believer of the sixteenth
or seventeenth centuries, a Slavophile of the nineteenth century, or a
Communist commisar of the twentieth century, we will find virtually no
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change in the internalized mental map of reality, in particular in regard
to the relations between Russia and the West. Only the labels have
changed. Out of these most superficial and ephemeral changes, the ideo-
logues of this century have attempted to manufacture theories to obscure
the historical essence of the problem.
Stalin's recreation of the Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church
on Sept. 4, 1943, and the accompanying changes made in official Soviet
propaganda and other arrangements, as the price for Orthodox support
in the conduct of the Great Patriotic War, serves as a very powerful
illustration that some things do not change so easily. If we review the
fragmentary materials available on the history of the Rossiya Society,
alias the Society for the Preservation of Architectural Monuments, a
group of Great Russian chauvinist military officers of the highest ranks
founded by Marshal Chuikov and continued by Marshal Grechko and
others, it is evident that the old traditions of the Third Rome, along
with the Stalin revival, constitute the ideology of the present Soviet
build-up for World War III. It may be an esoteric ideology for empiricist
academics or those on the Kissinger or Harriman payrolls, but for a
competent analyst it is a plain fact, and not very esoteric at all.
Stalin himself publicized his own views on the matter to a certain
extent in his concluding toast at the Kremlin banquet for Red Army
commanders on May 24, 1945, in which the Generalissimo stated: "I
should like to drink to the health of our Soviet people . . . and first of
all to the health of the Russian people. I drink first of all to the health
of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all
the nations of the Soviet Union. . . . It has won in this war universal
recognition as the leading force in the Soviet Union among all the peoples
of our country.... The confidence of the Russian people in the Soviet
government was the decisive force which ensured the historic victory
over the enemy of mankind-fascism."
On July 8, 1948, the Stalin regime organized a large-scale celebration
in Moscow for the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the Russian
Orthodox Church. The following observations from the speech of Ste-
phen, Metropolitan of Sofia and Exarch of Bulgaria, demonstrate the
continuing central importance of the Third Rome prophecy:
In this way the Russian Orthodox Church freed herself from sub-
jection to Constantinople (Tsargrad). It was not a revolt of subjects
against authority; it was also not a rejection by an adult Daughter
of the duty of unconditional obedience to her Mother. It was a
majestic act of Orthodox zeal, a defense of one's own Orthodoxy
against new criminal attacks on it. It was a courageous step by a
great Church which was prepared to defend all Universal Orthodoxy,
including the Greek one. . . . Moscow became the Third Rome,
having taken the place in the confession of Christ's truth of the
First Rome which had departed from the truth, and of the Second
Rome which had slipped off the path of faith-Constantinople"
(Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 8, 1948, p. 16).
Or, put more succinctly, in the words of the late Metropolitan Nikodim
of the Russian Orthodox Church spoken to representatives of the Church
of England in Lambeth Palace in Canterbury several years ago: "One day
very soon you will have to recognize that we are the Third Rome!"
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2.3 Imperial Soviet Russia and
the Chaldean-Byzantine
Model of Empire
The Soviet state's raison d'etat is Imperial Peace in the same sense as it
was in the old Russian Empire, and the Ottoman, Byzantine, and Roman
Empires before it. Political folklore has preserved the notion of the
doctrine of Imperial Peace in the form of traditional gossip about Pax
Romana, Pax Britannica and so on. Imperial Peace is that state of affairs
in which a great empire has extinguished from the face of the earth every
possible rival state or political institution. It is, today, the substance of
the Soviet-sponsored "peace movement," and the price that the Western
alliance's appeaser faction, beginning with Lord Carrington, is willing
to pay in order to "avoid war."
The actual political doctrine of Imperial Peace first emerged as a fun-
damental commitment of the state in the third millennium B.C. during
the Ur period of Akkadian hegemony in Mesopotamia, under the influ-
ence of the Chaldean priesthood, as far as recorded history informs us.
The Ur Chaldean doctrine of Imperial Peace, in fact, bears striking
resemblance to the present policies, both domestic and foreign, of the
Soviet Union. Essentially, the concept is: In order to maintain the
stability and continuity of a state, based on internal repression and on
state management of the economy, one must destroy any and every other
state or political entity, near or far, which might become a rallying point
of ideological or political loyalties or which might threaten the material
resources of the state-run economy.
A quick summation of the Mesopotamian notion of statecraft from
the Ur Chaldean period will bring out the similarities to the Soviet state:
As tens of thousands of surviving cuneiform tablets of the period show,
the economy of Mesopotamia in that period was a state-run, centrally
planned economy similar, institutionally, to that of the U.S.S.R. Plan-
ning and management were carried out by the Chaldean priesthood at
the temples who, in later years, became known as the Magi, or "magi-
cians." In that riparian-agricultural economy, economic management
consisted of seeing through the annual agricultural production cycle:
storing and preserving the seed, distributing the agricultural tasks from
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sowing to harvesting, and meting out payments to the working population
in the form of stipends from the stores of the temple. The most important
task, however, was water management:
In the geography of Mesopotamia, this meant political and military
control over the entire area irrigated by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers,
a task involving the subjugation of peoples inhabiting not only the Tigris
and Euphrates basins but also all the territories which might endanger
control over the two rivers' headwaters and by extension, those further
territories and peoples adjacent to territories in proximity to strategic
locations near the rivers. This perspective brought the foreign policy
interests of the Chaldean priesthood all the way up to the north coasts
of the Caspian and Black Seas and out into the Eastern Mediterranean.
These perceived needs of the Chaldean priesthood gave rise to the
original notion of Imperial Peace: All nationalities and peoples inhabiting
any relevant territory of the known world must be deprived of the means
and ability to form politico-military institutions of state. World Empire
thus became the practical requirement for preserving dominion over the
state-socialist run strip of fertile land between Tigris and Euphrates from
Ashur down to Babylon.
The means adopted by the Chaldean statesmen for imposing such
world Imperial Peace over different populations have changed little over
the centuries. They have remained principally five: 1) genocide, 2) pop-
ulation relocation, 3) assimilation into the dominant group, 4) bestowal
of a special status of subjugation and alliance which in the Roman Empire
period became known as Foederati, 5) religious cult manipulation which,
as state policy during the Roman Empire, was given the name Pax Deorum-
"peace of the gods."
In Soviet policy, these five motifs are very familiar: 1) Genocide against
Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Poles, et al. is known to have occurred
repeatedly; 2) Relocation both of Russian populations into hostile ter-
ritories and of hostile non-Russian populations away from their national
home has also been the standard Soviet policy; 3) Assimilation, especially
by means of forced Russianization, especially against Latvians, Estonians,
Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians is also well documented;
4) Bestowal of the status of populi foederati is the policy of what we see
happened to Eastern Europe's "captive nations," as well as the Cuban
and Vietnamese "surrogates." Ironically, the East Germans of today have
acquired the status of the favored foederatus once enjoyed by the Ostro-
goths from the time of Constantius to that of Justinian; 5) Finally, the
policy of Pax Deorum is, in content, nothing different from Josef Stalin's
famous nationalities policy: Each nation, each gentium of gentiles is allowed
to worship its own hearth, provided that all hearths together, all na-
tionalities, sacrifice and work for the aggrandizement of the Imperium.
Continuity of imperial tradition
What must be understood first and foremost, if one is ever to adequately
estimate what the Soviet Union in fact is, is this: These hideous policies
of oppression and brutality such as genocide, ethnocide, mass brain-
washing, coersion, "assimilation," manipulation and prostitution of cap-
tive nations, are not arbitrary whims of tyrants who enjoy administering
brutal oppression. They are the logical consequences of a highly refined
tradition of statecraft, going back many thousands of years, a tradition
associated with the notion of "Ecumenical Empire" and, thus, "Ecumen-
ical Peace." When the Chaldean priesthood of Ur first devised this notion,
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it found great fascination it its application and execution. Over a period
of many centuries, though dynasties changed as the Babylonian "King
Lists" show, the Mesopotamian Empire, under many different names such
as Akkadian, Sumerian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, remained. The
great engineers of Empire, the Chaldean priesthood, remained at the
controls through all these changes. Each time a particular dynasty or a
particularly successful king threatened this control, it or he was replaced.
What remained invariant in Mesopotamian politics was the Imperial
principle and its practitioners, the Chaldeans. They practiced religious
manipulation, genocide, population relocations; they manipulated and
controlled at will militarily powerful primitive tribes; they invented and
practiced with abandon what many centuries later Rudyard Kipling would
dub "The Great Game."
Over the centuries of practice, for the Chaldean Magi, "the play became
the thing." A deeply rooted tradition of Magi-associated statecraft emerged
in the affairs of mankind. The Old Testament, in more ways than one,
reflects the struggles associated with this tradition of statecraft, the Cult
of Temporal Power. In the New Testament, it is echoed in the references
to the Whore of Babylon and in the account of Jesus Christ's triumph
over the temptation presented in the form of "the Prince of this World."
As the Great Game itself became the "thing," the tradition of Ecu-
menical Empire and thus Ecumenical Peace, was transplanted westward.
The last great project of the old Chaldean priesthood, in the name of
their own power, involved employment of Persian military might to the
task of reducing the Greek republics to slavery. It produced the "Persian
Wars" described by Herodotus, which resulted in defeat of the empire.
In order to preserve the idea of empire, the Chaldean priesthood was
willing to undermine its own Mesopotamian seat of power and to build
up Sparta, Thebes, and finally Macedonia as powerful military marcher
lords against the republican forms of government in ancient Greece.
In order to preserve the Imperial idea, they allied with and helped
augment the power of the militarily superior Macedonia, on the basis of
agreements with King Philip, to restore ecumenical "Imperial Peace"
under the infamous "Isocrates Plan." Philip's son, Alexander the Great,
abandoned his father's deal, destroyed militarily the power base of the
Chaldean priesthood, restored ancient republican liberties, and for this
he was assassinated. After Alexander's assassination, the Chaldean Magi
and other recipients of their tradition, embarked on the project of trans-
planting their notions of imperial statecraft, the "Great Game" of world
empire, westward. Eventually, by means of influences over and through
the Ptolemaic and Seleucid dynasties, and through the cult of Magna
Mater, the Roman Empire was constructed as an ecumenical empire, to
maintain ecumenical imperial peace.
Rome maintained this peace by means of the same "population control"
policies devised earlier by the Chaldeans: genocide, population reloca-
tions, assimilation through extension of Roman "citizenship," Pax Deo-
rum, and use of populi foederati.
Thus, the ecumenical power of world empire was being preserved, and
the Chaldean Magi's principle of statecraft ruled triumphant, whereas
all nations and peoples ruled by this scheme were nearing extinction, in
the depths of cultural, economic, and demographic "heat death," the
proper outcome of imperial "Ecumenical Peace." Christianity emerged
as the affirmation of Natural (God's) Law, against this entropy, the law
of empire. The struggles which ensued, led directly to the famous "Dio-
cletian Reforms," and the founding of the Byzantine Empire, the direct
precedessor of the present Soviet Empire.
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Diocletian reforms and the Russian cultural matrix
The reason for which General Secretary Gorbachov and Marshal Ogarkov
today are beating their heads against the culturally induced anti-tech-
nology bias of the mass of the Russian population, is the same reason to
which they owe their current position of extraordinary political power:
the Diocletian Reforms of the Roman Empire toward the end of the third
century A. D. These reforms codified a number of laws and decrees whose
purpose was not merely to prohibit any technological change in society's
economic practice, but also to promote institutional forms of life which
would extinguish the very idea of the possibility of technological change
from the minds of the subject populations.
The Diocletian Reforms also created the framework of institutions of
Imperial power which remained dominant throughout the 1,123 years
of existence of the Byzantine Empire and which we find today in the
Soviet Empire: the elected (not hereditary) Emperor, or General Sec-
retary, the appointed/elected (not hereditary) Senate or Central Com-
mittee, and the continuity of the Imperial administrative class or
Nomenklatura.
Emperor Constantine 1, "The Great," formally inaugurated the city of
Constantinople, to be the Second Rome, on May 11, 330. The "City"
fell to Sultan Muhammad II, The Conqueror, on May 29, 1453. During
the intervening 1,123 years, the Eastern Roman Empire, called "The
Roman Empire," by its contemporaries, and "The Byzantine Empire," by
our contemporary historians, was ruled on the basis of the administative
edicts of Emperor Diocletian, without the slightest alteration.
These edicts, the so-called Diocletian Reforms, were based on specific
legislation explicitly prohibiting the introduction of any technological
innovation, whatsoever, in society's economic practice, on grounds of
preserving the stability of professional guilds; the Diocletian Reforms also
included major legislation, whose stated intent was the reduction of
population.
Emperor Diocletian, also, around 303, was the first emperor to publicly
proclaim Mithra, Sol Invictus Mithra, Protector of the Empire. An earlier
Roman emperor, Tiberius, who ordered the crucifixion of Jesus Christ,
was, on the island of Capri, under the overwhelming influence of actual
Chaldean priests who had persuaded him to proclaim Mithra a god-
protector of the empire. Tiberius had failed to persuade the Senate to
agree. Diocletian did so with the addition "Sol Invictus," Sun Invincible.
At the time of Diocletian's proclamation of Mithra as "Protector of the
Empire," Constantine was a tribunus in Diocletian's court.
Zero growth and technological standstill, was the stated axiomatic,
philosophical, purpose to which, the imperial state, designed by Diocle-
tian, was dedicated. The state's internal administrative regulations, the
so-called constitution, regulating the behavior of the institutions of power,
the political "system" of Diocletian state, the Byzantine Empire, was:
1) The Emperor: Not a hereditary, but an elective office. The Byzantine
emperor had to be elected by the Senate, acclaimed by the Army, and
confirmed by acclamation by the "people," i.e. the riff-raff of Constan-
tinople's streets.
2) The Senate: Even before Diocletian's reforms, the "Roman Senate"
had been transformed beyond recognition. Diocletian merely codified
those transformations. "Senatorial Provinces," administered by tradi-
tional patrician families, ceased to exist. The Senate lost all legislative
power. Instead, it became the consultative assembly for all the Senior
Imperial Advisers, the power seat of the senior functionaries of govern-
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ment. Its function, almost identical to the modem day Soviet Central
Committee, was a) to run the day-to-day affairs of state, b) elect the
emperor, c) in its capacity as a special sort of judicial court, to approve
broad policies. Like the members of the Soviet Central Committee, the
Byzantine, Diocletian-modeled Senate, had its members divided into
three classes: those residing in the seat of power, Constantinople, the
illustres, also adopting the title of Patrician, those permanently stationed
in the seats of provincial governments, like Oblast secretaries, the so-
called clarissimi, and those who floated between the capital and the
provinces, like Geidar Aliyev in the 1970s, called the spectabiles.
3) The Church. A special function of the Imperial Administration. In
the pre-Christian era of the Diocletian Empire, its function was exem-
plified by the institution of Pax Deorum, to be administered by the
priesthoods of all the different cults under the direction of the Pontifex
Maximus, the emperor.
Emperor Constantine I, the Great, who allowed Christianity to be
included in the list of officially sanctioned religions of the empire, was
a senior ranking member in Emperor Diocletian's court, a tribunus, during
the time of the great Diocletian persecutions of the Christians in 303
and afterward. The founder of the Eastern, Byzantine, Roman Empire,
was thoroughly schooled in the Diocletian reforms.
When Diocletian introduced his reforms, including the cult of Sol
Invictus Mithra, he was reigning in the eastern part of the empire. He
remained in the East throughout his life. While he was "Augustus," his
deputy, the "Caesar," was Galerius. There is no evidence that Diocletian,
whose name was applied to the "Diocletian persecutions," was in any
way especially hostile to the Christian cult of the time. He was merely
in favor of a unifirm cult orientation for the whole empire's population,
a cult orientation which would "pray for the state." Evidence suggests
that the "Diocletian persecutions" were ordered by Ceasar Galerius in
an effort to establish such uniformity of worship.
The Diocletian-Galerian persecutions, the last ever to take place, were
suspended by an edict, signed by Diocletian and Galerius as well as the
two co-emperors of the West, in which the Christians were allowed free
worship, and full restoration of their properties, both private and church
property, with the understanding that they would "pray for the state."
(The text of the edict survives, see Appendix.)
The imperial tradition is passed to Muscovy
Documented elsewhere is the fact that the Byzantine Empire, during the
Paleologue dynasty, had abandoned the Chaldean doctrine of statecraft
and aligned with the Augustinian traditions of the Catholic Church in
the West. For this, members of the imperial elite and clergy of Byzantium
engineered the military conquest of their own seat of power by the
Ottoman Turks. The same political faction transferred the mandate for
Imperial statecraft to one of their backwater dependencies, the obscure
Grand Duchy of Muscovy, by means of the legend of the "Third and
Final Rome."
Maps 10-19 chart the territorial growth of the Russian state from the
1400s-when its rulers were bitten by the "bug" of the "Third and Final
Rome,"-to the present day. In the span of 500 years, since, more or
less, the discovery of America by Columbus, the Russian state grew from
a miniscule patch of land defined by the Tver-Kaluga line and by the
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Volga and Oka rivers, to a vast expanse covering one-sixth of the surface
of the earth. Beyond its own formal territory, it exerts dominion over
millions of square miles of territories inhabited by its populi feoderati in
Mongolia, Afghanistan, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola,
Mozambique, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East
Germany, etc.
The growth of this empire has been astounding. It has been fueled by
strategic motivations which are coherent with the old Chaldean concept
of ecumenical Imperial Peace: The Russian state, either in its Soviet or
in its earlier form, "cannot feel secure" so long as there exist other socio-
political formations in the world which might challenge its power.
The Soviet Union's Institute of Ethnography, the Soviet state's watch-
dog for "nationalities' policy," routinely but painstakingly preaches that
the organized state is the finest achievement an ethnic group, or nation,
can attain. Having reversed "classical Marxist" tenets on the subject, it
argues that "the state" is an accretion of a nation's, not a class's, historical
activity. Any given social class, e.g., the proletariat, may attain to
political supremacy in the state, only if it can best serve the state interests
of the nation. It short, the currently official justification for the "dic-
tatorship of the proletariat" in the Soviet Union is, stated explicitly,
that it is the political arrangement which best serves the state of the
Russian nation, the Russian Empire.
Seen through the eyes of the Russian imperial state's Institute of Eth-
nography, Russia's adversaries in the modem world are the states which
have been formed by the largest rival ethnic formations.
To quote the Director of the Soviet Institute of Ethnography, Yulian
Bromley:
Although a single biological species, which develops according to
common social laws, the human race today falls into a multitude
of different historically formed communities, such as race, class,
family, state, etc. Among these human communities, a special place
is occupied by units now customarily referred to as ethnic: tribe,
nationality, nation, ethnic group, etc. According to very conser-
vative estimates, the human race has inherited from the past at least
two or three thousand of these units. They differ enormously-both
in level of development and in number-ranging from nationalities
archaic by origin, and even tribes which now have only thousands,
if not hundreds of members, to nations of many millions. Charac-
teristically, 11 peoples alone constitute almost 50 percent of man-
kind. The 7 largest exceed 100 million each. They (starting from
the largest, according to 1978 data) are. Chinese (934 million),
Hindustanis (180.5 million), U.S. Americans (172.2 million), Ben-
galis (138.7 million), Russians (138.6 million), Japanese (115.7
million), and Brazilians (112 million). At the same time, the almost
1,500 small peoples numbering up to 100,000 each account for less
than one percent of the world's population.
In the Russian/Soviet leadership's scheme, a nation is as good as its
state. It is a long-established dictum in the Russian tradition of statecraft
that nations, either become the dominant force in world history, or,
failing that, they become "ethnographic material" for other, more suc-
cessful nations. Here lies the secret of the Russian state. Without the
obsessive idea, from the 1440s onward, of Moscow's mission as the "Third
and Final Rome," nothing can be either understood or explained of the
history of the Russian state. It is a history of an endless struggle to prevail
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over other ethnic populations, transform them into "ethnographic ma-
terial" for the Russian state, lest Russia itself become their "ethnographic
material."
The maps of the history of the Russian state's growth tell much of the
story (Maps 10-19):
In the year 1,300 A.D. the Russian state, as it h,Ild been left by
Alexander Nevsky, Grand Prince of Moscow, was a minuscule settlement
around the city of Moscow. When the messianic doctrine of the Third
and Final Rome became adopted by Moscow's rulers after 1439 and they
dropped the title of "Grand Prince of Muscovy" in favor of the Byzantine
style of "autocrat," the Russian state was still no more than a patch of
land delineated by the Oka and Volga rivers surrounding Moscow and
the Tver-Kaluga line. This tiny triangle, in fact, is the home of the
people who are identified as Great Russians.
The great expansion of the immense Russian state out of the confines
of Tver-Kaluga/Oka-Volga begins with the pursuing of the dream of the
Third Rome. Ivan III, coached by the Byzantine Greek priesthood, lays
claim to the title of the last Byzantine emperor, whose niece he had
married, and launches the great drive of conquest. Under him, the Russian
state expands north to the Kola peninsula and the Arctic Sea; east to
the Ob river; south to Kursk; and West to Smolensk and the outskirts
of Pskov.
Under Ivan IV, the Terrible, the Russian state, in pursuit of its destiny
as the Third and Final Rome, and under the skillful guidance of Met-
ropolitan Makarii, expands south of the Don River and up to 200 miles
south and east of the Kama River. These newly acquired vast stretches
of land of the growing Russian state were not filled by "ethnic Great
Russians," the peoples inhabiting the narrow stretch of Volga-Oka/Tver-
Kaluga. The peoples who were subjugated were also subjected to forced
Russianization: Votyaks, Permians, Cheremissians, Mordvins, Bashkirs,
Voguls, Syrians, Cossacks, Chuvashes, and others (Maps 23-24).
The technique then, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was
identical to that employed today by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan:
decapitation of national leadership, violent extinction of national in-
telligentsia, forced mass relocations, and selective settlements of Russian
population in such strategic locations as forts and administratively im-
portant urban centers. This technique of transforming subjugated pop-
ulations into "ethnographic material" for the Russian state was to be
repeated again and again over the centuries, as the Russian state continued
its relentless expansion eastward into Asia, southward through the Ukraine
into the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and westward into Poland, Lith-
uania, Estonia, Latvia, East Prussia, Bessarabia, Moldavia, etc.
In the 1979 census, 109 different nationalities were reported to exist
inside the Soviet state. Ten years earlier, they were 129. Some have
dropped out as used up "ethnographic material," their former members
now identifying themselves as "Russian." Not easily racially identifiable,
a "Russian" is one whose inner sense of national identity is, essentially,
rooted in the axiomatic, not necessarily conscious, acceptance of the
messianic mission of the Third and Final Rome. From "Great Russian,"
the circle expands to "Byelorussian," "Ukrainian," "Slavic," "Panslavic,"
"Indoeuropean."
The Soviet Union today is the old "Great Russian" state which has
enlisted, willy-nilly, the resources of Byelorussian, Ukrainians, Slavs,
"Panslavs," to the drive to construct the "Third and Final Rome." It has
now embarked on exacting the loyalties of the "Indoeuropeans" of West-
ern Europe, Iran, and the Subcontinent, to the imperial scheme of
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dominating the "Eurasian landmass." If the Soviet Institute of Ethnog-
raphy has its way, then Germans, Italians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, English
and so forth, will become the "Great Russian" state's "ethnographic
material, going the way of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Poles, Latvians,
Lithuanians, Esthonians and other proud and "fiercely independent" peo-
ple.
However, for these nations to become "ethnographic material," their
organized nation-states must first be destroyed-which is exactly what
the Soviet Union intends to do upon establishing unchallenged strategic
dominance over the Eurasian landmass. The Soviet Institute of Ethnog-
raphy has, for many years, maintained the most meticulous record of
ethnic separatist movements which might be used against the existing
European nation-states.
Each year, this institute produces the most comprehensive annual
encyclopedia of developments in every one of the thousands of ethnic
groups, tribes, minorities etc. around the world, called Peoples and Races
of the World. The results of this comprehensive monitoring are com-
municated to various specialized organizations such as the Oriental In-
stitute, the Latin American Institute, and others which function as the
think tanks of the KGB and its associated SSD of East Germany which,
in turn, fan the flames of separatist insurgency around the globe from
the Basques, Britons, Corsicans, et al., of Europe to the Sendero Lu-
minoso, Tupamaros, and so forth of Ibero-America, to the various re-
ligious, tribal, and ethnic insurgencies of Asia and Africa. These are
Third Rome's battering rams for the eventual pulverization of the existing
nation-states, which it views as the final obstacles to its dream of Imperial
Peace, the Third and Final Pax Romana.
The expansion of the Russian Empire during the twentieth century
The `Great can not be merely described as territorial expansion qua territorial ex-
Russians' and the pansion-extensive as that has been. The expansion of the geographical
boundaries of the Empire have been accompanied by a far greater change
`Great White Race' in its ethnic map. For the Russian Empire, territorial expansion means
expansion of the territory settled by the Great Russian Race.
No real understanding of the racist and Russian-chauvinist mind of
the Soviet leadership, past and present, is possible without examining
in depth, the historically unprecedented scale of human forced migrations
that have occurred as a result of Soviet Russian policy decisions. Through
the past 65 years, and with especial intensity under Stalin from 1943-
48, "enemy" non-Russian ethnic populations numbering in the tens of
millions have been forcibly uprooted and expelled from territories they
had inhabited for hundreds of years. Millions of Great Russians have
been resettled by official policy into these vast territories vacated by the
expelled millions.
As we shall see, moving the Great Russian ethnic line westward,
southward, and eastward, has also meant moving the Diocesal boundary
of the Russian Orthodox Church an equal distance in each of these
directions. Put into historical terms, in the last four decades, the East-
West cultural and religious divide has been moved, along with the Great
Russian and Russified Slav ethnic line, hundreds of kilometers to the
West.
Expulsion and Great Russian expansion has been westward, southward,
and eastward, always away from Russia proper. The accompanying Russian
ethnic area expansion, has been likewise in these three directions. To
the west, it has been at the expense of Protestant German and Baltic
populations (East Prussian, Baltic German, Pomeranian, East Branden-
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Region
Number Expelled
East Prussia
1,950,000
Danzig
300,000
Pomerania and East Brandenburg
1,900,000
Silesia
3,250,000
Prewar central Poland
650,000
Sudetenland
2,900,000
Hungary
250,000
Yugoslavia
300,000
Romania
100,000
Prewar eastern Poland
275,000
Black Sea Germans (U.S.S.R.)
250,000
Baltic Germans
185,000
burg, Estonian, Latvian) and Roman Catholic German and Polish pop-
ulations, (Silesian, and the Polish populations east of the Bug and the
San, the rivers forming the current Soviet-Polish boundary).
To understand the magnitude of massacre and expulsions involved in
the Russian Empire's expansion to the west under Stalin, one must start
with a view of what the Russian prewar western boundary of 1939 looked
like. To the west of Russia was Poland with a population of 35 million,
Germany with 72 million, Czechoslovakia with 14 million, and the Baltic
republics: Estonia with 1,127,000, Latvia with 1,925,000, and Lithuania
with 2,462,000 people.
Then came the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the partition of Poland, the Russian
seizure of the three Baltic republics, then the war, and, finally Stalin
forcing through his territorial expansion demands, and his mass popu-
lation expulsion. In short, a staggering redrawing of the territorial, ethnic,
and ecclesiastical map of Europe, not seen in centuries.
Ten years later, by 1948, the territories along the western boundary
of the Soviet Union looked quite different. The entire German ethnic
populations of prewar Poland, the three Baltic states, and Czechoslovakia
were expelled. The areas of prewar Germany, east of the rivers Oder and
Neisse, were all but vacated of Germans. Forty percent of the area of
prewar Poland was acquired by the Soviet Union. Most of its Polish
population was forcibly expelled-to settle the depopulated areas of pre-
war Germany that were added to Poland after the war. The part of prewar
Germany taken by Russia-the northern half of East Prussia around
Konigsberg-was settled exclusively by Russians. Its Russian (Orthodox)
population functions as an ethnic and ecclesiastic "buffer," or cordon
sanitaire between Roman Catholic Poland and Lithuania, the only Roman
Catholic republic in the Soviet Union.
The table shows the magnitude of the Stalin program of mass population
expulsion, making Eastern Europe a thoroughly Slavic preserve, by re-
moving the Germans from Eastern Europe, and in doing so-"compen-
sating" Poland and Czechoslovakia at the expense of Germany, binding
the non-Orthodox Slavic Poles and the Czechs to Russia. In the case of
Czechoslovakia, the Germans represented 24% of the country's prewar
population. The population density of the country's western regions has,
to this day, never recovered.
By the same token, removing the Poles from their historical eastern
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provinces, "purified" the Russian Empire down to three main Slavic
groups: Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians.
The western Ukrainians were also "purified" through Stalin's 1946
edict outlawing the Vatican-affiliated Ukrainian Uniate Church. The
Church's leaders, its bishops and priests, were arrested, imprisoned, or
deported to Central Asia, and many were executed or died in prison
camps. This smashing of the Church, together with the 1945-50 "mini-
Afghanistan" type of anti-Russian partisan warfare which raged in the
western Ukraine-and was brutally suppressed-broke the back of
Ukrainian nationalism.
Since then, the entire Ukraine has been officially Orthodox in religion,
and its population has been increasingly Russified. The same very ad-
vanced Russification process has been underway in the other Slavic re-
publics, Byelorussia, and in the Baltic states.
The conclusion and aftermath of World War II produced 15,310,000
refugees from Eastern and Central Europe. Of these, 12,310,000 were
German-speaking-not to mention the two million non-combatant Ger-
mans who were killed in those countries.
Eastern and central Poland saw massive displacements, in addition to
the six million Poles who died under Nazi occupation. Of the 1,600,000
eastern Poles deported to Siberia by the Russians, 508,000 died in short
order. Following the war, 1,500,000 from eastern Poland, and 3,500,000
from central Poland, resettled in the new territory of western Poland,
which had been carved out of the German Reich.
Regarding the Baltic states, especially Estonia and Latvia, the basic
population figures speak for themselves. Above all, the Estonians and
Latvians have never recovered from the mass deportations and executions
of 1940-41, and 1944-46.
The Soviet occupation administration of neighboring Lithuania, 1944-
46, was run by Mikhail Suslov, the political godfather of both Yuri
Andropov and Mikhail Gorbachov.
According to the 1935 census, conducted in each of the three Baltic
states while they were independent, there were 1,473,000 Latvians and
993,000 Estonians. Neither of these two nationalities has yet to regain
its 1935 numbers. The 1979 census recorded only 948,000 Estonians,
and 1,344,000 Latvians.
The Latvians are about to become a minority in their "own" republic.
In 1979, they made up only 53.7% of the population (only 52.4% in
the 1984 interim count), while Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians
combined added up to 40% of Latvia's population (the Russian component
being 32.8%). In 1935, Latvia was only 10% ethnically Russian. The
Latvian capital of Riga now contains at most a 38% Latvian population;
the majority is Russian. With the scheduled start of construction on the
Riga Subway, thousands of Russian construction workers and their fam-
ilies will be brought in, and the balance will tilt even more.
The Russian ethnic takeover of Latvia is the result of a postwar policy
of settling Russians and other Slavs into the Baltic republics-above all
in Latvia and Estonia. Estonia's Russian population has risen from less
than 4% in 1935. (Officially the Estonian census of 1935 records an
8.2% Russian population, but more than half of the people were con-
centrated in the area called Virumaa, south of Lake Peipus, which was
annexed by the Russian Republic in 1945. Its population included 48,300
Russians, 14,700 Setukesen-an Estonian-speaking tribe which had con-
verted to Russian Orthodoxy back in the Middle Ages-and a mere
7,800 Estonians.) Today, Estonians make up 64.7% of the population
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in the 1979 census (63.5% in the 1984 interim count), while in 1979,
Russians made up 27.9% of the population, and with Ukrainians and
Byelorussians, 32%.
We must not overlook the Russian ethnic and religious extension of
the line in the far north and far south of the new, postwar western
boundaries of the empire. In the far north, the Karelia region, annexed
from Finland, which was then run by the Finnish member of the Russian
leadership, Otto Kuusinen, and his young aide and sidekick, Yuri An-
dropov. The Finnish population was expelled en masse to Finland during
1944 and 1945. Some 450,000 Finns were deported. In addition, from
1941 to 1944, some 62,000 Ingermanlander (one of the ethnic groups
which has disappeared from Russia) from the Karelian area, were trucked
to Finland.
Karelia has since been resetled with Russians and Ukrainians. The
same heavy resettlement has occurred in formerly Romanian Bessarabia,
seized by Russia in 1940, and renamed the "Moldavian Republic."
Lebensraum to the south and east
The Russian Empire's drive to the south during this century can be
demarcated into two phases. The first phase began following 1917, and
was in full swing under Stalin-from the collectivization through the
war. It involved a huge extension of the boundary between the Great
Russian Race and the Moslem populations to the south-at a horrendous
cost to the Moslem populations.
This phase embraces the "Afghanistans" of its time: 10 years of brutal
suppression of Moslem and Turkic revolts in Central Asia (1919-29) and
among the Moslem nationalities of Russia proper; brutal actions, in-
cluding the mass genocide of the Kazakhs, during the Collectivization
period, 1929-33; and the forced deportation of the Crimean Tatars and
the Moslem tribes of the northern Caucasus, during the war from 1943
to 1945.
The second phase, which has been underway since 1978 at the latest,
has involved a further southern expansion, accompanied by a grisly rep-
etition of the 1943-47 themes of mass murder and mass expulsions of
populations from the empire, this time to the ethnic benefit of an officially
recognized and sanctioned Turanian Division of the Russian Empire,
added to the historical Slavic one.
During the time of the Tsarist Empire, there were never more than
token Russian populations in areas such as the northern Caucasus, the
Crimea, and the areas of Tatar and Bashkir concentrations between the
Volga River and the Urals, let alone the huge expanses of Kazakhstan-
by far the biggest geographically of all the Central Asian republics.
All these areas today are either predominantly Russian inhabited (or
in the case of the Crimea, Ukrainian), or have a Russian majority (the
case of Kazakhstan). This change occurred at the expense of forcibly
evicted Moslem populations, who were either murdered, as in the case
of the Kakakhs and Bashkirs, or were forcibly deported to Central Asia
under Stalin during 1943-45.
Of those forcibly deported, hundreds of thousands did not survive the
trip, or the camps. They included Crimean Tatars, who were expelled
en masse to Central Asia, and the five Moslem tribes of the northern
Caucasus: the Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars, and Kalmyks. Slavic
Ukrainians were settled in the Crimea, and Great Russian settlers poured
into the northern Caucasus.
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These Moslem tribes, though allowed under Khrushchov to resettle
in their original areas (with the exception of the Crimean Tatars, who
have never been allowed back), have never regained their status as the
majority inhabitants of the region. The area lying to the south and
southeast of the Great Russian Krasnodar-Stavropol region (home of Yuri
Andropov and Mikhail Gorbachov) has become, like the Krasnodar
Region itself, a Great Russian preserve.
As we shall document, the post-1917 period in Russian history has
seen the realization of the Russian imperial "final solution" for every
Moslem ethnic population located within the geographical confines of
the Slavic Russian or Ukrainian republics. The largest Moslem ethnic
groups in the Russian Republic proper were, and are, the Volga Tatars,
and the Bashkirs, who inhabit the region west of the southern Urals.
Through a process of massacre, dispersal, and Russification, the Great
Russian Race "purification" of the Russian Republic proper, has reached
a degree unprecedented in history. The Russian record would make An-
glo-Saxon racist Cecil Rhodes blush with envy.
The Volga Tatars, who numbered six million in the 1970 census, were
"pacified" through a process of massacres during the Civil War following
the Revolution, and were then scattered throughout the Russian Re-
public, such that they have lost a sense of geographical concentration
and continuity. The Tatars numbered some 2,400,000 in the 1897 census;
30 years later, in the 1926 census-reflecting the Civil War depreda-
tions-their population had only grown to 2,856,000.
Their dispersal over the decades has formed the precondition for a
strong Russification of the Tatars. Their population peaked at six million
in the 1970 census, and remained stagnant at 5,931,000 in the 1979
census. This cannot be accounted by any birth rate phenomenon, but
is rather the proof of ongoing and intensified Russification.
Concerning the Tatars as a group, pious believers in the potential of
"Moslem card" destabilization of the Soviet Union, can forget about
them. The same is true for the second largest Moslem ethnic group in
the Russian Republic: the Bashkirs.
Two case studies of genocide
What happened to the Bashkirs during the Russian Civil War, 1918-21,
can only be described as genocide. In the 1897 census, they numbered
1,500,000, and had grown to two million by the end of World War I.
After the 1917 Revolution, the Bashkirs, celebrating their freedom from
the Tsarist yoke, declared an independent state. In 1920, Red Russian
armies crushed the Bashkir State, executed all Bashkir leaders, and mas-
sacred the population.
Over one million Bashkirs were murdered in the wave of killings,
burnings and executions that swept their territory. The 1926 census,
which recorded barely one million Bashkirs, bears mute testimony to the
extent of the genocide. The ensuing post-genocide Russification is doc-
umented by the otherwise inexplicable census of 1959-33 years later-
which records only 954,000 Bashkirs, and that of 1970, which records
1,181,000 Bashkirs. The latest census, in 1979, showed only 1,240,000
Bashkirs. Shall the Bashkirs, who have never regained their 1897 pop-
ulation level-let alone that of 1918-pose a "Moslem card" threat to
the Russian Empire?
The genocide committed against the Bashkirs was followed up with
the mass murder of the Moslem Kazakhs of Central Asia. The Soviet
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Russian suppression of the Kazakh uprising of 1918 killed many Kazakhs,
but did not stop their population growth. The 1926 census counted
3,800,000 Kazakhs, nearly all in Kazakhstan. Before the 1929-33 Col-
lectivization, the Kazakhs were nomads. The Collectivization triggered
the second Kazakh revolt. By the end of Collectivization, 1,400,000
Kazakhs had been killed-40% of the entire Kazakh population. In 1936,
the Kazakh population was reported to be 2,600,000.
Since then, the Kazakhs have belonged to the assimilated Russophile
variety of Moslem nationalities, and served Mother Russia very well
during the war (as was also the case with the Volga Tatars and the
Bashkirs). They have been poorly rewarded for this good behavior. They
have a Republic with an enormous land area which bears their name,
Kazakhstan. The name is a bad joke. The Kazakhs make up less than
40% of the population of "Kazakhstan." The largest ethnic population
in "Kazakhstan" is Russian (over 45%).
Stalin took no chances on preserving the Russian domination of Ka-
zakhstan. Besides the normal contingents of Ukrainians settled in along
with the Russians, most of the Volga Germans, deported en masse in
1941 after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, were moved to Ka-
zakhstan. The flip side of this coin, is that over 20% of the Kazakh
population of the Soviet Union has been dispersed outside Kazakhstan,
including 9% scattered throughout Russia.
Afghanistan and Iran
From 1978 on, the Russian leadership has been overseeing the same
pattern of mass killings and population expulsions it conducted along
the western boundary of the empire during the 1940s, but this time along
its southern boundary. This has continued down to the present. Soviet
asset Khomeini and the Tashkent variety of Mullahs have locked Iran
and Iraq into a replica of the Thirty Years War, a grisly re-run of the
killing fields of World War I.
A recent estimate put out by New York Council on Foreign Relations
member Philip Geyelin mentions 500,000 Iranian and over 200,000 Iraqi
war dead. Sunday Times of London correspondent Amin Taheri, an
Iranian exile, adds an estimated 12,000 political opponents executed by
Khomeini; 250,000 killed in clashes with urban guerrillas, in the raging
guerrilla war in Iranian Kurdistan, and other tribal rebellions. In addition,
Taheri says that over 2,000,000 Iranians have emigrated since Khomeini
came to power. This gives a population outflow of more than three million
from Iran, which borders on the Moslem part of the Soviet Union.
In Afghanistan, which also borders on the Moslem part of the Soviet
Union, the dimensions of the population outflow are even more stag-
gering. Out of an Afghanistan population of 16 million, according to
recent statements by Christian Democratic member of the West German
Bundestag, Jurgen Todenhofer, over one million have been killed by the
Russian occupation (a repeat performance of the revolt suppression and
genocide committed against the Soviet Central Asian populations during
the 1920s and 1930s), and nearly 5,500,000 refugees have been generated,
most of whom have fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Thus, through
death and exile, within a few years the area of Afghanistan has lost over
40% of its population, as Kazakhstan did during the 1930s.
The burden of more than 3,200,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan, is
threatening to tear that country apart, a consequence not unforeseen by
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Soviet planners. It should be noted that the genocide depredations against
the Moslem populations of Soviet Central Asia during the 1920s, also
produced a wave of refugees into Iran (of Turkmens) and Afghanistan
(Uzbeks, Tadjiks, and Kirgiz).
Those Afghans who remain behind are being ground up into the new
assimilated generation-though this time with a Turkic twist. The most
telling feature of the Soviet political-demographic occupation policy in
Afghanistan, apart from the population reduction itself, is the basing of
all schooling upon the ethnic language of the respective village or region.
Concretely, this means that in the northern regions of Afghanistan,
inhabited by Turkic-speaking populations (Uzbek, Tadjik, Turkmen) the
local language-corresponding to the same Turkic languages of the Soviet
"republics" on the the other side of the border-is used.
This strategem will establish a laboratory for the future expansion of
the Turanian division of the empire, into the Turkish-speaking parts of
Iran-Azerbaijan and Iranian Turkmenistan.
The Greater Race's junior partners
Another striking pattern, especially evident since the mid-1970s, has
been that nearly all the Soviet Union's far-flung "surrogates," have them-
selves been engaged in a parody of Great Russian Race expansion, at the
expense of neighboring populations, and of ethnic minorities within their
own national boundaries. The case studies are:
Syria: This nation has been steering a depopulating civil war and ethnic-
religious conflicts in neighboring Lebanon-the domain of "Greater
Syria"-since 1975, when the mass ethnic killings began. Lebanon, with
a mere three million people, has seen more than 100,000 of its citizens
killed, and a mass emigration of even greater magnitude. Syria has aided
Iran in continuing the slaughter in Iraq, and is now aiding and abetting
the beginnings of a Kurdish revolt in southeastern Turkey.
Ethiopia: Expulsion of Moslem and ethnic-minority Christian tribes in
Coptic Ethiopia began with the Soviet-backed Ogaden War in 1977-78
against Somalia. The Moslem-nomadic Somali population of the Ogaden
were driven out en masse into the squalid refugee/death camps of Somalia
(the mass starvation of 1980, and again recently, along with the mass
cholera outbreaks). In the north, besides the hundreds of thousands killed
in over 20 years of fighting in Eritrea, Moslem Eritrea has been one of
the worst-ravaged famine areas. This same pattern of brutal repression
and mass starvation, with no aid allowed in, has plagued the northern
provinces of Tigre and Wollo.
Libya: Soviet client Libya began its expansion in 1973 with the an-
nexation of the Aouzou Strip in neighboring Chad. Last year saw the de
facto annexation of the northern half of Chad, already depopulated through
Libyan actions. The Libyan occupation of northern Chad has generated
a massive refugee influx into southern Chad, and into western Sudan.
Western Sudan, currently a center of famine deaths from drought, is
itself being rapidly depopulated, as the famine survivors move south and
east.
Bulgaria: The "Bulgarization" of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, speaks
for itself. The Bulgarian "race," stagnating in population, will grow through
the forced assimilation of the country's 10% Turkish minority.
We will conclude this section with some telling notes on Russian
population policy.
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Siberian populations and the Jews
Russian expansion to the east-into Siberia-was already accomplished
under the Tsars. The Soviet period has been used to consolidate the
Russian populating of Siberia, and the far-eastern region north of the
Amur and Ussuri Rivers, by transforming the huge region from a virtually
empty tract, into one with a multi-million Russian population.
No treatment of Russian ethnic policy would be complete without a
word on Soviet policy over the period of Yuri Andropov as KGB chief
(1967-82) and party General Secretary, which is the period of permitted
Jewish emigration. Over 260,000 Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate
in this period.
The motivation behind the policy-aside from certain obvious deals
and arrangements with Israel, and Israeli "pay-offs" in return for the
"blood transfusion" of European Jewish immigrants into a state where
emigration has tended to exceed immigration-has been the final im-
plementation of late nineteenth-century Russian Orthodox Church leader
Pobedonostsev's "solution" to the Russian Jewish "Problem": "Let one-
third die, one-third emigrate, one-third assimilate."
That is precisely what has been set into inexorable motion under
Andropov's KGB tenure, and even though the ratios may have changed,
they still add up to 100%. In 1897, there were 4,308,000 Jews in the
Tsarist Empire. In the 1970 census, there were 2,150,000; and by 1979,
after the peak period of Andropov-allowed emigration, only 1,800,000.
These gross figures, however, do not tell the full story; the age structure
of the remaining Jewish population does. By 1979, only 6% of the Jewish
population was children under 10 years old, compared with a Soviet
average of over 18%. In 1970, 12% of the Soviet Jewish population was
over 60 years old. By 1979, this had risen to an alarming 38%. Andropov
and the KGB had allowed the "unassimilable" young Jewish couples with
children to form the bulk of the emigration. Left behind have been the
aged, who will soon die, which will produce a stupendous drop in the
Jewish population over the next two decades. The "rest," as Pobedon-
ostsev would say, "shall assimilate."
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2.4 The Andropov Dynasty:
`Stalin's Children'
The ascendancy of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachov, who only in 1980,
at the age of 49, had become the youngest full member of the Politburo,
met with enthusiasm among many Western politicians and alleged experts
on the Kremlin. "Mikhail Gorbachov: Best Bet for Reform in the Kremlin,"
Princeton Russian affairs specialist Stephen F. Cohen called him (Nov.
11, 1984, Los Angeles Times). The London Observer profiled Gorbachov
as "Kremlin's apostle of change" (Nov. 11, 1984), shortly before Gor-
bachov-not yet the party General Secretary-arrived in London with
his wife Raisa, to show off to the world the outward shine of the modem
folk who were about to take over at the Kremlin.
When U.S.S.R. President and Communist Party General Secretary
Konstantin Chernenko died on March 12, Gorbachov was proclaimed
his successor as party chief just four hours and 15 minutes after Cher-
nenko's official death announcement. The record swiftness of his ele-
vation, in the name of a unanimous Central Committee, bespoke a
collective leadership decision made weeks, if not months, beforehand.
The rosy forecasts and commentaries resumed, with a stress on Gorba-
chov's "accent on reform," and supposed interest in achieving early break-
throughs in arms control-the latter supposition having been furthered
by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's announcement after five
hours of talks with Gorbachov during the December 1984 visit to London,
that "I like Mr. Gorbachov; we can do business together."
Just a few sour notes snuck through in the West. Amid the widely
professed optimism, "cautious" and otherwise, one West German TV
station reminded its audience that "Gorbachov, after all, was a close
supporter and follower of Yuri Andropov's policies ... and, one shouldn't
forget, it was under Andropov that East-West relations were the worst
ever, ... the deepest Ice Age." Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, it
was leaked, had nominated Gorbachov at the Central Committee plenum
after Chernenko's death, with this vote of confidence: "This man has a
nice smile, but he has iron teeth!"
The qualifications for party chief today, begin with the ability to
manage the war machine that Soviet society has become, under the
direction of the combined political-military command. Indeed, the stur-
diest link in the Nomenklatura, the official hierarchy of the Byzantine
Soviet bureaucracy, is one veiled in secrecy-the Defense Council of
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the U.S.S.R. Consisting of the combined inner core of the party and
military leadership, the Defense Council provides continuity of purpose
and policy, which explains the resoluteness and consistency of Soviet
foreign policy, even as the top party post of General Secretary passed
through four sets of hands in the last three years. As of 1984, it included
political leaders: the party General Secretary, the prime minister, the
foreign minister, the chairman of the KGB, and the Central Committee
Secretary for defense matters; and from the military, the defense minister,
the Chief of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, the
CINCs of the Soviet Strategic Missile Corps, Ground Forces and Navy,
and the first deputy defense minister in charge of reserves. The most
senior members, former Foreign Minister (now President) Andrei Gro-
myko and Adm. Sergei Gorshkov, have been members of the Council
since the late 1950s.
Gorbachov's every pronouncement to date follows the watchword of
Marshal Ogarkov, that the civilian economy must be so integrated with
the military, that it can be thrown into full war-mobilization gear at a
moment's notice. The shake-up of the party bureaucracy and industrial
ministries, which from 1981 to 1983 moved key defense-industry man-
agers into top positions in the machine-tool and electric-power sectors,
resumed under Gorbachov. Thus the party and government purges, the
most sweeping in decades, are taking place under the aegis of this political-
military command. The regional party organizations, through the plant-
level party organizations subordinate to them, are responsible for ob-
taining results in the mobilization of the economic and defense capacity
of the Soviet Union.
Beginning March 22, with the ouster of 70-year-old Ivan Bespalov
from the post of First Secretary of the Kirov Oblast party organization,
the leadership of 11 Oblast (province) and Krai (territory) party organ-
izations has changed hands. Gorbachov and his men could move so
quickly, because they were already Yuri Andropov's men. During the
short time that Andropov, the ex-KGB chief, was party General Secretary
(Nov. 1982-Feb. 1984), he launched a clean-out of the Central Com-
mittee apparatus, the staff which administers the rest of the party.
In May 1982, during the last year of Leonid Brezhnev's life, Yuri
Andropov made his move from the KGB, to become a Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Within
a short time, Andropov had launched an assault on Brezhnev's political
allies throughout the security apparatus (KGB and interior ministry,
which is the political police), the party, and the government, using the
device-which was simultaneously useful for shocking the economy out
of lethargy-of the "anti-corruption" drive. He elevated three key figures
of today's leadership: Mikhail Gorbachov, Vitalii Vorotnikov, and Yegor
Ligachov. He increased the scope of Gorbachov's power in the Central
Committee Secretariat, from responsibility for agriculture, to ideology
and aspects of foreign affairs and cadre policy. Vorotnikov, he brought
back from a virtual exile as ambassador to Cuba, to become First Secretary
of the Krasnodar Kraikom-after the incumbent, Brezhnev-allied Sergei
Medunov, was ousted on corruption charges (to be subsequently expelled
from the Communist Party). Andropov brought Ligachov in from the
Tomsk provincial party organization, in Siberia, to take over the Central
Committee Department of Organizational Party Work, which handles
hiring and firing throughout the party organization.
The shakeout of the Central Committee staff began in 1982, when 2
of the 23 departments of the Central Committee staff changed hands
(Economic Affairs and Propaganda). In 1983, there were six more new
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Simplified scheme of main institutions of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet Government.
Lines with arrows indicate important lines of command. Numbers indicate size of body.
Secretariat of the Ir( \ Council of Ministers
CC CPSU (11) K of the U.S.S.R. (156)
Departments of the
CC CPSU (23)
Central Committee
of the CPSU (307)'
Republic, Oblast, 1 -1 Re ublic Ministries;
Other CPSU Committees Area Economic Authorities
CPSU Committees
At Economic
Enterprises
Enterprises,
Amalgamations
Ministry of
Defense
(High Commands,
Armed Forces
Branches)
'The CPSU Central Committee com-
prises all the members of the Politburo
and Secretariat, many members of the
Council of Ministers, First Secretaries
of Republic and Obkom party organi-
zations, and high-ranking military offi-
cers. Unlike the other institutions shown,
it is not a standing, executive body, but
convenes periodically (two or more times
a year) in plenary session, to debate
and approve policies set at the level of
its executive bodies, the Politburo and
Secretariat.
Other overlapping memberships:
The 13 full members of the Politburo
include 3 CC Secretaries, 5 members
of the Council on Ministers and 3 First
Secretaries of CPSU committees of im-
portant republics or cities.
The 13 (estimated) members of the
Defense Council include (at least) 6
Ministry of Defense officers, 2 Central
Committee Secretaries who are also on
the Politburo, and 4 members of the
Council of Ministers.
Party committees at all levels overlap
with the leadership of government in-
stitutions, including economic entities.
They may also include military officers
from commands in their regions.
department heads, including the crucial appointment of Yegor Ligachov
as chief of the Organizational Party Work Department, which handles
hirings, firings, and purges throughout the party organization. Some of
the retirees had been in power for the entire Brezhnev era (Nikita Khrush-
chov was ousted in Oct. 1964). One more Central Committee depart-
ment, the Construction Department, has changed hands in 1985, and
the imminent abolishment of another, the International Information
Department, created by Brezhnev in 1978, is rumored.
CPSU Central Committee department leadership changes, 1982-85
Old chief New chief
Date installed Date installed
CC Department New post Previous post
Administration of G.S. Pavlov N. Ye. Kruchina
Affairs 1965 December 1983
Retired Deputy Chief, CC
Agriculture Dept. since
1978, while Gorbachov was
CC Secretary for
Agriculture
Cadres Abroad N. M. Pegov S. V. Chervonenko
1975 January 1983
Retired Amb. to France
Construction I. N. Dmitriyev B.N. Yeltsin
1969 April 1985
First Secretary, Sverdlovsk
Obkom
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CPSU Central Committee department leadership changes, 1982.85
(continued)
Economic Affairs
(formerly Planning &
Finance)
Heavy Industry
General
Organizational Party
Work
Organizational Party
Work (2d change)
B. 1. Gostev
1975
V.I. Dolgikh
1976
Politburo
K. U. Chemenko
1965
Gen. Secretary, now
deceased
I. V. Kapitonov
1965
CC Secretary
(retained post)
Ligachov
April 1983
Politburo
N.I. Ryzhkov
December 1982
Deputy Chairman,
Gosplan; originally from
Sverdlovsk
I. P. Yastrebov
1983
First Deputy Chief, Heavy
Industry Dept.
K.M. Bogolyubov
July 1983
Deputy Chief, Gen. Dept.
Ye. K. Ligachov
April 1983
First Secretary, Tomsk
Obkom (Siberia)
G. P. Razumovskii
June 1985
First Secretary, Krasnodar
Kraikom
B. 1. Stukalin
November 1982
Chairman, State
Committee for Publishing
V. A. Medvedev
August 1983
Rector, CC Academy of
Social Sciences
Propaganda Ye. M. Tyazholnikov
1977
Amb. to Romania
Science and S. P. Trapeznikov
Educational 1965
Institutions Retired
There were also major changes at the Central Committee Secretariat
and Politburo level:
February 1982 Death of Mikhail Suslov, CC ideologist and power
broker for over three decades.
May 1982 Yuri Andropov becomes CC Secretary.
May 1982 Vladimir Dolgikh, CC Secretary for Heavy Industry,
becomes candidate member of Politburo.
November 1982 Death of Leonid Brezhnev; Andropov is General Sec-
retary of the CC CPSU.
November 1982 Nikolai Ryzhkov becomes CC Secretary, as he moves
from the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) to be
chief of the reorganized Economics Department of the
Central Committee.
November 1982 Geidar Aliyev, former KGB official and candidate
member of the Politburo since 1976, is made full Pol-
itburo member and moved from the post of First Sec-
retary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, to First
Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R.
May 1983 Death of Arvid Pelshe, Politburo member and chair-
man of the Party Control Commission.
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June 1983 Grigorii Romanov, the Leningrad Party chief, a Pol-
itburo member since 1976, becomes CC Secretary.
June 1983 Vitalii Vorotnikov, the First Secretary of Krasnodar
Kraikom, whom Andropov had "rescued" from Cuba
in 1982, is made candidate member of the Politburo
and prime minister of the Russian Republic (RSFSR).
Candidate Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev
succeeds Pelshe at the Party Control Commission.
December 1983 Solomentsev and Vorotnikov, the past and current
prime ministers of the Russian Republic, are made full
members of the Politburo.
December 1983 KGB Chief Vitalii Chebrikov becomes candidate
member of the Politburo.
December 1983 Yegor Ligachov, whom Andropov put in charge of
organizational work in May, is made a CC Secretary.
February 1984 Death of Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko, long-
time Brezhnev aide, becomes General Secretary.
November 1984 Death of Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov, Politburo member
and defense minister.
March 1985 Death of Chernenko. Mikhail Gorbachov is General
Secretary.
April 1985 Ligachov and Ryzhkov are made full Politburo mem-
bers, without apprenticeship as candidate members.
Chebrikov becomes a full member, Defense Minister
Marshal Sergei Sokolov a candidate member.
April 1985 Viktor Nikonov, a Volga basin party official who had
been RSFSR agriculture minister since 1983, is made
CC Secretary for Agriculture.
July 1985 Romanov removed from Politburo. Edvard Shevard-
nadze, First Secretary of Communist Party of Georgian
Republic, promoted from candidate to full member of
the Politburo. Shevardnadze becomes foreign minis-
ter, as Andrei Gromyko is named chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (President).
July 1985 B.N. Yeltsin, former First Secretary of Sverdlovsk
Obkom, now head of the CC's Construction Depart-
ment, and Lev Zaikov, since June 1983 the First Sec-
retary of Leningrad Obkom, become CC Secretaries.
Two or three regional power bases were coming into play, as Andropov,
and then Gorbachov, assaulted Brezhnev's bastions in the bureaucracy.
(From among the First Secretaries of the 158 Communist Party regional
organizations-the Oblast and Krai committees, or obkom and krai-
kom-comes approximately one-third of the membership of the ruling
party's Central Committee.)
One power center is the south Russian agricultural region, just north
of the Caucasus mountains, comprising Stavropol Krai and Krasnodar
Krai. From this region, where Suslov was First Secretary of Stavropol
Kraikom (1939-44), where Andropov was born and Gorbachov made his
career, come Gorbachov, Vorotnikov, and Razumovskii.
Another is the central Siberian area of three adjacent oblasti: No-
vosibirsk, Tomsk, and Kemerovo. Ligachov, originally from Novosibirsk,
was First Secretary of the Tomsk Obkom for 18 years. V.K. Sitnikov
and V. V. Bakatin, Secretaries from Kemerovo Obkom, were installed
as First Secretaries of Irkutsk Obkom (March 1983) and Kirov Obkom
(April 1985), respectively, to replace Brezhnev-era appointees who were
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generation
retired; Kemerovo First Secretary L.A. Gorshkov moved to government
of the Russian Republic, as deputy prime minister, in April 1985.
A third area feeding cadres into the national leadership is the Ural
mountain complex of heavy industrial cities like Sverdlovsk and Che-
lyabinsk, which were built up after the evacuation of industry from the
Ukraine during World War II. Nikolai Ryzhkov, who took over the
Central Committee Economics Department under Andropov and whom
Gorbachov put on the Politburo, came to national prominence as director
of the giant Uralmash machine tool plant in Sverdlovsk. In June 1985,
the Sverdlovsk Obkom Secretary, B.N. Yeltsin, came to Moscow to run
the CC Construction Department, and on July 1, was promoted to
Secretary of the Central Committee; he is succeeded in Sverdlovsk by
another official originally from that city, Yu.V. Petrov, who in the
meantime worked as one of Ligachov's deputies in the Organizational
Party Work Department. Solomentsev, who came out of the Chelyabinsk
party organization in the 1950s, brought M.G. Voropayev from the
Chelyabinsk Obkom First Secretary's job to the staff of the Party Control
Commission in January 1984.
All of these are key regions of the Russian Republic, whereas Brezhnev
had built his machine out of the Dnepr River basin industrial area, in
the Ukraine.
A dozen obkom First Secretaries were replaced in the first 12 months
that Andropov was General Secretary. The party elections of November
1983-February 1984, run by Gorbachov and Ligachov while Andropov
was dying, switched 19 more. In all, one-fifth of the obkoms changed
hands. Only five obkom changes occurred in 1984, but as Chernenko
faded from the scene, the purge resumed in 1985. Three obkom secretaries
were transferred in the first two months of the year; then, with Gorbachov
in the saddle, the shake-up resumed full strength with the 11 further
reappointments and retirements of March-June 1985.
Meanwhile, reports pour in of scores of removals and transfers at lower
levels of power, throughout the U.S.S.R. These range from the addition
of 9,000 personnel to the KGB and police agencies in Uzbekistan, to
publicized firings of party officials for corruption in Bratsk (Siberia).
Typical of the brusque Gorbachov approach was a TV interview given
by Sverdlovsk party leader B.N. Yeltsin, shortly before his promotion to
the CC apparat in Moscow. "We summed up the results of work done
in the first two months of the year and came to the conclusion that it
was necessary to get rid of managers who failed to show their worth," he
explained, "And we have decided to relieve Comrade Charnov of the
post of director of Krasnouralsk combine...."
They have not finished yet. With an eye toward preparations for the
27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in February
1986, Pravda on June 20, 1985, editorialized in favor of "improvement
of the style of work"-and an infusion of new blood. "Stability of lead-
ership, which involves a correct combination of experienced and young
party workers, is very valuable," said Pravda. "But this cannot be accom-
panied by any stalling whatsoever, in the movement of cadres. It is
necessary more boldly to advance to responsible positions women and
young people, and promising workers." The new Central Committee
king-pins, many of whom are heavy and defense industry managers and
engineers by background, are looking for people who will produce results.
Who are these men of Gorbachov's generation? (The oldest of the
recent promotees, Aliyev and Ligachov, were born in the early 1920s;
Gorbachov in 1931.) The best choice of terms for describing this younger
generation as a whole, is "the Andropov dynasty."
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They were barely of an age to be soldiers in World War II, if at all.
Their youth was shaped during the cult of "Czar" Josef Stalin, and they
emerged into junior or field-grade military ranks, or began their party
careers, in the first years of the Stalin period. In short, they are "Stalin's
children." Once again, the way to imagine their minds, is to think of
the mental outlook of Fyodor Dostoevsky's letters and memoirs, overlaid
by Soviet military General Staff training that integrates the tradition of
the Prussian General Staff.
Andropov's own case is indicative. He emerged as a prominent figure
in Hungary, in 1956, under the direct patronage of the highest ranking
Soviet families from the old Communist International apparatus.
Andropov had been a CC Secretary once before his power play of
Spring 1982. He took leadership of the KGB only in 1967, after a career
in the party and foreign service that culminated in a 1962-67 stint as
CC Secretary in charge of relations with ruling Communist Parties, i.e.,
Eastern Europe and China. The man who brought Yuri Andropov to
Moscow was an old Finnish communist named Otto Kuusinen, whose
subordinate he was, first in the party organization in Karelia, near the
Finnish border, and then at the Central Committee.
In the 1920s and 1930s, Kuusinen had worked on the Executive Com-
mittee of the Communist International. After a failed attempt to become
the Soviet-sponsored President of Finland on the eve of World War II,
Kuusinen joined the CPSU and eventually sat on its Politburo from 1957
until his death in 1964. Kuusinen was instrumental in effecting an in-
stitutional shift in the late 1950s, which was momentous for Soviet foreign
policy. Together with the Armenian old Bolshevik and survivor of purges
Anastas Mikoyan, the only Soviet Politburo member to have graduated
from an Orthodox seminary (the same one Stalin attended), Kuusinen
called for expanding the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the Soviet
party and state. Two things resulted: re-establishment of Hungarian Com-
internist Eugen Varga's think tank under the name Institute for the
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and constitution
of a special CC consultants' group on international affairs, reporting to
Kuusinen and then to Andropov. There was, and still is, much circulation
of personnel between the think tanks (formally attached to the Academy
of Sciences) and the CC staff. Georgii Arbatov, the head of the IMEMO
spinoff Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, and another Kuusinen pro-
tege, was head of the CC consultants' group in 1964-67.
The think tanks not only process huge quantities of intelligence data,
but advise the party Central Committee and the foreign ministry on
operations in the regions they study. The foreign policy apparat of the
Soviet Academy includes the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, the
Africa Institute, the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System,
the International Workers' Movement Institute, the Latin America In-
stitute, the Institute of Orientology, and the Far East Institute. They are
a favorite playground for the children of the older generation of Soviet
leaders-not just because papa could obtain a prestigious post, but because
posts in these institutions, free of the protocol restraints that government
officials have, allow a great flexibility of travel and operation for this
powerful younger generation of the Soviet elite. Mikoyan's son, Sergo
Mikoyan, edits the Latin America Institute's monthly, America Latina,
one of the Soviet social science community's most vociferous boosters of
"indigenist" insurgencies against nation states. Anatolii Gromyko, son
of long-time Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, heads the Africa Insti-
tute. Igor Andropov, Yuri's offspring, attended the foreign ministry's
prestigious Institute for International Relations, a training ground for the
think tanks, before opting for the foreign service-he is now Russian
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imperial pro-consul (ambassador) in Greece. (Under Gorbachov, the life
and family of Andropov have even become the subject of a TV docu-
mentary.)
If Andropov gave them their promotions, the fresh faces of Gorbachov
and his Russian Republic power-base colleagues owe their advance also
to the stalwart Stalinist ideologue of the three post-war decades, Mikhail
Suslov. Before he died in 1982, there is every reason to believe, Suslov
extended his protection to Gorbachov-the promotee from Suslov's Stav-
ropol Krai, who otherwise might have floundered as CC Agriculture
Secretary during a string of miserable Soviet grain harvests in the late
1970s. Ligachov, Gorbachov's henchmen in the ongoing purge, had a
touch of Suslov in his background as well; before his 1983 promotion,
the only stint Ligachov had served in Moscow, between assignments in
the Novosibirsk party apparat and then as party leader in Tomsk, was
from 1961 to 1965, as deputy chief of the CC Propaganda and Agitation
Department-within Suslov's bailiwick.
Background of key personnel in party leadership:
Gorbachov, Mikhail S., Politburo, General Secretary of CC CPSU
Born 1931. After work at a machine-tractor station in Stavropol Krai,
Gorbachov went into full-time party work. He obtained a law degree in
1955. His whole career was in the Stavropol Krai Komsomol and party,
until promotion in 1978 to be CC Secretary for Agriculture.
Aliyev, Geidar ali-Reza, Politburo, first deputy prime minister
Born 1923. Born in a Shi'ite Muslim family in Azerbaijan, Aliyev was
a career KGB officer with field experience in Turkey and Iran, who rose
to head the Azerbaijani KGB in 1967, the year Andropov took over at
the national level. Two years later, Aliyev became head of the Communist
Party in the Azerbaijan Republic and tore the party and state apparat
apart from top to bottom, replacing nearly 2,000 officials with KGB men,
in order to carry out a pilot project that became known as "the Azerbaijan
experiment." Aliyev's special formula was a sweeping anti-corruption
purge, extensive profiling of public opinion by sociologists, and attention
to the "spiritual needs" of the population. Deemed a success by Andropov,
he was brought to Moscow as a full Politburo member and first deputy
prime minister-with a portfolio covering the militarily crucial area of
transportation, as well as his pre-existing responsibilities for special op-
erations in the Middle East and Asia.
Chebrikov, Viktor M., Candidate Politburo, chairman of KGB
Born 1923. Although his party career was launched in Dnepropetrovsk,
the center of Brezhnev's machine, Chebrikov came to the KGB in 1967
with Andropov and worked with him for fifteen years.
Dolgikh, Vladimir I., Candidate Politburo, CC Secretary
Bom 1924. Trained as a mining engineer, Dolgikh made a name for
himself as chief engineer and then director of the Zavenyagin Mining-
Metallurgical Combine, in Norilsk-the only such industrial complex
above the Arctic Circle. He came to Moscow as a CC Secretary in 1972
and officially headed the CC Heavy Industry Department beginning in
1976. Dolgikh became a candidate Politburo member in 1982, but has
not surged forward with the Andropov/Gorbachov tide.
Ligachov, Yegor K., Politburo, CC Secretary for organization
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Born 1920. A graduate of the Moscow Aviation Institute, Ligachov
worked as an engineer at an aircraft plant in Novosibirsk, where he
became involved in the Komsomol, then party work. From 1961-65, he
was in Moscow in the CC Propaganda and Agitation Department, then
headed the Tomsk party organization until promotion to head the CC
Organizational Party Work Department in April 1983.
Ryzhkov, Nikolai I., Politburo, CC Secretary for the economy
Born 1929. Trained at a technical school, Ryzhkov worked as a welder
and then an engineer in Sverdlovsk. In 1970 he became General Director
of the giant "Uralmash" machine-tool plant in Sverdlovsk, in 1975 First
Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Machine Building, and in 1979
one of the deputy chairmen of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan).
Vorotnikov, Vitalii I., Politburo, prime minister of Russian Republic
(RSFSR)
Born 1926. A railroad locomotive repairman as a teenager during the
war, Vorotnikov later worked in industry in the Volga town of Kuibyshev,
where he graduated from an Aviation Institute and became a party official.
He was First Secretary in his native region of southern Russia, Voronezh,
from 1971 to 1975, then rose in the RSFSR government apparat, before
being packed off as ambassador to Cuba in 1979. His recall and promotion
through Krasnodar Krai to the RSFSR premiership and the Politburo
came under Andropov.
Yeltsin, Boris N., CC Secretary
Born 1931. Educated as a construction engineer, Yeltsin became First
Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom-also Ryzhkov's town-in 1976.
After nearly a decade of running that heavy industry center, Yeltsin was
brought to Moscow by Gorbachov, to head the Central Committee
Construction Department, in April 1985. That he was being groomed
for a promotion was evident, when Yeltsin led the CPSU delegation to
the a West German Communist Party event in October 1984.
Zaikov, Lev, CC Secretary
Born 1923. Zaikov was director of a defense-related electronics firm
in Leningrad, before he became the city's mayor in 1976. He succeeded
Grigorii Romanov as Leningrad Obkom First Secretary in 1983, when
Romanov-who came out of the Leningrad shipbuilding industry, an-
other important defense sector-was made Central Committee Secretary
for industry, particularly the defense industries. Today, Romanov is dis-
graced, but not the defense-linked Leningrad party organization. Shortly
after becoming Central Committee Secretary, in June 1985, Zaikov ac-
companied Gorbachov on a visit to the Byelorussian Military District,
where they are believed to have met with Marshal Ogarkov.
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3. -Soviet Imperial Objectives
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3.1 Redrawing the
Political Map of the World
Soviet imperial grand strategy is centered upon establishing a world-
empire of a form echoing the Persian, Roman, and Byzantine empires.
Under the circumstances such an empire were established without general
warfare, by the early 1990s, the world would be aligned more or less as
follows.
All of continental Eurasia and Africa would be under Soviet domi-
nation (Map 25).
In Europe: The existing states of Western Europe, as altered to some
degree by split-off of independent or semi-independent "separatist"
enclaves, would be nominally independent, "semi-colonial" client-
states of the Soviet Empire. Croatia and possibly some other Dal-
matian fragments of a dismembered present Yugoslavia, would be
assigned to the western portion of Europe, with the rest of Yugoslavia
divided among an enlarged Serbia, an enlarged Albania, and ex-
pansion of Bulgaria to more or less the extent of the medieval
Bulgarian Empire, the latter including Macedonia and most of Thrace.
In the Middle East: A somewhat carved-up Turkey would have nom-
inal independence, and the rest of the Middle East and North Africa
would be under the domination of Syria, with a special role assigned
to a nominally independent, and expanded state of Israel. Essen-
tially, Syria would be the principal Soviet instrument throughout
the region of the former Ottoman Empire's greatest extent.
In Central Asia: A nominally independent Iran would be a Soviet
client-state, minus a portion awarded to a newly-created state of
Baluchistan. Afghanistan would continue to be assimilated into the
Soviet Empire proper, gobbling up northern portions of Pakistan.
In the Asian Sub-Continent: India would exist, perhaps partially dis-
membered, as an independent state under Soviet domination, while
Pakistan as such would cease to exist.
