COUNTERSPY: CIA COPS IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150005-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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COUNTER 7
The Magazine For People Who Need To Know 1p,
Volume 4, Number 2 $2
CIA COPS IN
EL SALVADOR
AFRICANS AND
RIGGS BANK
IN SOUTH AFRICA
by Kojo Arthur
CIA AND LABOR
IN TURKEY
by John Kelly
US-AUSTRALIAN ROLE
IN EAST TIMOR
GENOCIDE
by Denis freney
CIA INTERVENTION
IN AFGHANISTAN
by Konrad Ege
CIA IN AMERICA
by John Kelly
Spring 1980
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Editorial
On July 11, 1941, before the U.S. en-
tered World War I.I. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt created the Coordination
of Information (COI) Office - the first
"CIA".
According to the official Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) history, by
Kermit Roosevelt, "The order (creating
the COI),, however, was not to be spe-
cific as to the functions of the new
agency; both the President and (William
J..) Donovan agreed that, in the deli-
cate situation then existing, it would
be preferable to have no precise defi-
nition appear".
The order establishing the COI was
not only imprecise, but consciously de-
ceptive. It charged the COI to "carry
out,.when requested by the President,-
such supplementary activities as may
facilitate the securing of information
important for national security not now
available to the Government".
Again, Kermit Roosevelt commented on
the deliberate vagueness of the order's
intent: "Only the few who had been ini-
tiated in Donovan's ideas and concepts
and his conferences with the. President
and the Cabinet committee realized the
importance of the phrase."
The importance of the wording was, in
Donovan's mind, that it allowed him and
the COI to do just about anything that
accorded with his personal definition
of national security.
The CIA, maintaining the COI's inten-
tionally obscure phrase, has been doing
whatever it pleases under bogus authori-
zations of this kind, new laws nonwith-
standing.
For this reason, CounterSpy sees no
point in expending efforts to "reform"
or "restrain" the CIA through legisla-
tion. The CIA has never concerned itself
with the law, even when its own in-
vestigators uncovered violations. As
former CIA official, James J. Angleton
once told Congress: "It's inconceivable
that a secret intelligence arm of the
government has to comply with all the
overt orders of the government."
Given the CIA's disregard of the law
and its enormous record of consciously
committed crimes it is folly, at best,
to talk of reforming the CIA. The only
acceptable, humane response is to work
for'the abolition of the CIA.
Accordingly, CounterSpy, as we have
stated in the past, fully supports
the abolition of the CIA.
This is not to say that to work
with Congress is pointless. It is
important to prevent the passage of
laws desired by the CIA such as those
restricting the Freedom of Information
Act and the publication of information
about CIA operations and personnel.
Public exposure of the activities and
crimes of the CIA is the only legal
means for protection from, and possi-
bly restraint of_, the CIA.
Thus, CounterSpy urges everyone to
work to prevent passage of laws
presently being considered, which
would seriously cripple progressive
publications. Those who-are able,
should contribute money, labor, and
skills to progressive publications
whose very existence is under deter-
mined attack by the CIA.
CONTENTS
CIA COPS IN EL SALVADOR
........................... p.3
AFRICANS AND RIGGS BANK IN
SOUTH AFRICA
by Kojo Arthur ........................... p. 4
IA AND LABOR IN TURKEY
by John Kelly ............................ p. 6
US-AUSTRALIAN ROLE IN EAST TIMOR
GENOCIDE
by Denis Freney ......................... p. 10
CIA INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN
by Konrad Ege ....... ................ p.22
CIA IN AMERICA
by John Kelly ........................... p. 39
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CIA COPS IN
EL SALVADOR
When the huge anti-government demonstra- Jose Manuel Flores (8/73-12/73);
tions took place in El Salvador in early Rafael Antonio. Galvez Erazo (1/7.1-5/73);
1980 against a U.S. backed regime, the Juan Bautista Garay Flores (5/67-9/67);
people in the demonstrations were bom- Alberto Garcia Alonso (3/70-7/70); Adan
barded with teargas and other "non-lethal" Garcia (4/63-7/63); Carlos Rene Garcia
weapons shipped in by the U.S. government (16/69-2/70); Reginaldo de Jesus Garcia
"for the occasion". For a long time, Sal-
vadorean police had also been trained
under the now defunct U.S. Office of Pub-
lic Safety (OPS) program.
The following Salvadorean police offi-
cers received special, CI.A-directed train-
ing in the U.S. from 1963-74. Their
courses included classes and training in
Police Intelligence, Planning for Riot
Control, Targets of Insurgency,, Counter-
insurgency Intelligence, Chemical Muni-
tions, Explosives and Demolitions, and
Crowd and Mob Psychology.
In addition, for the CIA, the OPS pro-
gram served as an excellent field for re-
cruitment and for extending the "CIA in-
frastructure" in El Salvador.
Jose Antonio Aguilar Mejia (in the U.S.
from 9/74-12/74); Rigoberto Aguirre
Leonor (6/68-8/68); Ramon Alfredo
Alvarenga (5/73-6/73); Pedro Antonio
Angel (7/70-8/70); Roberto Augustin
Archila Ulloa* (2/69-4/69); Salvador
Arias Ramos* (8/71-10/71); Pedro Antonio
Artiga Henriquez (8/68-12/68); Ruben
Avila Villalta (7/63-10/63); Carlos Angel
Aviles Flores (4/63-7/63);
Justo Alfonso Ayala Alfaro (1/63-2/63);
Guillermo Ayala Campos (8/69-11/69);
David Ayala Mixoo (6/69-9/69); Luis
Adalberto Ayala Tevez (7/63-10/63); Juan
Antonia Bairbs Lopes (5/69-8/69); Jose
Eugenio Barrera Lemus (4/72-8/72);
Gonzalo Alberto Campos (4/69-8/69); Jose
Antonio Castillo*(2/69-4/69); Jose
Antonio Castillo (3/70-7/70); Victor
Manuel Castro Garay (1/63-2/63);
Edgardo Alfonso Cea-Chavez (4/69-8/69);
Candel Cisneros Ilrquilla (2/73-6/73);
Virgilio Cortez (7/63-10/63); Julio
Cesar Cortez*(4/67-8/67); Ricardo
Alfonso Cruz Portillo (3/70-7/70);
Adolfo Cuellar Martinez* (8/70-10/70);
Miguel Angel Fabian* (8/71-10/71);
Miguel Angel Flores (4/63-7/63); Jorge
Ernesto Flores (5/73-6/73);
(6/6910/69); Orlando Gomez Platero*
(10/72-12/72); Jose Antonio Hidalgo
Morales (7/63-10/63);
Alirio Enrique Huezo (5/73-8/73);
Jose Nicolas Jimenez (7/63-10/63);
Rene de Jesus Landaverde Torres (S/68-
12/68); Jose Larios Guerra (8/69-11/69);
Jose Angel Leiva (3/68-7/69); Joaquia
Lopez Zapata (3/68-6/68); Serafin
Lopez (7/63-10/63); Jose Adolfo Medrano
Pacheco (1/63-2/63); Jose Alberto
Medrano (6/69); Jose Raul Mejia (2/73-
6/73);
Eugenio Arturo Melendez Bonilla
(4/63-7/63); Jose Victor Menendez
Guevara (8/68-12/68); Jose Nelson
Merino Chavez (1/71-5/71); Jose Luis
Mira (7/63-10/63); Jaime Mauricio
Mojica Amaya (4/74-6/74); Jose Alberto
Molina (1/73-5/73); Jose Efrain
Salvador Monterrosa (7/63-10/63);
Armando Noches Palacios (5/73-6/73);
Jose Antonio Palacios Lovos (4/63-7/63);
Juan A. Palma (4/72-8/72); Jose
14auricio Palomo Paz (5/69-8/69);Jose
Mauricio Palomo Paz (4/74-6/74); Juan
Carlos Pena (12/67-4/68); Isidro Penate
Valiente (7/67-11/67); Carlos Pereira
Alvarenga (5/69-8/69); Carlos Santana
Quinteros Andra1e (7/63-10/63); Oscar
Rank Altamirano (S/69-6/69'- he also
attended courses.at the FBI National
Academy); Efrain Reales Guatemala
(9/74-12/74); Eduardo Romero Castillo
(7/63-10/63);
Rufino Solorzano Ramirez (10/6913/70);
Carlos Sosa Santos*(8/70-10/70);
Roberto Mauricio Staben Perla (7/67-
11/67); Juan Felix Urbina Gomez (5/69-
8/69); Jose Maria Urihe Portan (5/68-
12/68); Ricardo Valle Talavera (4/63-
7/63); Jesus Alberto Vargas (4/72-7/72);
(* received special training in the
use of explosives at the Border Patrol
Offices (the "CIA Bomb School") in Los
Fresnos, Texas) 3
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Jose Luis Vasquez Cierra (7/63-10/63);
Abel Antonio Velasco (7/63-10/63);
Carlos Alejandro Zacapa (4/72-8/72);
Jose Ramiro Zepeda (5/73-8/73).
AFRICANS AND
RIGGS BANK
IN SOUTH AFRICA
by Kojo Arthur
(Ed. note: Kojo Arthur works with the
Africa Research and Publications Pro-
ject in Trenton, N.J.)
When the ceasefire agreements for en-
suring elections for majority rule in
Zimbabwe were on the verge of possible
collapse, Nigeria threatened to resort to
arms to resolve the Zimbabwe problem. Ni
geria's Minister for External Affairs
warned that "Nigeria would return fire
with fire if South Africa intervened mil-
itarily in the political transition in
Zimbabwe".
It will be recalled that it was the
flexing of muscles by, Nigeria on the eve
of the last Commonwealth Conference in
Lusaka, Zambia that broke the back of
Britain which then agreed to setting up
the Lancaster Conference. Shortly before
the Commonwealth Conference, Nigeria an-'
the nationalization of British
Petroleum's (BP) oil operations in Nigel'
ria. This act forced the British govern-
ment led by Margaret Thatcher to rescind
its decision to lift sanctions that had
been imposed on Rhodesia's illegal minor-
ity regime of Ian Smith and Bishop Abel
Muzorewa. The Lancaster Conference even-
tually led to a ceasefire agreement and
elections as part of the political tran-
sition in Zimbabwe.
Nigeria, besides flexing its muscles,'
contributed material and financial Sup-`;-_,
port to the Southern African liberation
struggles. Nigeria's External Affairs
Minister, Professor 11haya Audu has said
that Nigeria has spent over $40 million
in aid to these liberation struggles,
Moreover, Professor Audu has declared that
4
Nigeria would zealously guard the indepen-
dence of Zimbabwe.. Nigeria's support of
the liberation struggles in Southern
Africa is commendable.
Other African countries, for example
the Frontline-States, have also contribut-
ed immensely in various ways to bring vic-
tory to,the "Zimbabwe people.
Whilst commending the positive contri-
butions` of Nigeria and other African
states to the liberation struggles in
Southern Africa, one must point out some
of the negative contributions that have
helped prolong the liberation struggles.
It is'well known that countries like the
Ivory Coast,, Gabon, Central Africa Repub-
lic and Malawi have economic ties with
apartheid South Africa. However, very
little, is known about the fact that a
number of African and some Caribbean
countries that are vocal in condemning
re:cist South: Africa have, through their
Embassies, bank accounts with the Riggs
National Bank in Washington, D.C.
.One may wonder what is wrong with Af-
rican and Caribbean Embassies in Wash-
ington.doing business with Riggs ? It
is this. Riggs is the biggest commer-
cial bank.in Washington; it is also one
of the major U.S. banks that provide in-
Vestment funds in South Africa to sup-
port and perpetuate discrimination and
human indignities. there. .
Bet ren,1073 and 1976, Riggs provided
loans totaling $7.5 million to a brewery,
a commercial bank, and two important
state corporations. On December 13, 1973
Riggs,granted a $1 million loan to ISCOR
for eleven years witha five-year grace
period"at 314 % interest rate. ISCOR is
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a state corporation meeting 72 % of
South Africa's iron and steel require-
ments. The development of an efficient,
powerful iron and steel industry is a
main component of the apartheid country's
plans for achieving industrial and mili-
tary self-sufficiency.
Another loan for $ 1 million was
granted by Riggs to ESCOM on January 17,
1974. ESCOM received two other loans on
July 25, 1974 for $ 1 million and on Sep-
tember 15, 1975 for $ 2.5 million. ESCOM
is the South African state-controlled and
managed Electric Supply. Commission which
operates 21 power stations and provides
over 86 % of the country's power needs.
ESCOM is currently involved in an expan-
sion plan intended to meet South Africa's
growing energy needs. This plan includes
construction of coal-fired, nuclear, and
hydro-electric power stations,
Again in 1976 Riggs loaned $ 1 million
to South Africa Breweries and another
$ 1 million to Standard Bank of South Af-
rica. Interest rates on all six
South African loans ranged between 3/4 %
and 7 1/4 %. (According to the D.C Bank
Campaign, Riggs has granted loans and
lines of credit to the Chilean military
regime; the group further charges that
Riggs practices local redlining. Riggs
has granted mortgage money in a dispor-
portionate share to home buyers in af-
fluent neighborhoods in Washington.)
Almost at the same period Riggs made
the South African loans, Nigeria had mil-
lions of dollars outstanding to its cred-
it with Riggs. As of December 1977 for
example, Nigeria had about $ 52.7 million
credit outstanding in her accounts at
Riggs. Whereas Riggs was loaning millions
of dollars to support South Africa in
oppressing the African people of all
Southern Africa, Nigeria received a loan
of $ 75,000 from the bank in June 1972
for a national electric power project.
Other African and Caribbean countries
whose Embassies have accounts with Riggs
include Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Jamaica, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tu-
nisia. The Embassy of Ghana received a
$ 2.5 million loan from Riggs on October
21, 1976 for a ten-year period at 1 %
interest rate.
