DEFENSE WEEK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100210007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 16, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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STAT
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300
NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC
20045
? ?
Monday, June 16,1980
Aegis: A Nice Idea, But
Does It Work And
How Vulnerable Is It?
By Andrew Cockburn, New York
In the present uproar over military readiness, and the
drawbacks of high-technology weapons systems, It is the
Air Force and Navy aviation that have taken most of the
knocks. F-14s and F-15s have provided good sport with
their shocking mission capability rates, as have air-to-
air and air-to-ground missiles. Meanwhile, more osten-
sibly old-fashioned weaponry-such as the Navy's sur-
face vessels-have been getting off lightly. As one might
expect, they deserve further examination.
Connoisseurs of tion Congressional ups
sophisticated and expen- and downs, since the early
sive weapons systems were 1970s. The Aegis is a
interested to note the highly sophisticated and,
budgetary sprint put on
this year by the CG-47
Aegis cruiser. The Aegis
procurement budget, as
requested by the Defense
Department, has rocketed
from $825 million in FY
80 to $1.63 billion in FY
81. The CG-47 is a new
class of cruiser (previously
designated as a destroyer)
that has had its share of
controversy, not to men-
INSIDE
of course, very expensive
air defense system for pro-
tecting surface ships from
attack. The estimated cost
for 16 of them is presently
reckoned at $15 billion.
The keynote to the
system is a phased array
radar coupled with ship-
to-air missiles by means of
a very complicated com-
puting system. Simply
(Continued on page 9)
Britain's reawakened interest in chemical warfare
(the country is tilting towards acquiring its own of-
fensive capability) is prompting a wave of research
into protective measures. NAIAD, a 12-pound "por-
table chemical lab", is the scientists' latest contribu-
tion. Page 2
In the last several years, the Brazilians have been
building up their defense industry and pursuing ex-
port markets with gusto. And the Brazilian govern-
ment has no qualms about dealing with even the
most radical regimes. A report from Sao Paulo. Page 4
Volume 1, Number 11
DOD Solves Its
ILLEGIB
Ordnance Shortage
By Fiddling
The Numbers
By Richard Barnard
The Navy and Defense Department are in the midst of
a fiery dispute over a recent budget-cutting measure by
DOD which, Navy sources say, will bridle its firepower
and weaken its ability to protect itself, much less to
devastate an enemy. The controversy swirls around
DOD's across-the-board reductions in the FY 1981 pro-
curement objectives for some of the Navy's most
reliable and important munitions-such as the Mark-48
heavy torpedo, the Harpoon anti-ship missile, and the
Marine Corps' TOW anti-tank missile. In the case of the
Mark-48, for example, the Navy will now be permitted
to buy only about 3,000 of these torpedoes rather than
the approximately 5,000 originally planned.
Prompted by howls of outrage from several senior ad-
mirals of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, Navy leaders
have taken the offensive in a recent series of meetings
with DOD executives to iron out their strong differences
over the inventory of bombs and projectiles which the
Navy should have on hand. The Navy insists that the
lowered ceilings will stretch their stockpiles of
torpedoes, missiles and mines perilously thin and
jeopardize the ability of their battle groups to project
sufficient firepower long enough to defeat a well-armed
enemy. (Continued on page 9)
Imagine. An airborne assault coming in beneath
enemy radar, with paratroops dropping from as low
as 250 feet. The Army tests a new parachute. Page 3
"l think we have to get a lot more scared than we
are. We're scared enough to want to increase the
defense budget, but we are not scared enough to get
serious about what we buy or how we deploy
forces... "A Defense Week interview with Rep. Les
Aspin. Center Pages
Although it was the first Red Flag Rapid Deploy-
ment Force exercise, journalists invited to Nellis Air
Force Base last week saw little enough rapid deploy-
ment. They did hear a warning from General Wilbur
Creech, commander of the U.S. Tactical Air Com-
mand. pagell
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Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1986
The Chemical Lab
On 'Active Duty'
By David Ffsh/ock, Porton, England
The already somewhat over-
burdened British soldier soon will be
able to go into battle equipped with
an automatic chemical laboratory.
This highly sophisticated portable
pack, weighing about 12 lbs., will
warn a platoon by means of red
lights and alarms if the enemy is at-
tacking with nerve gas. At such a
warning, the soldier can don the
new protective "armor" that British
troops have been training with in re-
cent exercises in southern England.
NAIAD (nerve agent immobilized
enzyme alarm and detector) is one
of the latest developments from
Porton, Britain's Chemical Defense
Establishment. It uses
cholinesterase, the natural enzyme
incapacitated by nerve gas, as its
sensor. Another development is
CAM, the chemical agent monitor,
which can indicate when it is safe to
dispense with protective measures.
A recent reorganization of British
research efforts has brought
together in one Porton laboratory
(spending about $15 million a year)
research and development of means
to defend against both chemical and
biological assault. Defense against
bugs has become a small adjunct of
the work directed there by Dr. Tex
Watson. A group of about 10 pro-
fessionads form a "microbiological
watchtower" against new kinds of
threat from this fast-advancing sec-
tor of science. The main
laboratories of the former
Microbiological Research Establish-
ment at Porton, which once
employed 400, have passed into the
civil sector as the new Center for
Applied Microbiology and
Research, dealing with exotic public
health problems such as Lassa fever.
Britain's latest defense spending
estimates allocated an increase of
3.5 per cent on chemical (including
biological) defense. Watson ex-
plains that, in the late-1960s, Britain
was growing "rather complacent"
about the threat of attack from such
agents. But the 1970s saw a
"tightening of resolve" by govern-
ments about what intelligence
sources insisted was a growing
threat. This year's defense estimates
noted that "Soviet forces maintain
large stocks of chemical munitions
and are fully equipped and trained
to operate in a chemical environ-
ment."
The Russians are even showing
renewed interest in cyanide-prussic
acid gas-as an offensive agent,
although Porton believes that it is
too slow-acting to be effective.
However, a whiff of cyanide picked
up by NAIAD could be enough to
put NATO forces into protective ar-
mor, greatly reducing thereby their
efficiency as a fighting force.
NAIAD will pick up cyanide as well
as the more sophisticated nerve
agents invented in Germany during
World War II.
According to British scientists,
German war records show that the
Porton laboratory's reputation was
a significant factor in stopping Ger-
many from using agents such as
Tabum, which is ten times as toxic
as phosgene, one of the First World
War weapons. Today Porton is a
leader in NATO collaboration on
chemical and biological defense
R&D. Its staff point proudly to its
motif-a red cloud with a bayonet
thrusting through it. Yet there are
serious doubts as to whether good
defenses are sufficient, because they
are so cumbersome. Hence the call
for NATO to have the capacity to
reciprocate such a threat.
Watson stresses that his work re-
mains defensive-designed to pro-
tect all three service arms against
nuclear, chemical and biological at-
tack and to improve the
serviceman's chances of survival if
hit by such agents. NAIAD is
hardened against blast, heat and
radiation "to the same extent as any
man in the open," says one if its in-
ventors. Thorn Automation is mak-
ing it for the Army, at a price Por-
ton puts at "under $10,000." It
should come into service next year.