In East Asia: China, Japan, and Vietnam would be the only states
with nominal independence in their present form. As long as they
were under Soviet strategic domination, both Japan and Vietnam
would be encouraged to build up military capabilities as checks upon
China's inherent expansionist impulses.
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Black Africa is largely written off to effects of famine and pandemics,
with Africa south of the Sahara assigned to be a source of strategic
minerals for Soviet-dominated Eurasia, conserving strategic minerals
in Soviet territory as such.
The Americas: The Soviets have no near-term imperial ambitions
within the Americas as such. Andropov (Der Spiegel, April 24, 1983)
assigned the Americas to the U.S. sphere of influence, and Andro-
pov's successors have continued that policy. Soviet meddling in the
Americas has the limited but crucial strategic objective of drawing
collapsing U. S. military capabilities into endemic warfare through-
out Central and South America, thus aiding the process of reducing
the U.S.A. to a third-rate power.
Generally: The build-up of Soviet naval forces is aimed during the
near-term as part of the constellation of forces for possible fighting
of World War III, especially the submarine force. The Soviet surface
fleet is intended, for the longer-term, to serve as the Soviets' arm
of imperial power on the oceans of the world, the successor to the
nineteenth-century role of the British Navy.
The pivot of Soviet attempts to secure this empire without generalized
warfare, is the Soviet hope of pulling West Germany (the Federal Republic
of Germany) out of the Atlantic Alliance and into the Soviet sphere of
influence. Germany has had this special place in Bolshevik strategy
throughout the present century, even before the 1917 Revolution. It
continues to be Soviet policy, that with Germany as the favored tool of
Soviet imperial expansion, Soviet imperial victory is assured. Today,
because of the decisive strategic and economic position of the Federal
Republic in Europe, were Soviet asset Willy Brandt's Social Democratic
coalition to come to power in the Federal Republic, not only would all
Germany slide more or less irrevocably into the Soviet strategic sphere
of "Finlandization," but all of Western Europe would rapidly follow suit.
In the case that the Soviet world-empire were established by means
of generalized warfare, the picture of a 1990s world under Soviet dom-
ination would perhaps be somewhat different than we have outlined
above. Nonetheless, the outline supplied above gives an adequate insight
into Soviet imperial strategy for the purposes of this Special Report.
The `New Yalta' agreements
The Soviet Empire could never have reached the present degree of prob-
ability of victory without massive collusion from inside top-most leading
circles in the Atlantic Alliance. Specifically, beginning Soviet partici-
pation in the 1955 London Conference of Bertrand Russell's World
Association of Parliamentarians for World Government, the Liberal wing
of the Anglo-American Establishment negotiated agreements with the
Khrushchov government for future redrawing of the world's political map.
Under this agreement, excepting the special case of China, the entire
world was to be placed under rule of a single super-government, a modified
United Nations Organization with greatly enlarged powers. Under this
arrangement, the entire world, excepting China, was to be divided into
two sub-divisions of world-government, one Soviet-dominated, and the
other dominated by the powerful financier families associated with the
Anglo-American Liberal Establishment. Those institutions of the modem
sovereign nation-state, established during the fifteenth-century Golden
Renaissance and, later, the American Revolution, were to be caused to
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wither away, by stripping away of elements of sovereignty reassigned to
supranational institutions of monetary and other authorities.
The terms of this agreement were consolidated during 1958, high-
lighted by the keynote address of Dr. Leo Szilard to the 1958 second
Pugwash Conference in Quebec. This address laid out the interdependent
terms of Nuclear Deterrence and "New Yalta." The Anglo-American
Liberal Establishment agreed to give up the economic and military stra-
tegic superiority of the West, and to award the Soviet empire a greater
area than was given to it by the 1943 Yalta agreements, in return for
Soviet agreements to participate in the scheme of "world government"
laid out by Bertrand Russell and his associates.
Earlier, prior to 1953-55, the Atlantic Alliance had adopted Russell's
proposal for "preventive nuclear attack" against the Soviet Empire. Russell
had argued, that if the Stalin regime refused to submit to a world-
government agreement, that regime must be forced to submit to this by
military means, and that a nuclear attack on the Soviet empire should
therefore be planned to occur prior to Soviet acquisition of nuclear
arsenals. When the Soviets had acquired nuclear arsenals, during the
interval 1949-53, Stalin's successors indicated their willingness to accept
Russell's proposals for a system of "world government" composed of two
imperial divisions.
So, the fate of Hungary and Poland in 1956, was sealed at the 1955
London Conference of Russell's association.
This agreement was put into effect as governmental policy only grad-
ually, beginning with McGeorge Bundy's key role as National Security
Adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The agreements were vir-
tually consolidated by actions of Henry A. Kissinger during the 1971-75
period, notably including the SALT and ABM treaties, and including
the Vietnam negotiations and the 1973 Mideast War and ensuing pe-
troleum crisis.
Under President Carter, the process entered the end-game phase of
strategic chess-play. Carter completed the introduction of the monetary
and economic policies which have destroyed the economic and military
power of the Atlantic Alliance and its trading-partners from within.
Excepting President Reagan's adoption of the SDI policy, the Reagan
administration, thus far, has continued the policies set into motion by
Bundy, Kissinger, and Carter. These policies, if continued now, ensure
the monetary and economic catastrophe essential to Soviet strategic
victory.
Although the Liberal Establishments within the Atlantic Alliance,
including large chunks of intelligence services, are riddled with outright
Soviet agents, it should not be assumed that the Liberals generally are
simply Soviet agents. Russell and others have prescribed, that by paying
the temporary price of awarding Moscow an enlarged Soviet empire, the
preconditions are established for internal crumbling of that enlarged
Soviet empire over a generation or so ahead, as all such empires have
crumbled internally in known history. It is assumed by the architects of
this Liberal Establishment policy, that the future crumbling of the Soviet
empire will lead to the emergence of the kind of "international socialist"
world-order prescribed by Russell, H. G. Wells, et al.
We must assume that the Soviet dictatorship has recognized and has
also prediscounted such long-term ambitions of Russell, et al. In the
Soviet view, these Liberals are as V. I. Lenin famously described them,
"useful fools." Once their usefulness to Soviet ambitions is used up, the
Soviets will exterminate them, as a precaution against those Liberals'
resurgence to world-power in a future time.
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So, the "New Yalta" agreement awarding the Soviets an enlarged
empire, is the fruit of common but conflicting goals of the Liberal Es-
tablishment and the Soviet ruling-class, the Nomenklatura of the modern-
day Soviet "Diocletians."
The historian must be reminded of certain Liberals of yore, the Chal-
dean financier families behind the Persian Empire who proposed to divide
an enlarged world-empire into two parts, the one, the portion west of
the Halys and Euphrates Rivers, to be ruled by King Philip of Macedon
and his heirs. Philip, the Persian tool, was replaced by Alexander the
Great, and the Persian Empire destroyed. Had Alexander not been as-
sassinated by Aristotle's circle, in their second attempt at poisoning, the
later reemergence of the Chaldean system of empire, in the successive,
Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine forms, would have been prevented.
Similarly, the Roman and Byzantine empires later made possible their
own destructions through aid of destroying their economies and popu-
lation-levels from within, and by what passed for very clever, "Metter-
nichean," diplomacies in their time.
It is chiefly the Anglo-American Liberal Establishment, with its "world
government" schemes, its policies of "Nuclear Deterrence," "Arms Con-
trol," and "post-industrial society," which has fostered the means of its
own destruction, the internal ruin of the economic and military capacity
of the Atlantic Alliance, in front of Soviet imperial insurgency.
Documentation: See Appendix for Russell, Szilard, and Kissinger ci-
tations.
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3.2 The Northern Flank
"World War III will perhaps not be won on the Northern Flank, but
it may well be there that it will be lost." This is a statement that is
continually repeated-for right and wrong reasons-by Western strat-
egists concerned with the balance of power between the Soviet Union
and the United States on the Northern Flank of Europe and the Atlantic.
In this report, we will document why the statement above is absolutely
and frighteningly true-why, in fact, as things now stand, the West, by
its failure to address the weakness of the Northern Flank, both militarily
and politically, has guaranteed the Soviet Union the ability to conduct
the ultimate nuclear blackmail against the United States and thereby
win World War III with an absolute minimum of losses to itself.
The starting point for our analysis will be to determine the value of
the Northern Flank for the Soviet Union, i.e., what it wants in the Far
North. From there, we can examine the various possible ways the Soviets
have to attain their objectives, comparing their capabilities with ours.
What do the Soviets want?
To understand the military importance of the far northern reaches of
Europe to the Soviet Union, we must-as always-return to the strategic
"first premise" of Soviet military thinking and planning: the necessity to
be able to fight and win nuclear war. In this respect, there is one feature
of the northernmost region of Europe which more than any other de-
termines its value: On the north side of the Kola Peninsula, along a strip
of coastline barely 60 km long, the Soviet Union has built a gigantic
complex of naval bases and military support installations, which consti-
tutes the biggest concentration of military power anywhere in the world,
ever (Maps 26-27).
These bases are the home of the Soviet Northern Fleet, the largest of
the four fleets in the Soviet Navy and, most importantly, the fleet which
contains more than 60% of all of the strategic missile-carrying submarines
in the Soviet Navy. These are the nuclear missiles which are targeted
on the United States and which represent the second strike reserve of the
U.S.S.R. In the "maximum option" of the Ogarkov Plan for nuclear war
against the West, an initial barrage of land-based nuclear missiles and
submarine-based missiles off the U. S. coast would devastate the U. S.
eastern seaboard at the same time that an assault is launched against
Western Europe. In that scenario, it is absolutely essential that the Soviet
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Union has retained a second strike potential with which it can threaten
the United States to refrain from any possible counterattack. The Soviet
nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Northern Fleet are
that "trump card" which is essential to the entire scenario.
This is the way to approach the value of the Northern Flank. There
are, of course, other reasons why the Kola complex is of strategic im-
portance to the Soviets. As a forward position directly under the shortest
flight path from the United States to the Soviet heartland, the Kola plays
a vital role in Soviet strategic air defense. And, with the same logic, it
provides one of the best bases for the Soviet strategic bomber fleet.
The other major role that is frequently ascribed to the Northern Fleet,
and thus to the Kola, by NATO strategists-the interdiction of the sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) between the United States and its
Western European allies-is, on the other hand, largely illusory. The
idea that the fortunes of the West might depend on preventing the Soviet
Northern Fleet from "breaking out" of its containment in the Norwegian
Sea and intercepting U.S. reinforcements to Europe across the Atlantic
is patently nonsensical in light of Soviet strategy. As we have outlined
in detail in Part 1, on the Ogarkov war plan, every single U.S. East
Coast port will be wiped out by Soviet nuclear strikes in the first minutes
of war. There will be no ships and no cargo left to interdict.
The Northern Fleet is not going to try to "break out" of the Norwegian
Sea. But it is going to do everything it can to prevent NATO from
entering that area.
To repeat, then, it is the strategic nuclear-missile submarine force of
the Northern Fleet that determines Soviet strategy in the Far North.
Those submarines must be protected, at all costs. The first priority will
be to secure total hegemony over the area of jeopardy to these submarines,
an area including the Barents and Norwegian Seas-and the adjacent
coast of northern Norway. Not only must no NATO hunter-killer sub-
marines or surface anti-submarine vessels be allowed to enter this area,
but NATO air forces must be totally denied the use of Norwegian airspace
and air fields within range of Murmansk and the Barents Sea.
Denial of this area to NATO is the first priority of all Soviet planning
for the Northern Theater. This strategic task has far-reaching implications
for all of the countries on the Northern Flank-for NATO member
Norway, as well as for neutral Sweden and Finland.
In wartime, the highest priority mission of Soviet Armed Forces in
the Northern Theater will be to deny all use of the Barents, Greenland,
and Norwegian Seas and northern Norway to NATO. For the Soviets,
there are various options open to achieving this objective. Clearly, the
optimum option would be to gain access to northern Norway, particularly
the airfields located there. A Soviet presence on the land adjoining the
Norwegian Sea would be of immense military value. The mere possibility
of greater dispersal of their air and naval forces over this greater area
would be a significant advantage.
Moreover, if Soviet aircraft were to be able to operate from bases in
northern Norway or Sweden instead of from the Kola Peninsula, it is
estimated that their combat value in the area just north of the so-called
"GIUK gap" (the line from Greenland over Iceland to the United King-
dom, which also forms the southern boundary of the Soviet defense zone
for the Kola) would be doubled. According to Swedish military research-
ers, a MiG-25 Foxbat, for instance, operating from current Warsaw Pact
bases on the Kola or in East Germany, could patrol in this area for
approximately 1.5 hours, or engage in combat for around 10 minutes.
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From airfields in Sweden or Norway, the same plane could patrol for
over 3 hours or fight for 20 minutes.
We will examine below the various options-both military and non-
military-which are available to the Soviets for achieving this "optimum
variant." However, there is no reason to assume that in the context of
a nuclear war, the Soviets would deem it worth the effort, and above
all, the time, required to actually seize the bases for their own use. The
far more likely alternative-one that would be infinitely quicker and
more effective if the main goal were denial of the bases to the enemy,
rather than own use-would be to "clean out" the entire area with nuclear
and/or chemical weapons.
There can be no doubt about the Soviets' capability to carry out this
latter, considerably more brutal option. The 1984-85 edition of the
Norwegian-language version of IISS's Military Balance includes a table of
Soviet nuclear weapons which could be used against the territory of the
Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland). The IISS
figures (supposedly up to date as of July 1984) are conservative, especially
as regards new generations of longer-range and more accurate missiles,
and they totally ignore reload/refire capacity, not to mention MIRVing.
Nevertheless, the overall conclusion is irrefutable: The U.S.S.R. has
stationed a devasting nuclear force within range of every conceivable
target in Scandinavia, with enough megatonnage to completely wipe out
anything remotely resembling a facility of military use to the NATO
enemy. In raw numbers, the next table shows the IISS figures on nuclear
weapons within range of targets in Norway, Sweden and Finland.
Thus, within range of NATO's Northern Flank, there are, by this
highly conservative estimate, well over 10,000 Soviet nuclear weapons,
not including nuclear artillery. The targets? Northern Norway has a total
of five airfields; Sweden somewhat more. In addition, there are several
key NATO surveillance installations on the Norwegian side. But what-
ever the total, it adds up to a relatively tiny number of vital military
targets that could be taken out by this massive nuclear force on the Soviet
side.
Now, it might correctly be pointed out that most of these weapons
have other deployment options. But, on the other hand, it is debatable
whether any of those alternative targets would have such great strategic
value as the military objects that present a potential threat to Murmansk
and the surrounding complex. And in a significant number of cases, the
weapons are stationed in locations (e.g., the Kola Peninsula) so as to
make them usable only against targets in northern Scandinavia.
In sum, the most efficient-and for that reason, the most likely-
Soviet option to secure its SSBNs, is simply to launch simultaneous
nuclear attacks against the targets in northern Norway and Sweden.
There are, however, other, less brutal options. In addition to its SSBN
force and the vessels designed to protect those nuclear missile subs, the
Northern Fleet has in recent years considerably beefed up its amphibious
capability. Together with the combat-ready troops of the ground forces
on the Kola, the Soviet marines of the Northern Fleet are trained for
the mission of launching a surprise attack against northern Norway for
the purpose of seizing the airfields and occupying the region as rapidly
as possible.
According to Norwegian military experts, the Soviet scenario for such
an attack would probably involve an offensive in two stages. The first
phase would consist of a surprise attack by the Soviet forces already in
place on the Kola Peninsula near the Norwegian border. To maximize
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Range (km) Total number (July 1984)
Land-based
ICBM
SS-11 Sego mod 1/2
10/13,000
mod 3
8,000
SS-19 mod 2/3
10,000
IRBM
SS-20
MRBM
SS-4
SRBM
SS-12 Scaleboard
900
100
(?)'
SS-1 C-Scud
300
540
(?)
Frog 7
70
530
(?)
GLCM
SS-C-1 b Sepal
450
100
(?)
SSC-X-4
3,000
Total land-based missiles:
Nuclear-capable artillery
M-55/D-20 152mm towed
Howitzer
M-1973/C-2-S 152mm
self-propelled Howitzer
? 54-72 of
each on Kola alone
M-1975 203mm
self-propelled gun
M-1975 240mm
self-propelled mortar
?
?
24 in Leningrad
MD
24 in Leningrad
Sea-based
SLBM
SS-N-5 Serb
SLCM
SS-N-2 Styx
45
506
SS-N-3 Shaddock
450
296
SS-N-7
70
88
SS-N-9 Siren
280
200
SS-N-12 Sandbox
550
96
SS-N-19
500
88
SS-NX-21
3,000
SS-N-22
220
28
Total sea-based missiles:
Air-launched
Bombers
Tu-95 Bear B, C
12,800
100
Mya-4 Bison
11,200
43
Tu-16 Badger
4,800
410
Tu-22 Blinder
4,000
160
Tu-26 Backfire
8,000
235
Su-7 Fitter A
1,400
130
MiG-21 Fishbed
1,100
160
MiG-27 Flogger D, J
1,400
730
Su-17 Fitter D/H
1,800
850
Su-24 Fencer
4,000
630
ALCM
AS-2 Kipper
200
90
AS-3 Kangaroo
650
(100)
AS-4 Kitchen
300-800
830
AS-6 Kingfish
250
820
AS-X-15
3,000
Total air-launched nuclear weapons:
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the element of surprise, these units would not have been reinforced in
advance of the attack. With air and spetsnaz (special commando force)
strikes, Soviet troops would first knock out surveillance facilities and
move to seize the airfields. Simultaneously, the 45th Motorized Rifle
Division-stationed in Pechenga (formerly the Finnish Petsamo), only
9.6 km from the Norwegian border-would move by land across the
border into Finnmark.
Meanwhile, the elite 63rd ("Kirkenes") Naval Infantry Brigade would
launch an amphibious assault in the same areas or further south.
Also further south, the second Soviet division on the Kola-the 54th
Motorized Rifle Division, based in the Kandalaksha/Alakurtti area-
would move westward, either 1) across Finland and up through the
"Finnish wedge" (the part of Finland that extends deepest into Norway)
to the Norwegian coastal town of Skibotn or 2) across Finland to Kiruna
in Sweden, and on to the key Norwegian port of Narvik. The Swedish
military estimates that the Soviets can send troops across this latter route
at the rate of one division per day using the excellent new road from
Kiruna to Narvik (completed in 1984 under protest by the military). Of
course, both these alternative routes for the 54th would constitute a
breach of the neutrality of either Finland or Sweden or both-unless
permission were granted in advance (a possibility we will examine later
in this report). In either case, the role of the 54th is to secure the entire
northernmost parts of Norway.
In the second phase of the attack, the objective would be to take
Norway as far south as Trondheim. Most of the remaining divisions of
the Leningrad Military District (six more motorized rifle divisions, plus
one airborne) could be deployed in this mission. The 76th Guards Air-
borne Division, based in Pskov, is ready for combat at all times. Its 7,000
men and equipment, including 300 armored assault vehicles and 30 assault
guns, could be airlifted to the Kola within hours. Or, if the ability to
overfly Swedish airspace were secured, the 76th could be airlifted directly
across the Baltic Sea and Sweden to Trondheim, Norway. The other
divisions could be transferred to the Kola by rail at a rate of around one
division per day, or within hours by using the huge air transport facilities
of the Soviet Air Force and its adjunct, the "civilian" airline, Aeroflot.
The Kola has at least 16 all-weather airbases with runways of 2,000
meters or more.
These divisions could either be carried all the way up to the Kola to
follow on the 45th Motorized Rifle Division across Finnmark, or be
"dropped off' along the way, to use the well-developed Finnish rail and
road network which conveniently connects onto the main Leningrad-
to-Murmansk line on the Soviet side.
The capability for a Command and control
surprise attack in In contrast to the situation on the Central front of Europe, the Soviet
command structure for its forces on the Northern Flank remains unclear.
northern Norway Although it might be argued that Scandinavia as a whole would be
included in a large Western Theater together with Germany and the
Baltic Sea, there are also strong reasons for hypothesizing the existence
of a separate Soviet Northern Theater of Military Actions, or TVD North.
Such a TVD would include the Soviet Leningrad Military District (LMD),
all of Finland, and roughly the northern halves of Sweden and Norway.
The main reason for such a hypothesis is the very specific military
mission of Soviet forces as outlined in the scenarios above. Secondly,
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even though the bulk of the forces in the LMD are geographically closer
to the Baltic Theater than the Kola, it would appear that their priority
mission is in the North. The LMD forces did not, for instance, take part
in the crucial test of the Baltic Theater command-the Zapad-81 exercise
in 1981.
Finally, there are strong historical reasons why the Soviets might well
draw a line across Scandinavia at the points indicated. In 1939, as part
of the secret protocol of the infamous Hitler-Stalin Pact to divide Eastern
Europe between the Russians and the Nazis, the entirety of Finland was
given to the Soviets. But in addition, during the autumn of 1939 military
maps were printed in both Germany and the U.S.S.R. which showed
all of Sweden and Norway north of a line from Sundsvall on the Swedish
east coast to Trondheim on the Norwegian coast as part of the Soviet
sphere. (The southern halves of each country were defined as part of the
Nazi sphere.) Then, as now, there was a specific military reason for drawing
the dividing line at roughly that point. Even then, the defense of Mur-
mansk was a paramount consideration.
If, then, there is a separate TVD North, it is intriguing to note that,
in contrast to the other principal Soviet theaters, no commander has
been publicly announced. There is a credible explanation for this. As
we will see in the discussion below on force strength on the Kola, the
Soviets have consciously pursued a policy of "low visibility" of combat
preparations on the Northern Flank in order to enhance surprise attack
capability and to minimize NATO response in peacetime. To announce
the name of the wartime commander of the TVD North, as they have
done for the Western, Southwestern, Southern and Far Eastern High
Commands, would not be in keeping with this general policy.
So, there may well be a commander of a "High Command North."
Who he is, however, is a matter of speculation. He would undoubtedly
have the current rank of Army General (four-star general), and he should
be a Central Committee member or candidate member. Within these
criteria, there are two possible names:
1) Army General Mikhail Sorokin (born 1922) "disappeared" from
public view in December 1981. There are indications that after that date
he may have commanded the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Otherwise,
his qualifications for commander of the TVD North are striking: he is a
Central Committee candidate member, and from 1976 to 1981 he was
the commander of the Leningrad Military District. Thus, his background
closely parallels that of Gen. Army Gerasimov (CINC High Command
Southwest), Gen. Army Maksimov (CINC High Command South), and
Gen. Army Tret'yak (CINC High Command Far East)-all three are
former commanders of the principal military district in their respective
theater commands.
2) Army General Grigorii Salmanov (born 1922) has not been heard
of since he was replaced as commander of the Transbaikal Military District
in late 1984. He is a full member of the Central Committee. From 1969
to 1975 he was commander of the Kiev MD, and in 1975-78 he was the
deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces for Combat Training.
The headquarters of the TVD-North would in all likelihood be in
Petrozavodsk in Karelia. This was the headquarters of the former Northern
Military District of the U.S.S.R., which existed from 1951 to 1960,
when it was formally disbanded and integrated into the Leningrad MD.
That change was probably part of the "low profile" approach in the North
referred to above. The Soviet decision to disband the Northern MD came
not long after Norwegian Prime Minister Gerhardsen had pledged-in
response to an inquiry by Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin-that Norway
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would not receive, stockpile, or build launching ramps for nuclear weap-
ons or delivery vehicles.
Force strength
The force composition and strength of the Soviet TVD North have been
determined by two principal considerations. First of all, they are specif-
ically designed for a surprise attack in an environment of a sparsely
populated but physically rough terrain with a harsh climate, factors which
place a premium on relatively small, but highly mobile forces. Secondly,
it has been Soviet policy to keep visible force build-up on the Northern
Flank to a minimum, while concentrating on measures that enhance a
sudden "last-minute" capability directly prior to the attack. The low-
profile approach is for political reasons: The Soviets have so far wanted
at all costs to avoid a situation in which their own build-up might provoke
NATO countermeasures that would threaten their all-important Kola
installations.
The result of this policy is that nominal troop strength on the Kola
has barely increased at all in the past 20 years, while an intensive qual-
itative upgrading has proceeded without interruption. Even at a relatively
early stage of this qualitative improvement, the Soviets had an impressive
ability to make quick reinforcements. They have, of course, done their
best to hide this capability-it is never practiced openly. But in the crisis
situation at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
something of the real capability was revealed when they quickly increased
ground forces on the Kola by 40%.
Looking, then, at the Soviet order of battle in the entire LMD, and
not just the Kola, we can determine that the TVD North command has
at its disposal around 840 aircraft, and between 8 and 10 divisions plus
support troops. Most of the combat aircraft are normally based in the
south of the LMD, but they could be flown up to Kola airfields in a matter
of hours. Considerable preparations have been made in recent years to
facilitate the rapid shift of forces northward. In the past 10 years, stocks
of equipment and supplies have been prepositioned on the Kola for the
LMD tactical air units. It was revealed in 1978 that hardened underground
shelters had been built to accommodate around 500 aircraft. In 1981,
NATO's Northern Command announced that expansion and hardening
of the Kola runways, construction of camouflaged ammunition stores,
and preparation of hardened fuel depots were under way.
As the air force case indicates, the Soviet policy on the Kola is to
build up infrastructure to quickly receive reinforcements from the south.
This also goes for helicopter complement of the ground forces, which
represents a major improvement in offensive power. There are some 190
utility helicopters in the LMD, which significantly increase the ability
to conduct rapid and large-scale tactical operations over the difficult
terrain. There is also at least one regiment of attack helicopters (40 Mi-
24 Hind D/E and 20 Mi-8 Hip E and Mi-17 Hip H) in the south, and
indications that there are two attack-helicopter squadrons (14 Mi-24
Hind D/E and 16 Mi-8 Hip E) on the Kola itself.
The helicopters are not the only factor upgrading the Kola ground
forces. Units are receiving the new generations of tactical missiles, with
longer range and greater accuracy. Above all, the Soviet divisions are
better prepared to fight in the difficult topographical and climatic con-
ditions of the North. Units have been equipped with more tracked ve-
hicles for traversing snow and marshy terrain. And the LMD divisions
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have apparently been undergoing intensive training in arctic warfare.
One alarming signal is the fact that recent issues of the Soviet Ground
Forces' tactical journal, Voyennyi Vestnik, have been devoting dispro-
portionate attention to 1) the Norwegian Army and 2) combat in arctic
conditions. In 1984 alone, such articles included: "The Offensive in
Arctic Regions," "Troop Protection in Arctic Regions" (on the specific
behavior of nuclear radiation in cold climates!), "The Infantry Battalion
of the Norwegian Army in Basic Forms of Battle," "Norwegian Land
Forces," and "Combat in Arctic Regions" (by the First Deputy Com-
mander of the Leningrad Military District). It seems unlikely that so
many articles have been written for the edification of only two divisions
stationed on the Kola.
Finally, there has been an alarming build-up of amphibious capability.
The 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade has been nearly doubled in size since
1983, and has reportedly been engaged in "virtually continuous am-
phibious exercises," landing small sabotage groups and spearheads for
larger assaults. In early 1984 it was learned that the Northern Fleet had
received a squadron of the Soviets' new "Lebed" class air-cushion vessels
which can be used to shuttle men and equipment ashore from larger
landing craft at record speeds. "Lebed" have a top speed of 100 km/hr
and can carry 35 tons.
After a review of the Soviet forces ready to move into northern Norway,
Can NATO defend it is of course justifed and necessary to ask the question, what can NATO
Norway.? do to defend its member country, Norway?
The shocking facts of the matter are these: The total number of standing
troops in all of Norway is roughly 6,000. In the critical Finnmark province
closest to the Soviet border, there is an essentially symbolic unit of 1,500
men: a 450-man battalion at the border and a battalion group (1,000
men) in Porsanger. They face the 45th Motorized Rifle Division less than
10 km from the border on the Soviet side. The 45th has 13,500 men
and 220 tanks (more tanks, incidentally, than the entire Norwegian
army!). In the area of Troms, further south (at the tip of the "Finnish
Wedge"), the Norwegians have a standing brigade of approximately 5,000
men. There are no non-Norwegian NATO troops on Norwegian soil.
In short, NATO has a grand total of 6,000 troops in the North; the
Soviets have 30,000 to 40,000 in place, and the 76th Airborne can be
there within hours.
Thus, in a surprise attack situation, there is no defense for Finnmark
at all. NATO strategy is to simply give it to the Russians. The Soviets
will not encounter serious opposition until Troms, where the 5,000-man
Norwegian brigade has dug itself into a fortress in the high cliffs along
the fjords. Since it is well-protected and also isolated, Troms is therefore
a first-priority target for a Soviet nuclear strike. And outside of Troms,
down to Trondheim-the southern border of the territory the Soviets
want and need-there are only coastal defense installations.
Official Norwegian plans call for Troms to be reinforced after an attack
by two more brigades mobilized locally. Another two brigades from the
south of Norway are earmarked for Troms, but their arrival there presumes
Norwegian control over the airfields where they are to land. But, even
in the best case, this is all that could be pitted against the several divisions
of Soviet troops that could be in the area after that same period.
A more serious threat to the invading troops than the mobilization
brigades would be the Norwegian air force. There are two squadrons (18
aircraft each) of F-16 fighters stationed in north Norway in peacetime,
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with another 36 F-16s and 35 F-5As based in the south which could be
deployed in the north.
Compared to the Soviet adversary, however, it is obvious that the
Norwegian forces are no match for an invasion force. NATO has drawn
the same conclusion, and bases its defense strategy on reinforcements
from outside Norway. The Allies could theoretically provide 10 squadrons
of aircraft, plus various alternatives of air mobile and amphibious forces.
But there are significant reservations in each individual case. The only
unit of NATO reinforcements which is actually earmarked for Norway
is the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade-but it requires
a minimum of three weeks for deployment. Other theoretically designated
units have alternative deployment options, and most have done little
cold-weather training. The most highly publicized unit, the USMC ma-
rine amphibious brigade, a 10,000-man force which could be ready for
combat in Norway in four to six days, has disappointed many observers
by the indifference it has shown toward its mission in Norway. Its lack
of enthusiasm appears understandable, however, when one learns that
the brigade's pre-positioned heavy equipment is not in Finnmark, or in
Troms-which is where the brigade would have to land if its intervention
were to make any military sense in a fight for northern Norway-but in
Trondheim, 805 km south of Troms!
In short, given the actual capabilities, one can only conclude that the
current NATO and Norwegian strategy is to give up Finnmark without
a fight, stage a heroic but rather meaningless "last stand" at the Troms
fortress, and then, presuming the arrival of the U. S. marine brigade or
other reinforcements, attempt to draw some sort of truce line around
Trondheim-i.e., give the Russians roughly what they are prepared to
take in any case.
This conclusion-as cruel as it may seem-is the only one that can
be drawn. And this brings us to a discussion of one final Soviet option
for gaining control of the Northern Flank-the one that may in the end
prove to be the most likely of all. This final option is that of guaranteeing
Soviet access to and control over northern Scandinavia before the war
ever begins. To understand the details of such an option, we will have
to extend the discussion to include not only Norway, but also Sweden
and Finland.
Neutralizing the neutrals
In the context of a nuclear war with the United States, the Soviet Union
has little interest in invading and occupying either Norway, Sweden, or
Finland. Once continental Europe is under Soviet control, that can be
done at the Soviets' leisure in any case. But in the immediate war
situation, what the Soviet Union must absolutely do, as we have outlined
earlier, is deny the military use of these countries' territory to the NATO
enemy.
In the case of Finland, the possibility of a pro-NATO turn is minimal.
Finland has since 1948 been bound by a Treaty of Friendship, Cooper-
ation, and Mutual Assistance to the Soviet Union. (That treaty was
renewed for another 20 years in June 1983.) In the event of war, or even
threat of war, Finland must assist, and accept the assistance of, the Soviet
Union. Already now, Finnish military cooperation with the U.S.S.R.
is extensive. In northern Finland, e.g., Kittila, new airfields have re-
portedly been built with the "expert guidance" of Soviet advisers. In the
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spring of 1980 a Soviet delegation visiting northern Finland proposed
the building of joint radar systems in that area to protect the Soviet
Union from cruise missiles and low-flyi,nng aircraft; the proposal was re-
peated in 1983. As recently as May 19135, Marshal Akhromeyev spent
five days inspecting Finnish military inst2.ilations and discussing with the
Finnish command. This is the only foreign country he has visited since
becoming Chief of the General Staff.
For Sweden, the situation is more complex than for Finland, but the
broad outlines of the Soviet policy are cle.ir. Hitherto, the Soviets have
pursued a classical "hard-cop/soft-cop" app-oach. Repeated violations of
Swedish territory at sea and in the air are intended to show the Swedes
that military resistance is hopeless. At the same time, in Swedish Prime
Minister Olof Palme, the Russians have an asset unrivaled among Western
politicians. There is overwhelming evidence of Palme's personal desire
to strike deals with the Soviets, including ones ,`ha : would mean sacrificing
Swedish national interests for nothing in return. However, the real power
in the Kingdom of Sweden lies not with Palme, but with the country's
oligarchical elite, and it is more likely that they would drive a harder
bargain with the Russians. For them, the Soviets might have to use
stronger arguments than with Palme.
Failing all else, the Soviets might resort to rather brutal blackmail.
The Russians could present the Swedish elites--and may well already
have done so-with the following persuasive argument: "You Swedes
know how very much we in the U.S.S.R. respect your neutrality. But
in the present crisis, a problem has arisen. You have a very well-developed
network of air bases in northern Sweden, dangerously within range of
our own naval base in Murmansk. We Russians know that you would
never dream of attacking us from those bases. But we just cannot depend
on your being able to deny their use to NATO. We're sure you understand
our concern. After all, our most important military base is at stake. Now,
unfortunately, we-and you-have only two altern atives: Either we will
have to use a few of our 10,000 nuclear warheads within range of Sweden
to ensure that nobody uses those bases, or you can Olow us-very tem-
porarily-to use your airspace and possibly send a few troops across your
territory. Once our problems with our NATO adversary are solved, we
will leave and you will have your territory back. We are sure you will
agree that the latter alternative is preferable."
How precisely and under what circumstances the Soviet negotiators
would present those arguments to the Swedes is, of course, impossible
to know. But there is no doubt that the approach is an effective one.
Moreover, it is one that could also be applied to the Norwegians. In
fact, it already has. The current Norwegian "no-defens ?-of-the-North"
policy was adopted in response to precisely this sort of (ar least) implicit
blackmail: by prohibiting foreign bases and troops on its soil-a self-
adopted Norwegian reservation on its NATO membership adopted in
March 1949 in response to a Soviet question; by banning all nuclear
weapons on its soil-a self-adopted Norwegian resevation on its NATO
membership adopted in late 1957 in response to Soviet queries; by keeping
Finnmark demilitarized-a self-adopted Norwegian policy since the war-
Norway believes it can avoid "provoking" the Russian Bear.
In the more recent period, this policy of appeasement has reached the
level of "compromise on top of compromise." A case in point is the
compromise reached in Norwegian politics regarding the pre- positioning
of heavy equipment for a U.S. marine brigade in northern Norway. The
original plan was to have the brigade land and fight relatively far north,
near Troms. Norwegian politicians of the Social Democratic left wing,
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led by convicted KGB Col. Arne Treholt personally, opposed the stock-
piling idea altogether, arguing that it would "upset the balance in northern
Europe." The Norwegian right wing finally accepted a compromise: The
equipment would be pre-positioned, but in a location over 800 km away
from where the troops were supposed to fight! Thus, the original act of
appeasement-to ban foreign bases and troops-was compounded by the
second act of appeasement-moving the brigade's base so far south as
to be thoroughly worthless.
The practical consequence of this kind of policy is that Norway has
guaranteed the Soviet Union a total sanctuary for its main arsenal of
SSBNs-all of which are targeted on the United States. Without that
guarantee, the U.S.S.R. would never have dared build up the biggest of
all its military bases only 50 km away from the border to NATO. It is
merely one further logical step in this same line of thinking to grant the
Soviets a total sanctuary on the Kola once and for all.
In 1940, the Nazis invaded Norway. A resistance movement was or-
ganized, and-albeit hesitantly-the British and French began to fight
the Nazis in Norway. A few weeks later, in the Far North, in Narvik,
the Allies had a crucial chance to deliver a major defeat to the Nazis
and possibly open up the battle for the liberation of Norway already in
the summer of 1940. Boxed up in Narvik by the English, French, and
Free Polish forces, Hitler turned to the neutral Swedes and demanded
that they allow Nazi reinforcements and supplies to be shipped to Narvik
through Sweden, on Swedish railways, to reinforce his troops in Narvik.
The Swedes gave Hitler what he wanted. Sweden remained untouched
by the war. But Norway was thereby condemned to suffer five long years
of Nazi occupation.
Today, the same sort of deals are in the making. Sweden may avoid
nuclear devastation, and Norway may still keep part of its territory. But
the price will be infinitely higher, for the deals made on the Northern
Flank this time will be the guarantee that the Soviet Union can win
World War III.
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3.3 The Imminent Knockout of
NATO's Southern Flank
On June 2, 1985, the Southern Flank of NATO disintegrated as the
Soviet-controlled socialist government of Andreas Papandreou, riding
on a wave of vote fraud, internal terror and intimidation, and backed
by approximately 30,000 clandestine, paramilitary communist personnel,
secured re-election. As of that date, Greece, nominally a member of
NATO, is in fact the Soviet Union's Trojan Horse inside the Western
alliance. Any future military or diplomatic action of Greece under Pa-
pandreou will be an integral part of Soviet strategic deployment.
In fact, the fall of Greece into the Soviet orbit is a unique case study
affording the student of international affairs a special insight into the
method by which the Soviet High Command is combining military,
diplomatic, espionage, and political (overt and covert) means for pros-
ecuting its war against the West, just below the threshold of general
strategic assault.
This Russian Trojan Horse, the Soviet-dominated Papandreou gov-
ernment of Athens, is capable, on a mere nod from Moscow at the
appropriate moment, of unleashing the dramatic endgame in NATO's
Southern Flank debacle, in the form of a contrived military conflict with
Turkey in the course of which NATO-member Greece requests military
assistance from neighboring Warsaw Pact forces against NATO-member
Turkey. This NATO planners' nightmare is now poised to be unleashed
at a moment's notice. Moscow is positioned to get its long-sought prize,
control over the Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits.
NATO's Southern Flank had been crippled in June 1974 when Turkey,
at the instigation of Henry Kissinger, invaded Cyprus. The invasion
precipitated the collapse of the Greek military government of the time
and caused Greece to withdraw from NATO. Greece did return to the
Alliance in 1980 but, in October 1981, a socialist government under
Andreas Papandreou, a Soviet-controlled asset, was brought to power by
means of intense anti-NATO propaganda and vote fixing. Greece's re-
lations with NATO remained in limbo until the spring of 1985, when
Prime Minister Papandreou and his handpicked joint Chiefs announced
a drastic change in the country's national security doctrine: The Warsaw
Pact was dropped as a potential military adversary, and NATO-member
Turkey was identified as the sole "potential threat" to Greek national
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security against which the Greek armed forces will be armed, trained,
and deployed.
After the June 2, 1985 election, a re-elected Papandreou government
announced a further important change in defense policy: Greece intends
to seek military alliance with its communist neighbors to the north in
case of conflict with Turkey. Thus, one of the two pillars of NATO's
Southern Flank, Greece, formally no longer shares either the strategic
interests or principles of the Alliance. The valuable United States military
bases still in Greece have been given notice that they shall be removed
by 1988-three years from now at the latest. Matters, however, are likely
to deteriorate much faster than that: There is an immediate potential
for an artificially induced military conflict between two formal NATO
allies, Greece and Turkey, in the course of which one of these NATO
members, Greece, requests the military assistance of the Warsaw Pact.
What will happen in such a situation, which may materialize before the
end of 1985?
The military value of the Southern Flank
The so-called Southern Flank of NATO, which consists of the territories,
waters, and air space of Greece and Turkey, has, as its assigned principal
strategic mission, to preserve the Mediterranean Sea under the military
control of the NATO alliance. A strategic appreciation of this part of
the world, therefore, depends on an estimation of the strategic value of
the Mediterranean Sea both in peacetime and at war.
In peacetime, the Mediterranean Sea carries approximately 75% of all
of Western Europe's international commercial traffic measured in ton-
nage. The military master of the Mediterranean is the absolute arbiter
of the economies of the European part of NATO.
In wartime, whichever power controls the Mediterranean Sea, possesses
the most efficiently centralized "interior lines of communication" which
permit it to concentrate, amass, deploy, and redeploy great amounts of
war materiel, supplies, and troops to any country of Europe, Africa, and
Asia with shores on the Mediterranean. The ultimate fate of Napoleon's
Egyptian expedition and Erwin Rommel's Africa campaign are classic
demonstrations of the extremely high military value of the Mediterranean.
At this time in history, the defense of this great body of water depends
on events influencing the life of two formal members of NATO, Greece
and Turkey, which occupy the northeastern quadrant of the Mediter.
ranean. It is there where the Strait of Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara,
and the Strait of Dardanelles, "The Straits" (Map 28), connect the great
Russian "lake," the Black Sea, with the Mediterranean. The reason that
NATO to this day remains in control of the Mediterranean Sea is that
its control over the Straits enables NATO to bottle up Russian naval
power inside the Black Sea at will.
The fall of the Straits to Russia would reverse military fortunes through-
out the Mediterranean and would make the rest of European NATO a
hostage to Russia.
At the present time, the approximate naval comparisons in the Med-
iterranean stand as follows.
NATO naval forces, excluding the special case of Greece, are:
U. S. Sixth Fleet: 39 principal surface combatants
Italian Navy: 22 principal surface combatants
Spanish Med. Fleet: 11 principal surface combatants
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French Med. Fleet: 12 principal surface combatants
Turkish Navy: 15 principal surface combatants
NATO Total: 99 principal surface combatants
56 submarines
Soviet Mediterranean 14 principal surface combatants
Squadron (at present): 10 submarines
To which could be added, if the Straits fall under Soviet control, the
following force of the Black Sea Fleet:
80 principal surface combatants
24 submarines
For reasons which should be obvious, a fall of the Straits into Soviet
control will virtually automatically make the Greek Navy an ally of the
Soviet naval force, thus adding a further
21 principal surface combatants,
10 submarines,
thus bringing the the Mediterranean naval balance to the following,
assuming Turkey gets knocked out in a local conflict with Greece and
her new-found friends:
Soviet-aligned force: 115 principal surface combatants
44 submarines
NATO force: 84 principal surface combatants
40 submarines
Apart from this theoretical result, emerging from a presumably local-
izable Greek-Turkish conflict of the aberrant type described here, the
actual conventional force comparisons between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact in the sector covered by the "Southern Flank" are as follows:
If Italy were to step in to fill the gap left by Greece, and if, generously,
Yugoslavia, for its own national reasons, decided to side with NATO
against the Warsaw Pact, then the NATO side would consist of the
following non-naval forces:
Men under arms: 951,000
Tanks, all types: 6,902
Combat aircraft, all types: 1,178
Artillery, all types: 6,524
Poised immediately opposite this NATO-allied force is the South-
western TVD of Marshal Ogarkov's "Western Theater," with the follow-
ing conservatively estimated forces:
Men under arms: 1,123,000
Tanks, all types: 11,960
Tactical aircraft, all types: 1,670
Artillery, all types: 9,455
However, the NATO force in the Southern Flank (with Yugoslavia
included), is not facing only General Gerasimov's Southwestern TVD.
It is also threatened by General Maksimov's "Southern Theater," by Syria
and by Albania (which is expected to side with Bulgaria against Yugo-
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slavia). Syria and the "Southern Theater," of course, would move prin-
cipally against Turkey. Thus, the total adversary force confronting the
Southern Flank, would be, approximately:
Men under arms:
1,563,000 (plus 135,000, Greece)
Tanks, all types:
21,680 (plus
2,237, Greece)
Tactical aircraft:
3,163 (plus
303, Greece)
Artillery, all types:
19,055 (plus
1,096, Greece)
In short, the political takeover of Greece from within, has created a
military situation in which the remnant of NATO's Southern Flank is
faced with an adversary which enjoys a local, operational superiority of
2-to-1 in ground combat personnel; 4-to-1 in tanks; 2-to-1 in tactical
aircraft; 3-to-1 in artillery. The further advantage of the tactical opposite
numbers over the NATO's Southern Flank tactical force is that they
enjoy tactical nuclear support from SS-20, SS-4, SS-5 and SS-22 launch
sites. Local NATO forces have no such coverage. The anti-NATO force
enjoys geographical continuity and tight cohesion of "inner lines of com-
munication." The NATO allied force, Italy, Yugoslavia and Turkey, is
fragmented both by water and by enemy territory.
In sum: With the fall of Greece under Soviet infuence, Turkey and
her Straits are indefensible unless the United States is willing to go to
general thermonuclear war in defense of Turkey and the Straits (Map
29).
`Escalation dominance' and other Russian options
The "sanitized," i.e., declassified version of the CIA's "National Intel-
ligence Estimate" for this year's Soviet force strength, presented to the
U. S. Senate, lets slip through a uniquely important conclusion: that the
purpose of the Soviet Union's unprecedented strategic nuclear arms build-
up to absolute supremacy over the United States, "appears to be" to
ensure that the United States will be unable to intervene in any "sub-
nuclear" military conflict, "anywhere in the Eurasian landmass." In short,
the CIA admits in public that it is its considered opinion that Soviet
posture is what specialists call "escalation dominance." This term de-
scribes a situation in which the Soviet forces have attained absolute
military supremacy at all possible levels of conflict, from low-intensity
operations to limited tactical conventional engagement, to full tactical
conventional engagement, to operational conventional, theater conven-
tional operational, strategic conventional and strategic nuclear engage-
ment. The implication is that the Soviet forces could at will initiate any
limited conflict anywhere and be guaranteed to win it, if left within its
original limits, thus leaving it up to the losing adversary to decide whether
he will up the stakes and, in order to salvage a losing local situation,
plunge into a losing regional or a losing strategic conflict.
All this, of course, is in theory. In reality, the CIA's formulation in
this year's NIE is simply a suggestion that if we, the United States, leave
the "Eurasian landmass" alone, we should not feel too uncomfortable
with our existing strategic inferiority.
Would the Soviet Union's military force engage itself for the purpose
of opening up the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus, which would lead
it to naval supremacy in the Mediterranean? This question, posed without
reference to the region's political realities, is pure speculation. The Soviet
Union need not risk one soldier's bleeding nose to bend Turkey to its
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will. Others, it is beginning to emerge, might do the bleeding for the
Russians.
After the fall of Greece to Russian influence, the Achilles heel of
NATO's Southern Flank is to the south of the Caucasus Mountains: the
military roads from Stavropol and Krasnodar down to Batum, Tiflis,
Kirovabad, Yerivan and the critical military junction of Nakhichevan,
south of the point where the Turkish, Soviet and Iranian borders meet.
From there, massed Soviet divisions would move down south into Iran,
proceed to Tabriz, Maragheh and Kermanshah, turn around Lake Urmia
to Urmia and Khey, and completely outflank Turkish defenses from
Trebzon to Mount Ararat. From Urmia, Soviet troops could move east
to Rawanduz, Mosul and link up with allied Syrian forces in Aleppo
(Map 30).
The Soviet military-logistical capabilities to execute such a blitzkrieg,
out of the Transcaucasian Military District, are being upgraded on a crash
program basis to wartime requirements. In early 1985, the Russians began
the crash construction of two railway lines in the Transcaucasus, in the
Soviet Republics of Georgia and Armenia.
The first line, scheduled for completion at the end of 1987, starts 20
kilometers (12.5 miles) south of the Georgian capital of Tiflis, and pro-
ceeds southwest to near the Turkish border at Achalkhalaki, in moun-
tainous terrain, opposite the Turkish provincial capital of Kars. Kars
Province was part of the Tsarist Russian Empire until 1914, and was
officially demanded by Josef Stalin in a postwar ultimatum to Turkey.
The second railway line, to be completed by the end of 1986, goes
from the Armenian town of Idzhevan, southward to Razdan, across the
high plateau west of Lake Sevan, to a point near the Turkish border.
Any Soviet invasion of Turkey would be preceded by a massive Soviet
destabilization campaign. In the wake of the Soviet moves into northern
Iran, the Moscow-financed Kurdish insurgency in Turkey will flare up
into a veritable bloodbath. The Shi'ite insurgency in the region of the
Turkish naval base of Alexandretta, well financed and coached by Syria's
Hafez Assad, would move to link arms with Syrian troops. A Greek
provocation in the northwest against Turkey and a Greek-invited Greek-
Bulgarian military alignment, would force the Turkish leadership to a
dramatic choice: either capitulate to the wishes of the Soviet command
and turn over military control of the Straits to the Russians, or try to
fight simultaneously against 1) domestic insurgency, 2) a Greek-Bulgarian
military action in Turkish Thrace, and 3) a Syrian-Shi'ite action against
the naval base of Alexandretta.
Given the political orientation of the Greek government, a situation
may well arise which, while not directly involving the two superpowers,
produces a military conflict between NATO-member Turkey on the one
side and NATO-member Greece on the other, the latter aligned with
Syria and Bulgaria. The local comparison of force strengths in mid-1985
would look as follows:
Regular Forces
Army
A.F.V
Airforce
Navy'
Greece
135,000
2,545
303
10/14/7/18
Bulgaria
105,000
1,860
188
2/ 2/ 6
Syria
240,000
4,100
503
/ /2/20
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Greece
350,000
30,000
24,000
Bulgaria
150,000
20,000
25,000
Syria
460,000
?
2,500
Thus, Turkey, if she keeps her Cyprus contingent, would have an
equal number of men under arms as her combat adversaries; would be
outnumbered significantly in mobilizable reserves; would be outnumbered
by a ratio of 2.5-to-1 in tanks; of 2-to-1 in combat aircraft; and would
be significantly outnumbered in combat surface ships on her Mediter-
ranean side. Turkey would, of course, suffer even more severe local tactical
disadvantages, because a significant portion of her land, air and naval
forces would be pinned down against the Kurdish insurgency and at the
non-combat border areas with the Soviet Union and Iran, assuming that
Moscow chooses to adopt a neutral posture and let her surrogates do the
job.
In a local conflict of this type, Turkey would have to capitulate. The
likelihood of its occurring is much greater than most imagine. It is almost
bound to be triggered by the eventual death of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini.
Soviet political envelopments
Turkey is likely to be exposed to maximum pressure, in the context of
the strategic crisis which is expected to erupt with the death of the aging
Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. The Soviet government, since the days of
Yuri Andropov, has made it clear with official government statements
that its national security interests will not permit the eruption of chaos
in its neighbor Iran, and that she considers it within her treaty rights to
move troops to occupy northern Iran as she had done, invoking the same
treaty, at the end of the Second World War.
The recent completion of a third military railroad in the Transcaucasus
region suggests that Moscow this time is planning a more permanent
occupation of northern Iran. The same prospect is suggested by the
massive infiltration of Azerbaijani-speaking Soviet operatives into north-
ern Iran since 1979 and by the amassment of Azerbaijani-speaking di-
visions at the borders with Iran. Soviet units in Afghanistan would also
have the option of moving into the eastern side of northern Iran. From
on-the-ground reports, it appears that a Soviet-sponsored political rear-
rangement of Iran, now being arranged jointly by Soviet, Syrian and
Israeli intelligence services, involves a mutilated southern Iranian "Islamic
Republic" under Ayatollah Rafsanjani, or someone of his persuasion, at
the helm, in close coordination with the Syrian and Libyan government.
A leading Israeli political faction associated with Kissinger's friends around
Ariel Sharon has been in secret negotiations with the Soviet Union via
Edgar Bronfman, exploring the possibility of an Israeli-Soviet under-
standing based on 1) Israel's recognition of and adjustment to the fact
of Soviet supremacy in the Middle East and 2) solution of Israel's grave
demographic problem by means of Soviet-sponsored mass emigration to
Israel of Soviet Jews.
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This Israeli faction's strategic orientation, in addition to a rapproche-
ment with the Russians, appears to include the following overall prospect:
After the anticipated Soviet takeover of northern Iran, both Israel and
Syria will continue to share the common objectives of emasculating Jordan
and Iraq, and of making it impossible for their ally, Egypt, to render
them any military assistance. Thus, both Syria and Israel will tend to
both 1) increase their assistance to the Shi'ite fundamentalist forces of
mutilated southern Iran and 2) place a premium on building up Kurdish
insurgency into a considerable military threat. For the latter objective,
both Syrian and Israeli planners concur that the best way of building a
serious Kurdish threat against Iraq is to foment a powerful Kurdish move-
ment in southeastern Turkey, which is already in progress.
Thus, by approximately the time of the Soviet military occupation of
northern Iran after Khomeini's death, Israel, under the appropriate in-
ternal power readjustments, would enter into a Soviet-sponsored ar-
rangement with Syria. The arrangement would provide for the 40,000
Syrian troops now pinned down in Lebanon-plus the far greater number
of Syrian forces tied down between the Israeli-held Golan Heights and
the nearby Syrian capital of Damascus-to be freed up for deployment
against Turkey. Such a redeployment of Syrian forces out of the Lebanon
cauldron and away from the Golan-Damascus Front, would be the necessary
precondition for Papandreou to move, with assistance from Bulgaria, for joint
military action against Turkey, while Soviet forces in northern Iran have
completed their envelopment of Turkey's eastern border armies.
In this overall scheme of imminent politico-military envelopment of
Turkey, NATO's last remaining bastion in the Southern Flank, the
following broader considerations are brought to bear.
Soviet penetration and power projection
Incrementally since 1981, the Soviet High Command has built up an
impressive military and quasi-military presence in the areas surrounding
the "Southern Flank," both directly and through surrogates. One of the
important pivots of this Russian military presence is the prepositioning
of massive amounts of war materiel in the deserts of Libya and the
stationing of Soviet Blackjack strategic bombers in both Libya and Syria.
For all intents and purposes, Libya and Syria are de facto extensions of
the Russian military establishment.
The number of Soviet/Warsaw Pact uniformed military personnel in
the relevant areas is over 20,000 men, approximately distributed as fol-
lows:
Soviet and allied troops in Southern Flank-relevant locations:
Syria
Libya
Ethiopia
N.
Yemen
S.
Yemen
U.S.S.R.
7,000
1,800
1,700
500
1,500
East Germany
210
400
550
-
75
Poland
131
-
-
-
-
Cuba
-
3,000
3,000
-
300
The presence of these forces backs up larger Soviet military deployments
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secured by treaty agreements, both public and secret. During 1983 and
1984, the number of such treaties and agreements, in our estimate, was
approximately 25. As a result, the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean
has established major presence in Latakia, Syria, in Bengazi and Tripoli,
Libya, in the island of Malta and in no less than five naval locations in
Greece, including sovereign floating-dock naval facilities just outside the
three-mile limit of Greek territorial waters, across from the NATO naval
base at Souda Bay, Crete.
From August to December 1984, the following supplementary treaties
were concluded:
A "friendship treaty" between Libya and Malta, providing for extensive
military cooperation and presence of Libyan troops in Malta; secret Lib-
yan-Greek treaty with a $1 billion price tag; a secret Greek-Syrian treaty
which includes clauses of joint Greek-Syrian military action against Tur-
key; a long series of treaties and agreements between Syria and Libya; a
Libyan-Moroccan amalgamation treaty worked out by Kissinger's friends
over the previous summer. A secret Syrian-Algerian-Maltan "Friendship
Treaty."
All these treaties involve military and naval agreements, sharing of
weapons and munitions, and special privileges and facilities for the Soviet
Navy in the Mediterranean. All military aspects of these treaties have
been supervised by the Russian military at the highest level. Marshals
Sokolov, Ogarkov and Akhromeyev deployed in the area more than once
during 1984. These 1984 developments in the Mediterranean had been
preceded by an impressive Warsaw Pact exercise during the month of
March, codenamed Soyuz 84, whose objective was to practice a massed
land invasion of Greece and Turkey along the following four axes: into
Turkey down the Maritsa river in the directions Edirne-to-Gallipoli and
Edirne-to-Istanbul; into Greece down the Vardar and Struma rivers. The
maneuver indicated that it would take Warsaw Pact troops 24 hours to
reach the Aegean coast of Greece and 42 hours to reach Istanbul (Map
31).
In the course of the Soyuz 84 maneuver, the Soviets installed an
unspecified number of SS-20s in Bulgaria's Pirin Plain, north of Nevrokop.
At approximately the same time, the Turkish General Staff, having
received reports that Syria's Hafez Assad had fixed the prospect of con-
quering the Turkish naval base of Alexandretta as a major policy com-
mitment, conducted a study of Alexandretta's defense: It concluded that
the Turkish Army cannot defend the port city for more than 72 hours,
should the Syrian units now in Lebanon be freed up for redeployment.
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3.4 Germany-the Key to Europe
The Soviet plan of conquering Europe has two basic variants:
1) Military conquest. In all likelihood, this would occur as a European
or Western Theater conflict, subsumed under a Soviet global nuclear
assault upon the United States and its NATO allies;
2) A series of deals struck by the Soviets with leading European oligarchical
families. These would be negotiated through political party "cut-outs,"
such as the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Egon Bahr
and Willy Brandt, the Free Democratic Party of Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
or foreign ministry cut-outs under Foreign Ministers Genscher, Andreotti,
Howe, and Dumas.
Whether conquest occurs by war or peaceful capitulation, there is one
invariant: The inclusion of West Germany as a Soviet satrap means the
automatic incorporation of all Europe into the Soviet sphere of influence.
Germany is the key to Europe, and the Soviets' entire strategy for con-
quering Europe without firing a shot, is predicated on breaking West
Germany out of the Atlantic Alliance.
Similarly, if Russia takes Europe by storm, the Central, or German
Front will be the decisive Front within the European Theater of military
action. Russian victory on the Central Front means that the Soviet Union
need not incur further losses by fighting for every square kilometer of
Europe. Once Germany and the Central Front are occupied, the "game"
is over, Russia declares "checkmate," and the rest of Europe capitulates.
Germany's place on the map
Germany is the industrial hub and geographical center of Europe, the
military mainstay in both troop contingent and geographical terms, for
the defense of continental Western Europe. If Germany falls to the
Russians, the economic relations of all Europe shift overnight into a
Soviet-Comecon centered economy. West Germany itself would become,
as East Germany has been for decades, a colony functioning as an in-
dustrial and high-technology "milking cow" for Mother Russia.
One glance at a map of Europe shows what becomes of Western Europe's
defenses should Germany fall to the Russians militarily. The Russian
Army would stand at the Rhine, looking into a defenseless France, to
say nothing of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. To the north,
Denmark would be equally defenseless, and its fall would be followed by
terms of capitulation being worked out with Norway and Sweden. To
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the south, the loss of Germany would leads automatically to the Russians
taking neutral, defenseless Austria, placing the Soviet Army at the Bren-
ner Pass on the Italian border. It would be only a matter of time-and
very little at that-before a Soviet "New Order" for Italy, and the entire
Mediterranean, would be "negotiated."
In recognition of the decisive role played by German territory in the
defense of Europe, by far the strongest concentration of U.S. and NATO
ground and air forces are deployed on German soil. The active NATO
forces consist of 345,000 West German Bundeswehr Ground Forces,
including 12 Armored and Mechanized Divisions; some 200,000 U.S.
Ground Forces, in 5 + Divisions; 60,000 British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR) troops; a 50,000-man French Army Corps in the Baden region
in southwest Germany, and scattered combat units from the Canadian,
Dutch, and Belgian Armies. All in all, some 700,000 Army troops on
hand.
The role of the West German Armed Forces in the defense of the
Central Front is decisive. The following figures, supplied by the 1985
Annual White Paper of the West German defense ministry, speak for
themselves. The West German Armed Forces provide the following per-
centages of troops and equipment for the NATO Forces on the Central
Front.
Ground forces
Main battle tanks
Ground/air defense
Combat aircraft
Naval forces in Baltic
Naval air forces in Baltic
Percent
50
60
50
30
70
100
In terms of raw numbers, the NATO forces deployed on German soil
are, broadly speaking, sufficient to handle the situation. But numbers of
troops in and of themselves do not win wars.
Wars are both deterred and won by abandoning illusions and consoling
thoughts as to how one would wish a war to be fought. Rather, one
studies carefuly the Soviet enemy's actual, existing Order of Battle, his
doctrine, his strategic policy goals, his build-up of troops and hardware,
and how that fits with his doctrine and strategic policy goals. Then one
draws the appropriate conclusions regarding both strengthening and de-
ployment of one's own forces-no matter how chilling the reality be-
comes.
From this standpoint, the NATO Order of Battle in Germany and
Central Europe is a deployment of forces based on cardinal illusions,
starting with the widespread NATO premise that a European war would
"start as a conventional conflict," or with "limited use of nuclear weapons."
The same massive NATO forces in Germany become sitting ducks in a
nuclear and chemical weapon shooting gallery, should a Soviet blitzkrieg
ever be mounted across Germany.
Certain potentially fatal deficiencies must be rectified among the U.S.
and NATO forces in West Germany, concerning especially types of
nuclear arms (above all the urgent need for thousands of neutron artillery
and neutron mines), operational methods, dispersal and hardening of
air, missile, and ground units and readiness/alert status.
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Soviet doctrine and the German Front
As with the Ogarkov Plan Maximum Option for thermonuclear assault
on the United States, any Soviet assault on West Germany would be
characterized by:
1) Surprise attack;
2) Pre-emptive nuclear and chemical precision first strike by missiles
and aircraft, to eliminate all crucial military and logistical targets in the
first hour of war. In the case of Germany, the Soviet high-speed offensive
would follow the first-hour precision bombardment, as the Red Army
marched into a Germany where the bulk of the massive NATO units no
longer existed.
The assault on West Germany would begin with a Soviet barrage by
hundreds of nuclear and chemical weapons. NATO would have a warning
time of 5-10 minutes, the time from which the barrage is launched to
the time that the nuclear and chemical warheads hit the hundreds of
NATO military bases, logistical bases, airfields, missile bases, and nuclear
weapons storage sites, that comprise their targets.
Five to ten minutes after launch, NATO would be battered by hundreds
of low-yield (20-150 kt) nuclear and chemical warheads-low-yield in
order to limit the blast and fire damage around the military and logistic
sites being targeted. The purpose would be to maximize the damage to
NATO military capability, while minimizing the destruction of civilian
population and industrial facilities, which are to be occupied by the Red
Army in the next days, and later become a Soviet zone of occupation.
The hundreds of low-yield nuclear and chemical warheads will be
delivered by precision-accurate modem short- and medium-range missiles,
the SS-21 (120 km), the SS-23 (500 km), the SS-22 (1,000 km) (Map
32). These new missiles have been deployed in full strength since the
end of 1984 with the Soviet spearhead invasion forces stationed in East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland; as well as with their Second
Echelon invasion forces stationed in Soviet East Prussia, the Baltic States,
Byelorussia, and the Carpathian region.
During the first hour of war in Europe, additional hundreds of low-
yield nuclear and chemical-weapon bombs would be dropped by Soviet
long-range fighter-bombers, such as the modem Su-24 type-itself for-
ward-based for the first time during 1984-with precision accuracy over
NATO military and logistical targets.
Every SS-21, SS-23, or SS-22 missile launcher deployed has quick
reload capability. This means that every half hour another missile can
be fired from the same launcher.
We must now look at that first hour of war on the Central Front, from
the standpoint of a Soviet strategic planner. Marshal Ogarkov has his
list of NATO targets in Germany and the Low Countries, that must be
wiped out in that time-frame. The list is divided into the categories
"hardened" and "soft" targets (the latter forming the overwhelming ma-
jority); and then, by type: unit barracks for the personnel of all NATO
armored and mechanized divisions and brigades; armor, vehicle, and
equipment storage areas; airfields, cruise and Pershing missile sites; air
defense SAM sites; ammo and fuel depots; key military port facilities.
Let's take one simple example to illustrate how this would work. Every
combat brigade (armored or mechanized) of the NATO Forces in West
Germany sits on a non-hardened base. There are 36 German Bundeswehr
brigades, some 20 American brigades, about 10 British and Canadian
brigades, an equal number of French brigades, and a few Dutch and
Belgian units. Let's say that at 4:00 a.m., when it's no longer pitch dark,
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but when all the NATO troops are fast asleep, the SS-23s based in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia, which can reach every comer of West
Germany, open fire, aided by SS-21s to hit targets close to the border.
Five minutes after launch, the 80 or so targets that comprise the entire
NATO ground combat capability in West Germany, no longer exist.
The same strike would eliminate most NATO theater combat aircraft
capability, and all "soft" military and logistical targets. Even assuming
the best-case scenario-that the hardened Pershing missile sites escape
unscathed-the United States could, at best, fire off each non-reloadable
Pershing and then wait for the Red Army to arrive.
In addition, the Ogarkov Plan programs nuclear strikes to wipe out
any U.S. or NATO European Theater capability based outside Germany
and the Low Countries, that could effect or influence in any way the
decisive battle on the Central Front. Thus, the French Force de Frappe-
the Albion Plateau land-based missiles and the nuclear ballistic sub-
marines in the Mediterranean and Atlantic-would be targeted for elim-
ination by a MIRV barrage by SS-22s and SS-20s. Additional SS-22s
would knock out the Air Force component of the Force de Frappe on the
ground, before it could take off.
Similar SS-22 and SS-20 strikes would target the U.S. cruise missile
bases in England and in Comiso, Sicily (here, SS-20s or SS-22s covertly
stationed in Bulgaria would do the job).
The capability to match the doctrine
The Soviets, under the Ogarkov Plan, have developed and deployed an
offensive capability-and, in particular, a nuclear and chemical weapons
capability-to enable their Armed Forces to carry out their assignments
dictated by the Ogarkov Plan, especially during the critical first hour of
nuclear war.
The Soviet short- and medium-range Euromissiles were developed,
starting in 1975, and deployed during late 1983 and throughout 1984,
explicitly for the purpose of effecting the transition of the Soviet Armed
Forces deployed in Eastern Europe and the Western U.S.S.R., to the
point where they could deliver a surprise attack, a decisive knock-out
blow on the Central Front, to take Germany with relatively minimal
civilian destruction, and then occupy all Europe.
Before the new generation of SS-21s, SS-23s, and SS-22s were de-
ployed, the Soviet Armed Forces could launch the same surprise attack,
and devastate all of Germany, but had no precision-strike capability
against hardened U.S. and NATO sites. The Soviets were not in the
position to limit civilian casualties and industrial destruction, and thus
occupy the new western territories of Russia's Eurasian Empire, as intact
as possible.
The late 1970s development and 1980s deployment of the Su-24 long-
range nuclear-capable fighter-bomber, gave the Soviet forces facing West-
ern Europe a previously non-existent long-range aircraft nuclear-delivery
system, for pin-pointed strikes on NATO targets. The force strength of
deployed SS-21s, SS-23s, and SS-22s, as well as forward-based Su-24s,
is more than sufficient for what is required to accomplish the tasks on
the Central Front, mandated by the Ogarkov Plan for the first hour of
war.
The deployment of SS-21s, SS-23s, and SS-22s missiles (in order of
range) in Eastern Europe was announced by the Soviet Union, as "coun-
termeasures" to the stationing of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe.
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But at the time of that announcement, autumn 1983, these new missile
systems were already deployed in the western Soviet Union. Here are the
principal characteristics of these new weapons:
SS-22 SRBM. Range: 1,000 km. Three warheads, totaling less than
500 kt. According to the Oesterreichische Militdrische Zeitschrift (OMZ)
(No. 6, 1984), three SS-22 brigades were moved from the western
U.S.S.R., into East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Thus, the two brigades
in East Germany (72 SS-22 launchers) and the one brigade in Czech-
oslovakia (36 SS-22 launchers) represented unit-additions sent from Rus-
sia. There has been no report of the removal of Soviet "Scaleboard" units
from either East Germany or Czechoslovakia, contrary to Soviet claims
that the older units were being "replaced." The OMZ report anticipated
the transfer of a fourth SS-22 brigade (36 launchers) from the western
U.S.S.R. into one of the same two East European countries.
Several sources report that at least two more brigades of SS-22 units
(72 launchers) are stationed on the former territory of East Prussia, now
within Soviet borders, around the city of Kaliningrad (formerly Konigs-
berg); here, two artillery divisions are stationed, which represent the
highest concentration of artillery divisions (tactical-operational missiles)
anywhere in the entire Soviet Order of Battle. These SS-22s target West
Germany and Scandinavia.
SS-21 SRBM. Range: 120 km. Warhead: approximately 150 kt. The
SS-21 is a considerable improvement over its predecessor, the "Frog,"
which had a range of only 70 km. Even if each SS-21 battalion only
replaces one Frog battalion, this will enhance Soviet short-range nuclear
missile capability by approximately 50%; a Frog battalion contains only
four launchers, while an SS-21 battalion has six. On top of the increase
in launchers, is the increased range and improved accuracy.
Every Soviet motorized rifle, tank, or airborne division has such a
battalion. Thus, counting Soviet divisions in East Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Poland, we can establish a minimal total of 168 SS-21 missile
launchers targeting the Federal Republic of Germany, out of 210 launchers
aimed at targets in Europe.
SS-23 SRBM. Range: 600 km. Warhead: approximately 150 kt. The
deployment of SS-23s into Eastern Europe has been completed, so the
number of SS-23 launchers can be no fewer than the previous number
of "Scud" launchers. Scud brigades contained between 12 and 18 missile
launchers each. Based on the strength of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe,
that gives a minimum total of 360 SS-23 launchers targeting Europe, of
which 288 are aimed at West Germany.
The Soviet deployment and build-up of short- and medium-range missiles
Methodical blitzkrieg plus fighter-bombers in the past two years has not occurred as an isolated
case. During the same time-frame, their deployment was part of a clearly
preparations documented, meticulous build-up of forward-based ground, air, and am-
phibious forces, especially the ground and air forces based in East Ger-
many, and the amphibious forces assigned for operations in the Baltic.
In the past two years, Soviet Forces in East Germany have grown from
400,000 to at least 470,000. The qualitative jump has been far more
staggering, especially in tank strength, armored infantry combat vehicles,
and artillery, including nuclear-capable artillery.
We begin by examining what has happened with the Soviet tank and
motorized rifle divisions, the armored combat formations that will tear
through Western Europe on "Day X," when the high-speed offensive
begins. The crucial attacking formations will be those stationed in East
Germany.
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During 1984, the following hardware and troop additions occurred
among the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG):
Tank strength
1) The strength of each of the 10 armored divisions of the GSFG
increased from 270 to 415 tanks per division. This brought tank strength
in the armored divisions of the GSFG up from 2,700 to 4,150.
2) Each of the nine motorized rifle divisions of the GSFG had one
tank battalion added (45 tanks per battalion), which increased the tank
strength of these motorized rifle divisions from 1,975 to 2,380.
3) Three independent tank regiments were added to the 2nd Guards
Tank Army, facing northern Germany and Schleswig-Holstein. This
added 405 tanks.
4) In December 1984, the Soviets began modernizing their tank forces
in the GSFG with the T-80, the newest Soviet tank.
The tank strength of the GSFG thus stands at 6,935 tanks.
Artillery
1) Each of the 19 divisions of the GSFG received a fourth artillery
battalion, bringing divisional artillery to 72 pieces per division, instead
of 54. This comprises 36 152mm cannon and 36 122mm cannon.