Two aspects of U.S. bank loans to South
Africa have made them especially vital to
maintaining white minority rule. First,
the loans have come primarily during
periods in which South Africa has faced
serious economic and political instabil-
ity. After the 1973 Arab oil boycott,
South Africa has had to pay continually
spiralling prices for its imports, par-
ticularly oil. Recession in the U.S. and
Europe (1974-75) also constricted South
Africa's export markets. Moreover, the
price of gold (South Africa's leading ex-
port commodity) at that time was below
normal levels, reducing the country's
ability to bring in foreign exchange,
Plagued by these economic problems, South
Africa looked toward foreign banks for a
bail-out. Riggs loans to state corpora-
tions in South Africa provided such a
bail-out.
The second aspect of the U.S, bank
loans to the apartheid regime is that the
recipients of these loans have generally
been prominent institutions of the rac-
ist government. Commenting on the ability
of the South African government to borrow
from foreign banks, the Financial Mail
stated a month after the owl' eto upris-
ing: "..a unique feature of the market
has been the support 'of U.S. banks. Appar-
ently more finance has come from this
quarter than ever before." (7/2/76)
A list of recipients of these recent
loans reads like a Who's Who of South Af-
rican corporations. Nearly tthree-quarters
of the total U.S. investment in South Af-
rica are controlled by 12 major state
corporations. These corporations include
ISCOR (iron and steel industries), ESCOM
(electricity and power), ARMSCOR (which
has made South Africa virtually self-suf-
ficient in production of all but the most
sophisticated arms), SASOL I and II (mak-
ing synthetic fuel from coal), Phosphate
Development Corporation (FOSKOR), SAHRR
(railways) and SANRACHEM4 (chemical in-
dustries). Beginning in the 1920's,
these government corporations were estab-
lished to ensure government authority
over the most strategic sectors of the
economy. The state corporations are among
the largest economic enterprises in the
country.
U.S. banks and corporations (e.g. IBM,
General Electric, General Motors, Xerox,
Tenneco, Texaco, Honeywell, Citibank,
Chase Manhattan, etc.) rank high in
terms of the foreign contribution to
South Africa's economy. After Britain,
the U.S. is the largest foreign investor
in South Africa. U.S. banks have over $ 2
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billion in outstanding loans to South Af-
rica, accounting for 33 % of all loan
claims against the country. Thus, Riggs
loans to South Africa are of special
qualitative importance. It has been con-
centrated in major sectors of South Af-
rica's economy that are dominated by a
limited number of state corporations.
For Nigeria and other African and Ca-
ribbean countries to continue to transact
business with Riggs National Bank is to
undermine the efforts these countries
have made in support of the national lib-
eration struggles in Southern Africa.
Just as American banks and corporations
have helped to build and maintain
apartheid through investing in South
Africa, their disengagement can now as-
sist in ending that system. Blacks within
South Africa, representing a broad politi-
cal spectrum, have called for this action.
The NAACP has came out for total with-
drawal.of U.S. companies. State legisla-
tures have begun to express concern and
take action - Madison, Wisconsin gives
preference in bids to firms that do no
business in South Africa. There are many
other examples of disengagement.
What are the African and Caribbean
countries doing to accelerate the disen-
gagement process ? Nigeria particularly
can flex her economic muscles more to get
Riggs and other area banks (Maryland Na-
tional, United Virginia and American Secu-
rity and Trust) to discontinue bailing out
South Africa. Nigeria can learn from its
actions against BP.
CIA AND LABOR
IN TURKEY
by John Kelly
The Asian-American Free Labor Insti-
tute (AAFLI.) began as a concrete expres-
sion of George Meany's support pf the
U.S. war in Vietnam. AAFLI opened its
first regional. office in Saigon. AAFLI
money than began pouring into the hands
of CIA agent Tran Quoc Buu, then head
of the Vietnamese Confederation of La-
bor (CVT). Accordingly, "Buu and the
,CVT were the labor functionaries of the
Thieu regime and the U.S. government,
and the CVT purpose was to effectively
break worker strikes and resistance".l
AAFLI is a counterpart of the AFL
CIO's American Institute for Free Labor
Development (AIFLD), described by for-
mer CIA officer, Philip Agee as a "CIA-
controlled labor center financed
through AID".2 The President of AAFLI
for many years was George Many, the
"principal CIA agent/collaborator for
purpose of the CIA international labor
operations".3 Meany's successor and
AAFLI's present president is Lane
'Kirkland, who recently feted CIA agent,
Jonas Savimbi of UNITA (Angola) at his
home. The'executive director of AAFLI
since its inception has been Morris
Paladino, formerly the "principal CIA
agent for control of the Inter-American
Regional Labor Organization (GRIT)".4 -
In recent years, there has been an in-
flux of personnel from the CIA's AIFLD
to AAFLI. These transfers have includ-
ed: Isaac Barnes, Joseph Bermudez,
Emanuel ("Slim") Boggs, Emilio Garza
("CIA agent for labor operations"5),
Jack E. Goodwyn ("CIA contract agent"6),
Kenneth P. Hutchinson (former director
of the CIA/AIFLD Front Royal Institute),
Thomas Miller, Richard Oulahan,
Valentino B. Suazo, and Robert D.
Wholey.
AAFLI's first Country Program Direc-
tor (CPD) for Turkey was former U.S.
State Department labor attache, Emanuel
Boggs whom Agee described as a "sus-
pected high ranking CIA asset"7. Boggs
was also the former director of AIFLD's
CIA-controlled Front Royal Institute,
and he had served in Chile where AIFLD
worked closely with the CIA.
Following Boggs as AIFLD/CPD in Tur-
key was Tom Miller. Miller had previous-
ly served in South Vietnam 8 in con-
junction with the CVT and its head, Tran
Quoc Buu . Following Vietnam,'Miller
served in South Korea 9 where workers'
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"Next week begins what Mr. (Tom)
Miller describes as the heart of the
program, a two-week study of the
'dangers and safe-guards for demo-
cratic labor . We (AIFLD) will use a
case study approach to see what hap-
pened in Cuba, how it came about,
and what steps might have been taken
by unions to thwart it', says Mr.
Miller. The teachers will-be Cuban
union leaders who fled when the Reds
came to power."
Harold H. Brayman,
National Observer,
7/30162-
rights are non-existent and the so-
called unions working with AAFLI are
rife with KCIA agents.
AAFLI began its formal operations
in Turkey following a Spring 1972 sem-
inar attended by 44 "leaders" of the
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
(TURK-IS) and its affiliated unions.10
Arising from the seminar were AAFLI-
directed conferences and training pro-
grams. Led initially by AAFLI econo-
mist, David Kaplan, the subject of these
seminars were: "contract analysis; job
analysis; job specifications and writing
job descriptions; job evaluation and mo-
tion study; wage comparisons by industry
and area; the living wage concept; read-
ing a company financial report; produ-
tivity and production;'and accounting
procedures of state economic enter-
prises." 11
While not surprising it is significant
that AAFLI's training, given by capital-
ist economists, contains little rele-
vance to the rank-and-file workers.
There is no training in union organizing,
in.strike organizing, or in how to bring
about just wages, sick leave, overtime
pay, medical benefits, unemployment ben-
efits, child care, or safe, sanitary
working conditions. Nor is there ever
training in how to research a company's
records to see if its assets and prof-
its are commensurate with workers'
wages and benefits.
This pro-corporate nature of AAFLI
belies its representation as a union-
ist's or worker's organization. At the
same time, it brings out why AAFLI works
with the CIA, because the CIA has always
worked primarily for U.S. corporations
and the furtherance of monopoly capital-
ism.
In Turkey, AAFLI has worked primarily
with TURK-IS although not with rank-and-
file unionists but designated leaders.
In the U.S., AFL-CIO leaders, such as
Meany and Kirkland, have always ruled
autocratically and never been elected by
rank-and-file members. The AFL-CIO lead-
ership through AAFLI in Turkey attempted
to also create and maintain an elitist,
labor aristocracy, more privileged than
the rank-and-file. Naturally, this elit-
ist minority is easier to manipulate,
and, in turn, to be used to steer
unions to support pro-corporate, and
U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Again, it should be emphazised that
the overwhelming majority of rank-and-
file union,members~ as it is the case
even in the U.S., do not know of the
machinations of AAFLI or its manipula-
tive attempts with its various leaders.
Thus, the following exposition is not
to cast aspersions on TURK-IS but rath-
er to alert its members as to who is
being "courted and wooed by AAFLI, an
arm of the CIA and U.S. corporations.
This is vital information to rank-and-
file unionists since under AAFLI/CIA
influence and/or control their own
union will facilitate their exploita-
tion and denial of elementary workers'
needs.
As mentioned, AAFLI launched its for
mal operations at a 1972 conference
which was held from May 23-27 in Izmir,
Turkey.12 This conference was overseen
by CIA collaborator 'lorris Paladino
who described AAFLI "with special em-
phasis given to the Institute's Phil-
ippine research project".13 However, he
did not mention that Filipino union-
ists in 1970 had exposed AAFLI's collab-'
oration with the CIA in the Philippinesl4
Prior to the 1972 conference,
Paladino had visited Turkey in 1971.
This is what he had to say, in part,
about his visit:
"I.was in Ankara during the terrorist
activity and the declaration of martial
law and was in almost daily contact with
the principal leaders of TURK-IS." 15
Neither Paladino nor AAFLI expressed
opposition to the declaration of martial
law. AAFLI has never opposed martial
law unless it interfered with AAFLI
7
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operations. On the contrary, under mar-
tial law, AAFLI operations-often flour-
ish such as in South Korea. This fact
exposes the hypocrisy of AAFLI as a work-
ers' organization since workers' rights
are all but non-existent under martial
law; strikes are invariably outlawed.
For AAFLI to expand its union acti-
vities under such conditions is a
cruel hoax since it gives the impression
of extensive servicing of, and concern
about, workers' needs. But, these union
activities are meaningless if a union
cannot strike when it is necessary. Fur-
thermore, AAFLI never pushes for strikes,
no matter how oppressive the working
conditions, in defiance of martial law.
It should also be noted that Paladino,
like the CIA and oppressive governments,
clumped together all opposition activi-
ties, which included labor dissent, in
Turkey as "terrorist activities".
Despite his being named as a CIA agent
in Agee's.book, Paladino later was the
guest speaker at the Tenth Statutory Con-
gress of TURK-IS held April 12-18, 1976
in An}C~,~ra,16
At Paladino's side was then-TURK-IS
president Halil Tunc whom AAFLI later
brought to the U.S. along with Kutay
Aksel to "meet personally with Paladino
and George Meant'.*17 That same year
(1977) Binali Jagison, then president,
Turkish Agricultural Workers Union, and
Fuart Alan, then president of the Turkish
Municipal Workers Union were brought by
AAFLI to the AFL-CIO's 12th Biennial Con-
vention in Los Angeles (December 8-13),
where they also met with Paladino.18
Visiting AAFLI's U.S. headquarters in
1977 were the following officials of
TURK-METAL, the Turkish metalworkers
union: Ergul Ozsahiner, Muammer Gur, I.
Hakki Suren, Ali Tatarer, Fevzi Korkmaz,
and Abdurrahman Unlu; as well as M.etin
Ogan, then TURK-IS International Affairs
Department Director.19
The other AAFLI representative at the
May 23-27, 1972 conference besides
Paladino was David Kaplan, who was as-
sisted by Dr. Toker Dereli, then profes-
sor of labor relations at the University
of Istanbul. TURK-IS officials featured
at the conference were Seyfi Demirsoy
(president); Halil Tunc (general-secre-
tary); Kaya Ozdemir (education secretary)
and Ferit Azkara (education director).21
. Following the May conference, a nation-
al AAFLI/TURK-IS research and data col-
lection center was established under the
stimulation of Emanuel Boggs.22 While
this may be all well and good for the
analysis and collection of collective
bargaining contracts, it should be noted
that in Chile, for one (where Boggs for-
merly served) AIFLD and its Chilean asso-
ciates gathered innocent-seeming data on
union members. Subsequent to the over-
throw of President Allende, some of this.
data was used by DINA to target thou-
sands of workers for reprisals and even
executions. 23 Hence, Turkish. workers
had best beware of questionnaires which
have been flowing out of the AAFLI/
TURK-IS data center.
On August 20, 1975, AAFLI, in con-,
junction with TURK-IS, established the
Ankara Region Consumer Cooperative Fed-
eration (Tukobirlik).24 This was an-
nounced at a press conference given by
Sadik Side (TURK-IS); Huseyin Polat
(AAFLI coop specialist); Ethem'Ezgu
(TURK-I'S); Turan Albayrak (Ankara Co-op
Federation); Ibrahim Capan (KOOP-IS);
and Cafer Yalniz (Ankara Co-op Federa-
tion)., Organizations begun by AAFLI
are of particular concern. In the field.
of agriculture, AAFLI has also worked
closely with officials of TARIM-IS, the
Turkish agricultural workers' union.25
Following the establishment. of Tuko-
birlik, AAFLIts Tom Miller and Frank
Anastasio worked with its president,
Huseyin Eksi and Mustafa Kundakci of
the Izmir Highway Workers to stimulate
the creation of the Izmir Regional
Co-op Federation.26 (Kundakci later con-
ducted a TURK-IS/.AAFLI training pro-
gram for members of the Cement/Ceramic
Workers Union in Izmir.27)
Also in 1975, AAFLI, in "continuing
its close cooperation with TURK-IS"
sponsored a study tour in the U.S. for
Huseyin Elbek (TURK-IS), Yalcin
Gulpinar (Agricultural Workers Union),
Emre Kocaoglu (Textile Workers National'
cco,
Union), and Ibrahim Uluc (Food, Tabacco,
and Allied Workers National Union).
The four attended programs at the Wis-
consin University School for. Workers
and the AFL-CIO Labor Studies Center in
Washington, D.C.
