COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN: SPECIAL: COMPLETE CAIB INDEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100180007-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 1, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
Number 14 - 15 October ly~l $5.00
Speaal: COMPLETE CRIB INDEX
INFORMATION BiJ~~.ETIN
Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
 Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
Editorial
Enough time has passed since the election of an actor and a
spy to the two top posts in the U.S. government to convince
even the most optimistic at home and abroad that the ideo-
logues in power believe what they say and have every inten-
tion of implementing their vision of reversing history-even
if it means war. And indeed many signs point to that terrible
inevitability.
A group of determined reactionaries has taken total control
of the Executive branch and substantial control of the Leg-
islative. They already had at their service a largely Nixon-
appointed Supreme Court. Many experienced foreign
analysts describe events in the United States in terms of a
coup G''etat, a coup which most Americans don't realize has
occurred. There is surely a need to sound the alarm.
Several themes of this Administration have rapidly come
into focus: stark economic and political repression at home,
blatant. interventionism overseas, and military and corporate
control of the economy.
It is impossible for us at CRIB to deal with our primary
concerns in a vacuum. Covert operations and the role of the
intelligence complex are inextricably intertwined with
across-the-board attacks by this government against the peo-
ple-attacks which are not as uncoordinated as they may at
first g_ance appear. There is a fundamental relationship be-
tween developments in domestic and foreign policy and the
scope of intelligence activism. In that respect, two com-
plementary and dangerous steps have been taken. On the one
hand there is a sharp increase in the use of covert operations
abroad accompanied by efforts to legalize, for the first time,
CIA domestic operations. Concurrently, powerful moves are
underway to impose an unheard-of level of secrecy on all
activities touching those areas.
Upsurge in Covert Operations
It is no secret that the Administration is now committed to
CIA dirty tricks on a scale not seen since the Agency's
heyday. During the election campaign the CIA complained
that President Carter had tied its hands. But as Michael Getler
noted in the June 15 Washington Post, the CIA is "expanding
its most secret clandestine, covert and paramilitary opera-
tions overseas, according to agency sources." There are ob-
vious confirmations of this, not the least of which is the
announcement October 1 of a major new building plan for
Langley to double the size of CIA Headquarters. The prob-
able use of the Department of Commerce as part of a network
of commercial undercover operatives, detailed in the Naming
Names column this issue, is another indication of expanded
activity.
Specific examples which illustrate this trend are coming to
light with unusual frequency:
? Shortly before his death, Anwar Sadat admitted to the
world the massive role played by the U.S. in the Afghan
?able of Contests
Editorial ................. 2 Naming Names ........... 7
Index to CAIB Number 1-Number 12 ....................... I-1
Cov~~r~Action hr%ormarinn Bufletin, Number 14-I5, October 1981, published by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit
Corpo anon, P.O. Box 50272, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone: [phone]. All rights reserved; copyright ?1981 by Covert Action Publications,
Inc. Typography by Arr %or Peop/e, Washington, DC; printing by Faculty Press, Brooklyn, NY. Washington Staff: Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Louis
Wolf. Board of Advisors: Philip Agee, Ken Lawrence, Elsie Wilcott, Jim Wilcott. The CoverrArrion /n%urmation Bu//e~in is available at many
bookstores around the world. Inquiries from distributors and subscription services welcomed. Library subscriptions encouraged. Indexed in the
Aherna~ive Press /nc/ar. Cover graphic by Tony Auth of the Phi/ude/phiu Inquirer, whose permission to reprint is gratefully acknowledged. ISSN
0275-309X.
2 CovertAction Number 14-15 (October 1981)
Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
 Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
rebellion. He revealed, to the consternation of U.S. officials,
that Egypt was the conduit for U.S. arms shipments to the
rebels, suggesting a scale of paramilitary involvement even
greater than had been suspected. U.S. intervention in Afgha-
nistan even reached the "Style" section of the Washi~igton
Post in a recent note describing a propaganda film supporting
the rebels. The film benefit was sponsored by a shadowy
group called Youth for Understanding, which sends Amer-
ican students overseas in highly-controlled and isolated prog-
rams. YFU's board includes David Abshire, Director of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, base for many
"retired" intelligence officers. Attending the screening were
CIA Director William Casey and disinformation specialist
Arnaud de Borchgrave.