2) BM-21 122mm multi-barrel rocket-launchers are being replaced
with BM-27 240mm "Stalin Organ" multi-barrel rocket-launchers, each
of which has 40 tubes. Each motorized rifle or tank division has one
multi-barrel rocket-launcher battalion, containing 18 launchers. The 19
such divisions of the GSFG, therefore, have BM-27 240mm multi-barrel
rocket-launchers. In addition, the GSFG artillery division, based at Pots-
dam, contains one artillery brigade, with at least 54 BM-27 240mm multi-
barrel rocket-launchers.
3) Large increases have occurred in self-propelled gun strength, giving
an increased battlefield nuclear punch. According to the Oesterreich Mil-
itdrische Zeitschrift, the GSFG's artillery division has acquired a 203mm
nuclear-capable self-propelled gun; sources report that the number in-
volved is between 36 and 72.
4) GSFG conventional self-propelled gun (122mm and 152mm) and
mobile howitzer strength reached the following levels:
? Division artillery regiments. The standard strength of a Soviet
artillery regiment attached to motorized rifle and tank divisions is
three artillery battalions; two are equipped with 18 122mm self-
propelled guns, each, and the third with 18 152mm self-propelled
guns. During the 1980s, the artillery regiments of GSFG divisions
have been expanded to include four artillery battalions. An extra
battalion of 18 152mm self-propelled guns was added. Division ar-
tillery strength now is:
19 X 36 = 684 122mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers;
19 x 36 = 684 152mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers.
Thus, in the 1980s, division artillery strength has increased by
342 152mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers.
? Army-attached artillery (in Soviet terminology). Recent increases
have brought per-army artillery strength up to:
2 battalions (18 pieces each= 36) 130mm artillery pieces;
2 battalions (18 pieces each = 36) 152mm self-propelled guns or
mobile howitzers;
1 battalion (18 launchers) BM-27 multi-barrel rocket-launchers.
That is the strength per army, of which there are five in the
GSFG, for the totals:
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10 battalions of 130mm artillery= 180 pieces;
10 battalions of 152mm self-propelled guns =180 pieces.
5 battalions of BM-27 multi-barrel rocket-launchers = 90 pieces.
? The artillery division at Potsdam has one brigade of 152mm self-
propelled guns = at least 54 pieces.
? Grand total for GSFG artillery:
918 152mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers;
684 122mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers;
180 130mm artillery pieces;
486 240mm BM-27 multi-barrel rocket-launchers.
Motorized and armored infantry, infantry combat vehicles
The Soviets customarily equip the motorized rifle regiments in tank
divisions with the BMP-1 infantry combat vehicle, while only one of
the three motorized rifle regiments of each motorized rifle division is
equipped with the BMP-1. The rest are equipped with the BTR series
of armored personnel carriers. The BMP-1 is heavily armed in contrast
to the BTR; it has a 73mm gun (an APC does not) and anti-tank wire-
guided missiles.
The exception to the rule is the GSFG, where not only the motorized
rifle regiments of tank divisions, but also two (instead of the standard
one) out of the three motorized rifle regiments in each motorized rifle
division, are equipped with the BMP. This exception to the rule was
revealed in Jane's Defence Weekly (Dec. 17, 1984).
GSFG figures on BMP-ls (108 per motorized rifle regiment) show an
increase by 972 BMPs during the recent force beef-up:
1) Before: 10 tank divisions, each with 1 motorized infantry regi-
ment=1,080 BMP-ls. After: Same.
2) Before: 9 motorized rifle divisions, each with 1 motorized rifle
regiment equipped with BMP-ls= 972 BMP-ls. After: 9 motorized rifle
divisions, each with 2 motorized rifle regiments equipped with BMP-
1s=1,944 BMP-ls.
Logistics and war stockpiling
Here we can cite the 1985 British Government Defence White Paper,
which reflects the stand of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces as of the
end of 1984:
Warsaw Pact stockpiles of ammunition, fuel, and tactical pipe-
laying equipment in East Germany and Eastern Europe can now
allow operations to be sustained for 60 to 90 days.... This period
is about twice as long as that of only 5 years ago, due to considerable
improvements in the sustainability of the Soviet Ground Forces
facing NATO.
The U.S.S.R. is also establishing a new pipeline brigade, equipped
with pipelaying machinery to supply Soviet troops with fuel in wartime.
Pipelayers towed by tractors can lay 427 meters of pipe in 8.5 minutes,
and can carry 70 sets of 70 meter-long pipe.
Baltic amphibious capabilities and rail ferry
An enormous boost in the logistical-resupply capabilities of the Soviet
and Warsaw Pact Armies in Central Europe will occur with the official
opening on Oct. 7, 1986 of the Soviet-East German Rail Ferry, running
from Memel (Klaipeda) in Soviet Lithuania, to Mukran on the East
German Baltic island of Ruggen, a distance of 273 nautical miles. The
project is modeled on the Soviet-Bulgarian rail ferry, completed in 1981
and providing service across the Black Sea.
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Six rail ferries are being built for the new line-three East German
and three Russian. Each can hold 108 railway cars. The ferry will operate
continuously, with a ferry leaving each end of the line every eight hours.
This military-logistic project demonstrates Soviet insistence on adopt-
ing proven East German work organization methods, wherever possible.
The East German party newspaper Neues Deutschland reported on the
project on June 7, 1985: "In Klaipeda, the Party leaderships of the various
construction [project] amalgamations were at first working separately from
one another. The advantages [of construction methods] in Mukran were
convincing, so the Klaipeda workforce copied their experiences." Amid
indications that the project is behind schedule, Neues Deutschland also
reported that in Autumn 1985, a Soviet "construction brigade of welders,
carpenters, and masons" would spend two weeks in Mukran, for on-the-
job-training in East German construction methods.
Mukran will have a 1,345-meter long harbor mole. Round, pre-fab-
ricated concrete casings, each 13 meters in diameter, have been sunk to
form the piers. Mukran will be outfitted with broad-gauge rails of the
Soviet rail system, as well as the standard-gauge rails. One-third of a
total length of 100 km of track has been laid at Mukran.
Besides the rail ferry, the Soviets are acquiring other components of
an amphibious operations capability in the Baltic Sea, of the dimensions
required to rapidly capture Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland, and the Danish
Islands, and neutralize southern Sweden.
1) One Landing Ship Dock (LSD). The "Ivan Rogov": Since the
"Zapad" maneuvers of Autumn 1981, this prototype ship, capable of
carrying 500 fully-equipped naval infantry and their vehicles, has been
in service with the Baltic Fleet.
2) 26 Landing Ships Tank (LST), of which there are three classes:
the new "Ropucha," under construction at the Gdansk shipyards in Po-
land; the "Alligator" (built 1966-77); the "Polnochny" (built 1961-73).
The Baltic Fleet has:
4 "Ropucha" class LSTs;
2 "Alligator" class LSTs;
20 "Polnochny" class LSTs;
30 smaller landing ships and boats.
3) The Baltic Fleet also has a sizeable number of roll-on/roll-off ships,
officially registered with the Soviet Merchant Marine; and the majority
of the following listing of Soviet Navy hovercraft-type vessels, all built
since 1969:
16 Aist class hovercraft (as of summer 1984);
20 Aist class hovercraft (as of summer 1985);
17 Lebed class hovercraft;
36 Gus class hovercraft.
The Aist hovercraft can carry 100 tons of equipment: for example,
two T-72 tanks plus either four PT-76 light amphibious tanks or four
BMP-1 APCs, together with half a company of naval infantry. The rate
of production of Aist was doubled in mid-1984, resulting in the ability
to put at least four into service per year. Sources have linked the ac-
celerated Aist program with the huge construction project at Ruggen,
on the East German Baltic Sea coast, which will be a huge supply depot,
including barely concealed, covert military stockpiling. Aist-class hov-
ercraft based in Kaliningrad (Konigsberg) or Klaipeda (Memel), with a
speed of 60-65 knots per hour, could reach Ruggen within four hours,
during a nighttime operation to seize Danish territory or Schleswig-
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Battle commands
Holstein. Soviet hovercraft can travel over the Baltic ice in the winter,
and over swamp, marsh stretches, and sandbars, and need not worry
about the water being too shallow. For the same reason, they are im-
pervious to underwater obstacles, and mines. All these advantages are
of enormous importance, especially in a Baltic environment.
Finally, in 1984, the Soviets began testing a sea-skimming transport
plane that would be "a quantum leap forward in amphibious warfare,"
according to the Sunday Times of London (July 29, 1984).
In that same 1983-84 time period, the five Armies comprising the GSFG
underwent a thorough reorganization of units and commanders, with the
clear purpose of preparing for a war that would begin with a nuclear and
chemical weapon bombardment, and a mass armored high-speed offensive
pouring into West Germany.
The reorganization greatly increased tank, nuclear artillery, and ar-
mored vehicle strength on the crucial breakthrough front facing Han-
nover-Braunschweig. In this region, the Soviet 3rd Shock spearhead
Army, with its headquarters at Magdeburg, was transformed into an all-
Armored Division Army of four Armored Divisions. The tank strength
of the Soviet Armies facing North Germany was more than doubled.
In the past two years, the Soviets have built up their war-fighting
logistics capabilities to the point where the British government now
admits in its 1985 Defence White Paper that Warsaw Pact forces have the
munitions, fuel and supplies on hand for sustained war-fighting for 60-
90 days.
It is important here to add that the Soviet forces now facing West
Germany-impressive as they may seem-are not to be seen as the final
troop and unit strength that would exist on the eve of war. Defense-
related sources in West Germany have noted with alarm-again over
the past few years-an accelerated military construction program in East
Germany, to build airfields, depots, barracks and other "troop accom-
modations." Thus, shortly before war, tens of thousands of Russian troops
would be flown in, or brought in otherwise, covertly. They would "hook
up" with their pre-positioned equipment and supplies, and become part
of the high-speed offensive.
NATO may indeed have pre-positioned stocks of equipment and sup-
plies. However, the troops to man them, unless they were on location
in Europe before the Soviet blitzkrieg, would never arrive, once the war
actually got under way.
The other "sure-fire" proof of the intent behind the build-up is the
new wave of Army commanders for the GSFG brought in during 1983-
84, as discussed in Part I of this report. That chapter also documents
the maneuvers conducted by the tremendously reinforced units of the
GSFG during 1984 and up to the present in 1985, where the art and
execution of a surprise attack with no advance warning or physically
observable "tip-offs" are given to the U. S. and NATO surveillance.
By year's end, a witness of these practices such as the London Observer's
James Adams would be compelled to write that Army Gen. Zaitsev's
innovations in the GSFG had rendered obsolete NATO's newly pro-
claimed Follow On Forces Attack (Fofa) doctrine, which provides for
deep strikes into attacking Warsaw Pact forces to disrupt second-echelon
reinforcements. "The latest Soviet tactical revisions have already made
Fofa out of date," acknowledged the Observer.
Highlights of this series of exercises were:
1) In the exercises of June 28-July 5 1984, the crescendo occurred on
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July 4. On that day, without any prior notice or warning, the following
Soviet troop movements occurred:
? All four Soviet divisions belonging to the 2nd Guards Tank Army
which faces West Germany from the Baltic to the Mittellandkanal
in the Hannover region, left their barracks and moved close to the
border.
? Three of the four Soviet Armored Divisions comprising the 3rd
Shock Army, facing the Hannover area of West Germany, were
moving to positions near the border.
? All four Soviet divisions of the 8th Guards Army in Thuringia
took up positions in close proximity to the Hessen frontier opposite
Fulda.
? Soviet forces on maneuvers concentrated in the Western part of
Czechoslovakia, west of Pilsen, near the West German border, and
west of Prague.
? 60,000 Soviet, Hungarian, and Czech troops remained in the
Sopron region of Hungary, along the Austrian border, two days after
the official July 2 "termination" of the "Danube-84" exercises; 16,000
of the 60,000 troops are Russians, and the exercises involved Soviet
Mig-24 "Hind" Helicopter gunship units, with MiG 23 fighter es-
corts.
? The Soviet 7th Airborne Division, based at Kaunas, Lithuania,
was airlifted into East Germany.
? Soviet Marines landed on the Lithuanian Baltic coast north of
Memel (Klaipeda).
2) The Soviet-Czech maneuvers in Czechoslovakia (May 26-31, 1985)
demonstrated the ability to launch tens of thousands of troops into a
simulated offensive action, without any prior physical sign that anything
"was up." The Soviet and Czech troops, overseen by Marshal Ogarkov
personally, conducted the exercise in areas very close to the West German
border.
No military preparation to attack West Germany would be complete
Preparing Ivan for without a full-scale "political education" campaign to prove to "Ivan"
that a "German threat" exists, which could require Russian pre-emptive
war
action. This type of campaign has also been launched during the past
18 months.
The wave of maneuvers to rehearse and perfect the art of surprise
attack in 1984-85, was immediately preceded by a campaign begun in
the Soviet military press against so-called German Revanchism, with the
particular twist, that this phenomenon had permeated the Bundeswehr
and the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Krasnaya Zvezda told
its military readership the Big Lie that the "Revanchists" sit at the center
of power, run the West German military, and are posing, as before
"Operation Barbarossa" on June 22, 1941, a direct security threat to
Mother Russia. On July 12, as the maneuvers concluded (though nu-
merous Soviet units remained in place and left Western intelligence
people guessing, what would happen next), Soviet government issued a
demarche against the West German government for "violation of the
Potsdam Agreements"-the 1945 accords under which the Soviet Union
reserved the right to march into West Germany in the event of a Nazi
revival there.
The "anti-Revanchism" campaign is aimed to destabilize the CDU
government of Helmut Kohl, and bring to power-by the 1987 federal
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elections in West Germany at the latest-the neutralist/capitulationist
German Social Democratic Party, led by Willy Brandt and the public
advocate of a West German "security partnership with the Soviet Union,"
Egon Bahr.
To recast an old phrase of Stalin's: Soviet Party General Secretaries
come and go, but, the policy of courting the SPD and bringing it to
power remains. Regardless of who sat on the Kremlin throne, the SPD
has been assiduously courted. The very first Western delegation invited
to meet with Chernenko in early 1984, was that of the SPD, led by Bahr
and Brandt. The same "honor" awaited Bahr and Brandt after Gorbachov
came to power.
This does not count the myriad of meetings, channels and contacts
established over the past two years between the West German SPD and
the ruling SED of East Germany.
While Gorbachov has courted the SPD, he has promised summit visits
to every major European country-but not West Germany. The Soviet
snub has been further magnified by Gorbachov's acceptance of a summit
even with Reagan, who otherwise is the object of so much Soviet hate
propaganda. For Kohl, not even the "time of day" is offered.
The Soviets hope that the SPD can come to power in 1987, and
"negotiate" the surrender of West Germany. Barring that, the Russian
"legal" case to supply a pretext for invading West Germany is being
manufactured, should a "limited option" invasion be called for.
The Russians suddenly "discovered" a takeover by "revanchists" in the
West German Armed Forces, right before they began their massive 1984
prewar upgrading of their forces in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Last summer, right after their huge maneuvers in late June-early July
1984, they suddenly "discovered" that West Germany was "guilty" of
"violation" of the postwar Potsdam Agreements.
Thus, barring surrender, West Germany could be assaulted and con-
quered with or without the Soviets going to the trouble of concocting a
"legal" argument.
However, it will be of as little comfort to the West German citizens
to be attacked and conquered after a campaign of self-righteous statements
and charges by the Soviet Union "justifying" their invasion, as it was in
the past for the victims of Hitler's invasions and occupations.
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3.5 The Socialist International-Comintern
`Popular Front'
Since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Soviet grand strategy for world
domination has always been based on bringing Germany under Moscow's
control. With the industrial potential of Germany at its command, the
Soviet position of power in Central Europe assures Moscow of early
domination of all of continental Europe and the Mediterranean. There-
fore the strategically most significant deployment of the Socialist Inter-
national, as Moscow's Western flunky, is to deliver Germany to the
Russians, like a fatted calf. If the Socialist International, and particularly
its West German branch, is not stopped, all of Western continental
Europe is in imminent danger of falling into the Soviet sphere of influence.
In that case, and with the help of the Socialist International's Mediter-
ranean branch, particularly through the efforts of Greek Socialist Prime
Minister Andreas Papandreou, the United States will be reduced to
control of about 15% of the world's industrial potential. There will be,
then, only one superpower in the world, Moscow's Empire.
The Socialist International's Central European operations, aimed at
bringing about de facto Soviet domination of West Germany, have over
the recent period reached a degree of blatancy that is impossible to ignore,
or mistake for anything other than an end-game attempt to break Ger-
many out of the Western sphere of influence once and for all. Looking
at the most recent period alone, from May through July of 1985, one
sees that in that brief time-frame, the Socialist International has given
public voice to its alliance with the Soviet Union, has re-established the
old Popular Front under Moscow's direction, and has revealed the stand-
ing, secret negotiations between its West German branch and the East
German ruling party for the purpose of pulling the Federal Republic of
Germany out of NATO. In doing all this, the Socialist International has
demonstrated that it no longer cares to hide its position as the Soviet
Union's direct instrument for the subversion of the West.
The sequence of events has been extremely rapid, as we outline below.
The Bahr Plan
On May 26, 1985, Socialist International General Secretary Willy Brandt,
the former West German Chancellor who also heads the German Social
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Democratic Party (SPD), went to Moscow for a three-day visit, accom-
panied by his closest collaborator, Egon Bahr. Brandt and Bahr first had
a three-hour meeting with Soviet Communist Party head Mikhail Gor-
bachov, then-Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and senior Central
Committee members Boris Ponomaryov and Vadim Zagladin. This was
followed by a private meeting, lasting over five hours, among Brandt,
Bahr, Gorbachov and Gromyko. The two Germans also met privately
with the chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal Akhromeyev.
From public speeches following this intense series of discussions, what
emerged was the mutual adherence of both sides to the old Socialist
International-SPD concept of a "security partnership" between Western
Europe and the Soviet Bloc. The policy was first officially voiced by the
SPD in a party document issued in early 1983, but its origins go back at
least another ten years to the so-called "Bahr Plan." The existence of
that Bahr Plan was leaked in 1973 by noted German intelligence specialist
Walter Hahn in an article published by Orbis, and has been confirmed
publicly by Bahr himself on numerous occasions.
The content of the Bahr Plan, as revealed by Hahn and Bahr, includes
four principal points-which spell out the gist and aim of current Socialist
International activities. These are, 1) recognition of East Germany as a
separate state; 2) establishment of a German-German accord pledging
non-use of force; 3) on the basis of'the normalization of German-German
relations, initiation of negotiations for mutual reduction of U. S. and
Soviet armed forces in East and West Germany; and, as the final coup
de grace, 4) establishment of a non-nuclear "collective security system
in Mitteleuropa. " At this stage, the Plan held, both the Warsaw Pact and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be dissolved.
Bahr's most recent allusion to this game-plan was made just nine days
before his departure to Moscow. Speaking at Tutzing Academy in West
Germany, he said that the German question was "cemented" (insoluble)
as long as the Federal Republic of Germany stayed with NATO. Bonn
should rather concentrate on "joint initiatives for arms control and peace
with East Germany," he said, and cease "thinking in terms of military
blocs," replacing this with "a security partnership with the Eastern neigh-
bors.... German partition and NATO membership are siamese twins."
Willy Brandt's chief public message while in Moscow was that Europe
needs a "security partnership" with the U.S.S.R. In contrast, he attacked
the United States on all fronts, blasting the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) and U.S. defense policy generally (accusing President Reagan, for
example, of "cheating the people at Geneva"), as well as American policy
in Central America and the Third World overall, and American eco-
nomic policy. He proposed that the Soviet-Western European security
partnership consist of, for starters, a design for a Europe "free of nuclear
weapons and chemical weapons," that would see its Eastern and Western
parts "collaborating in science, economics, technology, and ecology."
Gorbachov replied with lavish personal praise for Brandt and his efforts
in the New Ostpolitik, rightly pointing out that "you, Mr. Brandt, and
we" see entirely "eye to eye" on all matters.
Gorbachov also alluded to then-ongoing negotiations for organizational
collaboration between the Socialist International and the Communist
parties as a whole: "In spite of all remaining ideological differences," he
said, "Communists and Socialists should collaborate in finding the so-
lution to the most essential problems in our time."
Finally, Brandt and Gorbachov reported on their agreement to form
a joint working group of the SPD and the Soviet Communist Party, as
the highest level of the Socialist International-Soviet partnership. The
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group will set joint policy and initiatives on questions of disarmament,
opposition to the SDI and chemical warfare, and Third World policy.
Its first session will be held this coming September in Bonn, with del-
egations headed by the ubiquitous Egon Bahr, for the Socialist Inter-
national side, and Boris Ponomaryov for the Soviet Union.
The new Popular Front
While Brandt and Bahr were conspiring with the Soviets in Moscow,
two carefully prepared meetings were taking place in West Berlin and
Paris, respectively, to put in place the organizational working relationship
between the Socialist International and the communist movement in
the West, i.e., the re-creation of the old Socialist-Communist Popular
Front.
This was a process actually begun in March, under the auspices of the
two most important Western representatives of the Socialist and Com-
munist sides: the German Social Democrats and the Italian Communist
Party (PCI).
In March, the SPD and PCI held what they termed a "leadership
conference" in Rome, attended by the chief executives of both parties.
At the end of this summit, the SPD and PCI announced that "now is
the time once and for all to end the historic division of the European
labor movement"-words echoed later by Gorbachov-and shift into a
mode of unifying policy for the "Socialist" and "Communist" wings of
the "labor movement." This would be done, as reported at the post-
conference press briefing, around the development of a "European pro-
gram" to separate European from American policy in four areas: 1) eco-
nomic, monetary and financial matters, 2) technological and scientific
matters, 3) military and national security matters, and 4) prevention of
the militarization of outer space (the SDI). In other words, European-
American decoupling.
This pilot arrangement, led by the PCI and Brandt's SPD, went through
a second organizational step before being raised to the entire Western
European Socialist International leadership the weekend of May 26 in
Paris. That step was the consolidation of a special relationship between
the SPD and the government of France.
On May 21, five days before departing for Moscow, Brandt and Bahr
traveled together to Paris to meet with the head of the French Socialist
Party (PSF), Lionel Jospin, and the rest of the party leadership. The
French Socialist government of President Francois Mitterrand, of course,
is playing a leading role in attempting to sabotage European participation
in the SDI, to the extent of announcing, on April 7, a counter-SDI
project code-named "Eureka." Eureka would differ from the U. S. effort
in two vital areas: it would exclude the United States from the project,
and exclude, too, any military application of the research. Moscow has
therefore happily embraced the program, and East German President
Erich Honecker has gone so far as to propose-on June 8, a few days
before the French Defense Minister was due to arrive in East Berlin-
that there should be "trans-European" collaboration in Eureka, including
the Soviet Union.
On May 21, then, Brandt and Bahr met with the leaders of the French
branch of the Socialist International, and adopted what they termed a
common platform. As with the SPD-PCI meeting, the Franco-German
Socialist platform consisted of a denunciation of the SDI as an attempt
to "militarize space," and a call for a "European alternative in defense
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and economics, and monetary and technology policies." The joint doc-
ument they drew up denounced the SDI as "fomenting technologies that
destabilize the strategic balance." Speaking to journalists on the new
Socialist International document, Brandt and Jospin called for "greater
European independence from the U. S. in economics, technology de-
velopment, and industrial policy," with Brandt adding that he would
"confer" on the platform with Gorbachov while in Moscow.
These decisive pre-arrangements having been completed, the entire
European Socialist International leadership gathered in Paris the follow-
ing week. As reported to the press at the time, the meeting took up
"European self-assertion against the dollar" (point one of the PCI-SPD,
SPD-PSF agenda) and "alternatives to the SDI" (points 2, 3, and 4 of
the Rome agenda). The new Popular Front was in the offing.
German-German negotiations
On May 10, after winding up a two-day meeting in East Berlin with the
East German ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the SPD
made the dramatic announcement that it had been conducting secret
negotiations with the SED over a period of one year. Karsten Voigt, a
member of the SPD senior negotiating team, termed the latest round
"historic," and made the astounding revelation that the West German
foreign ministry-i.e., Brandt's close political ally and co-conspirator,
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher-and the U.S. State Depart-
ment had been kept briefed on the negotiations throughout their duration.
Two days later, the SED sent to Bonn a delegation headed by the
powerful SED Central Committee member Hermann Axen, to participate
in the first-ever joint press conference between the East and West German
Socialist-Communist parties. The agenda of the press conference, in
which Bahr himself was spokesman for the SPD, was to present a draft
resolution for a chemical-free zone in Europe, to begin with the two
Germanies and Czechoslovakia and later include Poland and the Benelux.
The draft had been finalized at the previous week's East Berlin meeting,
with Voigt reporting that the SED and SPD had achieved "a historic
breakthrough . . . a practical step towards security partnership. . . . We
are pioneers for the government."
As can be easily demonstrated by the partial enumeration below of
the SPD's activities during the period of SPD-SED negotiations, the full
content of those talks was nothing less than the activation of the Bahr
Plan. In other words, treason against the West German Constitution
and American strategic interests-with the complicity of the State De-
partment.
The growing deviation from the West German Constitution on the
part of the SPD made its appearance in a party position paper published
in November 1984, approximately five months after the SPD-SED ne-
gotiating round had begun. The paper was a statement of support for the
so-called "Gera demands," first made by Erich Honecker in October 1980.
In it, the SPD, more explicitly than in any previous policy statement,
separated the question of German national unity, from that of German
reunification.
Honecker's Gera demands, which the SPD was now backing, called
for the abolition of the Salzgitter Central Registration Agency, which
monitors the German-German border, the solution of the Elbe border
dispute, and the transformation of the West German Permanent Missions
into full-scale embassies. The core of the Gera demands, however, on
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which Honecker placed the greatest emphasis, was for West German
recognition of East German citizenship. In sum, the demands were, and
are, for West German recognition of East Germany as a sovereign and
separate state. SPD support for the Gera package placed the party in
violation of the reunification pledge of the West German Constitution
of 1949, the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanies, and the
1973 Constitutional Court ruling reaffirming the commitment of all con-
stitutional bodies in West Germany to work toward reunification.
Developments between the SED and SPD came fast and furious after
that.
? In December 1984, the SPD and SED held a joint seminar in Bonn
on "Peaceful Coexistence and Security Partnership," the concept elab-
orated by the SPD in 1983 on the basis of the Bahr Plan. The seminar
was part of the public side of the secret SPD-SED negotiations then
ongoing. The idea of a security partnership is firmly linked to the Socialist
International's call for a "second Ostpolitik," as announced by Brandt
in March 1985. It is based on the concept of a "European peace order"
from the Atlantic to the Urals, stipulating increasing European coop-
eration between East and West in the framework of such a "security
partnership" that does not question existing borders.
? In January of 1985, the SPD published a document attacking the
version of Ostpolitik practiced by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, demanding
an end to the "fruitless discussions of the openness of the German ques-
tion."
? In February, the SPD refused to sign a joint resolution on the state
of the nation (essentially, the text of Christian Democratic Chancellor
Kohl's State of the Nation speech). The Social Democrats instead drew
up their own resolution, calling for, 1) West German respect for East
German citizenship (the Gera demands), and 2) removal of the 1955
German Treaty and the 1973 Constitutional Court ruling from the foun-
dations of inter-German policy (the Gera demands again).
? That same month, Hermann Axen visited Bonn for the latest round
of SPD-SED secret negotiations.
? In March, the SPD issued a report by its legal experts backing the
Gera demands from a legalistic standpoint, affirming that the disputed
frontier between the two Germanies ran along the middle of the Elbe
river, and not along its northern bank, as the West German government
and courts maintain.
? In a May article authored for Der Spiegel, Egon Bahr proposed to
the French and British that they strike a deal with Moscow to make
American nuclear weapons in Western Europe "expendable," a precon-
dition for the creation of the "nuclear free Mitteleuropa" stipulated in the
Bahr Plan. He also wrote that this was to be one of the topics on the
agenda during his and Brandt's visit to Moscow later that month. As is
typical for all leading members of the SPD whenever they discuss military
matters, Bahr of course spent a hefty portion of his article in virulently
attacking the American SDI project.
? In mid-March, another of Willy Brandt's closest collaborators in
the SPD leadership, Horst Ehmke, penned an open letter, claiming that
"all present problems in Europe" could be "traced back to the fact that
the German workers movement of the 1920s was split into Social Dem-
ocrats and Communists." This, he said, "paved the way for Hitler," and
thus for World War II and Europe's postwar partition into East and West.
Resuming the dialogue between Social Democrats and Communists, Ehmke
wrote, would therefore help to overcome Europe's problems of today.
? At about the same time, on March 17, Bahr issued a statement
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International
espionage networks
that, "The Soviet leaders show more commitment to nuclear disarmament
than the Americans," and said he was giving the green light for his party
section (the state of Schleswig Holstein SPD) to open official relations
with the neighboring party sections of the SED. SPD-SED negotiations
at the top, meanwhile, had already been ongoing for over half a year.
Although the Socialist International's activities in West Germany are
the most important among its world-wide operations, due to West Ger-
many's decisive position in Western Europe and in NATO, Socialist
International operations of equal intensity and subservience to Soviet
interests could be detailed for practically every nation on the globe.
The so-called Palme Commission, officially named the Independent
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, is paradigmatic of
Socialist International operations and their interface with other treason-
ous networks and individuals throughout the world. The Commission
was founded in the summer of 1980, almost as soon as it became clear
that Ronald Reagan might be the next president of the United States,
and following urgent consultations between the Olof Palme, now Swedish
Prime Minister, and Zagladin and Ponomaryov in Moscow. Its triumvirate
of founding members was comprised of Palme, former Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance and Soviet General Mikhail Milshtein. One month later,
the Swedish publication Goteborgs Handels och Sjofartstidning embarrassed
all by identifying General Milshtein as a KGB officer. Palme's office did
not bother to deny the report, but from that point on, the commission
described Milshtein as a "scientific adviser to the commission," rather
than a secretariat member.
Other prominent members of the Palme Commission are, Georgii
Arbatov, director of the U.S.A.-Canada Institute, a spinoff of the IM-
EMO intelligence institution charged with profiling of, and operations
against, the United States; Egon Bahr of the SPD; David Owen, foreign
secretary in Britain's last Labour Party government, representing the
British branch of the Socialist International; and Leslie Gelb, a protege
of Cyrus Vance as director of political-military affairs at the Vance State
Department, former New York Times correspondent, and a senior fellow
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Since its founding, predictably, the Palme Commission has functioned
as an important channel for the conduiting of Soviet policies into the
West. One particularly clear-cut example of this has been the commis-
sion's sponsorship of the "northern nuclear free zone" idea, for which it
has organized for years. The proposal would de-nuclearize the already
extraordinarily weak northern flank of NATO, a policy that would leave
this crucial flank open to either Soviet military assault or more subtle
political pressure and blackmail. The immediate result, in either case,
would be a finlandized northern flank, leaving the way open for any
possible Soviet assault on the Central European heartland.
As came out at the trial of convicted KGB agent Arne Treholt, sen-
tenced as a Soviet spy on June 20, the "northern nuclear-free zone" policy
originated with Treholt's KGB controller. Treholt (then a highly-placed
official in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry), conduited the proposal through
Socialist International circles in Scandinavia to the Palme Commission,
which picked it up as its own.
The Palme Commission also acts as a platform for attacks against
Western economic interests, mirroring in this the work of another So-
cialist International institution, the Brandt Commission on Third World
policy. Both commissions have publicized and aggressively organized in-
ternationally against scientific research and development, both in the
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advanced sector and, in the case of the Brandt Commission especially,
with respect to the Third World. This Socialist International organizing
against scientific research and economic development has been one of
the organization's most persistent activities, and gone hand in hand with
Socialist International backing of such Soviet-funded assets as the "en-
vironmentalist," terrorist, linked Green Party in West Germany, the Nazi-
Communist, terrorist PAN party in Mexico, and others. The utility,
indeed decisive importance, to Moscow of such organizing has been
extraordinary.
Economic decoupling
This in turn is coherent with one of the key activities of the Socialist
International today: its involvement in promoting Western European
economic decoupling from the United States. Back in April 1984, the
Soviet Union sponsored a meeting of the Joint German-Soviet Economic
Commission in Tashkent, Uzbekhistan, on "perspectives for commercial
use of the ECU [European Currency Unit] as an international reserve
currency to replace the dollar." Since that time, the Socialist Interna-
tional has become one of the major spokesmen for such a policy, alongside
other treasonous elements in the West involved in cutting deals with
Moscow to the detriment of Western policy interests and Western civ-
ilization as a whole.
Without reviewing the enormous strides which the ECU has made
since 1984 in becoming an institutional alternative to the dollar in
international trade, such as the March 1985 decision of the Bank for
International Settlements to become a "clearing house" for the ECU, it
is sufficient to point out some of the activities of leading Socialist In-
ternational members, to indicate the backing which the organization has
given to the Soviet proposal. The French Socialist president of the
European Community (EC) Commission, Jacques Delors, is using his
position in the Community to organize extensively for conversion of the
ECU into a full-fledged currency to replace the dollar in European-related
trade. It was Delors, together with former Social Democrat West German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who at the April meeting of the EC Finance
Ministers, for instance, carried through a general agreement to take
preliminary steps to creating "a fully privatized ECU."
Schmidt, who has suddenly become a fervent spokesman for the ECU,
on April 27, 1985 gave a particularly radical speech, from the standpoint
of European-American economic decoupling, at the Interaction Council
meeting in Paris. Taking the decoupling line further than it generally
has been taken in public, Schmidt called for the creation of a European
Central Bank, centered around the ECU, which would have an inde-
pendent money supply, independent interest rate policies, and protec-
tionist monetary intervention capabilities against the dollar. He outlined
a 15-point plan to transform the ECU into a full-fledged, European-wide
currency, proposing it be used to denominate private-sector loans, with
legal restrictions on private use abolished, and ECU coins and checks
introduced. (The plan was later published in May by the British Royal
Institute for International Affairs.) The real intent of the plan is to
integrate the Western European and Soviet Bloc economies. Already the
primary use of ECU-denominated transactions is for East-West trade and
credit activities.
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3.6 Syria and Israel Within
the Soviet Strategic Sphere
In late 1982, Israeli intelligence sources reported to EIR that then-Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon made a secret trip to Greek Cyprus to meet with
two ranking officials of the Soviet GRU, the military intelligence service.
The subject of those secret discussions was an Israeli-Soviet quid pro quo
to drive the United States out of the Middle East. In exchange for Israeli
complicity in a series of anti-American covert diplomatic and low-in-
tensity military operations, the Soviet Union would "guarantee" Israeli
control over an expanded piece of eastern Mediterranean turf, fulfilling
the "Greater Israel" designs of the faction associated with Sharon; and
would gradually allow for the emigration of a large number of Russian
and Eastern European Jews to colonize the West Bank of the Jordan
River, thus de facto consolidating Israel's 1967 land grab.
This "Greater Israel" scheme prefigures a parallel emergence of a "Greater
Syria," constituting the second satrap of the future Soviet domination
of the eastern Mediterranean. The dismantling of Lebanon and the virtual
extermination of the Palestinian population in successive genocidal cam-
paigns by the Israeli Defense Force, the Syrian Army, the Syrian-backed
Abu Musa radical Palestinian front, and the Amal Shi'ites of Lebanon-
also agents of the Alawite Brotherhood ruling Syria-demonstrated on
the field of battle the potential for Hobbesian coexistence between
"Greater" Syria and "Greater" Israel.
While no published sources have corroborated the particulars of the
reported Sharon-GRU session and the strategic deal consolidated there,
subsequent events have clearly demonstrated that Israel is no longer
America's "leading ally" in the Middle East, despite continuing howls to
this effect from U. S. State Department, Eastern Establishment, and
Zionist Lobby voices.
Three factors, representing a dramatic change in direction and control
over Israeli politico-military policy, provide the backdrop to the emerging
Tel Aviv-Moscow-Damascus pact:
1) The demographic shift within the Israeli population. Over 50% of the
Israeli population is now Sephardic, Middle Eastern-born. The shift from
a Western European, Judeo-Christian cultural matrix to an Oriental,
Semitic cultural matrix has been identified by recent Israeli writers as a
repudiation of Western values and a reemergence of a Jewish "kabalistic"
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brand of fundamentalism. This shift has been aggravated by the fact that
over one-third of the Israeli citizenry, predominantly Ashkenazi pre- and
postwar European emigres, have left Israel and returned to the United
States or Western Europe, thus drawing out of Israel some of the leading
scientific and technological strata of the population. A radical, funda-
mentalist peasant caste has thus emerged in recent years as a prominent
political force, providing the social base for Ariel Sharon's drive for power
under the slogan "Arik, Arik, King of Israel."
This "Oriental" shift has been augmented by the emergence of a Rus-
sian-Jewish-dominated New Right movement in Israel, heavily pene-
trated by the KGB. This New Right is in a prominent position within
the Jewish Underground, or, Temple Mount movement, which has re-
vived a Khomeiniite brand of Judaism preaching the rebuilding of the
Third Temple of Solomon. The other predominant grouping within the
Temple Mount conspiracy is a powerful and wealthy community of Syrian-
born Jews from the Turkish border region of Aleppo, who reportedly
maintain deep but quiet ties to the Alawite Assad leadership of Syria,
also Aleppo-based.
2) The collapse of the Israeli economy. Whereas Israel's inflation rate
was 20% in 1975, it is now an astounding 180%, with interest rates on
certain categories of loans over 210%. While exports of citrus and other
real economic products have collapsed and overall exports stagnated,
official Israeli arms exports have increased sixteenfold over the last decade.
Official exports of arms and diamonds in 1983 accounted for 60-70% of
Israel's total exports. The unrecorded smuggling of drugs, diamonds, and
weapons has massively increased, placing Israel in a leading position
within the overall worldwide "unofficial economy"-i.e., the arms-for-
drugs black market.
Within this arms-for-dope bazaar, Israel has entered into documented
barter dealings with Khomeini's Iran, providing spare parts for U. S.
equipment originally sold to Iran during the reign of the late Shah, in
clear and brazen violation of U.S. law. Through Lebanese channels
centered around the Chouf Mountains-based Chamoun clan, the Sharon
faction additionally entered into cooperative business ventures, including
massive West Bank land scams, with the Bulgarian foreign trade bank
Litex. The latter arrangement was consummated in an October 1982
meeting at the Chamoun family Chouf mountain retreat at approximately
the same time that Sharon was cavorting with the GRU on Cyprus.
The singular focus on building Israel's arms industry was expressed in
clear anti-American terms in the 1981 Meridor Memorandum, drafted
by Ya'acov Meridor, a member of former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin's cabinet. The memorandum was ostensibly part of the U. S. -Israeli
letters of understanding: "We shall say to the Americans: `Don't compete
with us in Taiwan . . . South Africa . . . or the Caribbean or in other
areas where we can sell weapons directly. . . . Let us do it. Sell the
ammunition using a proxy, Israel will be your proxy.' "
From its current status as the world's seventh-largest arms exporter,
Israel's defense sector has mapped out an ambitious program to place
Israel in the number three spot over the next several years. At the heart
of this drive has been an extensive lobbying effort into the Reagan
administration and the U.S. Congress, to force the release of previously
classified stealth and other technologies to Israel for the production of
the Lavie jet, a joint Israel-Republic of South Africa production venture.
This would give Israel the additional delivery system capabilities, as well,
for the rapid development of an independent intermediate-range nuclear
capability.
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On repeated occasions, this particular Israel-South Africa connection
has been caught funneling state-of-the-art U. S. computer technologies
to the Soviet Union.
3) The Lebanon invasion of 1982 and its aftermath. In June 1982, Ariel
Sharon launched the Israeli Defense Force invasion of Lebanon on the
pretext of assaulting Palestinian terrorist bases behind the attempted
assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov. The
action marked a decisive breach in U.S. -Israeli relations that accelerated
Sharon's openings to Moscow and Damascus. Sharon launched the op-
eration on the basis of personal assurances from then Secretary of State
Alexander Haig that the United States would fully support the Israeli
invasion. When the United States-already at that moment caught in
the ringer of the Malvinas War-harshly rebuked the Israeli move and
President Reagan took the unprecedented step of firing Haig, Sharon
wrote off the United States as an "unreliable ally," and took his business
to Moscow and Damascus, where more "practical" minds supposedly
prevailed.
When every effort from inside Israel to dislodge the butcher Sharon
from power failed, a deep cultural pessimism took hold in the country
that merely accelerated the radical fundamentalist drive to impose a
Sharon dictatorship.
Beginning in 1984, a more open phase of diplomatic dealings with
Moscow began, through the personal "shuttle diplomacy" of Edgar Bronf-
man and Armand Hammer. Both men made a series of trips to Moscow
during the Andropov and Chernenko periods, to negotiate a broad-based
Moscow-Tel Aviv rapprochement involving Jewish emigration and an-
ticipated official recognition of Israel by the Soviet Union. According
to Canadian sources, this was paralleled by an increasingly public role
of the Bronfman family, particularly Charles Bronfman, as the semi-
official channel between the Canadian and East German governments.
Privately, Canadian intelligence sources have told EIR that this Bronf-
man-East Germany channel is directly into Gen. Marcus ("Misha") Wolf,
the number two man in the East German Ministry of State Security
(MfS). The son of a German-Jewish Communist Party official who fled
to Russia during the Hitler period, Wolf has been identified as the single
most powerful figure in the MfS and a close personal associate and protege
of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov.
The Sharon Plan to destroy Lebanon, and divide the spoils between
Syria and Israel, slaughter the Palestinian population there, transfer the
dirty-money operations previously based in Beirut into the Israeli banking
system, and convert the West Bank into a Russian emigr? populated real
estate boondoggle, was, in fact, a corollary to the Kissinger Doctrine
elaborated by the former Secretary of State at a July 23-24, 1982 secret
meeting at the Bohemian Grove in California. In that address, Kissinger
called for the United States to strategically withdraw from 75% of its
global commitments and assume a more modest role within a concordat
of Western nations modeled on the Holy Roman Empire of the post
Treaty of Vienna period.
Convinced by the Reagan administration's failure to fully support the
invasion of Lebanon, that the United States must be punished by hu-
miliating setbacks within the eastern Mediterranean, the Sharon group
in Israel provided consistent aid and comfort to the Shi'ite terrorist
offensive against the United States, beginning with the February 1983
bombing of the U. S. embassy in Beirut that wiped out the entire U. S.
CIA station for Lebanon.
The Tel Aviv-Damascus Hobbesian deal with Moscow's blessings was
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Count Bennigsen
and the `Islamic
Card'
consumated during April-June 1985 through the following sequence of
events, that culminated in the TWA 847 hijacking.
? In early April 1985, Israeli forces entered southern Lebanon and
rounded up over 700 Shi'ites, trucking them across the Israeli border
into a detention camp. The mass hostage-taking was aimed by the Sharon
group, now strongly allied with Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, at forcing
Amal leader Nabih Berri to reach a security pact with Israel assuring the
permanent elimination of Palestinians from southern Lebanon. On April
5, the Reagan administration denounced the Israeli move as a violation
of the Geneva Convention and demanded the unconditional relase of
the "hostages."
? On May 14, a top Israeli intelligence official met with the head of
Amal intelligence, a known Syrian intelligence asset, in southern Le-
banon, soliciting a negotiating package that would lead to the release of
the Shi'ite hostages inside Israel. The terms proposed by the Israeli official
reportedly called for an Amal action against the United States that would
provide Israel with an "excuse" for releasing the 700 Lebanese Shi'ites.
? On May 17, the Mossad leaked a story in the Washington Post blaming
the CIA for a March 8 car-bombing in Beirut that killed 80 Shi'ites.
Despite the fact that the Lebanese secret unit that carried out the car
bomb attack was acting under direct Mossad orders, Israel's "proxy" status
for U.S. actions inside Lebanon, in effect since the humiliating American
withdrawal from Lebanese territory in 1984, served as blackmail leverage
against the Reagan administration's revealing the facts of the case. The
Washington Post story was widely circulated in the Shi'ite press inside
Lebanon, building a revenge climate against "CIA terrorists."
? On May 20, a second secret meeting in southern Lebanon between
the Mossad official and other ranking members of the Amal military
command took place. Allegedly, this meeting spelled out a detailed
arrangement between the Amal and the Israelis, involving policing re-
sponsibilities for the border zone with Israel, the release of the Shi'ites,
and the staging of the TWA hijacking. The secret accord was ratified
first by the head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon before the plan went
operational in early June with the Athens hijacking.
The conclusion: The TWA hostage incident marked the consolidation
of a process begun with the 1982 Lebanon invasion, which fundamentally
realigned the eastern Mediterranean into a Damascus-Tel Aviv-Moscow
controlled zone, in which, barring a dramatic shift in policy from Wash-
ington, the United States is no longer a prominent player.
When terror by Islamic fundamentalist groups, against innocent citizens
from the United States and other countries, escalates with new hijackings
and murders, one would hardly expect to hear the old argument of the
1970s voiced in Washington, that Islamic fundamentalism should be
welcomed as a counterthrust to communism in Central Asia.
But Professor Alexandre Bennigsen, late of the University of Chicago
and now based at the Sorbonne in Paris, is still in action. He makes the
rounds on Capitol Hill. He gets a forum in the U. S. Information Agency's
Problems of Communism to vent his enthusiastic hope for the spread of
Islamic revolt ("Mullahs, Mujahidin and Soviet Muslims," Problems of
Communism, Nov. -Dec. 1984). This scheme, that the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism in West Asia would inspire turmoil in Soviet Central
Asia and trepidation in the Kremlin, was the stuff of Bennigsen's frequent
congressional testimony and academic dissertations, which fueled the
doomed "arc of crisis" policy under the Carter administration. The con-
tinuing popularity of Bennigsen, the author of The Islamic Threat to the
Soviet Union, demonstrates the dangerous persistence in Washington-
185
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EIR Special Report/Global Showdown
among professed conservatives as well as around the State Department-
of fascination with the "crumbling of the Soviet Empire," even as the
Russians count their gains in areas near and far from their borders.
In the 1970s, Carter's national security chief Zbigniew Brzezinski pro-
claimed that Islamic fundamentalism would be a bulwark against Com-
munist insurgencies along an "arc of crisis," stretching from the southern
borders of the Soviet Union, through the Near East and into North
Africa. In Iran, the keystone of the arc, the Carter administration abetted
the overthrow of the Shah by the mullarchy of the insane Ayatollah
Khomeini. The Islamic revolution, the hope was voiced, would ultimately
sweep into Soviet Central Asia, whose inhabitants would rise against
their Russian overlords simultaneously with the peoples of Eastern Europe.
The U.S.S.R. would crack open like a walnut.
The results in the late 1970s, when this view was policy, were somewhat
different. The Soviet Union achieved such a striking increase of power
in the region, that Brzezinski subsequently suggested, in a June 1983
speech at Harvard University, that the United States might as well
abandon the Middle East, along with Western Europe, and search for
allies in the Pacific Basin.
The so-called Rejection Front of radical Arab states under Soviet
tutelage, was consolidated out of the rage engendered by the Camp David
pact. In this alignment, Libya and Syria were joined by Iran-after the
Khomeini revolution brought down the Shah. Khomeini sits astride the
Persian Gulf oil routes, scarcely veiling his threats to call in Satan Number
2 (the U.S.S.R.), if Satan Number I crosses him; and the Soviets have
invested heavily in both infrastructure and political assets in Iran. Syria
is armed to the teeth with Soviet weapons. What is left of Lebanon
teeters on the brink of becoming an "Islamic state" under the domination
of Soviet-armed Syria, with the added benefit of Khomeini's "moral
guidance" for the one million Shi'ite Lebanese. Saudi Arabia is being
told by Moscow that the time has come for a Soviet-Saudi diplomatic
thaw, under the threat of a Khomeini-proclaimed "holy war" to be trig-
gered by terrorist assaults on the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia.
Between 100,000 and 200,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. Soviet-
backed ethnic and religious insurgencies threaten to break Pakistan into
pieces.
The national security of the United States and of the targeted nations
of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Indian Ocean littoral demands,
that the widely shared fantasies of the Jesuit-trained Brzezinski and ideo-
logues like Bennigsen be put aside, and the truth admitted: Moscow has
mastered the "Muslim card," and turned the arc of crisis into a Soviet
arc of opportunity.
The Soviets have their own program for "Islamic culture" and, through
East Germany, an alliance with Hitler's old Nazi networks in the Middle
East to spread terrorism. In an August 1980 article, the Moscow Institute
of Orientology director, Academician Yevgenii Primakov, gloated that
policy-makers in the West had no grasp of religious factors in the Middle
East, since they mistakenly viewed Islamic uprisings as a short-lived
"explosion of fanaticism," while underestimating the "anti-imperialist
direction of the growing movement for Islamic solidarity"-that is, the
Soviet ability to turn it to advantage.
Geidar Aliyev and the Tashkent nexus
The master of the Soviets' "Islamic card" is Geidar Ali-Reza ogly Aliyev,
the career KGB officer of Shi'ite Muslim origin, promoted in 1982 to be
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First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and a full member of
the Politburo. Before coming to Moscow at that time, Aliyev operated
for 15 years out of Soviet Azerbaijan, first as its KGB chief and then as
First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.
He was located in Baku, the Caspian Sea oil town that is the capital
of Soviet Azerbaijan. It is second only to Tashkent, Soviet Uzbekistan,
as a military command center for the U. S. S. R.'s southern flank-what
now comes under the High Command South, commanded by General
of the Army Yuri Maksimov, a member of the Politburo of the Uzbekistan
Communist Party since 1981. In both the Transcaucasus and Central
Asia, the two foci of the Soviet Muslim population, the local party
machine and the Islamic establishment are integrated under the political-
military command.
In wartime, their special capabilities come into play. For instance,
before the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, thousands of
Soviet Uzbek and Tajik cadre were infiltrated across the border into the
areas of Afghanistan where the population is Uzbek and Tajik, to carry
out spetsnaz sabotage activities in advance of the invasion. More recently,
Iranian sources have observed the transit of persons from Iran's north-
eastern province of Turkmenistan, on Iran's border with Afghanistan,
into the Soviet Union; after military training in the U.S.S.R., they slip
back into Iran.
Soviet and Comintern officials, from the early 1920s on, conceived
of Tashkent as a jumping-off point for power throughout south Asia, just
as certain Slavophile-linked geopoliticians-like the Buryat Mongol mys-
tic, arms merchant and court intriguer Badmayev-had counseled the
late-nineteenth-century Tsars to seize the Himalayas, thence to take
British India. Leon Trotsky, in August 1919, declared that "the road to
Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and
Bengal." In May 1919, the newspaper Zhyzn natsionalnostei (Life of the
Nationalities), published by the Central Bureau of the Communist Or-
ganizations of the Peoples of the East, editorialized, "Without active
assistance from the outside by the fresh untapped forces of Russia's Mus-
lims, it [the revolution in Asia] can once again fall into a lethargic sleep
of spineless inertness and apathy. Let Britain, which has always been
afraid of the spectre of a Cossack lance on the peaks of the Himalayas,
now see this historical lance in the hands of Russia's Muslim-proletarian
coming to the aid of his brothers in Persia, India and Afghanistan."
Such extreme-or rather, frank-statements are today termed by oh-
so-scholarly Soviet specialists, evidence of "leftist, adventuristic tend-
encies." The Tashkent-based Communist University for Toilers of the
East was repeatedly purged. But the views of the "Islamo-Marxists" forged
Soviet policy and capabilities in the region. By the late 1920s, the
Comintern's Third World operations were reshaped to emphasize the
building of individual communist parties, but the role of the Azerbaijani
Communist Party, with its heritage from the Islamo-Marxist Nariman
Narimanov, stayed strong. The party's approach, later perfected by Ali-
yev, was to exploit indigenous belief structures, but to tame them away
from disruptive excesses and tool them into a means for the outward
expansion of influence. Azerbaijan supplied organizers and administrators
to Soviet Central Asia proper, making Baku a point from which Soviet
influence radiated into the Islamic world. The Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi
communist parties were organized from Baku; the Communist Party of
India, from Tashkent.
The Soviet state and cultural establishment, meanwhile, built up the
image of Tashkent as a developing-sector boom town and crossroads of
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Asia, by staging major events there. The late Uzbek party chief, Sharaf
Rashidov, hosted many events like the 1983 Seventh Conference of the
Afro-Asian Writers Association. In 1966, Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei
Kosygin propelled Tashkent into world headlines, when he invited the
prime ministers of India and Pakistan to come there for reconciliation
talks after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. Not long after that, the Soviets
readied another diplomatic coup for Tashkent, but did not succeed in
bringing it off. The late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat revealed that
the Soviets had invited him to come negotiate with Israel after the 1967
war, and asked, "I wonder what would be the position of the Soviet
Union, if the accord we signed at Camp David, had been signed at
Tashkent?"
The Islamic establishment
Alongside the overt and covert activities of the state, the four Spiritual
Boards of the Soviet Muslim establishment, revived during World War
II on the base of a hierarchy first set up by Catherine the Great in the
eighteenth century, have developed diplomatic prowess paralleling that
of the Russian Orthodox Church/Moscow Patriarchate.
The organization of Soviet Islam today proceeds from the 1943 con-
cordat signed after discussions between Stalin and the Mufti of Ufa,
Abdurrahman Rasulayev, which revived the Central Muslim Spiritual
Board that first functioned in the eighteenth century. There are four
boards, or Spiritual Administrations, each headed by a Mufti or Sheikh,
which cover: 1) Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Tashkent), 2) Transcau-
casus (Baku, Azerbaijan), 3) European U.S.S.R. and Siberia (Ufa, Bash-
kir A.S.S.R.), and 4) North Caucasus (Makhachkla, Daghestan
A. S. S. R. ).
The Muslim boards were encouraged to expand in the 1960s, when
the Soviets upgraded the social sciences and all manner of cultivation
of what they call "cultural factors."
In 1968, the Tashkent board began to publish the quarterly Muslims
of the Soviet East in English, French, Persian, Arabic, and Uzbek, to
propagandize to Mideast readers what a great life their Muslim brothers
in the Soviet Union enjoy. The same year, Soviet Muslims first went
abroad, and a Soviet mullah on the annual Hajj to Mecca became an
established custom. These travels allow propaganda interchange with
Muslim leaders from all over the world.
Soviet mullahs are trained at one of two schools in Central Asia.
Primary is the Bukhara madrasah, to which Soviet Muslims come from
all over the U.S.S.R. Bukhara has a "work-study" program so that the
budding mullahs can teach at nearby mosques while getting their degrees.
The best students go on to the Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Institute of
Tashkent, or take further training in Damascus or Cairo.
The propaganda thrust from Tashkent, Baku, Ufa and the Caucasus
is by no means limited to showcasing the material advantages of Soviet
Muslims. Muslims of the Soviet East participates in some very precisely
targeted operations, such as the Jerusalem Temple Mount scenario for
sparking religious war by a Jewish and Christian fundamentalist threat
to the holy shrines of Islam in Jerusalem. On April 16, 1982, mullahs
throughout the U.S.S.R. preached on the threat to these Islamic holy
places, arising from "brigands' attempts to undermine this sacred mosque
which is being allegedly perpetrated with a view to finding Solomon's
temple."
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The fraud of Bennigsen
Before Zbigniew Brzezinski ever heard about Soviet Muslims, Alexandre
Bennigsen was the authority on them. He shaped the field of Soviet
Central Asia studies, training dozens of specialists at the Sorbonne and
at Chicago. One Central Asia specialist, who has followed the spread
of Bennigsen's gospel on the potential for Soviet Muslim revolt, observes:
"Bennigsen has had an absolutely horrendous effect on American strategic
estimates (in that area of the world). I can't tell you how many times
he has traveled to Washington to testify before Senate committees and
meet with people."
The Muslim population of upwards of 44 million, living within the
U.S.S.R., makes it the fifth largest Islamic country in the world. Contrary
to Bennigsen's myths, the interesting question is not whether at some
point in 40 or 50 years those Muslims will threaten Russian rule. An
overriding strategic question will be answered, in this decade, long before
Muslim demography transforms the Soviet Union: Will Moscow destroy
U.S. power worldwide and preside over its ultimate empire? As for Soviet
Muslims, will they or won't they serve Soviet imperial aims during this
crisis?
Bennigsen systematically blacks out this strategic reality. At a March
1983 conference on Soviet Central Asia, the professor expounded his
fixed theme in typical fashion: "The question of `identity' among Soviet
Muslims is of critical importance. Without trying to be overly dramatic,
the ultimate cohesion of the U.S.S.R. could be at stake."
Bennigsen does acknowledge that Soviet Muslims have served as a
foreign policy asset, stating that Soviet Islam's goal of appearing as a part
of world Islam desirous of contacts abroad-for the sake of "its own
survival and protection-conveniently parallels Moscow's desire to ap-
pear to Third World Muslim nations as 'one of them'." But in a 1983
book co-authored with his daughter, Marie Broxup, Bennigsen asserted
that Soviet Muslims had become drastically less effective in foreign op-
erations, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. "The period of co-
operation between the Soviet Islamic establishment and Moscow .. .
seems to have come to an end with the invasion of Afghanistan." After
EIR exposed this as a systematic cover-up of the deployments by the
Soviet Muslim Boards, Bennigsen attempted to clean up his record.
"Without doubt," he said in the recent Problems of Communism article,
"the official Soviet Islamic establishment is once again entrusted with
an important high-level diplomatic mission. Moscow's aim in sponsoring
the official Islamic establishment is both transparent and highly suc-
cessful. . . . The message they bring to their co-religionists abroad may
not be very different from official Soviet propaganda ... but it is accepted
with a certain sympathy because it is presented by authentic Islamic
scholars.... Thanks to the activity of these representatives, Moscow
managed to neutralize to a certain degree the disastrous propaganda image
of the Afghan genocide."
Bennigsen admits all that, but refuses to abandon his main line: "One
might well ask now long the Soviets can play the sophisticated but
dangerous game of supporting Islam abroad, while trying to destroy it at
home." The answer may be: As long as anybody in the United States is
foolish enough to follow the advice of Bennigsen, who hails the "Islamic
Revolution" of the fanatics in Iran, even as they commit more atrocities.
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3.7 China vs. Japan and Vietnam
Under Soviet Strategic Hegemony
In the fall months of 1983, a series of events and processes were unleashed
throughout Asia signaling that the Soviet Union had moved to a more
advanced stage in its drive for world power domination. In August, the
nation of Pakistan broke out into near civil war, as the Soviet-backed
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy launched a drive to over-
throw the regime of Zia ul-Haq. The MRD movement, localized mainly
in the province of Sind, functioned as the protective umbrella for a far
more dangerous game: the growth of insurgent separatist movements in
Baluchistan and Sind, also openly backed by the Soviet Union. Within
a week after the first full-scale demonstrations in Pakistan had begun,
Filipino opposition leader Benigno Aquino was murdered on Aug. 14,
and the full-scale destabilization of the Philippines was in progress. De-
spite a divided opposition, a major point of attack for the Filipino op-
position is the demand that the U.S. military installations at Clark Field
and Subic Bay must be removed.
On Sept. 1, in an event that shocked the entire world, the Soviet
Union, under the direction of Far East Commander Vladimir Govorov,
now Deputy Minister of Defense, shot down without warning the KAL-
007, murdering all 269 on board. In speeches justifying this action, the
then-Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov exclaimed that any aircraft
that violated the "holy soil of Mother Russia" would meet with the same
treatment. Approximately five weeks later, on Oct. 9, the world was
shocked again when spetznaz (special forces) deployed by North Korea
carried out a terrorist bombing against the government of South Korean
President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon, Burma, murdering 17 people,
including four members of the South Korean cabinet, and narrowly miss-
ing President Chun himself. This act of war against South Korea re-
portedly not only involved the insane North Korea regime of Kim Il Sung
(the country's 100,000 spetznaz forces are under the control of his son
and designated successor, Kim Chong-il), but also East German intel-
ligence. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the event, Moscow propaganda
stood solidly behind North Korea in its self-justifying enraged diatribes
against the Chun government.
With these operations, particularly the last two, the Soviet Union was
proclaiming a new policy of Schrecklichkeit toward Asia. More importantly,
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Moscow was announcing, in the starkest terms possible, that the Soviet
Union had arrived in the region, and was now undeniably filling the
growing vacuum left by the steady strategic withdrawal of the United
States from the region since 1975. In the nearly 24 months that have
passed since then, each country of the region-U.S. ally or no-has
had to redefine its foreign policy to take into account the emerging reality:
Unless U. S. withdrawal is reversed, each nation is forced to cut its course
between two major empires in the region-the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China.
This chapter will leave to one side the required measures to be taken
in U.S. policy in order to reverse the current and actual strategic dom-
ination of the region by the Soviet Union, but will examine that dom-
ination and its implications.
As in the case of the Middle East, so in Asia, the Soviet Union has
acquired its strategic gains without ever bloodying the nose of one Soviet
soldier. The gains have been won by default. The U.S. strategic with-
drawal, as well-informed Asians verify, began not with the fall of Saigon
in 1975, but with the 1969 enunciation of the so-called Guam Doctrine
of Henry Kissinger. The Guam Doctrine functioned parallel to the ir-
responsible doctrine of flexible response toward Western Europe. As the
doctrine was spelled out by Richard Nixon at a press briefing in Guam
in July 1969: "The United States is going to encourage and has a right
to expect that defense will be increasingly handled by, and the respon-
sibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves . . . [Military in-
volvement and aid] will recede." The inexorable result of this doctrine
was the withdrawal without honor from Saigon and Phnom Penh in
1975.
Kissinger covered the planned U.S. withdrawal from the region by
means of the China Card. Under this idea, the United States would
increasingly hand over its strategic responsibilities in the region to the
People's Republic of China as the effective counter against the Soviet
Union.
Furthermore, the China Card was also the primary motive for the
"Pakistan tilt" carried out by Kissinger, which permitted the Soviet Union
to make major diplomatic headway into India, the major power of the
subcontinent.
As the China Card held sway, the U.S. political and military presence
in the region continued to deteriorate. Under the Kissinger domination
of foreign policy during the Carter administration, the United States
refused to offer any concession to the appeals of Vietnam for relations,
creating the conditions under which Vietnam, under increasing pressure
from the China-sponsored Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, signed a Friend-
ship Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1978, allowing the Soviets to
occupy the U.S.-constructed deepwater port at Cam Ranh Bay. Today,
it is acknowledged that Cam Ranh Bay is the "largest forward base" the
Soviet Union possesses.
U.S. withdrawal reached such proportions that the Carter adminis-
tration, by 1979, was actively preparing for U.S. military withdrawal
from South Korea, abandoning the front line of defense for Japan.
As for Southeast Asia, the U.S. attitude in practice toward its allies
in this region is effectively summarized by Henry Kissinger's unabashed
announcement in a speech delivered in Hong Kong in October 1983:
"Southeast Asia has, as far as the United States is concerned, governments
that are neither allies nor are they-considered strictly-countries with
which we have a friendly relationship."
Kissinger and his "China Card" colleagues such as Zbigniew Brzezinski
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have been arguing since 1983 that the United States should abandon
Western Europe for the greater rewards of a Pacific-oriented policy. The
argument is a hoax; the United States has already nearly completed
withdrawal from the Pacific.
Given the strategic significance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans Basin,
U.S. policy over the last 15 years is patently insane. Two-thirds of the
world's population is concentrated in the Indian and Pacific Oceans
basins, making the region the world's richest concentration of manpower,
raw materials, and food. Furthermore, led by Japan and South Korea,
the national economies of the region have weathered the current world
depression far better than economies elsewhere, holding onto respectable
growth rates while other nations have been slipping into collapse. Asia
is rapidly becoming the engine of the world economy.
For the Soviet Union, imperial domination over the region guarantees
control of world trade and permits Moscow to dictate the transfer of
wealth and raw materials to the Soviet heartland on terms the Russians
find suitable, under conditions in which Moscow otherwise has little to
offer to its trading partners. Strategic domination is also a sine qua non
for forcing the United States into the status of a third-rate power. Fur-
thermore, given the Pacific's strategic function as a line of defense for
the U. S. continent, Soviet domination over the Pacific effectively check-
mates the United States itself.
Granted a strategic backdown of the United States, the Soviet Union
would be faced only with China as a power to contend with in the region.
The final withdrawal of the United States from the region would pre-
cipitate the collapse of ASEAN, with Thailand leading one faction to
become subsidiary states of China, and Indonesia leading the other to
become subsidiary states of Moscow aligned with Vietnam. Japan and
Vietnam would be permitted to subsist as nominally independent states
and as the only forces in the region capable of acting to check the
inherently expansionist drive of China.
The events of fall 1983 suddenly awoke various policymaking circles in
The Soviet buildup the United States to the fact that while the United States was suffering
under the media-induced Vietnam Syndrome, the Soviet Union had
been carrying out a massive military build-up in the region.
While much attention has been paid to Soviet SS-20s in Eastern
Europe, little has been said concerning the escalating presence of SS-
20s in the Asian theatre. Since October 1983, the Russians have increased
the SS-20 placement from 115 to approximately 150-160 today. The
Soviets are also seeking to place SS-20s in North Korea.
In addition, as of this moment, the Soviet Union enjoys military
superiority in the Pacific. This has been won through the acquisition of
two capabilities: the build-up of the Soviet Pacific fleet and the forward
base capabilities given the Soviets through Cam Ranh Bay.
1) The Soviet Pacific Fleet. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is today the largest
fleet out of the four the Soviets possess, and is superior to the United
States Seventh Fleet, charged with responsibility for the same area. The
comparison is as follows:
Soviet Pacific Fleet:
31 ballistic submarines and ballistic nuclear
submarines
102 other submarines (including 90 attack subs)
88 principal ships, including two aircraft carriers
18 amphibious units
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84 principal auxiliaries
340 combat aircraft, including 120 bombers
1 naval infantry division
1 naval special force (spetznaz)
Facilities in Vietnam, South Yemen, and Ethiopia, with
Soviet bases in Vladivostok and the Kurile
Islands off the northern coast of Japan.
United States Seventh Fleet:
20 diesel submarines and nuclear submarines
3 aircraft carriers
22 surface combatants
6 amphibious units
8 support ships
Facilities in Japan, Philippines, Diego Garcia, and Guam.
In addition, the United States has approximately 391 combatant air-
craft deployed in the region at Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and
Guam through the Air Force.
The Soviet-U. S. submarine ratio is 2:1. Analysts expect further Soviet
deployments in the Far East to include fourth-generation MiG-20 Ful-
crums and Su-27 Flanker fighter jets to Etorofu on the Kurile Islands,
plus long-range Blackjack bombers and Su-24 Fencer fighter bombers to
complement the nuclear-capable air force.
The predominance of the Soviet Pacific Fleet permits the Soviet Union
to shut off the crucial chokepoints in the Pacific sea-lanes, which function
as the lifelines to U. S. allies, particularly the Philippines, South Korea,
and Japan. This includes the La Perouse Strait between Hokkaido in
Japan and the Sakhalin Islands; the Korea Strait between Japan and
South Korea; the Luzon Strait through Luzon, Philippines and Taiwan
in the South China Sea; and the Malacca Strait between Indonesia and
Singapore-Malaysia through which all traffic passing from the Indian
Ocean into the South China Sea must flow.
2) Soviet Forward Base-Cam Ranh Bay. In Cam Ranh Bay, it is now
estimated that the Soviets have stationed there 26 ships, including 2
mine sweepers, 2 frigates, and 3 submarines. In early 1985, the Soviets
also stationed 14 MiG-23s, along with 10-20 Badger long-range bombers
and a half squadron of Bears. The acquisition of Cam Ranh Bay has
given the Soviets two new capabilities. First, the Soviets now have the
ability to carry out full fleet presence in the region without forcing ships
to go all the way back to Vladivostok for servicing. Second, Cam Ranh
Bay also gives the Soviets a strike capability throughout Southeast Asia
and even to Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific, site of crucial
U. S. testing installations.
The Soviets are also currently building up port installations for basing
at the Cambodian port of Kompong Som, bringing Soviet forces right
into the Gulf of Thailand.
3) Result: Soviet Strategic Positioning. United States strategic security
in the Pacific theatre has been based on securing the island nations off
the Asian land-mass-Japan and the Philippines, and ensuring the se-
curity of South Korea. The Soviet military build-up over the last decade
has cut a strategic path to 1) break up the U.S. strategic perimeter and
2) encircle China.
The Soviets have carried out a major build-up on Sakhalin Island, on
the northwest tip of Japan. In the spring of 1984, MiG-31s, the most
advanced MiG fighter in the Soviet inventory, were stationed on South-
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ern Sakhalin. On the northeastern tip of Japan, a few miles away from
the Hokkaido coast, the Soviets have built airbases on the two south-
ernmost Kurile Islands, Etorofu and Kunashir with five runways for TU-
16 Badger and TU-95 Bear long-range bombers. In the fall of 1983, the
Soviets stationed 20 MiG-23 fighters on Etorofu, raising the number to
40 in the spring of 1984.
Moving southwest toward the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union in
the last year has tightened its military-strategic alliance with the North
Korean regime of Kim I1-Sung. A reading on how close this relationship
has become was given by reports May 5 of this year that pairs of Soviet
bombers from the maritime province of Siberia had flown through North
Korean air space along the demilitarized zone, from east to west three
times over the last year. The flights included two Badgers. Military
specialists speculate that North Korea has given the Soviets a new route
from the U.S.S.R. mainland to Cam Ranh Bay (see below for further
details of Soviet-North Korean cooperation).
Cam Ranh Bay itself gives the Soviets a forward naval base in the
South China Sea, a move designed to outflank U.S. bases at Clark Field
and Subic Bay in the Philippines.
The Soviets have also moved, with aid of the Socialist International,
British Commonwealth governments of Bob Hawke of Australia and
David Lange of New Zealand, to close off the outer perimeter of U.S.
strategic capabilities in the Pacific. In late 1984, the 1951 Anzus Pact
(among Australia, New Zealand and the United States), was jettisoned
when New Zealand's newly elected prime minister, David Lange, affirmed
his campaign promise to discontinue ports of call by U. S. nuclear-fueled
or nuclear-carrying vessels. U. S. standing policy is to never divulge the
nuclear or non-nuclear status of a ship. When the U.S. refused to state
the status of the USS Buchanan, New Zealand refused the port of call.
The New Zealanders were encouraged in their stance by the lack of
protest coming from Australia. Instead, on March 4, the Hawke gov-
ernment announced it was indefinitely postponing the next scheduled
Anzus meeting because the treaty had become a "dead letter." The So-
cialist International, along with full-fledged agents of the Soviet KGB,
have been active in promoting the idea of a "nuclear-free zone" in the
South Pacific. The ostensible aim of this operation is to force a halt to
French nuclear-testing in New Caledonia and Mururoa. The more precise
target is to disrupt U.S. presence on the Marshall Islands, the Marianas,
Micronesia, and Palau by fostering anti-U.S., anti-nuclear insurgencies
and so-called "independence movements." The Kwajalein Atoll, for in-
stance, next to the famed testing site of Bikini Atoll, is the site for U.S.
testing for the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets have also gained
their own little toehold in this area. In 1979, the former New Hebrides
became independent from Great Britain and France. Today, this island
off the eastern coast of Australia, is headed by an Anglican clergyman,
Walter Lini, who proclaims that Vanuatu is an ally of Cuba.