In 1979, TURK-IS held its 11th Statu-
tory Convention in Ankara which was at-
tended by twenty foreign unionists'in-
cluding Morris Paladino and AFL-CIO
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vice-president-John 'O'Dbnneil.29 At
the convention, Ibrahim Denizcier re-
placed Halil Tunc as president.30
Denizcier is the president and founder
of the Food, Drink, and Tobacco Workers
Union (Tekgida..Is). He has been in con-
tact,with AAFLI, specifically AAFLI re-
presentative Maida Kemp.31 Reelected at
the convention were Sadik Side (General
Secretary), Omar Ergun (Financial Secre-
tary), and Kaya Ozdemir (Education Sec-
retary).32 As we saw, Side has been in-
volved with AAFLI since 1975 and Ozdemir
since 1972. Ozdemir, along with Sanar
Taysi (Director of Research anc Inter-
national Affairs, TURK-IS), was brought
by AAFLI to the 1975 AFL-CIO Convention
in San Francisco.33 Ozdemir was also a
featured speaker at the AAFLI/TURK-IS
Labor Educators' Conference in Samsun in
1978 which was overseen by AAFLI Educa-
tion Director, William Lanxner.34 Omar
Ergun has been involved with AAFLI since
1975 at which time he worked with
Emanuel Boggs in establishing Tuko-
birlik. 35
In closing, I want to repeat that none
of the above is to cast aspersion on
TURK-IS or any of the other unions named.
It should, in fact, be mentioned that
recently 13 trade unions affiliated with
TURK-IS charged that "the employers are
demanding that the government abolish
all the democratic rights that the work-
ing class has obtained at the cost of
their blood and life".36
The above exposition is also not say-
ing that any of the aforementioned Turk-
ish unionists are CIA agents. It is say-
ing, however, that they are working with
AAFLI, a mechanism promoting capitalism
in conjunction with the CIA. Since mono-
poly capitalism and the CIA are increas-
ingly threatening to destroy all workers'
rights in Turkey,'it is crucial for all
Turkish workers to know what AAFLI is
and who AAFLI's Turkish agents are. This
then is the purpose of the article.
3) ibid.
4) ibid.
5) ibid.
6) ibid.
7) ibid.
8). AAFLI News, Oct., 1976, p.3 (Avai-
able from: Suite 401, 1125 15th St. NW,
Washington, D.C. 20005
9) ibid.
10) AAFLI News, Nov.-Dec.,1972, p.3
11) ibid.
12) AAFLI News, July,1972, pp.2-3
13) ibid. /
14) William Pomeroy, An American Made
Tragedy, International-Pu lis rrs ,New
York, 1974
15) AAFLI News, June-July,1971, p.4
16) AAFLI News, May*June;1976,p.3
17) AAFLI News, Nov.,1977-Jan.,1978,
p.5
18) AAFLI News, August-Sept., 1977,
p.4
19) ibid.
20) AAFLI News, July,1972, pp.2-3
21) ibid.
22) AAFLI News, Dec.,1973, p.223) Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher
;-
Spokesman Books, Nottingkam, England,
1977
24) AAFLI News, Oct., 1975, p.2
25) AAFLI News, August,1979, p.2
26) AAFLI News, March,1979, p.1
27) AAFLI News, Dec.,1978-Jan.,1979,
p.4
28)
AAFLI News,
May-June, 1975, pp.5-6
29)
AAFLI News,
May,1979, p.2
30)
ibid.
31)
AAFLI News,
May,1978, p.1
32)
AAFLI News,
May, 1979, p.2
33)
AAFLI News,
Oct., 1975, p.4
34)
AAFLI News,
Feb., 1978, p.3
35)
AAFLI News,
May-June,1975, p.5
36) Bulletin Info-Turk, Year IV, Nov.,
1979, p.5 (Available from: Square Ch.
M. Wiser, 13/2, 1040 Bruxelles, Bel-
gium)
1) Don Thomson and Rodney Larson, Where
were _ you, brother ?, War on Want,- Loon oh,
2) Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA
Diary, Peguin Boo sk"'F~armondswort ,
esex, England, 1975
?
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US-AUSTRALIAN ROLE
IN EAST TIMOR
GENOCIDE
by Denis Fren ey
(Ed. note: Denis Freney is an Austra-
lian journalist who has written exten-
sively on the collaboration between
Australian and U.S. intelligence ser-
vices.(i) He has also done support
work for independence struggles in
Southeast Asia. CounterSpy welcomes
this contribution for the light it
sheds on U.S. complicity in the geno-
cide being waged by the Indonesian mil-
itary in East Timo::. (ii)
Since 1904, East Timor has been the
object of imperial contention in the
Southeast Asian region. In that year
the island of Timor was divided in half
the Dutch claiming West Timor and the
eastern half going to the Portuguese.
In 1912, a two year uprising against
the,'Portuguese resulted in the death
of 3,000 Timorese.
During World War II, the island was
occupied first by Australian troops (in
order to "protect" its "independence"),
then by the Dutch, and finally by the
Japanese. Allied attempts to dislodge
the Japanses by bombing resulted in the
destructioi of Timor's few towns, dam-
age to many villages, and the death
of over 50,000 Timorese.
When Indonesia gained its indepen-
dence from the Dutch following the war,
this never included East Timor. With
the help of the Catholic Church, which
"seemed to concentrate more on helping
its flock come to terms with their
plight rather than on pressing for re-
forms" (iii), the Portuguese hung on to
their island colony, exploiting it in
every way possible.
Following the Portuguese revolution
in 1974, political life in East Timor
blossomed. Of the three major political
parties at the time, only Fretilin (Re-
volutionary Front for Independent East
Timor) had any popular following.
Fretilin's literacy and agricultural
development campaigns, its support
among conscripts in the Portuguese-led
military forces, and its firm commit-
ment to independence for East Timor
made a mockery of the political plat-
forms of its rival parties.
One of them, the UDT (Timorese Demo-
cratic Union), was comprised of those
who had benefitted from Portuguese rule,
with several of its leaders associated
with.fascist parties in Portugal. A
third party, APODETI (Timorese People's
Democratic Association), was created by
Indonesia and was the only party call-
ing for union with Jakarta. Its presi-
dent, Arnaldo dos Reis Arat'Ljo, collabo-
rated in Japanese war crimes and was
jailed after World War II. Following
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in
December, 1975, Arat'ijo was selected to.
head the new puppet regime (iv).
Throughout, the resistance of the
people of East Timor in the twentieth
century has been heroic. The latest
struggle against Indonesian genocide
has resulted in the loss of at least
one-sixth of its population. The world
knows little of the courage of the East
Timorese, and still less of the com-
plicity of the Western "democracies" in
Indonesia's bloodbath. May this article
serve to educate people on,both.)
In the past four years, of an esti-
mated population of 689,000 in 1974,
some 100,000 (at a conservative esti-
mate) East Timorese have been killed.'
This followed a full-scale invasion
launched by the Indonesian military
dictatorship of General Suharto on De-
cember 7, 1975. In a war-hidden from
the world through an effective ban on
visits to the island by outside jour-
nalists and the connivance of the world
press, Suharto and his military have
carried out an act..of genocide, aimed
at the ferocious resistance led by
Fretilin.
Until the end of 1978, the vast ma-
jority of East Timorese and some-80 per
cent of the territory was under Freti-
lin control. Only after mid-1978,, when
Indonesian campaigns of encirclement
and annihilation, "advised" by U.S. of-
ficers, led to massive destruction of
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food crops and homes in the liberated
areas, did starvation and lack of ammu-
nition begin to take its toll. The be-
trayal of former Fretilin President
Xavier do,Amaral in September 1977 and
Information Minister Alarico Fernandez
One year later also contributed to the
relative success of the Suharto regime
in East Timor in 1979.
Fretilin guerillas continue their re-
sistance despite the lack of supplies
from outside, an Indonesian-inducei
famine, and the murder of Fretilin Pres-
ident Nicolau Lobato on December
31,
1978. Latest reports indicate
a
massive, new Indonesian offensive
in-
volving over 15,000 troops aimed at de-
stroying remaining liberated areas in
the eastern part of the country, and
small-scale guerilla units operating
elsewhere throughout the whole terri-
tory. 2 It is clear that resistance
continues, and will continue for a long
time, even though it is now on a
smaller scale than in the first three
years.
It is not possible in this article to
trace all the events which have oc-
curred in East Timor before ani since
the 1975 invasion.3 Our main purpose
will be to look at the role the U.S.
government has played in aiding
Suharto's genocide, and, in particu-
lar, the role of the CIA, in associa-
tion with Australian intelligence or-
ganizations.
and said: "We'll talk about that later."
The AP further reported that, according
to Ford's press secretary Nessen, Ford
and Suharto had discussed the Timor
issue only in very "general terms" and
Suharto had not told Ford the invasion
was about to be launched. When ques-
tioned about reports that Ford had
asked Suharto to delay the invasion
until he left Indonesia, Nessen denied
them.
Officials later also disputed re-
ports that Kissinger had told Suharto
the U.S. "understood Indonesia's posi-
tion regarding East Timor". However,
in October, 1975 Indonesian General
Ali Murtopo had visited Washington,.and
as a result Kissinger had recommended
that Congress double military aid to
Indonesia to $42.5 million in credit
purchases, "to enable it to cope more
effectively with the new political re-
alities in Southeast Asia".4 At the
same time, Suharto was asked not to use
U.S. military equipment "conspicuously"
in anything he planned.5
As U.S. State Department and
Pentagon officials have since admitted,,
the arms and other equipment used in
the invasion were IJ.S.-supplied.
The cover-up, on the part of both In-
donesia and the U.S., came almost imme-
diately. Aware that its use of U.S.-
supplied weapons against East Timor
broke a 1958 Washington-Jakara agree-
ment prohibiting use of U.S. arms for
external aggression, Indonesia's for-
THE 1975 INVASION
On December 6,197S, President Gerald
Ford and Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger arrived in Indonesia for a
short visit. They were wined and dined
to great effect -- off gold plates,
the delicacies washed down with French
champagne and wines.
The next day, 12 hours before the
full-scale invasion of East Timor by
over 10,000 Indonesian troops, backed
by largely U.S. supplied weaponry, war-
ships, planes, etc., Ford and Kissinger
departed for Hawaii. Suitably enough,
it was the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. '
When they arrived in Hawaii, Ford was
asked-about the invasion of East Timor.
According to an Associated Press (AP)
report of December 7, 1975, Ford smiled
It would be a fair guess to say that
Ford and Kissinger discussed the vital
Ombai-Wettar straits with Suharto,
These straits run north of East Timor.
They are the only deep-water route
between the Pacific and Indian oceans
which U.S. nuclear submarines can use
without surfacing. The alternative
is the much longer route around the
southern Australian coast.
Suharto and the U.S. hatre had a
long secret agreement allowing nucle-
ar submarines this passage. They
feared that an independent East Timor
may have objected to use of, its terri-
torial water for such purposes. This
undoubtedly was one of the reasons
for the Indonesian invasion, and the
U.S. support for it.
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eign minister Malik, speaking to re-
porters the day of the invasion, stat-
ed that "Indonesians had entered the
territory in response to requests by
friendly forces". But during the in-
terview, Malik also said that Indo-
nesia's forces would be withdrawn as
soon as they determine that "peace and
order are res ored". Why, one might
ask, was it l~ft to Indonesia, and not
to the Timorese who had "invited"
them to determine when their forces
would be withdrawn ?
The'U.S. media played along with
this charade. Relying solely on Indo-
nesian news service, papers like the
New York Times and the Washington
Post simply repeated once-told lies.8
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Attempts by U.S. officials to cloak
U.S. complicity with Indonesia's in-
vasion were equally insubstantial. In
order .vp pay lip service to the 1958
agreement, the administration, in early
1976, placed a farcial ban on aid
to Jakarta.9
However, aid previously processed
("in the pipeline") continued to be de-
livered. In effect, no aid was stopped
and new agreements were not even de-
layed. Total aid was in fact stepped
up.
In hearings before Rep. Donald
Fraser's Subcommittee on International
Organizations of the Committee on In-
ternational Relations in February,
1978 it was reported that "at least
four separate offers of military equip-
ment were made to the Indonesian gov-
ernment during the January-June 1976
'administrative suspension'. This
equipment consisted mainly of supplies
and parts for OV-10 Broncos, Vietnam
War-era planes specially designed for
counterinsurgency operations against
adversaries without effective anti-air-
craft weapons, and wholly useless for
defending. Indonesia from a foreign
enemy. The policy of supplying'the
Indonesian regime with Broncos, as
well as other counterinsurgency-re-
lated equipment has continued without
substantial change from the Ford o the
present Carter administrations".1' As
then-Chairperson Fraser stated in the
hearings, the "suspension" reminded him
of "the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonder-
land: all we have left is the grin".
In July, 1976 the Suharto regime or-
chestrated an "act of free choice" in
which 28 hand-picked Timorese puppets
voted for integration with Indonesia.
The Ford administration immediately re-
cognized this vote as legalizing
Jakarta's aggression against and annex-
ation of East Timor. Use of U.S. sup-
plied weapons now became "internal" to
Indonesia and the suspension of aid
(that never was) was abandoned.
Nevertheless, the resistance of the
Fretilin forces was such that by the
end of 1977 a diplomat was quoted as
saying that the Indonesian military "is
running out of military inventory. The
operations in Timor have pushed them to
the wall" .11
The Indonesian military had suffered
catastrophic failures in East Timor.?
Corruption at the top, lack of military
expertise, and demoralized troops ac-
counted for some 17,000 Indonesian
dead.12 In addition, Suharto was facing,
particularly at the beginning of,1978,
serious internal problems at home, and
there were doubts whether his regime
could survive. Military difficulties in
East Timor compounded these problems,
while leading to growing awareness of
what was happening.
Washington and other western capitals
became alarmed and rushed to Suharto's
aid. This provided the basis for the ma-
jor offensive launched from July 1978 on-
wards.
In mid-1978, Fretilin radio, broadcast-
ing from inside East Timor, began to de-
nounce, for the first time, the presence
of U.S. military advisers in East Timor.
The Fretilin radio claimed they were
flying helicopter gunships, directing
fire, and even participating in attacks.
The radio also quoted eye-witnesses who
had seen the body of an American merce-
nary who was killed in the Remexio area,
near the capital Dili.
Also, according to Fretilin radio, two
U.S. military advisers arrived in Dili
in December 1977. More arrived in the
following three months and were taken to
Aileu (40 kms. south of Dili) by trucks
and helicopters. The radio estimated
that roughly ten U.S. advisers were
fighting with the Indonesians near
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Lekidoe on June 13, 1978, and in Remexio
village on June 21 and 22. They were
also sighted in fighting in the north-
west and central parts of the country.