While Britain debates the
desirability of having its own offen-
sive capability, in the light of Rus-
sian stockpiles in Europe, NATO
troops have been trying out
Porton's latest fashions in protec-
tive garb during exercises on the
6,800 acres of Salisbury Plain used
by Porton for trials. The so-called
NCB (nuclear, chemical, biological)
suits are designed to protect against
all three kinds of agents, and are
essentially the same for the three
services.
The suit about to be issued to the
Navy, for instance, can amount to
about 100 lbs. or more of modern
armor, including respirator, bat-
tledress, gloves and boots. It gives
protection for up to 24 hours,
although its most advanced version,
which is still being developed at Por-
ton, could give protection for up to
a month, the scientists claim. The
fabric itself is a composite structure
incorporating activated carbon, still
the most effective way of mopping
up chemical agents. The trick lies in
how the carbon is put on the
cloth-enough is needed to do the
job but not so much as to prevent
"Clinical trials of such drugs are a constant problem. Por-
ton's medics are only allowed to expose 'patients' to one
of the three main nerve gases and then only at concentra-
tions involving 'absolutely no risk at all'. "
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befense Week Monday, June 16, 1980
the material from "breathing."
Porton has also developed a char-
coal cloth, although this is too ex-
pensive and insufficiently abrasion
resistant for battledress.
A score of British companies
associated with the manufacture of
NCB suits for the three services
recently staged an exhibition in
Washington in an effort to sell the
concept to the Department of
Defense. They were endeavoring to
convince U.S. officials that Porton
is ahead of the Pentagon in its abili-
ty to protect against such agents as
cyanide, nerve gases, mustard gas,
and anthrax bacteria-all believed
to be stockpiled as munitions by the
Warsaw Pact.
Porton has also tried hard to
develop drugs that help to protect
servicemen against any agent which
might be ingested. The existing
technique is to carry automatic in-
jectors of atrophine for use if the
man believes he might have been ex-
posed to nerve agent. Porton has
discovered that atrophine's efficacy
can be greatly enhanced if the user
takes a drug called pralidoxime
mesylate or P2S beforehand. The
problem is that although P2S com-
bined with atrophine will allow the
soldier to survive several times a
lethal dose of nerve agent, the pills
themselves are veritable "horse
pills" and must be swallowed
whole. The service man would "go
into action rattling", remarked one
of Porton's medical researchers.
They have high hopes of a new pill,
much smaller and much less fre-
quently needed.
Clinical trials on such drugs are a
constant problem. Porton's medics
are only allowed to expose "pa-
tients" to one of the three main
nerve gases, and then only at con-
centrations involving "absolutely
no risk at all". Nevertheless, they
can reproduce some of the symp-
toms of nerve agent poison-
ing-nowhere near the stage of con-
vulsions, but such symptoms as an
increased flow of mucus and a
tightening of the chest. To be sure
that they have a useful form of pro-
phylaxis, however, scientists would
have to expose man to much greater
concentrations than are permitted.
As one medical researcher says
philosophically: "After all, we're
trying to protect against death-and
you can't simulate that."
LOW-ALTITUDE 'CHUTE
MA Y CHANGE AIRBORNE
ASSA UL T TACTICS
By Richard Barnard
A new type of parachute developed by a retired Army intelligence officer
promises to revolutionize the airborne assault, making it a more secretive
and potent weapon in the hands of an attacking force. Christian Koenig, an
intelligence officer for the 82nd Airborne Division prior to his retirement in
1976, says that his parachute enables airborne troops to jump at altitudes as
low as 250 feet, one-third the current minimum of 750 feet considered safe
by the Army. This means that aircraft loaded with soldiers could fly
underneath enemy radar and disperse paratroopers without detection.
Koenig told Defense Week that his parachute also provides an added
measure of safety for troops in combat: "If the enemy can't see you, he
can't shoot you," Koenig said.
The Koenig parachute is a modification of the standard T10-B parachute
issued to every Army jumper. Koenig's basic innovation is to attach six air
pockets to the outside bottom skirt of the parachute. These pockets catch
the air and force the chute open almost immediately after a jumper leaves
an airplane. This eliminates any freefall or acceleration by the parachutist,
permitting a slow rate of descent. The slow descent makes low altitude
jumps possible. The standard chute is forced open by air rushing through
the apex of the canopy, which takes longer, according to Koenig. A jumper
with a standard Army chute falls at the rate of 17 feet per second, compared
to about 10 feet per second using the Koenig parachute.
Koenig's parachute was demonstrated at Fort Benning, Ga. on June 5,
before military representatives of several NATO countries. Five men, in-
cluding one of Koenig's business partners, jumped from a C-130 Hercules
troop transport at an altitude of 300 feet. An Army official who witnessed
the jump said the parachutes "opened reliably and quickly". The official
cautioned, however, that "you can't make any conclusions about a
parachute until you have tested it in at least 1,000 measured and recorded
jumps, and we're not anywhere near that" with the Koenig parachute.
Over the last two months, the Koenig parachute has undergone a series of
tests conducted by the Army Airborne Board at Fort Bragg, N.C. Col. G.
G. Thomas, president of the board, is not bubbling with enthusiasm about
Koenig's innovation. "We've finished only a third of our tests and we can't
draw any conclusions," Thomas said in a telephone interview, "but I've
seen nothing to date to indicate that this new parachute is a significant im-
provement over the T10-B. If there's any difference in opening time, it's
very slight." Thomas was quick to explain that the tests are conducted with
wooden dummies, not with "our jumpers." Dummies weighing from 180 to
200 pounds are strapped into Koenig parachutes and dropped from
transports at altitudes between 1,000 and 1,200 feet. Drops at 200 feet will
be conducted soon, Thomas said. The Airborne Board's tests are to be com-
pleted in October.
Koenig said he was uncertain of "what the board is doing with the chute"
but has been told the Army has decided to expedite its testing. A NATO
country has decided to purchase some Koenig parachutes, Koenig said, but
he declined to provide any details of the forthcoming sale because much of
the legal groundwork necessary to protect his patent applications in 12
countries still must be accomplished.
In addition to greater secrecy and safety, Koenig says his parachute offers
these advantages over the standard Army parachute:
? A 75 percent reduction in the amount of time paratroopers spend
floating to earth and providing enemy riflemen with excellent targets.
(Continued on next page)
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Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1980
Parac%rute
(Continued from preceding page)
? Faster separation of the
parachute from the suspension
lines, reducing the likelihood of a
fouled chute.
? Less pull on the soldier when his
parachute opens, thanks to the gen-
tle action caused by the six air
pockets, or "parachute inflation
assistance devices," as they are
called in the military lexicon.
Koenig, a master parachutist dur-
ing his .Army days, retired as a chief
warrant officer. During his 20-year
military career, he was awarded the
Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Pur-
ple Heart and 27 other medals.
Koenig said development of a low-
altitude parachute "was sort of a
mission with me. In Vietnam, I saw
a lot of guys die because their
helicopters were shot down. They
might have lived if they had been
able to ,jump out," with the aid of a
parachute which would open rapid-
ly. Koenig and his partners, Jim
Cazer and Duane Calhoun, both of
whom are parachute riggers for the
National Guard, began work on a
new chute in 1976 using simple wind
tunnels they developed themselves.
Over the next three years, the three
invested about $100,000 in develop-
ment and promotion of the Koenig
parachute.