In sum: Through primarily political means, the Soviet Union has been
able to steadily erode the U. S. strategic position in the Pacific, even to
the point of beginning to make advances into areas once deemed out of
bounds for Soviet strategic interests. The net effect of this process is to
isolate U. S. forces in the region, turning the Philippine, Japanese, and
South Korean bases, from points of concentration in a U.S. -dominated
region, into points of defense in an increasingly hostile or neutralized
environment.
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Flashpoints for confrontation
There are three areas that constitute flashpoints for Soviet military action
in the region: the Korean peninsula, Indochina, and a Soviet move toward
Pakistan from Afghanistan. In each of these three areas, the Soviets are
building up a military superiority designed to give them the advantage
at any level of warfare.
1) The Korean Peninsula. In the last year, the Soviets have tightened
their ties with the Kim II-Sung regime, a shift in policy announced with
the Soviet declaration in favor of Korean "reunification," a North Korean
formulation the Soviets had hitherto eschewed. After the visit of Kim
II-Sung to Moscow and Eastern Europe in early 1984, the Soviet Union
went through with delivery of MiG-23s to Pyongyang, and have offered
T-72 tanks. In early December 1984, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Mikhail Kapitsa was in Pyongyang, where he worked out "border ar-
rangements" between the Soviet Union and North Korea. Specifically,
this included the agreement to carry out trade by means of railway, a
measure that has obvious military implications. In late December, the
Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbum reported that Moscow had also asked
the North Koreans for three other military measures: 1) placement of
SS-20s in North Korea; 2) placement of Soviet military advisers in North
Korea; 3) the use of two North Korean ports for the Soviet Pacific fleet.
According to sources cited by Sankei Shimbum, the North Koreans
agreed to the first two of these demands, but refused the request for port
of call.
None of these measures would appear to be defensive in character.
There are currently at least 5,000 Soviet technicians in North Korea.
The Soviets have supplied Pyongyang with an unspecified number of
scud missiles of 300 kilometers in range. In early December, the North
Koreans moved three divisions forward toward the vicinity of Kaesong
just northwest of the demilitarized zone. The North Koreans began in
fall 1984 constructing three more underground fortifications near the
DMZ, equipped with electricity generators and food storage facilities.
According to testimony before Congress by Admiral William J. Crowe,
commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, in March 1985,
North Korea is becoming increasingly capable of launching a surprise
attack on the south.
For the Soviet Union, acquisition of South Korea, the one Asian
country closest to following Japan to become a fully industrialized nation,
is as beneficial as Soviet effective acquisition of the Federal Republic of
Germany. South Korea also functions as the front line of defense for
Japan. Under the current strategic conditions, South Korea and the
United States are in no position to adequately defend the southern half
of the peninsula against a Soviet-backed and aided invasion from the
north (See table on North Asian Theater).
2) Indochina. The Vietnam Armed Forces comprise by far the most
significant military force in the region, as proven by the total failure of
China's 1979 attempt to "teach a lesson" to the Vietnamese for their
invasion of Cambodia. The Chinese were unable to defeat Vietnamese
reserve forces. If the simmering conflict in this region were to become
full-scale war, the Vietnamese would require Soviet logistical aid. This
is now in preparation, with the Soviet build-up of the Cambodian port
of Kompong Son, and Soviet building up of transport infrastructure in
central-west Cambodia.
There are also consistent rumors of Soviet placement of intermediate-
range missiles in both Cambodia and Laos, but even without this, it is
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Country
Forces
Submarines
Aircraft
North Korea
784,000
21
740
U.S.S.R.
50 divisions*
133
340+
Japan
245,000
440
South Korea
622,000
351
United States
61,500
366 +
the estimate of most military authorities, that in a full-scale confrontation
between Vietnam and ASEAN countries, backed by the United States,
the ASEAN countries, notably Thailand, would lose. If the United States
were forced out of the Philippine bases, then this area would automatically
revert to the Soviet Union and China (See table below).
3) Pakistan-Afghanistan. Within the last months, the Soviets have
conducted a policy of consistent bombings of villages inside Pakistan
along the Afghan border, killing civilians, in preparation for a policy of
hot pursuit by troops into Pakistani territory. In this year alone, there
have been over 60 MiG bombing-strafing attacks on Pakistan from Af-
ghanistan, compared to 61 for all of 1984. In early June, the Soviets
warned Pakistan that they knew of every location of rebel guerrilla camps,
warning: "So far, we have not come across the border in hot pursuit."
In October 1984, the Soviets escalated their presence in Afghanistan,
with the placement of 60, 000 troops, bringing the total to 150, 000 troops.
On Oct. 2, 1984, the Pakistani newspaper Nawa-e-Waqt further reported
that the Soviets were installing SS-22 missiles in Afghanistan, 150 kilo-
meters from Herat, at Soviet air force and army bases in Shindand and
Jalalabad. Teheran, Mashhad, Islamabad, and Quetta are all within range
of these missiles.
The Soviets are moving fast to secure their southern flank on the
Afghan border. In May, the Soviets launched a campaign to end the
rebel siege of the fortification at Barikot, an operation successfully com-
pleted by mid-June.
For the Soviets, the Pakistani theatre is crucial to realize the long-
standing Russian dream for a warm-water port, a goal closer in reach
Country
Forces
Aircraft
Vietnam
1,277,000
(57 divisions)
290
U.S.S.R.
-
340
(with Pacific fleet)
Indonesia
281,000
90
Malaysia
124,000
34
Philippines
104,800
82
Thailand
235,300
(7 divisions)
203
United States
9,100
366
(Philippines)
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with the Russian 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The area around the
Pakistan-Indian-shared territory of Kashmir is also a strategic juncture
joining the borders of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the People's
Republic of China. The Chinese and the Pakistanis seek to hold a strategic
corridor joining their two countries, the Krakoram highway, which is
interrupted by Indian-held Kashmir. This May, the Soviets, according
to the Pakistani newspaper Mashriq installed surface-to-air missiles in the
Pamir Plateau in Afghanistan, adjoining the Chinese-Pakistani border.
The Soviets are also opening a tunnel in the militarily sensitive region
of the Vakkan Valley and a missile-equipped base close to the Krakoram
highway near northern Pakistan.
For the Soviets, there are two conditions which would permit im-
mediate Soviet intervention into Pakistan: an Indo-Pakistani war and
total destabilization of the Zia regime by separatist movements in Sind
and Baluchistan, who would call in the Soviets for military "help." In
the first case, it is presumed that Pakistan would lose the war, given the
proven inferiority in force and quality of the Pakistani armed forces. The
refusal of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to press ahead for a war
with Pakistan, over the suspected building of a Pakistani nuclear capa-
bility, may have been one of the prime motivations for the Soviet in-
volvement in her assassination in October 1984.
Asia under the Chinese and Soviet empires
The Soviet Union seeks domination over Asia, including the right to
set the terms of raw materials and manpower transfer from the region to
the U.S.S.R. Of the greatest economic importance to Moscow is Japan.
The Soviet Union has consistently demanded that Japan sign a "non-
aggression pact." The terms of Japanese surrender to Soviet Schrecklichkeit
policy are 1) the severing of defense ties with the United States, spe-
cifically an end to all potentials for Japanese cooperation with the Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative; and 2) Japanese recognition of Soviet title to
the Kurile Islands-that is, acceptance of a permanent Soviet military
blackmail threat at Japan's door. In return, the Soviets seek Japanese
assistance in the exploitation and development of Siberia.
The current advances for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement are a barometer
of the power balance in the region. Now that the Kissinger China Card
policy has removed the United States as a power in the region, the
Chinese leadership turns away from the United States to open relations
with the Soviet Union. On June 10, the Soviets and the Chinese signed
a five-year trade deal, which is expected to increase trade five-fold. The
Chinese are more interested in long-term power trends, than they are
with pressing the points of their three conditions for normalization of
relations: removal of Soviet troops from the Sino-Soviet border; removal
of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; and removal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan.
It is no contradiction (and certainly not for China) that this rap-
prochement with Moscow is being taken right at the point that the
People's Republic is relaunching its economy down the "capitalist road"
under the leadership of arch capitalist-roader Deng Xiao Ping, the pro-
tected asset of Kissinger partner, Chou En-lai. It was Deng who argued
in 1965 that the escalation of U.S. intervention in Indochina warranted
an immediate rapprochement with the Soviet Union. At the time, the
majority of the CCP leadership agreed with Deng. Mao's Cultural Rev-
olution was in part launched in order to outflank the Deng control of
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the party on this strategic issue. To this day, informed Asian sources
report, Deng maintains very good connections to the Soviet Union.
But with the removal of the United States from the region, China
automatically becomes the major challenge to Soviet hegemony in the
region. Although the Soviets have the strategic preponderance over
China at the current moment, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union could
conquer and militarily occupy the territory of the Middle Kingdom. Even
if the Soviets were to launch nuclear warfare against China, this would
not guarantee submission to Soviet domination. Nuclear war is a con-
tingency the Chinese are prepared for, not militarily, but as senior officers
of the People's Liberation Army view it, the Soviets can destroy China's
cities, but not her countryside, where 80% of the population lives.
Inside the military councils of the Kremlin, it is an accepted point of
strategic doctrine that it is imperative to liquidate the United States as
a world power and conquer Europe so that the industrial potential and
population of the latter continent will be at the disposal of the Soviet
Union for the inevitable moment of the final settling of accounts with
China, a war Soviet strategic planners expect to occur some twenty years
in the future.
China is meanwhile content to let the Soviet game play itself out,
while taking the short-term route of securing its long border with Russia,
while the Russians take care of the United States. But the withdrawal
of the United States from this region is a strategic disaster for China as
well, by denying China the potential for the outside technological and
scientific intervention required to sustain its 1 billion-plus population.
A China going into the twenty-first century, lacking a radical and major
upgrading of its infrastructural and industrial base, will be a China required
by its internal conditions to expand outward to settle its population. The
case of Cambodia 1975-79, indicates the tendency that can be expected
to erupt under such conditions.
This will pose a grave problem to the Soviet Union. For this reason,
it is expected that in order to hold the inherently expansionist tendencies
of China in check, the Soviet Union will be forced to maintain a nom-
inally independent Japan and a nominally independent Vietnam as mil-
itary forces in their own right.
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3.8 The Anglo-American
Liberal Establishment and
Its Massive Penetration
by Soviet Intelligence
The overwhelming evidence of the systematic, long-term Soviet build-
up and preparedness to wage war begs the question: How is it still possible
for anyone in the West to talk of "preserving parity" with the Soviet
bloc? How can the Strategic Defense Initiative, or any attempt at bols-
tering Western defenses, be called "a danger to the arms control process"
and treated by variious Western governments and media as an unfair
design "to upset and tilt the balance of forces" between the U.S.S.R.
and the United States?
This section will present the reader with the genesis of willful delusions
of the U. S. State Department and "arms control mafia" and their Western
European co-thinkers, concerning Soviet strategy and intent; how the
policy originated in British circles before being adopted by the U. S.
Eastern Establishment; and how the Anglo-American Establishment's
doctrine necessarily calls for the destruction of the superpower status of
the United States.
How is it that the West's principal institutions-including NATO-
have failed to even acknowledge, let alone publicize, the breach in
"parity" that has increasingly characterized the balance of strategic forces
for over a decade? Public debate on the widening chasm between Eastern
and Western capabilities would blow the lid off the Big Lie of arms
control. To take but one example, the unveiling by American intelligence
of the Soviet development of the Krasnoyarsk phased-array battle-man-
agement radar system in 1984 was crucial to bolster evidence of Moscow's
gradual phasing in of components of a complete ABM system. But the
publication of the evidence was delayed for several months upon inter-
vention of the U.S. Department of State, and the British government
even rejected the "interpretation" of the American finding. British and
Soviet authorities were at one to protect the 1972 ABM Treaty and
cover up a major Soviet violation.
The British protest was timed with repeated calls from the prime
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minister and other officers of the Crown urging resumption and early
success of the very arms control "process" behind which the Soviet build-
up has been allowed to occur and accelerate unimpeded. After the Czar-
in-the-wings Mikhail Gorbachov visited London in December 1984, the
quality of relations established with Mrs. Thatcher-"I like him. We
can do business together"-emerged in public view with Thatcher's stormy
Camp David talks with President Reagan. There she tried to impose a
Four-Point Program against the SDI. Only research, she said, and no
development. Any development should be conditioned by consultations
with (unwilling) allies, and any deployment by negotiations with the
Russians. The doctrine and practice of deterrence should be preserved.
No "uncontrolled arms race in space" must be allowed. Should that
program have been followed, or should it be in the future, there would
be no SDI at all.
The matter was made worse in March 1985 by British Foreign Secretary
Sir Geoffrey Howe, whose much-publicized speech at the Royal United
Services Institute of London called the SDI a "new Maginot line in
space," which "could wreck prospects for an agreement at the Geneva
arms talks." The minister complained, "We must take care that political
decisions are not pre-empted by the march of technology," and talked
of preventing "research [from] acquiring an unstoppable momentum of
its own...." His conclusion was that the allies should better ask them-
selves "how best to enhance deterrence, how best to curb rather than
stimulate an arms race." Said Howe, "I attach importance to convincing
the Soviet leadership that we in the West are indeed serious in our aim of
maintaining strategic stability at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons"
(emphasis added).
The fetish of arms control is the linguistic disguise for appeasement.
It did not arise suddenly-the last 30 years of "arms control, disarmament,
and detente" are what generated today's "New Yalta" surrender.
The doctrine of arms control and disarmament came to the United
States principally from Britain, starting with the development in the
early 1950s by senior British military officials of the notion that nuclear
weapons "have abolished global war." The concept of "deterrence" was
born out of the thought that global war having been made "impossible,"
the aim of warfare was to be "to prevent war," which of course brought
diplomacy and strategic manipulation to the fore. The British defense
ministry's Global Strategy Paper 1952 stated the policy and gave birth to
the belief that "mutual vulnerability" was the sole way of avoiding war.
With a lag-time of a few years, the same ideas were made into U.S.
strategic policy. The announcement in London that "global war is not
the Clausewitzian continuation of policy by other means," was followed
by the statement that "the overriding consideration in all military plan-
ning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it." As numerous
British commentators have conceded, "British atomic weapons were al-
ways in a sense a diplomatic weapon against the United States," one
designed to allow the Whitehall mandarins a place in the negotiating
process.
The new-born conceptions, however, needed to be translated into
hard strategic facts. The Era of Detente was initiated when British Prime
Minister Sir Anthony Eden invited Nikita Khrushchov and Marshal
Bulganin to pay the first visit to the West of the Soviet leadership since
the 1917 Revolution-to London in April 1956. The state visit was
reciprocated in February 1957 when Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
went to Moscow for the first peace-time visit there of a top Western
leader since the Bolsheviks had taken power. The policy-content was
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exemplified by Macmillan's unsuccessful search for a non-aggression pact
and a nuclear test-ban with Moscow.
In December 1962, when Macmillan met President Kennedy in Nassau,
Bahamas, he opened the talks by evoking "the awful prospects of an
indefinite arms race" to motivate his demands. At the height of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, Macmillan sent a letter to Khrushchov suggesting
that "the resolution of the Cuban situation would open the way for a test
ban agreement" (emphasis added). The crisis was being used to manage
the transition of U.S. and NATO strategy into the realm of arms control.
"I therefore ask you to take this action necessary to make all this possible.
This is an opportunity we should seize," Macmillan wrote Khrushchov.
While Macmillan was in thrice-daily telephone conversation with Ken-
nedy to advise on the Cuban crisis, he was telling Khrushchov to use
the crisis to enforce the control of armaments!
It was later Macmillan who successfully engineered the convening in
Moscow in June 1963 of the tripartite (U.S.A., Britain, U.S.S.R.)
conference which resulted in the first arms control treaty to be signed
after 1945, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (which the British prime minister
wanted to complement with a Non-Aggression Pact and a Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty, the latter of which did come about a few years later).
Macmillan's chief Western accomplice was U. S. negotiator Averell Har-
riman, who remained an inspiration behind the later arms control treaties
(SALT I and II, ABM, etc.). This provided the Soviets with the curtain
of official lies behind which their own breathless arms build-up could
occur.
Once disarmament, arms control, and detente had become the central
subject in international affairs, the British government discreetly with-
drew from the foreground, leaving it to the McNamaras and the Kissingers
to haggle the nitty-gritties with the Russians.
When Margaret Thatcher assumed the prime ministership in 1979,
her flamboyant anti-Soviet rhetoric earned her a now-eroded reputation
of anti-communist hard-liner. She has since been gradually, but com-
pletely absorbed by the consensus view in Whitehall and has made the
opening of a "new dialogue with the East" her fundamental foreign policy
priority. From her early 1984 sojourn in Hungary, and the ensuing string
of visits of British officials and unofficial envoys to Moscow and other
Warsaw Pact capitals, while a thin veneer of "Atlantic Solidarity" has
been maintained, the policy has been to seal "a real and lasting im-
provement in East West relations" with a Russia committed to world
domination by 1988!
Intense diplomatic and intelligence traffic between London and Mos-
cow permanently lays the basis for the strategic agreement that targets
the instrument-the SDI-and the policy-saving Western civilization.
While aiming to deny Europe its only possible anti-missile defense, Britain
is calling for an early reshaping of the strategic map, which we have
dubbed the "New Yalta." In London, one hears in high places that "the
Americans do not know how to play the diplomatic game. The Europeans,
with their foreign services that are hundreds of years old, know how to
play the diplomatic game-this is Metternich's old policy. The only ones
in America who understand and practice Metternichismus are the State
Department."
Among the leading practitioners of the New Yalta game of balance,
we find in London the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA),
also known as Chatham House, and its specialized branch the Anglo-
Soviet Round Table, which regularly and quietly associates top Soviet
Western hands and British experts on Soviet affairs. Together with the
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Edinburgh Conversations, held for the same purpose, they provide an
institutional forum for policy-coordination. Chatham House is organically
linked to the Foreign Office, from which policy trickles down into the
media, an array of think tanks and private organizations, including the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). These in turn create
reflections in the media, the BBC, Reuters, the London Economist, the
Financial Times, etc., which "set the tone" internationally. All share the
same passionate concern for "preserving parity" and condemning "the
arms race."
Delays of one day to one week generally obtain between the airing of
such views in London and their appearance in the New York Times,
Washington Post, and other leading U. S. liberal media. Initiatives and
ideas created at the RIIA or the Anglo-Soviet Round Table are echoed
in America by the Dartmouth Conference, the State Department, the
Office of Technological Assessment, the GAO, and by a series of congres-
sional and senatorial organs which promote arms control.
It would be wrong to consider the U.S. Eastern Establishment as an
entity distinct from its aristocratic British cousins. The East Coast blue-
bloods have for generations craved recognition as full-blooded members
of the British nobility, and, by pedigree, from their Tory ancestors in
the American Revolution and the War of 1812, their Civil War con-
spiracies against the Union as well as the fortunes their families acquired
in the British East India Company's drug trade, are to be considered as
a colonial extension of British policy-making circles.
The leading figures in the Eastern Establishment, from the early arms
control negotiator Harriman to his chosen successor as "chairman of the
Eastern Establishment," McGeorge Bundy (Kennedy's National Security
Adviser), freely confess their debt to London. Bundy, a vocal opponent
of the SDI and champion of a pledge to Moscow of no-first-use of nuclear
weapons, co-founded under the supervision of Britain's Lord Zuckerman
the top East-West policy-coordination organization, the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria.
IIASA is a neo-Malthusian think tank devoted to controlling and slowing
down technological development inclusively in the domain of armaments.
Zero-growth policies were imposed through the Club of Rome, a sister-
organization co-founded by KGB Gen. Dzhermen Gvishiani, the late
Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin's son-in-law and deputy chairman of the
Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology; and by Italy's
Aurelio Peccei and Britain's Dr. Alexander King, former OECD director-
general for Science, Technology, Industry, and Education.
Bundy inducted into the U. S. National Security Council the British-
trained Henry Kissinger, a protege of Chatham House's Sir John Wheeler-
Bennett. Kissinger told his Royal Institute audience, on May 10 1982,
the truth about the so-called Special Relationship between Britain and
America:
Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's rapid
awakening to maturity in the years following [World War II]... .
Britain has rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in
the ultimate efficacy of technology, despite her achievements in this
field. Philosophically, she remains Hobbesian: She expects the worst
and is rarely disappointed. In moral matters, Britain has traditionally
practised a convenient form of ethical egoism, believing that what
was good for Britain was best for the rest. . . . In the 19th century,
British policy was a-perhaps the-principal factor in a European
system that kept the peace for 99 years without a major war.
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American foreign policy is the product of a very different tradi-
tion. . . . American attitudes until quite literally the recent decades
have embodied a faith that historical experience can be transcended,
that problems can be solved permanently. . . . It was therefore a
rude awakening when in the 1960s and'70s the United States became
conscious of the limits of even its resources... .
During the 1920s, the U.S. Navy Department still maintained a
"Red Plan" to deal with the contingency of conflict with the British
fleet. It was not until the war with Hitler that the gap closed per-
manently. . . . The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty,
while formally American initiatives, were inconceivable without
British advice and British efforts. . . . [Foreign Minister Ernest]
Bevin shrewdly calculated that Britain was not powerful enough to
influence American policy by conventional methods of pressure or
balancing of risks. But by discreet advice, the wisdom of experience
and the presupposition of common aims, she could make herself
indispensable, so that American leaders no longer thought of con-
sultations with London as a special favor but as an inherent com-
ponent of our own decision-making... .
Our postwar diplomatic history is littered with Anglo-American
"arrangements" and "understandings," sometimes on crucial issues,
never put into formal documents... .
The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a
participant in internal American deliberations to a degree probably
never before practiced between sovereign nations. In my period of
office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral
negotiations with the Soviet Union-indeed, they helped draft the
key document. In ray White House incarnation then [as National
Security Adviser-ed.] I kept the Foreign Office better informed
and more closely engaged than I did the American State Depart-
ment. . . . It was symptomatic... .
It was lawful therefore that when both Kissinger and British Foreign
Secretary Lord Carrington were both retired from public office, they
should establish together the Kissinger Associates consulting organiza-
tion, which in turn returned some influence to Kissinger in Washington
after his business partner became Secretary General of NATO, a job that
imposes some restraints on public rhetoric, but affords its holder with
considerable influence in shaping transtlantic relations. Delegations of
parliamentarians from NATO member countries that make the pilgrimage
to the Brussels headquarters of the Atlantic Alliance often return startled
by the brash anti-SDI. language used privately by Carrington, while his
official pronouncements affect the carefully-balanced cant of the Foreign
Office, supporting Mrs. Thatcher's Four Points against the SDI and sim-
ilarly talking of the "new perspectives for improved and stabilized relations
with the Soviet Union."
The fundamental view held by the British policy-elite was summed up
by Harold Macmillan., when advising a young British colleague on how
to "run" the Americans: "Permit your American colleague . . . the feeling
that he is running the show. This will enable you to run it yourself. We
... are Greeks in this American Empire. We must run [the Americans]
as the Greeks ran the operations of Emperor Claudius."
In this way, the Great Deal proposed by Lord Bertrand Russell to
Khrushchov in 1955, to divide the world in two great empires and
demolish national sovereignty within the Western camp, while promoting
zero-growth, became "American" policy under Harriman, Bundy, Kis-
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singer, and Jimmy Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a member
of the pro-disarmament Palme Commission. The organization established
by Russell, the Pugwash Conference, became the nerve center of the
war against technological progress and its driver, military technology,
beckoning a series of arms-control treaties on its way.
In the meantime, H.A.R. "Kim" Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Ma-
clean, Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Anthony Blunt and other spies
were deployed to ensure "parity." While Pugwash slowed to a virtual halt
the progress of military and general technology in the West, Russia's
status and abilities were enhanced by "unconventional means."
The schemes for an "Anglo-Soviet Condominium" over Europe first
canvassed in Foreign Office documents dated 1942, are now entering the
implementation phase-and the consensus prevailing in Britain among
the Thatcher Conservatives, the Liberals, and Labour in opposing the
SDI is the most blatant illustration of it.
It was therefore lawful that Gorbachov should choose London as the
point of the wedge he started driving between Europe and America in
December 1984. The tone and substance of the Thatcher-Gorbachov
talks have been the common plank of all Western appeasers in their
rejection of the SDI, from the Bonn, May 1985 OECD summit refusal
to even mention the SDI, to the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in
Lisbon, which urged the United States to give priority to arms control
and disarmament at the Geneva talks.
Lord Carrington and his faction have no qualms about exploiting the
most intimate features of the Anglo-American "special relationship" in
order to cement their supposed deal with Moscow. One of the features
of the said "special relationship" is the routine delivery by American
agencies of masses of top-secret material, including codes and code words,
to the British. It has been standard British practice, especially by the
British Admiralty, to regard the "dumb Americans"' secrets as the stuff
of barter with the Soviets. During the Malvinas War of spring 1982, it
became clear to certain sectors of the U. S. intelligence community that
the British were transferring vital strategic information and codes to the
Soviets on a wholesale basis, especially in regard to U.S. fleet dispositions
and movements. There was for a time the possibility that British culp-
ability might be used as a factional weapon by U. S. intelligence factions
who were opposed to making American military forces into a toady of
British imperialism. The British response was to cover their treachery by
arresting fall-guy Geoffrey Prime, a former employee of the British military
communication facility, on charges that he had leaked official secrets to
the Soviet bloc. Prime was the key component in an official British
"explanation" of how the damaging leaks had occurred. To top off the
damage-control operation, Prime was sentenced to a long prison term.
But British betrayal of U. S. secrets has gone on, up to and including
the June 1985 TWA flight 847 hostage affair.
Carrington has not publicly stated that NATO should be disbanded,
and has even paid stiff upper lip service to a "conventional build-up" of
the Alliance. Thirty years of detente and betrayal by the British elite
have shown just how seriously his statements should be taken.
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4. The Build-Up of
Soviet Absolute Superiority
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4.1 The Soviet Military Build-Up's
Two-Fold Role
The Soviet empire's principal weapon of political influence is by no means
"Marxism," but rather the ideological persuasiveness of masses of Soviet
tanks and missiles. The key to the continuing growth of Soviet political
influence, is the perception that Soviet power is unchallengeable, and
Soviet victory inevitable. Soviet KGB and related recruitment among
the highest-ranking layers of Atlantic Alliance and developing nations,
is based upon the disposition of the cowardly to align themselves with
the "winning side." On this basis, in large part, the Soviet KGB and
GRU have recruited the apparatus of the "ultra-right," the Nazi and
Synarchist international networks, as a principal instrument of Soviet
subversion, terrorism, and sabotage internationally.
The most important, and indispensable aspect of Soviet peaceful sub-
version of the West, is the calculations of military advisors of govern-
ments, political parties, and financial interests, to the effect that the
Soviets have an absolute superiority in war-fighting power, a superiority
now rapidly approaching the capacity of the Soviets to launch, to survive,
and to win a general thermonuclear assault, with degrees of losses ac-
ceptable to the Soviet dictatorship.
On this latter account, the amount of military capacity which the
Soviets require to intimidate the West into peaceful submission is exactly
the same capacity needed to launch, to win, and to survive a general
thermonuclear war. Whereas Atlantic Alliance "deterrent" capacity has
been developed only for "show," rather than actual war-fighting, in the
Soviet case, the capacity is developed with more or less equal effectiveness
for either option. In short, the Soviets do not bluff with an empty hand.
The Soviet Order of Battle: offensive forces
A nation's "Order of Battle" is the totality of its combat forces, logistical
forces, and other auxiliary forces so positioned and arrayed, as to conduct
combat for the purpose of achieving the ultimate objectives of the state.
The physical components of the Order of Battle, i.e., weapons systems,
ammunition, logistical stockpiles, combat and administrative personnel,
are brought to life by the strategic doctrine which combines them into
a meaningful organism with the assistance of combat training, admin-
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Missile forces
istrative indoctrination, and a system of command, control, communi-
cations and logistical flows, so designed as to realize the objectives set
forth by the strategic doctrine.
What may be known, but is usually ignored or denied, about Soviet
doctrine and objectives, was the subject of the preceding chapters of this
report. What is known in the West about the Soviet Order of Battle, is
at the same time enormous in scope, and pitifully little.
A great number of weapon-counts are made and circulated in unclas-
sified form, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
NATO, the Congressional Research Service, and other institutions. The
actual gatherers of this information are the electronic surveillance means
of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and
National Security Agency.
Not one Soviet source of comprehensive information on the subject
exists. The Soviets have never even divulged any of it at the strategic
arms negotiations. Typically, the Soviet negotiators walk into those
sessions and refuse to report the size of their arsenals, on grounds that
the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. states that disclosure of such infor-
mation, for any purpose, is legally treason. The SALT/START talks have
therefore been based on the following procedure: The American side
presents a paper, in which it states what the U. S. believes the Soviet
arsenal to be, based on data gathered by the American so-called "national
means of surveillance," i.e., satellites and electronic surveillance. The
Soviet side, initially, rejects the American estimate, without disclosing
the nature of their objections. The American side then submits a second
draft estimate. The Soviets reject that, too. Further American estimates
are produced, until one estimate is proclaimed acceptable by the Soviets.
It is ultimately this Soviet-approved estimate, submitted to the Soviets
by U.S. intelligence, which finds its way into the publications of IISS,
the CRS, et al. Those estimates rejected by the Soviets are consigned
to secrecy.
In addition, before presenting comparison of U.S. and Soviet forces
in certain crucial areas, we stress again, that the build-up guided by the
Ogarkov War Plan entails not only the amassment of sheer force, but
the reorganization of Soviet society to fight war without a period of
mobilization during war. Respecting manpower, infrastructure, and all
kinds of materials, therefore, the U.S.S.R. has large, ready capabilities
that become part of the Soviet war machine the moment the Supreme
Defense Council declares them to be such, although they appear in no
table of military forces.
ICBMs
The U. S. Department of Defense pamphlet, Soviet Military Power 1985,
counts the following Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs):
Number
Deployed
Warheads
Max Range
(km)
Launch
Mode
SS-11
Mod 1
100
1
11,000
Hot
Mod 2
420
1
13,000
Hot
Mod 3
3 MIRVs
10,600
Hot
SS-13
Mod 2
60
1
9,400
Hot
(continued)
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Number
Deployed
Warheads
Max Range
(km)
Launch
Mode
SS-16
???
1
9,000
Cold
SS-17
150
4 MIRVs
10,000
Cold
SS-18
308
10 MIRVs
11,000
Cold
SS-19
360
6 MIRVs
10,000
Hot
SS-24
None
10 MIRVs
10,000
Cold
SS-25
None
1
10,500
Cold
Total ICBMs
1,398
(MIRV = multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle)
The SS-16 is a three-stage, long-range version of the SS-20, which
the Soviets pledged, under the SALT II treaty, not to deploy. It has
been observed, however, deployed at Plesetsk in northern Russia. A
statement entered by Sen. Jim McClure in the Congressional Record, April
27, 1983 ("Covert Strategic Reserve ICBM Force: Another Soviet SALT
II Violation"), cited intelligence estimates of 100 to 200 SS-16 launchers
deployed at Plesetsk.
To these must be added the SS-20 itself, since this IRBM, if based in
far northern Siberia, has intercontinental range-as the Soviets have
demonstrated in tests. In April 1984, during huge naval maneuvers in
the North Atlantic, the Soviets fired 6 SS-20s on a flight path that would
have ended in the United States; the missiles were brought down in the
Barents Sea. The SS-20 is normally equipped with three warheads. Its
range is enhanced, if the missile is armed with only one or two warheads.
Soviet Military Power 1985 counted approximately 400 SS-20s; when
strategic arms talks resumed in March 1985, U.S. officials stated the
number of SS-20s as 414. According to sources quoted in The Daily
Telegraph of London, Nov. 27, 1984, the Soviets drastically accelerated
SS-20 deployments in 1984, after they claimed to have frozen them in
the western part of the country. During 1984, the report said, the Soviets
had started construction of ten new SS-20 bases, in both the western
and eastern parts of the Soviet Union-the largest number of SS-20
bases begun in any one year, since the SS-20 was first deployed in 1977.
Taking a conservative estimate of SS-16s and the probable SS-20 force
for the end of 1985, the count of Soviet ICBM launchers at the ready
rises:
Number
Deployed
Warheads
Max Range
(km)
Launch
Mode
SS-16
100
1
9,000
Cold
SS-20
500
3
5,000
Cold
or 1
8,000
In October 1984, Defense Daily reported that the SS-25 ICBM, a heavy
missile which the Pentagon describes as "nearing deployment," was being
deployed among launch sites for the SS-20-a maneuver which disguises
the true numbers of both ICBMs and IRBMs on Soviet launch pads
detectable by U.S. satellites in space. A month later, U.S. officials in
Brussels said that the Soviets were "vigorously" building SS-20 bases and
converting others of them "apparently for the deployment of ICBMs."
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The Soviets, meanwhile, have claimed that the SS-25 is merely an
upgrade of the older SS-13, since both are three-stage, solid-fueled mis-
siles. But the SS-13 is a fixed-silo, single-warhead ICBM; the SS-25 has
been described in intelligence reports as housed in a truck-mobile canister
with a sliding roof. With the first reports of the SS-25s testing, there
was also some controversy among defense experts, over whether it might
have not a single warhead, but as many as 6 MIRVs. As with all the
mobile Soviet missiles, it is virtually impossible to make an accurate
count of the SS-25s, since their mobility allows for concealing them in
practically any building or tent.
According to several sources, who cited information channeled from
the Pentagon that did not, however, make its way into Soviet Military
Power 1985, the ambiguous SS-25 or SS-20 bases already house 40 or 50
SS-25 launchers. These must already be added to the running total:
Number Max Range Launch
Deployed Warheads (km) Mode
But, as we reported in Part 1, by the end of 1985, the Soviet Union
will have at least 460 operational SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers. The
rate of production of this missile is unprecedented; whereas the Soviets
have been building SS-20 launchers at the rate of approximately one per
week in the last years, the SS-25s are rolling off the line at the rate of
one per day. The West German Defense Ministry, in a White Paper
released in June 1985, projects a total deployment of 520 SS-25s, which
it describes as replacing the SS- 11; the Soviets, however, give no guar-
antees that they will dismantle SS-11s as the more powerful SS-25s are
deployed.
The West German Defense Ministry also anticipates the deployment
of 150 of the gigantic new, rail-mobile MIRVed ICBM, the SS-24, by
the end of 1986. Thus, very conservatively:
Number
Deployed
Warheads
Max Range
(km)
Launch
Mode
SS-24
100
20 MIRVs
10,000
Cold
SS-25
420 more
1
10,500
Cold
Total ICBMs
2,558 by
1986
This figure represents merely the number of ICBM launchers, ready
to be fired. The comparison with the United States is the following:
U.S.S.R. 2,558 ready ICBM launchers
U.S.A. 1,026 ready ICBM launchers
Summing up the warheads, with which these ICBMs are armed, gives
the most conservative estimate:
U.S.S.R. 9,300 ready ICBM warheads, not counting
the SS-24 and SS-25
U.S.A. 2,100 ready ICBM warheads
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If we amend this picture to take into account: 1) that the SS-18 can
carry 14 MIRVs, rather than just 10; and 2) the SS-24's capability, based
on its size, of carrying more than 20 MIRVs, not just 10-then the count
of ready warheads by 1986 goes off the charts:
U.S.S.R. 12,992 ready ICBM warheads,
including SS-24s and SS-25s
U.S.A. 2,100 ready ICBM warheads
That still omits the unconfirmed possibility that the SS-25, the "one-
a-day brand" missile, is not a single-warhead missile, but armed with up
to 6 MIRVs-which would raise the Soviet total of ready warheads in
1986, by another 2,300.
When we look at what Soviet and U.S. ready ICBMs and SLBMs (the
submarine-launched missiles, to be surveyed below), are able to deliver
combined-their so-called throw weight, this comparison becomes even
more disproportionate:
U.S.S.R. 12.4 million pounds not counting
SS-24 and SS-25
U.S.A. 4.4 million pounds
All of the above figures and comparisons refer only to the ready Soviet
ICBM force. They omit a major area of Soviet build-up, in which the
United States has nothing at all-their strategic reserve of ICBMs, for
reloads, for second or subsequent launches.
As we reported in Chapter 1, the Soviet missiles whose production
was decided on in the mid-1970s are all mobile; with the exception of
the SS-19, they are also cold-launch missiles. This means that the missile
does not blow out its own silo or mobile launcher during firing, so the
launcher may be reloaded again, almost immediately, for another volley.
Each SS-20 launcher, for example, is known to have two to three
reloads. The Soviet strategic reserve force, including missiles on hand
for reloading and missiles based at test ranges, has been estimated to
include 3,350 ICBMs, capable of delivering 9,300 warheads (Quentin
Crommelin, Jr. and David S. Sullivan, Soviet Military Supremacy) -again,
not counting the new missiles, SS-24 and SS-25. The United States has
zero ICBM launcher reloads or warheads in reserve.
Not content with this overwhelming margin of superiority, the Soviets
are testing two more ICBMs and another long-range IRBM. The SS-X-
26 and SS-X-27 are both gigantic missiles, bigger than the SS-18. Ac-
cording to Crommelin and Sullivan, intelligence monitors have deter-
mined that "the SS-X-26 will have a five ton payload with extreme
accuracy to a range of 7,000 nautical miles." There is also an SS-X-28,
a second-generation SS-20.
SLBMs
The accompanying bar diagrams compare Soviet and U.S. strategic mis-
sile launchers, warheads, throw-weight and reserve launchers. Besides
the ICBM component of these forces, they incorporate submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
Although the SLBM force is supposed to be the strong leg of the U.S.
"triad" of nuclear forces, the Soviets are bringing new classes of submarines
on line at a rapid rate. The Soviets have more nuclear-armed submarines,
although fewer warheads, than the U.S.; but the Soviet warheads are
more powerful and the Soviet SLBMs more capable in range and accuracy,
than the corresponding U. S. forces.
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SLBM
U.S. U.S.S.R.
ICBM
A
U.S. U.S.S.R.
MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SLBM
ICBM 1 9.9
1.9
R
U.S. U.S.S.R.
MISSILE THROW WEIGHT
(million lbs.)
MISSILE WARHEADS
0 ICBMS
1593
*MMAD
A
U.S. U.S.S.R.
Strategic Reserve
These graphics exaggerate U.S. capability, by counting the missiles and warheads on all SLBMs in the fleet-as few as 3 submarines might be
at sea and able to receive commands during war. The warhead comparison takes the most conservative estimate of Soviet warheads. (See text.)
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Number
Number Launch
Type of
Number of
Range
Deployed
Tubes
Missile
Warheads
(km)
Yankee-I
22
16
SS-N-6
Mod 1: 1
2,400
Mod 2: 1
3,000
Mod 3: 2
3,000
Yankee-II
1
12
SS-N-17
MRVs
1
3,900
Delta-I
18
12
SS-N-8
Mod 1: 1
7,800
Mod 2: 1
9,100
Delta-II
4
16
SS-N-8
Mod 1: 1
7,800
Mod 2: 1
9,100
Delta-III
14
16
SS-N-18
Mod 1: 3
6,500
MIRVs
Mod 2: 1
8,000
Mod 3: 7
6,500
Delta-IV
16
SS-NX-23
MIRVs
In testing
Typhoon
3
20
SS-N-20
9
8,300
The above nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) are the 62 allowed
under the SALT I agreement. As described above, they are armed with
1,536 warheads on 948 missiles.
But, as usual, that is not the whole story. In addition, the Soviets
have older SSBNs and SSBs in the fleet, also armed with SLBMs.
Number
Deployed
Number
Launch
Tubes
Type of
Missile
Number of
Warheads
Range
(km)
Golf-II SSB
13
3
SS-N-5
1
1,400
Golf-III SSB
1
6
SS-N-8
Mod 1: 1
7,800
Hotel-II SSBN
2
3
SS-N-5
1
1,400
Hotel-III SSBN
1
6
SS-N-8
Mod 1: 1
7,800
This brings the total to 79 submarines, armed with 1,593 warheads
on 1,005 SLBMs. This does not count the 11 Yankee-I class subs that
the Soviets have "removed from service as ballistic missile submarines,"
but not scrapped; these Yankee-Is are in service as attack subs or carrying
cruise missiles.
The Soviet SLBM force, compared with the U.S.:
Number of
Number of
Number of
Submarines
SLBMs
Warheads
Throw Weight
at least
U.S.S.R.
79
1,005
1,593
2.5 mn lbs
U.S.A.
35
592
5,344
1.9 mn lbs
Not to be omitted from the round-up of Soviet submarine, launched
missiles, is the sea-launched cruise missile program described in Chapter
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EIR Special Report/Global Showdown
1, which is only a few years old. The conversion of Victor-, Akula- and
Sierra-class submarines into cruise-missile launching subs is well under
way; the Soviet sea-based cruise missile force is already estimated at 575
cruise missiles (Crommelin and Sullivan). The United States has 3 cruise-
missile submarines, carrying 12 sea-launched cruise missiles.
Other types of missiles
IRBMS
U.S.S.R.
SS-4 2,000 224*
SS-20 5,000+ 500(end 1985)
U.S.A.
Pershing II 1,800 48
Tomahawk cruise missile 2,500
SRBMs
U.S.S.R.
Scud/SS-23 640
SS-12 (Scaleboard)/SS-22 216
Frog/SS-21 620
U.S.A.
Pershing-I 90
Lance 90
' or fewer, if some retired
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1984-85, except for the Scaleboard missile and its replacement, the
SS-22, where EIR's estimate is based on the number of SS-22 brigades reported by West German and
Austrian sources to have been deployed in Eastern Europe.
(See Chapter 3.4 of this report, for outline of dramatic Soviet build-
up of short-range nuclear missiles in the crucial, central area of Europe,
including characteristics of the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23.)
Air Force
U.S.A.
B-52G and B-52H
6,000/8,000
240
B-1 B
7,500
1
FB-111
2,350
61
U.S.S.R.
Tu-95 Bear B/C
8,300
125
Mya-4 Bison
5,600
48
Tu-16 Badger
3,100
556
Tu-22 Blinder
2,900
174
Tu-26 Backfire
5,500
265
Blackjack
4,500
in development for
Source (U.S.A.): IISS, The Military Balance 1984-85.
Source (U.S.S.R.): Soviet Military Power 1985; Aerospace America, April 1985.
1987/88
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With the production of the Backfire bomber in recent years, at the
rate of 30 per year, the development of the Blackjack, and the early-
1980s reopening of production lines for new versions of the Tu-95 Bear
bomber (originally produced in the late 1950s), the Soviets redressed a
lag-relative to other branches of weaponry-in bomber production.
Of the planes listed above, over one-third are assigned to Naval Avia-
tion. Basing of these aircraft overseas has extended the area in which
the Soviets can stage attacks in the initial hours of war. "Soviet bomber
and strike aircraft . . . can fly from airfields not only in the U.S.S.R.,
but also from bases overseas in Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Libya and
Vietnam," observed Norman Polmar in the April 1985 issue of Aerospace
America. "Considering all possible theaters of operation, even Cuba be-
comes a potential base for Soviet strike aircraft under certain scenarios.
The U.S. has already accepted the presence of Bear targeting (D model)
and antisubmarine (E model) aircraft."
The Su-24 Fencer
With respect to preparations for the Western Strategic Direction of
the Ogarkov War Plan, the single most disturbing Soviet Air Force
deployment of 1984 was the massive forward-basing of the Su-24 Fencer,
a long-range nuclear-capable fighter-bomber. The Su-24 is the Russian
approximation of the U. S. FB-111.
It has been confirmed that at least 300 Su-24s are now deployed facing
Western Europe, divided into two groups (each group of 150 aircraft
consists of 5 Su-24 regiments of 30 planes each). One group is head-
quartered at Vinnitsa in the Western Ukraine, which until 1984 had
been the the only region where this Su-24 group was based. Then, in
summer 1984, one Su-24 regiment of 30 planes was moved forward into
Hungary.
The second group of 150 planes is headquartered at Lignica in Silesia,
Poland. All of this group is forward-based, mostly in Poland; but one
30-plane regiment was reportedly forward-based in the Cottbus region,
in southeastern East Germany. Sources monitoring this deployment em-
phasize the importance of the current East German construction of a
fighter-bomber-capable military airfield at Laage, near Rostock, in the
Mecklenburg region of northwestern East Germany, which is being read-
ied to handle the Su-24. This will position them for take-off on strikes
against targets in Schleswig-Holstein, West Germany, and in Denmark
and Sweden. If the goal is a surprise attack, the sources observe, a shift
from fighter-bombers having 25 minutes of flying time from targets and
a flying time of only 1045 minutes, "makes all the difference in the
world."
These long-range aircraft are poised to strike in two principal directions:
against Western Europe and Great Britain, and against the Mediterranean
region. Their role is to eliminate key NATO military and logistical targets,
on land and sea, with nuclear and chemical strikes in the first half-hour
to one hour of war.
The necessary insight into the strategic priorities assigned to the Soviet
The Soviet Navy in Navy under the Ogarkov Plan will be found in looking, not only at the
the Ogarkov Plan
deployments of the SLBM fleet, but at the enormous priority the Russians
have given in the past 18 months, to conducting and perfecting anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) during naval exercises. By ASW, we mean
more than operations against enemy submarines as such.
The Ogarkov Plan requires maximal success of the Soviet nuclear first
strike against U.S. missile, other military, and logistics capability. From
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this goal follows the priority of protecting the Soviet Union's means of
delivering an effective, crippling first strike.
The sea-based component of the Soviet nuclear first strike force is
formed by the Delta-class ballistic missile submarines and cruise missile-
armed subs off the U. S. coast, and the Typhoon and Delta-III-class
SSBNs, which operate from Soviet "home waters"-the Barents Sea and
the Sea of Okhotsk (Map 33). Based on observations of Soviet naval
maneuvers in recent years, it has been hypothesized that the Kirov-class
multi-purpose cruiser, the largest non-carrier ship in the Soviet fleet, has
an assigned anti-ballistic missile (ABM) role. (The Kirov operates with
the Northern Fleet; the Frunze, the second Kirov-class cruiser, was des-
tined for the Pacific Fleet, which is responsible for the Sea of Okhotsk.)
SLBM bastions formed in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk would
be defended against missile attack, by means of a mobile ABM platform-
the Kirov-class ships. The Kirov carries the SS-N-19 supersonic cruise
missile in 20 launch tubes and 96 SA-N-6, in 12 vertical launch batteries,
each holding eight missiles. The Kirov's missiles are adaptations of the
SA-10 and SA-12, both of which have limited ABM capability. In the
1970s, Soviet military literature discussed the advantages of this kind of
defense of SLBM submarines.
The other strategic task of the Soviet Navy, in conjunction with
elements of the Strategic Rocket Forces (the SS-20s in particular), is to
take out as much of U. S. sea-going nuclear capability as possible in the
first hour of war. To consider the feasibility of such a Soviet attempt to
eliminate or minimize the possibility of a U. S. retaliatory strike-by the
pin-down effect on U. S. ICBMs and bombers of the sustained nuclear
bombardment of the U. S. mainland and an assault on U. S. SLBM-armed
submarines-requires us to understand the limitations on deployment of
such American submarines in the first place. Crommelin and Sullivan
aptly sum up the situation: "Less than 50% (about 15 subs) of our much
reduced submarine force of only 35 SLBM submarines is on patrol at any
one time. And even more alarming is the fact that reportedly only three
patrolling subs carrying a total of 48 SLBMs may be in communication
with the National Command Authority at any one time, and hence at
this very moment only this very small force may be actually capable of
retaliation to a nuclear strike."
Having set this scene, we proceed to review the past 18 months of
Soviet naval maneuvers, from the standpoint of their purpose in the
Ogarkov Plan.
Soviet naval maneuvers
The naval maneuvers of March-April 1984 were the largest scale rehearsal
of the naval component of the Ogarkov Plan yet conducted.
On March 27, 1984, the U. S. S. R.'s Northern Fleet and Baltic Fleet
simultaneously left their bases and moved into the North Atlantic. Three
surface task forces were involved:
1) The first, from the Northern Fleet, was led by the 28,000-ton
nuclear-powered cruiser Kirov, the largest non-carrier surface warship in
the world. This task force operated in the middle of the Norwegian Sea.
With the Kirov were:
4 Kresta II class ASW cruisers, equipped with the modem SS-
N-14 ASW missile
1 Sverdlov class cruiser
7 guided-missile destroyers, including the two most modem
classes, the Sovremenny and Udaloy (ASW)
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1 minelayer
1 landing ship
2) The second task force, also from the Northern Fleet, operated in
the area of Jan Mayen Island (Norwegian) and eastern Greenland above
the Arctic Circle. It consisted of.
4 Krivak class ASW missile frigates
1 supply ship
3) The third task force, from the Baltic Fleet, sailed through the North
Sea to the area of the Shetland Islands, where it joined the exercises.
The Kynda class cruiser Grozny was accompanied by:
4 Krivak class ASW missile frigates
2 fleet tankers.
All three task forces, carrying out ASW exercises, were joined by naval
aviation from the Northern Fleet. Squadrons of long-range Tu- 16 Badger
bombers and Tu-22M Backfire bombers carried out extensive attacks
against targets at sea; it was the greatest operational exercise in history
involving the Backfires and Badgers. By means of mid-air refueling, one
observer reported, these planes achieved "a much bigger radius than in
any previous exercise." (The Backfire's operational radius is de facto further
extended by the plane's having been fitted with As-15 Air-Launched
Cruise Missiles, whose range is 2,000 km.)
All three task forces simulated a wartime defense against over 20 nuclear
and conventional attack submarines, of the sort whose mission would be
to target and take out the Soviet SSBNs in the Barents Sea. During the
maneuvers, the Barents Sea submarine force simulated a nuclear strike
on the U.S. The exercise also had Soviet nuclear missile submarines,
stationed off the U. S. East Coast, simulate a pin-down barrage. Elements
of global coordination were introduced, as in the great Okean-75 exercises
of the previous decade, by simultaneous maneuvers of Soviet naval units
in the Mediterranean, the South China Sea, and the Caribbean.
These exercises thus tested the integration of the surface fleet's activities
with nuclear missile submarines, naval aviation-and also, with land-
based missile units nominally under the command of the Strategic Rocket
Forces, the SS-20 IRBMs. Timed with the arrival of the three task forces
at battle stations in the North Atlantic, at least six SS-20s were test-
fired from "bases west of the Urals in a northwesterly direction," according
to the Oesterreiche Militaerische Zeitschrift. This move must be seen as a
test of the SS-20s in their role as area ASW weapons.
There are multiple reports of Soviet breakthroughs in techniques for
the detection and targetting of submarines. In January 1983, Defense
Electronics reported that "the Soviets appear to have achieved a break-
through by taking advantage of a natural phenomenon known as bio-
luminescence, an illuminating property exhibited by plankton [microscopic
ocean life] when disrupted by ship movements that expose the sea life
to rapid thermal changes." The Salyut-7 orbital space laboratory was
subsequently reported to be carrying sensors for this purpose, a process
which U.S. officials quoted in the January 1983 report said they "do not
completely understand." Otherwise, Soviet work in lasers of the blue-
green range of the spectrum is significant for the development of un-
derwater detection capabilities.
With a radius of 5,000 km in its 3-warhead mode, the SS-20 is well-
suited to bombard not only U.S. SLBM submarines in the North Atlantic
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or the North Pacific, but also U.S. hunter-killer submarines and surface
ship concentrations.
Comparing the range of the SS-20 as stationed, with the battle stations
assigned the Soviet Northern and Pacific fleets during their simulation
of war, we perceive that an SS-20 shield is in effect for the fleet. The
addition of the Kirov (500 km anti-ship missile radius) and the Sovre-
menny class destroyers (110 km anti-ship missile range), Soviet ASW
task forces have an added belt of protection for carrying out their missions.
All Sovremenny class destroyers built so far (6) and all of the 6 most
modem, Udaloi class ASW destroyer have been assigned to the Northern
Fleet.
Pacific tests
April 1985, mid-Pacific ASW exercises
One year after the grand-scale Atlantic naval exercises, in April 1985,
the Soviet Union conducted their first-ever large naval maneuvers in the
mid-Pacific. The focus of the exercises, 900 miles northwest of Midway
Island, was on ASW capabilities, with emphasis on protecting the Soviet
missile submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk.
1) One task force was led by the Kiev-class ASW carrier, the No-
vorossiisk. With it were:
3 Kara class ASW cruisers
1 Kresta II class ASW cruiser
2 Krivak class ASW frigates
2 oilers.
2) Another task force, consisting of 12 ships and led by a Kara-class
cruiser, operated to the south of the carrier task force.
The Novorossiisk carrier task force left Vladivostok, and sailed south
through the Japanese Tsushima Straits in late March, then on to its mid-
Pacific stations. A U. S. defense source said at the time, "It indicates
they intend to simulate wartime missions, including protection of their
ballistic missile submarine operating areas in the northwest Pacific and
the Sea of Okhotsk."
On April 13, they were 900 miles northwest of Midway, moving
northwest, stopping at irregular intervals to conduct maneuvers. On April
14, they were 1,150 miles northwest of Midway, and by the next day,
some 525 miles southwest of Soviet Kamchatka. Thus, at all times, they
formed a screen between the U. S. mid-Pacific possessions and the Sea
of Okhotsk. By April 16, they were 55 miles off Cape Shiretoko, the
northeast extremity of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido.
September 1984, Sea of Okhotsk ASW exercises
These marked the first exercises in the Sea of Okhotsk to be led by
the Kiev-class ASW carrier Novorossiisk (the Novorossiisk only arrived
in the Pacific in 1984). With the carrier were:
1 Kara class ASW cruiser
1 Kresta II class ASW cruiser.
On September 29, 1984, this task force sailed through the La Perouse
Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin, into the Sea of Okhotsk. Jane's
Defense Weekly (Oct. 13, 1984) reported that the Novorossiisk was painted
light grey on its upper half, a camouflage "not seen on Soviet warships
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since the War." The exercises were marked by the first large-scale flights
in the Pacific, of Backfire bombers in formations of 20 and more.
ASW priority in naval construction
The enormous attention devoted by the Soviet Union to ASW is directly
traceable to the adoption of the Sokolovskii Doctrine during the 1960s.
Reviewing the new classes of major surface warships built by the U.S.S.R.
since 1966, the overwhelming emphasis on ASW functions is obvious.
The table below gives an overview of two decades of Soviet naval
shipbuilding: The Cruisers, Destroyers, and Frigates cited in the Table
are all Guided Missile Cruisers, Destroyers and Frigates.
Total in
Service
Post-1965
Classes
Post-1965
Classes, ASW
Carriers
6
4
4
Guided-missile cruisers
42
22
17
Destroyers
50
12
6
Frigates
32
32
32
The most recent Soviet naval exercises in the Atlantic, in May-June
1985, clearly show a new type of carrier task force, made possible by the
Northern Fleet's acquisition of three Sovremenny-class destroyers in from
1981-83. The carrier task force, which first engaged in Mediterranean
maneuvres, and then in the North Atlantic, near the Shetlands, was
led by the ASW carrier, Kiev. It was accompanied by:
2 Kresta II class ASW cruisers
1 Krivak class missile frigate
3 Sovremenny class destroyers (110 km missile range).
The modem destroyer classes, Sovremenny and Udaloi, have been
entering service at a rate of over 1 per year.
Cruise missile subs and anti-ship attack subs
No discussion of ASW warships would be complete without mentioning
the role of the Soviet hunter-killer nuclear attack submarines. There is
a remarkable parallel between the characteristics of surface ships currently
under construction, and of submarines, respecting ASW capabilities.
Soviet Oscar-class submarines will be capable of firing missiles against
ships as far as 500 km away. The Oscar carries the same SS-N-19 missiles
as the Kirov-class cruiser. As with the Kirov, there is one Oscar sub in
service with the Northern Fleet and one with the Pacific Fleet. The
modem attack submarines would form the front-line anti-ship pickets
(against U.S. carrier task forces), far out in the Atlantic and the Pacific,
deployed between the Soviet surface task forces and the U. S. home-
waters Atlantic and Pacific naval concentrations. They would also form
an anti-ship screen for the Soviet subs stationed off the U.S. coasts.
The Soviet priority on ASW capabilities is even more starkly seen,
upon examination of the submarine construction program. Three classes
of modem ASW nuclear attack subs, successors to the Alpha- and Victor-
classes, are under construction:
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? Sierra since 1981
? Mike since 1981
? Akula since 1983
The submarines deployed off U. S. coasts, to inflict pin-down barrages
during a first strike, are Delta-I and Delta-II SSBNs and the Victor-III
nuclear attack submarines. The 18 Victor-III subs are being fitted with
SS-N-21 cruise missiles (2,000 km range). At least one Yankee-I former
ballistic missile submarine has been reconverted into a cruise missile sub,
firing the SS-N-21. All Alpha-class nuclear attack subs have also had
SS-N-21 cruise missile firing capability installed. This represents a major
augmentation of the Soviet nuclear attack capability.
The headlong build-up of Soviet fighting strength on the ground is best
Soviet ground forces seen in our account of developments in the main potential TVDs, in
Graphs of "relative trends in main battle tanks and
artillery," appearing in NATO and the Warsaw Pact
Force Comparisons (1984), a NATO publication.
40 000 the West German weekly Der Spiegel, U. S. Army Major Arthur Nicholson
h
h
T
h
80
f E
G
was attempting to p
otograp
-
-in an area o
t
e
ast
ermany
where the Potsdam-based U.S. military mission has the right to travel
without restriction-when he was murdered by the Soviets in March
1985
i ne ooviers are aaaing tanks, as weit as arnuery, armorea personnel
carriers, etc., to their Western Theater forces at an accelerated rate.
Gen. Cor de Jager of the Netherlands, chairman of NATO's military
committee at the chiefs of staff level- said in May 1985, that of 12.000
new tanks added by w arsaw Pact rorces in the last aecaae, more than
a quarter of them, 3,500, were acquired during 1984. (That was the year
of maneuvers to rehearse the high-speed offensive in Central Europe.)
During the same ten years, de Jager said, NATO acquired a total of 1,500
10 000 new tanks.
I
WA
I
ARS
AW
PACT
WOW
N
-
AT
O
N
ow
MAIN BATTLE TANKS
(MAIN ARMAMENT 90mm
AND ABOVE)
Part 3.
With the war in Afghanistan, the Soviets have been combat-testing
their weapons, as well as their troops, which would be used in other
theaters of combat. The Mi-24 ("Hind") helicopter gunship, for instance,
widely deployed in Afghanistan, is the main attack helicopter provided
to Soviet forces facing off with NATO in Europe. A new attack helicopter
being tested now, the Mi-28 ("Havoc"), will have a third again as long
a combat radius (240 km) as the Mi-24, and will be armed with auto-
matically-homing anti-tank missiles that can be fired from out of range
of NATO anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, according to Interna-
tional Defense Review.
The Ground Forces are also being supplied with an improved version
of the T-80 tank, which itself was new as of approximately 1982. Jane's
Armor and Artillery 1984-85 reference book described the T-80 as a
challenge to NATO aircraft in the period immediately ahead. As many
as 1,400 T-80s are deployed with the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern
Europe, according to intelligence estimates, although the tank has yet
The roughest of comparisons depicts the overwhelming Soviet supe-
riority in ground forces (Map 34):
Ground
Combat
Artillery: Guns
Divisions
Tanks
& Howitzers
Total worldwide
U.S.S.R.
193
51,000
34,000
U.S.A.
16
12,023
5,140
(continued)
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WA
RS
AW
PACT.
s_1141.
11 l
NAT
O
Ground
Combat
Divisions
Artillery: Guns
Tanks & Howitzers
In Europe
Warsaw Pact
133
43,980
NATO
42
9,736
ARTILLERY/MORTARS
(TUBES 100mm AND ABOVE
INCLUDING ROCKET
LAUNCHERS)
Soviet military
manpower
Source (worldwide): IISS, The Military Balance 1984-85. A Soviet division has fewer men, but more
firepower, than a U.S. division.
Source (Europe): IISS, The Military Balance 1984-85. In this table, the figures are sums of forces in the
Warsaw Pact and NATO member countries that lie fully or partially within the domain of the Marshal
Ogarkov's High Command West: Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, U.S.S.R. (Baltic,
Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Leningrad and Odessa Military Districts, and the Groups of Forces in
Eastern Europe); United States (divisions actually stationed in Europe), Great Britain, Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and Norway. The com-
parison generously overstates NATO forces, because it includes countries, which ordinarily do not list
their military forces as part of NATO (France, Spain) and others, whose availability during war is highly
questionable, for reasons stated in Part 3; also, division-equivalent forces were counted for countries
whose armies are not organized into one or more full division (Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands).
With 48 to 72 hours of mobilization time, however, the nations of continental Western Europe could double
or triple the size of their armies. To be prepared for a Soviet high-speed offensive, they must bring their
forces up to mobilization strength, in advance.
The accompanying bar diagram, reproduced from the NATO publication NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
Force Comparisons (1984), dramatizes the precipitous Warsaw Pact build-up in Europe as a whole, as
against NATO stagnation, even though it significantly overstates NATO capabilities and understates those
of the Warsaw Pact, for several reasons: 1) failure to show the 1984 surge in Warsaw Pact tanks, reported
by Gen. de Jager, 2) inclusion in the NATO totals, of U.S. divisions, which would be prevented, under
the Ogarkov Plan maximum option, from ever reaching Europe, and 3) omission of the Leningrad Military
District from the Soviet/Warsaw Pact side.
Ready Ready
Active Reserve Sum Active Reserve Sum
Strategic &
Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces
923
1,646
2,569
141
24
165
Air Force
433
699
1,132
481
193
674
Ground Forces/Army
3,020
5,080
8,100
781
995
1,776
Navy
436
700
1,136
545
190
735
Naval Infantry/
Marines
Militarized Security
Forces
Total
5,418
9,156
14,574
2,147
1,491
3,638
Since 1974
655
24
Source: John M. Collins and Patrick M. Cronin, U.S./Soviet Military Balance, Statistical Trends, 1975-
1984.
The Soviet Armed Forces have begun to draft women, in a push to
bring additional manpower into the active military. A U.S.S.R. Supreme
Sovet decree of March 18, 1985 provided for women to be registered for
the military draft, if they have "medical and other specialized training."
Women aged 19 to 40 meeting these criteria could be "accepted on a
volunteer basis into active military service."
Also of importance for the bolstering of Soviet military manpower is
the reform of the Soviet school system, proclaimed on Jan. 4, 1984. The
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"Guidelines for the Reform of the General Education and Vocational
School" outlined a far-reaching reform, designed to make the U.S.S.R.
a full-fledged garrison state like ancient Sparta. Students are to be forced
into the workforce at an earlier age, with only a small minority admitted
to the universities. Rigorous military training, including field exercises
and attendance at militarized summer camps, is instituted across the
board.
The principles of the report may be found in Marshal Ogarkov's 1982
book, Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland, in which he emphasized
the importance of educating young people for the needs of defense.
Ogarkov called for: 1) an expansion of elementary military training in
schools, 2) sports activities with military significance, 3) upgrading Rus-
sian language training, and 4) instilling patriotism in youth.
Each of these four points was incorporated in the 1984 school reform
legislation, in addition to other measures. The existing general education
secondary schools are to be merged with vocational schools, leading
ultimately to universal vocational training for young people. The school
entrance age will be lowered from age 7 to age 6, making it possible to
move teenagers into the work force at an earlier age. In order to facilitate
this, the restrictions on child labor in the Soviet Union are being loos-
ened.
Col. S. Konobeyev, deputy head of the Defense Ministry's program
for military training in schools, pushed for an even more radical mili-
tarization of the schools than proposed. In a Feb. 1, 1984 article in
Krasnaya Zvezda, he proposed the following additional steps: Every Soviet
school should have a vice-principal in charge of military training of pupils;
50% increase in hours devoted to elementary military training; 6 full
days of military field exercises for each pupil in the final 2 grades of high
school; a program of summer "defense-sport" camps for youngsters of 15
and over; a 30% salary hike for military instructors in the schools; each
school in the Soviet Union to have its own armory, weapons storeroom,
firing range, drill fields, and other facilities, built by the students them-
selves; and tracking of students into a particular branch of the Armed
Forces already in their school years.
Determining the levels of chemical and biological agents produced and
Chemical and stockpiled by the Soviets for military use is hampered by the secrecy of
biological warfare this entire, major area of activity. The Soviets lie that they, like the
CBUnited States, adhere to the 1925 Chemical Warfare Protocol and the
(V~) 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention-assertions which are
disproved to the point of absurdity, by the testimony of defectors who
served in the chemical warfare departments of the Soviet and Warsaw
Pact Armed Forces, by the 1979 mass outbreak of anthrax after a biological
storage facility accident in Sverdlovsk, by the visible effects of CBW
agents in Afghanistan, and by the flamboyant demonstration in practice,
by the Bulgarian secret service, of fast-acting toxins for assassinations.
Crommelin and Sullivan enumerate CBW facilities and weapon stock-
piles as follows:
Modern chemical weapon production facilities
14
0
Biological weapon production facilities
8
0
Chemical weapons
700,000 tons
2,700 tons
Source for Soviet figure on chemical weapons: Crommelin and Sullivan, Soviet Military Supremacy,
estimate of minimum tonnage of stockpiled modern chemical weapons. Source for U.S. figure: Joseph
D. Douglass, Jr., "Chemical Weapons: an Imbalance of Terror," in Strategic Review, Summer 1982;
(continued)
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The Soviet space
program
estimate of what portion of the aging U.S. CW stockpile that is in usable condition. Higher figures often
seen for the U.S. stockpile are misleading, because they state tons of munitions, rather than tons of active
agent.
Soviet forces normally train for operation in areas of atomic-biological-
chemical contamination. Most Soviet missiles, bombs, artillery, grenades
and other weapons are capable of being armed with CBW warheads, as
easily as with nuclear explosives.
Recent Soviet comments on biochemical warfare agents, reported on
by Joseph D. Douglass and H. Richard Lukens in Strategic Review (Fall
1984), emphasize materials with greatly enhanced (as much as quadru.
pled) toxicity, compared with older agents. The current edition of the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia, quoted by Douglass and Lukens, describes
these substances: "Neurotropic toxins are toxic proteins which are pri-
marily byproducts of the life cycle of microorganisms. . . . The neutro-
tropic toxins are the most toxic chemical substances of all known toxic
agents. Their harmful effect is based upon their capacity to inhibit the
membrane receptors responsible for nerve impulse transmission. Under
combat conditions, they can be used as an aerosol or in a solid or liquid
state in mixed elements or ammunition; they can also be used for sabotage
purposes."
William Kucewicz, a journalist who has researched and written on
Soviet CBW, explained in a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty interview
(May 1984), how these supertoxins work: "A lethal germ could be pack-
aged in a rather innocuous virus. People would get the flu, and you
wouldn't think too much of getting the flu. As you were recuperating
from the flu, your body would begin producting the poisons. The toxic
genes in the virus would start telling your body to start making these
toxins, just like the genes tell a cobra to make venom." Kucewicz identified
laboratories of the Academy of Sciences at Moscow, Leningrad, and
Novosibirsk, as centers for this work on the military use of genetic
engineering.
Consistent with Ogarkov's insistence on having "civilian" facilities of
all types in a state of war-level mobilization, the Military Encyclopedia
also notes that, "The rapidly developing industry in microbiology can be
switched over from its peacetime mission of producing antibiotics, vi-
tamins, enzymes, proteins, amino acids, and microbiological organisms
for protecting plants, to the production of pathogenic weapons."
In the United States, Sen. Jake Gam said on June 3, 1985, "We have
not tested masks or tanks being affected by chemical weapons for at least
13 years." The plan to build a chemical warfare testing center at the
Dugway Proving Ground near Salt Lake City, Utah, was blocked by
decision of Federal Judge Joyce H. Green, who ruled favorably on a suit
by arms-control advocates, on grounds that the environmental impact
had not been properly investigated.
Recent pronouncements by the top space scientists of the Soviet Union
are classic examples of a tried-and-true habit of Russian language and
culture: the bald-faced lie, told to someone who knows it is a lie and
whom the speaker knows, knows it's a lie, in tones of finality that defy
any attempt at contradiction. Like the salesgirl who sullenly states, "We
have no sausage today," to a customer who is looking at a whole row of
sausages, Soviet Academy of Sciences officials Aleksandrov and Velikhov
and space-program designers Glushko, Mishin, Belotserkovskii, Nadi-
radze and Chelomei, in 1983 signed an open letter "to all the world's
scientists," attacking the United States for the "militarization of space,"
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and calling on the world's scientific community to endorse the latest
Kremlin peace-in-space proposals, aimed against the U. S. Strategic De-
fense Initiative.
Sokolovskii's Military Strategy stated, that "the modem concept of the
theater of military operations may include the entire territory of a bel-
ligerent or coalition, whole continents, large bodies of water, and ex-
tensive regions of the atmosphere, including space."
The Soviet space program has been controlled by the military from
Sputnik on. The main institutions that guide the space program are those
of the military and the defense-economy sectors-the Defense Industry
Department of the Central Committee staff, the government's Military-
Industrial Commission, the State Committee for Science and Technol-
ogy, the Ministry of General Machine-Building (it builds ICBMs as well
as space rockets), and the Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool-Making
Industry. Yet R. Sagdeyev, director of the U.S.S.R. 's Institute for Space
Research, tours the United States to present "scientific" arguments against
the SDI.
The Strategic Rocket Forces, under Chief Marshal of Artillery V.
Tolubko, oversee both military space flights and those described as non-
military, launched from the cosmodromes at Baikonur (Tyuratam), Ple-
setsk, and Kapustin Yar, just as they oversee strategic rocket tests. In
the other direction, a defense industry manager, who in 1961 won his
Hero of the Soviet Union medal "for outstanding service in the devel-
opment of rocket equipment and guaranteeing a successful flight of Soviet
man in space on the spaceship Vostok," went on to become U.S.S.R.
Minister of Defense-Dmitrii Ustinov.
Besides this obvious overlap, there are patterns of Soviet space-launch
coordination with other branches of the military. Jane's Space Directory
notes that in July 1976, the crew of the Soyuz-21 spacecraft were engaged
in a sort of joint maneuver with forces on the ground, by taking obser-
vations of large-scale land, sea, and air maneuvers in Siberia, in order
to study the ability of a manned spacecraft to monitor and participate
in such operations in the future.
"The Problems of Using Outer Space for Military Purposes was a
subhead in the first two editions of Sokolovskii's Military Strategy, in the
section entitled, "Methods of Conducting Modem War." The Soviet
military authors outlined a wide array of military activities in space, most
of which were subsequently conducted or tested by the Soviet space
program. These include reconnaissance, navigation, communications,
electronic countermeasure (ECM) satellites, "space bombers," etc.
In May 1985, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov acknowledged
the Soviet military space program, claiming that it was strictly defensive-
a matter of "the perfection of space early warning, reconnaissance, com-
munications, and navigation systems...."
The Cosmos series of Soviet satellite launchings, of which there have
been well over 1,600 since 1962, is almost entirely for military purposes.
ASATs
By 1971, the Soviets had demonstrated an operational anti-satellite
weapon (ASAT) capability, by means of the "killer satellite" technique.
Here, one satellite is launched into orbit, to intercept and destroy an-
other, by exploding in its vicinity.
The Soviets now have at least four ASAT programs in various stages
of development, according to a review by U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency analyst James Hanson, published in International Defense Review
(November 1984):
? the basic ASAT weapon, described above;
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? an ASAT battle station;
? an ASAT laser weapon;
? a high-altitude geosynchronous ASAT system.