In addition, they were training Indone-
sian troops in Aileu and Laklubar. On
July 5, 1978, one U.S. adviser landed on
Kaitasso mountain near Remexio to help
Indonesian troops fighting there. The ad-
visers were in the uniform of the Indone-
sian Red Berets and were being "very
careful" in battles.13
Despite the fact that these reports
were very detailed, and that Fretilin ra-
dio had been reliable in the past,14 in-
dependent observers such as Australian
diplomat Jim Dunn 1S were highly scepti-
cal, given U.S. and Indonesian denials
and lack of independent confirmation. In
April 1979, however, even Dunn reported
"an Indonesian official source" as stat-
ing that "U.S. military personnel had
from time to time visited East Timor to
inspect the situation".16
The U.S. military has, since the mid-
1950's, maintained extensive training
programs for the Indonesian military,
both in the States and in Indonesia it-
self. In March 1975, there were 56 U.S.
military personnel, and five U.S. civil-
ian experts posted. in Indonesia as part
of the "U.S. Defense Liaison Group"
which has been operating in Indonesia
for many years. Between 1971 and 1975,.a
total of 1,500 Indonesian officers were
trained in the U.S. and more by the De-
fense Liaison Group in Indonesia itself.
Up until December 1976, ?22,680,000 had
been spent on these training programs by
the U.S. government.17
Given the fact that, since July 1976,
the Ford administration (and, following
it, the Carter administration) has rec-
ognized East Timor as part of Indonesia,
and East Timor has been the site of the
only war Indonesia has been involved in
during the past five years, we can as-
sume that the U.S. military advisers
sighted by Fretilin in 1978 were prob-
ably part of the U.S. Defense Liaison
Group stationed in Indonesia, officially
carrying out "normal", "training" func-
tions.
When Portuguese fascism was overthrown
in April 1974, the news hit East Timor
like a bombshell. Only a small, clan-
destine group of East Timorese support-
ing independence had existed in Dili and
among Timorese students in Lisbon, Por-
tugal since 1970. They had discussed
and clarified their political ideas, and
had established contacts with Frelimo
and MPLA, the two groups which were wag-
ing national liberation struggles in the
Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and
Angola, respectively. But their possi-
bilities for action were limited, as
neither Australia nor Indonesia would
offer them a base for. operations.
However, when political rights were
established in May 1974, this clandes-
tine group formed the Timorese Social
Democratic Association (ASDT) 18 which
within a year had won the support of a
large majority of East Timorese, and
had raised political consciousness in
an extraordinary way.
The hot-house development of East Ti-
morese politics took--the--Australian and
U.S. intelligence by complete surprise.
Portuguese Timor had been one of the
most backward and isolated countries of
the world. It would have been a bottom
priority for any intelligence agency.
Yet, within a" month of April 1974,
there were three political parties com-
peting for support, the Portuguese mil-
itary was drifting rapidly to the left,
and Timorese students with a Marxist
education were returning to their home-
land from Lisbon, "infected" from the
upsurge there.
By September 1974, the ASDT had been
transformed into the Revolutionary
Front for Independent East Timor
(Fretilin) and its militants were
spreading out into the mountains and
working among Timorese conscripts in
the Portuguese colonial army in the ter-
ritory. In January 1975, the conserva-
tive Timorese Democratic Union (UDT),
swept along by events, joined in a co-
alition'with Fretilin, based on a pro-
gram taken almost word for word from
Fretilin's own program. Within a few
months, Fretilin had the overwhelming
support of the East Timorese.
The U.S. and Australia were quick to
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move. In June 1974, William A. Pierce,
the U.S. vice consul in Surabaya, Indo-
nesia, visited Dili for three days to
check out the situation. He returned re-
assured by the more conservative of the
ASDT leaders. However, concern mounted
as the Indonesian propaganda machine be-
gan to turn out stories of "communists"
in Fretilin, coinciding with the return
of radical students from Lisbon.19
Australian journalist/intelligence ad-
viser Peter Hastings arrived in Dili on
October 26, 1974 it order to strengthen
contact with Fretilin leader Jose Ramos-
Horta whom he had met in Canberra in
July. He also wanted to familiarize him-
self with the whole situation in East
Timor, as well as contact leaders of
Fretilin and other political organiza-
tions.
Hastings returned to Australia con-
cerned but determined to find a neo-co-
lonial solution. On December 3, 1974,
he took Horta (then visiting Canberra)
to lunch, where he introduced him to
Gordon Jockel, a former Austratian Am,
bassador to Indonesia, and head of the
Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO).
The JIO had been set up in 1970, under
the guidance of the CIA's Analysis
Branch.
The lack of American expertise in
East Timor had quickly resulted in
close coordination of CIA actions
there with Australian intelligence.This
had many advantages. First, Fretilin
was highly suspicious of Americans in
general, having read of CIA actions
elsewhere in the world. Australians
were, _on the other hand, more readily
accepted, especially due to'the fact
that?Australian commandos had fought
there during the Second World War and
had established a good reputation with
their paternalistic attitude which con-
trasted strongly with the brutality of
the Portuguese and Japanese.
Hastings, himself, had a long associ-
ation with the CIA, dating. back to his
work with Australian intelligence dur-
ing World War II. While his main inter-
est remained Papua New Guinea, he also
operated in West Irian and closely fol-
lowed events in Indonesia. As associate
editor of the Sydney Morning Herald,'"
Hastings was able to use his journalist
hat to advantage.
Another Australian with close CIA
links was (now Sir),Bernard Callinan.
As a captain of the Australian comman-
dos in East Timor during World War II,
he had established close, pe-^sonal
links with the educated elite in the
territory, and later spent many holi-
days there. After being evacuated from
East Timor, he became something of a
war hero and ended the war as a Briga-
dier. As a Catholic in the largely WASP
Australian Establishment, he had a bit
of a fight to establish a place for
himself, but after setting up a success-
fulengineering firm, he was chosen by
the Australian government in the late'
1950's to serve as an "adviser" to
South Vietnam's Diem, who was of course
also Catholic.
Callinan, who had gained a reputation
as a counterinsurgency expert after his
Timor experience, undoubtedly had wide
contacts with the CIA during his,Viet-
nam tour. During his time there, Aus-
tralian "advisers" were being trained,
by the CIA under its Special Forces
prografi.20 After Diem was assassinated,;
Callinan returned to Australia to be-
come vice-president of the Victorian
branch of the extreme-rightist Demo-,.
cratic Labor Party (DLP) and was sub-
sequently appointed to numerous govern-
ment and semi-goverment jobs.
It was through Australians such as
Hastings and Callinan, and more gener-
ally through the Australian intelli-
gence organizations, that the CIA got
much of its basic information on East
Timor, and through which it tried to
influence events among Fretilin lead-
ers in particular.
This was not the first time this had
occurred. It is important that libera-
tion movements around the world be
alerted to the close liaison existing,
between Australian intelligence and
the CIA.
Australia is a long way from most'
other parts of the world, and little
is known about it. Thus, Australian
intelligence can often fill in gaps
for the CIA. Two examples are well
known. In Cambodia, from 1970, the ul-
tra-secret Australian intelligence ser-
vice ASIS (Australian Secret Intelli-
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Bence Service) acted for'the CIA after
Sihanouk broke off diplomatic rela-
tions with the U.S. Similarly, in
Chile just prior to the 1973 coup
against President Salvador Allende,
ASIS operatives working out of the Aus-
tralian Embassy in Santiago played an
important role within CIA operations.
The then-Prime Minister McMahon admit-
ted this collaboration in the mid-
1970's.
Direct American links with East Ti-
mor were scanty. With the exception of
a few American anthwopologists who
were doing field research there, and
at least one of whom Fretilin claimed
was CIA, direct CIA involvement in East
Timor was scarce. There was, however,
a U.S. oil exploration corporation that
quickly moved in to establish rights to
the suspected rich oil reserves off the
East Timor coast.
Oceanic Exploration Co., of Denver,
Colorado had, in 1975, over 107 million
acres of oil prospecting rights on and
offshore all the world's continents,
with very big interests in Somoza's Nic-
aragua. The corporation is small - com-
pared to the oil giants - but in East
Timor Oceanic Exploration played a dis-
turbing and curious role.
Almost immediately after the change
of power in Portugal in April 1974,
Oceanic Exploration began negotiations
with the Portuguese government for off-
shore oil rights in the Timor Sea,
south of East Timor. In December 1974,
the Portuguese government granted Oce-
anic rights in large areas of the Timor
Sea, including areas in dispute with
the Australian government, which made
an official protest. Oceanic's rights
conflicted with rights granted to a big
league consortium - Arco/Aquitaine/
Exxon - by Australia.
Oceanic's negotiator was J.E. Bakken,
its treasurer/controller. He appointed
a part-Timorese, Jaime Santos, as Oce-
anic's representative in Dili, and vis-
ited the territory a number of times in
1975 -- in May, July, and August.
Bakken's visits were- curiously timed
and coincided with a series of political
crises in East Timor. In May 1975, the
UDT broke off its coalition with
Fretilin and began a rabid anti-commu-
nist campaign against its former ally.
In July, the UDT was preparing for its
coup, which was staged in August and
coincided with Bakken's third visit.
All of this may have been coincidental.
However, Oceanic's Dili representative,
Jaime Santos, was not only a leading
figure in the UDT, but was interestingly
enough also in charge of plans to ob-
tain a supply of weapons from Australia
for the coup.
Also in April 1975, UDT leaders had
visited Australia after a tour of Jakar-
ta and Hong Kong. In Jakarta, the UDT
leaders had been wooed by General Ali
Murtopo who was "project officer for the
acquisition of East Timor" or "Operation
Komodo" as it was known. Murtopo told
Dili Mayor Mouzinho "you could be mayor
of Jakarta one day" and boasted that the
Indonesian Army could take East Timor in
two hours (:).
In Australia, the UDT leaders met
with Bernard Callinan, whom they had
known for many years. He backed
Murtopo's demand that they break the
coalition with Fretilin and urged
them to unite with Apodeti (the min-
iscule pro-Indonesian group) against
"communism". He allegedly said:
"There's only one thing now: fix it
with Indonesia and UDT and Apodeti
will unite to throw communism out."
His pbsition was further supported by
JIO chief Gordon Jockel whom the UDT
met in Canberra. On returning to Dili,
the UDT leaders broke the coalition
with Fretilin, and soon afterwards
set out to organize support in Jakarta
and Australia for a UDT coup.
Jaime Santos played a key role in
garnering support. He went to Austra-
lia and met with extreme right-wing
forces there, linked with the army and
intelligence, and through them ar-
ranged for weapons to be sent to East
Timor for the coup.
Among these involved in this opera-
tion were friends of Callinan, members
of an extreme right-wing network
around a man named Michael Darby (who
was later to fly into East Timor after
the failure of the UDT coup), and an
Australian pilot working in East Timor,
Roger Ruddock, whose parents in Perth
were part of the Darby network.
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Michael Darby had worked as a captain
in the intelligence services of the
Australian Army in Vietnam, where he
naturally had excellent CIA ties. The
son of an eccentric extreme right-wing
Liberal (conservative) Party parliamen-
tarian, he, like his father, maintained
over a long period close links with
Taiwan and the different international
anti-communist bodies centered there.
(Darby still operates the Taiwan
Travel Agency in Sydney which functions
as a de facto consulate for Taipeh
since Australia recognized the People's
Republic of China. It is worth noting
that Darby has since been active in the
Vietnam refugee movement, and as a
leader of the extreme right of the gov-
erning Liberal Party in which he is
closely identified with Ustasha Cro-
atian fascist elements and with a
proven war criminal from Slovenia,
Lyenko Urbanchich.)
Jaime Santos may or may not have been
successful in getting weapons into East
Timor from Australia. Some Timorese
claim that he smuggled them in by
plane through Baucau airport, where UDT
officials were in high positions. In
any case, he was in Dili when the coup
attempt was launched on the night of
August 10-11, 1975 and played an impor-
tant military role in it, before flee-
ing to Australia when Fretilin launched
their counter-offensive.
Also in Dili at the time was J.E.
Bakken of Oceanic. Bakken flew into
Dili from Darwin, Australia on August
7, 1975 -- three days before the coup.
He flew out of Dili on August 17, just
before the Fretilin counter-attack, and
when Fretilin had seized one Portuguese
army post. Bakken got out just in time
- if he had remained a few more days he
might have been asked some embarrassing
questions by t}lte victorious Fretilin
forces.
All the evidence concerning Bakken is
of course circumstantial. There is no
hard evidence that he had anything to
do with the UDT coup. However, it would
be interesting to know just what he was
doing in Dili around that time, and his
exact relations with Jaime Santos, the
UDT, and the Indonesians.
The links between oil companies and
the CIA are legion. Oil companies often
rely on CIA intelligence to size up
different host-government ministries
regarding their willingness to grant
concessions. Oil companies also make
use of the CIA's penetration of a for-
eign country's labor movement in order
to gauge the relative safety of doing
business in a country. In return,
these companies often provide CIA
operatives; with cover.
As for Bakken's company, Oceanic has
been lobbying in Jakarta since 1976 to
have its oil explorationrights -
granted by Lisbon - recognized by
Suharto. At last,report, they had suc-
ceeded. Jakarta is at loggerheads with
the Australian government over the sea-
bed boundary in the Timor Sea, taking
the same position as Portugal, and, for
that matter, Fretilin (who, of course,
.do. not accept Jakarta's right to ne-
gotiate this question).
On August 11, 1975, after the night
of the coup, UDT was in control of
Dili, Baucau and the international air-
port there. The Portuguese Governor
Lemos Pires,, who had been sent to East
Timor in "exile" by the radical Armed
Forces Movement in Lisbon, and who from
the beginning was reputedly linked with
.the CIA, ordered Timorese conscripts to
remain in their barracks. UDT gangs
roamed the streets, killing Fretilin
members and imprisoning others. Almost
all other Fretilin leaders had managed
to flee to the hills, however, after
being tipped off about the coming coup.
Almost immediately, the UDT began to
send messages to Darwin, Australia from
the air control tower at Baucau air-
port. Reading them was the Australian
pilot, Roger Ruddock, on behalf of UDT
President Lopez da Cruz. (He is now
vice-president in the Indonesian-puppet
East Timor assembly.)