They attracted little attention
from the military services, however,
Soviets Using Unbeatable Nerve Gas?
Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kans.) says he has obtained "convincing
evidence" that the Soviet Union has a chemical warfare capability
against which the U.S. "has no defense whatsoever." The pervasive
and potent qualities of the Soviets' new X-Gas "extend far beyond
our greatest fears," Dole said in a recent speech on the floor of the
Senate.
X-Gas can invade the chemical filtering systems in U.S. gas masks,
tanks and personnel carriers, Dole asserted, "and render its victims
unconscious for 24 to 36 hours without rendering death, providing the
perfect opportunity for the aggressors to move in for the kill .... Whole
units and regions can be overrun... with minimal effort and without
the damage that would otherwise be incurred during the course of
combat as we know it." Relying totally on information he obtained
from Galen Greer, a reporter for Soldier of Fortune magazine who
recently returned from Afghanistan, Dole said: "The Soviets are cur-
rently using this gas indiscriminately against insurgents and civilians in
that country."
When queried about whether the Soviets actually have such a gas, a
Defense Department spokesman said U.S. intelligence "has nothing
on it."
until a fortuitious turn of events in
early 1979. Koenig heard that Gen.
Frederick Kroesen, then the Army's
Vice Chief of Staff, was to visit
Maxwell Air Force Base near
Koenig's home in Prattville,
Alabama. Koenig had served as
Kroesen's intelligence officer when
the latter was commander of the 82d
Airborne Division's "Screaming
Eagles." Koenig and his friends in-
vited Kroesen to the base officer's
club to view a 30-minute film about
their parachute. Impressed, the
general ordered a thorough test of
the new apparatus by the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command,
of which the Army Airborne Board
is a part.
The Army's initial indifference to
his parachute now matters little to
Koenig. He said, "This thing is go-
ing to work. We can get the jumps
down to 250 feet. You'll see."
Brazil Finds Third World Is A Lively Market
For Its Simple, Unsophisticated Weapons
By Waft Harris In Sao Paulo
The Carter Administration's policy of allowing U.S.
military sales only to countries with acceptable human
rights policies has had at least one effect that its ar-
chitect., would deem undesirable. Two Latin American
nations-Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina-have
been spurred by American hesitancy to extend military
assistance into building their own defense industries.
And to ensure that their industries will be economically
viable, both countries are building enough capacity in
weapons manufacturing that a major push for export
market; is taking place.
In the past two years the Brazilian defense industry
has leaped into the export trade. And American govern-
ment officials in Washington and in Brazil are keeping a
watchful eye on this developing trade, since the conser-
vative Brazilian government, which controls a large part
of the new industry, appears to harbor no qualms about
dealing with even the most radical regimes. While there
have been some exports to neighboring Latin American
nations, the Brazilians have achieved their greatest suc-
cess in promoting military sales from Engesa, the
private Brazilian defense firm, and the government of
Libya, for 125 lightweight Cascavel tanks. Already they
have been deployed alongside Soviet T-62 tanks in
border skirmishes with Egypt.
There is nothing secret about Brazil's booming
defense industry nor about its arms exports. A recent ar-
ticle in the Brazilian news weekly Veja entitled "The
Arms Market: Brazil Enters the Game," outlined the re-
cent developments in the industry and plans for expan-
sion. By specializing in weaponry of only moderate
sophistication, such as lightweight tanks and armored
cars, machine guns, and planes for military transport
and training, Brazil has drawn on its own experience
and military needs to become a chief arms supplier to
Third World nations who share similar aspirations.
Estimates vary on .the amount of income arms sales
have brought to Brazil, but it is clear that the industry
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Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1980
has grown from selling a mere $10-15 million in ex-
ported weaponry two years ago, to selling hundreds of
millions of dollars' worth today. Less than ten years ago
hardly more than a group of seven gun manufacturers,
the Brazilian defense industry today encompasses a total
of 55 businesses employing 17,000 workers. In 1979,
arms exports reached fifth place among Brazilian ex-
ports of manufactured goods.
When the Carter Administration two years ago in-
itiated its human rights policy and carried through on
threats to stop sales to Argentina during a period of par-
ticularly harsh political repression there, Brazil was in a
strong position to ignore similar American threats.
Although the U.S. did not prohibit military sales to
Brazil at the time, Brazilian authorities viewed the
Carter policy as interference in their affairs, and took
the opportunity to speed up the pace of own their own
defense program.
The industry drew on the expertise of military and
civilian personnel trained at the highly respected
Aerospace Technical Center in Sao Jose Dos Campos,
halfway between Rio De Janeiro and Sao Paulo. At the
same time, Brazil entered into licensing agreements,
particularly with the Italian defense industry, to buy
needed technology. The military also shrewdly perceiv-
ed that in developing this type of moderately
sophisticated weaponry, Brazil would be able to fill in a
technology gap between highly sophisticated American,
European and Soviet arms, and readily available guns
and ammunition. Brazil would provide a source of light
vehicles and aircraft now in keen demand from the
growing armies of the Third World, especially in the
Middle East and Africa.
The success of Engesa, the Sao Paulo-based private
firm which has three factories employing 2,200 workers,
in marketing its goods to the Middle East has stimulated
the interest of other companies, both private and
government-owned. The Cascavel's relatively low price
of $400,000 per unit makes it particularly attractive to
small Third World nations. The Cascavel, made of
lightweight high-strength steel, is a 12-tonne armored
vehicle that can maneuver easily in rugged terrain and
cross 300 kilometers of desert in ten hours. In addition
to sales to Libya and the Brazilian Army, other sales in-
clude 20 Cascavels to the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar.
Among other weapons developed by Brazil is a ver-
sion of the M-41 tank first used by the United States
during the Korean War. The private Sao Paulo firm
Bernardini has adapted the old M-41, famous for its
firepower but now notorious as a gas guzzler, into a
diesel-fueled M-41 B with a Saab motor. Since the new
model burns about one liter of gas per kilometer-com-
pared to about seven liters per kilometer for the old ver-
sion-the Brazilian brand could be a hot item as arms
buying nations grow increasingly aware of energy con-
straints. Veja reports that the U.S. Army is among those
armies that have been negotiating to buy adaptor kits to
turn M-41s into the Energy-efficient model.
Still other new Brazilian arms up for sale include the
Xavante AT-26 training and attack airplane. The
Xavante is the work of Embraer, the state-owned air-
craft company which started up in 1969 and now
employs 5,000 workers. Until recently, Embraer's pro-
duction was geared primarily toward civilian aircraft,
based on years of involvement with the America's Piper
Aircraft Corp. Military training planes, however, are
"the big thing" in the Third World these days, accor-
ding to a military attache at the U.S. Consulate in Rio
De Janeiro, and Embraer is poised to pick up a large
share of the market. The Air Force of Togo is among
the first foreign buyers of the Brazilian Xavante, which
is modeled after Italian antecedents.
Additionally, Embraer has developed a plane named
the EMB Ill Bandeirante-designed for marine war-
fare against submarines and small warships. The
Bandeirante has already been sold to the Brazilian
military as well as the Chilean Navy. The Beretta sub-
machine gun, now made in Brazil under an Italian
license, is produced primarily for export. Other
weapons in production or in various stages of develop-
ment include new transport planes, missiles, missile
launchers, flame throwers: the type of light weaponry so
much in demand in the Third World today. Brazil has
little interest in competing in heavier arms, dominated
by the U.S., European and Russian defense industries.