The first ASAT battle station test was observed in 1981, when the
15-ton Cosmos-1267, which can fire projectiles at other satellites, docked
with the Salyut-6 space station. In March 1984, Aviation Week & Space
Technology reported the view of U.S. military men, that the Soviets were
"developing a large laser-equipped prototype military spacecraft, . . . that
could be used for the type of heavy unmanned prototype directed-energy
weapon now known to be under development." This version of a laser
ASAT, as well as the possibility of a high-altitude geosynchronous ASAT
weapon, depend on the new generation of Soviet booster rockets.
The Soviets have repeatedly tested ASATs in combination with the
offensive and defense means of waging total thermonuclear war, as with
summer 1983 simultaneous tests of an ASAT, two ABM missiles, ICBMs,
and an SS-20, reported in Defense Electronics (May 6, 1985).
FOBS
Soviet tests of Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems, or FOBS, oc-
curred 18 times between 1966 and 1971. These were "space bombs," fired
into orbit and then slowed by retro-rockets so that they would reenter
the atmosphere and strike targets on earth, before the completion of one
orbit. By this means, the Soviets might attack the United States by the
"back door," traveling three-quarters of the way around the globe via the
South Pole, instead of on the shorter, more closely monitored North
Pole route.
Early-warning satellites
The huge Soviet network of early-warning and reconnaissance satellites
undergoes constant upgrading, such as the development of highly precise
laser radars to supersede infra-red detectors. According to Jane's Space
Directory, The Soviets are trying to "harden" their early-warning satellites
by shielding them against jamming.
Ocean surveillance system
For years, the United States had no counterpart at all to the Soviet
ocean reconnaissance satellites known as Electronic Intelligence Ocean
Reconnaissance Satellites (EORSATs) and nuclear-powered Radar Ocean
Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSATs). These are designed to detect,
locate, and target ships for destruction by various anti-ship weapons.
The reported Soviet experiments in tracking submarines are an ex-
tension of this capability into the realm of anti-submarine (ASW), which
figures in the Soviet plan to wipe out U.S. sea-based ballistic missiles.
Navigation
The U.S.S.R. informed the International Telecommunications Union
that the Global Navigation Satellite System (Glonass), similar to the
U.S. Global Positioning System (Navstar), entered service in 1982. The
Soviets described Glonass as designed for "worldwide aircraft radio nav-
igation," but it is believed to have been developed by the military for
both military and civilian use. There has been informed speculation, that
Glonass might be designed to intercept and process signals from Navstar.
Communications
The Molniya system of communications satellites was continuously
upgraded during the 1970s. The newer system, Intersputnik, covers the
U.S.S.R., Cuba, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
Espionage satellites
Soviet spy satellites customarily return film to earth, for high-resolution
photographs (as opposed to data-imaging)-with detail as fine as 0.2 cm.
225
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U. S. intelligence reports hint that beam-splitter mirrors have been used
on some Soviet spy satellites to photograph U.S. ICBM sites in laser
light, to pinpoint them with an accuracy of 15 to 30 m.
The next phase
With all this activity, the Soviet Union zoomed ahead of the United
States in space launches. From 1966, when each country carried out 70
launches, the U.S. plummeted to 20 or fewer each year during the 1980s,
while the U.S.S.R. today is making over 100 space launches per year.
There is no sign of any slowdown. The next projects in the Soviet
space program are:
? Large, modular space stations, as the successor to the Salyut space-
labs. In 1981, Academy of Sciences President A. P. Aleksandrov said
that the Soviets were looking ahead to "orbital stations . . . equipped
with one or several docking bays, which would permit new units and
equipment to be docked to the station." In December 1983, Ukrainian
Academy chief V. Paton said it was time for a shift "from longterm
orbital stations, which are periodically visited by different crews, to a
permanent orbital complex."
? At least one space plane. The Soviets have conducted tests of a small,
unmanned space plane. This is generally described, including in Soviet
Military Power 1985, as a one-third scale model of a larger, manned
space plane like the U.S. Shuttle. However, James Oberg, a close
observer of the Soviet space program and author of Red Star in Orbit,
has advanced the hypothesis that the unmanned plane is itself a finished
(potential) weapons system, having been tested for approximately four
years, that would be a new generation FOBS system of enormously
enhanced maneuverability.
? A heavy-lift booster. The Soviets are developing a booster of at least
the power of the U.S. Saturn V (no longer produced, the Saturn V
was the Apollo-project rocket that sent men to the moon); to match
the Saturn V's 3.5 million kg of thrust, will be to more than triple
the power of the U. S. S. R.'s most capable rockets. Soviet space officials
have publicized their new booster project as chiefly aimed at acquiring
the capability to launch the components of their space station, but it
has the additional military significance of being able to launch ASATs
into the geosynchronous, high-earth orbit where critical U.S. warning
and communications satellites are. Some specialists believe that the
Soviets aim to out-power the Saturn V by a substantial margin, achiev-
ing 5.5 million kg of thrust.
? A a manned mission to Mars, as early as 1992. The Soviets intend
to send a plasma experiment to a moon of Mars, and have stated that
their goal is a manned landing on the planet. It has been posited, that
the long-duration missions about the Salyut-Soyuz complex have been
preparation for such an undertaking.
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4.2 Active Defense:
the Soviet `Star Wars' Program
The Soviet Strategic Defense capability and program is made up of a
"High Frontier" component and a "Star Wars" component. The Soviet
"High Frontier" strategic defense (so labeled after General Daniel Gra-
ham's eponymous proposal which attempts to build an anti-missile defense
based principally on conventional, non-laser technologies), is extensive
and has been in existence since the 1970s. The directed-energy-weapons-
based "Star Wars" capability of the Russians, is at least 10 years ahead
of the American Strategic Defense Initiative; as of the end of 1984, it
had completed its "research" phase and had entered its development and
deployment phase. It is expected that the Russians might deploy their
first, crude, space-based anti-missile laser weapons some time toward the
end of 1985.
Soviet Strategic Defense is the assigned combat mission of a branch
of the Armed Services which has no equivalent in the United States
Table of Organization, called the Air Defense Troops (Voiska Protivo-
vozdushnoi Oborony, formerly called National Air Defense, or PVO Strany).
The PVO has approximately 550,000 men under arms, 7,000 radars,
over 3,000 interceptors, over 13,000 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)
launchers (most with reload capability), a great number of early warning
satellites, integrated battle management radar stations, and other ca-
pabilities.
Within the PVO are two subdivisions which, though established in
the mid-1960s, are little discussed and maintain a low public profile
because their very existence violates the 1972 anti-ABM Treaty. They
are the Anti-Space Defense (PKO) and the Anti-Rocket Defense (PRO).
The more than 13,000 Russian SAM launchers service 12 different
types of surface-to-air missiles deployed to defend an estimated 400 to
500 strategically important locations. These defended locations are, pri-
marily, the land-based ICBM sites, all primary and secondary command-
and-control centers, major industrial and major political/administrative
assets. The different combat-ceiling altitudes of the various SAMs provide
a kind of layered area defense which can operate from exoatmospheric
altitudes all the way down to altitudes expected to be used by low-flying
cruise missiles. The Soviet SAMs most versatile, and most appropriate
for anti-missile defense appear to be the 54-foot, 22,000-pound, nuclear-
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tipped SA-5s, deployed in an estimated 100 different sites in numbers
of approximately 2,000 launchers.
Since 1981, the Soviets have developed and deployed six new types
of surface-to-air missiles, all of them designed to intercept either inter-
continental missiles or low-flying cruise missiles. Of these, the versatile,
blazing speed SA-10 is considered by the Soviets as the "critical PVO
weapon of the 1980s." For lower-altitude defenses, it is complemented
by the SA- 11. Faster, higher-flying and electronically more sophisticated
and more maneuverable, also more reliably integrated in the Soviet early-
warning and radar system, are the more recent SA-X-12, SH-04 and SH-
08.
The earlier-generation SA-1, SA-2 and SA-3 launchers, which during
the 1970s constituted the backbone of Soviet strategic air defense, are
reported to be in the process of being replaced by the modern, reloadable,
ABM-capable SA-10.
These systems and the Soviets' known anti-satellite systems are the
backbone of their "High Frontier" strategic defense, as distinct from the
directed-energy based, budding "Star Wars" capability. How much ef-
fective, active defense the Russians' dense surface-to-air missile deploy-
ment can offer against incoming ICBMs, is a matter of speculation. The
only realistic assumption one can make under the present strategic cir-
cumstances, is that the most difficult task these forces would have to
face would be to defend Soviet assets after a Soviet first strike against
U. S. land-based ICBMs. If the American ICBMs are caught on the ground
and killed, and if (a generous) half of the American nuclear missile
submarines are able to launch their weapons, the Soviet SAM force will
have to seek and destroy approximately 2,500 nuclear low-yield, not very
accurate, not very long-range warheads.
At this time, the Soviets appear to have something like two nuclear-
tipped SAMs for every one of these warheads, ready to launch. If the
American retaliation is organized in successive salvos and not in one
instantaneous barrage, then the Soviet strategic defenses would be able
to reload and thus deploy more than two SAMs per American warhead.
If Soviet anti-submarine operations succeed in pinning down or otherwise
neutralizing American nuclear missile submarines, the ratio of defending
SAMs against incoming American warheads would further improve for
the Soviet defenders.
The Soviet anti-missile missile capability, however, is only a small
portion of the Soviet Strategic Defense program. Its space-based, directed
energy BMD program, during 1984 and 1985 has been growing by leaps
and bounds:
Jan. 16, 1984: Aviation Week and Space Technology reports that, ac-
cording to a high administration official, "What seems clear is that there
is in progress a pattern that places Soviet activity very close to the line
in terms of a breakout.... We might find this year that we have zero
time to respond to an ABM Treaty breakout by the U.S.S.R. with no
way to provide in a timely way a parallel capability."
March 28, 1984: U. S. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt testified before the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
"The Soviet Union is 10 years ahead of the United States in anti-ballistic
missile defensive capabilities. The Soviets may, in just another year's
time, be able to defend over one-third of both their population and
offensive forces from the U. S. retaliatpry deterrent. The Soviets may
also at any time launch the first anti-ballistic missile battle station in
space, where they have long been superior in anti-satellite capabilities."
April 2, 1984: Aviation Week reports that the Soviet Union has launched
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an intensive program at the Lebedev Physics Institute and the Kurchatov
Institute of Atomic Energy to develop a nuclear-pumped x-ray laser.
Progress is also reported in computerized guidance systems, laser com-
munication with submarines, and laser optics.
July 25, 1984: Cosmonauts aboard the Salyut-7 space station take a
space-walk and test a 66-pound industrial laser.
Soviet progress in BMD during 1984 was summarized by the planning
chief of the West German defense ministry, Dr. Hans Ruehle, in a January
22, 1985 article in the daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, headlined
"Chernenko's Star Wars." Dr. Ruehle wrote:
While the Soviet missile programs silently continued, the Amer-
ican activities were buried formally and de facto by the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. Thus, this treaty prevented any progress towards an
efficient American missile defense system, without stopping Soviet
research programs and modernization measures.
Since the 1960s, the Soviet Union has been undertaking an
impressive military research and development program in the field
of beam weapons. . . . On the basis of this work, one has to assume
today that the Soviet Union has the potential and the technology
for building militarily efficient beam weapons.
This is true especially for laser weapons, where the Soviet Union
has invested three to five times as much as America has done. They
have 12 big research centers and six big testing facilities. In Troisk,
they have built plants for the production of laser weapons. In Sar-
yshagan, a huge ground-based laser has been under construction
since 1971... .
No less alarming are the massive research programs in the field
of producing radiofrequency beams and particle beam weapons... .
It can be taken for granted that the Soviets are ahead... .
They are also in the process of building heavy transport rockets.
In the works is a rocket of 100-meter length with a transport capacity
of 150 tons. This would enable the Soviet Union to transport very
heavy weapon systems into space within a very short period, without
engaging in any complicated assembly work.
Approximately one month after Dr. Ruehle's report, American gov-
ernment defense intelligence analysts announced that the Soviet Union
had completed the technology-research phase of its high-energy laser
program and had now begun developing prototype laser weapons. Some
are of the view that . . . Soviets might deploy at least one such prototype
space-based weapon in 1985. Their ground-based laser point defense
capability is suspected to be much more advanced. For example, during
the June 1985 flight of the U.S. Space Shuttle, a Soviet ground-based
laser "painted" the American spacecraft for approximately five minutes,
thus demonstrating sophisticated targeting and tracking capabilities.
During 1984, the Soviet space budget was over $22 billion and had
been growing at a rate of 15% per year. Though the Soviet laser weapons
program was placed under strictest secrecy classification in 1977, nu-
merous unconcealable features were made known since then. It is known
to employ over 10,000 scientists in 12 major research facilities and at
least six testing and development facilities. From 1983 onward, the Soviet
space-laser weapons program conducted a number of spectacular exper-
iments in outer space which were deliberately underplayed by Western
government and news agencies. The Salyut 7 space station is known to
have repeatedly conducted laser experiments, including one with electron
beams conducted by cosmonauts Dzhannibekov and Savitskaya.
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The existence of the Soviet program for space-laser defense is not
exactly a secret. In fact, the existence of the Soviet beam-weapon program
has even been officially admitted by then Foreign Minister Andrei Gro-
myko who, in answering a direct question from Italian Foreign Minister
Andreotti, acknowledged that the Russians are indeed building beam
weapons. Andreotti's response was to propose that the matter be taken
up at the summer 1985 international scientific discussions held at Erice,
in Sicily. Gromyko's admission, which was widely reported in the Italian
press, has caused no change whatsoever in official Soviet propaganda,
which continues to refuse to admit the Soviet exertions going on in this
field.
What is secret are merely the various detailed features of the Soviet
program and its proximity to a strategically significant "breakout." Marshal
Sokolov, for example, the new Soviet Defense Minister after Ustinov's
death, reported in one of his first public statements in May 1985: "The
U.S.S.R. is conducting scientific research in space, including for military
application" (emphasis added). This statement was made in a lengthy
interview to TASS which was published in the May 5, 1985 issue of the
military daily Krasnaya Zvezda.
On an earlier occasion, Marshal of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Kol-
dunov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Defense Troops, boasted
that his troops "are equipped with cruel weapons and the most modem
combat technologies capable of tracking and destroying present as well
as future weapons of air attack in all heights, day and night, in any
weather."
To estimate just how advanced the Soviets are on their way to a
"breakout" from the 1972 ABM Treaty, we shall take into account two
sets of considerations: First, what are their known technological break-
throughs, and second, what are the military/doctrinal imperatives which
propel them to acquire Ballistic Missile Defenses based on "new physical
principles."
On the first: The exact state of progress by the Soviet researchers is
not available in the open literature in either this country or the Soviet
Union, but the following facts are known:
1) The Soviet Union has developed a land-based laser capable of
"blinding" U.S. surveillance satellites. Using an intense beam of visible
light, the Soviet weapon can overload the sensitive cameras in the spy
satellites, and, in some cases, can destroy the delicate optics. This weapon
has been available for at least the last six years.
2) The Soviet Union has developed a land-based high-powered laser
capable of destroying pilotless, subsonic aircraft. These experiments have
been observed by Western reconnaissance for several years.
3) The Soviet Union has now available extremely high-energy power
sources ideally suited for beam weapons use. As the Department of Defense
has put it, "They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic
(MHD) generator which produces 15 megawatts of short term electric
power-a device that has no counterpart in the West."
4) The Soviet Union has developed a high-energy microwave tech-
nology that has been used for ionospheric modification. An exotic weapon
using beam technology, this microwave generator would enable the Soviet
Union to "tailor" the upper atmosphere so as to block radio transmissions,
destroy radar reception, and conduct electronic warfare on a global scale.
5) The Soviet Union has tested a plasma beam weapon that generates
discrete plasma "bullets" capable of long-distance travel. Similar to ball
lightning, these plasmoids carry large energies in an electromagnetic field-
plasma complex sufficient to destroy a ballistic missile.
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6) The Soviet Union has tested a high-energy iodine laser, which has
successfully downed a ballistic missile. This experiment was a test of a
strategic beam weapon, not intended for battlefield use as an anti-tank
or anti-aircraft weapon, but as a ballistic missile defense system.
Soviet doctrine committed to beam weapons
On the second consideration, the military/doctrinal reasons for which
the Soviets have always been committed to development of high-energy
laser strategic missile defense, the following should be reiterated:
The seminal 1962 book by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, titled Military
Strategy and employed as the basic textbook for the selection, formation
and training of Marshal Ogarkov's current generation of Soviet military
leaders, made unmistakably clear the role assigned to strategic defense
by the Soviet High Command. Following are some of the most important
pronouncements of the Sokolovskii book's 1962 and 1963 editions (now
withdrawn from circulation):
An anti-missile defense system for the country should obviously
consist in the following: long-range detection of missiles using pow-
erful radar [ground and airborne] or other automatic technical equip-
ment [on artificial earth satellites] to assure the detection of missiles
during the boost phase [at the moment of lift-off or while the engines
are operating]; working out the coordinates of the flight trajectory
of the missiles; timely warning, and application of active measures;
anti-missile batteries; jamming devices to assure deflection of the
missile from its intended target and, possibly, to blow it up along
its trajectory.
Possibilities are being studied [back in 1962!-ed.] for the use,
against rockets, of a stream of high-speed neutrons as small deto-
nators for the nuclear charge of the rocket, and the use of electro-
magnetic energy to destroy the rocket charge in the descent phase
of the trajectory or to deflect it from its target. Various radiation,
anti-gravity and anti-matter systems, plasma ball lightning etc., are
also being studied as a means of destroying rockets. Special attention
is devoted to lasers; it is considered that in the future, any missile
and satellite can be destroyed with powerful lasers. All this work
which is being conducted in other countries deserves great attention.
The creation of a reliable system of antispace defense became an
important task in modem conditions... .
Ballistic missiles employed en masse are still [i.e., 1962-ed.]
practically invulnerable to existing means of PVO and their em-
ployment is almost independent of weather conditions. Only as
special instruments of PRO are developed will it be possible to
combat the massive use of missiles in the air... .
On March 31, 1967 (a few weeks after President Lyndon Johnson went
public with Robert S. McNamara's project to conclude an ABM treaty
with the U.S.S.R.), General Major N. Zavyalov reiterated, in an article
published in the military daily Krasnaya Zvezda:
Soviet military doctrine does not leave out of account the pos-
sibilities of defense. . . . In this, it should be stressed that we rec-
ognize not passive, but active defense, built on a new technical
foundation, brought to life by the appearance of modem means of
conducting war; a defense directed above all against the enemy's
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EIR Special Report/Global Showdown
nuclear means of attack. Such a defense takes on extraordinarily
important state, strategic significance.
In contrast to Moscow's present pious denunciations of President Rea-
gan's Strategic Defense Initiative, the Russian military command has
always been outspoken in preserving its prerogative of developing strategic
defense systems. Major General N. A. Talenskii, theoretician of the
Soviet General Staff, is such a representative spokesman:
Anti-missile systems are purely defensive and not designed for
attack. It is quite illogical to demand abstention from creating such
weapons in the face of vast stockpiles of highly powerful means of
attack on the other side. Only the side which intends to use its
means of attack for aggressive purposes can wish to slow down the
creation and improvement of anti-missile defense systems. . . . The
creation of an effective anti-missile system enables the state to make
its defenses dependent chiefly on its own possibilities, and not only
on mutual deterrence, that is, on the good will of the other side.
And since the peace-loving states are concerned with maximum
deterrence, in its full and direct sense, it would be illogical to be
suspicious of such a state when it creates an anti-missile defense
system, on the grounds that it wants to make it easier for itself to
resort to aggression with impunity.
Some say the construction of anti-missile defense systems may
accelerate the arms race. . . . Such a development is not at all ruled
out. . . . In any case, there is this question: What is more preferable
for security as a result of the arms race, a harmonious combination
of active means of deterrence and defense systems, or the means of
attack alone? (N. A. Talenskii, "Anti-Missile Systems and Disar-
mament," written before 1972 and printed in English in The Future
of Soviet Military Power, ed. L. Whetten. New York; Crane, Russak
and Co, 1976)
But did such Soviet statements on the feasibility, nay desirability, of
ballistic missile defense cease after the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty?
No, they did not. Soviet military writers still write quite frankly about
warfighting and war-winning, including "defense of the homeland."
The crucial element was "new technologies." In this realm, excluded
from specific limitations by the ABM Treaty, the Soviets saw the future.
In 1974, two years after the ABM Treaty was signed, the Mir (Peace)
Publishing House in Moscow issued in English a pamphlet by N. Sobolev,
entitled "Lasers and Their Prospects." In an ample chapter on military
applications, from which the drawing in this section is taken, Sobolev
explained rudiments of ground-based beam-weapon defense against nu-
clear missiles:
To destroy an enemy missile, not to let it reach the target, it is
sufficient to put its control system out of action. This can be done
by burning through the missile shell or rudders by a laser beam.
This will cause vibrations in the missile and result in its complete
destruction.
Figure 81 shows a block diagram of an anti-missile system based
on the use of lasers. Such a system must have a receiving unit for
processing the signals incoming from the early warning and target
tracking radar stations. These signals contain information on the
coordinates of the approaching missile. The tracking station must
aim at the target an optical radar in which a laser serves only for
determining the distance to the missile.
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Such an optical radar can furnish very precise data on the co-
ordinates of the target, and these data are used to actuate another
system employing a high-power laser, designed for destroying the
target. The optical radar will focus and aim the powerful laser beam
during the period of time required for a hole to be burned through
the missile....
Another possible anti-missile laser defense system is a project of
an orbital space station equipped . . . as well with lasers....
This text leaves no doubt as to the purpose of the phased-array, battle-
management radar now under construction in the locality of Krasnoyarsk,
Siberia-it is designed for use as part of a beam weapon defense system
against United States ICBMs.
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4.3 Passive Defense: Survival After War
The principal tasks of civil defense are to ensure the required con-
ditions for normal activity of all governmental control agencies
during the course of the war and the effective functioning of the
national economy. . . . All the civil-defense measures are so inter-
twined, that they cannot be separated from the overall problems of
the organization or the control of the nation and its economy.
-Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, Military Strategy
In the summer of 1972, when the ink was scarcely dry on the SALT
I and ABM treaties, the Chief of Rear Services and the Chief of Civil
Defense in the Soviet Union each became a deputy minister of defense.
The new occupants of those posts, appointed at that time, were Army
General (now Marshal) Semyon Kurkotkin and Army General Aleksandr
Altunin, respectively. These two officers hold the same jobs today.
Both these areas of responsibility are essential to the Soviet war plan.
War is won, the Soviets hold, not just by the clash of arms and taking
of territory, but by the ability of the victorious side to survive as a
functioning society after the war. The Soviet civil defense program,
tightly integrated with the economy as Sokolovskii prescribes, is the
starkest testimony to the Soviet intention to accomplish this.
Civil defense considerations figure in economic planning, not just
training and shelter-building. This is reflected in the dispersion of industry
outside of large cities, and the development of entire regions, such as
Siberia. (On the development of Siberia to be economically self-sufficient,
see Chapter 4.4.) The late Marshal Andrei Grechko called for dispersion
of industry, in order to make it "less vulnerable" during nuclear war.
Selective hardening of industrial plants in the Soviet Union has been
reported, but is difficult to detail, because many of the facilities most
probably affected are off limits to foreigners.
Soviet civil defense forces are organized as the Troops of Civil Defense,
which are trained at the Moscow Higher Command School of Road and
Engineer Troops. Formerly the Moscow Military School of Civil Defense,
this institution was renamed in 1975-a year in which the Soviet high
command moved to impose secrecy on several vital areas of its war
planning, including General Shavrov's new strategy textbook, and aspects
of civil defense.
Besides the Troops of Civil Defense, Altunin oversees a huge network
of civil defense chiefs of staff, assigned to regional and municipal juris-
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dictions of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, every factory or other economic
enterprise has people assigned to the organization of civil defense prep-
arations and practice.
The training of the population is serious, and begins early. The in-
troduction to a 1983 teacher's manual for elementary schools, entitled
Civil Defense, states:
Study in the general education school is the basic preparation of
pupils for defense against weapons of mass destruction. It helps the
military-patriotic education and moral-psychological preparation of
the younger generation.
The handbook outlines the course of training for schoolchildren at
each grade level, beginning with first grade. Older students, according
to a military instructor at a high school in Lithuania interviewed on the
radio, are supposed to learn "the destructive properties of nuclear, chem-
ical and bacteriological weapons of the armies of foreign states, means
of protection against them; civil defense signals; use of means of individual
and collective protection; . . . use of radiation and chemical detection
equipment," and so forth.
By their early teens, Soviet children will not only continue to get civil
defense and military training in school, but may join the DOSAAF, the
Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy.
This mass organization, which has over 100 million members, is chaired
by a high-ranking military officer. Since 1981, he has been Fleet Admiral
Georgii M. Yegorov, formerly the Commander of the Northern Fleet
and First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Navy. His predecessor, from
1972 to 1981, was Marshal of Aviation A. 1. Pokryshkin, who had been
Deputy CINC of the Soviet air defense forces (PVO Strany). Through
DOSAAF-organized clubs and sports events, Soviet youth learn diverse
military schools. The magazine published by DOSAAF, Military Knowl-
edge, is also the main journal of civil defense.
Soviet print and broadcast media continuously propagandize the value
of civil defense, in coordination with the organization of practices in
factories, schools and residential areas. The Turkmenistan party daily,
Turkmenskaya Iskra, to take a typical example, wrote on March 19, 1985:
[Civil defense] will preserve lives, ensure the steady operation of
governmental bodies and protect agricultural productions from de-
struction, making it possible to hold out in a nuclear missile war.
It is therefore important that all persons responsible for this should
unswervingly implement engineering-technical measures of civil de-
fense in building and resconstructing national economic installa-
tions. The local authorities and managers of economic and public
organizations must display more initiative in tackling these important
tasks.
Our scientific research and.design institutions have created reliable
plans for shelters to protect people from the effect of the destructive
power of nuclear weapons. The preparation of protective structures
is a matter of great state importance.
In cities, all kinds of underground structures, including the subway
system, movie theaters, and garages, are designed to double as bomb
shelters. An April 1983 radio report on civil defense training at the
Kuibyshev Civil Engineering Institute in Moscow described the shelters,
which are to "protect the country's population from the modem methods
of inflicting defeat upon one's opponent," as "designed to protect people
from shock wave, light radiation, hard radiation and radioactive con-
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tamination at the time of a nuclear explosion, . . . from noxious sub-
stances and bacterial weapons, as well as from the high temperature of
harmful gases." (Translation by BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts.)
The location of supershelters for the top classes of the Soviet No-
menklatura is top secret.
In the mid-1970s, Soviet writings on civil defense began to emphasize
the role of shelters for nuclear war survival, in addition to the more
widely propagandized method of mass evacuation into the countryside;
evacuation, obviously, takes more lead time.
While all this is going on, so is massive Soviet disinformation about
its policy on civil defense. In December 1983, Soviet plasma scientist
Yevgenii Velikhov and three other Soviet scientists participated in a
forum on the nuclear freeze, convened by U. S. Senators Edward Kennedy
and Mark Hatfield. "Both the Soviet and American scientists," reported
the New York Times, "said civil defense measures and technology that
envisioned countering nuclear missiles with laser weapons could not
conceivably halt the destruction of a nuclear war and that entertaining
such ideas could be dangerously destabilizing."
The attempt by the Reagan administration to relaunch a national civil
defense program, with a seven-year, $4.2 billion plan, touched off a storm
of controversy in 1982. (Federal government spending on civil defense
had come down to the level of $115 million per year, at the end of the
Carter administration.) Ironically, the Reagan plan-a Crisis Relocation
Plan-was drawn up on the basis of T.K. Jones's studies of Soviet civil
defense; it called for mass evacuation of the population from American
cities into the interior, and presumed some days in which to accomplish
this. The Crisis Relocation Plan gained no ground. By March 1985,
Federal Emergency Management Agency officials described it as defunct.
The Reagan administration has proposed to cut civil defense from $181
million in FY1985, to $119 million.
In 1982, Radio Moscow's English-language overseas service was quick
to broadcast an analysis of the U.S. civil defense scheme as "paranoid
delusion." Meanwhile, the Soviets had supplemented their long-standing
evacuation plans with increased construction of shelters and continued
build-up of independent economic zones all over the U.S.S.R.
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LO Mod
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f
. .. MIA.
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4.4 The Build-Up of the Soviet
War Economy
Remember, comrades: Our prewar generation was faced with the
task of having to accomplish in just a few decades what it took other
countries 100 years to do, because our country was in a critical
situation. Even then, we had the sense that the threat to our socialist
country was the top priority. We didn't manage to get everything
done that time, but we basically succeeded, and that was the foun-
dation of the victory of '45. Well, today we again have a long road
to travel, but we have to do it in a short time.
-Mikhail Gorbachov, speaking to members of the Communist
Party organization in Leningrad, May 17, 1985
On March 13, 1985, one day after Mikhail Gorbachov was named
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Radio
Moscow proclaimed that the policy goal under the new leader would be
to "economically surpass the United States." In the years immediately
ahead, announced Radio Moscow, the Soviet Union will become the No.
I economic power in the world.
Gorbachov is the man on whom Marshal Ogarkov and the rest of the
Soviet High Command are counting, to provide what they up to now
have lacked, but urgently require, in order to be fully prepared for war:
a functioning and efficient economy.
In the period since the military build-up for global supremacy was
launched, after the Soviet Union's 1972 victory in crippling the U.S.A.
through SALT I and the ABM Treaty, the Soviet military leadership
became acutely, increasingly aware, that the Soviet economy-especially
since that same early 1970s period-has continually lagged behind the
pace of the war build-up. Marshal Ogarkov and his colleagues found
themselves near a point, at which the U.S.S.R. "militarily" would be
ready to wage war, but would not have the economic base to make the
final "surge" required to ensure superiority. This discrepancy between
military needs and actual performance in the economy was the subject
of the stinging attacks leveled against the Brezhnev leadership by Marshal
Ogarkov and the Russian military leadership in the 1970s and early 1980s.
In early June, with great fanfare, the Soviet Defense Ministry published
Marshal Ogarkov's latest book, History Teaches Vigilance. Here again,
Ogarkov emphasizes that the U.S.S.R. can only win a war by "strength-
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ening its economic and military potentials and those of its allies." The
big difference between the new book and Ogarkov's previous writings,
however, is that it appears when the Kremlin is occupied by a General
Secretary who has both the inclination and, by all indications, the
ruthlessness, to address the problems of the Soviet economy to the sat-
isfaction of the military High Command.
Nowhere has Gorbachov more shown his dedication to the goals stated
by Ogarkov, than in his June 11 speech at a specially convened Central
Committee conference in Moscow, on the theme of introducing scientific
and technological progress into the Soviet economy. Gorbachov insisted
that the economy will be radically restructured. Together with the release
of Ogarkov's book, this speech signaled that the Soviet Union is entering
the decisive phase of its transition to an all-out war economy.
This June 11 speech by Gorbachov was one of the most extraordinary
Soviet policy documents ever, on a par with such historic speeches as
Stalin's famous March 1939 "Chestnuts Out of the Fire" speech before
the 18th Party Congress, which signaled the upcoming Hitler-Stalin Pact.
He began by stressing the urgency of modernizing and restructuring the
economy, in view of the military-strategic situation:
The decision of the Central Committee's Politburo to hold this
meeting in advance of the 27th CPSU Congress is motivated by
the need to take urgent measures in [accelerating the country's socio-
economic development on the basis of scientific-technical progress].
In putting forward the task of accelerating socio-economic de-
velopment, the Central Committee has in mind not just an increase
of economic growth rates. What is at issue, is a new quality of our
development, rapid progress in the strategically important directions,
a structural rebuilding of production, a transition to intensive meth-
ods and effective forms of management, and a more comprehensive
solution to social problems.
Gorbachov declared that this recasting of the economy was necessitated
by the international strategic situation, the framework for domestic con-
siderations:
The need to accelerate socio-economic development is deter-
mined by our internal requirements. . . . In the early 1970s, certain
difficulties began to be felt in economic development. The main
reason is that we did not display in time, perseverance in reshaping
the structural policy, the forms and methods of management, the
very psychology of economic activity... .
At the same time, the need to accelerate socio-economic development
stems from external circumstances. We are forced to invest the nec-
essary funds for the country's defense.
The High Command's Five-Year Plan
Gorbachov proceeded to tell the audience of Central Committee members
and specialists, that the Five Year Plan draft for 1986-90, just submitted
by the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), was inadequate and would
be returned for improvement. Since Soviet economic policy is set in the
form of of the economic five-year plans, somebody serious about changing
the direction of the economy would move to overhaul the next plan.
Gorbachov said:
Now that the party is approaching its 27th congress, that the
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programmatic documents of the congress are being prepared, it is
important to realize that we cannot do without accelerating sci-
entific-technological progress. Therefore, all of these documents,
above all the basic guidelines for the country's economic and social
development for the 12th Five-Year Plan [1986-90] and up to the
year 2000 must contain new approaches to ensure a sharp turn
towards the intensification of the economy.
The Central Committee's Politburo recently discussed the draft
of the guidelines and has on the whole supported the target figures
and objectives outlined in it. Yet, serious criticism was expressed,
which necessitates that work on the draft be continued. The draft
does not yet include measures ensuring for a number of industries,
a transition to the rails of predominantly intensive growth and
balancing all indicators. Work on the draft must be continued, and
the target figures of increasing the effectiveness of production should
be viewed as minimum ones.
What followed was the announcement of the most sweeping structural
changes in the Soviet economy since the industrialization-collectivization
drive of the 1930s. Gorbachov proclaimed the following specific economic
guidelines-to maximize production increases during the next few years'
final "surge" phase of war production:
The main emphasis will be put on the technical reequipment of
plants, the saving of resources, and ensuring a drastic improvement
in product quality.
On a nationwide scale, the share of funds channeled into reconstruc-
tion, in the overall volume of capital investments, should be raised from
one-third to at least one-half within the next few years. . . . We
cannot do without new construction. But projects under construc-
tion should be given serious attention: some of them should be
speeded up, others suspended or mothballed. [This implies that,
through the combined effects of suspended projects and the growing
automation of large plants-the constantly stressed modernization
of existing industry, a large portion of the workforce is to be made
superfluous in its present location and available for redeployment
elsewhere. -ed. ]
Machine building is playing the main, key role in the scientific-
technological revolution. In the 12th Five-Year Plan period, its
growth rate should be raised by 50 to 100%.
Capital investments in machine building should be increased, through
partial redistribution, by 80-100%, and the volume of supply of
modem types of equipment sharply raised.
It is a task of special importance, to commence mass production of
new-generation equipment, capable of assuring a manyfold increase in
labor productivity and opening the way to automation of all states of
the production process. . . . Microelectronics, computer science and
instrument-making, and the entire information industry, act as ca-
talysts of technical progress. They need to be developed at an ac-
celerated pace.
The problems of production infrastructure have come to the fore at
the present state of economic development. The lag in transport,
communications, material and technical supplies and other branches
adds up to great losses. It is necessary to find additional opportunities
for solving this acute problem in the national economy.
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Top priority: R & D
If President Reagan were to lift from Gorbachov's speech the discussion
of research and development, and commit the United States to the same
levels of funding for R & D crash programs as the Soviet boss did,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the other big defense labs
would be opening champagne by the case, and the question of America's
survival would not be the perilous cliffhanger it now is.
Imagine a declaration by the President of the United States, that said
the following (mutatis mutandis):
The development of fundamental science should be given priority im-
portance. It is this science that acts as a generator of ideas, makes
possible breakthroughs into new fields, and shows ways of reaching
new levels of efficiency. Here we must enhance the role of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. We must sharply turn the Acad-
emy's institutes toward expanding research of a technical direct-
edness and enhance their role in and responsibility for creating the
theoretical bases of fundamentally new types of machinery and tech-
nology. . . . According to existing estimates, institutions of higher
education are capable of increasing the volume of research they
conduct, by 100-150%.
Reviewing the points outlined by Gorbachov, the reader should think
back to the principles of war economy, which Lagovskii formulated nearly
three decades ago and Lagovskii's student, Marshal Kurkotkin, reiterated
in 1984. Gorbachov has his mandate to whip the economy into shape.
Already on Dec. 10, 1984, three months before becoming party General
Secretary, Gorbachov charted his course, with the keynote report to the
All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference on the Improvement of
Developed Socialism and the Party's Ideological Work in Light of the
Decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee:
Profound transformations must be carried out in the economy and in
the entire system of social relations... .
Life sets us a task of tremendous political significance-that of
bringing the national economy up to a qualitatively new scientific,
technical, organizational, and economic level and of achieving de-
cisive progress in the intensification of social production and im-
provement of its efficiency.
The course of intensification is dictated by objective conditions
and by the entire course of the country's development. There is no
alternative. Only an intensive economy, developing on the latest scientific
and technical basis, can serve as a reliable material base for increasing
the working people's prosperity and ensure the strengthening of the coun-
try's positions in the international arena, enabling it to enter the new
millennium fittingly, as a great and prosperous power. . . . The process
of intensification of the economy must be given a truly nationwide
character and must have the same political resonance as the in-
dustrialization of the country once had.
Gorbachov's reference to the industrialization drive of the 1930s, par-
ticularly its "political resonance," must fill many people with dread-for
that was the period of brute force industrialization, of forced collectiv-
ization, of the mass deaths and oppressions of the Stalin regime. Evidently,
that is exactly the mood the space-age Stalinists of the Andropov Dynasty
wish to invoke. When L.A. Voronin, a former high official in the Ministry
of the Defense Industry who is now Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, re-
capitulated the policies laid out at the June 11 Central Committee meet-
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ing, in a July 4 feature in the military daily Krasnaya Zvezda, he concluded
on this grim note:
To overcome all the obstacles on the path of introducing the
achievements of science and technology into production, and thus
to accelerate the rate of socio-economic development, is no easy
task. But this task, without doubt, will be solved, just as, in their day,
the grandiose tasks of industrializing the country, collectivization of ag-
riculture, and the cultural revolution were carried out, under the leadership
of the party.
A February 1982 EIR study of the Soviet economy found, that the burden
The critical sectors of military spending-which, by uncovering the military component of
the economy hidden both by Soviet statistics and by Western "add-up"
estimating techniques, we estimated to be substantially higher than any-
body else would say-would be sustainable only if pre-1975 and higher
productivity growth rates were restored to the Soviet economy as a whole.
That is precisely what the Gorbachov program sets out to accomplish.
The team to do it comes, not surprisingly, from the military sector of
the economy. If the tightest bottleneck in the Soviet economy is the
inability to transfer technological breakthroughs from the defense sector
into the civilian sector, the Andropov/Gorbachov team is attacking it
by putting defense-sector leaders in charge of key civilian industries-
the point being, that the latter are themselves of crucial military sig-
nificance, when the entire country is being mobilized for war. This is
what Gorbachov means by the "strategically important directions."
They are: energy, infrastructure, and the machine-tool sector.
Already under Yuri Andropov, the promotion of the Andropov Dynasty
of party cadre-often those with an engineer's or industrial manager's
background, as we reported in Part 2-was coupled with the elevation
of experienced defense industry managers to government ministries that
are central to these decisive sectors. The following changes took place
in 1983:
April 9, 1983 Sergei A. Afanasyev became Minister of Heavy and
Transport Machine Building. Since 1965, Afanasyev
had been in charge of the Ministry of General Machine
Building, which builds strategic missiles and space
ships.
June 15 Boris V. Bal'mont, Minister of the Machine Tool and
Tool-Making Industry, was elevated from candidate
to full membership on the CPSU Central Committee
(at the June 1983 "Andropov" plenum, along with
the First Deputy Chief of Staff, Marshal Sergei Akh-
romeyev, and the Deputy Minister of Defense for Ar-
maments, Army General V.M. Shabanov). Prior to
1981, Bal'mont had worked in the defense industry
as First Deputy Minister of General Machine Building.
Aug. 1 A Soviet government decree named Yevgenii Kulov
chairman of a newly-created State Committee for the
Safe Conduct of Work in the Atomic Power Industry.
Until then, Kulov had worked in the Ministry of Me-
dium Machine Building, which is responsible for "mil-
itary applications of nuclear energy," i.e., warheads
and bombs.
This occurred soon after a far-reaching shake-up of
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the nuclear industry and related construction author-
ities. In July 1983, a government decree named Gen-
nadii Sharashin, a first deputy minister in the Ministry
of Power and Electrification, as responsible for the
nuclear power program. Deputy Prime Minister Ignatii
Novikov, an old Brezhnev ally and head of the na-
tional construction authority, was scapegoated for
problems at the Atommash nuclear-reactor production
complex, and forced into retirement; his deputy Gen-
nadii Fomin was fired from the State Committee for
Civil Construction and Architecture, for failures in
the planning, design and construction in Volgodonsk,
the city where Atommash is located.
Scientists called into
action
In 1984, during Konstantin Chernenko's dying days, the purge of
industry resumed:
Sept. 7, 1984 Yakov Ryabov became Deputy Prime Minister of the
U.S.S.R. Evidently for byzantine political reasons,
Ryabov has bounced around from Gosplan to the Cen-
tral Committee industry departments to the State
Committee for Foreign Economic Ties (which handles
arms exports, among other things); he has always been
involved with the defense sector. Like Nikolai Ryzh-
kov, the new Politburo member and chief of the CC
Economics Department, Ryabov formerly directed the
huge Uralmash machine tool plant in Sverdlovsk.
Under Gorbachov, in 1985, the purge resumed. Again, the key sectors
are affected:
March 23, 1985 Pyotr Neporozhnyi retired as Minister of Power and
Electrification after 23 years, at the age of 74. His
successor is A.I. Maiorets, the Minister of the Elec-
trical Equipment Industry. Maiorets' deputy Gennadii
Voronovskii, originally from the Elektrosila power
equipment plant in Leningrad, succeeded him.
May 8 Vladimir Brezhnev, 53, replaced 76-year-old Ivan
Sosnov as Minister of Transport Construction, which
ministry is responsible for construction of railroads,
bridges, tunnels and subways in ports, national high-
ways, and airfields.
On June 10, the eve of the Central Committee meeting on science and
technology, the state daily Izvestia carried an interview with Anatolii P.
Aleksandrov, President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. The 82-
year-old physicist, dean of Soviet science, outlined a perspective for
tightest coordination between the scientists of the Academy, and the
leadership of industry. The need for this, he said, was defined by the
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative:
These steps by the U. S. demand that we not only strengthen our
defenses, but also move to raise the efficiency of our national econ-
omy in all directions as fast as possible and independently from the
West.
At the Central Committee meeting, Aleksandrov elaborated the ap-
proach he is calling for. The Academy president, according to Pravda:
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stressed the great significance of basic scientific research, for the
solution of national economic tasks and the modernization of im-
portant technologies. Expenditures on basic science, which is the
source of revolutionary shifts in technology, pay for themselves many
times over. And it is difficult to agree with some of those who have
spoken, who underrate the role of basic science for applied goals.
In the 1930s, I.V. Kurchatov, with his first work on nuclear energy
in full swing, was criticized at a meeting of the Academy of Sciences,
for working on a problem "having no relation . . . to practice...."
Further, the president of the academy discussed problems of the
quality and reliability of equipment and machinery produced... .
It is necessary to monitor all bottlenecks, to pool the efforts of science
and producers. This is a central task. And only in this way, will it be
possible really to overcome the shortcomings. The scientist dealt
with the need for a unified economic and scientific and technological
policy, in the decisive areas of scientific and technological progress.
He proposed a sharper concentration of forces in the area of elec-
tronics, computer technology and the information industry as a
whole.
Representatives of the defense industry and leading lights from the
Andropov Dynasty in the communist party leadership spoke at the session.
L.A. Voronin, the Gosplan official who hails from the defense industry,
reported that the new Gosplan draft will devote "special attention .. .
to the selection of those directions of scientific and technological progress,
which give the greatest effect in the framework of the entire national
economy. . . . In the long term, the increase in efficiency of production
is connected with the creation and widespread utilization of fundamen-
tally new technologies-laser, plasma, radiation, membrane, biotech-
nical and others."
Another speaker was A.G. Aganbegyan, Director of the Institute of
the Economy and Organization of Industrial Production-the institute
at the Novosibirsk-based Siberian Division of the Academy, where during
Andropov's tenure, economists circulated a controversial call for the
overhaul of planning and elimination of the middle layer of the bureauc.
racy. The significance of the prominence of the Siberian economists and
scientists is that Novosibirsk, headquarters of the Siberian Division es-
tablished in 1957, has been a command center for Soviet scientific pro-
grams central to the defense build-up, done on a "crash program" basis
(including major aspects of the Soviet directed-energy beam program).
State Committee for Science and Technology Chairman G.A. Mar-
chuk, former head of the Novosibirsk complex, took the floor to say that,
"The main condition for this linkage is through-and-through planning,
from the scientific research work to the broadscale assimilation of ad-
vanced technology and serial production of new technology."
Vitalii Vorotnikov, prime minister of the Russian Republic, hailed
"the fruitful activity of the Siberian Division of the U.S.S.R. Academy
of Sciences." In order that the Soviet Union may occupy "the most
forward scientific and technological positions in the world," declared
Vorotnikov, "fundamental shifts in the economy, on the basis of the modern
achievements of science and technology, are an objective necessity. " Politburo
member Vorotnikov also made a point of greatest importance for the
Soviet attempt to implement the Plan B of economic mobilization, dis-
cussed in this report; he called for a massive campaign, addressed to the
population:
Here, it is important to create an atmosphere of general interest
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in the rapid development of science and technology. For this pur-
pose, it is necessary to activate the work of the mass media and
propaganda in a significant way and to effect a cardinal turn from
passive edification, to the introduction of effective forms of giving the
entire population access to contemporary knowledge.
The activity of Yevgenii P. Velikhov, Vice President of the U.S.S.R.
Velikhov s prod ects Academy of Sciences, gives a preliminary image of what the Gorbachov
war-economy mobilization is supposed to accomplish. Indeed, judging
by Gorbachov's June 11 speech, the role of Velikhov and of other top
scientists, will rise; Gorbachov demanded a transformation of the very
nature of Gosplan, from a year-by-year bureaucratic planning agency, to
a policy-making powerhouse, run by scientists:
[We have to] create an integrated management and control system
of the economy. It is necessary to start from the upper echelons.
We will have to implement in practice, Lenin's idea of turning the
State Planning Committee into a scientific-economic body em-
ploying prominent scientists and leading specialists.
Velikhov, otherwise known for his contributions to the Soviet beam
weapon program and his propagandizing abroad, against the West's de-
veloping such defensive technologies, has initiated and led several large-
scale pilot projects on science and the economy, in recent years. He
outlined their main principles, in his own presentation to the Central
Committee science and technology meeting:
All Soviet society, including scientists, has been presented with
a broad and realistic program for the improvement of the technical
base of our national economy, a program for the real transformation
of science into a powerful productive force in society. . . . Only on
the basis of such a decisive transformation, is it possible to solve
the social and economic tasks facing the country and to sharply raise
the efficiency of our national economy and the productivity of social
labor... .
In science, too, decisive qualitative changes should occur, so that its
structure and organization may correspond to the new tasks... .
For today, we are talking precisely about revolutionary transfor-
mations and fundamentally new inventions, and therefore special
significance is given to the development of basic science and its
direct and immediate connection with production and education.
There must also be a new understanding by each researcher, of the
responsible nature of the historical moment and of his own role in this
nationwide campaign. . . . A very important problem in the efficiency
of the utilization of the potential of Soviet science is the most rapid,
that is speedy, completion of the whole cycle-from draft to pro-
duction. And therefore, we fully support the timely and fundamental
solution of this problem, which was proposed in [Gorbachov's] re-
port-the creation of interagency centers. The Academy of Sciences
is prepared to serve as the catalyst for organizing them... .
There is no greater happiness for the scientist . . . than to see
his ideas brought to life in real undertakings and products, which
are of use to the people. We understand the historical importance
of the moment and we will not let anybody down.
The idea of using big projects as the sparkplug for the introduction of
new technologies, bringing with them increases in productivity, is not
new in Soviet economic debates. In August 1980, economist V. Lebedev
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proposed to set up large projects, which would pioneer advanced industrial
technologies and serve as beacons to guide enterprises all around the
U.S.S.R.-a means for "centralized leadership of scientific and technical
progress and the whole economy." A year later, economists N.P. Fe-
dorenko and D.S. Lvov argued the case that only a fundamental change
in investment policy could open the bottleneck behind which innovations
in industrial technology get stopped up; instead of letting 70% of capital
investments go to rebuilding facilities at their original, obsolete tech-
nological level, they said, the bulk of new investments should serve as
"vehicles for new scientific and technological innovations."
"The number of technological innovations introduced in 1981 was 4%
smaller than in 1980, and the quantity of new models of machines,
equipment, apparatus, and instruments shrank by one-fifth during the
past decade," wrote Academician P. Bunich in March 1983, "And the
old machinery quite happily lives and gets along, although it is obsolete.
The annual rates of writing it off are so low, that it takes more than a
decade for complete turnover." The only solution, this economist wrote,
was the establishment and prioritization of nation-wide programs.
One of those programs, already in existence and administered by the
Academy of Sciences, was the program for "Creation and Production of
Laser Equipment and Technology for the National Economy," headed
by Academician Velikhov.
In 1977, a team of scientists from the Academy of Sciences and the
Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy began to build a beam technologies
laboratory, using the resources of Moscow's Likhachov auto plant (known
as ZIL), one of the very largest industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union.
They would work on the construction of laser, electron-beam and plasma
devices for commercial applications, thus benefiting the Likhachov firm
directly, while at the same time, expanding the resources of the beam-
technology research program far beyond anything done previously. Ve-
likhov was put in charge of the program, whose national significance is
denoted by the ZIL laboratory's classification as "a basic laboratory of the
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R."
Explaining his program in the Novosibirsk economics journal, EKO,
Velikhov said:
When you are dealing with a totally new technology, it is vital
to proceed as quickly as possible from the idea to its implementa-
tion. . . . There have been a great number of different opinions by
prominent specialists on the future of the laser. Some even said that
there was no need for the laser in the shops. It was precisely at that
point, that the engineers of the Likhachov auto plant foresaw an
important task, associated with problems of welding, which could
be solved with the help of lasers. We subsequently, together with
the plant specialists, built a laser device in two years and introduced
a new system of automation. . . . The firm did not take a narrow
consumer approach to the problem. They did not merely consider
the short-term results, but looked also at the long-term perspectives
of laser technology. We have now built a special laser lab, whose
work is being carried out on the basis of the full range of engineering
services of the company.
Welding, of course, is a process of critical importance not only for
industrial performance, but for any number of defense technologies. When
reports of Soviet breakthroughs in directed-energy beam development
first broke into Western industrial and defense publications in 1977, the
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Crash mobilization
experiments in question were powered by a technology called pulsed
magnetohydrodynamics (MHD), by which a burst of electrical energy con-
taining the energy equivalent of millions of pounds of TNT is released
in a fraction of a second. The Soviets were reported to be practicing
pulsed magnetohydrodynamics inside a huge steel chamber with three-
meter thick walls. The chamber could be manufactured, and stay in one
piece, thanks to the development of explosive flux welding, which was
pioneered at the Institute for Hydrodynamics in Novosibirsk, by the first
director of the Siberian Division, Academician Mikhail Lavrentyev; this
process was first developed to solve problems in maintaining, by con-
ventional welding techniques, the rail system in frigid Siberia.
Plasma physicist Velikhov has been involved in such matters for many
years, as a leader of Soviet work on MHD.
By the spring of 1983, Velikhov would report, in the Central Com-
mittee weekly Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, that the laser program was under
an interagency scientific and technological council run by the Academy
and the State Committee for Science and Technology, and that around
the "basic laboratories," located at ZIL, there were grouped a Scientific
Research Center for Technical Lasers (under the Academy), a Scientific
Training Center for Laser Technology (at the Bauman higher Technical
School), and laboratories at factories in Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, and
elsewhere.
More recently, as reported at an Academy of Sciences meeting in
November 1984, by corresponding member I.M. Makarov, Velikhov has
designed a national program for the development of computer technology
up to the year 2000. This he did in his capacity as Academy Vice-
President for the Applied Physical and Mathematical Sciences, and aca-
demician secretary of the Academy's Information Science, Computer
Technology, and Automation Department. In February 1985, Prime
Minister Nikolai Tikhonov stated that such a program had been approved
by the Politburo.
The national computer program is important for the rapid development
of the machine tool sector. Bal'mont, the former missile-builder who is
Minister of the Machine-Tool and Tool-Building Industry, has vigorously
pushed the production of computerized numerically-controlled machine
tools, including large "flexible production systems," that are program-
mable to produce several of the components a given factory needs to
turn out. In the last three years or so, the words "industrial robot" and
"micro-electronics" have appeared in the Soviet and East German media
as many times as "peace movement" and far more often than "proletarian
internationalism." The Soviet economic bloc, Comecon, has agreed on
the goal of placing 200,000 industrial robots in operation by 1990. In
Chelyabnisk, the southern Urals industrial city whose tractor plant earned
the name of "Tankograd" during World War II, the plan for 1986-90 is
to replace one-third of all jobs by means of "the introduction of flexible,
automated production systems, robotized assembly lines, manufacturing
centers and machine tools." This rate of automation is extremely im-
portant to the Soviets, in view of the deep trough in new members of
the labor force, occurring in the 1980s.
What has the Andropov Dynasty accomplished in the economy, so far?
We can point to several crucial areas, which involve both the drive to
generalize high-technology achievements and thus raise productivity
throughout the economy, and certain short-term measures of direct mil-
itary significance.
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Nuclear power
Only one year ago, Soviet nuclear plant construction was at a record
low. In two and a half years, only three plants had been completed
instead of a planned number of ten.
After the managerial shakeup of summer 1983 and a further, emergency
meeting on the problem by the Soviet leadership, in late summer 1984,
the results have begun to show. Between July 1, 1984 and June 30, 1985,
eight big plants (with a total capacity of 8,000 MWe) were commissioned.
According to Gennadii Sharashin, the Deputy Minister for Power and
Electrification, "The principal line of development in the future is to be
the construction of stations based on fast-neutron reactors [breeder re-
actors] of 800 to 1,600 MW, and this will mark an important stage in
the long-term creation of the fuel base for nuclear engineering."
The military daily Krasnaya Zvezda, on June 9, 1985, publicized the
military's direct involvement in the nuclear program. The paper printed
an unusual report on an "exchange program" between Atommash, the
world's only facility for the serial production of atomic reactors, and the
nuclear submarines of the Pacific Fleet. The point was, that training in
this branch of the economy serves as training for military service, and
vice versa.
A heightened pace of nuclear plant construction is in evidence through-
out the Soviet bloc. By 1990 or 1992, even Poland, which today has no
nuclear power plants, will have its first such capacity, the result of a
U.S.S.R.-Polish agreement signed in April 1983. Czechoslovakia will
quadruple its nuclear power capacity from a current 1,320 MW, to 5,280
MW by 1990. East Germany will triple its capacity, from a current 1,760
MW, to 5,520 MW. Hungary will double its nuclear power capacity from
a current 880 MW to 1, 760 MW. Bulgaria will add 2,000 MW of nuclear
power capacity.
Seen in percentage terms of national power supply, the increases are
also significant. Czechoslovakia will jump from a current 10% of its energy
capacity being nuclear, to 34% by 1990. In Hungary, it will double to
25% of national energy capacity, and in Bulgaria, jump from a current
26%, to 40% of the nation's energy capacity. In East Germany, it will
go up from a current 12% of energy capacity, to over 30% by 1990.
Eastern Europe now has 6,720 MW of nuclear energy capacity. By
1990, if plans are met, it will have 18,320 MW, nearly a three-fold
increase. The breakdown is as follows:
East Germany
1,760 MW
5,520 MW
Czechoslovakia
1,320 MW
5,280 MW
Bulgaria
2,760 MW
4,760 MW
Hungary
880 MW
1,760 MW
Romania
0 MW
1,000 MW
Poland
0 MW
0 MW
The quicker tempo in Eastern Europe, compared to the U.S.S.R., is
dictated by Soviet strategic planning, which insists on drastic reductions
of Eastern European use of Soviet-supplied fossil fuels (oil and coal)
wherever possible. This not only frees Soviet supplies for Western export
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markets and Soviet internal consumption, but also eases strains on the
Soviet transportation system.
Transport
In 1977, when Nikolai Ogarkov became Chief of the Soviet General
Staff, extensive studies were made concerning Soviet logistical require-
ments for a war in the European Theater, and also for a global war with
a European Theater division. Central to the study was the question of
remedying the deficiencies in both the Soviet and East European rail and
road systems.
The military responsibility for the task of ensuring that the Soviet
Union's transportation system can handle both the current war build-up
and actual wartime requirements, lies with Marshal Semyon Kurkotkin,
the Chief of the Rear Services since 1972. During Yuri Andropov's time
in office, a Politburo member, as well, was designated to oversee this
area; it was Andropov's protege and fellow KGB pro, the Muslim-born
Azerbaijani, Geidar Aliyev. The assignment of this portfolio to Aliyev,
who otherwise has large responsibilities with respect to Soviet operations
in the Middle East, reflected a decision at the highest levels in the
Kremlin, that the U.S.S.R.'s underdeveloped, inefficient and sometimes
decrepit transportation system was a major obstacle to the war mobili-
zation. There was also some dawning understanding, expressed in the
writings of some Soviet economists, of the role of infrastructure (or its
lack) in the economy-that millions of rubles invested in the machine-
building sector will come to naught, if the economy remains infrastruc-
ture-poor, like a body without a circulatory system.
Soon after Kurkotkin was named to run the Rear Services, Moscow
decided to construct the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway, a 3,100
km railroad from east of Lake Baikal to the Soviet Pacific coast, parallel
to, and to the north of, the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR). Until the
completion of the BAM in late 1984, the TSR was the only rail line
linking Russia with the Soviet Far East. Militarily viewed, the TSR is
far too exposed to instant interdiction in wartime, as it hugs the Soviet-
Chinese border for most of its length.
The BAM, given its distance north of the border, is more secure and
adds enormously to the Soviet military-logistical capability in the Soviet
Far East. It provides freight-handling capacity for the region far in excess
of any imaginable tonnage requirements for current civilian or military
purposes. This vast capacity, now a surplus of sorts, corresponds to what
tonnage requirements would be in the aftermath of a general war, when
the Soviet Union would be engaged in the mass resettlement of population
and equipment from devastated areas to "clean," or non-contaminated
territories.
The first great transportation-infrastructure project after the 1972 SALT
and ABM Treaty watershed, the BAM marked the onset of total war
planning by the Soviet Union. The decision to build it was in 1974,
construction began in early 1975, and the route was completedly tracked
by late 1984. In 1984, Aliyev made an inspection tour of the BAM,
accompanied by the CINC of the High Command Far East, Army Gen.
Ivan Tret'yak.
1978-1990: rail & road arteries of the Ogarkov Plan
In approximately 1978, the Soviet leadership decided to go ahead with
a more massive program of rail and road modernization, plus the con-
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struction of militarily crucial additions to the transport system in each
future Theater of Military Actions.
The areas of deficiencies in the rail system were:
? the level of automation in train routing and switching systems;
? bottlenecks at the Soviet/East European border stations arising from
the difference in the Russian and European rail gauges;
? lack of double trackage on some main rail lines;
? need for heavier rails to handle larger trains with heavier freight
loads;
? need for increased electrification of all main East European trunk
lines;
? lack of any high volume rail ferry service direct from the Soviet
Union to the Warsaw Pact's forward "springboard" areas of East Ger-
many and Bulgaria (the other two "springboard" countries, Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary, are landlocked).
1978 saw the start of modernization of existing trackage and the first
projects for huge new facilities, to remedy these deficiencies.
The first showpiece was the rail ferry between the Soviet Ukrainian
port of Ilyichovsk and Varna, Bulgaria. Its first phase was finished in
1981, with two ships in operation. By 1983, four ships were in continual
service. Russian freight cars can be offloaded in Varna, as containers,
from their broad-gauge chassis, and loaded on to Bulgarian European-
gauge rail under-carriages.
In 1978, the Comecon economic bloc launched a 10- to 12-year
program to upgrade every rail trunk line running from European Russia
through the East European satellites, as well as the main north-south
lines in Eastern Europe. This mammoth program is still under way. A
total of 14,000 km (8,750 miles) of east-west rail trunk lines, running
from the Ukraine and Byelorussia into and through Eastern Europe and
East Germany, are being modernized and upgraded. The north-south
lines slated for upgrade comprise 4,000 km (2,500 miles) of track.
The pace of this rail modernization program is extremely intense. In
the month of May 1985, alone, for example, the East German daily
Neues Deutschland reported:
? Completion by Poland of double-tracking of the trunk rail line run-
ning 350 km along the Oder River, from Wroclaw (Breslau) to Szczecin
(Stettin);
? Completion by East Germany of the program to electrify the trunk
rail line from East Berlin to Rostock, the main East German Baltic
port.
We reported in Chapter 4.3 on the progress of the biggest military-
logistical project on the Western Front, the rail ferry complex connecting
Klaipeda (Memel), Soviet Lithuania, with Mukran on the East German
Baltic island of Rueggen.
In addition to the 18,000 km of railroads affected by this program,
the Russians, in the early 1980s, very rapidly completed a broad-gauge
rail line from Soviet Byelorussia, through the Soviet-Polish border town
of Brest-Litovsk, and then 397 km deep into Poland, to the Upper Silesian
coal and steel center of Katowice. The first broad-gauge railroad ever
built deep into Europe, this line gives the Russian broad-gauge trains the
ability to go far into Poland without any stop at the border.
The Soviets have added new and modernized old rail lines on their
Northern Flank. Here, the most important measure was recently com-
pleted double-tracking of the line from Leningrad to Murmansk line.
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pleted double-tracking of the line from Leningrad to Murmansk line.
This main, north-south line has several spurs running west to the Finnish
border, where each of them hooks up with the Finnish rail system. Since
it was part of the Tsarist Empire till 1917, Finland's rail system already
has broad-gauge track like the Russians. The military significance of
upgrading these rail lines is discussed in 4.3.
Aliyev's role
Geidar Aliyev, the former KGB and party chief in Soviet Azerbaijan,
was put on the case of the Soviet transportation system not as planner,
but as enforcer. Among his first jobs was to lead a special Soviet gov-
ernment commission, to oversee completion of the BAM ahead of sched-
ule, despite the projects having been plagued by delays. His tour of
inspection, with Tret'yak, occurred in June 1984, when the Soviet press
was writing about widespread hold-ups in the construction. But under
Aliyev's ruthless pressure, the BAM link-up was made in October 1984,
as the military desired. Krasnaya Zvezda had devoted much attention to
the matter of the BAM's prompt completion. The Soviet Railroad Troops,
a section of Kurkotkin's Rear Services commanded by General Colonel
of Technical Troops M.K. Makartsev, were active in building the BAM,
as they are in maintaining the Soviet railroad system as a whole. The
Railroad Troops, since World War II, are closely tied to the Central
Administration of Military Communications, which plans and organizes
the movement of military supplies by rail, ship and aircraft.
The improvement of rail lines in the Transcaucasus, reviewed in Part
3, occurs in Aliyev's old base of operations. The new lines in Soviet
Armenia and Georgia, terminating near the Turkish border, are scheduled
for completion in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In 1985, the Soviets
began to build a railroad across the Caucasus Mountains, from Ord-
zhonikidze in northern Georgia to the Georgian capital of Tiflis. This
engineering feat, which will have 21 major bridges, is supposed to be
completed in the year 2000.
In the third Transcaucasus republic, Aliyev's home republic of Soviet
Azerbaijan, the Soviets electrified the railway leading from Djulfa on the
border between Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan, to Tabriz, the capital of
Iranian Azerbaijan.
With the occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, the Soviets also began
large-scale infrastructure construction out of Soviet Central Asia, to beef
up lines of control into Afghanistan. A new rail and road bridge connects
the river port of Termez in Soviet Uzbekistan with Afghanistan on the
other side of the Amu Darya (Oxus) River. From this rail bridgehead,
a rail line is being built in northern Afghanistan, which ultimately will
connect Soviet Uzbekistan with Kabul.
Road programs
Alongside trail modernization, the Soviet Union is carrying out large-
scale highway construction and improvement:
? The U.S.S.R. plans to have all major cities connected by modem
highways by the year 2000;
? Highways are being constructed and improved throughout Eastern
Europe.
Again, this effort includes projects of obvious military significance,
such as the new east-west highway running the length of Czechoslovakia,
or the Soviets' modernization of the main east-west road from Moscow
through Minsk, Byelorussia, to the Polish capital of Warsaw.
Comparing the rail and road networks of the Soviet Union and its
satellites ten years ago, at present, and what will be added in the next
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Energy
self-sufficiency
few years, forces a reaction of, "Aha, now I see what they've been up
to." In each potential theater of military operations, Russia's logistical
capabilities have grown by leaps and bounds, toward a level where they
fulfill wartime requirements.
Siberia's `autonomous' development
The biggest project in the Soviet war-economy mobilization is the de-
velopment of Siberia. From the first expansions of the Russian empire,
Siberia was envisioned as the main girder of "fortress Russia." The Slav-
ophiles, particularly, developed a geopolitical view of Siberia as the heart
of the world and of the power of the Great Russians.
Today, sparsely-populated, but energy- and resource-rich Siberia is a
heavily garrisoned area, in the economic life of which the military plays
a major part. Its 12,766,000 square km territory is a strategically posi-
tioned landmass, from which Soviet forces confront the United States
(with ICBMs, as well as across the Bering Straits), Japan across the Soya
Straits, and China across the Amur-Ussuri River boundary. Siberia's
highly-dispersed population (many Siberians live in houses made of logs,
which would require no special materials for post-war reconstruction),
its heavy industry, energy production (oil, gas, hydroelectric), vast fresh
water reserves, and scientific-technological elite (in Novosibirsk) define
for Siberia a key role in Soviet plans to survive world war. In Soviet
military thinking, Siberia as a whole constitutes a major strategic reserve.
The High Command Far East was the first of the new wartime com-
mands to be established, and has been designed so that its HQ in Chita
could function with a high degree of independence, if cut off from Mos-
cow. Siberia's economic development, too, exhibits planning for auton-
omy. Marshal Kurkotkin, the war-economy chief, has voiced enthusiasm
about the creation of so-called Territorial Production Complexes (TPCs),
industrial concentrations which may be centered on certain raw materials
deposits, but include all the branches of basic industry required for an
economy to function. The three main development zones of Siberia each
comprise one or more TPC. The zones are: 1) the West Siberian oil and
natural gas fields; 2) the Angara-Yenisei river basin in central Siberia;
3) the land along the north side of the BAM, in Eastern Siberia.
At the June 11 science and technology conference, Gorbachov said,
"The State will further stint no money on the development of Siberia."
Siberian economic development is led from the Academy of Sciences'
Siberian Division, established in Novosibirsk in 1957, the year of Sputnik.
Besides its center in Akademgorodok, which functions as an economic
command center for all Siberia, the Siberian Division has branches in
all the main towns of the region. Aganbegyan, the head of its Institute
of Economics and the Organization of Industrial Production, is a vigorous
advocate of TPC development, which he compares with the 1930s Ural-
Kuznetsk project run by Stalinist industrializer V. Kuibyshev.
The exploitation of west Siberian fossil fuel deposits on a large scale dates
only from the 1970s, but already in the 1976-80 period, oil from this
vast expanse of forest, lakes and swamps above 50 degrees N latitude
accounted for 90% of the increase in Soviet petroleum extraction. Over
2% of total Soviet investment in industry went into the West Siberia
oil and gas complex. By 1983, Siberia was contributing 60% of the
U. S. S. R.'s output of oil and gas condensate, 51 % of the natural gas,
more than one third of the coal and 40% of the hydroelectric power.
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Assistance from
foreign industry
Since 1978, the Soviet press has been writing almost uninterruptedly
about the problems of the Tyumen (West Siberia) oil and gas region.
The 1981 26th Party Congress marked a change in emphasis: The era
of "extensive" development of Siberia was over and the course would be
for "intensive" development. This was the watchword of the military's
economic specialists and of Andropov.
Vladimir Kuramin, a Deputy Minister of Construction for the Oil and
Gas Industry, wrote in March 1984, about the necessity of putting the
construction base in Western Siberia "on a fully self-sufficient footing,"
which would require a four or five-fold expansion of the volume of work
being undertaken at present. At the same time, he called for an influx
of people into Tyumen Oblast.
In central Siberia, the Yenisei-Angara river system powers a series of
12 huge hydroelectric dams that are in place or under construction,
including the 6,400 MW Sayano-Shushensk dam, the biggest in the
world. Around it is the Sayano TPC, which is to contain an aluminum
plant, machine-building and light industry.
In the same central region is the Kansk-Achinsk TPC, based on strip-
mining the largest prospected Soviet coal deposit, which contains 72.6
billion metric tons of lignite. Soviet officials have boasted, that this
region will become "a new Ruhr," a center of heavy industry to rival the
old German steel belt.
The BAM, whose military-logistical significance was noted above, gives
access to the vast east Siberian deposits of coal, iron ore, asbestos,
aluminum, copper, lead, molybdenum and other strategic raw materials.
One hundred towns are eventually supposed to spring up in the 11 TPCs
of the BAM zone. The spur that connects the TSR to the BAM and
then runs north to the coalfields of Neryungri is already the focus of
dense economic activity. There are plans to extend this 500 kilometers
northwards, to the as-yet unexploited natural gas fields of Yakutsk.
Even in advance of Siberia's greatest project, the planned diversion
of Siberian river flows for irrigation in Central Asia, Soviet policy is to
make Siberia self-sufficient in food. General Colonel I. D. Isayenko, Chief
of the Central Food Supply Administration (again, under Kurkotkin),
not only procures food for the Armed Forces, but supervises military
sovkhozy (state farms) throughout the Soviet Union. The number, lo-
cation and size of these farms is a military secret. Many of them are in
Central Asia and Siberia.
The Soviet economy builds itself a margin of increased industrial capacity,
on the basis of donations from the countries within the Soviet empire
and from East-West trade.
The Comecon member countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, are
subject to every-tighter "socialist integration" with the Soviet war ma-
chine. A Soviet party Central Committee plenum in December 1983,
according to Radio Moscow, decided:
Trade among the CMEA (Comecon) countries will grow by almost
19% in 1984 and the CMEA share of U.S.S.R. trade will reach
61%, versus 53.7% in 1980, testimony to deepening socialist eco-
nomic integration. . . . In the long term, integration will become
even deeper, all-embracing and effective.
Soviet trade figures for this decade show the results of this decision to
hook the East European economies more tightly to the Soviet wagon
(see table).
The Soviets are setting up particularly tight bonds with the high-
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1981
1982 1983
(millions of rubles)
1984
Total Soviet trade
109,740
119,576
127,480
139,711
Within the CMEA1
52,186
58,702
65,261
72,752
Among socialist countries2
57,944
64,952
71,409
80,326
With capitalist countries3
35,359
37,414
38,372
40,924
With developing sector4
16,447
16,883
17,698
18,461
1981
1982
1983
1984
(by percentage)
Total Soviet trade
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Within the CMEA'
47.6
49.8
51.2
52.1
Among socialist countries2
52.8
54.3
56.0
57.5
With capitalist countries3
32.2
31.6
30.1
29.3
With developing sector'
15.0
14.1
13.9
13.2
' The countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (or Comecon) include the Soviet Union,
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam.