The messages were directed to "base
commander, Darwin" and appealed for mil-
itary supplies to be flown into East Ti-
mor to help the ,JDT coup "against com-
munism" and "to remove the communists
from Timor for the security of the
Southeast Asia area". It named a number
of areas including Viqueque on the
southern coast, and Maliana, on the bor-
der with Indonesian (West) Timor, as
landing areas. In a number of these mes-
sages was added the words: "Request Base
Commander also contact Guam."
Guam, of course, is a major U.S. mili-
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tary base in the Pacific - the nearest
to East Timor. One can only guess at the
reason for this UDT appeal, and whether
there had been any earlier contact with
Guam .. or the CIA.21
The Australian government refused to
reply to UDT requests, but arranged for
a Foreign Affairs officer, Bill Fisher
to fly into Dili on a chartered plane,
with UDT agreement. On August 17, the
same plane returned to Darwin, with J.
E. Bakken on board.22
The UDT did not get the military aid
they sought. On August 20, after fruit-
less negotiations trying to gel the Por-
tuguese to restore the status _quo,
Fretilin launched a call for insurrec-
tion. The Timorese conscripts seized the
army arsenals and within!a few days con-
trolled Dili. By mid-September, all of
the territory was under Fretilin control
and the UDT leaders fled to Indonesian
Timor where the majority readily agreed
to become Indonesian puppets. The Portu-
guese fled to the offshore island of
Atauro.
UDT refugees in Australia who had been
evacuated by plane and air began to
spread horror stories about non-exis-
tent Fretilin atrocities. Then a TV
team from Sydney, accompanied by none
other than Michael Darby, sailed from
Darwin to Dili,.to find Fretilin in
control and no atrocities. Darby lost
no time in organizing a medical team's
trip into Dili, and quickly proclaimed
his pro-Fretilin sympathies. Roger
Ruddock, who, when not broadcasting to
Darwin for the TJfT, bombed Fretilin
positions from a light plane, had es-
caped to Darwin. A new strategy had be-
gun: win over the "moderate" Fretilin
leaders and isolate the "communists".
U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE AND
THE INDONESIAN INVASION
The August 1975 UDT coup attempt w,as
a crucial turning point for Fast Timor.
It provided an excuse for the Indone-
sian invasion. The rump UDT and the
miniscule APODETI were merged by the
Jakarta generals into an "Anti-Commu-
nist Movement" which called for East
Timor's integration with Indonesia.
The Portuguese used it as an excuse to
leave the territory, as they had wanted
to do since April 1974. The Australian
government refused to recognize
Fretilin's de facto control and even,
during the Fretilin counter-attack,
called for Indonesian intervention.
On the other hand, the UDT coup and
the Fretilin counter-offensive resulted
in Fretilin winning complete control
of the territory, and, at the same
time, control of the substantial arse-
nal of NATO-issue light arms that the
Portuguese had in the country. The
UDT - and their Australian and Indo-
nesian advisers - had seriously under-
estimated the support Fretilin had
among the Timorese people, and, there-
fore, among the Timorese conscripts in
the Portuguese army.
The Australian intelligence communi-
ty was divided on what position to
take on East Timor. One section, based
in JIO and the nefense Department, with
some support in the Foreign Affairs
hierarchy, opposed an Indonesian take-
over and favored a neo-colonial solu-
tion, with East Timor as "independent"
as, for example Bhutan (a small Hima-
layan state whose foreign policy and
and economy is controlled by neighbor-
ing India). This section feared that an
invasion of East Timor would lead to a
long-term radicalization of Indonesia.
The other, majority group was based
in Foreign Affairs and its intelli-
gence service, ASIS. They saw Suharto
as the main bulwark against "communism"
and wanted to support him in all cir-
cumstances.
While Michael Darby and his right-
wing group were linked more to the
first group, ASIS set about finding
its own sources in East Timor. It re-
cruited an Australian hotel and planta-
tion owner, Frank Favaro, as its agent
in Dili after Fretilin won power.., r'')
Favaro was ideally suited: he knew Ti-
mor well, had his own light plane, and
his own radio communication equipment.
Favaro was recruited, however, with-
out the knowledge of the Australian
government which, while supporting an
Indonesian takeover, wanted to keep
clear of any presence in East Timor.
Favaro was boasting in Dili that he
was the "Australian Consul". When La-
bor Party Prime Minister Whitlam
learned of Favaro's recruitment by
ASIS, he summarily dismissed the chief
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of ASIS, T. Robertson. Whitlam, soon
to be sacked by the appointed repre-
sentative of the Queen of England, the
Governor General, was having his own
trouble.with the CIA.23
On October 16, 1975, five Australian,
TV journalists were shot down by Indo-
nesian troops when they captured the
small East Timorese village of Balibo.
Some 450 miles away, the Australian De-
fense Signals Directorate (DSD) base at
Shoal Bay, near Darwin, intercepted In-
donesian field communications from
Balibo to Batugade (an Indonesian-occu-
pied village right on the border bet-
ween'East and, West Timor). The commu-
nications were from the Indonesian
forces which had just killed the Aus-
tralian journalists. Within hours,
,news of their murder was on the desks
of the JIO, government departments, the
Prime Minister, and other ministers.
Yet, to this day, the Australian gov-
ernment maintains that it has no "evi-
dence" that the journalists were killed
by Indonesian troops.24
The DSD, under the secret United
Kingdom-USA Treaty of 1952 (to which
Australia is also a signatory), is
closely coordinated into the network
of over two thousand U.S. National
Security Agency (NSA) listening posts
around the world. NSA officers are pres-
ent in all DSD posts, many of which are
situated around Darwin, to spy on South-
east Asia and further afield. Fifty NSA
officers work out of the DSD's Mel-
bourne Albert Park headquarters alone.25
The nSn undoubtedly sent the informa-
tion from Balibo on to the NSA, and,
therefore, through to other U.S. intel-
ligence agencies.
Given the undisputed ability of the
DSD/NSA to monitor short-range and low-
frequency field radio communications
in East Timor, the question arises as
to what use was made of Fretilin com-
munications intercepted during this pe-
riod, and particularly after the Decem-
ber invasion. Fretilin used Portuguese
field radios of a type freely available
to Western intelligence services. In
the past, for example, the NSA has
boasted of the role it played in locat-
ingChe Guevara's guerillas in the Bo-
livian jungles through their radio
communications, thus enabling the CIA-
trained Bolivian troops to track him
down and kill him.
18
In December 1978, 2,500 Indonesian
troops launched a massive operation to
kill or capture Fretilin President
Nicolau Lobato, who had circulated
freely through the mountains of East
Timor for three'years since the 1975
invasion. When he was killed on Decem-
ber 31, 1978, he had a transmitter
with him.
This operation,, occurred a few months
after Fretilin had charged that U.S.
military advisers were fighting along-
side Indonesian troops in East Timor.
While there are other facts which may
have led to the location of Nicolau
Lobato, it can not be ruled out that
the DSD/NSA played a role. Indonesia's
own attempts to jam Fretilin radio
communications with the outside world
have proved signally inept.26
From September until. December 1975,
Fretilin controlled East Timor, with
the exception of a few border villages
taken by Indonesian troops from Octo-
ber onwards. Fretilin opened the coun-
try to journalists and observers. At
least one group of journalists - a Ja-
panese TV team - acted as Indonesian
spies, showing their film to General
Ali Murtopo in Jakarta before return-
ing to Tokyo.
The independent journalists who en-
tered East Timor witnessed the progress
made by Fretilin in solving food prob-
lems, the success of their literacy
campaigns, and their efforts in repel-
ling.Indonesian border attacks.
Fretilin leaders proclaimed indepen-
dence on November 28, 1975 after the
Portuguese government refused to return
to East Timor in order to resume the
decolonization process, and after In-
donesian troops launched a major attack
on Atabae, only 30 kms. from the capi-
tal Dili.
On December 2, 1975, the Internation-
al Red Cross in Dili received a warning
from Australian Foreign Affairs saying
that Indonesian troops would kill any
Australian remaining in East Timor.
This information was no doubt also
from a DSD/NSA intercept or other in-
telligence sources. The Red Cross
(staffed mainly by Australian doctors)
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and all Australian journalists and
residents, with one exception, were
evacuated by the Australian Air Force a.
few days before the invasion. The one
person who did not leave, Australian
journalist Rodger East, was killed by
the Indonesian troops on the day of the
invasion.
These threats and murders (five jour-
nalists had already been murdered in
October) by the Indonesians.were "evi-
dence.of a final effort by Indonesia to
clear the territory of foreign q~serv-
ers before the invasion began". It
was important, so reasoned Indonesia,
that no independent observers be pres-
ent. This applied especially to the Red
Cross, whose absence "would mean that
the important work of enforcing the
Geneva conventions could not be done".28
The Australian government knew that
the invasion was about to occur but re-
mained silent and thereby actively
collaborated in Indonesia's plans to
"integrate" East Timor. As early as Oc-
tober 29, 1975, the Australian Ambas-
sador to Jakarta, Richard Woolcott,
cabled advice to the Foreign Affairs
Department that "Australian knowledge
of-Indonesia's intervention be con-
cealed" to avoid complications with
Indonesia.29
Since the invasion, one of the major
roles of U.S. intelligence agencies
has been to help in the cover-up of
the genocide carried out by Suharto's
troops. In Congressional hearings in
1977 and 1978, and most recently in
November 1979, U.S. State Department
officials have quoted "our own intelli-
gence" 30 as placing the death toll at
"probably under 10,000". Such figures
are a gross and conscious underestima-
tion of the death toll.
For example, the then-Foreign Min-
ister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, said
on March 31, 1977: "The total (death
toll) may be 50,000 or perhaps 80,000.
But what does this mean if compared
with 600,000 who wanted to join Indo-
nesia ? What is the big fuss ?" 31
When faced with this statement, a
State Department official told the
Australian Broadcasting Commission:
"If Malik said this, he is wrong."32
Obviously, the CIA knows best !
The cover-up continues: U.S. Am-
bassador Edward Masters, told a Con-
gressional hearing in December 1979
that he has not followed up reports
of Indonesian forces using starvation
as a means of fighting Fretilin "be-
cause he did not think such a policy
existed".33 Masters, listed in the
volume 4, no. 1 issue of CounterSpy
as an intelligence operative in
Jakarta during the bloody Suharto
coup in 1965, is no stranger to the
art of cover-up for mass murder.
American Catholic Relief Service,
which has a long history of collabo-
ration with the CIA and U.S. military
operations, is now in East Timor, sup-
posedly to provide famine relief for
the 240,000 East Timorese herded into
Indonesian concentration camps. CRS
has been denounced even by Indonesian
Catholic Church sources as "just
functioning as a link between the In-
donesian Army and the U.S. AID" which
"should not be described as a Church
34
programme".
True, CRS's Frank Carlin said in
Dili in late October 1979, that East
Timor was the worst situation he has
seen "in 14 years of relief work in
Asia" while an International Red Cross
official said it was "as had as Biafra
and potentially as serious as Kam-
puchea".35 Still, this did not prevent
.CRS's regional director Amando
Sonaggere from telling a U.S. Con-
gre$sional hearing just one month later
that this situation "no longer ex-
isted" (:) 37. In other words, a situ-
ation which "might be worse that Kam-
puchea" had been solved in little over
a month!
The role of the U.S. government, the
CIA/NSA, and their Australian collab-
orators in East Timor is another example
of support for genocide which joins a
long list of similar cases that have
been chronicled in CounterSpy and other
journals.
The Carter and Ford administrations
have been accomplices in the massacre
of anywhere between one-in-ten (Indo-
nesian Foreign Minister Mochtar's
latest figure) 38 and one-in-two Ti-
morese.39
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Those figures are hard to equal. It
is time the American people knew the
facts and moved to end this genocide
done in their name.
i) See Denis Freney, The CIA's Aus-
tralian Connection, 1977, puubil. by Denis Freney, P.O. Box A716, Sydney
South, NSW.2000
ii) See Denis Freney, Timor: Freedom
Caught Between the Powers, Spokesman
Books, London, 1975
iii) See Noam Chomsky and Edward S.
Herman, The Political Economy of Human
Rights, Vol.1, The Washington Connec-
tion and Third World Fascism, South End
Press, Boston, 1979
iv) ibid.
1) Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar
admitted 60,000 dead (London Financial
Times, November 16, 1979) while a former
Australian diplomat in Jakarta, Peter
Rodgers estimated 100,000 dead (Sydney
Morning Herald, October 31, l979Tther
independent observers estimate between
100,000 and 300,000 dead. For more com-
plete analysis, see East Timor News,
Nos. 60-63.
2) The Australian, December 15-16, 1979
and reports gathered by the author.
3) There are a number of books avail-
able, e.g. Jill Jolliffe, East Timor:
Nationalism and Colonialism', University
,of Queensland Press, Bris ane, 1978, for
events up to the invasion; Arnold Kohen
and John Taylor, An Act of Genocide: In-
donesia's Invasion oT East Timor, fapoT
England, 1979. East Timor News has co-
vered events for the past three years
(ETNA, 4th floor, 232 Castlereagh St.,
Sydney NSW.2000).
4) Age, October 22, 1975,
5) National Times (Sydney), October
13-18, 1975.
6) U.S. House of Representatives, Com-
mittee on International Relations, Sub-
committee. on International Organizations,
Hearings on "Human Rights in East Timor
and Use of U.S. Equipment by Indonesian
Armed Forces", March 23, 1977.
7) New York Times, December 8, 1975.
8) Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman,
The Political Economy 'of Human Rights
,
Vol.1, The Washington Connection and
T rd 'Worlld Fascism, South nd d'ress,
Boston, 1979, pp. 146, 147.
9) cf supra, # 6
10) U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on International Organi-
zations,-"UT.S. Policy on Human Rights
and Military Assistance: Overview and
Indonesia" February 15, 1978, pp. 36,
37; cited as in r:homsky and Herman,
The Washington Connection, p. 145.
11) International Herald Tribune,
December 5, 1977.
12) Fretilin radio broadcasts in Sep-
tember, 1978 estimated 20,000 Indone-
sian soldiers killed in East Timor..