But the Brazilians still harbor visions of building more
sophisticated equipment. The most interesting expan-
sion plan is a six-year project initiated last year to
develop Brazil's own submarine.
American government officials say Brazil was prepar-
ing to jump into the arms export business with or
without the sudden assertion of the U.S. policy on
human rights. But the Carter Administration's human
rights stance signalled to the Brazilians that they could
no longer depend on a traditional supplier for their
military needs, so domestic arms manufacturing gained
impetus.
There are news reports that the U. S.
Army is among those negotiating to buy
adaptor kits from Brazil to turn
American M-41 tanks into a more
energy-efficient model....
Now the Brazilian government is following the classic
Third World industrial development scheme of import
substitution and export development. Rather than
substituting lost American sources with European arms,
Brazil has developed its own industry and can now offer
its expertise to Third World nations with similar desires.
American career diplomats privately scoff at Carter's
human rights policy. They argue that governments in
the developing world resent the American insistence on
human rights and nuclear safeguards, and that by
withholding military aid and sales, the U.S. has lost
much of its leverage over these countries' policies. At
the same time, the American defense industry is missing
countless overseas contracts.
But other members of the U.S. defense establishment
say the debate over arms sales loses sight of the fact that
the human rights drive has achieved dramatic success,
especially in Latin America. Although proud, na-
tionalistic nations like Argentina and Brazil publicly re-
ject American human rights initiatives as unwarranted
interference, this same pride and quest for acceptance
among advanced Western nations has led the military
regimes to loosen their grip over the past year.
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Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1980 Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1980
Defense Week Interview With Rep. Les Aspin
An easy informality, the kind of bookish
disorderliness one would expect from an
academic, surrounds Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.)
in his Capitol Hill office. A shaggy grey and
white dog named Junket greets visitors and
lingers for a scratch behind the ears. Aspin
used to say that she was his only Congres-
sional junket. After taking a trip to China he
abandoned the pun, although not the dog. In
his office, Aspin leans back perilously in his
chair causing visitors to fear for the large mir-
ror that tilts, unhung, against the wall behind
him.
The sense that this is the office of a genteel
and somewhat rumpled professor is no acci-
dent. More so than most members of Con-
gress, Aspin is acquainted with the world of
ideas. After graduating with honors from Yale
in 1960, he received a Master of Arts from
Oxford in 1962 and, in 1965, a Ph.D. in
economics from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. Before his election to Con-
gress in 1970, he was an economics pro-
fessor at Marquette University in Milwaukee.
He was an aide to William Proxmire, the
unorthodox senior Senator from Wisconsin,
from 1960 to 1962 and a staff assistant to
chairman Walter Heller of the President's
Council of Economic Advisors in 1963. In
1964 he ran Proxmire's reelection campaign.
During Army service from 1966 to 1968,
Aspin served as an aide to Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara. He won election to the
House at age 31.
As a member of Congress, Aspin has gained
influence in his chosen area of exper-
tise-military affairs- out of proportion to his
seniority. After obtaining a seat on the Armed
Services Committee, he quickly moved to use
the only weapons available to a junior member
trying to buck the leadership-the press
release and the floor of the House. Aspin
quickly discovered that reporters have an
endless appetite for stories about Pentagon
mismanagement and waste, especially when,
upon investigation, most of them turn out to
be true. He quickly developed a reputation as
an accurate and trenchant critic of bloated
defense budgets at a time when defense
spending was less popular than it may be to-
day.
His releases, usually mailed out on Friday to
catch the Monday morning editions, often
present a well-researched alternative to the
standard line offered by Administration
spokesmen. When the Carter Administration
was overwhelmed by more than 100,000
Cuban refugees last month, Aspin revealed
that Carter should not have been taken by sur-
prise. The CIA had predicted the exodus
months in advance. In response to the cries of
alarm about the Soviet gains in missile
technology, which are used to bolster
arguments for the $50 billion MX missile
system, Aspin's release (given significant play
`We Have To Get A Lot More Scared Than We Are...'
in last Monday morning's dailies) said that
U.S. improvements in numbers and
sophistication of missiles outweigh those of
the Russians.
On the floor, Aspin has taken on the leader-
ship and won. In 1973, he succeeded in cut-
ting almost $1 billion from the defense budget
over the opposition of Armed Services Com-
mittee Chairman Edward Hebert. When the
Watergate class of 1974 arrived on Capitol
Hill and began to flex its muscles, Aspin was
among those who plotted the ouster of the
autocratic Hebert and his replacement by Rep.
Melvin Price (D-111.)
As military spending has become more
popular, Aspin's guerrilla attacks against the
Pentagon have lost some of their sting. In ad-
dition, age and experience have changed
Aspin. He is now a bit more conservative than
during his early years in the House. Richard
Barnard and Ken Maize of Defense Week
talked with Aspin recently about his current
views on defense policy.
Q. You voted against the 1981 defense
authorization bill. Why?
A. The authorization bill has become such a
mess now that it is not a serious document. The
people on the House Armed Services Committee
just add things on for their own constituencies
and then they get credit at home for having put it
into the bill. In fact, it doesn't mean anything,
because in the budget resolution process and the
appropriations process, those items come out. So
it is not a serious document.
Q. Does the House Armed Services Committee
have an important influence on the shape of the
military budget?
A. Only in the areas of pay and allowances and
setting the laws and regulations on personnel and
compensation issues.
Q. When you first became a member, did the
committee leave its palmprints on the budget?
A. Yes, it was an important committee.
Q. Why the change?
A. First, we used to go through a much more
critical examination of defense [issues], in terms
of the amount of money [authorized] and what
we were authorizing it for. But the committee
never kept up with that. So you end up with the
committee composed mostly of people who are
trying to protect something. It's a constituent
service rather than a defense committee. It's a
public works committee. The House Armed Ser-
vices Committee does almost nothing in defense
policy. I'm talking about the procurement part
of the defense authorization bill. Obviously, the
committee has influence over pay, allowances,
doctors' bonuses, and all those things are impor-
tant. But in terms of defense procurement, the
committee doesn't matter any more.
Q. Given your low opinion of Armed Services
Committee, why do you continue to serve on it?
A. It is a way to get into a lot of very in-
teresting defense and foreign policy issues. And
the personnel issues are not trivial. They are very
critical. What the Armed Services Committee
says is important because Congress tends to go
along with what the committee does in this area.
Also, if I could stay long enough to become a
subcommittee chairman, the subcommittee
would do what I want.
Q. How long will that take?
A. I don't know.
Q. There are some major changes coming.
A. [Rep.] Charlie Wilson [D-Calif.] lost his
primary recently. [Rep. Richard] Ichord [D-Mo.]
and [Rep. Lucien] Nedzi [D-Mich.] are leaving.
Q. Any possibilities of another coup d'etat?
A. Against Price? No, no way.
Q. Why not?
A. He's too decent a chairman. He shouldn't
be thrown out; he is a very fair chairman.
Q. You voted against the defense budget
resolution as well as the authorization bill. Why?
A. I thought the defense budget was too high.
Q. By how much.
A. Oh, I don't know. It could have been a little
higher than the House-passed version and I still
would have gone along with it.