2 Includes the Comecon countries, plus China, Yugoslavia, and North Korea.
3 Includes Finland.
Includes Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, and client states, such as Libya, South Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia,
and Angola. Dropping these countries from the developing-sector category, and putting them into the
socialist category, would make even more stark the picture of socialist country autarchy, and collapse of
trade with the developing sector.
technology heavy industry firms of the Comecon's industrial powerhouses,
East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In a report on East German exports
to the Soviet Union in 1984, Radio Moscow said:
The proportion of the following will increase: machine tools,
presses, forging equipment, electronically-controlled metalworking
lines and tools, plus electrical and industrial chemical goods. The
German Democratic Republic will supply: complete rolling mill
plants, equipment for production of cable and stranding machines,
equipment for crude petroleum reclamation and processing, cranes,
open-pit mining equipment, excavators, road construction machin-
ery, equipment for the construction industry, for the printing in-
dustry, ships, textile machinery, agricultural machinery, and railroad
cars.
With Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have signed an agreement to set up
"Robot," an International Scientific-Technical Association (STA), to
design and produce industrial robots for use in Czechoslovakia, the
U.S.S.R. and third countries. Vladimir aop, Deputy Chairman of the
Czechoslovak State Commission on Scientific, Technological, and In-
vestment Development, acknowledged in the Soviet weekly Ekonomi-
cheskaya Gazeta, that a primary goal of the "Robot" joint endeavor, is
to ensure the highest-quality input from Czechoslovakia to the U.S.S.R.:
It is anticipated that the portion of Czechoslovakia's exports to
the U.S.S.R., prepared under the aegis of `Robot,' will increase. . . .
This provides a good, long-term guarantee for the export of Czech-
oslovak machines and equipment of the highest technical specifi-
cations.
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Trade with the West: no upturn, but Soviet gains
In the case of East-West trade, recent reports in Western financial dailies,
about an alleged "upturn in the making" have been exposed as false, by
a recent EIR review of the real state of affairs (July 2, 1985).
Since trade is the movement of goods-not Politburo members and
high-level trade delegations-across national borders, the only "upturn"
to be found is in the realm of Soviet promises to Western Europe, that
if those countries decouple from the United States and reject the Amer-
ican Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), then Mother Russia will reward
them bounteously.
Where there is a rise in Soviet purchases from the West, this is ac-
counted for by 1) Soviet requirements for prewar stockpiling of goods,
as in the 1984 grain purchases from the United States, which account
for 90% of U.S.-Soviet trade, and 2) the need to overcome critical
bottlenecks in the Soviet economy. Purchases of grain and agricultural
products form the overwhelming portion of Soviet trade with Canada,
Australia, and Argentina, and, an increasing portion of Soviet trade with
countries of the European Community, such as Great Britain and France.
The spring 1985 award of 1.3 billion deutschemarks in orders to France
for petroleum industry equipment-the only recently signed European-
Soviet deal of any magnitude-is accounted for on both these political
and strategic-economic grounds. France, which is now spearheading Eu-
ropean opposition to the SDI, was "rewarded" with a few pieces of silver,
while Russia received urgently needed plant and equipment for its oil
industry, which has been repeatedly chastised by Gorbachov and other
leaders, for its stumbling performance.
The Italian government was recently told by Soviet foreign trade
officials, that unless Italy agreed to step up high-technology exports to
Russia, the Soviet Union would start cutting back its purchases of Italian
goods.
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4.5 The U.S. and Soviet Economies
Since MAD
Eclipse of U.S.
world power
MAD and monetarism
The continuing impact of the economic policies associated with Jimmy
Carter and Paul Volcker has reduced the United States to the status of
a global second-level power armed with the weaponry of a superpower.
This assertion is true in comparing present U.S. economic performance
with what was achieved in the past. It is also true in comparing U.S.
productive capacity with the other world superpower, the Soviet Union.
The United States is in grave danger of losing the economic might that
gave content to the nation's status and responsibilities as a global political
and military superpower pre-eminent.
The case of steel
Comparisons of production of raw steel, and the capital goods manufac-
tured from raw steel, in the United States and Soviet Union from 1972
to 1982, encapsulates the national security problem as a whole. It is
impossible to run a modem economy without steel. It is impossible to
maintain a national defense establishment without steel. Without steel
a nation cannot produce pipe and tube, forgings, cast wheels and axles,
excavating machines, bulldozers, railroad locomotives, and so forth.
In 1972, the United States outproduced the Soviets in raw steel by
about 3 million tons over the year. During the four-year period between
1972 and 1976, U.S. production declined by over 4 million tons, while
the Russians increased their output by about 28 million tons. Since 1976,
Russia's production has remained roughly constant, at about 147 million
tons per annum. The United States, to the contrary, has gone into an
accelerating decline, down to the 100-million-ton per-annum level, and
then further to under 70 million tons in 1982.
In the products made from steel the pattern is similar.
In production of steel for railroads, both the United States and Russia
increased out-put between 1972 and 1976, but then the United States
declined to half the level reached at that point, Russia maintained the
level reached, and thus outproduced the U.S. four to one.
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5 Million Metric Tons
U.S.S.R.
0
1972 76 80 82
Seamless Steel Tubing
7.5 Million Metric Tons
1.5
1972 76 80 82
Welded Steel Tubing
12 Million Metric Tons
2
1972 76 80 82
In steel forgings the United States has stagnated at a level higher than
the Russians.
In production of wheels and axles, Russia has advanced from a lead
of three to one in 1972, to nearly ten to one in 1982.
In welded tubing Russia produced nearly twice as much as the U.S.
in 1972, and increased that advantage. In seamless tubing, the advantage
remained at about 2 to 1 for the entire period.
Such is the situation in intermediate goods; in finished capital goods,
it is much worse. Russia was out-producing the United States in tractors
over 2 to 1 in 1972, and increased the advantage to nearly 8 to 1 by
1982. Russia's lead in the production of excavating machines was in-
creased from about 10 to 1 in 1972, to over 20 to 1 in 1982, and in
bull-dozers from two and a half times as many to five times as many.
Some may argue that the quality of Russian capital goods, for example,
their tractors, is much lower than the comparable item in the United
States. Russian tractors are said to have a service life of about two years,
against ten years of useful life for a tractor in the United States. Though
there may be truth in such arguments, the plain fact is that the United
States no longer produces the goods which, like tractors, it is claimed
we produce so well.
Since the period 1957-63, the partisans of Mutually Assured Destruc-
tion, following Bertrand Russell and Leo Szilard, have insisted that the
existence of thermonuclear-tipped intercontinental missiles has made
warfare certain suicide for whichever of the great powers initiates such.
For them, war thus became impossible. But if war was impossible, then
the in-depth logistical and industrial capabilities which backed war-fight-
ing capabilities were also unnecessary. Standing armies were unnecessary,
functioning navies were unnecessary.
Steel and steel-workers, machine-tools and machine-tool producers,
had become a thing of the past, and could be consigned to the garbage
heap, for recycling along with the political system of the nation-state,
and the heat-powered machine that had produced them.
The Soviet Union, however, never accepted this doctrine for its own
practice, only for the United States. Now the United States regularly
reports the growth of selected categories of weapons' production, and
argues that its own forces are being modernized to remain at parity. But
the destruction of basic, old-fashioned heavy industry, on which such
production depends, remains unaddressed.
The crumbling of steel
Half of the steel the United States produces is recycled scrap. 30% of
the total is produced in small, so-called mini-mills in electric arc furnace
mode. The industry claims, coherently with the fanatical perception,
that they produced 90 million tons on a capacity of 130 million tons.
Meanwhile, remaining Basic Oxygen Process steel capacity is down to
an estimated 70-million-tons capacity, and produces only 50 million tons.
Somehow, we lost 50 million tons of steel-making capacity, and the
Russians in 1982 were outproducing us by 80 million tons a year.
The United States reduced its capacity to produce raw steel, imported
ingots and slab steel from such countries as Mexico and Brazil for finishing,
built up its capacity to melt down the defective products of the automobile
industry, cushions and all, and continued to claim it had a steel industry.
Now, the U.S. produces automobiles from imported parts to be even-
tually melted down as scrap for our steel industry. By 1982, the Russians
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Steel Wheels and Axles
0
1972 76 80 82
Russia's secret
weapon
Electricity Consumed
2.4 Trillion kwh
were producing more than twice our output of raw steel, seven times our
output of steel for railroads, ten times our output of wheels and axles,
eight times our production of tractors, twenty times the number of ex-
cavating machines, five times the bulldozers.
The Russians have not only overtaken the United States in these areas.
More broadly, the nations of the Comecon system outproduced both the
United States and its European allies. By 1982, the margin of advantage
was about 5 million tons per year of raw steel. The same Comecon
countries produced 12% more welded tubing, 38% more seamless tubing,
three times the forgings, four times the steel wheels and axles, and twice
the amount of steel for railroad construction.
By 1982, steel production in the Western economies was being cut
back under the impact of the Davignon Plan. It was argued that there
was too much steel capacity to supply available demand. By 1984 and
1985, blast furnaces, inside and outside the United States, were being
blown up and dismantled. The Soviet Union, and its alliance partners,
continued to grow modestly at the indicated levels above the Western
partners' capacities.
While the Russians and the Comecon nations were continuing to
produce capital goods to maintain basic economic infrastructure-trans-
portation equipment, for example-in the Western nations, led by the
United States, this capability was being taken down.
The case for steel, and the industrial commodities that are produced
from steel, exemplifies the argument to be made as a whole.
In 1964, the United States, and its alliance partners in Western Europe
and Asia (Japan and South Korea), made up 26% of the world population
of 2.5 billion, not including China. The same allied nations provided
employment for 46% of the approximate total of 225 million industrial
workers worldwide, and produced 47% of the world's energy supply of
41 thousand trillion kilocalories per annum. Against this, Russia and the
nations of the Comecon had 15% of the world population, 25% of the
world's industrial workers, and produced 24% of the world's energy.
Energy, productivity, and employment
Such global pre-eminence as then the Western nations had attained was
based on the productivity of the labor force. Since the early 1960s that
productivity has been consistently under attack. This is seen most clearly
in comparing the ratio of goods producing workers in the Western nations,
to non-goods producing workers, and to the population as a whole.
The goods-producers, like the physical goods they produce, are a de-
clining percentile, of both the labor force, and the population as a whole.
It is estimated, for example, that there were by 1982, approximately 80
million goods producers within the leading Western nations, the United
States, West Germany, France, Italy, the U. K. and Japan, against a
potential of 130 million, if employment levels of the 1950s were once
again attained. That is, approximately 40% of the potential of the West-
ern nations, in labor terms alone, is criminally wasted.
By 1981-82, the population of the United States and its allies had
declined to less than 17% of the world total of 3.5 billion, not including
China. The industrial workers employed within the economies of the
Western nations had fallen to 37.6% of the world total of 333 million,
according to the World Bank. The energy produced within the same
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Industrial Workers Western nations had fallen also, to less than 38% of the world total
60 Millions
production of 80 thousand trillion kilocalories in the year.
The population of the Soviet Union and its satellites also fell as a
percentage of the world population as a whole, to 12.5%. The same
countries increased their share of the world's industrial workforce, to
nearly 27%, and increased their share of the world's energy production
50 U.S.S.R. to over 25%.
Such comparisons make clear that the problem is not that the Soviets
are building up so relentlessly, though they are, but that the West, as
the gap in steel production and the shift in employment ratios indicate,
is collapsing itself, and is pulled down by the policies of the United
40 A h h f h d 1 h
S
U.S.
30
1972 76 80 82
44 Thousand Kilowatts of Power
tates. t t e same time t o nations o t e eve oping sector, t o
uncounted "balance" in these figures, have been prevented from par-
ticipating in economic development. Such is also reflected in the charts
which compare the energy production and consumption, of the two super-
powers.
The United States has permitted its industrial workforce to stagnate
in number, while degrading the technological content of employment.
In this case, the Russians have expanded industrial employment faster
than the growth of the population as a whole.
The United States, though stagnating, continues to lead the world in
energy and electricity production. But only one-third of the total of either
energy or electricity production is consumed by industry. One-third of
the rest is consumed by that growing portion of the workforce which is
not productively employed, and which, opposite to the Russians, has
been permitted to grow at rates exceeding the growth of the population
as a whole.
The stagnating levels of total production and consumption in the
United States become a steady, though marginal decline, set against
increases in the productivity of energy production and consumption in
20 the Soviet Union, in the order of 25%.
If the United States and its allies were to reinstitute employment
policies comparable to those which prevailed in the 1940, and 1950,
the productive capacities and potentials of the western nations would
still be unchallengeable. The energy resources would still be available to
power such a transformation. While now, the greater availability of energy
within the United States and the Western world as a whole, is being
wasted in powering the expansion of unnecessary costs of overhead em-
ployment, parasitism, and waste.
Agricultural Tractors The United States is about 50% dependent on imports of consumption
goods. The United States does not produce them itself, but depends on
600 Thousands foreign skills and foreign capacities, for its consumption requirements.
Without productive capacity the United States cannot even produce
consumer goods. But the productive potentials of the western nations
480 ` have been transformed into servicing extensions of United States con-
sumption requirements.
This is the consequence of decisions made especially in 1982, when,
360
gutlessly, the current administration left Paul Volcker to continue the
work of destruction he had unleashed under Jimmy Carter, and the
240 fraudulent recovery was launched on the basis of "free trade" and the
120 U.S.
60
1972 76 80 82
"magic of the marketplace."
The "free-traders" and the "magicians" overlooked the fact that the
goods they buy and sell, speculate in, and demand debt service on, do
have to be produced somewhere. That "somewhere" is no longer the
United States. They bubbled the dollar to suck in the production of
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Excavating Machines others, to compensate for capabilities which no longer existed in the
48 Thousands
United States. Then, they claimed that United States might had been
restored. All the while, the United States became weaker than ever
before.
OOPPP- :;;;6uss.R.
6
An economic Pearl Harbor
The effect of Mutually Assured Destruction, and Carter and Volcker,
on U.S. heavy industry, and the productivity of the industrial worker,
could usefully be compared with Soviet nuclear bombardment of the
continental United States, or regions within the continent, such as the
area around Pittsburgh. United States economic policies, even the cost-
benefit analyists would agree, are cheaper for the Soviets, than full-scale
war would be, though more protracted in time.
And if the Soviet efforts to decouple the United States from its allies
were to succeed?
Then a Soviet Union exercising imperial sway over U.S. allies in
Europe and Asia would command 40% of the world's population, not
including China, 54% of the world's goods-producing labor-force, 38%
of the world's energy production, and 46% of the world's energy con-
sumption.
The United States would be left alone with 7.4% of the world pop-
ulation, 11 % of the world's goods-producing workers, about 24% of world
energy production, and 28% of energy consumption. The United States
would be far weaker in the world balance than the Soviets were in the
1950s. Soviet policy is directed to that end, whether the proponents of
MAD wish to believe it or not.
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4.6 What Are `Acceptable Losses'
for the Russian Command in
a Global Nuclear War?
Soviet military doctrine in the nuclear age was developed around the
task of solving the problems of "fighting and winning general thermo-
nuclear war." In Soviet military and civilian strategic thinking "deter-
rence" signifies the establishment and deployment of a military force
capable to so "fight and win general thermonuclear war" in a fashion so
demonstrable that any potential military adversary of the Soviet state
will be "deterred" from employing military means of state policy.
The Soviet concept of "winning" such a war includes the capacity to
preserve, more or less intact, the Soviet state, its power base, its assets,
and its capabilities of exerting dominion over the world after all its
potential adversaries and challengers have been crushed.
Any decision, on the part of the Soviet High Command, to go to war,
would be the result of a meticulous, cool calculation which would weigh
the possible losses to the Soviet state if it decides not to go to war, against
the expected losses to be incurred by fighting a general nuclear war. The
present configuration of the nuclear powers' arsenals is such that no margin
of doubt exists about the fact that in the event of nuclear war, the United
States would be completely obliterated in the sense that after the suc-
cessive nuclear salvos of the Soviet forces, not one blade of grass would
be able to grow on the North American continent for at least one hundred
years, whether such a war were to be initiated by the United States or
by the Soviet Union.
Under the present configuration of forces, the same cannot be said
about the Soviet Union. Some time in early 1984, some American
military researchers warned that the combined active and passive Strategic
Defense programs of the Soviet Union would soon be able to protect
approximately one third of the Soviet Union's strategic, political, in-
dustrial and other principal assets. We do not have a current, mid-1985
status evaluation of the increased effectiveness of Soviet strategic defen-
ses. Last year's "one third" survival estimate, presumably was based on
the assumption of a U. S. -initiated "first strike" against the Soviet home-
land.
The chances of survivability of Soviet assets increase dramatically if
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one assumes a successfully executed Soviet "first strike" or "preemptive
strike." Under certain circumstances, "nightmare scenarios" have been
examined, according to which, the Soviet Union might launch a preemp-
tive or first counterforce strike against American ICBMs, strategic bomber
bases and whatever nuclear missile submarines they can catch, leaving
intact any other American assets. To do this, the Soviets would need
to expend only a tiny fraction of their land-based ICBM force which
they could replenish within two hours by reloading their launchers. This
would leave the American command authority with a choice of a) ca-
pitulating orb) launching the surviving remnant of its SLBM force against
Soviet territory. However: any American President who decides to launch
would know that his retaliation would trigger the complete annihilation
of all forms of life on the North American continent within 20 to 40
minutes after he issues his order. His alternative, of course, would be to
formally declare the dissolution of the United States of America.
Such a peculiar, but otherwise much discussed "scenario" would never
come about in real life, unless the Soviet command had already taken
such measures that would assure it could reasonably "handle" any damage
caused by the surviving American submarine-launched nuclear force. If
possible, before such action, the Soviet command would prefer to secure
means of "making up" for its potential losses before it incurred them.
Their experience in the Second World War, in this matter, is not ir-
relevant: the much lamented loss of 20,000,000 Soviet citizens in the
course of the war had, in Stalin's own cool calculations, been "made up"
by the absorption of an equal number of Poles into the Soviet state during
the partition of Poland in 1939.
This episode sheds a certain amount of light into the reasoning by
which the Soviet high command "ranks" its "assets" according to relative
importance to the state, in order to make its calculation of "acceptable
loss levels."
Ranking highest, in Moscow's valuation of state assets, is the leadership
of the state: in various locations around the country, there are numerous
deep underground "hardened" bunkers reserved for the political and mil-
itary leadership. The most notorious such facility is in the northern
outskirts of Moscow, where no fewer than seven deep underground bunker
complexes are ready to house approximately 150,000 senior functionaries
of the state and their functions. These bunkers are securely protected
from any nuclear explosion of any warheads now in the inventory of the
United States; they are also connected with the Kremlin by means of a
deep underground rapid transit train. In addition, of course, Moscow is
officially, in accordance with a relevant provision of the 1972 ABM
Treaty, protected by an antiballistic-missile system of no fewer than one
hundred ABM missile launchers with reload capability.
The fact that the Soviets chose Moscow as the site to be protected by
the one ABM system permitted by the treaty is merely symptomatic of
the fact that the functions of the state are considered as the most highly
valued assets of the state by Soviet military planners.
The second most valued set of assets is the principal means for con-
ducting strategic war, the ICBM missile fields. Every one of these is
known to be currently protected by extensive deployments of SAM bat-
teries made up of SA-5s, SA-10s and SA-12s, primarily.
The third layer of priority assets for Soviet planners consists of certain
critical industrial, engineering and production facilities on the one hand
and the racial stock of ethnic Great Russian populations on the other.
The systematic "dispersion" and "decentralization" of major industrial
enterprises, which has been an invariant constant of Soviet military and
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economic planners since the 1950s, is designed to improve the protection
of both these two types of assets: industrial engineering facilities and
Great Russians.
Of course, special emphasis on the preservation of the Great Russian
racial stock is motivated by a great dose of typical Russian racism and
sentimentality on the part of Russian military planners. It is also, however,
based on a certain amount of political realism: The Soviet Union as a
state is in fact nothing but the political empire of the Great Russians, a
minority among the subject nationalities of the U.S.S.R. Should this
Great Russian ethnic core of the state be destroyed or mauled to the
point that it is not capable of exerting dominion over the other nations
of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet state will disappear and thus, the war will
end with its defeat, even though many of the "sinews of war" might
happen to remain intact but in the hands of, say, Ukrainians, Byelo-
russians, Turkemens, Tartars, and so forth.
The present Soviet leadership frequently boasts that the "Soviet people"
are ready to suffer "any sacrifices" for the cause of an eventual victory in
nuclear war. In January 1985, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's chief spokes-
man Vladimir Lomeiko, in order to impress his impressionable American
counterparts that Moscow could, if it had to, assign low thresholds to
its "acceptable damage" estimates, was quoted as having said that "what-
ever the price, the Soviet Union is ready to face all challenges." The
"Soviet people have shown" declared Lomeiko, "that they are able to
resist and to win in conditions more difficult than today, the 20 millions
dead of the last war should not be forgotten...."
Lomeiko would not be making such boastful assertions if he had reason
to believe that American nuclear arsenals included super silo-busting
nuclear warheads from which the Soviet leadership's hardened bunkers
could find no protection. Or if he knew that a few heavy-megaton "dirty"
cobalt bombs would descend upon the main national home bases of the
Great Russians in the very first minutes of a Soviet-provoked war.
For the present Soviet leadership, "acceptable losses" might include
the majority or, perhaps even the totality of all non-Great Russian pop-
ulations of the U.S.S.R. and of the industrial assets situated in their
territories, provided that their loss could be replenished by immediate
or simultaneous conquests in Western Europe, the Middle East and else-
where.
What is not an "acceptable loss" for them is the loss of their system's
existing political leadership and its Great Russian political base.
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4.? The Religious Factor:
Call to Arms for `Holy War'
Those who are familiar with the thousand-year history of the Russian
Church know that fighting for the greater glory of Russia, has always
been and remains an indispensable part of her mission. This was well
expressed in the Message of his Holiness Patriarch Pimen and the Holy
Synod on the 600th anniversary of the Victory at Kulikovo Field:
In the accomplishment of the heroic national feat-the Great
Victory of the Russian arms at Kulikovo-of special significance was
the power of the grace of the Christian Faith, the spiritual and moral
influence and patriotic service of the Russian Orthodox Church,
which has never remained apart and indifferent to the historical lot
of the nation. From the very beginning of her existence, now a
millennium, she helped establish Russia's culture, nationality, and
state (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, February 1983).
The 1,000th anniversary of the Christianization of Russia will be in
1988, and the signs of a celebration being prepared by an Empire-the
Muscovite present-day successor to Byzantium-with its three-sided lead-
ership of Party, Army, and Church, are in full evidence. The media have
started conditioning the Soviet population for the magical 1,000-year
date.
This is not the first time that such anniversaries have played a central
role in guiding Soviet Russian expansionist policies. Stalin's target date
for the acquisition of Greece and Turkey was 1948-the 500th anni-
versary of the Russian Orthodox Church as an autocephalous church.
With the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the United
States blocked the Russian Empire's attempt to incorporate Greece and
European Turkey, including Istanbul (Constantinople) -the seat of the
Ecumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, and a prize coveted by
Muscovy for centuries.
The importance of the 1988 millennium celebrations of the Chris-
tianization of Rus', is that Kievan Rus provides the chief "blood" link
for the Muscovites, in the theory of Moscow's succession to the power
of Rome.
During a June 1983 visit to West Germany, Archbishop Pitirim, head
of the Moscow Patriarchate's publishing department, stated Russia's doc-
trine of continuity:
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The history of the Russian Orthodox Church is an unbroken
one.... The ROC has a 1,000-year history. In 988, the Russians
in Kiev, which was the principal city of the Great Russian princi-
pality, accepted the Christian belief that decided many pages of
further history of the state and its culture. In 1988 we will celebrate
the 1,000th-year jubilee of this memorable event. . . . The Russian
Orthodox Church sees its destiny clearly. We want to attain our
goal of seeing the results of our spiritual activity.
By 1988, the Moscow Patriarchate will have set up new headquarters
in the huge Danilov Monastery complex in the middle of Moscow, only
four kilometers from the Kremlin. Special workers and student brigades
have been brought in to complete the massive task in time. Similar work
brigades are busy throughout the European part of the U.S.S.R. restoring
and reconstructing old Russian monasteries, church frescoes, and icons.
From at least the start of the "post-Brezhnev era" launched by Yuri
Andropov, the speeches of Soviet Communist Party leaders abound with
references to the millennium and with language lifted from the Russian
Orthodox Church liturgy.
Mikhail Gorbachov, in his speech of Dec. 10, 1984, vowed: "The
Soviet Union will do everything it can to ensure the strengthening of
the country's position in the international arena, enabling it to enter the
next millennium fittingly, as a great and prosperous power."
In June 1983, the late West German Deputy Foreign Minister Alois
Mertes, who was fluent in Russian, was amazed to hear then-Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko say, "Security is the svyataya svyatykh for the
Soviet Union." This expression is taken straight from Russian Church
liturgy. When the Orthodox priest emerges from the Ikonostas and shows
the Sacrament to the congregation, he says: "Svyataya svyatykh"-Holy
of Holies.
When Gromyko nominated Gorbachov as the new leader of the Com-
munist Party, he said the nominee deserved to be made party General
Secretary, because he upholds "the svyataya svyatykh for us all in fighting
for peace and maintaining our defenses at the necessary level."
Marshal Ogarkov's military cohort exhibits the same ideology at every
Military and church: opportunity. These Soviet officers, who miss no occasion to accuse Ronald
Reagan of waging a "crusade" against socialism, themselves employ cru-
one policy sader's language about "holy wars."
In his November 1984 article in Kommunist Vooruzhonnykh Sil (Com-
munist of the Armed Forces), "The Unfading Glory of Soviet Arms,"
Ogarkov himself wrote:
The path of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces to Victory
in the Great Patriotic War was long and difficult. It lasted nearly
four years and led through very bitter and bloody battles, through
very grave experiences. . . . But the Soviet people were not defeated
in spirit, and did not lose the will for victory over the invaders. In
an extremely difficult situation, in an extremely short time, the
Communist Party mobilized for holy war, the powerful forces of Soviet
society, which Great October had given it, and transformed the country
into a monolithic war camp. . . . [Today] the aggressive forces of
imperialism have to reckon with the growing weight and influence
of our forces, with the power of the united armed forces of the
Warsaw Pact. . . . It is the sacred duty of the Soviet Armed Forces to
reliably defend the conquests of socialism and peace on Earth.
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In this article, Ogarkov praised Stalin and the role played by him and
his high command, the Stavka, in the last war.
Since Gorbachov's installation as party chief, the Stalin revival has
produced some dramatic moments. On May 8, Gorbachov was speaking
on the 40th anniversary of V-E Day. He said again, "The mortal danger
overhanging the homeland and a tremendous force of patriotism raised
the entire country to a people's war-a holy war." But when Gorbachov
recalled, that "the gigantic work at the front and in the rear was guided
by the party, its central committee, and the State Defense Committee
headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-
Union Communist Party, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin," the response was
electric. The audience of veterans, party officials, and officers applauded,
and would not cease applauding, for several minutes. Soviet television
captured the moment, and broadcast it all over the U.S.S.R.
On the same anniversary occasion, the Russian Orthodox Church/
Moscow Patriarchate joined in the renewed praises for Stalin. The Journal
of the Moscow Patriarchate reprinted the appeal to the Russian people to
rise to the defense of Mother Russia, which had been issued by Metro-
politan Sergei-to be elevated to Patriarch two years later-on June 22,
1941: "Our Orthodox Church blesses all the Orthodox to rise in defense
of the sacred borders of our Motherland. The Lord will grant us victory!"
The journal explained:
Thus in wisdom and farsightedness, Metropolitan Sergei antici-
pated our ultimate victory on the first day of the war. . . . Metro-
politan Sergei issued a number of other messages, and so did his
closest associates. . . . [They] appealed to pastors and believers on
Soviet territory temporarily occupied by the Nazis, to the Slavonic
peoples and Christians of other countries, urging them to help in
the sacred struggle against the common enemy. . . . In 1942, in
the foreword to The Truth About Religion In Russia, Patriarch Sergei
wrote: "The fascist crusade has already swept over this country,
flooding it with blood, desecrating our shrines, destroying our his-
torical monuments, and committing monstrosities against defense-
less civilians...." The book convincingly shows that the Russian
Orthodox Church entered the war in unity and unanimity with the
Soviet people. Right from the start, the Church rose in defense of
the Motherland. The documents published in the book, demon-
strating the nationwide upsurge of patriotism among the believers
and clergy, are of vital importance for later generations... .
The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate began to come out at a
difficult time; the war was at its height. . . . Let us thank the gov-
ernment for its considerable attention to church needs... .
The article went on to recall how, upon receiving Patriarch Alexii in
1945, Stalin exhibited "complete understanding and wholehearted ap-
proval and promised us support in the future," which "attested to the
normal and benevolent relations between Church and State and helped
us to take advantage of the opportunities provided us" in the postwar
period.
Metropolitan Juvenalii of Krutitsii and Kolomna, interviewed by the
Vienna-based Catholic Information Agency (Kathpress) on the occasion
of Soviet Armed Forces Day, Feb. 23, 1985, demonstrated how close
coordination is today between church and military:
The millennium in 1988 will be a great spiritual festival, and in
this connection we shall be reminding the Russian people of their
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ancient traditions of striving towards God and spirituality.... This
Jubilee will be the celebration of our Holy Faith and Mission.
It is the sacred duty of our Armed Forces to guard the frontiers
of our country. Therefore our Armed Forces are always prepared to
repel any danger threatening us. Should the Church tell the Army
not to defend our holy borders? Should we tell our armed forces to
neglect their sacred duty? Under no circumstances would we do
so. . . . To hold our Army back from its duty would, in our eyes,
be as senseless as the demands made on our government to make
unilateral concessions when it has already stated that it would not
make a first strike. It is the holy duty of the Church to pray that
there will be no attack for us to repel. . . . [However] we are secure,
as we see the continuing fulfillment of the Word of Christ in our
country, that the Gates of Hell shall not prevail against the [Russian
Orthodox] Church. Therefore we are untroubled about the future.
Juvenalii, Patriarch Pimen, and their colleagues speak with the same
voice as the Soviet high command, in attacking the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative. On Feb. 1, 1985, Pimen told the Soviet news agency
Novosti that, "it is the sacred duty of all religious people" to halt the
Strategic Defense Initiative. Pimen was one of the earliest major figures
in Russia to decry the development of beam weapons, at a Moscow
Patriarchate-sponsored world "peace" conference in 1982, eight months
before President Reagan announced the SDI.
Russian Church and State accuse both Reagan and Pope John Paul II of
ROC 's war on the launching a "crusade" against the Soviet Union: Reagan for his Strategic
Vatican Defense Initiative, and the Pope for his crackdown against the "Liberation
Theology" and related wings of the Roman Catholic Church that work
hand in glove with the Russian Church and political leadership to un-
dermine the West.
The preparations for the 1988 anniversary of the Christianization of
Kievan Rus have been marked by a constantly escalating hate campaign
against the "Western" Roman Catholic Church and the Papacy.
There are many evil elements nesting in the Vatican, including the
Venetian patriarchate and the various Catholic monastic orders, the
Benedictines, the Dominicans, the Jesuits, who deal with Moscow from
the standpoint of discussing redrawing the world map between the West-
ern and Eastern (Soviet) Empires. This, however, is not what Moscow,
smelling world domination, is attacking. The goal of the Russian cam-
paign against the Vatican, is the elimination of the Vatican and the
Papacy as policy-making authorities.
In March 1985, in an interview with the Italian Communist Party
daily Unitd, Metropolitan Filaret (Vakhromeyev) of Minsk threw down
the gauntlet to the Vatican, declaring that "Liberation Theology is the
policy of the Russian Orthodox Church."
Such war cries against the Roman Church have been more and more
frequent since mid-1984. For example, a major part of Metropolitan
Filaret (Denisenko) of Kiev's June 1984 speech in Czechoslovakia, was
devoted to denouncing "fabrications" by Catholic scholars, concerning
alleged Western influence on the origin of Christianity in Kievan Rus.
He blasted the "Catholic scholars and their cohorts, the Ukrainian Un-
iates," for maintaining that the early Russian Church-before it betrayed
the Popes and went under the jurisdiction of the Constantinople Pa-
triarchate-was Christianized by Latin missionaries and thus canonically
linked with Rome. Referring to the "Latin missionaries" in Russia, Filaret
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The Pan-Slavic
dimension emerges
of Kiev said: "One should not forget that this was the time that the
Roman Popes were already carrying out the fight to expand its realm to
the East, and in part to Russia...."
The shock value of this speech can be imagined, considering that most
Czechs are Catholic.
According to Vatican sources, one of the main themes discussed at
the Feb. 27, 1985 meeting between Pope John Paul II and Andrei Gro-
myko, Soviet foreign minister at that time, was the situation of Catholics
in the Soviet Union. In view of the Pope's avowed concern about the
plight of the Ukrainian Catholics of the Eastern Rite, also known as the
Uniates, whose Church was banned by Stalin in 1946, it is believed that
during the private talks the "delicate" issue of legalization of the Ukrainian
Catholic Church was discussed. The Uniates live in the Western or
"Little" Ukraine, in territories which for the most part belonged to prewar
Poland, contiguous to the present Polish and Czech borders.
It is believed that Gromyko repeated the "hands off' warning con-
cerning the Uniates, made earlier by Patriarch Pimen. In his letter of
Dec. 20, 1980 to Pope John Paul II-six months before the Bulgarian-
connected attempt on the Pope's life-the Moscow Patriarch indicated
that any moves by the Vatican to call into question the results of the
Synod of Lvov outlawing Uniates could "negate" all the progress made
in improving relations between the Roman Catholic and Russian Or-
thodox Churches and would be "against the spirit of ecumenicalism."
Just before Gromyko's visit to the Vatican, the Russian Orthodox
Church in January 1985 commenced the first reprint of the 1946 Stalin-
era state tracts (drafted with Church blessing) outlawing the Vatican-
affiliated Uniate Church. This decision to reprint is a major escalation
in the anti-Papacy conditioning of the Russian population for the big,
imperial anti-Western 1988 Russian Millennium.
During Patriarch Pimen's imperial foray in 1984 to Warsaw Pact and
neighboring Slavic countries-Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (Serbia)-
he declared that the "duty of all Christian and other religious believers
in the Socialist countries ... is to support the State." After this tour,
Soviet and East bloc government media unanimously intensified their
attacks against the Pope, especially during his South American trip,
culminating with an official Soviet Government statement blaming the
Polish Roman Catholic leadership-and thus, not so indirectly the Pope-
for the situation which produced the murder of the Polish priest Popie-
luszko.
Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev's June 1984 speech at the Jan Hus Theo-
logical Seminary in Prague, Czechoslovakia, "On the Meaning of the
Christianization of Rus and its 1,000th Anniversary," defined the planned
Millennium more broadly as a pan-Slavic, racialist celebration of empire:
We the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church in your
country always feel that we belong to one blood and soil-having
deep ancient ties to Slavic scholars-the brother saints Cyril and
Methodius. At present, we are united not only with the historical
past but with present-day goals. . . . In 1988, the Russian Orthodox
Church is preparing to celebrate the 1,000th anniversary of the
Christianization of Russia. . . . The Christianization of Russia was
an outstanding historic event not only in the history of our Church
but our nation. It crowned the earlier labors of Cyril and. Meth-
odius. . . . For the Russian Orthodox Church, it was the beginning
of its official existence. It gave the spiritual meaning of the unity
of Ancient Rus. It influenced the bettering of relations between the
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Kievan princes, helped unite the principalities and unite the realm,
strengthened and expanded ties of Kievan Rus with many European
rulers, above all with Byzantium and Bulgaria.... With Christi-
anity, Russia took with it the developed forms of societal organization
of Byzantium, its cultural and spiritual revival. It saw the emergence
of the monasteries in Russia which became centers of learning....
Monasticism is an unbreakable part of Russian life.
The Russian Orthodox Church is continuing its 1,000-year mis-
sion under new social conditions. The experience of our Church in
socialist society has convinced us that no matter what the ideological
differences between believers and non-believers are, being conscious
participants in the new society gives us the opportunity to conduct
our savior mission. Deriving from our Orthodox tradition, we will
try to give our share toward securing and strengthening our secu-
rity. . . . Our Church calls on and inspires its sons and daughters
to continue and realize their patriotic and peace-making history.
In line with Filaret's stress on Bulgarian and Byzantine roots, the
Moscow Patriarchate has already announced plans for 1988 joint cele-
brations with brethren Orthodox Churches-which are to unite the
entire Slavic and Byzantine Orthodox realm. For example, the millen-
nium of the Christian Kievan Rus coincides with celebrations of the
Russian Orthodox Monastery St. Panteleimon, in the Mount Athos
complex in Greece.
Also this year, preparations to celebrate the 1, 100th anniversary of
the death of St. Methodius-a project launched by Todor Zhivkov's
Bulgaria-are being coordinated and conducted by every single Warsaw
Pact country with an Orthodox majority or a minority. When Gorbachov
in his acceptance speech upon his appointment as General Secretary of
the Soviet Communist Party, stressed that the Soviet Union's "first com-
mandment" is to strengthen the unity of Warsaw Pact countries, he was
speaking not only from the political, economic, and military standpoint,
but also from the deeper religious-cultural one.
By 1988, in the middle of Moscow, four kilometers away from the
Kremlin, the Danilov Monastery will be the new headquarters of the
Moscow Patriarchate. At a branch of the State Bank in Moscow, a special
account was opened for the Moscow Patriarchate's use under the title,
"Construction and Restoration of the Danilov Monastery of the City of
Moscow." The monastery was built at the end of the 13th century under
the first Moscow prince, Danilov, later canonized as the "Heavenly Pro-
tector Saint of Moscovy Russia."
After the October Revolution, it was taken over by the state. Under
the new political relationship, it was a residence for many Russian bishops,
and until the death of Patriarch Tikhon, represented a modus vivendi
between State and Church.
In August 1983, shortly before the shoot-down of the Korean Airlines
jet, Danilov was officially returned to the Church. Soviet TV and radio
prominently played up the event, including Patriarch Pimen's "thank
you" message to Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov. The Journal of the
Moscow Patriarchate wrote:
[The Danilov Monastery complex] has waited for its time to come,
and now, seven centuries after its foundation, it is going to become
the spiritual center of the Russian Orthodox Church. . . . The
rebirth of the Monastery of Saint Prince Danilov is a work of godly
prophecy. . . . In a renewed form, this Holy Monastery, the cradle
of the United Russian Nation-State, will be witness to the 1,000-
year celebrations of the Christianization of Russia.
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5. Soviet Strategic Sabotage and
Assassination Programs
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5.1 Andropov's Rise in the KGB:
Warsaw Pact Enters International
Drugs-and-Terrorism Business
Enshrined and institutionalized in the senior councils of the Soviet state
during 1967 was an entirely new capability of statecraft, associated with
Yuri Andropov assuming the chairmanship of the KGB, and the grooming
of what later became the "Andropov Dynasty" which now rules the
U.S.S.R. This "new capability of statecraft" involved the expert em-
ployment of terrorism, both under the guise of "national liberation" and
of simple "sociological phenomenon," cultivation of ethnic tensions and
manipulations both worldwide and inside the Soviet Empire, drugs, por-
nography, mystical cultism, and other forms of cultural warfare.
From the outset of Andropov's tenure in the KGB, major long-term
commitments were made to cultivate and unleash throughout the world
the twin weapons of drug trafficking and international terrorism. Contrary
to what most counter-terror analysts believe, drug trafficking and terrorism
were not unleashed as independent branches of subversive activity, but
as subordinate, though important, elements of a far-flung cultural warfare
against the Western alliance. This Andropov project was undertaken in
conjunction with similar subversive cultural policies launched in the
West by America's "Eastern Establishment" and its "elected head,"
McGeorge Bundy, then still National Security Advisor to President Lyn-
don Johnson.
During 1967, McGeorge Bundy, whose role in the assassination of
President Kennedy has yet to be clarified, promulgated the military doc-
trine of "Flexible Response," whose most important feature was its sep-
arating the defense of Europe from that of the United States, thus
overthrowing America's earlier military doctrine, which asserted that
militarily, the territories of the United States and Western Europe must
be treated as a single indivisible entity if they were to be defensible.
During that same year, McGeorge Bundy founded a joint project with
Yuri Andropov of the KGB, the International Institute of Applied Sys-
tems Analysis in Laxenberg, Austria, whose principal purpose was in-
telligence sharing and intelligence coordination for what then appeared
to be a joint "Eastern Establishment"-KGB project, namely the imposition
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of a cultural "paradigm shift" over the populations of Western industrial
nations. The new cultural paradigm, Bundy and other senior represen-
tatives of the Eastern Establishment agreed with the KGB, was to be the
"post-industrial society," the "Age of Aquarius," "counterculture," and
the replacement of the nation-state by ethnic separatist and integrist
movements.
Andropov's KGB poured enormous resources into this project over the
next two decades. Most of the financial resources were derived from
irltemational drug trade. Most of the political-ideological-cultural guid-
ance was supplied by the KGB-run Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet
Academy.
The European "black" nobility, with its great taste for ethnic separatist/
integrist movements and culturally degenerate projects, from the outset
was Moscow's leading partner in this affair. It also became Moscow's
leading business partner in the international guns-for-drugs bazaar which
constitutes the infrastructure of all international terrorism.
At a December 1980 West Berlin conference of the Mont Pelerin
Society, Baron Max von Thum delivered a keynote speech advocating
the legalization of all forms of black-market economy, citing the inter-
national drug and arms trade as one of the few "growth areas" in the
world economy during the 1970s. A review of the Thum and Taxis
banking and commercial empire's interface with the Bulgarian Kintex
and Foreign Trade Bank is an example of East-West collusion in the
$400 billion per year guns-for-drugs business.
According to a former Bulgarian State Security (KDS) official named
Sverdlev, at a Moscow meeting of the interior ministers of all of the
Warsaw Pact nations in 1980, orders came down from the KGB, to
"accelerate the disintegration of Western society" through support for
the drug trade. Toward this end, the Bulgarian KDS created a number
of state-owned trading companies, foreign-exchange banks, tourist ser-
vices, and trucking companies to interface into the already thriving heroin
and other hard-drug-smuggling networks in the West.
By 1970, Sofia had already emerged as the commercial center of the
guns-for-drugs trade, absorbing under the Kintex export-import company
the remnants of the old Vichyite "French connection" heroin ring, and
the Turkish-Syrian mafia responsible for the Middle East hashish trade
and for the laboratory refining of Far East "Golden Triangle" opium.
It was not until Nov. 23, 1982, when Italian authorities raided the
Milan headquarters of Stipam International Transports, a subsidiary of
Kintex, that a serious dent was made in investigating the "Bulgarian
connection." Documents carted out of the Stipam offices revealed a
worldwide "barter" arrangement accounting for tens of billions of dollars
in drugs and guns per year, dating back to 1967, when Stipam director
Henri Arsan set up the Milan operation out of a villa in Sofia that was
provided to him by Kintex. The Stipam connection funneled tons of
sophisticated arms into the hands of such diverse terrorist groups as the
Red Brigades, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the
Turkish neo-Nazi Grey Wolves, the Italian fascist New Order, factions
of the Lebanese Falange linked to the Nazi International, the Sandinistas,
the Pinochet government of Chile, the Afghani Mujahadeen, and the
Khalistani (Sikh) separatists.
It was through this drugs-for-arms-for-terrorists triad that the Agca
assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981 was .
carried out from beginning to end. It was on a forged Sikh passport in
the name Yoginder Singh that Mehmet Ali Agca traveled to Sofia,
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Vesco and the
Cubans
Bulgaria in the summer of 1980 to receive instructions and the initial
payment for the assassination plot. And it was through the Thurn and
Taxis-linked Bayerische Vereinsbank that the Bulgarian funds were trans-
ferred into West Germany for Agca's use.
Beginning with the Khomeini coup in Iran in February 1978, the focal
point of international opium production dramatically shifted from the
Far East to the "Golden Crescent" region of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and sections of the Punjab region of India, center of the Khalistani (Sikh)
insurgency. All of these areas were either under direct Soviet control or
under the control of "separatist" elements linked to Aliyev's "foreign
nationalities" division of the KGB and to the Nazi International. With
the Iran-Iraq war consuming enormous quantities of military hardware,
Teheran became a principal stop on the dope-for-arms underground rail-
road, and Iranian territory became a preferred training ground for foreign
nationals-including Western Europeans-receiving terrorist instruc-
tions from top-level Soviet military personnel at 12 camps inside Iran.
The continuing involvement of the British and Israeli governments in
the sale of enormous quantities of arms to Khomeini served up until late
1984 as a "blinder" to the fact of extensive Soviet GRU operations inside
Iran-with the blessing of the inner circles around Khomeini.
Recent U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) studies have under-
scored the role of the Soviet guns-for-dope trade in Western Europe in
providing reconnaissance and logistics for terrorism, especially through
"nationality" cutouts such as the North Koreans, the Bulgarians, and the
East Germans.
Simultaneous with the expansion of the drugs-for-arms infrastructure into
all the major capitals of Western Europe, a Bulgarian-Cuban interface
with the old Meyer Lansky-run Caribbean drug syndicate was achieving
enormous increases in the narcotics flow within the Western Hemisphere.
Here again, the unmistakable imprint of Marshal Ogarkov's doctrine of
"pinprick warfare" gave the narco-terrorist offensive a "Made in Moscow"
stamp of approval.
Immediately upon the November 1980 election of Ronald Reagan,
the Cuban government, with KGB consultation, prepared an insurgency
program called "Plan Bravo," according to CIA sources. The plan called
for flooding with cocaine Miami, New York City, New Orleans, and
other urban centers of the U.S. eastern seaboard. The revenues were
largely plowed back into the buildup of a narco-terrorist infrastructure
throughout the hemisphere.
Plan Bravo was facilitated by the recruitment of two allied capabilities.
First, U.S. drug and dirty-money kingpin Robert Vesco was co-opted
into the Cuban intelligence service, probably through previous Vesco
ties into the Bulgarian smuggling networks, including the Stipam group.
Now residing on an island villa just outside Havana, Vesco brought over
to the Cubans a Caribbean-U.S. apparatus of dirty banks and other
money-laundering facilities originally built up through the Swiss and
British Rothschild family-sponsored Investors Overseas Service (IOS).
This apparatus included a criminal infrastructure inside the United States
operating at least in part under the cover of the Anti-Defamation League
of B'Nai B'Rith, whose national chairman Kenneth Bialkin helped create
the IOS hot-money sieve; the direct interface with the Colombian cen-
tered Ibero-American cocaine mafia through Vesco's business partner
Carlos Lehder; and blackmail files on prominent political figures in every
American administration from the period of Richard Nixon through the
Carter administration of "Billygate" fame. Vesco, it should be recalled,
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was the original "back channel" between the Carter White House and
Libyan dictator Qaddafi.
Before landing in his Havana villa, Vesco spent much of 1981-83
shuttling between the Bahamas, Nicaragua, and Panama, overseeing the
creation of the financial linkups between the burgeoning cocaine families
of the continent, the Cuban intelligence services, and the Sandinistas.
Meanwhile, the second allied capability, the "Bulgarian connection,"
was sinking deep roots into South America. In 1979, Colombian President
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, who had just finished his term of office, made
an extended visit to Bulgaria, and established personal relations with
Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov, his daughter Lyudmila Zhivkova,
and her husband Ivan Slavkov. Lyudmila, a Bogomil mystic, facilitated
the buildup of the cultist and narco-terrorist Gnostic church throughout
Ibero-America, while her husband Ivan Slavkov became the principal
contact point for Bulgarian guns-for-dope transactions into the Western
Hemisphere, operating through a West German national, Peter Mulack,
in Miami. Among the recipients of Slavkov-Mulack arms, according to
an April 1984 report on Danish television, were: the Colombian M-19
terrorists, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, and the Chilean
DINA (secret police).
With the Bulgarian connection penetrated into the Western Hemi-
sphere, Nicaragua was further transformed into a central dispatch station
for all international terrorist operations in the region. By the early part
of 1983, the Iranian embassy in Managua was functioning as the bursar's
office for insurgency efforts in Central America, Mexico, the United
States, and parts of South America. Training operations and safehousing
were being provided to European and Middle Eastern terrorist groups,
with a direct linkup to the West German pro-terrorist "scene" through
Hamburg resident and frequent Managua visitor Philip Agee. The Ger-
man links to the narco-terrorist activities in South America were further
established last year when a Green Party delegation traveled to Peru to
join support networks of the fanatical killing cult Shining Path (Sendero
Luminoso); and when Vesco partner and avowed neo-Nazi Carlos Lehder,
the head of one of the three largest cocaine organizations in Colombia,
and reputedly one of the creators of the MAS "death squads," announced
that he was financing the formation of a Green Party affiliate in Colombia.
During the spring of 1984, in preparation for a renewed activation of
terrorism in Italy, the Red Brigades also deployed numbers of exiled
members from Paris to Managua to facilitate deeper operational ties to
other international terrorist cells.
The importance of the Western Hemispheric component of the Rus-
sian-directed terrorist international is underscored by the continuing
personal role played by leading French government official Regis Debray.
Author of Revolution in the Revolution, a handbook of urban insurgency
that spelled out the modus operandi of the first generation RAF and Red
Brigades, and founder in 1966 of the Havana-based Tricontinental Con-
gress, Debray has been the responsible figure in the Mitterrand govern-
ment for the current status of Paris as the leading terrorist safehouse in
continental Europe.
U. S. and French intelligence officials have privately stated that the
assassination of Rene Audran by the RAF was approved within the Elysee
by the Debray apparatus-as a message to any leading French military
figure committed to backing the U.S. SDI program. The assassination
of Audran, 24 hours after his return from a high-level diplomatic mission
to the Federal Republic concerning French-West German cooperation
on military R & D matters, has prompted an alert around the French-
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German joint laser installation in Alsace, one of the most important
military research centers in Europe.
Despite Debray's Cuban connections (he was a professor for several
years at the University of Havana), his former membership in the French
Communist Party, and his key role in the present Euro-terrorist upsurge,
it would be an error to label Debray a "KGB agent." Debray is acting on
behalf of Soviet Russian state policy because his controllers within the
French Synarchist circles are acting out their strategic deal with Moscow.
(The Synarchy was the secret racist organization which spawned both
the Nazi and communist movements in France in the 1920s, '30s, and
'40s.)
The most prominent among the "old families" directing Debray's
treachery is the Schlumberger family, Swiss Protestants who founded the
16th-century Banque Schlumberger, Neufliz, Mallet, and one of the
principal financial backers of the Mitterrand presidential campaign. The
Schlumbergers have been a controlling factor in every "jacobin" move-
ment in France since the time of the French Revolution, including the
French Communist and Socialist parties today. Nevertheless Schlum-
berger heiress Dominique Schlumberger de Menil, a resident of Houston,
Texas, is a converted Sufi dervish and a leading patroness of avowed
Hitler-lover and Muslim Brotherhood fanatic Ahmed Ben Bella. Madame
de Menil's deceased husband, Jean de Menil, was a board member and
shareholder in the Permindex Corporation of Montreal, named as the
masterminds of the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy,
and a proven funding conduit for the Synarchist Secret Army Organi-
zation (OAS) assassination plots against French President General Charles
de Gaulle throughout the early 1960s.
The terrorist apparatus unleashed against the population of Western
The terrorist core Europe by Moscow is operating on three distinguishable, but interfaced
levels.
1) The control. The precision targeting of critical components of the
NATO command is being accomplished through detailed intelligence
beyond the capacities of the terrorist underground acting alone. This
intelligence-typified by the access to the NATO secret pipeline map
and the identification and profiling of Audran and Zimmermann-is the
kind of information only accessible through state security services with
the depth of operational capabilities of a KGB or Stasi.
Next to the Warsaw Pact intelligence services themselves, the most
important official intelligence service exerting control over the European
targeted terrorist infrastructure is the Syrian. Deeply interpenetrated into
Geidar Aliyev's "Islamintern," Syrian intelligence was also the postwar
product of the Lausanne, Switzerland-centered Nazi (Malmo) Interna-
tional, through Alois Brunner, the number two figure in the Syrian foreign
ministry and a wartime Nazi SS official.
Through the Syrian-Turkish opium mafia colony in Aleppo on the
Turkish border, a tight interlock exists to the Bulgarian-Turkish black
market route into Eastern and Western Europe and to the Swiss dirty-
money centers. Aleppo is also a point of intersection with sections of
Israeli intelligence linked to former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.
Through this channel, Israeli arms sales to Ayatollah Khomeini have
been facilitated and "mutually beneficial" terrorist operations conducted
by Syria and Israel. Exemplary of the latter is Syria's ongoing assassination
spree against the Saudi-backed moderate faction of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization (PLO) associated with chairman Yasser Arafat.
U. S. intelligence specialists are projecting an increasing role by sections
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of the Israeli Mossad in Moscow's terrorist deployment against NATO.
Since December 1984, when Soviet asset Armand Hammer made a visit
to Tel Aviv en route to Moscow, the Soviet-Israeli back-channels have
been burning up in preparation for a fundamental shift in relations be-
tween the two countries. Hammer and Sharon, according to Israeli sources,
are seeking to work out a modus vivendi between Russia and Israel. In
early January, an unusual summit took place quietly in Teheran between
top officials of the Soviet KGB, the Mossad, and British intelligence,
concerning detailed plans to shut the United States out of the Persian
Gulf.
The potential for such an Israeli double-cross has grave implications
for the European terrorist efforts. The Mossad has virtual carte blanche
to operate in the Federal Republic of Germany, literally controlling the
Frankfurt International Airport, running the pornography district of
Frankfurt, and enjoying the right to kill with impunity on West German
soil. The number-two man in East German intelligence, Marcus Wolf,
is believed to have close ties to the Mossad.
2) The "terrorist scene. " In September 1984, at the outset of the NATO
Autumn Reforger manuevers, the West German "peace" movement, in
one 24-hour period, cemented shut nearly every "shape charge hole" in
every bridge and tunnel in the Federal Republic. The holes are part of
the defense of Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion, permitting quick
demolition of key bridge and tunnel access of Russian tank and armored
personnel carrier columns into West Germany.
This sabotage action starkly illustrates the link between the broad-
based terrorist and pro-terrorist "scene" and the Soviet spetsnaz ("special
designation") units.
During the spring of 1984, European newspapers reported that Soviet
and Bulgarian specially equipped TIR trucks, driven by spetsnaz drivers,
had conducted a thorough profiling of the highway, bridge, and tunnel
system of continental Western Europe, as part of the Kremlin's updating
of its invasion plans. It is virtually certain that the TIR surveillance-
reconnaisance missions provided the intelligence data for the "peace
movement" sabotage.
The broad-based pro-terrorist "scene" has 2,000-10,000 members ca-
pable of being mobilized for actions ranging from demonstrations to low-
grade bombings and other sabotage. These activists provide a cover for
KGB operations and ensure that Western counterterrorist resources are
stretched to the limit. The role played by West Germany's Green Party
in these pro-terrorist networks is central; indeed, the toleration of an
East bloc-dominated neo-Nazi movement within Western Europe is the
single greatest breach of NATO security.
3) The spetsnaz teams. It is the Soviet professional sabotage and as-
sassination teams which are carrying out the most sophisticated terrorist
attacks, including the Audran and Zimmermann assassinations and the
pipeline bombings. Local pro-terrorist circles are normally kept in the
dark about operational details.
While the past year's exposure of the Soviet spetsnaz squads served a
valuable educational purpose, one dangerous false impression was com-
municated, particularly through a Soviet defector source code-named
Viktor Suvorov. That was the false report that spetsnaz training and
membership is restricted to Russian nationals and predominantly to Slavs.
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Under the Aliyev "foreign nationalities" program, foreign nationals have
been fully integrated into the spetsnaz apparatus.
Within this effort, spetsnaz "cells" are known to he operative within
the IRA, the ASALA, and the Basque ETA. Since the 198 3 car-bombing
of the U. S. embassies in Beirut and Kuwait, at least a section of t 1. S.
intelligence has viewed the Islamic jihad group as a virtual "key and
code" for Middle East-based units of the expanded spetsnaz.
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5.2 Soviet Surrogates Provide
48 Months of Pre-War Assassinations
and Sabotage
The Soviet capability to perpetrate assassinations and sabotage is not
limited to the professional cadres of the spetsnaz, or even the Third World
liberationists with their diplomas from Patrice Lumumba University in
Moscow. When Marshal Ogarkov asks, as he did in a November 1984
article with reference to the President of the United States, "Are there
no forces in the world capable of tying the hands of these maniacs, who
hang the sword of death over the world?"-the forces ready to respond
are many more, and more far-flung, than those.
These forces comprise old communist networks carried forward from
the Communist International and now embedded within the so-called
peace movement; the capabilities of Syrian intelligence and Libya's
Muammar Qaddafi; layer upon layer of cultish groups, which may be
identified as gnostic or synarchist; surviving "Old Nazi" networks, adopted
and cultivated by Soviet agencies after the war; countless societies-
more often than not, sponsored by the Benedictine Order-agitating in
favor of the rights of "indigenous" or "endangered" peoples; and so forth.
Their capability is to carry out not just 48 hours of sabotage at military
installations, but 48 months of assassinations and blind terror, which by
disrupting governments and terrorizing populations, is every bit as much
a prewar deployment as the proverbial "last minute" spetsnaz operation
before a military attack. In the early 1980s, we have witnessed wave
upon wave of this terrorism, which is a vital component of the Ogarkov
Plan.
We stress: What is involved is by no means the mere recruitment of
terrorists and cycling of them through Moscow, or Leipzig, or Tashkent-
as much of that as does go on.
When Geidar Aliyev, the Shi'ite Muslim-bom Politburo member, calls
for improved exploitation of "spiritual factors" in Soviet society (appli-
cable also abroad), he is talking about what the Russian Empire has
teamed and manipulated over centuries of expansion. The Soviet Institute
of Orientology, whose director, Yevgenii Primakov, sneered at the West-
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The case of the
Middle East
em mis-estimation of the Iranian Revolution as a short-lived "explosion
of fanaticism," dates from the eighteenth century.
Thus, to fathom the Soviet role in any given terrorist atrocity-the
assassination of Indira Gandhi, for instance-and to identify, for the
purpose of prevention, the potential for new terrorist acts, it pays to
begin with a look at what the Slavophiles and the Occult Bureau of the
Okhrana (Tsarist secret police) were doing in the relevant region during
the nineteenth century, and how those activities intersected those of the
continental European and British oligarchy. The institutions, groups,
and individuals whose pedigree is tracked from such an investigation,
are the greatest, least-noticed component of the Soviets' hidden capability
for terrorism. These are the personnel, who conduct what is known to
insiders of the intelligence craft as "derivative operations."
"Derivative operations" are the domain of a special kind of organization,
which has grown up out of the underworld of "back channels," which
thrive in the cracks between the Western and Soviet bloc intelligence
services. The massive participation of the Bulgarian intelligence ser-
vices-and the KGB itself, according to the latest statements of the
gunman, Mehmet Ali Agca-in aiding the attempted assassination of
Pope John Paul II in 1981, was a product of such a "derivative operation,"
a plot in the cracks between certain powerful Western oligarchs and the
Bulgarian government. In the Gandhi assassination, the "derivative op-
eration" lay between the cracks of British and Soviet intelligence, in
Sikh separatist Jagjit Singh Chauhan's travels between Britain and Tash-
kent, during the 1970s; and it began with the "Great Game" of British
and Russian empires in Southwest and South Asia a hundred years ago.
In the Middle East, the secret source of Soviet capabilities is the Nazi-
Communist alliance: Soviet financing and deployment of old Nazi net-
works were preserved and expanded after World War II. The suicide
bombings throughout the region, the assassinations of statesmen and
politicians, and even the main tensions-the so-called Arab-Israeli con-
flict-remain a mystery, until it is understood that at the center of these
events lies the Nazi International, alive and well. Coordinated and fi-
nanced from Switzerland, these Nazi networks are fully integrated with
Soviet deployments, giving the Soviets a range of capabilities still enor-
mously underestimated both by Western intelligence agencies and by
nations in the area.
This Soviet use of Nazis is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, official
U.S. Embassy documents report that by no later than 1951, the Soviet
Union was coordinating closely with "a secret international organization
composed of former SS officers and partially financed by the Soviets.
They are supposed to work with the Russians against the Western orbit"
(quoted by Glenn B. Infield in Skorzeny: Hitler's Commando).
In turn, the Nazi networks interface the other crucial component of
Soviet capabilities-the shared networks of the British Secret Intelligence
Service's (SIS) Arab Bureau. British circles, of the same oligarchical
faction as Lord Carrington today, protected leading Nazis from hanging
at Nuremberg, and redeployed them into the Middle East after the war.
A few dramatic cases illustrate this ugly Soviet-Nazi-British Arab Bu-
reau connivance.
One of the top Middle East controllers for the Nazi International is
Francois Genoud, active in the area since his work for German military
intelligence, the Abwehr, beginning in 1936. Genoud's lawyer, Jacques
Verges, has been a KGB operative since his early days as a communist
in the Anti-Colonialist Student Union in Paris in 1950. Verges is cur-
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rently also the lawyer for Klaus Barbie, the Gestapo butcher recently
extradited from Latin America.
One of Genoud's leading associates from the Abwehr days, a fellow
Swiss who converted to Islam, Ahmed Huber, frequently travels to Leip-
zig, East Germany, one of the main training centers for Soviet bloc
operations in the Arab world. For many years Huber was the accredited
correspondent of ADN, the official East German news service, in Beme,
Switzerland.
The chief Soviet client state in the Middle East, Syria, was entirely
organized in the postwar period by leading SS and Gestapo officials,
including by means of one coup run by SS Col. Skorzeny, Hitler's Sab-
otage Division chief. The top adviser to Syrian intelligence and the Assad
brothers has been SS Haupsturmfuehrer Alois Brunner, also foreign affairs
adviser to the neo-Nazi Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS), founded by Hitler-
admirer Antun Saadeh.
A top Arabist in the Soviet Foreign Ministry after the war, responsible
for the 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal contracted through Czechoslo.
vakia, was Dr. Fritz Grobba, a convert to Islam who had previously been
the leading Mideast specialist for the Auswartiges Amt, Hitler's Foreign
Office, beginning in the 1930s and continuing throughout the war. In
1941, Grobba was on-the-scene adviser to the pro-Nazi coup of Rashid
Ali Geilani in Iraq. After his post-war stint in Moscow, Grobba returned
West and resided in West Germany.
From the mid- 1960s on, one of the Soviet gamemasters for the Middle
East has been KGB General Kim Philby, son of top British Arabist St.
John Philby. Philby, like his father, was notorious as a Nazi sympathizer
in Britain and in his pro-Franco coverage of the Spanish Civil War, at
the same time he was an operative of the OGPU, predecessor of the
KGB.
Lebanese Communist Party chief George Hawi, who consults regularly
with Boris Ponomaryov, Soviet Central Committee Secretary in charge
of the International Department of the Soviet communist party's Central
Committee, otherwise travels in the company of Abdullah Saadeh, head
of the fascist PPS, and son of its founder.
At United Nations-sponsored events on the Middle East, top Soviet
specialists on the Islamic world, Vladimir Vinogradov of the Foreign
Ministry and Soviet Orientology Institute head Primakov, have been
observed fraternizing with such figures as Salam Azzam of the London-
based Arab Bureau front, the Islamic Council of Europe; with Nazi-
financed radicals of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP); and with the "highly respectable" members of the Geneva-based
Islam and the West organization, one of whose founders was Marouf
Dawalibi, chief aide in Berlin from 1941-45 to the top Nazi Arab agent,
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.
Ahmed Huber, the alumnus of Abwehr Division II (Sabotage) during
the war and some-time employee of the East German telegraph agency,
has spoken of a great commonality of interests, between the old Nazis
and the "peace-loving" Soviets.' He participated, according to records
of French intelligence, in a July 1982 meeting of predominantly North
African Muslims in Paris. The pictures on the wall set the tone of the
'Review the careers of the Grand Mufti, of Skorzeny, of Genoud and his network-
bearing in mind all the while, that the Third Reich was consciously modeled on the
"Third Rome" ideology of Russian imperialists-and the essence of Nazi-Communist
terrorism begins to emerge.
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gathering: a large picture, of Ayatollah Khomeini and of the Grand Mufti
of Jerusalem, Hitler's main Arab ally.
The perspective of Nazi-Communist Huber, according to reports of
journalists who spoke with him in 1983, was that the coming year "should
see the real Muslims taking over the Islamic world. We have to do away
with the corrupt and the unbelievers like Arafat, Saddam Hussein, Mu-
barak, and the hypocrites of the Saudi monarchy who claim to represent
Islam. Today the Iranian Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini is
the true inheritor of the ideas of the Grand Mufti. We have to work for
a universal community of Believers!"
By the spring of 1985, Huber's vision had come a long way towards
realization. In the first week of March, a "World Council of the Islamic
Revolution" was created in Teheran, with the stated purpose of reuniting
the Sunni and Shi'ite branches of Islam-on the basis of the irrationalist
Islamic fundamentalism, which produces the drivers of car-bombs on
suicide missions. The 1980 book Hostage to Khomeini, written by EIR's
Middle East desk staff, provoked an outcry, with its assertion that the
secret, British-created Muslim Brotherhood cult organization of Hassan
al Banna was the key to the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Muslim Broth-
erhood is a Sunni organization, some criticism ran; it could have no
influence over a movement that was predominantly Shi'ite. After all,
the difference between Shi'ism and Sunnism is the equivalent of the split
between Catholicism and Protestantism.
But our point was, that so-called Islamic fundamentalism is essentially
a pre-Islamic, irrationalist cult, created on the basis of ancient Sufi belief
and brainwashing structures insinuated into Islam. Moreover, this revived
Sufism is the key to a broader "fundamentalist" revival, affecting Chris-
tianity as well. The common goal of this revived Sufism, whether in
Islamic or Christian garb, is the destruction of the modem nation-state.
Sufi, or-more broadly-gnostic, irrationalism is the unifying philo-
sophical basis of agreement among the Nazis, British SIS Arab Bureau,
and the Soviet players of the "Islamic Card," under the Shi'ite Geidar
Aliyev.
Where Sufism is involved, Nazis will not be far behind. (Heinrich
Himmler, in establishing both a training program and a belief structure
for the SS, consciously modeled the order on the Jesuits, themselves
directly modeled on the Sufi brotherhoods of the Middle East by Jesuit
founder Ignatius Loyola, from the time of his training in Paris under the
gnostic crusader order, the Hospitallers of St. John. A leading strain of
Nazi theory-race "science"-was adopted in large measure from the
writings of self-styled Count de Gobineau, author of Philosophy in Central
Asia and a leading Sufi propagandist.)
While Huber's 1982 meeting was taking place, printing presses were
already active in several parts of the Islamic world producing in Arabic,
Turkish, and other languages, the latest editions of Hitler's Mein Kampf,
scores of which had been found by the Israelis in certain quarters in
Beirut after the June, 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In February 1983,
Soviet asset Muammar Qaddafi, the dictator of Libya, told the French
daily Le Matin: "Hitler was right! He understood that the Jews were a
deadly threat to the German nation. He had to eliminate them."
Soviet sponsorship of assets calling for a Hitler revival and a "final
solution" for the Jews is not some side effect of the Soviet use of these
assets, but a lawful outcome of the Soviets' own beliefs and policy. Every
Qaddafi statement on killing the Jews, every old Nazi longing for the
final solution, is directly encouraged by Soviet leaders like General A.
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The Soviet
cult-masters
Yepishev, commissar of the Soviet Armed Forces, who promote a revival
of Great Russian chauvinism with all its worst features, including vile
anti-Semitism.
The master at pointing all kinds of religious fervor and blood-and-soil
cultism in "an anti-imperialist direction" is Aliyev. But with the upgraded
exploitation of "spiritual factors" by the Andropov-Aliyev KGB, many
more elements of the old Communist International apparat and the Soviet
Academy of Sciences institutions have come into the fray.
Andropov, Aliyev & Co., cultural warfare experts, draw heavily on
the legacy of the Communist International's Baku Congress, described
in Part 3 of this report.
The legacy of Baku found its way into Western Europe, too, where
we find Soviet operatives, once again, sharing tea with the European
"black" oligarchy. Comintemist Karl Radek went from Baku to attend
the founding conference of a League of Oppressed Peoples in Berlin, with
the German Graf von Reventlow, a "monarcho-marxist" whose wife,
Fanny von Reventlow, ran a group called Children of the Sun, in Ascona,
Switzerland. For Radek, this kind of liaison was nothing out of the
ordinary; of all the Bolsheviks, he was the closest to a prototype of a
"Nazi-Communist" and he hand-picked the leadership of the Communist
Party of Germany (KPD), which was to help the Nazis come to power.
Fanny Reventlow's Ascona center was attended not only by the An-
throposoph leader Rudolf Steiner and the future Nazi Rudolf Hess, but
by a prominent French Sufi mystic, Louis Massignon-later the teacher
of Russian emigre Count Alexandre Bennigsen, peddler of Islamic fun-
damentalism as a potent weapon against the U.S.S.R.
The modem version of Reventlow's league is the Society for Endan-
gered Peoples, a control-point for separatist terrorism in Europe. Those
of the "endangered peoples" support networks who clothe themselves in
scholarly garb, may be found in intimate dialogue with the staff of Yulian
Bromley's Soviet Institute of Ethnography.
A 1976 conference of Soviet and Western anthropologists, attended
by Bromley and top British ethnographer Ernest Gellner, was sponsored
by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and held
at its Burg Wartenstein castle in Austria; originally known as The Viking
Fund, this foundation had been endowed in 1941 by Swedish industrialist
Axel Wenner-Gren, who was so notorious a supporter of the Nazis that
hardly a single American anthropologist would take its money after the
war.
In 1939, the future Wenner-Gren Foundation activist Paul Fejos led
an anthropological expedition to Peru, where his studies of indigenous
Indian culture fed into a corpus of work, the result of which is the epidemic
of "indigenist" terrorism, epitomized by the murderous Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) guerrillas in that country today. There was a Soviet and
Comintern part in this project, too; the full name of the guerrilla gang
is the "Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui," after the founder
of the Peruvian Communist Party, whose works served as "bible" for the
anthropologists who built up the indigenist cult. In the 1920s, Mariategui
sojourned in Europe, in the milieu of Radek, imbibing the primitivist
doctrines of Soviet Russia's culture commissar, Anatolii Lunacharskii.
Today, Anatolii Shulgovskii of Moscow's Latin America Institute writes
that the "Indian question" is the central issue of revolutionary struggle
in Ibero-America, that "the characteristic trait of Latin America today
is the broad incorporation of the indigenous masses into the liberation
movement." Shulgovskii especially praised the work of one Nilo Ceyu-
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queo, an adviser to the executive committee of the Congress of Indian
Movements of South America, founded in 1980. The manifesto of that
group contains a list of indigenist principles, marking it as a movement
directed against nation states, and toward the destruction of the people
on whose behalf it is allegedly fighting. For example, it defends the coca
leaf, the widely-used brain-dulling drug, as "for the Andean peoples a
bible provided by a sacred divining power; it is for this reason that it is
used in the ceremonies, the offerings to Mother Earth, Father Sun and
the other natural divinities."