An Indonesian official source esti-
mated in November, 1979 a total of
17,000 Indonesians killed (a private
source to the author). A '.TPI report
from Jakarta (The Australian, November
8, 1979) quoted Indonesian military
sources as admitting that Indonesian
forces had "suffered high casualties"
in fighting Fretilin.
13) East Timor News, No. 38, July 27,
1978; and previous issues.
14) Details of the massacre in Dili on
.days of the invasion in December, 1975
given by Fretilin radio have since
been confirmed, including officially
by Indonesians. Fretilin radio'claimed
in November, 1976 that Indonesian
forces were using napalm, but in May,
1977 said they had stopped using napalm
after worldwide protests. Reports of
scale of fighting etc., given by
Fretilin have since been confirmed.
15) Jim Dunn was Australian Consul in
East Timor under the Portuguese, an
Australian diplomat in many cities in-
cluding Moscow, and, for a period, an
analyst with the Joint Intelligence
Organization (JIO). He is now in charge
of the South-East section of the Par-
liamentary Research Service, and has
exposed Indonesian atrocities in East
Timor.
16) In a Parliamentary Research Paper,
see East Timor.News, No. 53, May 3,
1979.
17) East Timor News, No. 38
18) ASST -- Timorese Social Democratic
Association, renamed Fretilin in Sep-
tember, 1974. The other two parties
were TJT)T (Timorese Democratic Union)
formed by -a conservative elite, which
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followed a Spinolista position, and
APODETI (Timorese Peoples Democratic
Association), a very small group favor-
ing integration with Indonesia. All
were formed in May, 1974.
19) These "ex-students" such as Mau-
Lear, Sa'he and Mamis Basserwan are
now leading the guerilla struggle in
East Timor.
20) CIA collaborator and Australian
journalist Denis Warner in ABC broad
cast on August 28, 1977.
21) For coverage of these events see
Denis Freney, Timor Freedom Caught
Between the Powers, Spokesman Rooks,
London, 1975. The TJDT message to
Darwin were reprinted in part in the
Sydney Morning Herald, August 18,
1975.(Originals in possession of the
author).
22) Bill Fisher has since turned up in
another potential trouble spot -- the
New Hebrides -- as Australian Consul.
The New Hebrides are soon to become
independent under the Vanuaaku Pati,
which won 70 per cent of the vote in
the recent elections. Right-wing mil-
lionaires Michael Oliver and Harold
Peacock, linked with ex-CIA mercenar-
ies around one Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, are planning a coup there...
(see Age, April 11, 1979 and
Self Too, No. 8, May 1979, for full
exposure). The New Hebrides are a
joint British-French colony in the
South Pacific, east of the Australian
coast.
23) For background on Australian in-
telligence links with the CIA, and the
role of the CIA in the overthrow of
the Australian Labor Party government
in November, 1975, see Denis Freney,
The CIA's Australian Connection.
24) "Death at,BaliboV, a lengthy in-
vestigation by '-famish '1c0onald, Nation-
al Times (Sydney), July 7, 1079.
25) National Times (Sydney), 'lay 23-28,
1977
26) The Campaign for Independent East
Timor maintained clandestine two-way
radio contact from Darwin, Australia,
with Fretilin radio in East Timor from
immediately after the invas*,on until
the surrender of Fretilin Information
'finister Alarico Fernande^ in December,
1978. On a number of occasions the
Indonesians attempted to jam the radio
contact. It was discovered that jamming
only occurred between gam and 5nm. each
day, and not on weekends. Australian
security police twice seized the under-
ground radio in Darwin.
27) see Chomsky and Herman, The Washing-
ton Connection, in. 144.
28 ibid.
20) ibid.
30) For example, evidence of '?obert B.
Oakley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs, cf supra, # 6.
31) Melbourne Age and Canberra Times,
April 1, 1977.
32) ABC Radio program "AM", April 1,
1977.
33) The Australian, December 6, 1979.
34) Australian Council for Overseas
_Aid report on East Timor, reprinted in
full in East Timor News,,No.61-62,
November 22, 1978.
35) Sydney Morning Herald, October 31,
1979.
36) Canberra Times, November 3, 1979.
37) . eT e Australian, December 6, 1979.
38) London Financial Times, November
16, 1979.
39) see cf supra, # 1
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CIA INTERVENTION
IN AFGHANISTAN
by Konrad Ege
On January 4, 1980, President Jimmy
Carter denounced the presence of Soviet
troops in Afghanistan as "naked aggres-
sion", and as a "deliberate effort of a
powerful atheistic government to sub- 1
jugate an independent Islamic people".
This speech launched a large-scale
media campaign. The media is now being
marshalled to portray the current
events in Afghanistan in such a way as
that the "crisis" there can be used as
a pretext for,increasing U.S. military
presence in the Middle East/South Asia
region, and for creating an "interven-
tionist mood" in the U.S. public. Given
this governmental manipulation of the
media, it is necessary to examine re-
ports of events in Afghanistan very
carefully.
THE OVERTHROW OF HAFIZULLAH AMIN
Although questions remain regarding
how Afghan president Amin was over-
thrown and replaced by Babrak Karmal on
December 27, 1979, one fact appears to
be certain: the main thrust of the U.S.
government version of events - that
Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and
put Karmal in as their puppet - is pure
propaganda.
First, the Soviet troop movement into
Afghanistan does not constitute an "in-
_vasion" (defined as one country sending
troops into another country against
that country's will). Soviet troops be-
gan arriving in Kabul as early as De-
cember 8, 1979.2 Needless to say, on
December 8, almost three weeks before
he was deposed, Hafizullah Amin still
spoke for Afghanistan.
Secondly, Soviet troops were asked in
to defend popularly supported reforms
under attack by a foreign supported re-
actionary sector of,society. Although
it is seldom mentioned in the U.S,.
media, no one has ever denied that Amin
requested Soviet troops as early as De-
cember 8. Nor has anyone denied that
the reforms (under attack) were bene-
ficial to the overwhelming majority of
Afghans. In fact, the latter was even
attested to by Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai,
an Afghan government defector.3
On December 15, Amin called for even
more Soviet troops.4 On December 25 and
26, these additional troops arrived in
Kabul, and according to the Washington
Star, were "to help ?Amin stamp out
a stubborn rebellion"5 of armed groups
opposing his government and the popu-
larly-supported reforms.
Amin came to power after the reforms
had been put in motion and ruled Af-
ghanistan for only three months. He had
gradually come to head the Peoples Dem-
ocratic Party (PDP) (then split into
the Khalq.and the Parcham factions)
which ousted an oppressive,-feudalist
regime closely aligned with the former
shah of Iran in April, 1978.
After coming to power, the PD$, under
Noor Mohammed Taraki, initiated wide-
spread revolutionary programs to the
benefit of the people. In September
1979, Hafizullah Amin overthrew Taraki
and installed himself as ruler, ousting
many PDP members and resorting to in-
creased repression against his oppo-
nents. In short, Amin was in the pro-
cess of setting back many of the gains
made by the PDP's revolutionary pro-
grams, and was fueling increasing oppo-
sition even from his own party.
To make matters worse, foreign forces
including the U.S. tried to exploit
this uncertain situation exacerbated by
Amin's repression by escalating their
involvement with reactionary sectors of
the Afghan society whose real objective
was to destroy the sorely-needed revo-
lutionary programs of the PDP.
The Carter administration has ridi-
culed the Soviet version of events in
Afghanistan - that they were called in
to fight this reactionary opposition -
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but even the London Times comments: "..
despite the scepticism of President
Carter and Mrs. Thatcher the Red Army
may have entered Kabul - initially - at
(Amin's) own request".6
The question of whether or not the
Soviet Union "invaded" Afghanistan is
of vital concern. As John Somerville,
Professor Emeritus at the City Univer-
sity of New York points out, the U.S.
government "has no case" for retalitory
measures if the Soviet Union did not
"invade" Afghanistan. "Whether in fact
the USSR violated international law de-
pends entirely on the answer to the
question: Did the Government of Afghan-
istan invite the USSR to come in with
its troops ? The USSR says yes. The
Government of Afghanistan says yes.
When our government says no, and in-
sists that the Soviet troops 'invaded'
Afghanistan, it is obviously flying in
the face of both fact and law."7
On December 27, 1979, Hafizullah Amin
was overthrown by PDP members and by
members of the Afghan military, proba-
bly with the help of Soviet troops, and
executed as an "agent of American impe-
rialism" and a "demagogic tyrannical
dictator".8 His ouster received broad
popular support; the London Times re-
ported under the headline "KabulRe-
joiced at Amin Execution" that on De-
cember 28, people "thronged the streets
'in a holiday spirit '11.9 Babrak Karmal,
who took power after Amin, then re-
quested more Soviet assistance to re-
sist foreign attempts to destabilize
the Afghan government; and in the fol-
lowing months, tens of thousands of
Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.
The continued assertion by the Carter
administration that Afghanistan was "in-
vaded" by Soviet troops has been used
to rationalize disturbing changes in
U.S. foreign and military policies. In
his January 4 speech, President Carter
announced a series of economic "penal-
ties" against the Soviet Union includ-
ing halting the delivery of 17 million
tons of grain to the Soviet Union.
Pushing harder, the Wall Street Jour-
nal was unsatisfied with economic sanc-
tions and wrote that trade sanctions
were "at best irrelevant"; instead, the
American reaction should be "military".
According to the Journal, measures
should include: establishment of U.S.
bases in the Middle East, reinstatement
of draft registration, development of
new weapon systems, "unleashing" of the
CIA, and, "Clearly we ought to keep
open the chance of covert aid to Afghan
rebels". 10
Later, in what has become known as
his "Doctrine",'President Carter de-
clared in his State of the Union ad-
dress on January 23, 1980, that the
Persian Gulf area "now threatened by
Soviet troops in Afghanistan" is synon-,
ymous with U.S. interests, and that the
U.S. will "defend" it against any
threat by all means necessary. This
led even the Washington Post to com-
ment: "Carter's unilateral declaration
of a new defense perimeter - in effect
placing the Persian Gulf on the same
footing as western Europe - was a bold
exercise of presidential authority.
The United States has no security
treaties with any of the Persian Gulf
nations ... Last night, administration
officials refused to say what is meant
by the 'Persian Gulf' but suggested it
included Iran ." 11
Along with the "Carter Doctrine", an-
other "doctrine" must be taken into ac-
count. On January 28, the fiscal 1981
military "posture statement" was re-
leased by Secretary of Defense, Harold
Brown. Brown writes that the greatest
danger to "U.S. security" does not come
from "Soviet expansionism" but from
"disturbances" in developing nations.
Brown explains: "The particular manner
in which our economy has expanded ...
means that we have come to depend to no
small degree on imports, exports and
the earnings from overseas investments
for our material well being."12
Brown's statement lays bare that the
real reason behind the Carter Doctrine
is not any "invasion" of Afghanistan
but rather the continued expansion of
U.S. private investments in this area
of the world as well as their protec-
tion against indigenous popular oppo-
sition movements fighting repressive,
U.S. backed regimes. To this end, Brown
is pushing for a Rapid Deployment Force
(RDF) which will be used for "interven-
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In his State of the Union address,
President Carter stressed the "need
to remove unwarranted restraints on
our ability to collect intelligence
and to tighten our control on sen-
sitive intelligence information".
With this statement, he gave a
new push to ongoing efforts by the
CIA, in conjunction with conserva-
tive members of Congress, to free
the CIA from any legal restraints on
its operations, however weak and un-
enforced those restraints habe been.
(e.g., CIA Director Stansfield Turner
testified recently that the CIA had
consciously ignored laws requiring
reports to Congressional Committees
prior to covert operations.)
Provisions in the proposed legis-
lation include severely limiting
the Freedom of Information' Act (FOIA)
(even though CIA officials acknow-
ledge that they can protect "legiti-
mate secrets" under the present
FOIA); and making publication of the
names of CIA officers illegal, even
if the information leading to the
publication is obtained from public
sources.
Both Senate and House Committees
have already sponsored bills which
would create a "greater operational
flexibility" for the CIA "in light of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan"
in the words of Walter Huddleston,
chairperson of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee.
Using the Afghan "crisis", Carter
and the Congress are moving rapidly
to legitimate and institutionalize
the CIA's covert operations, which
have been going on since 1947.
tions" through "missions in varying
terrain ... around the world". The New
York Times speculates that the "most
likely contingency (for use of the
RDF) would be a revolt in Saudi Arabia
in which case the Saudis (the New York
Times is here referring to the royal
family and not the whole Saudi people)
urged Washington for support". 13
Of significance is the fact that
Carter's State of the Union address was
not received well in the Middle East.
Even most of the repressive, U.S. orient-
24
ed oil producing regimes were not eager
to be "protected" by the U.S. military.
Addressing Carter, Al-Anba' (Kuwait)
wrote: "The last thing we want is pro-
tection and the last thing we request is
your nuclear umbrella." 14
Another Kuwaiti paper, Ar-ra'y Al-'Amm
was even more pointed: "... We must not
forget that all Arab states, except..
Egypt.. have objected to the concentra-
tion of the American fleets in the Arab
area's waters. Despite this, Carter did
not feel embarrassed when he announced
-- like the Nazi fuehrer who regarded the
Danzig corridor as belonging to the reich
-- in disgusting, thoughtless arrogance,
he regarded the Arab land with all the
Arabs in it as 'vital interests' of the
United States.... The Americans, who are
aware of their criminal role in the usur-
pation of Palestine ... want to usurp the
Islamic will and to distort its aspira-
tions by dragging it .. into the American
fold and exploit it to serve American
policies and goals. ... The American game
of instigating the Soviets to intervene
militaxil;' in Afghanistan was completely
exposed when it was ascertained how they
tried to exploit their fabricated crisis
with Iran in an ugly, opportunist and
vulgar manner." 15
In addition to Brown's revelation
about the real aims of U.S. foreign and
military policy, it was the case that
months before Soviet troops entered Af-
ghanistan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Na-
tional Security Council proposed to Carter
that a new "security framework" be es-
tablished in the Middle East. Brzezinski
wanted Carter to announce this new policy
which would be as important as "the es-
tablishment of the NATO alliance" in a
"major speech to the nation".16 Claim-
ing a "Soviet invasion of Afghanistan",
this major speech was finally given in
the State of the Union address.