? Frantic efforts to repeal the Clark Amendment, prohibiting
covert involvement in Angola, and the increased CIA pre-
sence in South Africa and the front-line states, reinforce the
knowledge that clandestine activity in Southern Africa, parti-
cularly Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, is
rapidly expanding. No knowledgeable observer believes the
Clark Amendment was ever fully complied with, but its re-
peal would allow the U.S.-South African plan to boost the
fortunes of Jonas Savimbi and his small band of mercenaries
attempting with South Africa to overthrow the MPLA gov-
ernment in Angola.
? Africa has also become a major focus for the Defense
Intelligence Agency, according to a startling story in the Au-
gust 20 Christian Science Monitor. The DIA openly
announced its preparedness to pay up to a half million dollars
to any university African studies program which would allow
DIA personnel to train there. As one student observed,
"what the DIA really wants is ready-made legitimacy or
`cover.' "
? Charges by Cuba of U.S. biological warfare through the
introduction of fever-bearing mosquitos, though they were
immediately countered by U.S. charges of Soviet-sponsored
chemical warfare in Indochina, have focused deserved atten-
tion on greatly expanded Pentagon research and development
of chemical-biological weapons. While Cuba was experienc-
ing aserious epidemic, the U.S. charges, coming from the
nation which developed and used napalm, Agent Orange, and
other chemicals, were never substantiated.
? The recent incredible Libya-Mauritania-Mauritius am-
troversy presented a strange spectacle of the government and
the press arguing not over whether certain covert operations
were planned, but over which plan had been leaked by which
government agency. None of the scenarios were beyond the
realm of possibility; first, a plan to assassinate Mohammar
Khadafi was reported by Newsweek; the government's first
denial said the documents described to Newsweek's reporter
actually referred to a plan to destabilize Mauritania, which
had failed to support Morocco's murderous war in the Sahara
against Polisario; after the predictable diplomatic uproar in
Mauritania, this was "corrected" to be a plan to intervene in
Mauritius to prevent the progressive opposition from an ex-
pected victory in the upcoming election. These are all forms
of covert operations in which the CIA has engaged in the
past.
? Most complicated of all the sensational stories of CIA
machinations is the Wilson-Terpil case. Two former CIA
operatives were supposedly engaged in a massive terrorist
training program based in Libya. Yet the U.S. government,
particularly the C1A, has known about and, some press
reports suggest, sanctioned-the operation for years. No one
is able to say just who is working for whom, or how many
present or former operatives are involved. According to some
accounts, one of the fugitives actually met with CIA officials
in Morocco during this period to plot the assassination of
their supposed mentor, Khadafi. The exposures to date,
whether or not accurate, are surely just the tip of the iceberg.
? The Wilson-Terpil case raised the issue whether there
should not be some restrictions placed on the employment of
former intelligence officials by foreign governments. Ironi-
cally, the first person to fear the sting of such proposed
legislation was Vernon Walters, former Deputy Director of
the CIA. Now making hundreds of thousands of dollars a
year from foreign corporations and governments-especially
Guatemala and Morocco-he is simultaneously functioning
as a "roving" Ambassador-at-Large for Alexander Haig.
There are also developments not directly in the intelligence
arena which bear close watching. Perhaps the most ominous
is the degree to which the Department of Defense is attemp-
ting to gain control over areas where the military traditionally
had been excluded. The crushing of the Air Traffic Control-
lers strike led to the installation of thousands of relatively
inexperienced military personnel in civilian airports around
the country. Another less known example now before Con-
gress is a complicated and technical revision to the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 which would give supervisory
control of the U.S. telephone system to the Pentagon, even
without any declared national emergency.