The glorification of mother-cult practices that hold a population in
bondage to its own backwardness, barring the road to economic and
cultural progress, is the hallmark of the "cultural relativism" that is
hegemonic in anthropology and ethnography, Soviet included-the same
way of thinking, which led the American Museum of Natural History
in New York at one time to display the stuffed bodies of captured human
beings, Eskimos.
There is hardly an ethnic sub-group anywhere inside or outside the
U.S.S.R. that has escaped scrutiny by the brigades of ethnographers from
Bromley's Institute of Ethnography. On the home front, this means studies
like Sufism in Turkmenia, From the History of Buryat Shamanism, and
Khorezm Legends as a Source Material for the Study of the History of Religious
Cults of Soviet Central Asia. Abroad, they look at such matters as: Small
Peoples of Southern Asia, Indians and Pakistanis Abroad, Ethnic Processes
in the Countries of South America, Small Peoples of Indonesia, Malaysia and
the Philippines, Symbolism of Cults and Rituals of the Peoples of Asia (the
U.S.S.R. Excluded), The Church and the Oligarchy in Latin America, 1810-
1959, The Maronites, and so forth. Their work has been turned to account
by the KGB in Southwest Asia, Europe, Latin America, and wherever
else separatism and separatist terrorism suit Soviet purposes.
Recommended reading
EIR Special Report, How Moscow Plays the Muslim Card in the Middle
East (1984); detailed history of Nazi-Soviet collaboration in the Middle
East.
EIR Special Report, European Terrorism: The Soviets' Pre-War Deploy-
ment (1985).
Mexican Labor Party, The PAN: Moscow's Terrorists in Mexico (1985);
includes history of the Synarchist movement, where Nazis and Com-
munists cross paths once again.
EIR Special Report, Narco-Terrorism in Ibero-America (1984).
EIR, Vol. 12, No. 14, "Syria's role as the center of world terrorism."
EIR, Vol. 12, No. 20, "Behind the conspiracy to create a unified,
fundamentalist Islam."
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6. The Soviet Plan of Attack
Soviet doctrine, and patterns of build-up of capabilities and military
exercises coincide, to the following effect. Under the maximum option
provided by the current Soviet war-plan, the Ogarkov Plan, the Soviets
will launch World War III from a standing start, without what would be
revealing forms of pre-assault mobilizations and deployments from bar-
racks.
This means, that all Soviet nuclear weapons and antisatellite weapons
would be deployed simultaneously:
1) U.S. territory would be targeted for successive echelons of "first
strike" thermonuclear assault, with the first to arrive being an
SLBM barrage exploding over U.S. territory within several min-
utes of the beginning of the general assault, followed by arrival
of successive waves of initial and reload salvos of ICBMs.
2) There would be a simultaneous assault against all U.S. nuclear
submarines, aided by continuous tracking of these over an ex-
tended period prior to assault.
3) There would be a simultaneous assault against all European and
Mediterranean targets by intermediate- and short-range missiles,
and reload fire of these missiles to provide cover for deployment
of general assault forces under cover of nuclear artillery.
4) Under the cover of nuclear-artillery and supplementary missile
bombardments, there would be a general, coordinated, naval,
land, and vertical troop-assault against the territory of Western
Europe, leading into the occupation of Bristol, England, by Mar-
shal Ogarkov personally, within about 14 days of the general
assault.
The U.S. territorial targets of thermonuclear bombardment include
the following prime targets:
1) Pin down all U. S. thermonuclear capability, and destroy as much
as possible, by successive pin-down and destruction assaults, with
initial and following reload salvos, and destruction of the U. S.
nuclear-submarine fleet.
2) Destroy all U.S. Atlantic port-cities through which reenforce-
ment of forces in Western Europe might be attempted, such as
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Hampton Roads
area, Savannah, and New Orleans.
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Unless the United States is operating on a "launch on warning" tar-
geting of, especially, the territory of Muscovy and its prized Siberian
assets, giving an assured penalty in excess of "acceptable penalties of
victory" for Soviet war-plans, such a first-strike attack, launched by 1988,
would ensure a victory for Soviet forces, with virtually assured immediate
surrender by governments of Western Europe and the United States.
This plan of attack presumes not only the capability for launching the
assault to this effect, but also deployment of measures of active and
passive Soviet ballistic missile defense.
In the matter of active defense, it is clear that the Soviets are presently
relying upon a combination of antisatellite technology plus very crude
but effective thermonuclear means against U. S. missiles: saturating the
exoatmosphere with neutron and EMP densities sufficient to neutralize
the greater portion of U.S. missiles, plus some degree of first-generation
point-defense forms of ground-based ballistic missile defense.
In the matter of passive defense, Soviet civil defense approaches that
of Switzerland, whereas civil defense is virtually non-existent in Western
Europe and the United States. An important factor is the medical com-
ponent of Soviet civil defense, including deployment of medical services
and mass inoculations of the population. Aided by a state-by-state cam-
paign conduited through the ACLU, the formerly prevailing programs
of inoculation of school-children in the United States are becoming
almost non-existent. The vulnerability of the United States to biological
warfare is increasing rapidly, whereas Soviet defenses in this respect are
rapidly improving.
Documentation: See Appendix on general principles of use of neutron-
fluxes and electromagnetic pulses (EMP) as BMD modes.
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7. Keys to U.S.A. and NATO
Counter-Strategy
The two key problems to be solved, representing the cornerstones of an
Atlantic counter-strategy, are 1) Exo- and endoatmospheric defense against
Soviet missiles and nuclear artillery, and 2) Deployment of enhanced-
radiation battlefield weapons against Soviet naval and ground assault
forces.
It must be stressed afresh, especially in light of some very foolish
chattering among some news media, politicians, and systems analysts,
that there are no perfect weapons-systems either of offense or defense.
Contrary to old theories of set-piece warfare demolished in 1806 on the
battlefield at Jena, the efficient planning and conduct of warfare is a
matter of constant improvisation in firepower and mobility, in an en-
vironment of forced-draft technological attrition in design and effec-
tiveness of weapons-systems and tactics. All competent planning and
conduct of warfare is of the form of "crash program" mobilization and
deployment, whose product is a rapid-fire succession of improvisations
merely approximating the optimal result sought assymptotically.
The object of defensive counter-strategy is to administer, by successive
improvisations, a sufficient penalty to the assault, to impose unacceptable
degrees of losses in vital self-interests to the assaulting power. The essence
of assault, is to win and survive warfare with acceptable degrees of losses;
the same applies to the defense. The essence of both is mobile devel-
opment of capabilities, both in space and in technology of firepower and
mobility: to gain freedom of continuing action in depth, at the expense
of relatively reduced freedom of action and depth of opposing forces.
The essence of battle is not the battle itself, but the results of the battle
respecting the larger matters of freedom of action in depth.
If the defending power can contain the assaulting power's freedom of
action sufficiently, the balance of advantage shifts to the defending power,
which is then able to deploy counterassault against the constrained op-
ponent. Thus, a nominally inferior force, with superior freedom of action,
may defeat a nominally superior force.
If we can exhaust the adversary's assault capabilities, by means which
minimize the penalities we suffer as a defending power, and can exhaust
the adversary's capabilities sufficiently that his freedom of action is weak-
ened significantly relative to our own, we survive and win the conflict.
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If our adversary is militarily rational, as the Soviet military command is,
and if he knows that we have such a potential advantage, he will not
launch war under those conditions, unless we give him no option but
that of launching the war despite the known risk.
Limiting ourselves, for a moment, to the issue of weapons systems.
The advantage is determined by three factors: firepower, mobility, and
relative cheapness. If we can provide the defense with greater mobility
and firepower for destroying assaulting forces than those assaulting forces
represent, and if we can destroy a unit of assaulting force more cheaply
than that unit can be produced and deployed, then the defense has an
implicitly absolute superiority to the offense.
For example: How many of a flotilla of Soviet missiles can be neutralized
by the detonation of one average thermonuclear warhead of defense
detonated exoatmospherically in ballistic missile defense? Or, how many
of a flotilla of Soviet missiles can be destroyed by an average, nuclear-
powered array of x-ray laser beams? What is the cost of deploying the
defensive weapon, as compared with the cost of producing and deploying
the flotilla of assault-missiles it destroys? What is the firepower and
mobility of the defensive system, relative to the firepower represented
by the combined production, deploying, and attempted anti-BMD de-
fenses of the assault-missile flotilla?
If the defense can deploy greater firepower and mobility than the
offense, and deploy this more cheaply, then, given approximately equal
total efforts, the defense wins. If the defense wins by a sufficiently large
margin, then the offensive capability of the defense will next be able to
overwhelm the attacking power with a counteroffensive. Soviet spies are
very industrious and numerous, and the Soviet military command is
rational in these technicalities of war-planning; if they discover that we
have a margin of effective defense adequate to neutralize the war-winning
margin of a "rolling first strike" assault, they will postpone the launching
of warfare accordingly.
We must educate the politicians and others to recognize, that under
this universe, there exists no absolute offense, nor perfect defense, as
there exists neither irresistable force nor immovable object. Only the
lawfulness of the ordering of the laws of the universe is unchangeable,
such that everything of lesser degree, including the largest galaxy, can
be moved or dissipated as a matter of principle.
It is the rather obvious corollary of this, that it is a self-deception, to
imagine that we must first perfect the application of one technique, before
advancing to a superior technology. There is nothing which can be
accomplished by improving the application of a lesser technology, which
could not be accomplished better with even a fairly crude application of
a most advanced technology. In economic science, "better" signifies
advances in the productive powers of labor; in military applications, we
describe "productivity" as "firepower" and "mobility," or, the same thing,
as "relative freedom of action."
We must situate the task of developing a ballistic missile defense, and
defense against ground and naval assault, and other forms of airborne
assault, not as a task of perfecting any particular set of technologies, but
rather as a rapid-fire succession of successively more advanced technol-
ogies. Rather than pausing at each stage of technology, to perfect the
application of those principles, we must race ahead to the next higher
technology as soon as we have deployed even relatively crude applications
of the technology now in hand.
Consider simple illustrations of the point from ordinary economics.
The idea of a piston-engine fired by fossil fuel is now more than 300
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years old; the first outline of the principles of this engine was developed
by Gottfried Leibniz's collaborator, Christian Huyghens, during the sev-
enteenth century. During the past decades, we have behaved very fool-
ishly, trying to perfect automobiles based on the variety of internal
combustion engine currently in general use. Instead of wasting tens of
billions of dollars on emission controls for present designs of internal
combustion engines, we could have developed engines which bum meth-
ane, or better, hydrogen, as a fuel; the waste-product of well-organized
methane oxidation is water and carbon dioxide, whereas the waste-
product of well-organized hydrogen combustion is water, which is not
exactly a pollutant of air.
Similarly, the failure to improve railway systems, has given us excessive
dependency upon highway motor vehicles, as well as a worsening air-
traffic problem. Inherently, we can move passengers and freight more
cheaply by modern technologies in rail transport, than by air or highway
vehicles, and if we take into account the time lost in travel to and from
airports, over distances of about 250 miles or less, between population-
centers, the elapsed time of travel from starting-point to destination
between cities, can be readily less by rail transport than by air-transport.
Some argue that the combined convenience and cost of using auto-
mobiles to the purchaser, militates against investment in improved rail-
transport between cities and against greater use of intra-urban rapid
transit. This narrow view overlooks the real cost to society of operating
the motor vehicle, including such costs as highway construction and
maintenance, urban traffic management, and pollution, for example.
Had we not tolerated the foolish policy of failing to develop and
maintain mass-transit rail-systems, we would have discovered that the
very large concentration of travel costs in mass-transit systems would
have already created the preconditions for superseding simple rail roadbeds
of the type now in use, by new technologies such as magnetic levitation.
The gains in economy, and social benefit of personal time saved, would
have been so great, that it would have been foolish to continue to improve
systems based on present designs of railway networks, when more ad-
vanced technologies would enable us to accomplish the same end-result
cheaper and better. In automotive production, better materials, such as
ceramics, new combustion-systems, would give us a better, cheaper, safer,
and more durable product, than efforts to perfect existing modes of
automotive design.
In military science, the urgency of this recommended policy confronts
us more forcefully. Whenever we have the choice of perfecting existing
technologies, or racing ahead to develop improvised applications of more
advanced technologies, the improvisation of more advanced technologies
is always the correct choice of policy. Whenever we catch ourselves
lingering over the idea of perfecting an existing technology in use, we
must become suspicious that our military adversary may be bypassing us,
developing a crude but workable improvisation of a more advanced tech-
nology, by aid of which he may defeat us.
In both economics and military science, advances in productivity or
advances in firepower and mobility, have a very simple rule-of-thumb
measurement: increase of both the amount of usable energy per-capita,
and increasingly coherent application of higher energy-flux densities in
applications. It should not be astonishing that we measure productivity
and increase of firepower and mobility in the same terms; they are ul-
timately the same thing. Firepower and mobility are essentially nothing
but the application of the principle of increased productivity to the
battlefield. Moreover, the ability to deploy superior firepower and mobility
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depends upon the technological level and scale of productivity in depth
in the economy producing the means of warfare.
In economy, the principle of success is not that of achieving some
fixed level of technology, of productivity, but, rather, of achieving a rate
of increase of the level of technology, of productivity. In the preparations
for, and conduct of modem warfare, the precondition for superiority is
not perfection of fixed types of weapons-systems, but, rather, a rapid
increase in the level of technology-of fire-power and mobility-achieved
during the entire span of the process of preparations for and conduct of
that protracted war-fighting. A high rate of technological progress, in
depth and scale, in the economy, is the precondition for achieving high
rates of improvised progress in firepower and mobility in the conduct of
war-fighting.
The process of developing a defense adequate to outweigh the Soviet
offense, must be viewed, not as the production and deployment of a fixed
array of weapons-systems in a fixed way, but as a more fluid process of
successive improvisations, and this on an ever-more-extended scale at
an accelerating pace.
One of the more frequent objections to Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense,
Tactical defense is the argument that successful ballistic missile defense, by weighing
against Nuclear Deterrence, introduces once again the possibility of fight-
ing protracted forms of generalized warfare. This objection is more fre-
quently met in Europe than in the United States, for the obvious reason
that it is on the battlefields of Europe that Soviet general assault must
be faced.
This kind of objection to SDI is flawed on two principal accounts.
Immediately, it overlooks the fact, that the "new physical principles"
essential to SDI have immediate and obvious applications to defense
against naval and land assault. Secondly, it overlooks the fact, that a
return to the possibility of general warfare fought by soldiers, is a most
desirable reversal of recent decades trends in capabilities and doctrines.
The folly of much influential Western military thinking on these points,
is most directly and forcefully illustrated by examining the development
of Soviet strategic doctrine and war-plans since Marshal V. D. Sokolov-
skii's 1962 book on this subject. Soviet military thinking throughout the
postwar period to date, has concentrated upon effecting developments
in both thermonuclear offense and defense which permit Soviet com-
manders to bring the Soviet ground-forces into play as the decisive weapon
of winning wars. What frightens European commanders most, is the
prospect that loss of the nuclear-deterrence umbrella would unlock the
floodgates for Soviet armored assault, the much-cited vast inferiority of
the Atlantic Alliance to the Soviets in terms of so-called conventional
war-fighting capabilities.
If we compare the male populations of combat-age of the two opposing
alliances, we must deem absurd the notion that the Warsaw Pact should
have an intrinsic superiority in so-called conventional capabilities. On
condition that deployed and reserve forces of the Atlantic Alliance na-
tions are maintained at acceptable levels of quality, the vast superiority
of the combined economies of the OECD Western nations over the
Soviet economy 15 years ago, ought to have shown that the end of the
nuclear-deterrence umbrella should have been greatly to the advantage
of the Atlantic Alliance. The difference is, that the Soviets have de-
veloped their total war-fighting capability, while the Atlantic Alliance
has relied so much on the mythical nuclear umbrella, that it has allowed
its total war-fighting capability to collapse.
Even with no more than readily feasible alterations in total Atlantic
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The myth of
`War to End War'
Alliance capabilities, over the coming three to five years, an effective
policy of strategic ballistic missile defense can be complemented by a
total war-winning potential for the Atlantic Alliance. Not only does
BMD apply as immediately to the endoatmospheric trajectories of me-
dium- and short-range missiles, as to exoatmospheric ICBMs. The same
technologies have ready application to ground-warfare problems of de-
fense. The case of the use of the so-called neutron bomb as an infantry-
weapon of defense against armored assault, illustrates the general prin-
ciple.
The advantage of the neutron bomb, and other varieties of enhanced-
radiation devices, is that it destroys exposed armored and other assaulting
forces over large areas, while leaving such a low residue of radioactivity,
that defending troops can immediately counterattack through the regions
over which the devices have been detonated. It is inherently a means
of defense, since it is relatively inefficient against troops dug in behind
a shielding yard of ordinary dirt, whereas attacking forces must, inher-
ently, be in the open for such bombardment. Once the adversary's rear-
echelon defense capabilities are significantly neutralized, the counter-
attack is able to carry the battle to the attacker's territory.
It must be emphasized again, that we are not speaking of absolute
weapons, such that with aid of these our forces might advance with
impunity. War remains war, with all the toll that implies for even the
best forces. We are speaking of winning, rather than losing general
warfare, and of the survival of the victorious nations.
During the course of the first World War, the fraudulent piece of rhetoric
was popularized among the Western allies, that that "Great War" was
"A War to End All Wars," representing the massive killing and destruc-
tion of four years in Europe as a noble act of pacifism.
There is only one condition under which warfare could be banned
from our planet. That is the condition under which our planet is composed
of sovereign nation-states, each and all self-governed by Augustinian
principles of natural law. In this condition, and no other condition, the
force of natural law becomes the efficient means by which peoples and
nations arrange the remedy of those injustices which might otherwise be
just cause for wars or insurrections.
Especially absurd, is the popularized doctrine of this century, that war
flows from the egoism of nation-states. This popular delusion requires us
to assume that, since the modern form of sovereign nation-state was
established during the last half of the fifteenth century, there were no
wars on this planet prior to that century.
Contrary to the silly and dangerous delusions of the modern pacifists,
warfare is the most natural condition of diplomacy for as long as nations
echoing the laws of the Chaldean and Roman empires, and of Sparta,
continue to command means adequate to warfare. Such states and pop-
ulations must perpetually seek the destruction of societies echoing the
constitutional principles of Solon. If such states succeeded in eliminating
all republicanism from this planet, such states would make war upon one
another, since the "blood and soil" racialism inherent to the Spartan,
Chaldean, and Roman models of religion, philosophy, and law, requires
the subjugation of many peoples by one people, and are so composed
that by their nature they must proliferate vile injustice upon the greater
portion of humanity.
There can be no end to war until the point is reached, that the heritages
of Spartan, Chaldean, and Roman law are eradicated as a significant
force on this planet.
The pacifists shrilly, hysterically insist, that war is the greatest of all
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evils. On the contrary, it is the second greatest of all evils; the greatest
evil would be the bestialization of mankind through lack of efficient
resistance to the heritage of Chaldean and related religions, philosophies,
and legal doctrines. If no alternative means exist for this purpose, than
warfare is the most justified means which the republican cause must
deploy, to combat the efforts of the Chaldean or similar heritage to
impose its sway upon mankind.
So, today, the Soviet dictatorship and its pacifist fellow-travelers in
the West, argue that submission to Soviet rule were the commendable
alternative to the penalties of attempting to resist Soviet ambitions. Were
we to submit so, for the sake of peace, what then would be the ensuing
condition of all mankind? In particular, the Judeo-Christian heritage of
Western European culture would vanish from this planet, and the Chal-
dean bestiality of Sodom and Gommorah would rule this planet every-
where. To prevent that, war is not only justified, but imperative, if no
efficient alternative can be found.
There can be no durable peace between us and the Soviet empire, so
long as Soviet society shall persist in being an echo of the socialism of
the Diocletian reforms. At best, there can be protracted war-avoidance.
Between the heritages of Solon and Lycurgus, no peaceful accommodation
but the full submission of the one to the will of the other is possible.
Where there is no agreement in law, the law exerts no force; in such a
case, the lack of the force of law renders the decision to the law of force.
Durable war-avoidance can be secured by no means but the adversary's
certainty that should he launch war, he shall not win nor survive that
war.
We of the West, with all our faults, did not destroy the Soviet Union
when we had the overwhelming superiority of force needed to accomplish
such a result. Give the Soviets such a superiority of force, and they will
destroy us, even to the point of obliteration, if we fail to surrender abjectly
to their rule. Therein lies the expression of our moral superiority; we,
at least, sought war-avoidance as a more or less perpetual state of affairs,
awaiting the moral self-betterment of Soviet society. They will not be
so charitable. Against war launched by the Soviets, no law has force but
the law of force.
The Soviets, like their cousins, the Sufi mystics, are essentially irra-
tionalists, whose doctrine of law is the triumphant exertion of the arbitrary
will of a race which deems itself destined to be the ruling imperial race
of this planet. On this account, and other important accounts, there is
no important difference between the present Soviet Nomenklatura and
the leadership of Hitler's Nazis. The logic which the world should have
employed during the 1930s, in dealing with the Nazi menace, is the logic
we must not fail to employ in strategic assessments and related matters
of policy respecting the Soviet menace of today.
Fortunately, the Soviets are less immoral than the cothinkers of the
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the latter the most obscenely evil eruption
existing on this planet today. The Soviets' morality is delimited to the
aspect of their behavior in which they are scientific and rational, a
rationality most efficiently manifest in the military domain. Unlike a
totally irrational form of superstitious Sufi mystic, the Soviet command
will not risk a war unless it can precalculate the winning of such a war
with acceptable losses. The essence of war-avoidance between the su-
perpower blocs, thus reduces essentially to affording the Soviets two key
items in its own strategic calculations: We must deny them the pleasure
of precalculating "victory with acceptable losses," and we must also cause
them to estimate that if they avoid war by postponing its launch, we
shall not threaten the destruction of the Soviet state itself.
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This calculation must be provided the Soviet command through the
only means it can be provided: We must launch immediately a "science-
driver" form of "crash program" comparable to that launched by President
Franklin Roosevelt during the interval 1939-43. We must make such
drastic reforms in monetary and economic policies, as precisely reverse
the trend toward "post-industrial society" unleashed with introduction
of the "Great Society" program of the late 1960s. By shifting our credit
and taxation policies, and our infrastructure-building practices, back to
emphasize employment in production of physical goods, at expense of
administration and intensive mode. The increase in per-capita physical
output, so effected, will enable us to sustain defense-expenditure rates
in the U.S.A. easily in the $400-500 billion annual range. If comparable
shifts in policy occur among our allies, and respecting our trading-partners
of the developing nations, the power of the Alliance will be increased
in amounts and at rates which deter the Soviets from implementing their
war-plans.
In that context of policy-shifts, we must constantly improvise com-
mitments of our existing strategic capabilities, to such effect that the
"first strike" potential of Soviet forces is significantly nullified, forcing
them to a postponement of the projected date of launch of general warfare.
These immediate and continuing improvisations, must be situated in
exploiting the potentialities of shifting the balance of warfare to the
advantage of the defense, through a "science driver" mode of "crash
program" in developing the technologies which supply superior firepower
and mobility to such defense.
There are many who propose that improvements to such effect might
be made gradually over the coming years, and perhaps more fully un-
leashed approximately 1989, when perhaps Vice-President George Bush
succeeds President Reagan. What deluded folly such and comparable
opinion is! Unless we change U.S. monetary, economic, and defense
policies rather immediately, in the directions indicated here, the Soviets
will assuredly be positioned to launch, survive, and win general warfare
as early as 1988. Then, unless we submit, they will launch war. In that
case, President Reagan will be either the last President of the United
States, or the last President to complete a term in office.
We face an ominous Global Showdown with a ruthless, rapidly ad-
vancing Soviet power. Yet, the more ominous showdown we face, is with
ourselves. We can survive, if only we have the wisdom and courage to
effect immediate and sweeping changes in our present monetary, eco-
nomic, and military policies. If we can not face that challenge to our-
selves, history will judge, before the close of this present decade, that
ours was a nation which lost the moral fitness to survive.
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Appendix
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Soviet Coverage of
Lyndon H. LaRouche 1983-85
Soviet and Eastern European coverage of individuals and policies associated
with Lyndon LaRouche increased following President Reagan's March 2 .3,
1983 endorsement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets blame
LaRouche for the adoption of this policy, and for the scientific, technological,
and economic outlook that, if adopted in the West, would ruin current Soviet
designs for world domination.
April 11, 1983. Yugoslavia. Politika Ekspres, a widely circulated afternoon
paper. Article by the news agency Tanjug's Bonn correspondent Milenko
Babic, who interviewed Helga Zepp-LaRouche, chairman of the European
Labor Party and wife of Lyndon LaRouche.
At present, Helga Zepp-LaRouche assuredly proposes . . . the
debt bomb. She affirms: the indebted developing countries are po-
tentially the biggest power of the contemporary world. Finally she
concludes: if it were put to use, this power would accelerate the
building of a new world economic order. . . . A dreamer? Perhaps,
because she has the "prescription for development.". . . She founded
the Club of Life, which is counterposed to the "Malthusianism of
the Club of Rome." The theoretician of her club is her husband,
the otherwise renowned American politician Lyndon La-
Rouche... .
Zepp-LaRouche proposes a "debtors cartel." ...Such a cartel
could declare a moratorium and stop repaying the debts. The IMF
and the financial oligarchy would be forced to accept a global dia-
logue ....The aim? First: Write off the debts of the poorest countries
completely ....Second: For the remaining indebted countries,
transform short-term credits with high interest into long-term credits
with low interest. For her, this is a second step towards recovery.
Third: Having ended the monopoly'over technology, and with its
free transfer to the underdeveloped countries, the new order calls
for creating an alliance of sovereign states for the international
division of labor. For Zepp-LaRouche, this is "the only way for
humanity to survive," since "the depression creates the conditions
for fascism." ...Zepp-LaRouche doesn't pretend to be an altruist.
She openly lectures for capitalism and its interests, but its "genuine
interests." Which are? The West needs new markets, and therefore
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it is foolish to send the Third World into bankruptcy. If you want
to prop up capitalism, you must have strong purchasers. The financial
oligarchy, however, does not work for the benefit of capitalism,
which they are pushing towards suicide. They are less capitalists
than pre-capitalists, precisely oligarchs-that is feudalism, according
to Zepp-LaRouche.
May 1, 1983. Poland. Zycie Warszawy, leading non-party daily in Poland.
Article by deputy editor Karol Szyndzielorz.
It is not often that one day after an article on anti-missiles, we
get a visit to our editorial office. This is what happened last week
when, reacting to my "Missiles Against Missiles" article, two rep-
resentatives of the Executive Intelligence Review, a publication
whose founder is Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., came up. They wanted
to convince us that skepticism toward the possibility of building
anti-missile systems is but ill founded. Indeed, L. H. LaRouche had
started, as early as 1977, a campaign on the subject of taking ad-
vantage of the most advanced technologies for strategic needs.
(Szyndzielorz quotes "a report prepared by the Fusion Energy Foun-
dation," on the board of which LaRouche sits. Zycie Warszawy noted
that the FEF report counts on "the known technological optimism of
Americans" as a factor in carrying out the a crash program for defensive
strategic weapons.)
May 23, 1983. U.S.S.R. Literaturnaya Gazeta, a popular weekly. Article
by Prof. Rostislav Ulyanovskii, Deputy Chief of the International De-
partment of the party Central Committee. The book Hostage to Khomeini,
which is the subject of the article, was commissioned by LaRouche.
Not only those who were directly or indirectly involved in the
long drawn-out American-Iranian conflict, not only the Carter
administration, but also the forces which opposed the administration
in the contest for the presidency made capital out of the hostages.
Interesting in this regard is the book by American journalist Robert
Dreyfuss, Hostage to Khomeini, published in New York in 1980 in
connection with the election campaign. Illustrating with concrete,
real facts the unscrupulousness of Carter's policy in the hostage crisis
(it is to him that the title of the book refers), the author at the
same time makes his criticism of the U. S. president so grotesque
that it practically goes beyond the limits of credence. Thus, R.
Dreyfuss asserts that it was Carter, in collaboration with British
Intelligence and the BBC, who helped the coming to power in Iran
of "a gang of cutthroats" headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, whom
he describes without batting an eyelid as a "profound moral evil"
and "an amoral, vindictive old man, whose perverted model of Islam
actually has nothing in common with religion." Moreover, R. Drey-
fuss claims that "the seizure of the U.S. Embassy took place with
the knowledge and support of the Carter administration." Having
"defamed" Carter and above all Khomeini in this way, the author
does not omit to pay "attention" also to the Soviet Union, asserting
with reference to "information from a certain source" that the piratic
U.S. air raid into Iran in April 1980 failed because of the "inter-
vention" of Soviet MiG-21 airplanes. R. Dreyfuss does not conceal
that one of his main goals is to discredit the Iranian revolution.
"Khomeini," he writes, "in fact did not make the revolution. Power
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was handed to him from outside." He also proclaims another of his
aims-"to contribute to the political education (?!) of Americans."
In special instructions "How to use this book," printed on the first
page, the reader is invited to "buy two copies of the book and send
one to your congressman. Ask your local bookstore to carry this
book. Ask the local newspaper to publish it in condensed form."
The ordinary American is supposed to pay for everything, even for
the "right" to be held up for public dishonor. This is the basic
commandment of bourgeois morality and ethics, which propagate
unspiritual ideals.
July 6, 1983. U.S.S.R. Literaturnaya Gazeta. Part III of a series by Iona
Andronov on the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II.
... Wiesbaden. Dotzheimer Strasse. No. 164. The West German
branch of an American subversive institution under the mask `Neue
Solidaritaet.' The speciality of the Wiesbaden center is to infiltrate
the ranks of peace movement supporters and left-leaning youth
organizations, shadowing them and disorganizing them from the
inside. The basic method of their diversionist intrigues is an intensive
anti-Soviet propaganda. Zealous on that in Wiesbaden is the Amer-
ican Paul Goldstein, holder of the intricate title of a "European
counterespionage expert ....In the opinion of his New York bosses,
Goldstein has one out-of-office flaw: he hates fascists. Anti-Sovie-
tism is for Goldstein a business with which you can make money.
But the hatred against Nazis is a burning emotional passion, born
obviously from the thirst to take vengeance on the contemporary
Epigones of the former torturers of his European kinsmen. Goldstein,
who is living in Wiesbaden today, knows by heart the names and
biographies of a multitude of Hitlerites living in the FRG, of strange
Turkish fascists and other different races of brown dirt.
Oct. 26, 1983. Literaturnaya Gazeta. Article by Fyodor Burlatskii.
Notes of a political observer
`Star Wars'/The Space Program: a casus belli?
The White House and Capitol Hill are starting to discuss a five-
year program for the development of space-based weapons. Its initial
cost is 17 to 18 billion dollars, but in the long run, not less than
40 to 50 billion dollars. The program has been drafted by a group
of scientists and political advisers under the leadership of Secretary
of Defense C. Weinberger. With this step, President Ronald Reagan
is entering a new round of militarizing the U.S.A. American ob-
servers laconically and expressively call the current plans the pres-
ident's "star wars."
At the same time, the international public, in the U. S. itself and
in Western Europe, is getting more and more actively involved in
deliberations about what entering into the military space era promises
humanity: strengthening of security or its final destruction.
The leader of our country, Yu. V. Andropov, clearly precisely
defined the Soviet position on this issue, in a declaration. Space
weapons, if they are created, will undoubtedly represent a most
dangerous factor of destabilization. If you allow, for example, that
the Americans could be the first to create an effective system of
space weapons-putting into orbit 400 satellites armed with nuclear
and laser beams-then they could hardly resist the temptation to
launch a first strike. This in turn would face the U.S.S.R. with a
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completely new military and political dilemma. In other words, space
weapons are a casus belli for nuclear war.
In the responses to my article "War Games" (LG, 8/10/83), foreign
commentators tried to contest this conclusion. But unlike the leaders
of the U. S. , who don't hide that they are seeking military superiority
over the U.S.S.R. by militarizing space, these commentators present
themselves in the role of liberals or even pacifists. They pretend
that they believe that space weapons, in counterbalance to strategic
weapons, are not arms of attack, but means of defense.
In the article "Yu. Andropov's Space Diplomacy" in the Swiss
paper Neue Zuercher Zeitung, the basic ideas of the article "War
Games" are laid out in considerable detail. [Translator's note: Bur-
latskii is citing an Aug. 25, 1983 NZZ article, "Andropows Wel-
traumdiplomatie," which he quotes with several omissions and
distortions.] "It is completely obvious," writes the paper, "that in
the center of the author's attention is not only the threat of a
declaration of war; the basic pathos of his article is aimed at dram-
atizing space weapons, whose use will have, in his opinion, cata-
strophic consequences next to which the tragedy of Troy, Carthage
and Hiroshima grows pale and the horrifying pictures of the future
painted by H.G. Wells and the nightmarish visions of Kafka fade.
With the appearance of deep moral indignation, Burlatskii depicts
how one fine day robots will be able to decide the fate of humanity."
Further on the conclusion follows: "Thus, Yu. Andropov's space
initiative appears before us as a propagandistic maneuver to incline
Washington to negotiate."
To incline Washington to negotiate. . . What is reprehensible
about that? Does the paper really seriously propose that even talks
on banning the militarization of space can be dangerous? Does the
paper really believe that "star wars" are capable of strengthening
anybody's security-the U. S. A.'s, Western Europe's or that of Switz-
erland itself?
Another response was sent from Wiesbaden (FRG) in the name
of some "European Labor Party." Its headline sounds like this: "Beam
Weapons: Soviets threaten nuclear strike." The problem, as we see,
is immediately turned upside down. Everything is precisely the re-
verse: the U. S. S. R is proposing to ban beam weapons and any other
space weapons, while the U. S. is planning to create such weapons.
"Burlatskii," says the response, "is a fervent supporter of the nuclear
weapons freeze, who on March 23 personally took up cudgels in
Minneapolis against a committee of the `European Labor Party,'
writes that with the development of the new American strategy,
the Russians are confronted with a new dilemma. He threatens a
Russian preventive strike in the following words: `Space weapons
are undoubtedly a casus Belli for nuclear war.' In other words: instead
of accepting Reagan's proposal for joint development of beam weap-
ons, which the Soviet Union is secretly developing anyway, Bur-
latskii threatens a Russian preventive strike." [Translator's note:
The preceeding paragraph quotes a leaflet distributed in Europe after
Burlatskii's Aug. 10 article and published as an editorial in Neue
Solidaritaet. Burlatskii misquotes the leaflet, which was put out by
the ELP, but referred to the International Caucus of Labor Com-
mittees' intervention on a pro-freeze conference where Burlatskii
appeared in Minnesota.]
Reading these lines, I did not know if I should be indignant or
laugh about the amusing and ridiculous maxims of the authors, the
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conjugal symbiosis of the American LaRouche and his wife, the
German Helga Zepp-LaRouche, who come out in the name of the
committee of a nonexistent party. We will not pay attention to
their trivial pretensions, but return to the essence of the question.
Nobody has succeeded or will succeed in refuting the conclusion,
that space weapons represent one of the most dangerous factors for
violating strategic stability. And this stability has served and until
now does serve as an important guarantee against thermonuclear
conflict. And besides that, who has given and who could give a
guarantee that today's plans for satellite defense against missile strikes
will not tomorrow be transformed into satellite systems of laser and
nuclear attack? Any serious physicist will affirm that this problem
can quite well [be] solved. For the White House it is only important
to get started on implementation of their space program. And later-
later on, everything will roll along quickly in the direction of de-
stabilization.
They say that "star wars" very much stirs the imagination of R.
Reagan. But if this is so, perhaps it would be worth proposing to
the American president a calmer version of "star wars," which would
simultaneously sooth the soul, caress the ears and eyes, and not
cause fear in the pit of the stomach. Why not invite the American
actor Gregory Peck and our Michail Ulyanov, and at the same time
perhaps the English Lawrence Olivier together with I. Smoktunov-
skii, and also A. Mironov with J. P. Belmondo to participate in a
joint movie on some space subject, let's say: "Star Wars of the
earthlings against the extraterrestrial empires of evil?" Then all of
us-earthlings-could enjoy "star wars" without risk of their turning
into a nuclear conflict. I liked this phrase from an American com-
mentary: "Wars are waged by little boys." Perhaps the cinema is the
best modem form of satisfying this childish passion?... .
Nov. 15, 1983. Izvestia. Article by Rome correspondent N. Paklin.
Sabbath at the Hotel Majestic
Outwardly, they in no way looked like cavemen. They were well-
dressed, clean-shaven and their manners were courteous and polite.
And the conference hall in the chic Roman Hotel Majestic where
they assembled in no way resembled a cave. But all it took was to
turn up in that hall and listen to the speeches, and no doubt remained
... you were among the troglodytes. They came to Rome from
various countries, on invitation from a certain Lyndon LaRouche.
In the United States, this economist by profession sought to advance
his presidential candidacy in the last presidential elections, but
burned out in the very first steps. Now he is once again trying to
run. As the hobbyhorse of his electoral campaign LaRouche has
chosen . . . space weaponry. He was delighted with the proposals
Reagan made on March 23 of this year, to fill near-earth space with
lasers and other types of "total weaponry," and now he is sparing
no effort in the propaganda of this misanthropic idea. The get-
together at the Hotel Majestic showed that both Reagan and
LaRouche have followers in the Old World.
...The first to come up to the microphone was the proper-looking
Signora Fiorella Operto. On the program of speakers, she was iden-
tified as a member of the "Club of Life," financed by the same
LaRouche. The theme of her presentation sounded like this: "Why
Western Europe should join in the production of space weaponry."
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Why, indeed? In order, proclaimed Fiorella Operto, to counter
the "Soviet threat." As for the nuclear "Pershings" and "Toma-
hawks," which Washington is bestowing upon the Western Euro-
peans, they-so she said-can help the West only partially.
"You should get space weaponry"-that was the leitmotif of the
presentation of the American Paratroop General V. Warner. But
something else, too . . . "alongside the creation of space weaponry,
it is necessary in the future to increase the production of nuclear
missiles and all types of conventional arms." He finished his pres-
entation amid the applause of those present, among whom there
were several high-ranking representatives of the Italian Defense
Ministry. The elderly Italian General G. Macri, who used to serve
in special units of the American army in the Federal Republic of
Germany, spoke in the same vein. "We will answer the Soviets with
space weaponry"-he appealed to the audience. Of what deadly sins
did the enraged orator not accuse our country!-including that the
Soviet Union has outstripped the West in the creation of space
weaponry. The general, naturally, kept quiet about the fact that it
is precisely the Soviet Union that is coming out against the mili-
tarization of space, and at the last, 38th session of the United Nations
General Assembly introduced a draft treaty to ban the use of force
in space and from space against the earth.
It was shameful and horrifying to listen to the French Col. M.
Geneste. This warrior was presented as the "father of the French
neutron bomb." He talked breathlessly about how his offspring kills,
accompanying his story with slides. "It is necessary immediately to
supplement neutron weapons on earth with laser weapons in space,"-
this was the conclusion of M. Geneste. He was supported by Bun-
deswehr Colonel G. Seuberlich and other speakers-military men,
pseudo-scientists, and journalists who have put their pens to the
service of military business.
In Rome, LaRouche and his supporters held already their second
sabbath of recent weeks. Setting aside the personal ambitions of
this unsuccessful aspirant for the presidential office, then the aim
of these get-togethers is to propagandize among the Western Eu-
ropean public the "advantages" of the Reagan proposal to spread
lethal types of weapons in space. Understanding that naked pro-
paganda will not accomplish anything, Western European indus-
trialists are being asked to join in the creation of "global space
weaponry." They are being seduced by tens and thousands of billions
of dollars, which the U.S. is not skimping on allocating for the
militarization of space. The Reagan Administration wants to bind
Western Europe even more closely to its criminal policy in the area
of nuclear and space armaments.
March 28, 1984. Literaturnaya Gazeta, international news section. Article
by Aleksandr Sabov, Paris correspondent.
Pulse of the Week
"The Call of the Hundred" Is Heard!
"War or peace is the concern of all peoples . . . We are convinced
that the nuclear arms race will not guarantee the security of peoples,
that its intensification puts humanity at the brink of an abyss...."
These are lines from the "Call of the Hundred," which is printed
day after day in the pages of "L'Humanite." And the last Saturday
and Sunday of March confirmed that even one progressive news-
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paper, despite the total silence of the so-called "free" press, is capable
of bringing to thousands and millions the alarm for peace. The
initiating group of one hundred prominent public figures in France
addressed its appeal to the intelligentsia of the world-writers, art-
ists, scientists, doctors, lawyers, teachers. Last year, this initiative
brought emissaries to Paris from seven countries; now they arrived
from forty countries. Among them was a Soviet delegation, headed
by Academician N.N. Blokhin. The 500 guests voted for the final
document of the Paris forum, "Call to the Intelligentsia of the
World." And thousands of their Parisian hosts. And there were so
many telegrams from all over the world! The poet Jannis Ritsos,
the writers Guenther Grass and Heinrich Boell, the film directors
Volker Schloendorf and Juan Bardem, the architect Oskar Niemeyer.
But here is another "forum," with the same address and the same
date: Paris, March. "The Activity of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in
the USA in 1938-1943 and Charles de Gaulle after 1960-Two
Twentieth Century Examples Which Inspire Our Movement."
The organizers of this get-together did not invoke the name of
Roosevelt in the sense of honoring him as a champion of dialogue
between the great powers! His authority is steered onto a narrow
military path: it was under him, they say, that work began on the
atom bomb. Charles de Gaulle, too, is exalted only as the creator
of the independent French nuclear forces. While doing this, they
consciously sweep aside the military doctrine of Gaullism: defense
in all directions, independence above all from NATO and the USA,
and even more, his political conception: peaceful co-existence and
detente. Such cynical speculations on the heritage of Roosevelt and
de Gaulle are resorted to by the U.S.-based "International Caucus
of Labor Committees," which in Europe is called the "European
Labor Party." Even the "free" press directly calls this caucus and
party neo-fascist organizations, protected by the CIA, and calls its
leaders, the American Lyndon LaRouche and the Frenchman Jacques
Cheminade, "Fuehrers."
Let us alternate playing voices from the tape cassettes. You will
not mistake, reader, which voice is from where! Thesis: "We, Span-
ish writers, together with the teachers unions, want to conduct a
peace week in the schools, since peace must be taught." Thesis:
"We will rewrite the schoolbooks in the spirit of Judeo-Christian
civilization!. . ." A concerned question: "Shouldn't we be disturbed
by the fact that in France the very concept of `pacifist' is beginning
to be interpreted as `traitor'?" The answer is martinet-like, straight
from the shoulder: "France must become the best ally of the United
States in Europe, at least in military might!"
At the first forum they said: "If there were a minute of silence to
honor the memory of the victims of the second world war, then our
earth would fall silent for several decades. . ." And on the same
day, in the same city: `When I become President of the USA (!),
I will, without wavering, pose the Russians this choice: either they
accept our conditions, or-total nuclear war!
Lyndon LaRouche was answered with applause. The crowd, of
course, did not compare with the overflow at the other, genuine
peace forum. There the doors were open to all. But here, they first
search you head to foot with an electronic sensing device and take
one hundred francs entrance fee, and only then let you into the
hall.
Had this been altogether a sparsely-attended and insignificant
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meeting, I would not for the world draw a parallel with the forum
of intelligentsia from forty countries-that would be too much honor!
But alas, it was quite well attended.
...The 500 intelligentsia from 40 countries, together with their
French co-thinkers, also put the question thus: if the arms race is
not stopped, a minute of silence may grow into a hush for etern-
ity....
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Krafft Ehricke's Contribution
to Global and Interplanetary
Civilization
The following address by Lyndon H. LaRouche was given on the occasion of
the Krafft Ehricke Memorial Conference sponsored by the Fusion Energy
Foundation and the Schiller Institute June 15-16, 1985 in Reston, Va.
As each of us is born, each of us must die. Within that brief interval of
life, what distinguishes a life as human, as exalted above the condition
of mere beasts, is that which the individual contributes to the enduring
benefit of future generations. Our beloved and most accomplished friend,
Krafft Ehricke, has bequeathed to future generations a beautiful and most
valuable gift.
For the information of those who have not been told, let this be said
here, so that it may he repeated elsewhere. Krafft's adult life was dedicated
to what became an important part of the work of a small group of dedicated
pioneers associated with Dr. Hermann Oberth. These men and women,
assembled amid the horrible conditions of material and moral decay
following Germany's defeat in the First World War, dedicated themselves
to uplifting the moral condition of all humanity, to turn mankind's eyes
from petty squabbling in the mud of this planet, to exploration and
colonization of space. To this purpose, these pioneers of science, drew
upon one of the most precious contributions which German culture had
already given to all mankind, the scientific heritage of Nicholas of Cusa,
Johannes Kepler, Gottfried Leibniz, and Karl Gauss.
With the aid of that scientific heritage, these pioneers have enabled
mankind actually to explore, and now soon to colonize nearby space.
What they have accomplished, could not have been accomplished, with-
out the advantage of the heritage of Leibniz and Gauss. They have led
all mankind along the only pathway by which we might reach the stars.
In that effort, our dear Krafft Ehricke served with notable distinction,
to the degree that his name must be remembered most prominently by
those who construct the first colonies on the Moon and Mars. He has
helped in an important and practical degree, to make clear to humanity,
that it has been the intent of the Creator that mankind's destiny is to
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become mankind in the universe. There, in the stars, lies mankind's
entry into the long-awaited Age of Reason, when our species sheds at
last the cultural residue of the beast.
To the pioneers assembled around Hermann Oberth, as to all leading
currents of scientific progress in modern history, came the awful truth,
that no government thus far, has been able to muster itself to support
generalized scientific and technological progress, except in connection
with military ventures. This has been the twentieth-century history of
the United States and Western Europe. It has been the history of Germany
in particular.
The circles of the great Friedrich Schiller represented the highest degree
of progress of understanding of the direct connection between scientific
progress and the principle of pure beauty. Yet, all their efforts were
frustrated, until the battle of Jena so humiliated the Prussian state, that
that state reluctantly turned to the circles of Schiller, to prepare the
Liberation Wars out of which every later institutional progress of Germany
emerged. In the feudalistic reaction which seized Europe at the 1815
Congress of Vienna, the efforts of the Humboldts to make Germany a
center of the world's scientific progress, would have been crushed, if the
Prussian military had not intervened to subsidize the efforts of Alexander
von Humboldt and Crelle's Journal.
In the United States, when the economic and scientific policies of the
Founding Fathers had been all but crushed out of institutions of govern-
ment, it was the war of 1861-1865 which transformed the United States
into a great agro-industrial power. It was Britain's mobilizing the United
States for the First World War, which produced the industrial progress
of the decade following 1907. It was the mobilization for the Second
World War, which unleashed the United States' agricultural, industrial,
and scientific recovery from the Great Depression. It was the aerospace
mobilization of the United States, up into 1966, which continued the
agricultural, industrial, and scientific progress of the United States after
that war.
So, it is the lawful irony of the modem history of science, that the
noble passion of the Oberth group is known to the world today in terms
of their military accomplishments. They are known to common opinion,
not as the conquerors of space, but in terms of the military contributions
of Peenemuende. They are known as the group of scientists and engineers
who gave the world military rockets, the principles of supersonic aircraft,
shaped explosive charges, and numerous other such artefacts. If the Soviet
Union had not gotten about 6,000 Peenemuende veterans drunk, and
hauled them into Soviet workshops, Moscow would not have acquired
that German science upon which its acquisition of modem military rock-
ets and thermonuclear detonations depended. Without "Operation Paper-
Clip," the United States, too, would have had great difficulty in mastering
these technologies.
It is therefore not accidental, that a unit of Soviet intelligence estab-
lished by the late Suslov, has successfully penetrated a corrupted channel
of the U.S. government, to convey forged Soviet libels against U.S.
veterans of the Peenemuende project. The Soviet government knows
very well, through its own scientific debt to Peenemuende, that the
United States will be defenseless against the Soviets' massive military
mobilization for 1988 now being conducted, unless the United States
turns once again to the resources of aerospace development built up here
around our Peenemuende veterans. So, the Soviet intelligence, working
through the Moscow Procurator and the East Germany-based VVN, has
conduited forged documents, through known Soviet agents, into the
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Office of Special Investigations, for the purpose of scapegoating and
demoralizing the persons who are either veterans of Peenemuende or
closely associated with them.
This action by certain officials and other citizens of the United States,
is very simply, very plainly, pure and simple treason, pure and simple
aid and comfort to a Soviet government which has declared its mobili-
zation for impending "Holy War" against the United States and its allies.
According to documented Soviet military doctrine, the Soviet Union is
already in a state of war against the United States, and under those
conditions, those persons who are aiding and abetting this Soviet-directed
scapegoating of Peenemuende veterans, are guilty of treason as the U.S.
Constitution defines treason, as giving aid and comfort to the enemies
of the United States in time of war.
My friends, we are again in a condition of warfare. Except for escalating
sabotage and assassinations, in Europe and the United States, being
directed by Soviet intelligence, it is not yet a shooting-war. However,
Soviet doctrine specifies, that the state of war begins with a pre-war
mobilization up to the level of full-scale war-economy. Not only are
Soviet forces mobilizing just so; that new Stalin in Gucci shoes, Gor-
bachov, and other principal Soviet officials, have affirmed, repeatedly,
that this is the present practice and intent of that government. True,
there are many wishful dreamers around Washington, who deny the
simplest facts known to every European leader on this and related ques-
tions. Avoidance of the facts, does not alter the facts. We are again at
the threshold of general warfare, and sane men and women will act
accordingly.
So, once again, as the veterans of Peenemuende have twice experienced
this hard reality, those of us who would prefer to colonize the Moon and
Mars, are condemned to devote our competencies to perfecting the in-
struments of warfare.
Krafft Ehricke understood this bitter truth very well. By "very well,"
I mean, that as my wife and I were deeply privileged to know him and
to collaborate with his efforts, Krafft as we knew him was both a world-
citizen and a patriot, in precisely the sense Schiller defined this quality
of the beautiful soul. We must hate war, as General Douglas MacArthur
hated war, but we will not buy peace at the price of the degradation of
all civilization; we will not buy a peace at the price of transforming our
children and grandchildren into slaves or degraded beasts.
These foregoing observations are essential, to situate both the subject-
matter of my report to you today, and to situate that subject-matter in
the common spirit we here assembled share, in reflection on the memory
of our dear friend.
It is now nearly three and a half years, since I announced the design
of a new strategic policy for the United States and its allies, a policy
later announced by President Ronald Reagan in his famous televised
address of March 23, 1983. What I outlined, and that for which my
associates and I have campaigned throughout most of the world ever
since, was a combined strategic and tactical defense, based upon the
orders of magnitude of superiority in firepower and mobility of coherently
directed electrohydrodynamic impulses. I proposed that this be accom-
plished by means of the kind of "crash program" we experienced most
recently in the 1958-1966 phase of the Apollo project and related aero-
space developments.
Although the relevant industry of France, Germany, and Italy, among
other nations, is already committed to these lines of research and de-
velopment, the new policy of defense is not yet a "crash program." Once
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Washington belatedly awakens to the reality of the present strategic
situation, SDI and its tactical complements, will be transformed into a
"crash program." It is in this setting, that we today have urgent lessons
to be learned from the Peenemuende experience.
Although many of the valuable lessons of the Manhattan Project and
of the Apollo Project, are embedded in the knowledge of some of our
military specialists and scientists today, the essence of the principles of
a successful "crash program" is not competently understood. To imple-
ment the SDI and related projects through a "crash program," not only
must we eradicate the obstacle of "systems analysis" from the Department
of Defense. The best specialists in our military need the best insights
which can be contributed into the deeper principles of a successful "crash
program.
There are either assembled, or represented here, today, a body of
knowledge and experience, which, in total, is best equipped to assist in
providing the urgently needed answers to such questions. The connection
between the primary dedication of the Oberth group, to reaching the
Moon, and the military work of the Peenemuende veterans, is perhaps
the best case in point from recent experience. To that point, I shall now
summarize a draft proposal, indicating my best estimate of what the
essential principles of the needed "crash program" are.
I stress draft proposal, to emphasize that this is subject to modification
through aid of the experience represented here today. I would hope
thereby, to stimulate such a discussion-process. However, although the
proposal is conditional in detailed features, it has the advantage and
authority of resting primarily on known principles of the current of
economic science established by Leibniz, and upon the standpoints in
method, successively, of Carrot and Monge in France, and of the circles
of Gauss in Germany.
I summarize first, the essential historical background, and then sum-
marize the draft policy itself.
By "crash program," I mean the tight integration of the most advanced,
The history of crash most fundamental scientific research with the production and deployment
of new technologies in a general way, such that there is no organizational
programs separation between the most fundamental scientific research and pro-
duction in general.
The history of "crash programs" begins with the collaborations on this
matter, between Cosimo de Medici in Italy, during the rise of the Golden
Renaissance. The first implementation of a true "crash program," was
that led from Milan Italy, by the collaboration between Luca Pacioli and
Leonardo da Vinci. The next true "crash program," was launched by the
French Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert, following the 1653 defeat of the
Habsburgs by Cardinal Mazarin. Colbert's sponsorship of Huyghens and
Leibniz in Paris, was the driver out of which European scientific progress
was revived, and out of which the industrial revolution was directly
planned and set into motion. The next true "crash program," was that
attempted in France, beginning 1793, under the leadership of Lazare
Carrot and the 1794-1814 Ecole Polytechnique. The development of
Germany's world supremacy in science, around the central figure of Gauss,
was the result of the attempt, led by Alexander von Humboldt, with
collaboration of the exiled Carrot, to transfer the work of the Ecole
Polytechnique, then being suppressed in France, into a safe haven in
Germany. The economic reforms introduced by Friedrich List, inter-
secting the work of Humboldt's collaborators at Berlin and Goettingen,
both backed by heirs of Scharnhorst in the German military, is the secret
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of the scientifically-driven industrialization of nineteenth-century Ger-
many.
The superiority of the work of the Peenemuende veterans' work in
implementing crash-program efforts, might seem to be explained by the
fact that the Goettingen tradition, including the Betti-Beltrami offshoot
of Goettingen in Italy, is peculiarly superior to the Cartesian tradition
of France and English-speaking countries in hydrodynamics. So, it should
be noted, during the 1920s and early 1930s, Italy was the world's leader
in air-frame design, and already a leader in the scientific principles of
supersonic aircraft-design. Professor Busemann has emphasized the debt
which the Oberth group had to its Italian collaborators during the 1920s
and early 1930s. So, it might be assumed that Peenemuende had only a
specialized competence, well-suited to rapid advances in aircraft and
rocketry.
Such notions of limited competence must be cast aside, as we examine
the point, that Bernhard Riemann's 1859 paper "On The Propagation
of Plane Air Waves of Finite Magnitude," pertains not only to the
transition to supersonic velocities, and shaped charges, but is key to
isentropic compression of thermonuclear plasmas, and was also the start-
ing-point for Schroedinger's exploration of the hydrodynamical structure
of the electron.
The successive heritage of Nicolaus of Cusa, of Kepler, of Leibniz, of
Monge, and of Gauss, is an elaboration of the principle that physical
space-time is essentially hydrodynamic in character, and that the math-
ematics of physical space-time must be derived by aid of a rigorous de-
velopment of, and training in what is called synthetic, or constructive
geometry. In the rise of German science, out of Schiller's attack on
Immanuel Kant on the issue of aesthetics, the efforts of the anti-Kantian
student of Schiller, Herbart, to base education upon a fusion of the
classics with education in geometry, Gauss's elaboration of the impli-
cations of the arithmetic-geometric mean, and Riemann's basing his
program for advancement of Gaussian physics entirely upon a correction
of Herbart's error, are crucial. The explicitly anti-Kantian physics of
Gauss, is based on elaboration of the principle of scientific method dis-
covered by Nicolaus of Cusa, called today the isoperimetric principle,
that only circular action, not straight-line motion of point-masses, is self-
evidently existent in physical space-time.
Hence the physical space-time of Riemann, which is the proper physics
for economic science, defines the invariant characteristics of the laws of
our universe as congruent with an harmonically ordered hyperspherical
function, in which conic self-similar-spiral action is the form of physical
least action. The general method of experimentation, which flows from
the Gaussian manifold, requires a synthetic-geometric construction of
the indicated relations of a phase-space, and the extension of this con-
struction hydrodynamically according to principles of self-similarity.
If this is taken into account, economic science shows us how a properly
defined "crash program" must work, and why the Gaussian tradition, as
mediated to a large degree by the work of Prandtl, is the best vantage-
point for such programs.
The possibility of correlating fundamental scientific progress directly
with increases of the productive powers of labor, was opened up by
Leibniz's founding of economic science, with emphasis on Leibniz's de-
fining the meaning of the term "technology," in the context of study of
principles of heat-powered machines. Instead of accepting a Cartesian
scheme, in which straight-line motion of point-masses is axiomatic, eco-
nomic science consistent with the principle of least action, is based upon
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the fact that action in physical space-time is intrinsically circular action,
as Leibniz shows in his famous refutation of Descartes' errors on the
notions of momentum and work.
The notion of "technology" arises in elementary study of the principles
of heat-powered processes, by considering the simplest ideal case. In the
hypothetical case, that two machines employed to produce the same
quality of product, consume coal-equivalent at the same rate, consider
the special case, that the operative employing one of these two machines,
produces greater output than employing the other. This ideal case, forces
to our attention, the notion of the internal organization of the productive
process as a cause of increase of the productive powers of labor. The
notion of ranking such internal organization of processes, according to
correlation with increase or decrease of relative productive powers of
labor, is the simplest outline of a generalized notion of "technology."
Since I have elaborated this conception in several published locations,
I shall not repeat those details here. I shall merely summarize those
features of economic science, which bear directly on the proposition
chiefly under consideration in this report as a whole.
The correlation between advances in technology and increase of the
productive powers of labor, is measured by functions of the interrelations
among these four categorical elements:
1) The usable energy-throughput per-capita and per-square-kilo-
meter.
2) The energy-flux density of the power supplied.
3) The capital, intensity of production.
4) The internal organization of the productive process as such.
These are the four, interdependent factors employed for measuring
accurately the relative level of technological development of compared
economies. Provided that productivity is measured in units of increase
of potential relative population-density, existing statistics from national
and supranational agencies, provides provably accurate qualities of mea-
surement. This measurement has the specific and more or less indispen-
sable usefulness, of enabling us to estimate the investment-budgets needed
to increase the productive powers of labor of any economy by some
projected amount.
The measurement of the causal relationship between quantified ad-
vances in technology and resulting increases in the productive powers of
labor, requires specific choices of method and procedures in mathematics.
The method must be based on a rigorous application of the principle of
synthetic geometry, and the physical space-time of economic action must
be geometrically the physical space-time elaborated by the work of Gauss,
Dirichlet, Weierstrass, Riemann, and Cantor.
To unify mathematically, the four interdependent aspects of technol-
ogy, we must define "energy" in terms of self-similar circular action in a
Gaussian manifold. We must think of energy in terms of both radian-
measure of perimetric action in space-time, and in terms of the areas and
volumes subtended by either cylindrical or conical self-similar-spiral ac-
tion. Only on those conditions, can the four interdependent aspects be
integrated. So, for example, we think of the measurement of energy as
action, by a standard wavelength of coherent electromagnetic photon,
such as a standard wavelength of perfectly lased yellow light.
There is one additional point concerning economic science, which
must be stressed here and now, if the nature of well-designed "crash
programs" is to be exposed. To make the point clear to those who are
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not professionals, I illustrate the problem which requires economic science
to employ the mathematical physics of Riemann.
If we measure the relative productivity of the U. S. economy, during
various intervals of the post-war period to date, we have the following
picture of the relationship between technology and productivity. We
make these measurements in terms of changes in potential population-
density, and measure productivity in terms of per-capita physical-outputs.
The U. S. economy recovered from the post-war recession, with the
launching of military mobilization during 1939, and stumbled along on
the basis of this up-tick, until the deep recession of 1957-1958. The U. S.
economy recovered rather vigorously under the combined impact of the
aerospace and Kennedy investment-tax-credit impulses, into the middle
of the 1960s. With the partial demobilization of research, under the
"Great Society" program, the economy stagnated into 1971, and has been
in continual, accelerating collapse ever since.
Look more closely at what has occurred since President Carter and
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker introduced what Volcker de-
scribed as "controlled disintegration of the economy," beginning October
1979.
By February of 1980, Volcker's measures sent the economy into a
rather steep decline, until the summer of that year. A slower rate of
decline, which some called a partial recovery, followed. During the spring
of 1981, the economy went into another steep decline, into October
1982. Beginning the first quarter of 1983, the rate of decline slowed
significantly, and then began to accelerate again during the Spring of
1984. Since March of this year, the rate of decline has been accelerating
rapidly, erupting now in the forms of a declining price of the U. S. dollar,
and waves of bankruptcies throughout the banking system, as well as in
agriculture and industry. This is the steepest decline in the economy
since the 1931-1933 period.
Most of you have either ridden on a roller-coaster, or have at least
watched the procedure. You chug up to the high point of the structure,
and then begin an accelerated descent. You go up and down. Each time
you go up, you reach a high point which is lower than the preceding
highest elevation of the ride. Finally, you reach the bottom.
That is the way economies usually collapse. Since October 1979, the
U. S. economy has been on a roller-coaster ride downhill. The brief
periods which some have called "economic recoveries," during this period,
were not recoveries. That is, the rate of per-capita output of physical
goods never reached the level of a previous high.
In the history of modem economies, general advances and declines in
productivity always occur in jumps. General falls in levels of productivity
always resemble a roller-coaster ride downhill, whereas general rises occur
in the reverse pattern. Why is this so? The answer is elementary. At
least, the answer is elementary to an economic science based on the
Gaussian manifold.
To make the explanation as brief as possible, I show you some diagrams
from my article refuting the notion of "artificial intelligence."
How do we describe an economic process, in which growth of pro-
ductivity is caused by consistent technological progress under conditions
of rising energy-intensity and capital-intensity? In first approximation of
the ideal classroom case, the function we require is generated as the
compounding of conic self-similar-spiral action with conic self-similar-
spiral action. The result, as you see, is an hyperboloid. This seems to
present us with a nasty problem. It seems that the arms of the hyperbola
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are shooting off into Cartesian infinity. This is a mathematical discon-
tinuity. Yet, we know that economies do not come to a halt because of
successful increases in productivity.
First, we must eliminate the Cartesian absurdity. We do this by proj-
ecting the image onto a Riemannian sphere. No more silly Cartesian
infinities. I discuss this in some detail in the published item I have
indicated, and in additional detail in a published criticism of the incom-
petencies in Professor Wassily Leontiefs featured report in the June 1985
Scientific American. Since those items are available for those who wish
to follow up the details, I need only summarize the most essential point
now.
At each discontinuity, there is the addition of at least one singularity
to the economic phase-space. This corresponds thermodynamically, to
an increase of the energy-of-the-system of the economic process, when
energy of the system is measured as potential population-density per-
capita. We measure action as the perimetric area of action swept by our
figure, and the work done as the volume of the sphere subtended by that
area of displacement. So, increasing the energy of the system per-capita,
means that at the point of apparent discontinuity, the continuing action
occurs on the surface of a larger concentric sphere. What you see in the
figure now, are projections of the action on larger spheres projected on
the one sphere.
In the ideal classroom case, the concentric spheres are in a self-similar
harmonic ordering, as we would expect by adding a third degree of conic
self-similar-spiral action to the mathematical model.
This classroom model I have outlined, conforms more or less exactly
to what has occurred historically, both in periods of technological prog-
ress, and in periods of economic devolution, such as the post-1966 period
of the U. S. economy's descent into what is sometimes called a "post-
industrial society." The roller-coaster character of economic collapse,
means, that as a period of steeper collapse destroys elements of the physical
economy's farms, industries, and basic economic infrastructure, the econ-
omy drops to a lower sphere in our classroom example. It appears to
stabilize itself briefly in that lower state of the system, and then collapses
to a still lower sphere. In the rise of productivity, in a technology-intensive
mode, the pattern indicated in the model occurs.
This model illustrates what we ought to mean, when we observe that
economic processes can not be analyzed by methods of systems of linear
inequalities, because economic processes are intrinsically, everywhere
non-linear. Economic advances occur in approximately the same way
Riemann describes the generation of trans-sonic shock-waves, in his "On
The Propagation of Plane Air Waves of Finite Magnitude." Let us term
the singularities of economic processes, "technology waves." The radia-
tion of the impact of newly introduced, advanced technologies, spreads
through the economy in waves, altering the division of labor and pro-
ductivities throughout the economy, and adding new kinds of materials
and instruments to the repertoire of production as a whole.
In devolution, the reverse occurs, as we note that the United States
today has lost many of those branches of industry which were essential
to the Apollo Moon Landing. We also observe, that the raw energy
throughput and energy-flux densities of production, have collapsed per-
capita for the U.S. population as a whole. We are operating in a lower
state of structure, and at lower per-capita energy of the system, than we
did in 1970, when the general and generally accelerating rate of decline
began.
Now, we must reverse that decline. I review briefly the key parameters
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The new industrial
revolution
of the needed technology-driven recovery, and then come to my summary
proposals on "crash program."
It is a remarkable experience today, to view the Fritz Lang film of 1929,
"The Woman On The Moon." The elements contributed to the design
of that film by Dr. Oberth, show us how little we have progressed beyond
the conceptions of spaceflight which German science had outlined more
than fifty-five years ago. Especially under the conditions of relative sci-
entific stagnation of the past twenty years, we know very well what
present frontiers of science will shape the technological revolutions of
the comming twenty to thirty years.
In projecting either the fulfilment of the SDI, or technological rev-
olutions in the economy generally, we divide the required technologies
into two classes, which we may term quite usefully as primary and auxiliary
technologies. The primary technologies available to us for SDI and tech-
nological progress today are three:
1) Control of thermonuclear plasmas as a source of very high quan-
tities and energy-flux densities of organized electromagnetic ac-
tion;
2) Coherent organization of directed-energy impulses;
3) What we call, in short-hand, optical biophysics: the electro-
hydrodynamic characteristics of living processes.
The auxiliary technologies include such improvements in computer
technology as true parallel processing, and true analog-digital hybrids
designed for efficient processing of the class of non-linear functions im-
plicit in a Gauss-Riemann electrohydrodynamic manifold. In terms of
SDI and related classes of military assignments, the first two categories
of new technologies are the source of the firepower and mobility of the
weaponry, and the auxiliaries are needed for acquiring and aiming at
targets, as well as delivering the systems to their firing-positions.
To grasp the general implications of the new technologies for both
the economy and military science, the most efficient view is developed
by giving our "crash program" teams the mission-assignment of estab-
lishing and maintaining colonies on both the Moon and Mars. In other
words, if we wish to develop the SDI and its offshoots in the best way,
the way to organize the program is as a by-product of a mission-assignment
for colonizing first the Moon and then Mars. Every technology we require
for military purposes, will appear as a by-product of the primary mission-
assignment. The Soviets already understand and are applying that prin-
ciple, which U.S. policy has so far failed to grasp.
Fusion provides us the needed technology for powered interplanetary
flight, superseding the problems of unpowered ballistic trajectories of
space-flight. Fusion is also indispensable for power to the colonies. Since
we can not carry vast quantities of manufactured articles or food from
Earth to Mars, we must have tools specifically qualified to produce needed
materials and articles from the raw materials of that planet. This requires
not only very high quantities of power per-capita, but also energy-flux
densities at least four times those prevailing in U. S. production. We
require a universal class of tools, to use such very high energy-flux dens-
ities; we require the self-focussing characteristics of lasers and particle-
beams, for example, which enable us to conquer every problem of ma-
terials. To feed the colonies, and long-range manned interplanetary ex-
peditiions, we require not merely present biotechnology, but the more
profound capabilities locked up within optical biophsyics.
It should follow, that if we can create and maintain viable cities in
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artificial environments on Mars, the Sahara and the Gobi deserts ought
to be mastered easily by using the same technologies on Earth.
In the condition of mankind estimated to be most primitive, so-called
hunting-and-gathering society, the potential human population is in the
order of a maximum of about ten millions individuals. Today, we are
approaching five billions, the greatest portion of which increase has been
the product of the Golden Renaissance and Colbert's, Huyghens', and
Leibniz's launching of the modern scientific-industrial revolution. There
are limits to natural resources for the lower beasts, but not for mankind's
technological progress. We have moved upward in potential population-
density, through the maritime fishing revolution, the ensuing agricultural
revolution, and so on. Today, by increasing the energy-flux density of
modes of production by a factor of about four, which these new tech-
nologies will permit us to do, we effect a revolution in the meaning of
the terms "primary materials" and "natural resources." With sufficient
abundance of cheap and coherently organized energy per-capita, at suf-
ficiently great energy-flux densities, there are no limits to natural resources
for mankind anywhere in this universe. With mastery of optical biophysics
as well, the frontiers for mankind become immediately implicitly limitless.
The measure of effectiveness of weapons in particular, and military
forces in general, is firepower and mobility. In production, firepower and
mobility is called productivity. Both of these equivalent qualities are
reflections of the technologies embodied in the construction of those
scientific instruments which we call capital goods. It is impossible to
introduce through capital goods, those new technologies which increase
the productive powers of labor, without implicitly creating the means of
production of weapons of comparably increased firepower and mobility.
It is impossible to introduce the capital goods needed to produce weapons
of increased firepower and mobility, without creating thus the productive
capacity for effecting comparable increases in productivity.
That is key to effective "crash programs." By accelerating the use of
new technologies for defensive weapons, we create the new technologies
of production for accelerating productivity in the economy generally.
The latter aspect of the process up-shifts the economic process, to the
effect that a large-scale "crash program," so directed, costs the nation
not a single added net penny. The gains in productivity produce marginal
increases in per-capita output in excess of the military expenditures which
foster those gains in productivity.
These gains in productivity proceed in non-linear jumps, as I have
indicated. Thus, it would not cost the United States a single net penny
to construct a colony on the Moon beginning some time during the next
decade, nor to work toward building a colony on Mars by approximately
thirty years ahead. The spill-overs of increased productivity into the
economy as a whole would vastly more than pay for the research and
deployment of such colonization projects, probably the pay-back would
be approximately ten-fold. The "systems analysts" might argue that their
computers tell them this is not possible; but as long as they cling to the
delusion that "cost-benefit analysis" can be based upon systems of linear
inequalities, they are ignorant of the fact, that technology-driven eco-
nomic processes are non-linear.
From the foregoing and related considerations, I propose the following
Science driver crash to be at least approximately true:
programs' 1) That all science-driver "crash programs" must have a mission-
orientation, based upon a task which subsumes required solutions
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to each class of the problems to be solved as a by-product of that
undertaking.
2) That the mission-orientation of all science-driver programs, must
encompass the full spectrum of all frontier developments in sci-
ence, and that the work must be organized on a properly defined
conception of the geometrical composition of physical space-
time.
3) That no boundaries be constructed among fundamental research,
development of prototypes and generalized production and de-
ployment of new technologies.
4) That the method of development must be in the best tradition
of the scientist devising materials and instruments in collabo-
ration with manufacturers and tool-makers. All producing fa-
cilities included in the spectrum of required classes of production
of materials and instruments, must assign comers of their facilities
to work with scientific teams in the same mode scientists work
traditionally with tool-makers in the construction of scientific
instruments. In short, the extension in scale of the normal prac-
tice of good scientific research, into the sphere of generalized
production as such.