Even without a "Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan", the Carter Doctrine was
needed to maintain U.S. imperialism in
the Middle East. When the shah of Iran
was forced from his throne, and U.S.
military and intelligence installations
were "put out of order" by the Iranian
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peoples' revolution, "the Nixon Doc-
trine (of relying on regional surro-
gatesto carry out U.S. policies in a
certain region) died" as a Pentagon
official worded it. 1'/ The U.S. gov-
ernment was left without any coherent
imperialist strategy in the Middle East;
and there was no immediate surrogate
who could take over the shah's role.
Therefore, the U.S. government had to
reassert a stronger military presence.
AFGHANISTAN - A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
CARTER DOCTRINE ?
As outlined above, it is incorrect to
call the Soviet troop movement into Af-
ghanistan an "invasion". Still, as a
matter of principle, military.involve-
ment of one country in another must be
examined very carefully. It is neces-
sary to look at Afghanistan in the
light of a conflict between major pow-
ers, i.e. the U.S. and China against
the Soviet Union. However, that analy-
sis is clearly inadequate.
In the following exposition, an at-
tempt is made to explore the Afghan sit-
uation by looking at it in two ways:
first, by examining the history of U.S.
intervention in Afghanistan, particular-
ly with regards to the leftist takeover
in 1978; and secondly, by exploring
the role of other countries which led
to the internationalization of an in-
ternal Afghan conflict.
Until 1973, Afghanistan was under a
very corrupt and repressive monarchy
and was one of the world's poorest
countries. In 1973, King Zaher Shah
was overthrown in a popularly supported
coup led by Mohammed Daoud.
Under Zaher Shah, the U.S. government
had been trying hard to influence the
political course of Afghanistan, and to
make Afghanistan a "more non-aligned"
country. Afghanistan had had tradition-
ally close ties to the Soviet Union;
the two countries have a common border
of over 1,000 miles, and the Soviet
Union had been Afghanistan's main mil-
itary and economic partner for decades.
One attempt to make Afghanistan "more
non-aligned" was through U.S. propa-
ganda. The United States Information
Service'(USIS) published a daily Wire-
less File Bulletin, and Free World, an
illustrated monthly; both publications
were "distributed by USIS regularly to
government officials, educators, and
to special groups".
In addition, film showings were "held
regularly for secondary school and uni-
versity students, government officials,
and the general public. Films supplied
by the USIS (were) frequently pres-
ented at the palace to the King and the
royal family... In 1965 approximately
200,000 persons attended the showing of
USIS films". 18 Undoubtedly, in a
country with no TV, and only a few cin-
emas, such films could have a consider-
able impact.
Another way the U.S. government, spe-
cifically the CIA, attempted to manip-
ulate the Afghan government, was
through the Afghanistan Students Asso-
ciation (ASA), an organization of Af-
ghans studying in the U.S..ASA was
In 1960, Guenther Nollau,, a high
ranking official of the West German
Verfassungsschutz (an intelligence
agency "for the protection of the
constitution") went to Iran, Afghan-
istan, and Turkey to "examine the
Soviet thrust" into these countries.
He summarized his observations in a
book which was translated into Eng-
lish, and published in 1963 under
the title "Russia's Southern Flank"
by the CIA-connected Praeger Publish-
ing House.
Nollau concludes in his book: "The
(pro-Western) tier consisting of ...
Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan is
still intact. While the weakest part
of it was in Persia in 1946 and 1953,
it has shifted to Afghanistan since
1955. It is not clear yet whether the
tier will break at this place ... The
West has means to withstand that.
The support of Persia and Turkey has
contributed to pushing back the Soviet
influence in these countries ... The
Soviet economic offensive in Afghan-
istan can be countered if the West
gives aid under conditions as good as
the Soviet aid."
Nollau's mission and book attests
to the interference by NATO govern-
ments in Afghanistan long before
Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.
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founded in 1954 under the auspices of
the American Friends of the Middle
East (AFME), a CIA conduit and-an orga-
nization which was self-described as
promoting "a better understanding of
the .. aspirations of eople in other
parts of the world". 19
AFME's Board of Directors included
several oil corporation officials and
retired State Department officers, as
well as, after 1960, Kermit Roosevelt,
one of the orchestrators of the 1953
CIA coup in Iran. Several years after
its founding, AFME published a state-
ment claiming that the need for. an or-
ganization like AFME had increased be-
cause-of the "intensifying of the
Soviet prropaganda in the Middle
East". z
In 1960 alone, the CIA provided AFME
with nearly $ 1 million, more than 90
per cent of its income. 21
Abdul Latif Hotaki, an Afghan stu-
dent in the U.S., testified in 1967
that the CIA had tried to recruit him
through Zia Noorzay, a former presi-
dent of ASA. Hotaki refused to coop-
erate, and was subsequently harassed
by the U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service. 22
Zia Noorzay himself had been intro-
duced to the CIA by an official of
AFME. Upon his return to Afghanistan,
Noorzay became president of the State
Treasury under King Zaher Shah. Abdul
Latif Hotaki stated that a good num-
ber of ASA members who had'studied in
the U.S. and later became officials in
the Afghan government had been "either
CIA trained or indoctrinated". 23 Thus,
through the ASA, the CIA cultivated
future government officials who would
remain beholden to the CIA.
Another former ASA-president is Nike
Kamrany. He commented on CIA-ASA re-
lations: "We don't assume that all CIA
people are unfriendly... If the CIA
asks me for advice on any subject, I
will be happy to give it.'! 24 As of
1978, Kamrany still lived in the U.S.
He is a professor of economics and has
held positions at MIT, Stanford Re-
search Institute, and the World Bank.
He is also-the author of several books
including "Peaceful Competition'in Af-
ghanistan" (Communication Service Co.,
Washington, DC, 1969).
When Mohammed Daoud took power in
1973, Afghanistan was in miserable eco-
nomic shape; a situation which the U.S.
government tried to exploit. This time,
however, interference in Afghanistan
was carried out in a massive way, and,
in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine,
through the then-shah of Iran. The
shah offered $ 2 billion in aid to Af-
ghanistan - for a certain price: Af-
ghanistan had to move away from being
a non-aligned country with close ties
to the Soviet Union (which included
military cooperation and training) to
become a pro-U.S. country. Daoud ac-
cepted this conditional aid, and the
shah began to exercise increasing power
in Afghanistan, especially through his
CIA-trained secret police, SAVAK.
In spite of this aid, Daoud did not
solve his country's economic problems
and was faced with mounting opposition.
He tried to crush this resistance
through increased repression, carried
out largely under the guidance of SAVAK.
In-early April, 1978, one of Afghani-
stan's popular leftist leaders leaders,
Mir Akbar Khaiber, was assassinated by
the Daoud regime. (The Afghan police
were, at the time, trained and advised
by West German police officers.) The dissatisfaction finally erupted in mas=r
sive demonstrations in Kabul. A few
days later Daoud had virtually all
Aftist leaders arrested. As they were
about to be executed, anti-Daoud sec-
tors of the Afghan military revolted,
and ousted him. Noor Mohammed Taraki, a
civilian, took power, and Rabrak Karmal
became Vice President.
Taraki's government reversed some of
Daoud's foreign policies, and returned
to close ties with the Soviet Union,
which sent a large amount of aid to Af-
ghanistan, including technical and mil-
itary assistance. Concerning internal
politics, the new Afghan government
took drastic steps, and, in fact, en-
acted a'revolutionary program. It ini-
tiated a badly-needed land reform,
started a literacy campaign, erased
most of the debts the peasants owed to
their feudal masters, legalized trade
unions for the first time in Afghan
history, and enacted laws providing for
the equality of men and women. These
measures virtually eliminated the feu-
dalist system, threatened the power of
the landlords, and began to eliminate
26
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the extreme suppression of women. These
new laws were preceived by the conser-
vative clergy to be a threat to their
power. As a male elite, they had in many
cases been closely aligned with the feu-
dal landlords and privileged tribal
chiefs.
It does not come as a surprise that
these measures met considerable resis-
tance from the.part of society which had
profited the most under the King's and
Daoud's feudalist system. They undertook
armed resistance against the Taraki gov-
ernment. Teachers and party officials
who went out into the countryside were
assassinated, and the mullahs "declared
the government and party to be in-
fidels" 25 because of their ideology.
Referring to the reforms, one Afghan
told the New.York Times that it was
particularly the promotion of equal
rights for women that stirred the op-
position:'"The moment the women were in-
vited to the meeting the fighting
started... The Government said our wo-
men had to attend meetings and our
children had to go to school... this
threatens our religion. We had to fight."
The Afghan "rebel" also claimed that
he and others attacked a political meet-
ing in his village, and commented on the
"punishment" for the people captured at
the meeting: "Those who were just help-
ers (of the party) we spared. The
(party) workers we did not spare. We
killed them." 26
Beginning in late 1978, the reforms
of the Taraki government were threatened
increasingly by the armed conservative
opposition. In addition, the govern-
ment made mistakes which alienated
parts of the population. There was a
growing power struggle within the gov-
ernment, dealing mainly with the ques-
tion of how to promote reforms and how
to counter the armed reaction.
Hafizullah Amin, in particular,' who
had taken on more and more power, in-
cluding the control over the secret po-
lice and the army, was criticized for
"a heavy handed approach to reforms and
counterinsurgency measures". 27 Amin
was the director of massive, and at
times brutal, counterattacks against the
"rebels".
When he took complete power, ousting
Taraki in September 1979, repression in
Afghanistan escalated. Amin imprisoned
th
cl
ca
ag
al
sh
ga
pr
th
Th
th,
in,
spi
ac]
chi
the
in
Amin and Hikmatyar were greatly wel-
comed at Langley, the CIA Headquar-
ters.,, 28 The New Times goes on to say
th t Amin was also in contact with the
CI and the Pakistani government and
th t he planned a coup at the end of
ne ember, 1979, for the ousting of the
Pn members of his government and for
establishing himself along with
Gu buddin Hekmatyar as the only leaders
of Afghanistan. 29
It is not possible for CounterS to
either discount or confirm these alle-
gations. However, in an article on
Fe ruary 13, 1980 in the Indian Express
reporter Kuldip Nayar writes from Pa-
kistan: "He (Amin) approached Islamabad
in early necember. General Zia told me
that Amin sent him frantic messages
for an immediate meeting. 9e said: 'For
obvious reasons, I could not have gone
to meet him. I asked Mr. Agha Shahi
(General Zia ul-Haq's adviser on foreign
affairs) to go but the day he was to fly
to Kabul the airstrip was under snow and
later it was too late because the
Russians had arrived." 30
P kistani radio reports on the day
Sha i was supposed to go to Kabul (De-
ce er'22) confirmed that he "could not
leave Islamabad for a two day visit to
Kab 1 due to inclement weather ,..(and)
it as been officially stated ... that
bec use of Mr. Agha Shahi's prior en-
gag ments (he was scheduled to go to
Saudi Arabia) he will visit Kabul on 30
and 31 December'.', 31
The Indian Express article also sug-
ges s that Amin sensed something was "in
the offing", that is, while he depended
usands of political opponents in-
iding his own party colleagues, and
?ried out a violent, cruel campaign
Linst the "rebels" which, in turn,
,enated more of the population. In
rt, Amin was destroying the popular
.ns made through the revolutionary
gram in 1978.
'he Karmal government goes even fur-
!r in their allegations against Amin.
y accuse him of trying to destroy
PDP and the revolution, and of try-
to set himself up as a ruler re-
nsible to no one. In order to
ieve that, the Kabul New Times
rged, he'began to contact one of
rebel leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
October 1979. "The talks between
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on Soviet assistance to stay in power,
he knew that the Soviet government and
large sectors of'the PDP disagreed with
his regime. Facing this opposition,
Amin had to search for other allies to
maintain his position. Apparently, he
tried to play two cards simultaneously:
11e called for additional Soviet assis-
tance including the deployment of troops
on December 15 to help him stave off the
immediate military opposition, and, at
the same time, attempted to develop
closer ties with Pakistan, and possibly
even some factions of the "rebel" move-
ment in an effort to reduce his depen-
dence on the Soviet Union which, in his
view, had become an "unreliable ally".
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE-CONFLICT
Until the end of 1978, the conflict in
Afghanistan had been an internal
struggle,between-the former rulers of
Afghanistan and their followers, and the
government and people who supported its
revolutionary program. At that time,
however, this internal conflict was in-
ternationalized - a change which not
only escalated the.fighting but also
made it possible for a person like Amin
to come to power. Had the internal op-
position not been massively supported
by other countries, and the reforms in
Afghanistan been allowed to proceed
peacefully, the PDP's and the Afghan
Army's energy could have been directed
towards internal development.
On February 2, 1979, the Washington
Post reported that "Afghan dissidents
are undergoing guerilla training at a
base 12 miles north of Peshawar", a
city in Pakistan close to the Khyber
Pass which links Afghanistan with Pa-
kistan. This camp, '.'a former military
base ... still contains some Pakistani
army vehicles and is under the guard of
Pakistani soldiers". According to Paki-
stani officials, the people in this
camp are "refugee families". Journal-
ists who visited the camp, however, saw
no women there and "the 270 men bil-
leted at the ... camp were almost all
young". 32
A similar observation was made by the
Swiss Neue Zuericher Zeitung: "It is
very striking ... that practically all
of the people who flee to Pakistan are
male adults." The same article reported
that the'"refugees from Afghanistan use
all they have to buy arms" and that the
military government of General Zia ul-
Haq had given them 20 million rupees.33
By now it is an established fact, ad-
mitted even in the conservative Western
media, that Zia ul-Haq is permitting
rebel training in Pakistan, and that
there are Chinese advisors training
the rebels.34
One might ask why Zia ul-Haq is pro-
viding massive aid to the rebels. He is
faced with. strong internal opposition
to his brutal regime, and with the per-
sistent struggle of the Baluchis and
Pushtuns (two nationalities in the
south and north of Pakistan, respective-
ly) for self-determination and indepen-
dence. Clearly, Zia ul-Haq does not need
additional problems.