Finally, it should be noted that the overall justification for
these sorts of initiatives is found in the Administration's open
declaration of a new Cold War-possibly the prelude to a hot
war. The campaign began with the much-maligned, and
much-amended, CIA report on Soviet influence in world-
wide terrorism. When the first draft did not support the
allegation that terrorist incidents were dramatically rising in
number, or directed by the Soviet Union, CIA Director Casey
ordered a further rewrite of the draft. Ultimately the defini-
tion of terrorist "incident" was amended from past usage to
include "threats" and "hoaxes." Thus the statistics were
instantly doubled. The next phase of the campaign was the
release of the Department of Defense report on the Soviet
military posture-creating the impression that the Soviet Un-
ion has moved ahead of the U.S. in practically every index of
military preparedness and hardware. This report, of course,
was issued at a time when the Administration was fighting in
Congress for its military budget-one of the very few areas in
which expenditures are to go up rather than down.
Cold War tactics and Cold War rhetoric can be setting the
stage for a hot war, as the constant references by government
officials to "limited nuclear war" and to "first strike capa-
bility" suggest. The ideology of the Administration points to
this, as does the apparent failure of its domestic policies. The
economy is not, in fact, recovering, and the Administration
may well believe that there is nothing so good for the eco-
nomy as a war.
The Return to Super-Secrecy
There are so many moves afoot to shroud this Administra-
tion's actions in secrecy that we can only briefly list them in
this space.
? The CIA has abolished its Office of Public Affairs and
appointed an assistant to the Director to deal with the press by
what he calls "inverse public relations."
? The CIA is sharply curtailing its publication of unclassified
Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
 Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
reports and analyses.
? In May, the CIA announced that it was eliminating the
practice of briefing reporters going abroad, but took a more
self-serving approach to the issue in August. They
announced, according to an Associated Press report of Au-
gust 3, that the "CIA is willing to provide `background'
information to newsmen about to embark on trips abroad,
provided that when they return, they brief the agency on the
countril~s they visited." It is astonishing that this open admis-
sion of the use of journalists as intelligence agents did not
generate any widespread controversy in the press.
However, these housekeeping arrangements are minor
compared to the developments in the legislative and regula-
tory fields.
? Most significant is the imminent passage of the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act, discussed in greater detail below.
? Coulded with the finalization of that law is the news that
the third draft of the Reagan Administration's proposed
Executive Order on domestic spying is nearing implementa-
tion. That Order does not require Congressional approval,
only the President's signature. It would eliminate the mini-
mal 19'78 Carter guidelines and authorize widespread covert
operations by the CIA within the United States. It would
legitim.ze infiltration and manipulation of lawful political
organizations and other activities supposedly prohibited by
the CIA's own charter -though it has repeatedly been
violated in the past, most notoriously in the form of Opera-
tions C HAOS and MK-ULTRA. The new proposal goes even
further in unleashing both the CIA and the FBI than the first
draft, discussed in CA/B Number 12.
? The ,;overnment is taking further steps to stifle criticism
and whistleblowing by disillusioned present and former in-
telligence personnel. The Intelligence Identities Protection
Act is one; the revocation of the so-called "Snepp guide-
lines" is another. When the Carter Administration won its
case against Frank Snepp over the unauthorized publication
of his book, Decent Lnterval, the Supreme Court decision
was much broader than expected. In the wake of protest, the
-~ WARNING: ALTERATION, ADDITION OR MUTILATION OF ENTRIES IS PRONIBITEO.
Justice Department conceded that the powers recognized by
the Court were too encompassing, and issued guidelines
limiting the extent to which prior censorship would be im-
posed. The Reagan Justice Department is now abandoning
those guidelines.
? A strong move is also under way to repeal the Freedom of
Information Act, or if that is not possible to exempt com-
pletely the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and other intelligence
agencies from its coverage.
? The government is pushing for the power to conduct war-
rantless searches of newsrooms when officials suspect
national security offenses.
? Then there is the strange case of the "black-bag" warrants.
In 1978, Congress created the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court, which was to issue warrants authorizing sur-
reptitious entries for the purpose of installing, repairing, and
removing electronic surveillance devices in foreign intelli-
gence cases. In 1980, the Carter Administration began sub-
mitting warrant requests to this court for black-bag jobs -
entries made for the purpose of searching for, and photo-
graphing or seizing documents and other items. The court
granted three such warrants last year, but was the subject of
criticism from both the left and the right. Liberals argued that
such entries required probable cause that a crime was about to
be committed, which the court did not insist upon, while
conservatives argued that such entries could be conducted by
the Executive without any court approval. The conservatives
have now won. The Reagan Administration announced that it
was not going to bother to submit such applications to the
court, and asked for a ruling that the court did not have the
power to issue warrants in such cases. On June 23, the court
agreed.