Q. You are among those who want to see real
growth in the defense budget?
A. I think real growth is necessary, yes.
Q. At what level?
A. A couple of percent, maybe.
Q. What about the line items in the budget?
Do they concern you more?
A. Yes. When you are talking about one or
two percent growth, it matters more what you
spend it on than how much you spend.
Q. How should it be spent?
A. Everybody says the same things over and
over again: more on readiness, more on the nuts
and bolts, less fancy equipment, more standard
stuff.
Q. The Administration is talking a lot about
the need to pay more attention to operations and
maintenance. Is the Pentagon serious about it?
A. Not serious enough. In each of the next
five years, according to the Pentagon's figures,
the increase in defense funds generally is between
6.6 and 11.7 percent. That's for everything. The
planned increase for O&M varies between 3 per-
cent and 0.5 percent per year. They are increas-
ing procurement a lot more than they are increas-
ing O&M, yet they keep saying O&M is the item
they are missing.
I think that the main thing is having a force
that is ready and able to fight, and to be able to
deal with contingencies in a professional manner.
And that is partly a function of how much we
spend. There is a good case to be made for
spending more money there. But part of the pro-
blem is that we are not being very serious about
this whole business. I constantly get the impres-
sion that we are not scared enough yet to over-
come the bureaucratic stratification which works
against having an effective force. There are lots
of examples of how that hurt us during the war in
Vietnam: the constant rotation of people
through there with six month tours of duty, for
example. That is a sign that you are really not
taking a war seriously. You are using it as a train-
ing ground.
This recent fiasco in the desert is another ex-
ample. Everybody wanted in. Nobody wanted to
let the Marines have the whole show. So you got
the Air Force C-130s, Navy helicopters and a
commando team made up of all different ser-
vices with jumbled lines of communication.
That's an indication of a lack of serious intent. I
have heard some horror stories-I don't know
whether they are accurate or not-about discus-
sions going on [during the mission] and nobody
knowing exactly who is in charge. I haven't run it
down to verify it, but someone was telling me
about a night vision device the military was
testing on the raid. They discovered the new one
wasn't much better than the old one. [Is it possi-
ble that] we were running experiments [on this
mission], I mean, is this some kind of an exer-
cise?
Everybody, every contractor, wants to get his
little piece of equipment [used] so they can adver-
tise in the service magazines: `The night vision
device used on the Iran raid!' That is the kind of
bureaucratic stuff going on.... We are not
serious; we're not serious at all.
Q. In the closed committee hearings on the
mission in Iran, did you or anyone else ask why
we had a tri-service force?
A. You'd get some bullshit answer back, but
the real reason, I'm sure, is that all [three ser-
vices] wanted a piece of it. Spread the risk,
spread the reward, spread the blame. Everybody
wants a piece of the action.
Q. There has been a lot of talk about the need
to really examine that mission. Has anyone done
that?
A. It's one of those things that's over and
everybody wants to forget about it. Reminds you
a lot of Vietnam, doesn't it? But there is a lot still
to be learned, just as there is a lot to be learned
from going back and looking at Vietnam some
more. But there's no stomach to do it.
Q. What does it take to get serious?
A. I don't know. I think we have to get a lot
more scared than we are. We're scared enough to
want to increase the defense budget, but we are
not scared enough to get serious about what we
buy or how we deploy forces, and to stop worry-
ing about who gets the bureaucratic credit.
Q. The President has a military education. Do
you see any evidence of that?
A. No.
(Continued on next page)
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Aspin Interview (From preceding page)
Q. What do you hope to accomplish in your
work in the intelligence field? Should there be a
new charter for the CIA?
A. That is possible, but the main issue is: how
good is your intelligence? Are there things you
can do to make it better? I don't know the
answers yet. I am in the midst of a whole set of
hearings on these questions.
Q. Has the CIA been handcuffed and, if so,
has this resulted in poor intelligence?
A. Intelligence has nothing to do with whether
the agencies were handcuffed or not. The hand-
cuffing applied to their covert operations and a
few invasions of privacy in this country. But in
terms of foreign intelligence-which is what you
hope that the CIA and the intelligence communi-
ty in general is going to provide for
you-nothing was ever done about that. It
wasn't even examined much. The Pike commit-
tee focused on constitutional abuses.
Q. How do you assess the quality of in-
telligence?
A. You need a benchmark in order to judge.
An event is either predicted to happen or not
happen, and it does or it doesn't. Other ways?
We know, for example, at any one time, with a
very high degree of accuracy, how many missiles
the Soviets have. And we project that ten years
into the future. After ten years, you can see how
good the forecasts were.
Q. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's way
of resolving his irritation with the CIA was
to form the Defense Intelligence Agency. Is there
any need for one intelligence agency in McLean
and another in the Pentagon?
A. Ideally, you want to eliminate duplication
in collection and promote duplication in
analysis. DIA has had a lot of problems with
this, but as a general proposition you want to en-
courage different ideas, promote competition,
and reduce the probability of a mindset develop-
ing. You need somebody to question the assump-
tions.
Q. How good a job is Harold Brown doing?
A. He has been a very good secretary of
defense. He is probably more technically compe-
tent than anybody else who has ever held that
job, in terms of being able to understand the
weapon systems and what they mean and their
technical capabilities. It is hard to find a lot of
real `dogs' in the Pentagon budget in terms of
weapon systems.
I wish he would talk out a little bit more about
the philosophy of defense. He does not look on
that as a major part of his job. It means there is a
vacuum there because nobody in the Administra-
tion is conceptualizing about defense. Nobody is
saying, `Here's our philosophy of defense. Here
is where we are going and here is what we are try-
ing to accomplish. This is what the money is for.'
Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1980
DOD's Computers Poised
To Learn A New Language
By Patrick Murphy
The Defense Department has almost finalized Ada, its new
computer programming language, and will shortly begin to in-
troduce It to military use. An Ada Joint Programming Office is to
be set up in the Pentagon at the-beginning of next month and Ada
is expected to be added to the DOD's list of approved program-
ming languages. At the same time, three of the seven languages
now on the list will be dropped. Ada is the outcome of a design
competition last year that was won by Cii-Honeywell Inc. of Min-
neapolis. The competition was part of an effort by DOD to
develop a language for use in programming DOD's huge com-
puter capability during the 1980s.
"Ada is designed particular-
ly for use with embedded com-
puter systems," says DOD of-
ficial David Fisher, who has
worked on the project for the
last five years. "Embedded
systems are ones incorporated
into a larger system-a ship, a
plane or communications net-
work-whose primary function
is not computation. Also, one
of Ada's most important
characteristics is its great
flexibility: it is both machine
and operating system indepen-
dent."
Perhaps Ada's most striking
feature, however, is the fact
that it was designed to be
suitable for both DOD and in-
dustrial process use, thus mak-
ing possible a direct interface
between the military and in-
dustry. A real-time control
capability facilitates the
language's use in areas like
avionics, refining and com-
munications. Ada supporters
believe that it will become to in-
dustrial process control what
FORTRAN is to science and
COBOL to business. In the
private sector, aerospace and
shipbuilding companies have
already expressed interest in the
new language and the Euro-
pean Community has given it
an important boost by adop-
ting it as its standard for in-
dustrial process control. British
and West German defense
department officials worked
with the Pentagon in develop-
ing Ada.