5. That no restrictions on area of fundamental research be assigned.
Any research which bears upon any class of problems subsumed
by the primary mission-assignment, is implicitly authorized re-
search.
It would be an error, if the task-orientation of the SDI were limited
to a list of projected military requirements. The proper mission-orien-
tation adopted as the mandate of the program should be the Moon-Mars-
colonization task. Each weapon-system developed, should be developed
by accelerating the by-products of the primary mission-assignment.
The point is, that the various of the scientific capabilities for devising
the military and capital-goods products required, must have a common
coherent basis. This basis must be defined by a task which explicitly
subsumes all of the relevant technologies, and which taxes to the limit
the foreseeable potentialities of each and all of those technologies.
Let us proceed to colonize the Moon and Mars, as Krafft Ehricke
committed himself to implementation of this process. Along the way,
we have a military problem to solve, which the technologies of space-
colonization are best suited to solve. Being patriots and world-citizens,
we shall solve that intervening task, but we shall solve it best by never
taking our eyes away from our primary mission-assignment. Once civi-
lization is secured, and the productivity of labor throughout this planet
increased greatly by the technological revolution flowing through our
SDI task, we shall have established the more powerful economy we require
to begin actually the colonization, first of the Moon, and then of Mars.
All this we shall do best, if we view the practical task of colonization of
Mars as a necessary way of bringing to all of mankind a vision of man
as man in the universe, and thus fostering the opening of the long-
awaited Age of Reason.
That search in conquest of space, for this higher moral condition of
mankind, is the great scientific and moral legacy of the Oberth group
and its crash-program exertions. We need not put that legacy aside
because of military needs; we shall solve the military tasks best, if the
light of the stars is never out of our eyes. Let us pledge to the memory
of our beloved Krafft Ehricke, that we shall never do otherwise.
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Dr. Lowell Wood on the
First Eight Hours of Nuclear War
In November 1983, when the Soviets announced that they were increasing the
number of missile-armed submarines deployed close to U. S. coasts, Dr. Lowell
Wood of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory publicly outlined the opening
phase of a potential Soviet attack-in order to motivate the speedy implemen-
tation of the U. S. Strategic Defense Initiative, the development of a capability
to kill attacking missiles in the boost phase. Addressing a National Press Club
forum on beam-weapons defense, on Nov. 30, 1983 (excerpts of the transcript
appeared in EIR, Dec. 20, 1983), Wood said:
I would like to briefly recapitulate the current strategic arms situation
for you, which I suggest is essentially that of two men staring each other
face to face holding cocked guns thrust at the other fellow's head... .
We are faced with a situation in the United States, that Soviet strategic
ballistic missile, launching submarines are positioned right off both coasts
of the United States. We, of course, have the bulk of our international
assets on or close to the coasts, including our capital, and, in particular,
from the time that Soviet submarines launch ballistic missiles toward the
United States, there is roughly three minutes for political decision-mak-
ers, located in or about the capital of this country, to live, after the
breakwater event is confirmed. That is to say, after the military command
centers notify the decision-making authorities in and about Washington,
there is somewhere between 150 and 200 seconds to go. That, I would
suggest, leaves very, very little time-realistically, negative time-for
intelligent political decision making. Maybe it leaves time for no political
decision making at all.
Then, the thing that happens after that is that you have six to eight
minutes after breakwater confirmation, until the North American Air
Defense Center at Colorado Springs and the Strategic Air Command
post at Omaha are destroyed by these same missiles. The bomber field
in Fort Omaha is in about the geographic center of the country, so all
the U. S. bomber fields are under attack by that time, and the missile
fields of the United States are subject to pindown attack-that is to say,
having bombs exploded over them launched from submarines, until Soviet
missiles from ICBM fields in Central Asia and elsewhere arrive to defin-
itively destroy missile fields and any remaining bomber bases. After that,
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U.S. decision-making capability falls to the National Emergency Com-
mand Post's so-called Looking Glass-that's a plane that flies around
over the United States and tries to stay alive and tries to command
strategic war; it's going to run out of fuel within eight hours and it would
have no place to land. And so, sometime within eight hours of the time
that war starts, the United States is left with essentially no political or
military decision-making capability.
In a circumstance such as I've just sketched, the evaluation of options
by the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Air Command-to whom
authority will legally devolve to become the commander-in-chief after
most of the political decision-making capability of the country has been
wiped out-would be circumscribed, to phrase the matter delicately.
On the other side, in particular the deployment of Pershing Its leaves
the Soviets less than 10 minutes to make intelligent decisions after launch
confirmation, because, to be candid about it, the Pershing Its will he
aimed, if they are optimally deployed in a military-political fashion, they
will be aimed at Soviet decision-making points, Soviet command posts,
and not just Soviet military pockets, in order to symmetrize the situation
that Soviet ballistic-missile-launching submarines place the United States
in.
So I suggest to you that automatic means, particularly computers, and
not political military leaders, will fight strategic war after it's initiated,
and very specifically, I invite your attention to the Iikelihood that strategic
weaponry will come under attack . . . very, very early in the war because
of its very high military potential; strategic weaponry will come under
attack, and the owners of strategic weaponry will have the option of
using it very quickly or losing it in its entirety, and that provides a great
deal of impetus toward across-the-board salvo in strategic weaponry by
both sides very early in the war.
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Soviets Project Collapse of the West
Castro forecasts
collapse by 1988
Soviet projections of the collapse of the western economies, discussed in the
second part of this report, are reflected in Fidel Castro's June 2, 1985 interview
with Joelmir Beting in the Brazilian publication, Folha de Sao Paulo. Excerpts
follow:
Castro: Now we will discuss the salvation of capitalism.... The world
is going towards the abyss and the abyss may be bigger than the world....
We are living the Third World War, the economic war. It is an undeclared
war, the war of extortionary interest on the debt, the war of debased
prices on trade. The world is already counting the corpses and already
is walking in the ashes, but the aggressors in this war, still without a
response from the aggressed, hold that the war does not exist, that the
dead ones are healthy. The aggressors are the rich countries, which enrich
themselves in recent years from the impoverishment of the poor....
The poor have nothing more to lose. The collapse which is getting
closer is going to bring down the American and European creditor banks
of the non-performing debtors. And the banks are the physical ballast
of capitalism.... Clearly, the creditor can't kill the debtor; that is a
rule I learned when interned with the [Jesuit] fathers, where I passed 12
years of my life and where I only left on Holy Week.
The IMF itself deserves to be saved, but as a forum for governments,
not banks, to make decisions.... The deviations of the IMF are a
subproduct of the greater crisis, the disorganization of the monetary
system, the indiscipline of the financial system, and the truculence of
international trade practices.
Last year, Latin America had to pay a total of $70 billion to the
creditor countries. By our evaluation criteria of the bills being collected
by the creditors, they are receiving a legitimate amount of $25 billion
and an additional illegitimate amount of $45 billion.... By illegitimate
debt we mean usurious interest, which has nothing to do with the Moslem
business of interest. By our criteria, any interest above 8% annually ...
is spurious interest, since it is a usury rate from economies with inflation
under 4% annually.
...The spoilage can be calculated by liter, by meter and by dollar.
Latin America had to indebt itself by $45 billion just to cover that
spoilation attributed to the free market.
The rich countries don't want to save capitalism. They think that
capitalism faces no risks, at least their capitalism. . . . All we Latin
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Americans are in agreement with what the diplomatic movement of the
Cartagena Club says: foreign debt is an essentially political problem and
the solution will have to be necessarily political. The effect of the debt
itself, with the social explosion of the people and the political implosion
of the government, cannot be neutralized by banking routines or financial
shows.
Where is the differentiated treatment in favor of Brazil or in favor of
Argentina?. . . The extortion of interest and despoilment of trade is done
as a bloc, but the debt may not be renegotiated as a bloc . . . a rene-
gotiation . . . must start, politically, with the distinction of legitimate
debt from illegitimate. The first must be paid. The second must he
cancelled.
My scheme is to save the banks and not merely the depositors. A
proposal to save capitalism before the defeat [derrocada] which is ap-
proaching in 1988 at the latest.
Q: Two years from now?
A: The count-down of the time bomb of the "debt crisis" [English in
original] could reach zero in 1988. The indebted countries will not he
able to pay their accounts in 1986, if they are able to honor their interest
obligations in 1985. Then the crack appears in 1987 and the castle comes
down on top of the king in 1988. The forecast is not only mine. The
prophesy also comes from some American economists and certain Eu-
ropean bankers. One of these economists just came through Havana. I
don't know if he is a good prophet, but he has a Nobel Prize in economics.
... We are going to save the banks. The debt no longer collectable
from the Third World will be reimbursed to the banks by governments,
with the approval of their parliaments, through a simple budgetary trans-
fusion with low annual payments: a small part of the military budget will
be injected into the financial system, the pillar of capitalism, the foun-
dation of national security. And, for dessert, the survival of capitalist
democracy in the Third World, a question of international security. The
political destabilization of the Third World [stems from] the arms race
financed by U.S. taxpayers. And the American taxpayers would like to
see a tenth of that money shifted to a more noble cause. The Third
World's hunger is the trigger of the Third War, the last war, the war of
final retaliation.
Q: What about retaliation against moratoria or bankruptcy?
A: . . . But they can't against all the debtors as a bloc. The industrialized
countries need our raw materials and our markets. . . . Reprisals is a
story to scare naughty children. In Imperial Rome, which had a Senate
as democratic as the U.S. Senate, a debtor who did not honor his debt
was automatically transformed into a slave, in the line of Roman law.
Q: What would be the bankers' reaction?
A: Like an ostrich. They don't want to invest in correcting the system.
If my proposal seems utopian, it is due to the foolishness of men. President
Reagan's projection on the recovery of the world economy is based on
a nice fantasy, if not to say an elegant lie. . . . The U.S. recovery is a
facade; its foundation is not solid; the internal process is a repressed
volcano. . . .
Q: Where is the eruption of the repressed volcano?
A: The public sector in the U.S. is the world's most deficit-ridden in
absolute terms and is trying to break the record in relative terms. . . .
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Moscow bets on
Reaganomics
Q: But isn't the United States, through Bretton Woods, the owner of
the world's mint?
A: Incredible isn't it? The manager of that fantastic machinery is the
IMF. In 1972 [sic] Nixon began the project: he cut the dollar's link with
gold, by telephone. He did so because the gold-base, a bookkeeping asset
dependent on a physical asset, the vile metal, has as its largest producer
a country banished from the monetary planet, the Soviet Union.
The "debt crisis" will reach its climax in 1988, and at that time, the
idea should sprout in the form of some sort of opening or solution. Things
will have to change for better or for worse. This is the law of nature. In
1988 at the latest, the utopian or fantastic proposals of renegotiation of
the foreign debt outside the bank offices will function as lifesavers on
the cresting waves wrecking the ship.
We must prevent the disaster.
In a March 30, 1985 television broadcast in Moscow on the topic of the arms-
control negotiations, the chief Soviet Americanologist, Georgii Arbatov of the
U.S.A. & Canada Institute, put forward the Soviet approach to the Geneva
talks, based on an evaluation of whether the United States could afford to
move ahead with the Strategic Defense Initiative under its current economic
policy. As the following quotations show, the Soviet view is that the U. S.
economy cannot. Therefore, the Soviet strategy is to buy time on the assumption
that the U.S. economy will collapse before the White House can actually
implement the SDI, under current U. S. policy.
The excerpts below are from the translation provided by the Foreign Broad-
casting Information Service. Arbatov and Pravda's Yevgenii Grigoryev were
guests on the March 30 edition of "Studio Nine"; the host was Valentin Zorin.
Emphasis has been added.
Arbatov, discussing the U.S. debt, which he blames on military spend-
ing: "How to get out of the situation? Fearing inflation they do not want
to set the printing presses in motion, to print money. What happens?
This cost of credit increases. . . . This has now become the curse of the
American economy at all levels. An enormous number of farmers have
gone broke-and are continuing to go broke-since last fall. Moreover,
many of them go broke simply because they cannot get into such credit
situations, of enormous and literally usurious interest rates.
Grigoryev: They say that only in the last year, the U.S., or its banks,
pumped nearly $100 billion from Western Europe and certain other
Western countries; $100 billion is almost one-third of its annual military
budget.
Zorin: I would like to say that the present Washington leadership,
having uncoiled an enormous spiral of the arms race, has apparently made
a very serious mistake with long-term consequences. The mistake lies in
the fact that the resources of the American economy have been overestimated
and the scale of the arms race has exceeded its resources.
Georgii Arkadyevich, you talked about last year's budget deficit. This
fiscal year, the budget deficit-that is, the excess of expenditure over
revenue-is already more than $200 billion. In order to somehow ex-
tricate itself from this position, the administration has to plunge ever
deeper into the quagmire of debt, and the U. S. national debt to private
corporations and banks has already exceeded quite astronomical amounts,
having far exceeded the limit of a trillion dollars, and cannot continue
like this for long. Today, one can live in debt, but debts must be re-
paid. . . . Sooner or later the United States will have to face this bitter
truth, and some people in Washington now understand this.
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Lagovskii assessing
the economic
potential of
Moscow's enemies
It is interesting that the current White House chief of staff, when he
was not in the White House but still in the post of Secretary of the
Treasury-I mean Donald Regan-said, I will quote him: "If the most
serious measures are not taken and the current budget deficit remains, we will
lose our economy." These are very responsible words, and the Secretary
of the Treasury does not just make idle statements. Admittedly now,
finding himself in the White House, Donald Regan does not make such
statements-at least, not out loud-but the essence of the matter does
not change.
It is difficult to tell what Washington is counting on when it uncoils
the arms race not according to the means or resources of the U.S.
economy. Either the boss of the White House is insufficiently aware of all the
consequences or, like one of the French kings, he operates on the principle:
Apres nous le deluge, and is not very concerned about the legacy he leaves
for his successor. But the fact remains-an objective fact-the current
level of military expenditure is a backbreaking burden for the U.S. econ-
omy. If appropriate modifications are not made, the future situation will
be fraught with the most serious consequences. I do not know whether the
officials of Washington are aware of this, but if someone believes that we in
Moscow do not see this and do not follow this problem carefully, he is making
a very serious mistake. We can see it.
Arbatov: Yes, we are aware of this. After all, the U. S. economy is
the most powerful economy in the capitalist world, and of course, one
cannot underestimate its resources, but these resources certainly have
their limits. In general, not only the desire to impose the arms race on
us in order to bleed us dry economically . . . was behind the arms race.
I cannot say that it is very easy for us. Of course, our country has to, in
looking after its security, spend more than it would like to on the arms
race. But on the path to achieving their aims-and one can see this
today-the Americans themselves will not survive, so to speak, I mean eco-
nomically. You see, this question of the deficit has today already become the
main question of political struggle in the United States. I think that it will
be the primary question in the whole political campaign associated with
the congressional elections, when the current administration-if these
problems grow-could also lose the Senate. Their political rivals already
have the House.
Exemplary of the Soviet commitment to the study of every conceivable facet
of the U. S. economy, from the standpoint of how it will affect the correlation
of forces in a global showdown, is the 1957 book by General Major A.N.
Lagovskii, Strategiya i ekonomika, cited in Chapter 1. 1 of this report. Excerpts
are from Chapter 4: "The Strategic Plans and the Economy of the Adversary. "
The study of the economic potential of other countries furnishes
material on the ability of these countries to wage armed struggle
and, on the other hand, it reveals the weak and strong points of
their economies. This information is also reflected in strategic plans
for influencing the economic potential of the aggressor.
... One has to determine what the enemy's armed forces are,
... which are the most vulnerable points in his military commu-
nications, and so on. This makes it possible to draw conclusions
concerning the approximate timetable for the enemy's mobilization
of his war production, the weak points in his economy, the geo-
graphical distribution of his productive forces, his transportation
networks, etc. . . . [On this basis] the strategic command can de-
termine against which economic targets, when and by which means
an armed assault will be most effective.
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EIR Special Report/Global Showdown
... In assessing the economic capacities of the probable adver-
sary, strategy must have concrete data and knowledge about the
economy of the enemy as well as that of those states whose economy
can be utilized by the enemy in war.
...The elaboration of war plans and of plans for upcoming mil-
itary operations is impossible without a clear conception of all the
strong and weak points of the enemy with respect to both his military
and his economic and moral potential. The enemy's economic po-
tential must be carefully studied, both with respect to its present
levels and its prospects for development, so as to identify and analyze
the strong and weak points of his economic potential. This analysis
will make it possible to stake out the main directions for effectively
weakening the war economy of the enemy-at what times, within
what periods, and against which objects an attack would be most
effective and what category and what amount of resources will be
required for carrying out the next battle.
... The economic centers and the facilities required for waging
war are important combat targets for strategy in modem war. For
this reason, one of the most important tasks which strategy has to
fulfill, already in peacetime, is to investigate the economic relations
of the probable adversary, the geographical distribution of his in-
dustry, and his domestic and foreign trade links. In addition to plans
of military action, there also has to be a plan for action against the
enemy's economy. In elaborating this plan, an entire range of ques-
tions has to be studied, ranging from statistical data to fundamental
principles, so as to shed light on the laws and the contradictions of
the enemy's arms production and his armed forces. One has to
identify the enemy's strong and the weak points and draw the correct
conclusions from these economic facts.
... In a state with a socialist planned economy, a close rela-
tionship between strategy and the economy can be established .. .
by means of constant contact between the military and the economic
commands... .
In a modem army there must also be officers who are professional
specialists in the field of military economics. We call such persons
(by analogy with military engineers) "military economists." These
specialists must absolutely be included on senior military staffs as
well as in the leading state planning and economic bodies.
The economic issues which military art, and especially strategy,
is interested in are manifold. Under present conditions, military
professionals are not the only people concerned with "purely mili-
tary" questions, nor are economists the only ones concerned with
economic matters. Today, a large number of problems which fall
into the immediate field of activity of the military command to a
large extent touch upon questions of the economic policy of the
state both in peacetime as well as in war. Examples of such questions
are: preparing the state for war, increasing the personnel and the
technical equipment of the army and navy, command and control
in battle, etc. Consequently, every senior staff must include a group
of military economists who compile, investigate and evaluate the
most varied categories of economic data. Properly processed, this
data will serve military planning per se.
The economic issues which have to be investigated by military
science today extend far beyond the boundaries of a discipline such
as, e.g., military geography. Military economists must as a first
priority master the material contained in subjects that could be
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termed "military-economic statistics" and "military-economic in-
ventory of national resources." These special disciplines must be the
subject of special attention by Soviet military science and be given
a prominent place in the educational curriculum for military econ-
omists.
... Another topic which has to be included among the tasks of
military economists is the preparation of data on the strength of the
war economy of the probable enemy as well as the weak and strong
points of his economic potential. This data is the precondition for
drawing up a plan of military attack on the economic potential of
the aggressor.
Lagovskii motivates the necessity of establishing departments of mil-
itary economics at all military academies and schools, publishing the
appropriate textbooks, etc. Such a program was established at the General
Staff Academy itself, headed by Lagovskii. Marshals Ogarkov and Kur-
kotkin were among the first graduates of the new program.
In the early 1960s, IMEMO (the Soviet Institute of World Economy
and International Relations in Moscow) organized a secret special De-
partment of Technological and Economic Research, which was given
special offices in Moscow. While the main IMEMO center is located on
Profsoyuznaya ulitsa 28, this secret military department is housed in its
own three-story building on Kalinin Prospekt 6, virtually next door to
the Soviet General Staff.
The special department is staffed almost entirely by Soviet officers,
including colonels and generals. Their assignment is to analyze the West-
ern economies with a single aim: to identify the most vulnerable facets
of each country's war economy potential. They also are required to make
proposals as to which vital economic complexes and logistics centers
should be spared so that they can be used by the Soviet armed forces in
an invasion and occupation.
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Edict Ending the Diocletian-Galerian
Persecutions
This edict is discussed in Chapter 2.3 of this report, under the heading, "Imperial
Soviet Russia and the Chaldean-Byzantine Model of Empire. "
The Emperor Caesar Galerius Valerius Maximianus Invictus Augustus,
Pontifex Maximus, Germanicus Maximus, Egyptiacus Maximus, The-
baicus Maximus, Sarmaticus Maximus five times, Persicus Maximus twice,
Crpicus Maximus six times, Armeniacus Maximus, Medicus Maximus,
Adiabenicus Maximus, Holder of Tribunical Authority for the twentieth
time, Imperator for the nineteenth, Consul for the eighth, Pater Patriae,
Proconsul; the Emperor Caesar Flavius Valerius Constantinus Pius Felix
Invictus Augustus, Pontifex Maximus, Holder of Tribunical Authority,
Imperator for the fifth time, Consul, Pater Patriae, Proconsul; and the
Emperor Caesar Valerius Licinianus Pius Felix Invictus Augustus, Pon-
tifex maximus, Holder of Tribunical Authority for the fourth time, Im-
perator for the third, Consul, Pater Patriae, Proconsul-to the people
of their several provinces greetings.
Among the other steps that we are taking for the advantage and benefit
of the nation, we have desired hitherto that every deficiency should be
made good, in accordance with the established law and public order of
Rome; and we made provision for this-that the Christians who had
abandoned the convictions of their own forefathers should return to sound
ideas. For through some perverse reasoning such arrogance and folly had
seized and possessed them that they refused to follow the path trodden
by earlier generations and perhaps blazed long ago by their own ancestors,
and made their own laws to suit their own ideas and individual tastes
and observed these; and held various meetings in various places.
Consequently, when we issued an order to the effect that they were
to go back to the practices established by the ancients, many of them
found themselves in great danger, and many were proceeded against and
punished with death in many forms. Most of them indeed persisted in
the same folly, and we saw that they were neither paying to the gods in
heaven the worship that is their due nor giving any honor to the god of
the Christians (because meetings were forbidden). So in view of our
benevolence and the established custom by which we invariably grant
pardon to all men, we have thought proper in this matter also to extend
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our clemency most gladly, so that Christians may again exist and rebuild
the houses in which they used to meet, on condition that they do nothing
contrary to public order. In a further letter we shall explain to the justices
what principles they are to follow. Therefore, in view of this our clemency,
they are duty bound to beseech their own god for our security, and that of the
state and of themselves, in order that in every way the state may be preserved
in health and they may be able to live free from anxiety in their own homes.
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Anglo-American Contributors to
Soviet Hegemony
Leo Szilard's `pax
Russo-Americana'
The Soviet Empire could never have reached the present degree of probability
of victory without massive collusion from inside top-most leading circles in the
Atlantic Alliance-the crucial ingredient in the redrawing of the world's political
map discussed in chapter 3. 1.
In a speech to the Pugwash conference in 1958, Dr. Leo Szilard, the model
for the movie character "Dr. Strangelove, " created the script for so-called
limited nuclear wars, based on a deal between the United States and the Soviet
Union. It was entitled: "How to live with the bomb and survive-The possibility
of a Pax Russo-Americana in the long-range rocket stage of the so-called atomic
stalemate. " Note that Szilard anticipates the scenario, now circulating in the
East bloc press, in which the apparent resurgence of a Nazi movement in
Germany is used as the pretext for a Soviet invasion of West Germany. Excerpts
of the 1958 speech, later printed in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
follow:
A conflict between two nations which America and Russia are com-
mitted to protect but which they do not fully control might lead to a
major disturbance, because it might induce America and Russia to in-
tervene militarily on opposite sides. A political settlement between Amer-
ica and Russia which is specifically aimed at eliminating the possibility
that they may intervene on the opposite sides in any of the presently
discernible potential conflicts would therefore go a long way toward
averting the worst kind of disturbances... .
...In the long-range rocket stage, when they no longer need to
threaten each other's security, there may remain no major conflict be-
tween America and Russia. Moreover, in that stage, they will have one
interest in common which may override all of their other interests: to
be able to live with the bomb without having to fear an all-out war that
neither of them wants. In these circumstances, America and Russia ought
to be able to reach a political settlement, specifically aimed at the danger
that they may be forced to intervene militarily on opposite sides in any
one of the presently foreseeable conflicts.
It is conceivable that America and Russia may be able to go one step
further, that they may be able to agree on a revision of the map, and
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that they may subsequently act in concert with each other, should other
nations attempt to change the map by force or the threat of force. Could
such a pax Russo-Americana conceivably evolve during the next stage?.. .
The threat of massive retaliation, on which American policy was based
during some of the postwar years, may well be an effective threat as long
as the nation thus threatened is unable to strike back. No objection can
be raised, therefore, against such a policy on grounds of expediency. A
policy which calls for the dropping of bombs on Russian cities and the
killing of millions of Russian men, women, and children in retaliation
to a Russian military intervention in Western Europe is, of course, difficult
to justify from a moral point of view, particularly if one holds that the
Russian government is not responsive to the wishes of the Russian
people... .
Many . . . people now believe that conflicts between the great powers
will be henceforth resolved by using small atomic bombs, locally in the
contested area, that the large bombs which America and Russia have
accumulated will remain in the stockpiles, and that their existence will
in no way affect the outcome of the "limited" war. The most persuasive
argument in favor of this view may perhaps be phrased as follows:
"... A limited war need not deteriorate into an all-out war, if the
United States and Russia realize that the objective of such a war cannot
be anything approaching `victory,' not even victory in the contested area
to which the fighting may be limited. The objective of such a limited
war would rather be to exact a price and therefore make it costly for the
enemy to extend its rule. America and Russia would need to impose upon
themselves certain far-reaching restraints, proclaimed well in advance.
They could do this, for instance, by both declaring unilaterally at the
outset that they would use atomic bombs only against troops in combat
and only within their own side of the prewar boundary...."
... Clearly, if America and Russia, which had threatened each other
with the destruction of all the cities of the enemy, as a reprisal against
the loss of one of their cities, such a threat would not be believable,
except at the cost of wholesale destruction of the cities of both nations.
Could America or Russia threaten to retaliate for each injury by in-
flicting double the injury suffered? Could she threaten that for every city
demolished in her territory she would demolish one or more cities totaling
ih inhabitants twice the cities she has lost? Clearly, if both nations
adopted this principle, there would be in the end total destruction on
both sides, coming more slowly but just as surely as in the case of massive
reprisal... .
... If Russia demolishes one or more evacuated cities in America,
she must tolerate the destruction of cities with the same aggregate pop-
ulation.
... If one of these two nations chose to abolish the threat of war,
and to substitute the threat of demolishing evacuated cities instead, the
other nation would have practically no choice but to follow suit.
... Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, that in the long-
range rocket state there may occur some major disturbance affecting the
Arabian peninsula, which threatens to cut off Western Europe from its
Mideast oil supply. Let us further assume that America is on the verge
of sending troops into [the area]. . . .
Russia would then have to decide whether she wants to fight an atomic
war on her southern border, and take the risk that such a war might not
remain limited. . . . she might decide to proclaim that she would not
resist an American intervention locally in the Middle East but would,
if need be, exact a price from America not in human life but in property.
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Bertrand Russell:
totalitarian world
government
She might proceed to name some 20 American cities and make it clear
that in case of American troop landings in the Middle East, she would
single out one of these cities, giving it four weeks warning to permit its
orderly evacuation. In order to make this threat believable, Russia would
have to make it clear that she ... would tolerate, without threatening
any reprisals America's demolishing Russian cities having the same ag-
gregate population.
In the long-range rocket stage, America and Russia are going to become
increasingly indifferent to changes that might take place on the continent
of Europe. In that stage there will be no important reason why the United
States should wish to maintain any military bases on foreign soil. And
a military alliance with the nations of Western Europe would no longer
add anything much to the security of America, even if America should
continue to maintain an alliance with the nations of Western Europe.
She would be bound to regard these allies as more and more expenda-
ble....
Right now, the nations of Europe are tired of war. Clearly, the people
of Western Germany are more interested in increasing their prosperity
than in the problem of unifying Germany.
Yet the time might come when unifying Germany may become the
overriding political issue on which all Germans may unite. And similarly,
once Germany has been united, the issue of recovering for Germany
some or all of the territories lost to Poland may become the overriding
issue on which all Germans may unite.
... then Russia and America might be willing to guarantee, jointly
or separately, the agreed upon status of Europe against changes brought
about forceably by either Poland or Germany. they could do this effec-
tively, without a risk or appreciable cost to themselves, by relying on
the threat of demolishing, if need be, a few cities, either in Germany or
in Poland, perhaps giving each city several weeks of warning to permit
its orderly evacuation.
In October 1946, Bertrand Russell, father of the so-called peace movement,
wrote an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists advocating the
creation of a totalitarian world government "to preserve peace":
When I speak of an international government, I mean one that really
governs, not an amiable facade like the League of Nations or a pretentious
sham like the United Nations under its present constitution. An inter-
national government ... must have the only atomic bombs, the only
plant for producing them, the only air force, the only battleships, and,
generally, whatever is necessary to make it irresistible....
The monopoly of armed force is the most necessary attribute of the
international government, but it will, of course, have to exercise various
governmental functions ... to decide all disputes between different
nations, and will have to possess the right to revise treaties. It will have
to be bound by its constitution to intervene by force of arms against any
nation that refuses to submit to arbitration.
In his 1951 book, The Impact of Science on Society, peacenik Russell
wrote:
War has hitherto been disappointing in this repect [reducing population]
... but perhaps bacteriological war may prove effective. If a Black Death
could spread throughout the world once in a every generation, survivors
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Henry Kissinger:
U.S. should not be a
superpower
could procreate freely without making the world too full. The state of
affairs might be unpleasant, but what of it?
On July 23-24, 1982, at a secretive meeting of corporate, banking and political
leaders at the elite San Francisco area mens club, the Bohemian Grove, former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave an address which, according to a
reporter who penetrated the exclusive session, included the following:
... In the period following World War II, the United States controlled
55% of the world's gross national product. The figure today is more like
25%. Now as a result the United States needs to conduct a different
kind of foreign policy that accounts for its diminished economic influ-
ence-a foreign policy that would be more like that of Great Britain.
...You are now a once-developed nation like Britain. You must now
reduce your economic and military commitments globally, and instead
resort to British tactics of psychological and cultural warfare.
In the March 5, 1984 issue of Time magazine, Kissinger wrote an article
titled, "A New Role for Europe, " recommending the U. S. "decouple" from
Western Europe:
...During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of
American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us,
a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic
partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imag-
ination, insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas except
security. With respect to defense, the U.S. has been indifferent at best-
at least since the failure of the European Defense Community-to any
sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a
militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations
or might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the common security.
The opposite is almost certainly the case.
In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic
competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common
Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal
ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility
and unity would promote closer cooperation with the U. S. A Europe
analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to
find association with the U.S. essential. Greater unity in defense would
also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of
every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts across
the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there are at least five kinds
of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different
standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major
conflict it would be nearly impossible to keep this hodgepodge of forces
supplied.
Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe
to develop greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am
not talking about traditional "burden sharing," paying more for the ex-
isting effort. I have in mind something more structural-a more rational
balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of responsibilities fails
to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political
objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing
the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But
since drift will surely lead to unraveling-if more imperceptibly-states-
manship impels a new approach. . . .
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Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings and pressures pro-
vides a facade of unity; chared purposes require a deeper sense of partic-
ipation. Specifically:
1) By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for con-
ventional ground defense....
2) This requires that planning for Europe's defense become a more
explicitly European task... .
3) Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary-General . . . has been
European. In the new structure . . . it would make more sense for this
official to be American-whenever the new Secretary-General, Lord
Carrington, decides to retire... .
Redeployment
The issue of redeploying American forces touches raw European nerves
like no other. The slightest hint of altering present arrangements jangles
sensibilities; it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of
European neutralism. But if present trends continue, it is certain to
become a central issue in the alliance relationship... .
Let us assume a group of wise men and women from both sides of the
Atlantic came together to plan a global strategy unconstrained by the
past . . . Such a group would almost surely conclude that the sensible
division of responsibilities would be for Europe, with economic resources
and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate on
the conventional defense of the Continent. To maintain the global
balance of power-by definition as essential for Europe as for America-
the U.S. would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable of
backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the
Middle East, Asia or the Western Hemisphere.
Such a division of responsibilities would also enable our military es-
tablishment to shift some of its intellectual energies and scientific research
from a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies
to the defense of regions where conflict is much more likely. In such
regions our allies are less prone to see their interests immediately engaged,
and the countries being threatened are in a worse position to assist in
the defense effort... .
In my view, persisting in a deployment that is losing its rationale
accelerates these attitudes. Pacifism and neutralism are on the march in
Europe even under the present setup; isolationism in America is not yet
so vocal but is being powerfully encouraged by endless allied disputes.
An alliance that cannot agree on its political premises cannot sustain
itself by clinging to military arrangements decided a generation ago in
totally different circumstances. With current trends the issue of the
rationale for the NATO deployment will become unavoidable. If it arises
not as an integral component in a comprehensive design but as a single
question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe,
unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most
destructive means-the American budgetary process. Then indeed we
might see in America a psychological wrench away from Europe and in
Europe a panicky resentment against the U.S.A. change in deployment
without a positive political and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own
sake, might shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary
and tempt aggression.
There is an urgent need for a serious and rapid re-examination of
NATO doctrine, deployment and policies, conducted by men and women
known for their dedication to Western unity. The group-to be formed
immediately after the [1984 fall] elections-must begin with one of the
most divisive issues before the alliance: an agreement on the nature and
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scope of the threat ... A deadline for completion should be set-
certainly no longer than two years....
If Europe should agree to build a full conventional defense and were
prepared to express that commitment in unambiguous yearly obligations
to increase its forces, the U. S. should accept the judgment that its present
ground forces in Europe are an indispensable component. Such a decision
might in fact invigorate the conventional arms-reduction talks and in
time lead to stability at a lower level. But if Europe should opt for a
perpetuation of the present ambivalence or for only a token improvement,
then the U.S. will owe it to the overall requirements of global defense
to draw certain conclusions. If Europe by its own decision condemns
itself to permanent conventional inferiority, we will have no choice but
to opt for a deployment of U.S. forces in Europe that makes strategic
and political sense. If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to
even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion,
perhaps up to half, of our present ground forces would be a logical result.
To provide time for necessary adjustments, that withdrawal could he
extended over five years. To ease the transition further, we could, if
Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for a time af-
terward in a new status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared
for use in Europe but also available for use in emergencies outside it.
Any withdrawal would make sense only if the redeployed forces were
added to our strategic reserve; if they were disbanded, the effect would
be to weaken the overall defense.
The proposed redeployment would leave intact air and naval forces,
as well as intermediate-range missiles, so long as Europe wants them. A
useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic re-evaluation of
the existing inventory of very short-range tactical nuclear weapons, a
legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions; these weapons now represent
at one and the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest
danger of unintended nuclear war because, being deployed so far forward,
they are unusually subject to the exigencies of battle.
In this scheme, withdrawal would not be an end in itself-as it will
if frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic go much further-hut one
component of an adaptation to new circumstances extending over some
eight years that rededicates the U.S. to the alliance for the indefinite
future. . . .
The United States cannot lead the alliance or even contribute to its
cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. . . .
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Mastering EMP for Offense
and Defense
The deployment of thermonuclear technologies designed to saturate the
exoatmosphere over U.S. missile sites with neutron and EMP densities,
is a significant aspect of the Soviet plan of attack discussed in Part 6 of
this report.
Since June 1983, Dr. Edward Teller of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory has emphasized in several national interviews the need to
educate industry and the public about large electromagnetic pulses (EMP)
generated by space-based nuclear explosions. One large, space-based nu-
clear explosion is capable of generating an EM pulse sufficient to destroy
most unshielded electrical and electronic devices and systems throughout
the United States without necessarily causing any other type of direct
bomb damage.
Teller's statements on this matter strongly indicate his concern that
EMP effects may not be limited to those generated by offensive Soviet
nuclear explosions. EMP effects could be used as part of a layered defense
against nuclear-tipped missiles. This particular defense could be generated
with part of the U.S. arsenal of offensive nuclear warheads.
This possibility of using nuclear explosions in space to interdict ICBMs
was noted by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii in Soviet Military Strategy: ".. .
and the use of electromagnetic energy to destroy the rocket charge in
the descent phase of the trajectory or to deflect it from its target."
All nuclear explosions generate extremely short bursts of intense radio
waves. These EM pulses are created when the initial radiation (x-rays
and gamma rays) of the nuclear fireball ionize and accelerate electrons
in the air, thereby producing large electrical currents.
In exoatmospheric (space-based) detonations, EM pulses were found
to be both more intense and extensive than in air bursts. The United
States discovered this empirically in 1962, when a space-based nuclear
test over Johnson Island generated an EMP signal which "turned off"
the lights in Hawaii thousands of miles away. At the same time, the
Soviets exploded a 60 megaton monster H-bomb in a high altitude test.
The Atmospheric Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed shortly after this
test series. In retrospect, U. S. scientists realized that the Soviet Union
was aware of a dramatic increase in EMP associated with high altitude
detonations long before 1962. The U.S.S.R. had completed an extensive
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program of high altitude nuclear explosions to empirically map out the
potential of EMP effects.
EM pulses dramatically increase in amplitude and extent in exoat-
mospheric, as compared with atmospheric, detonations for two basic
reasons. EMP is primarily due to bomb-generated gamma rays. The elec-
trical current that they create through the ionization and acceleration
of atmospheric electrons is called a Compton current. It is this short-
lived current which generates the EM pulse. In the atmosphere burst
case, the Compton current propagates symmetrically outward from the
point of detonation. Thus, if we drew lines representing each radial
direction along which a Compton current is found, it would define a
sphere with the detonation point at the center. This simply indicates
that the gamma rays are deposited into the atmosphere in a spherical
shell.
In the exoatmospheric case, however, only it portion of this spherical
shell of gamma rays intersects the Earth's atmosphere. As a result, the
Compton current generated is no longer spherically symmetrical. There-
fore, the interaction between the Compton current and the Earth's mag-
netic field is greatly enhanced. And this interaction leads to the generation
of a Compton current perpendicular to the radial direction. This new,
transverse component of the Compton current generates out-going and
in-going fields of the magnetic dipole type. The out-going magnetic dipole
EMP is a short pulse of high amplitude, because the Compton current
pulse moves outward in synchronism with this part of the EMP.
The Earth is surrounded by a thin plasma (the ionosphere) whose
properties determine conditions for shortwave radio communication. EMP
and the Compton currents whicl-, generate it interact with the ionosphere,
causing long-lived disturbances which interrupt and distort radio com-
munication.
It has long been recognized that EM pulses can directly disrupt the
functioning of ICBMs. If an ICBM warhead is not shielded against EMP,
EM pulses can be absorbed into the electrical circuitry of the missile's
guidance and detonating system, causing short bursts of intense electrical
current which either destroy or permanently disrupt the circuits. More-
over, the effectiveness of electromagnetic shielding can always be over-
come through increasing the intensity of the EM pals,. This has spurred
great emphasis on the development of optical fiber circuits for military
systems, since these non-electrical circuits are not effected by EMP.
EMP may have a number of possibilities for indirectly disrupting an
ICBM. The huge amounts of energy contained in the ionosphere are
normally so diffuse that the ionosphere is harmlessly traversed by an
ICBM; but it may be possible to use EMP as a sophisticated kind of
"ionospheric modification," and so replicate the self-generated beams,
streamers, and density changes that are seen in other ionospheric mod-
ification experiments. Some combination of bomb-pumped plasma in-
stabilities in the ionosphere, scientists have speculated, may be usable
for large-area defense against ballistic missiles. In such an application, a
high-altitude burst of a nuclear weapon or deposition of energy from an
x-ray laser would be used to energize the ionosphere and to act as a "seed
crystal" for organizing ionospheric plasma energy. The resultant plasma
instabilities may be capable of generating missile-destroying electron beams,
electric field changes, or plasma density variations.
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I--------------------
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Maps
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Map 1. "Line of force" of current Soviet military deployments, illustrating global envelopment of continental United States.
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Maps 3, 4, and 5 show the sequence of Soviet actions in the first 20 minutes of a "pre-emptive strike," after Soviet ICBMs have been fired from
Map 3.
Soviet First Strike (Surprise Attack)
Destruction of U.S. Command and Control Centers (2-3 minutes)
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Soviet First Strike
Soviet ICBM's Destroy U.S. ICBM Fields and All Ports (After 20-30 Minutes)
Map 6. Soviet ICBMs strike strategic assets in the continental U.S.A., 20 to 30 minutes after the initiation of hostilities.
346
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Central Group
of Forces
Group of
Soviet Forces
in Germany
Mir Leningrad
Ural
J
'7*AOBIDV a'
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DUCHY OF
POLAND
LLE
KINGDOM OF
HUNGARY
ROMAN CATHOLICISM
966
? KIEV
ORTHODOXY 988
Map 9. The furthest advance of Western Christendom, under Charlemagne and his successors.
The expansion of Russia. Map 19 projects Moscow's intended expansion by 1988.
1300
Map 10.
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Venice
O
BLACK SEA
Constantinople
4iPIRF
41 1 " 11,
I Ionian
41ED1e,9,97 Islands or
4AI Crete
F'4 Cyprus 0
Alexandria 0
EGYPT Cairo
Map 20. The eastern Mediterranean before and after 1453. Besides sponsoring the Ottoman Empire as a continuation of the Byzantine Empire,
Venice directly controlled the indicated regions of the Adriatic, portions of Greece, and key Mediterranean ports.
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SEA OF
AZOV
Map 23. The Union Republics and ethnically-defined Autonomous Regions of the U.S.S.R.
Republics
1. Armenian S.S.R.
2. Azerbaijan S.S.R.
3. Estonian S.S.R.
4. Georgian S.S.R.
5. Kazakh S.S.R.
6. Kirgiz S.S.R.
7. Latvian S.S.R.
8. Lithuanian S.S.R.
9. Moldavian S.S.R.
10. Russian S.F.S.R.
11. Tadzhik S.S.R.
12. Turkmen S.S.R.
13. Ukrainian S.S.R.
14. Uzbek S.S.R.
15. Byelorussia S.S.R.
Autonomous S.S.R.s and
National Regions
1. Abkhaz A.S.S.R.
2. Adygey Aut. Oblast
3. Adzhar A.S.S.R.
4. Aginsk-Buryat Nat'l Okrug
5. Bashkir A.S.S.R.
6. Buryat A.S.S.R.
7. Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.
8. Chukchi Nat'l Okrug
9. Chuvash A.S.S.R.
10. Dagestan A.S.S.R.
11. Evenki Nat'l Okrug
12. Gorno-Altay Aut. Oblast
13. Gorno-Badakhshan Aut. Oblast
14. Jewish Aut. Oblast
15. Kabardin-Balkar A.S.S.R.
16. Kalmuck A.S.S.R.
17. Karachay-Cherkess Aut. Oblast
18. Karakalpak A.S.S.R.
19. Karelian A.S.S.R.
20. Khakass Aut. Oblast
21. Khanty-Mansi Nat'l Okrug
22. Komi A.S.S.R.
23. Komi-Permyak Nat'l Okrug
24. Koryak Nat'l Okrug
25. Mari A.S.S.R.
26. Mordvinian A.S.S.R.
27. Nagorno-Karabakh Aut. Oblast
28. Nakhichevan' A.S.S.R.
29. Nenets Nat'l Okrug
30. North Ossetian A.S.S.R.
31. South Ossetian Aut. Oblast
32. Tatar A.S.S.R.
33. Taymyr Nat'l Okrug
34. Tuvinian A.S.S.R.
35. Udmurt A.S.S.R.
36. Ust'-Ordynsk-Buryat Nat'l Okrug
37. Yakut A.S.S.R.
38. Yamal-Nenets Nat'l Okrug
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Map 24.
Muscovy in the 15th Century, showing the different nationalities inhab-
iting the area, at the time that the messianic doctrine of the Third and
Final Rome was adopted by Moscow's rulers, and the great expansion
of the Russian state began.
Map 25. Redrawing the political map of the world: all of continental Eurasia and Africa under Soviet domination.
356
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Greenland
GREEN ANO SEA
Iceland
ARCTIC OCEAN
BARENTS SEA
Murmansk
?
Kola
Peninsula
Pechenga
Kirkenes . . . Murmansk
TROMS
Kiruna ? FINNMARK
Narvik. FINNISH , KOLA
WEDGE
Bodoe ? Alakurtti
Map 27.
The Northern Theater of Military Actions. The biggest concentration of
Soviet military power is based on the north side of the Kola Peninsula.
? Sundsvall
NORWAY
Oslo? SWEDEN
-Leningrad
? Pskov
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Map 28.
"Zone of the Straits" connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean:
Dardanelles-Sea of Marmora-Bosporus.
TUNISIA
GREECE
MaUa
MEDITERRANEAN
CYPRUS
NON./.IRAQ
JORD N
EGYPT SAUDI ARABIA
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Map 31.
Axes of force employed in the 1984 Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria.
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m y u) m m m W W u)
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N N- M M M CO M
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Index of Names
Abbreviations:
MSU Marshal of the Soviet Union
Acad. Member of U.S.S.R. Academy
of Sciences
Gen.Sec. General Secretary, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union
Abraham, Bishop of Suzdal, 87
Abu Musa, 182
Adams, James, 172
Afanasycv, S.A., 246
Aganbegyan, A.G., Acad., 248, 256
Agca, Mehmet Ali, 278-9, 285
Agee, Philip, 280
Akhromeyev, S.F., MSU, 27, 36, 42, 50,
58, 154, 163, 176, 246
Aksakov, Ivan, 100-1, 103
Aksakov, Konstantin, 100-1
at Banna, Hassan, 287
Alcuin, 81
Aleksandrov, A.P., Acad., 10, 11, 223,
225, 247-8
Alexander 1, Tsar (19th cent.), 1 11
Alexander II, Tsar (19th cent.), 7, 99,
104
Alexander the Great, 116, 144
Alexei (Simanskii), Russian Orthodox Pa-
triarch, 270
Alexis, Tsar (17th cent.), 93-4, 97
Aliyev, Geidar A., Politburo member, 73,
118, 132, 134, 136, 186-7, 253, 255,
279, 281-2, 284, 287-8
Altunin, A.T., General of the Army, 232
Ambrose, Russian monk, 100
Amelko, N.N., Admiral, 36
Andreotti, Giulio, Italian Foreign Min.,
164, 230
Andropov, Igor Yu., 135
Andropov, Yuri V., Gen. Sec. (1982-84),
7, 10, 25, 36, 38-9, 42, 49, 51-2,
123-5, 128-30, 132-7, 142, 161, 184,
245-6, 248, 251, 253, 257, 269, 277-
8, 288
Anna, Byzantine princess, 75
Anno, Bishop, 82
Antonov, A.I., MSU, 59
Aquino, Benigno, 190
Arafat, Yasser, 281, 287
Arbatov, Georgii A., Acad., 135, 180,
326
Argov, Shlomo, 184
Aristotle, 144
Arsan, Henri, 278
Assad, Hafez, Syrian President, 160, 163,
183
Audran, Rene, 280-2
Augustine, Saint, 10, 69, 73, 80-1, 102
Augustus, Roman emperor, 73, 76, 89
Aurelian, Roman emperor, 73, 76, 78
Avvakum, Archpriest, 95-6
Axen, Hermann, E. German Politburo
member, 178-9
Azzam, Salam, 286
Badmayev, Shamrazan, 187
Bahr, Egon, 164, 174, 176-7, 179-80
Bakatin, V.V., 133
Bakunin, Mikhail, 107
Bal'mont, By., 246, 251
Barbie, Klaus, 286
Barlaam of Calabria, 83
Basil, Byzantine emperor, 75
Begin, Menachem, 183
Belokonov, K.K., General, 36
Belotserkovskii, space designer, 223
Ben Bella, Ahmed, 281
Benedict, Saint, 100
Bennigsen, Alexandre, 185-6, 189, 288
Bentham, Jeremy, 11, 13
Beria, Lavrentii, 110
Berri, Nabih, Lebanese Shi'ite leader, 185
Bespalov, Ivan P., 130
Bessarion of Nicea, Cardinal, 86
Betekhtin, A.V., General Colonel, 59
Bevin, Ernest, 203
Bialkin, Kenneth, 279
Blunt, Anthony, 204
Boethius, 81
Bogdanov, Aleksandr, 99
Bogolyubov, K.M., 132
Boichuk, Ye.V., Marshal of Artillery, 36
Bolotnikov, Ivan, 93
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 75, 111
Borisov, G.G., General Colonel, 60
Brandt, Willy, SPD Chairman, 9, 16, 142,
164, 174-9
Brezhnev, Leonid I., Gen. Sec. (1964-82),
3, 10, 54, 130-4, 136, 242, 269
Brezhnev, Vladimir, 247
Bromley, Yulian, 119, 288-9
Bronfman, Charles, 184
Bronfman, Edgar, 161, 184
Broxup, Marie, 189
Brunelleschi, 88
Brunner, Alois, 281, 286
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 74, 186, 189, 191
Bulganin, N.A., MSU, Soviet Prime Min.
(1955-58), 150, 200
Bundy, McGeorge, 142, 202-3, 277
Bunich, P., Acad., 250
Burgess, Guy, 204
Burlatskii, Fyodor, 306
Bush, George, 299
Byrnes, James, 112
Caligula, Roman emperor, 73
Carrington, Lord Peter, 114, 203-4, 285
Carter, Jimmy, U.S. President (1977-80),
34, 38, 143, 185-6, 204, 260, 263-4,
279-80
Castro, Fidel, 71, 324
Catherine the Great, Russian empress
(18th cent.), 98-9, 112
Ceyuqueo, Nilo, 288-9
Chamberlain, Neville, v, vi, 16
Chamoun family, 183
Charlemagne, 6, 68-9, 73, 81, 101
Chebrikov, Viktor M., General of the
Army, 133, 136
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EIR Special Report/Global Showdown
Chelomei, V.N., 223
Filaret (Vakhromeyev), Russian Metropoli-
Hegel, G.W.F., 100
Chernavin, V.N., Admiral of the Fleet,
tan, 271
Herodotus, 75, 116
43
Filofei of Pskov, Russian monk, 90-2
Herzen, Aleksandr, 100
Chernenko, Konstantin, Gen. Sec. (1984-
Fomin, Gennadii, 247
Hess, Rudolf, 288
85), 11, 26, 129, 132-4, 184, 247
Ford, Gerald, U.S. President (1974-76),
Himmler, Heinrich, 287
Chemiavsky, Michael, 104
35
Hitler, Adolf, vi, 7, 75, 110-1, 122, 126,
Chervonenko, Stepan V., 131
Fuchs, Klaus, 204
150, 179, 186, 286-7, 298
Chou En-lai, 197
Fulgentius, 81
Honecker, Erich, E. German party leader,
Chuikov, Vasilii, MSU, 113
58, 178-9
S. Korean President,
Chun Doo Hwan
Howe, Sir Geoffrey, British Foreign Min.,
,
190
Galerius, 118
164, 200
Indian Prime Min
(1966-
Gandhi
Indira
Roman emperor
203
Claudius
.
,
,
Huber, Ahmed, 286
,
,
129
Stephen F.
Cohen
84), 197, 285
Hussein, Saddam, Iraqi President, 287
,
,
Senator
223
Gam
Jake
U
S
221
John M.
Collins
,
,
,
.
.
Huyghens, Christian, 295
,
,
General Colonel
Gashkov
I
A
60
118
Christopher
73
Columbus
,
,
.
.,
,
,
,
Rashid Ali
286
Gailani
Manuel
85
Comnenus
,
,
,
,
Roman emperor, 70, 75-6,
Constantine
Gelb, Leslie, 180
Infield
Glenn B.
285
,
288
Gellner
Ernest
,
,
91
117-8
85
,
,
Isayenko, I.D., General Colonel, 257
,
,
Genghis Khan
83
Czechoslovak official, 203
Vladimir
Cop
,
Isidore of Seville, 81
,
,
Francois
285-6
Genoud
Quentin Jr., 211, 214, 222
Crommelin
,
,
Isidore, Metropolitan of Moscow, 86-8
,
Hans-Dietrich
W. German
Genscher
Patrick M.
221
Cronin
,
,
Ivan III, Grand Prince of Muscovy, 89-90,
,
,
178
Foreign Min
164
Admiral, 195
Crowe
William J.
.,
,
120
,
,
Gerasimov
Dmitrii
90
Robert 0., 96
Crummey
,
,
Ivan IV (Grozny), Russian Tsar (16th
,
10
86
88
Cardinal
Nicholas
Cusanus
Gerasimov, I.A., General of the Army,
cent.)
58
68
79
81
90
92-3
109-
,
,
,
,
,
150
158
33
42-3
58-60
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
Saint
6
273
Cyril
,
,
,
,
10, 120
,
,
,
Norwegian Prime Min.
150
Gerhardsen
,
,
Ivan Kalita
Grand Prince of Muscovy
85
Philip
126
Geyelin
,
,
,
,
Ivanovskii, Ye.F., General of the Army,
V
P
223
Glushko
Danilov, Russian Prince, 273
.
.,
,
Gorbachov, M.S., Gen. Sec., 3, 11, 26,
43, 59
Dante Alighieri, 83
39, 40-1, 73, 98, 117, 123, 125, 129-
Dawalibi, Marouf, 283
136-7
176-8
200
31
133-4
174
Debray, Regis, 280-1
,
,
,
,
,
,
256
259
269
204
242-7
249
John Paleologus, Byzantine emperor, 86
De Gaulle, Charles, 281
,
,
,
,
,
Gorbachova
Raisa
129
John Paul II, Pope, 271-2, 278
de Gobineau, Count, 287
,
,
Gorshkov
Leonid A.
134
John of the Ladder, Saint, 83
de Jager, Cor, General (Netherlands),
,
,
132
Gostev
Boris I.
Johnson, Lyndon B., U.S. President
220-1
,
,
General of the Army
Govorov
V.L.
41-
(1963-69), 143, 231, 277
Delors, Jacques, 181
,
,
,
190
43
Jones, T.K., 237
de Menil, jean, 281
,
N.F.
General Colonel
60
Grachev
Joseph II, Patriarch of Constantinople, 86-
Deng, Hsiao Ping, Chinese leader, 197-8
,
,
,
Graham, Daniel, U.S. General (Ret.),
7, 89
Deutscher, Isaac, 112
227
Jospin, Lionel, French socialist leader,
Diocletian, Roman emperor, 6, 69-70, 73,
General
36
Grebish
Ye.D.
177-8
76-9, 93, 116-8, 144, 330
,
,
,
MSU
Defense Minister
Grechko
A.A.
Justinian, Byzantine emperor, 83, 85
Dmitriyev, Ivan N., 131
,
,
,
(1967-76), 36, 38, 54, 113, 130, 232
Juvenalii, Russian Metropolian, 270-1
Dolgikh, Vladimir I., 132, 136
Green, Joyce H., U.S. Federal judge, 223
Donskoi, Dmitrii, Grand Prince of Mus-
Gregory Palamas, Saint, 84
covy, 85
A.I.
General of the Army
36
Gribkov
Kapitonov, Ivan V., 132
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 7, 100, 104-9, 135
,
,
,
,
42
Kapitsa, Mikhail, Soviet Deputy Foreign
Douglass, Joseph D., 222-3
P., General (exile), 51
Grigorenko
Min., 195
Druzhinin, M.I., General Colonel, 43, 59
,
Fritz
286
Grobba
Karpov, V.N., General Colonel, 35.6, 40
Dumas, Roland, French Foreign Min., 164
,
,
Anatolii A.
Acad., 135
Gromyko
Kasbegi, Alexander, 109
Dzhannibekov, cosmonaut, 229
,
,
Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Min.
Gromyko
Kennedy, Edward, U.S. Senator, 237
,
Kenned
John F
U
President (1961-
S
133
9
36
75
129-30
(1957-85)
y,
.,
.
.
,
,
,
,
,
,
230
269
272
135
176
63), 143, 201-2, 277, 281
,
,
,
,
Khomeini
Ayatollah Ruhollah
126
161-
Eden, Sir Anthony, 200
Gubin, I.A., General Colonel, 41
,
,
,
2
183
186
279
281
287
298
Ehmke, Horst, 179
Guizot, Francois, 73
,
,
,
,
,
,
Khomiakov
Alexei
100-3
110
Ser
ei
Eisenstein
Gvishiani, Dzhermen, 202
,
,
g
,
,
Khrushchov, Nikita, Gen. Sec. (1953-64),
el-Husseini, Haj Amin, Grand Mufti of Je-
131, 142, 200-1, 203
rusalem, 286
Hahn, Walter, 176
Kim Chong-il, 190
Engels, Friedrich, 76
Haig, Alexander, 184
Kim 11 Sung, N. Korean President, 190,
Epifanii, raskolnik leader, 96
Hamilton, Alexander, 8, 13
194-5
Eugenius IV, Pope, 86
Hammer, Armand, 184, 282
King, Alexander, 202
Hanson, James, 224
Kipling, Rudyard, 116
Harriman, Averell, 38, 74, 113, 201-3
Kireevsky, Ivan, 100-2
Fedorenko, N.P., 250
Hatfield, Mark, U.S. Senator, 237
Kissinger, Henry, v, 16, 34-5, 74, 113,
Fejos, Paul, 288
Hawi, George, Lebanon communist, 286
143-4, 156, 161, 163, 184, 191, 197,
Filaret (Denisenko), Russian Metropolitan,
Hawke, Robert, Australian Prime Min.,
201-3, 335
271-3
194
Kleist, Peter, 111-2
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Kohl, Helmut, West German Chancellor,
173-4, 179
Koldunov, A.I., Chief Marshal of Avia-
tion, 42, 230
Konobeyev, S., Colonel, 222
Kosygin, Aleksei, Soviet Prime Min.
(1964-80), 188, 202
Kovtunov, A.V., General Lieutenant, 61
Kozlov, M.M., General of the Army, 36,
40
Kruchina, Nikolai Ye., 131
Kucewicz, William, 223
Kuibyshev, V., 256
Kulikov, V.G., MSU, 36, 63
Kulov, Yevgenii, 246
Kuramin, Vladimir, 257
Kurchatov, I.V., Acad., 248
Kurkotkin, S.K., MSU, 25-6, 35, 51, 232,
245, 253, 256-7
Kuusinen, Otto Ville, 124, 135
Kuznetsov, N.N., Colonel, 36
LaRouche, Lyndon H., 3-5, 8-10, 46,
303-10
Lagovskii, A.N., General Major, 19-20,
24, 245, 327
Lange, David, New Zealand Prime Min.,
194
Lansky, Meyer, 279
Lavrentyev, Mikhail, 251
Leander, Spanish churchman, 81
Lebedev, V., 249
Lehder, Carlos, 279-80
Leibniz, Gottfried, 13, 69, 97
Lenin, V.I., 7, 79, 110, 143, 249, 295
Leonardo da Vinci, 88
Leontief, Wassily, 11
Ligachov, Yegor K., 130-4, 136-7
Lini, Walter, 194
Lizichev, A.D., General Colonel, 63
Lobachev, G.A., General Major, 54-5
Lobov, V.N., General Colonel, 60
Lomeiko, Vladimir, 267
Lopez Michelsen, Alfonso, former Colom-
bian President, 280
Loyola, Ignatius, 287
Lukens, H. Richard, 223
Lunacharskii, A., 99, 288
Lushev, P.G., General of the Army, 41-2
Lvov, D.S., 250
Lycurgus, 69, 298
Maclean, Donald, 204
Maclean, Fitzroy, 76
Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Min.,
200-1, 203
Maiorets, A.I., 247
Makarov, I.M., 251
Makartsev, M.K., General Colonel, 255
Maksimov, Yu.P., General of the Army,
33, 40-1, 43, 59-60, 150, 158, 187
Malinin, V., 91
Mao Ze-dong, 197
Marchuk, G.A., Acad., 248
Maria-Theresa, Austrian empress, 68
Mariategui, Jose Carlos, Peruvian commu-
nist, 288
Mark, Metropolitan of Ephesus, 87
Marx, Karl, 9, 76
Massey, Suzanne, 75
Massignon, Louis, 288
Maxim the Greek, 97
McClure, James, U.S. Senator, 209
McNamara, Robert, 4, 201, 231
Medici, Cosimo, 86
Mednikov, IS., General Colonel, 41
Medunov, Sergei F., 130
Medvedev, V.A., 132
Meletius of Antioch, 97
Meretskov V.K., General Colonel, 60
Meridor, Ya'acov, Israeli cabinet member,
183
Mertes, Alois, 269
Methodius, Saint, 6, 273
Mettemich, Austrian Prince
Michelet, Jules, 99
Mikoyan, Anastas I., 135
Mikoyan, Sergo A., 135
Mill, John Stuart, 11, 13
Milshtein, Mikhail, Gen., 180
Mishin, V.P., 223
Misjur'-Munexin, M.G., 91
Mitterrand, Francois, French President,
177, 281
Molotov, Vsyacheslav, 111-2
Mubarak, Hosni, 287
Muhammad II, Sultan, 117
Mulack, Peter, 280
Nadiradze, space designer, 223
Narimanov, Nariman, 187
Nedelin, M.I., Chief Marshal of Artillery,
57
Neporozhnyi, Pyotr, 247
Nevsky, Alexander, 84, 120
Nicholas I, Tsar (19th cent.), 104-5, 112
Nicholas II, Tsar (19th-20th cent.), 79
Nicholson, Arthur, U.S. Maj., 220
Nicodemus the Hagiorite, Saint, 99
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 107
Nikodim, Metropolitan, 113
Nikon, Russian Patriarch (17th cent.), 93-
7
Nikonov, Viktor P., 133
Nixon, Richard, 35, 191, 279
Novikov, Ignatii, 247
Nunn May, Alan, 204
Obaturov, G.I., General of the Army, 37
Oberg, James, 225
Ogarkov, N.V., MSU, 3, 17, 24-7, 30,
33-6, 38, 40, 42-6, 48-56, 58-9, 61-3,
73, 92, 98, 103-4, 117, 130, 137,
158, 163, 166, 173, 184, 221-3, 230,
242-3, 253, 269-70, 279, 284, 291
Orlov family, .98
Osipov, V.V., General Colonel, 58, 60
Owen, David, 180
Pahlevi, Mohammed Reza, Shah of Iran,
186
Palme, Olof, Swedish Prime Min., 9, 154,
180
Papandreou, Andreas, Greek Prime Min.,
156-7, 162, 175
Paton, V., Acad., 225
Paul 11, Pope, 89
Pavlov, Georgii S., 131
Pavlovskii, LG., General of the Army, 41
Peccei, Aurelio, 202
Pegov, Nikolai M., 131
Pel'she, Arvid Ya., 132
Peter III, Tsar (18th cent.), 98-9
Peter of Damascus, 97
Peter the Great, Russian Tsar (17th-I8th
cent.), 7, 69, 78, 94, 96.7, 99, 108
Petrarch, 83
Petrov, V.I., MSU, 39-43, 50
Petrov, Yu. V. , 134
Philby, H.A.R. "Kim," 204, 286
Philby, St. John, 286
Philip, King of Macedon, 116, 144
Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople (9th
cent.), 82, 94, 101
Pimen (Izvekov), Russian Orthodox Patri-
arch, 73, 268, 271-3
Pitirim, Russian Archbishop, 268
Pius II (Piccolomini), Pope, 86
Plethon, Gemistos, 86
Pobedonostsev, Konstantin, 128
Pokryshkin, A.I., MSU, 236
Pol Pot, 191
Polmar, Norman, 215
Ponomaryov, Boris N., 176-7, 180
Popieluszko, Jerzy, Fr., 272
Popkov, M.D., General Colonel, 41
Popov, N.I., General Colonel, 60
Postnikov, S.I., General Colonel, 59-60
Potyomkin, Prince Grigorii, 98
Primakov, Yevgenii, Acad., 186, 284, 286
Prime, Geoffrey, 204
Pugachov, Yemelyan, 7, 98
Pushkin, Aleksandr, 100, 107-9
Pyankov, B.Ye., General Lieutenant, 54-5
Qaddafi, Muammar, Libyan dictator, 280,
284, 287
Rabin, Yitzhak, Israeli Defense Min., 185
Radek, Karl, 288
Rafsanjani, Ayatollah, 161
Rashidov, Sharaf, 188
Rasulayev, Abdurrahman, 188
Ratramnus of Corbie, 82
Razin, Stepan (Stenka), 96, 97
Razumovskii, G.P., 132-3
Reagan, Ronald, U.S. President, 5, 49,
75, 143, 180, 184-5, 200, 231, 245,
268, 271, 279, 299
Reccared, King of the Visigoths, 81
Rhodes, Cecil, 125
Riazanovsky, Nicholas, 101-3
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 111-2
Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 95
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Rodin, V.S., General Colonel, 59
Romanov, Fyodor, Russian Orthodox Pa-
triarch, 93
Romanov, Grigorii V., 38, 58, 133, 137
Romanov, Michael, Tsar (17th cent.), 93
Rommel, Erwin, 157
Roosevelt, Franklin, U.S. President (1933-
45), 9, 71, 299
Rosenberg, Alfred, 107
Ruehle, Hans, 229
Rurik, 75
Russell, Bertrand, vi, 142-4, 203-4, 261,
334
Ryabov, Yakov, Soviet Dep. Prime Min.,
247
Ryzhkov, Nikolai I., Politburo member,
132-4, 137, 247
Saade, Abdullah, 286
Saadeh, Antun, 286
Sadat, Anwar, 188
Sagdeyev, Roald, 224
Salmanov, G.I., General of the Army, 42,
60, 150
Samarin, Yuri, 100
Savitskaya, Svetlana, 229
Schaeder, Hildegard, 91
Schelling, Friedrich, 100
Schlumberger de Mend, Dominique, 281
Schmidt, Helmut, West German Chancel-
lor (1974-82), 181
Seraphim of Sarov, 100
Sergei (Stargorodskii), Russian Orthodox
Patriarch, 270
Sergei of Radonezh, Saint, 84-5
Sergei, Archimandrite, 96
Shabanov, V.M. , General of the Army,
246
Shakespeare, William, 107
Shaposhnikov, B.M., MSU, 59
Sharashin, Gennadii, 247, 252
Sharon, Ariel, 161, 182-4, 281-2
Shavrov, I.Ye., General of the Army, 35
Shein, B.P., General Lieutenant, 54-5
Shevardnadze, Eduard A., Soviet Foreign
Min., 133
Shirinkin, A.I., General Colonel, 59
Shulgovskii, Anatolii, 288
Shuralev, V., General Colonel, 60
Sidorov, V.V., Admiral, 43
Simeon, Russian monk, 88
Singh Chauhan, Jagjit, 285
Sitnikov, V.K., 133
Skokov, V.V., General Colonel, 60
Skorzeny, Otto, 286
Slavkov, Ivan, 280
Smith, Adam, 8
Sobolev, N., 232
Sokolov, A., General Lieutenant, 36
Sokolov, S.L., MSU, Defense Minister,
30, 133, 163, 224, 230
Sokolovskii, V.D., MSU, 17, 19, 24, 29,
35-6, 40, 50, 224, 231, 235, 296, 338
Solomentsev, Mikhail S., Politburo mem-
ber, 133-4
Solon, 69, 298
Soloviev, A.V., 95
Solovyov, V.V., General, 36
Solovyov, Vladimir, 100
Sophia (Zoe) Paleologue, Byzantine prin-
cess, 89-90
Soroki, . M.I., Genet ' of the Army, 42,
150
Sosnov, Ivan, 247
Stalin, Josef, Gen. Sec. (1924-53), 28, 59,
79, 81-2, 84, 93, 99-100, 109-13,
115, 121-4, 126, 135, 143, 150, 160,
174, 243, 245, 270, 272
Steiner, Rudolf, 288
Stephen, Exarch of Bulgaria, 113
Stukalin, Boris 1., 132
Sukhorukov, D.S., General of the Army,
44
Sullivan, David S., 211, 214, 222
Suslov, Mikhail A., Politburo member
(1955-82), 7, 10, 40, 123, 132-3, 136
Suvorov, Alexander, General, 98
Suvorov, Viktor, 282
Sverdlev, Bulgarian defector, 278
Sylvester, Pope, 90
Szilard, Leo, 143-4, 261, 332
Taheri, Amin, 126
Talenskii, N.A., General, 232
Teller, Edward, 338
Thatcher, Margaret, British Prime Min.,
129, 200-1, 203-4
Theodora, Byzantine empress, 83
Tiberius, Roman emperor, 73, 117
Tikhon, Russian Orthodox Patriarch, 273
Tikhon of Zadonsk, 100
Tikhonov, Nikolai, Soviet Prime Min.,
251
Todenhoefer, Juergen, 126
Tolstoi, Leo, 100
Tolubko, V.F., Chief Marshal of Artillery,
35, 51-2, 224
Trapeznikov, S.P., 132
Treholt, Ame, Colonel (KGB), 155, 180
Tret'yak, I.M., General of the Army, 34,
43, 59-60, 150, 253
Trotsky, Leon, 187
Tyazhol'nikov, Ye.M., 132
Ulyanovskii, Rostislav, 304
Ustinov, D.F., Soviet Defense Minister
(1976-84), 33, 38, 59, 133, 190, 224
Utkin, B.P., General Colonel, 59
van den Brueck, Moeller, 107
Vance, Cyrus, 180, 204
Varennikov, V.I., General of the Army,
36
Varga, Eugen, 135
Vasilii II, Grand Prince of Muscovy, 87-89
Vasilii III, Grand Prince of Muscovy, 90-2
Vasilyev, A.A., 79
Vasilyevskii, A.M., MSU, 59
Velikhov, Ye.P., Acad., 223, 237, 249-51
Velikhovskii, Paissius. 100
Verges, Jacques, 285
Vemadsky, V., Acad., 5
Vesco, Robert, 279-80
Vinogradov, Vladimir, 286
Vladimir, Russian Prince, 75-6, 79, 82,
87, 90-1
Voight, Karstens, 178
Volcker, Paul, 260, 263-4
von Herberstein, Baron, 92
von Neumann, John, 11
von Reventlow, Count, 288
von Reventlow, Fanny, 288
von Thum, Baron Max, 278
Voronin, L.A., 245-6, 248
Voronovskii, Gennadii, 247
Voropayev, Mikhail G., 134
Vorotnikov, V.I., Politburo member, 98,
130, 133, 137, 246
Vostrov, V.A., General Colonel, 60
Wells, H.G., 143
Wenner-Gren, Axel, 288
Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John, 202
Witte, Count Sergei, 7
Wolf, Marcus, Gen. (E. Germany), 184,
282
Wood, Lowell, 322
Yastrebov, Ivan P., 132
Yagoda, Genrikh, 110
Yazov, D.T., General of the Army, 41,
43, 60
Yegorov, G.M., Admiral, 236
Yel'tsin, Boris N., 131, 133-4, 137
Yermachenko, I.F., Colonel, 36
Yermakov, V.F., General Colonel, 60
Yepishev, A., General of the Army, 63,
287-8
Yezhov, Nikolai, 110
Zagladin, Vadim, 176, 180
Zaikov, Lev N., 133, 137
Zaitsev, M.M., General of the Army, 41-
2, 54, 63, 172
Zaporozhchenko, A.K., General, 36
Zarudin, Yu.F., General Colonel, 60
Zavyalov, N., General Major, 231
Zepp-LaRouche, Helga, 303-7
Zhivkov, Todor, Bulgarian President, 273,
280
Zhivkova, Lyudmila, 280
Zhukov, G.K., MSU, 59
Zhukovsky, V.A., 104
Zia ul-Haq, Pakistani President, 190, 197
Zimmermann, Ernst, 281-2
Zuckerman, Lord Solly, 202
Zumwalt, Elmo, U.S. Admiral, 228
Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100310004-9