? But the most vicious assaults on the First Amendment are
found in the Philip Agee passport decision and the Intelli-
gence Identities Protection Act.
The Supreme Court ruling in the passport case gave the
Secretary of State the authority to revoke the passport of any
American who travels abroad and speaks out against U.S.
NAME-NOM ??
PHILIP BURNETT FRANKLIN AGEE ?
SERE BIRTHPLACE-LIEU DE NAISSANCE ? ?
Y ND, U.S.A.
B D
UE DA7E-DATE OE DELIVRANCE ?
...
p
9~8
% IRES % LE ?
?
''\,.
? ?
REVOKED: D C. ?
'
? ? ?
N
-
....
..
SIGNATURE FBEARER-SIGNATURE DU ITULA~RE
-~ IMPORTANT: TNIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID UNTIL SIGNED BY THE BEARER. ~ ? . , ?
PERSONS INCLUDED HEREIN MAY NOT USE THIS PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL
UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY THE BEARER.
Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
 Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
foreign policy. But it goes beyond that. The Court stated:
' `Agee's disclosures, among other things, have the de-
clared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations
and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are
clearly not protected by the Constitution."
This effectively criminalised certain categories of speech,
not even based on the content of the speech but on the intent
of the speaker. "Speech," which must be free under the
Constitution, was thus transformed into "conduct," which
may be regulated. Congress considered this an open invita-
tion to do likewise, which it is in the process of doing.
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act
Sadly, but not unexpectedly, it now appears that the Act
will become law in one form or another-probably the worst.
The campaign against the Act collapsed in part because of
what we believe were indefensible actions, a compromising
of the First Amendment by representatives of the American
Civil Liberties Union. Many progressive people who
opposed the bill as a violation of Freedom of Speech believed
that the appropriate strategy was to delay. Gaining time was
necessary to educate legislators, the public, and especially
the press to the dangerous ramifications of the bill. We and
our supporters had sought the opportunity to testify before the
House Judiciary Committee.
It appears that the ACLU representatives though they
had publicly stated that all versions of the bill were unconsti-
tutional-determined that since some sort of bill was going to
pass, the correct strategy was to negotiate over the specific
language in an attempt to end up with a "less unconstitution-
al" version. In furtherance of this strategy ACLU representa-
tives met secretly with the CIA at Langley and agreed that in
exchange for CIA acceptance of the narrower language which
they preferred, they would urge the Judiciary Committee not
to conduct hearings and also urge people not to delay any
further a final vote on the bill. This in tact is what happened,
except that the ACLU was double-crossed by the CIA
something they should have expected. When their "less un-
constitutional" version was introduced on the floor of the
House, Rep. John Ashbrook, one of the most reactionary
congressmen in the country, introduced an amendment to
reinstate the original, "more unconstitutional" language. It
was also discovered that the CIA had actively lobbied Mem-
bers of Congress and had sent a lengthy memorandum to
them in support of the Ashbrook amendment. Ashbrook
pointed out that the CIA and the President preferred his lan-
guage over what he described as the ACLU version. The
Ashbrook amendment was passed by a comfortable majority,
and the amended bill passed overwhelmingly.
This is not the first time ACLU actions have resulted in
compromising the rights of progressives, and it is not the first
time their strategy has backfired. As Victor Navasky points
out in his book, Numing Nantes, the ACLU's "ambiva-
lence" towards leftists has a long history. In 1938, the ACLU
had promoted its absolutist position in a pamphlet entitled
"Why We Defend Free Speech for Nazis, Fascists and Com-
munists," and in 1939, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, an open
member of the Communist Party, was elected to the board of
directors of the ACLU. But in 1940, she was kicked off the
board for being a communist. In the 1950s one ACLU direc-
tor gave the FBI the names of ACLU members who had
suggested the organir.ation should join the campaign against
the notorious witch-hunting House Un-American Activities
Committee. Years later the informer _justified his actions by
pointing out that HUAC then refrained from issuing a poten-
tially damaging report on the ACLU.