Within DOD, the new
language is gaining acceptance,
especially from the Army. The
Air Force and the Navy are
both interested, although they
are anxious to see Ada prove
itself as both have large in-
vestments in existing software.
DOD policy is to use Ada in
new systems, but not to require
conversion of existing ones. On
some big projects, however,
old systems may be repro-
grammed because this will be
less expensive than continuing
to work in the old language.
Another attractive-if more
whimsical-aspect of Ada is
that it does not add to the
cacophony of DOD acronyms.
The language is named after
Ada Augusta Byron, daughter
of the poet, and a mid-19th
century mathematician. She
worked as a programmer for
Charles Babbage and his
mathematical "engine", a
forerunner of today's com-
puters.
Christopher Reber has been named manager of
aerospace strategic planning and development operations
for General Electric's Aerospace Group in Valley Forge,
Penn. Previously, Raber was general manager for strategic
systems programs.
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Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1980
the services' munitions inventories.
Even assuming that the attack subs will fill some of
their 24 tubes with Harpoon or Tomahawk missiles,
procurement ceilings for these and other armaments are
dangerously low, critics argue, in light of the salvo-
firing tactics used to counter the Soviets' capability to
electronically foul some of the Navy's radar-guided
torpedoes and missiles. "If you're being jammed, you'll
take two or three shots to make sure at least one hits the
target. You're not going to sit there and worry about
confidence levels. Our inventories are not based on
these realities," a Navy official said. The several thou-
sand Mark-46 light torpedoes on hand provide little
comfort since, in practice firings, their 120-pound
warheads have taken to bouncing off the hulls of some
types of ships, according to Navy reports.
The procurement objective for the Captor, the Navy's
only deep-water mine, was reduced from about 6,000 to
less than 1,000, "which is about enough to mine half a
harbor," said a government official. The Captor is an
antisubmarine mine which senior Navy officials con-
sider essential to block certain shipping lanes in the Sea
of Japan and the United Kingdom-Greenland-Iceland
gap that are vital to the nearly land-locked Soviets. In
late December, DOD reduced funds for the mine, partly
because of what it found to be poor performance.
However, Adm. Thomas Hayward, Chief of Naval
Operations, has said repeatedly in recent months that
the Captor is effective and needed and that he will seek
increased procurement.
The lowered procurement ceiling for the TOW, the
Marine Corps'anti-tank missile which can be carried by
infantry troops and rapidly assembled in the field, is
particularly vexing to some service officials, since the
Corps has been criticized of late for a lack of heavy
firepower, especially the type which would be needed in
a heavy-armor environment such as Central Europe or
the Middle East. The Corps had wanted to increase
from two to three TOW shooters per company, a goal
which may prove elusive.
The Trouble With Aegis
(Continued from page one)
at $600,000 and driving a warhead of over 550 put, the phased array pointed out that this
pounds, it is a proven weapon for the 90 attack sub- dispenses with the old- rather baroque system is
marines planned for the Navy, including 73 in the fleet fashioned revolving radar only the latest offspring of
and 17 still to be built. Each sub, including the new Los dome mechanically sweep- a family tree that goes
Angeles class, can carry 24 Mark-48s, meaning the in- ing the skies. Instead, the back to the 1950s. The
class destroyers, Oliver Hazard Perry class guided
missile frigates and some cruisers hold only eight Har-
poons each.
To some observers, the Pentagon's new procurement
ceilings mean that the Navy's ordnance stockpiles are
being maintained at unacceptably thin margins. An ex-
cellent case in point, sources say, is the Mark-48. Priced
DOD's Ordnance Shortage
(Continued from page one)
Critics of the DOD measure contend that the new ceil-
ings are based on some artful arithmetic rather than
on realistic estimates of the Navy's long-range needs for
several types of munitions. Part of the dispute involves
a single mathematical formula used to compute non-
nuclear ordnance requirements. Previously, DOD based
its procurement programs on the estimated numbers of
bombs and missiles needed to provide a "99 percent
confidence level" that Navy ships will have the
firepower to destroy a given number of assigned targets.
To obtain that confidence level, the Pentagon computes
the probability of kill ratio for each bomb and missile.
Those ratios are projected against given targets, such as
the 350 Soviet subs and 400 merchant ships that are sup-
posed to be fodder for U.S. attack submarines. In a re-
cent policy change, that confidence level figure was
dropped to 94 percent. Now that expectations have been
lowered, the Navy no longer needs as many torpedoes
and missiles to do its job. Or so the theory goes.
Translated into hard figures, this seemingly in-
nocuous drop of five percent means the Navy will be
allowed to buy about 5,000 Mark-46 light torpedoes,
rather than the roughly 9,000 originally planned. The
inventory objective for the Marine Corps' TOW is now
less than 2,300 rather than the original objective of
2,500 to 3,000. Inventory objectives for other Navy
munitions, including the Stinger and Dragon portable
missile systems, have undergone similar reductions, ac-
cording to DOD statistics. The same applies to ar-
maments of other services, such as the Army's Lance
and Hellfire missiles.
The procurement objective for the Navy's Harpoon
anti-ship missile has been lowered by about a third to
roughly 2,000, a change which the Navy finds difficult
to counter since the magazines of its DD-963 Spruance
ventory objective should be 2,160 torpedoes just to arm fixed panels of this system progenitor was called
the ships. In addition, the Navy will use almost 300 an- can sweep instantaneous- SAGE, which stood for
nually for practice firings. Another 450 torpedoes nor- ly, thus theoretically being Semi Automatic Ground
mally are in transit for refittings and the like. These able to keep oncoming Environment. In this
figures equal the Navy's inventory ceiling for Mark-48s, targets under constant system, a dozen command
which prompted one government official to remark: "I observation. The data centers around the U.S.
hope they never have to come in and reload." In addi- thus received is fed to the would direct and coor-
tion, the new procurement ceilings "assume that our computers which can then dinate the air defense of
logistics system is going to be perfect-that we're going direct the ships and their their respective zones, and
to have the right number of torpedoes in places like ship-to-air missiles with would in turn feed data to
Pearl Harbor, Mare Island, Calif., Norfolk, and the unerring accuracy. North American Air
Mediterranean at exactly the right time. I wonder if that So much for the con- Defense Command HQ at
will happen," said this official, who regularly monitors cept. But it is not often (Continued on next page)
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Defense Week Monday, June 16,1980'
The Trouble With Aegis
(Continued from preceding page)
Colorado Springs. By
1960, after the U.S. had
spent $20 billion on SAGE
and related air defense
facilities, they called a
halt. Though the system
was not yet fully opera-
tional, the Pentagon con-
cluded that it was already
obsolete and could never
work anyway.
Despite this setback the
system lived on. If it was
no good for the United
States, the reasoning
went, it might do for the
allies. So the sons of
SAGE-Nadge and
Badge-grew and pro-
spered in Europe and
Japan respectively. The
essential elements of the
system were also incor-
porated in the airborne
AWACS and E-2 variants.
And so we have in this
generation PATRIOT for
the Army and Aegis for
the Navy.