Whether in the current case it was self-interest and a desire
to appear "respectable," or a sincere belief that it is not a
violation of one's principles to promote the passage of an
unconstitutional law which motivated this disastrous strategy,
we all must cope with the results. Although the bill is clearly
unconstitutional. condemned by more than a hundred profes-
sors of constitutional law and a growing number of editorial
writers, the court battles will take a long time and, liven the
nature of the present Supreme Court, a victory there is at best
uncertain.
The bill makes it a crime to divulge "information which
identities" any present or former undercover intelligence
officer, employee, agent. informant, or "source of operation-
al assistance." It is not restricted to "naming names:" it is
not restricted to the CIA; it does not even allow the exposure
of crimes and, most important, it is not limited to infornur
tion which comes from secret or classified sources. The
negotiations between the ACLU and the C(A were over
whether the standard of guilt would be divulging the inl~inna-
tion "with the intent to impair or impede the intelligence
activities of the United States" (the "less unconstitutional"
version), or divulging the information "with reason to be-
lieve" that it would impair or impede, etc. (the "more un-
constitutional" version). In our opinion, the distinction is
insignificant. The intelligence agencies hive made it abun-
dantlyclear that in their judgment on~? disclosures of anything
related to their activities which they wish kept secret impairs
or impedes them to some degree. Few investigative j~urnal-
ists would find it easy to convince a judge or jury that
although the revelation in question might have impaired or
impeded intelligence activities, that was not really wh_v they
published the story.
As is apparent, this is an unusual issue of CA/B. After
months of painstaking effort, Daniel Tsang has produced the
comprehensive and detailed index of our first twelve issues
presented here. We believe you will find it an invaluable aid
to research work, and will understand that the extraordinary
costs of its preparation necessitated this our first double
issue.
We also publish what may be, for the reasons made clear
above, our last Naming Names column for some time. It also
represents a laborious effort to complete all our research in
progress at the time it became obvious that the Identities bill
would soon become law.
We want you-especially our present and future subscri-
bers-to know that we have no intention to cease publica-
tion. On the contrary, we believe that the rest of our nriga-
zine, beyond the Naming Names column, represents the most
valuable contribution we can make to the struggle against
U.S. interventionism. We hope that the new law will soon be
consigned to the garbage heap of history, but regardless of
the duration or the success of that struggle, CA/B will not
disappear.
Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
 Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
THE INTELLIGEIITCE IDENTITIES
PROTECTIOl~ ACT
? The bill covers unclassified material. People believe this bill deals only with releasing information which is
obt.iined from classified material. There is nothing in the bill which limits its scope in this way. In fact, it is
spe~;ifically designed to suppress revelations derived purely from unclassified material. It prohibits the disclosure of
"any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent."This applies even if the information comes from a
book on a library shelf, or from a newspaper published anywhere, or from a chance remark overheard in the
hallway.
? The bill covers the FBI, military intelligence, and other agencies, as well as the CIA. Many people think the bill
applies only to the disclosure of undercover CIA officers. This is not true. Most significantly, it also applies to the
"foreign counterintelligence and counterterrorism components" of the FBI, as well as to the intelligence divisions of
the military services, and all the other intelligence agencies, such as the NSA. This bill would prevent nn
organization from exposing and expelling an FBI informer discovered in its midst, even if discovered through
entirely legal and open means.
? The bill is not limited to the exposure of government employees. The bill does not merely cover CIA case
officers or FBI undercover agents. It covers present and former government employees, agents, informants, and
wh2~t are called "sources of operational assistance." Under the bill, for example, the famous Washington Post story
which disclosed that the CIA had been making annual payments to King Hussein of Jordan would be criminal.
Many articles about the CIA connections of the Watergate conspirators would have been unlawful.
? The bill is not even limited to "names." Supporters of the bill suggest that since it deals with "names of agents" it
should not affect mainstream journalists, because one can expose an illegal or immoral operation without having to
names the names of the individuals involved. This is also untrue. The bill speaks of"information that identifies"an
undercover operative or source. As any journalist knows, it is almost impossible to present information which
exposes some operation without giving away some information from which one could deduce the identities of the
people involved. For example, last summer a number of news stories pointed out that a supposed anti-government
radio station "in Iran" was in fact a CIA radio station being operated in Cairo. No names were given, but anyone
who was watching the broadcasting facilities in Cairo would have learned from this story that the people entering
and leaving the building were CIA people.
? The bill virtually eliminates "whistleblowin=" in the intelli=ence Held. The experience of the last several years
certainly teaches that if there is any area of government susceptible to horrendous abuses it is the field of
intelligence. This bill will have the effect of eliminating the possibility of "whistleblowing" by anyone in the
intelligence field, because, as pointed out above, exposures of abuses, even grossly illegal activities, would
invariably involve "information that identifies" some undercover people.
? The alleged protections and limitations in the bill are meanin`less. M uch talk has been made of the idea that the
bill is really designed only to "get" publications like the Covert Action !n/ormation Bu//etin. Mainstream, or
"legitimate"journalists would not be affected. But the language does not bear that out, and, obviously, prosecutors
will prosecute whom they wish when they wish. The House bill applies to "whoever, in the course of an effort to
identify and expose covert agents with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United
Stales...."The Senate version applies to "whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and
exp ase covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence
activities of the United States...." Neither of these clauses affords any real protection. The CIA and other
intelligence agencies have stated many times that the disclosure of an-? of its personnel or operations impedes its
effe aiveness. Anyone writing anintelligence-related story would be aware of that. (When the Post was considering
the King Hussein story, the White House actually interceded, trying to get the editor to spike the story, stressing that
its publication would impair U.S. intelligence in the Middle East. Under this bill, that would surely havc set the stage
for criminal prosecution.) What might constitute a "course of an effort to identify" or a "pattern of activities
intended to identify" is unclear, but it would not take much. Researching a series of articles, or perhaps even a single
article, would probably suffice. Trying to root out the informers in one's group would surely be enough. The notion
that this bill has any safeguards whatsoever is another myth.
6 Cover~tAction Number 14-15 (October 1981)
Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
 Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
Naming Names
Because of the imminent passage of the Intelligence Identi-
ties Protection Act, this will be our last "Naming Names"
column until such time as the constitutionality of the Act has
been decided by the courts. Although we continue to believe
that the Act's application to the research which generates this
column is unconstitutional-since our sources are not classi-
fied material-we believe it would be counter-productive to
make the publication of this column under the new law the sole
basis for a legal challenge. Much other research work is
affected, and many other publications are involved.
Moreover, we intend to continue to publish the Bulletin, the
balance of which remains, we believe, extremely valuable,
and to continue our struggle against covert operations and
U.S. secret intervention around the world.
Salaam, Tanzania in late 1976, returning to Langley. There
are no entries in State Department publications relating to
him between 1977 and 1980. On the May 1981 Brussels
Diplomatic List, Aitken is listed as Attache. Given his
seniority and experience he is undoubtedly the new Chief
of Station in the city which houses NATO headquarters,
replacing James Lawrence Corrigan, whose biography
appears in Dirt t~ Work, Dirt t~ Work 2, and CA IB Number 8.
According to the same Diplomatic List, case officer
Juha Oliva Merikoski has been transferred to the Brussels
station, where his cover title is Second Secretary.
Merikoski's biography appears in Dir(r Work.
In this issue we publish the locations of sixty-nine CIA
officers in forty-five countries around the world. They
include twenty-three Chiefs of Station or Base and nine
Deputy Chiefs of Station. Biographical material which
may already be found in Dirty Work: The CIA in Western
Europe, Dirty Work 2: The C!A in Africa, or previous
issues of the Bulletin, is referenced, but not generally
repeated.
Bangladesh
Stephen Elroy Montgomery, who was Chief of Base in
Jerusalem from October 1977 (see biography in CA 18
Number 9), was transferred in August 1980 to the Dacca,
Bangladesh Embassy. According to the March 1981 Dacca
Diplomatic List he is serving under the cover of Second
Secretary (Political). Given his seniority and his three
years as Chief of Base in the sensitive Jerusalem post, he
may be the Chief of Station in Dacca.