The rationale for Aegis
is that the Navy does not
presently possess the
means to counter high in-
tensity Soviet anti-ship
missile attacks. Aegis is
expected to supply that
answer, but information
reaching Defense Week in-
dicates that-despite years
of work-the Navy and
RCA, the prime elec-
tronics contractor, have
not yet mastered all the
problems. Earlier this
year, the General Accoun-
ting Office circulated a
classified report on the
system. An unclassified
section of this report in-
dicates just how bad some
of the problems are.
The Navy has the less-
than-ambitious goal of 80
percent operational
availability for Aegis. But,
according to the report,
"the Navy considers [the
80 percent goal] as
unrealistic and invalid
under its current logistic
system. The Navy expects
that the actual level of
operational availability
will be 43 percent or less."
This is disastrous, as it
means that they will be
unable to replace defective
parts fast enough to keep
the whole system in work-
ing order even half the
time.
Furthermore, the Navy
had hoped that the soft-
ware would operate for
five hours continuously
before failing-i.e.,the
computers should be able
to deal with their inputs,
both human and
automatic, for that
amount of time before
conking out. "Less than
50 percent of this goal was
achieved during opera-
tional tests conducted in
May 1979," the GAO
report noted. "Navy of-
ficials however stated that
at this stage in a develop-
ment program the soft-
ware is satisfactory."
The weight of the
system itself is a problem.
"The displacement weight
of the ship is currently
over approved goals, and
the addition of the plann-
ed vertical launcher (an
improved method of laun-
ching missiles), more
missiles, and the Light
Airborne Multipurpose
System (LAMPS) III
helicopter will increase the
weight by more than 100
tons," adds the report.
One might ask what dif-
ference 100 tons makes to
a big cruiser. The point is
that all this extra weight
lies on the top of the ship.
The radar system itself is
already enormously
heavy, to say nothing of
all the new missile laun-
chers and helicopters.
On the latter point there
is, however, a ray of
light-in a backhanded
sort of way. Under a sec-
tion called "Reduced anti-
submarine warfare
capability," the GAO
report says that "the
LAMP III is not yet in
production and will not be
available until the follow-
on ships are built." So
there will be no LAMPS
III helicopters on the first
ship when it is launched in
the middle of next year,
just the landing pad.
Unfortunately, there is
other bad news on the an-
tisubmarine front. The
report notes that "the
Tactical Towed Array
Sonar is [not] yet in pro-
duction." Towed sonar
enables a ship, by trailing
a line astern, to listen for
submarines at various
depths. But the Navy has
tried to go one better and
tow a whole series of lines
astern at once. This is no
problem, so long as the
ship is traveling in a
straight line. But things
can get tricky once it starts
to maneuver, as any trawl
fisherman could have told
them.
Last but not least comes
Aegis' vulnerability. On
this subject, the GAO has
this to say: "The ship's
combat information
center is located above
deck within the ship's
aluminum plate
superstructure and is
susceptible to partial
damage or complete
destruction. If the combat
information center is
damaged, the ship's
fighting capability will be
reduced. The Navy is stu-
dying ways to reduce the
vulnerability of the
center."
In fact, if the combat
information center is
destroyed, the ship's
fighting capability will be
more than reduced; it will
be nonexistent unless the
crew resort to small arms.
For a crucial part of the
ship to be housed in
aluminum plates is
curious, since aluminum is
soft and easy to penetrate,
turns into flaming
droplets of molten metal
when hit by a missile or
shell, and corrodes at the
point where it interfaces
with the steel hull. So why
use aluminum? Answer:
the Navy must find a way
of reducing the top
heaviness caused by all
that fancy equipment top-
sides, which consumes no
less than four megawatts
of power.
RCA, the prime elec-
tronics contractor for
Aegis, refused to discuss
details of the system with
Defense Week, referring
all queries to the Navy. At
the Aegis Program Office
of the Naval Systems
Command in Washington,
Capt. Ted Alexander said
that questions about the
system must be submitted
to the Navy in writing. In-
galls Shipbuilding, a part
of Litton Industries,
which is building the
CG-47 cruiser, also de-
clined comment. A
spokesman for Ingalls at
Pascagoula, Mississippi,
said: "We feel that these
questions really ought to
be answered by the Navy.
We're just building the
ship. f f
President Carter has nominated Jack
Borsting to be comptroller of the Defense
Department. Borsting, 51, has been provost and
academic dean of the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterey, Calif. since 1974. From 1954 to
1956, he was a nuclear projects officer in the Air
Force. If Borsting's nomination is approved by
the Senate, he will replace Fred Wacker, who
retired from the federal service February 29.
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Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1980
Air Force Flexes Its Firepower
By Jim Stevenson, Nellis Air Force Base, California
"Any potential adversary of the U.S. should be
careful not to underestimate America's capability to res-
pond," General Wilbur Creech, commander of the
USAF Tactical Air Command, warned at News AFB
last week. Creech was speaking to journalists invited to
the base for two days to watch parts of the first Red
Flag Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) exercise.
However, in spite of the general's assurances, his au-
dience of aviation and military correspondents were less
than wholly convinced. Many of the displays put on for
the event were impressive, but did little to demonstrate
rapidity in the deployment of forces. And conversations
with some of the officers present revealed a noticeable
lack of unanimity on the speed with which the Air Force
could fulfill its role in the RDF.
Creech's claims, for example, that an Air Force
squadron could be in the Middle East in less than 24
hours and that the entire Air Force RDF complement
could be in place "within days" and could operate for a
sustained period of time on current munitions and
spares were disputed by one Air Force officer there.
Citing a conversation he said he had had with Col.
Leonard Perroots, one of Creech's intelligence officers,
this officer claimed that moving the entire Air Force
RDF complement would take four or five weeks rather
than days. Additionally, he estimated that it would take
a year to bring the complement up to its pre-deployment
strength.
Much of the Air Force effort seemed to be aimed at
dazzling impressionable journalists with displays of
flypasts and firepower. There were action-packed ex-
amples of how a remote airfield would be taken,
dissimilar air combat training between an F-S and and
F-15, dropping of 500-lb. laser-guided bombs by F-4s
and a demonstration of deep strike interdiction by way
of 2 F-111s dropping MK-84s for a total of 48,000 lbs.
What the Air Force wanted the media's attention
for-it became increasingly clear-had little to do with
RDF, but a great deal to do with reacting to the failure
of the recent Iranian hostage rescue effort. Asked about
the raid, Creech delivered a soliloquy on how America
has had both failures and successes in the past. Among
the latter, he said, were the Berlin airlift, the deploy-
ment in response to the Cuban missile crisis, Lebanon
and one component of the Iranian raid-the "flawless
response of the C-130s."
Creech, during a press conference, also denied sug-
gestions that an Air Force infatuation with technical
sophistication is damaging its readiness. The hydraulic
leak that affected the Iranian raid helicopter was not "a
function of sophistication", he argued, and could
happen on any aircraft. "I think," he said, "that it
would be a mistake to draw any lessons from the Iranian
mission abort that we can't perform."
As evidence of that, the general cited a recent F-11ID
deployment to England. Although the plane is Tactical
Air Command's most sophisticated, he said, for the 30
days that the ten F-IIIDs were in Britain, they had a
fully mission capable rate of 86 percent and a mission
capable rate of 88 percent. (In FY 1979, by comparison,
records show that the F-111D had a mission capable rate
of 34 percent). "The issue," the general went on, "is
not maintenance but lack of spare parts, which is only a
function of budgeting. The Air Force is going to buy
more spares and less big ticket items."