CAIB has learned that the new Deputy Chief of Station
at the La Paz, Bolivia Embassy is James Lee Adkins. As
noted in CAIB Number 9, Adkins has served in the
Dominican Republic, Chile, and Guyana, where he was
transferred in January 1979, and where he was posted
during the bizarre Jonestown incident. At least as of
September 1981 he was in La Paz, where he is assisting the
Chief of Station, paramilitary expert William Adger
Moffett III (see CAIB Number 12).
Belgium
The new CIA Chief of Station at the Brussels, Belgium
Embassy is veteran Robert D. Aitken, who was born in
1928 in New Jersey. Aitken, whose biography appears in
Dirty Work 2, left his post as Chief of Station in Dar-es-
A veteran case officer who has been at the Brasilia,
Brazil Embassy since June 1980 is Robert L. Spinelli, Jr.
whose biography appears in Dirty Work. He was last
noted serving at the Buenos Aires, Argentina Embassy, in
early 1978. No State Department records have been found
indicating his posting between that time and mid-1980,
when, according to the July 31, 1980 Brasilia Diplomatic
List, he was posted to Brazil.
The new Chief of Station at the Bujumbura, Burundi
Embassy is Larry G. Jarrett, whose biography appears in
Dirty Work 2 and in CAIB Number 8. Jarrett had been
Chief of Station in Chad only since January 1980, but at
least as of August 1981 he had been transferred to Burundi.
His relatively short tenure in Chad may have been due to
unwelcome involvement in the civil strife of the past fcw
years.
CAIB has learned that Linus Frederick U pson III, a case
officer whose biography appears in Dirk t? Wnrk 2, has been
transferred, at least as of April 1981, to the Douala,
Cameroon Consulate under cover as aneconomic-commer-
cial officer. Upson has served under diplomatic cover in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.
China, Peoples Republic
As of at least September 1981, a case officer serving at
the Guangzhou, China Consulate General is Ronald L.
Cerra, whose biography appears in Dirt ~? Work. Cerra has
served in both Geneva and Paris before his posting to
Guangzhou (formerly Canton).
Cyprus
A case officer whose biography appears in Dirty Work,
Paul J. Redmond, Jr., has been transferred, at least as of
Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
 Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
September 1981, to the Nicosia, Cyprus Embassy. He has
served in Malaysia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, and Greece.
The new Chief of Station in Quito, Ecuador is John
William Hennessy, born May 29, 1926 in Puerto Rico.
Henn?ssy has been with the CIA almost from the
beginning, serving undercover as a "Department of the
Army analyst" from 1951 to 1952. From 1952 to 1954 he
was under deep cover as a salesman for an unspecified
private manufacturing company. After three years back at
George Washington University, from which he had
graduated in 1951 before entering the CIA, he reassumed
give-away cover, spending from 1956 to 1957 as a
Department of the Army analyst. In July 1957 he began a
long career under diplomatic cover, serving two years at
the Santiago, Chile Embassy, followed by four years at the
Sao Paulo, Brazil Consulate General, and two years at the
Salvador, Bahia, Brazil Consulate. There are no entries
regarding his whereabouts between late 1965 and mid-
1967, when he returned briefly to Headquarters, before
being posted, in September 1967, to Montevideo, Uruguay.
No re~~ords have been found covering the period between
late 1571 and mid-1973, when he was posted to the Bogota,
Colombia Embassy, apparently as Deputy Chief of
Station. Between April 1975 and April 1981 there is again a
break in references to his whereabouts, but, CAIB has
learned from a Latin American journalist, that at least as of
May 1981 he was in Quito, in the political section of the
Emba ~sv.
From the same source CAIB has learned that serving
under Hennessy is Lance G. Hopkins, born 1938. Hopkins
served as a case officer in Montevideo, Uruguay from 1972
until a-t least late 1975. No further references to him were
found before he was observed in Quito.
Egypt
There are at least four new CIA postings to the Cairo,
Egypt Embassy, three of which appear in the May 1981
Cairo Diplomatic List and one of which has been noted by
a CAIB source. The new Chief of Station, replacing the
60-yea r old Murat Natirboff, who may well have retired, is
Clark Rumrill, born May 30, 1934 in New York. Rumrill
served at the Madras, India Consulate General from 1962
to 1961. After a stint at Headquarters and Persian language
training, he was posted in 1966 to Kabul, Afghanistan.