Creech also cited the purchases by the Air Force of
A-10s (a "very unsophisticated aircraft", as he des-
cribed it) and F-16s ("it came into the world as a
lightweight fighter") as evidence of the Air Force's goal
of "durability, sustainability, maintainability, reliabili-
ty or whatever '-ility' you want to call it.. .After all,
we're going to have to fight and maybe die by using it
and the last thing we want, I assure you, is a rifle that
won't fire or an airplane that won't take off on the day
of the war."
The general's corporate memory, in this instance, is
rather short. Both the A-10 and the F-16 were imposed
on the Air Force by the then Secretary of Defense. A
recent Air Force Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) also showed a slowing of F-16 purchases and cut
out altogether purchases of the last 130 A-10s.
Carter The "MX Doubter"
President Carter was once "the most important
doubter" about the need to develop the $34 billion land-
based MX missile system, according to Seymour
Zeiberg, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Strategic and Space Systems.
In a speeech late last week in Salt Lake City, Utah,
Zeiberg said that, as early as 1973, it was apparent that
the Soviet Union was "working toward the capability to
directly attack our (Minuteman) ICBM silos: (The
Soviets) were deploying large missiles with up to 10 ac-
curate warheads each." But, as late as 1977, several in-
dividuals in the White House, including the President,
doubted that the Soviets had achieved the guidance ac-
curacy needed to destroy the Minuteman system,
Zeiberg asserted. Minuteman ICBMs are a key weapon
in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
A White House review of the Soviet gains in missile
technology, ordered by President Carter in the spring of
1977, concluded that the Soviets would have to develop
an entirely new generation of ICBMs to obtain the ac-
curacy they would need to knock out the Minuteman
missiles. That would take years, the study stated.
But events soon proved the study wrong. In late 1977,
test firings of modernized versions of the SS-18 and SS-
19-the Soviets' two largest and most potent ICB-
Ms-provided "compelling evidence" that the Russians
had made enormous improvements in missile accuracy,
Zeiberg said.
However, after spending "close to a year deciding
there was a threat that we had to counter, we would
spend another year in picking a response," Zeiberg went
on. After reviewing and then casting aside at least 30
alternatives,the Carter Administration selected the land-
based MX as the best way to checkmate the Russians.
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Defense Week Monday, June 16, 1980
30mm Gun Pod Faces Further 'Development'
Hopes that the 30mm gun pod
may have finally made it into the
services' inventory (Defense Week,
No. 8) may be premature. The
crucial issue of whether the gun pod
program, a simple, effective weapon
system which has already passed all
tests with flying colors, should be
put straight into production or con-
signed to the Siberian wastelands of
"full scale development" at Eglin
Air Force Base in Florida is still be-
ing fought over. Eglin, it should be
noted, has never produced a suc-
cessful weapons system-inflicting
instead such disasters on the tax-
payer as the proximity fuse and the
wide area anti-armor munitions, as
well as (in its latter stages) the
Maverick missile (of which more
later).
Late last week, the Air Staff was
mulling over the PMD (or Program
Management Directive) and, accor-
ding to the Office of Air Warfare a
decision to send the program to
Eglin is "highly likely". How has
this unexpected and ominous turn-
about taken place? Apparently the
R&D cartel in the Pentagon
spearheaded the Air Force
Requirements Division appeal to the
sentimental side of some of the
leading figures in the debate, par-
ticularly on the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee. Eglin, so the argu-
ment ran, has never produced a suc-
cessful weapons system. So why not
give the guys down there a break
and send them the 30mm gun pod,
which needs no further develop-
ment, for "full scale development"
so that they can have some credit at
last?
Amazingly enough, this absurd
argument prevailed and resistance
weakened enough to imperil the fate
of the trusted gun pod. The Office
of Air Warfare claims defensively
that "this does not mean that the
thing will go back into the
laboratory. Eglin has the capability
to run a production program just as
Wright Patterson does."
Seasoned observers, however,
take no solace from this. The move
to Eglin is interpreted as a cunning
attempt to kill the project and to
make the world safe for high
technology air-to-ground systems.
Which brings us to the Maverick.
The dismal shortcomings of this
weapon (Defense Week, No.9) in-
clude the fact that a pilot needs to
make four or five passes over the
target to get a successful lock-
on-figures that, contrary to the
assertions of Hughes Aircraft which
makes the Maverick, are not
classified. According to World War
II Luftwaffe ace Col. Hans Ulrich
Rudel, the usual range at which
anyone can identify a tank even with
good eyesight is 500 meters. He
should know as he knocked out 519
of them. The minimum launch
range of the Maverick is at least
double that-a tricky fact of life,
which an awful lot of dollars and
uncountable tests have been unable
to alter. Furthermore, a single pass
over the target requires 10 to 15
seconds of level straight flight from
first sighting the target to launch.
As the enemy will be firing back
with, among other things, radar-
guided multiple rapid fire machine
guns, the prospect of flying in a
straight line for that amount of time
is not going to do much for morale.
Rudel reckoned that the longest that
he could afford to fly straight, even
back in WW II, was three seconds.
As one observer put it "it's not that
they haven't done a marvelous
engineering job on the Electro
Optical and the Infra Red Maverick,
they have. The problem is that the
basic concept is total lunacy."
Back in 1975, the U.S. Air Forces
in Europe (USAFE) ran very inten-
sive tests with the EO Maverick. At
the end, the then commander Gen.
John Vogt, who on a previous occa-
sion has referred to the missile in the
presence of a high level NATO
delegation as "a load of crap", sent
a message to Washington indicating
that he had no use for the missile.
The message did not go down well
and he retired not long afterwards.
Cautionary note: Gen. Vogt is now
an advisor on defense matters to
Presidential candidate Ronald
Reagan. The Maverick's future
may be endangered.
- Andrew Cockburn
The State Department announcement last week that licenses have been granted to
two giant defense contractors-Northrop and General Dynamics-for the transfer
State Opens A of technical data on their export fighter planes opens the way for the purchase of
American aircraft by at least 15 foreign countries. Austria, long in the market for a
Door For Foreign new fighter, is said to have narrowed its choice to the General Dynamics F-16
(powered by a General Electric J79 engine) or the French Mirage 50. Taiwan wants a
Fighter Purchases new fighter to replace its aging fleet of Lockheed F-104 Starfighters. Both countries
are on the list approved last week. Government and industry sources say that other
countries considering purchase of the F-16 or Northrop's F-5G include Jordan,
Brazil, Malaysia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Singapore, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philip-
pines and Venezuela.
DEFENSE WEEK IS PUBLISHED EVERY MONDAY. COPYRIGHT 1980.
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Editors: Richard Myers, John McCaughey, Ken Maize, Andrew Cockburn. Design/Graphics: Kathy Cummings, Donna Horchler.
NEW YORK: Guy Hawtin. SEATTLE: William Cushing. LONDON: David Fairhall, David Fishlock. BUSINESS
STAFF-WASHINGTON: Jane Terrell (business manager), Grant Stockdale (assistant publisher), JoAnn Dyer, Susan Brown,
Pamela Bleen.
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