There are no State Department records indicating his
postings from 1969 to early 1972-suggesting in-service
training or time spent under deep cover-when he was
posted to the Jerusalem Consulate General In 1974 he was
transff~rred to Lahore, Pakistan, where he served until at
least 1976. The next reference found places him back at
Headquarters in October 1979, and in July 1980, according
to the May 1981 Diplomatic List, he was sent to Cairo.
Rumrill apparently superseded Charles T. Englehart as
Natirboff's Deputy (see CAIB Number 10) during the
transition period. CAIB understands that Natirboff
departed Cairo some time in the last four months.
Apfarently Englehart has also left Cairo, or is planning
to do'o shortly. The new Deputy Chief of Station is Earl
Norbert Garrett III, who arrived, according to CAIB's
sources, some time prior to August 1981. Garrett's
background, up till 1978, is found in Dirty Work. His last
posting ,from 1975 until at least 1977, was in Kuwait. We
do not know where he served between 1978 and his arrival
in Cairo.
Also serving as a case officer in Cairo is Thomas A. Ruth
II, born September 18, 1943 in Hawaii. His record is
unusual; according to the 1974 Biographic Register he
was from 1962 to 1963, and in 1965, a mail carrier for the
U.S. Postal Service. Then, from 1965 to 1973 he is listed as
a "records analyst" for the Department of the Army, a
well-known CIA training cover. How a mail carrier made it
to the CIA is an interesting question. Perhaps Ruth was
involved in the massive CIA mail opening operations of
that time and caught the eye of his future employers. In
1973 he began using diplomatic cover, receiving several
months' language and area training, before his posting, in
March 1974, to the Beirut, Lebanon Embassy, for
additional field language training. He was assigned in
Beirut until 1977, and no State Department entries
concerning him have been found from that time. The May
1981 Cairo Diplomatic List indicates he was posted therein
May 1980, as Second Secretary.
Yet another case officer in Cairo is Kenneth Mitchell
Sapp, who was transferred from Tripoli, Libya in October
1980 (see CAIB Number9). Sapp, like Ruth, is undercover
as a Second Secretary (Political Affairs).
In CAIB Number 9 we noted major changes in the Paris,
France station: Edwin Franklin Atkins taking over as
Chief of Station from the ailing Eugen Burgstaller; Serge
Taube moving in as Deputy Chief of Station; and James
M. Potts taking over from Francis John Jeton as chief of
Africa operations. We have now discovered three additional
case officers at the important Paris station.
Most notable is the presence, indicated on the October
1980 Paris Diplomatic List, of John S. Habib, whose
biography appears in Dirt~~ Work 2. Habib, 51, a 24-year
CIA veteran, last served as Chief of Station in Morocco,
where he was posted at least as of August 1978. The Paris
List shows his cover to be First Secretary (Economic
Affairs). Since Potts has recently turned 60, it may be that
he is planning to retire and Habib will be joining the
triumvirate of senior officials.
Another case officer in Paris is Joseph Charles Bernard,
born January 17, 1939 in Michigan, also appearing on the
October 1980 Paris Diplomatic List, in the cover position
of Second Secretary. He trained in the CIA under military
cover from 1962 to 1967, as an "analyst" for the
Department of the Army. In 1967 he assumed diplomatic
cover, posted to the Singapore Embassy as a political
officer. We have found no records regarding his where-
abouts from 1971 to 1975. From 1976 until at least 1978 he
was a Second Secretary at the Ottawa, Canada Embassy.
The next reference found is his posting to France last year.
Yet another case officer in Paris, according to a CAIB
source in Paris, is Barry M. Broman, born October 13,
1943 in Kentucky. Broman served under cover as a
(continued on page 9
following the Index)
Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
 Approved For Release 2010/06/09 :CIA-RDP90-008458000100180007-1
COVERTACTION
INFORMATION
BULLETIN
~XCIUSIVe: (I\ I\ til':11\ 1htH41 (\tll F
~PP:CIAI. SGPPLF:M F,NT ON AFRICA
VV ~I Viii
umner ] ? I ' identities
(~I-A data ntanagcnn~nt
Brooke Marinell~.K.) I I:'2
,e