One probable reason for his support
to the rebels is his fear of being over-
thrown as Daoud was in 1978. Another
reason might be, that the government of
China, on which Zia depends for eco-
nomic and military reasons, has asked
him to provide bases for the rebels in
Pakistan. One might also speculate that
China supports Pakistan in its efforts
to build nuclear weapons; one more rea-
son for General Zia not to alienate the
Chinese.
(In August 1979, the Carter adminis-
tration stopped all military aid to
Pakistan because of that country's nu-
clear program. At the time, covert op-
erations by the CIA to "disable the Pa-
kistani uranium enrichment facility"
were debated in the U,S', government,
but were later supposedly ruled out.35)
Until the U.S. media confirmed in
January 1980 that the U.S. government
was in fact aiding the rebels, this was
a hotly debated question. Carter ad-
ministration spokespersons denied
charges of U.S. aid to the rebels often
repeated in the Afghan and Eastern Eu-
ropean press as "slanderous and base-
less". 36 Said State Department spokes-
person, Tom Reston in June 1979: "I
deny that any U.S. personnel or arms
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were being used in the training and
equipment of Afghan rebels in Pakistan
or any place else." 37
Either Reston had not been told, or
he lied. Already on January 13, 1979,
an Indian daily, The Patriot, revealed
that "a special CIA cell has been set
up in the American Embassy in Islam-
abad and the American Consulate-General
in Karachi under the overall command of
R. Lessard ... The Lessard Task Force
has reportedly been given the task of
organizing extremely secret and sensi-
tivve operations both in Iran and Af-
ghanistan. The recent spurt in counter-
revolutionary activities on the Pak-
Afghan border is apparently the handi-
work of this team".
Research done by CounterSpy has con-
firmed that Robert P. Lessard, listed
as "Second Secretary" of the U.S. Em-
bassy in Islamabad, is in fact a CIA
officer. He has been assigned previ-
ously to Afghanistan, and, for the ex-
ceptionally long time of ten years, to
Iran under the shah. Other CIA officers
in Islamabad include John J. Reagan (He
has served in Indonesia, Hong Kong, and
Malaya) and David E. Thurman (who
worked in Karachi, Pakistan for three
years before being transferred to Is-
lamabad). A CIA officer in Karachi is
Richard B. Jackman, who served pre-
viously in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Abu Dhabi.
Subsequent to official denials, it
was confirmed that the U.S. had been
aiding the rebels by someone who should
know: Paul Nitze, President Carter's
adviser on Afghanistan. Nitze is a mem-
ber of. the right-wing Committee on the
Present Danger, and, according to
Har_per's magazine "has been involved
in almost every major effort to jump up
the defense budget since 1949".39
In October, 1979, Paul Nitze stated
that the "unrest" in Afghanistan is
"due to Red Chinese, Pakistani and U.S.
aid to the rebels". He further said
that Zbigniew Brzezinski wanted to
give aid more openly to the rebels in
early 1979. According to Nitze, it
took some doing to convince Brzezinski
that such openess was inappropriate.40
The question of aid to the Afghan in-
surgents is one more indication of the
extent of the U.S. propaganda effort
regarding Afghanistan. The Carter ad-
ministration, as the facts and Nitze's
statement prove, is deliberately mis-
informing the people in the U.S., and
lying about one of the most important
factors in the present conflict in Af-
ghanistan.
On January 9, 1980, Birch Bayh,
Chairperson of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, confirmed
Nitze's statement indirectly on NBC-
TV's "Today" show by answering the
question whether the U.S. government
has in any way been trying to help the
rebels: "... when a significant number
of people in Afghanistan were deter-
mined to try to exert themselves and
to try to have some say in what kind
of government Afghanistan should have,
and not have it imposed upon them by
Soviets, we did take certain steps to
help them do what any group of citi-
zens should be able to do in a coun-
try". 41 Bayh refused to elaborate fur-
ther.
On February 15, 1980, the Washington
Post confirmed that the Carter ad-
ministration had decided to support
the rebels by sending them arms pre-
sumably through the CIA. The Post re-
ported that "U.S. covert aid prior to
the December invasion ... was limited
to funneling small amounts of medical
supplies and communications equipment
to scattered rebel tribes, plus what
is described as 'technical advice' to
the rebels about where they could ac-
quire arms on their own".42
U.S. governmental officials are also
continuously in contact with some of
the "rebel leaders". One of these is
Ziya Nezri, a supporter of the monar-
chy, who had discussions with State De-
partment officials in early March 1979.
Another "rebel leader" is Zia Khan
Nassry, who, like Nezri, is a natural-
ized U.S. citizen. He comes from a rich
Afghan family; his father was governor
of the northeastern Paktia province,
and his father-in-law, Abdul Rezag Khan,
was head of the Afghan Air Force under
the King for 20 years until 1973. Nassry
himself claims that early this year he
helped organize a "group called Gazi, a
coalition of displaced Afghans dedicated
to harassment of the Soviets". An article
in the February 4, 1980 Daily Telegraph
(London) stated that "Gazi had eeT re-
sponsible for damaging Soviet buildings
in Paris and Brussels". 43
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Nassry, who represents the Afghanistan
Islamic Nationalist Revolutionary Coun-
cil has received support from the Rocke-
feller funded Asia Society. (One of the
Asia Society's recent new members is
former CIA director William Colby.)
David Chaffetz of the Asia Society
writes that he helped map out Nassry's
travel plans and prepared a briefing
paper entitled "Afghanistan: Russia's
Vietnam ?" for Nassry's use in his pro-
paganda work. 44
An interview with Nassry was also
printed in the April 1980 issue of-Sol-
dier of Fortune, a U.S. magazine for
mercenaries. In this. interview, Nassry
tells Soldier, of Fortune that his
"rebel movement" is willing to recruit
mercenaries through a Washington, DC
contact. 45
Another U.S. based representative of
the "rebels" is Bashir Zikria, of the
Afghan National Front, who is a pro-
fessor at Columbia University. After
returning from a two months visit to
the rebel camps, Zikria was a guest of
WNET/WETA's MacNeil/Lehrer Report in
August 1979. Zikria assured the viewers
that the "rebels" believe "that it is
inevitable that (they) win" and that
over 16,000 "rebels" are "moving to-
wards Kabul". 46 .
The "rebel representatives" in the
U.S. conduct a fairly, effective pro-
paganda campaign. Most of the arms, how-
ever, are apparently being given to the
rebels in Pakistan rather than being
channeled through these representatives
in the U.S. As the Boston Globe re-
ports, "for days, Arthur Hummel, the
American Ambassador in Pakistan has been
urging that government to turn its
back while the United Sta s smuggles
arms to the insurgents".
One way foreign aid is'reaching the
Afghan rebels is through the "refugee
channel". While there can be no doubt
that there are refugees fleeing the
armed conflicts in Afghanistan, their
plight has been exploited and their
number has been exaggerated. For exam-
ple, the Washington Post reported on
January 24, 1980 that there were
600,000 refugees in Pakistan. At the
same time, "rebel leader" Nassry put
the figure at 300,000.
A good number of refugees - 50 per
cent might be a good guess - are in
fact nomads, who normally go to Paki-
stan each winter. The U.S. media has
chosen to distort this fact. In an edi-
torial on January 28, 1980 the Wash-
inton Post bemoaned: "A little girl,
a look,of confusion and doubt on her
face, carrying a barefoot infant on her
back .. the pictures come from camps
in Pakistan where masses of refugees
from Afghanistan are gathering." 48 The
Pest was referring to a UPI picture it
had carried on the front page on Janu-
ary 26.
An Afghan interviewed by Counterspy
in March, 1980, found this ridiculous.
According to him, one can recognize
from the little girl's.features that
she belongs to a nomadic tribe which
would be in Pakistan each winter.
Some of the "refugee camps", as stat-
ed in the Neue Zuericher Zeitun (see
above) are in fact military training
centers. Others are made up almost ex-
clusively of women and children who
have been brought out of Afghanistan
in order to free their men to join the
fighting. "Refugees" interviewed by
William Branigan of the Washington Post
"said they were bringing their women
and children out and seeking arms and
ammunition".49
It is also hardly ever reported that
some "refugees" were forced to leave Af-
ghanistan by their landlords, who,
using the deeply rooted feudalist men-
tality, were able to convince peasants
that it was their duty to follow their
landlords who went to Pakistan after
having their fiefdoms expropriated as
part of the land reform.
It is of note, also, that a delega-
tion comprised of representatives of
the International Rescue Committee (IRC)
and CARE visited some of the "refugee
camps" in February 1980. Both IRC and
CARE have collaborated with the CIA
during the U.S. war in Vietnam. When
the elders of the Afghan refugees told
the IRC-CARE delegation that they were
determined "to free their homeland from
foreign occupation", the delegation
assured them that "the people of the
United States ... understood their
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plight and they were providing assis-
tance for their succor". 50
Another expression of planned sup-
port for the "refugees" occurred on
February 13, 1980, when Mary Ann Dubs.,
the widow of Ambassador Adolph Dubs
who was killed in Kabul in February
1979, and Robert Neumann, announced
the establishment of the Afghanistan
Relief Committee (ARC). Neumann served
as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
under King Zaher Shah from 1966-73,
and is now a senior associate of the
Georgetown University Center for Stra-
tegic and International Studies, which
is closely linked to the CIA.
The ARC (with Sen. Clairborne Pell,
of the right-wing Freedom House, as
honorary chairperson) plans to raise
$10 million to aid the refugees. ARC's
Chairperson is John Train, a prominent
investment counsellor and columnist
for Forbes magazine. The ARC's Wash-
ington representative is William
McClulloch. In the 1960's he worked
as an economic advisor to King Zaher
Shah's regime.
Interviewed by a West German jour-
nalist in March, 1980 McClulloch said
that the aid for the refugees is being
collected "only because it's really
needed"; but when he was asked what he
thought about charges that this aid
will actually end up helping the
"rebels", he replied: "I certainly
would hope so."
According to "-1cClulloch, the aid
collected by the ARC will be distri-
buted through organizations like IRC
and Catholic Relief Service (another
relief organization that has worked
closely with tke CIA). In addition, ARC
representatives will shuttle back and
forth from Pakistan to the 1J.S, and
supervise the aid process.
Emphasizing that he was expressing his
personal views rather than those of ARC,
McClulloch also harshly criticized Pres-
ident Carter's handling of the Afghan-
istan situation. He asserted that the
only way to solve the crisis was to
strengthen the rebels in any way pos-
sible, and simultaneously influence the
Soviet Central Asian republics - with
their large Muslim populations - by
attempting to destabilize them; through
increased radio broadcasts asking them
to rise up, and by "parachuting people
in and letting them set off plastic
bombs". McClulloch suggested that this
was the only way to get the Soviet
government to negotiate about a with-
drawal.
Yet another organization aiding the
refugees is Afghanistan Relief, spon-
sored by the Orange County based Cal-
ifornia International Christian Aid,'
headed by Robert Poudrier. He claims
that he was on a "relief mission" in
Afghanistan on January 18-23. Most of
his aid is apparently being funnelled
through Zia Nassry.51
While there is legitimate human con-
cern for these Afghans being forced to
leave their country, it is obvious that
most of the aid to the refugees, either
directly or indirectly, is in fact sup-
porting the reactionary rebel movement.
This fact is highlighted when the aid
is provided by people and organizations
who support the "rebel movement" and/or
have a history of working with the CIA.
CARE, IRC and CRS officials are not
the only ones in the Pakistan/Afghani-
stan border area ostensibly aiding the
refugees. There is also Louis Dupree,
who lived in Kabul for many years until
he was accused of being a CIA agent, ar-
rested, and forced to leave the country
in 1979. Dupree, an anthropologist and
expert on Afghanistan, wrote a lengthy
article on Afghanistan in the July/
August 1979 issue of Problems of Com-
munism, published by t e -U.S. Inter-
national Communication Agency (ICA).
Dupree now lives in Peshawar where he
works closely with the "rebels" and
with the U.S.. government.
Continued aid to the rebels via the
refugees has, in fact, been suggested
by Zbigniew Brzezinski when he visited
a refugee camp in Pakistan in early
February, 1980. Brzezinski expressed
the confidence that the refugees "would
be able to go back to their homes one
day" and pledged that they "were not
alone". 52
Brzezinski had gone to Pakistan on
February 1, to negotiate a $ 400 mil-
lion aid package to Pakistan, which
included $ 200 million over two years
in military loans, badly needed eco-
nomic aid (Pakistan's foreign debt is
over $ 7 billion) and a reaffirmation
of "U.S. security commitments" to pro-
tect Pakistan from "Soviet aggression".
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However, in what was described as a
"new blow to U.S. diplomacy" 53 the
Pakistani military ruler eventually re-
jected the aid package because he did
not want to be accused of being a "sur-
rogate of the United States" 544 vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union and India. (The
Indian government has pointed out that
U.S. arms to Pakistan have been used
against India but never against the
Soviet Union in the past.,)
Zia ul-Haq is obviously afraid of
the reprecussions that U.S. aid - mass.
sive and visible, but, in his opinion,:
not sufficient - could have. As men-
tioned, there are two independence
movements in Pakistan as well as
strong opposition against Zia's bru-
tal regime. A few days before
Brzezinski arrived in Pakistan, pro-
Soviet demonstrations took place in
Baluchistan. 55
Refusing the proposed aid package
(which does not, however, mean refus-
The Pakistani police officers, time given); Iqbal, K.D. Zafer (10/69
listed below, have attended CIA con- -12/69); Islam A.H. Nurul (8/68-11/68);
nected police training programs in the Jabbar, Mir Abdul (nc time given);
United States, which were conducted Kamal, Abdul (5/67-9/67); Khaleque
under the office of Public Safety Khan, Abdul 6/70-10/70); Khalil, Ahmad
(OPS).
A major focus of these OPS programs
was the creation of a nationally co-
ordinated police force under a uni-
fied command which would be able to
deal more effectively with "problems"
than scattered local police forces.
Officers were trained in various
ski.11s, including communications, in-
terrogation, intelligence gathering,
riot control, handling of, explosives,
infiltration, etc. Another key ele-
ment.in these programs was training in,
psychological warfare.
In addition, for the CIA, the OPS
served as.an excellent field for re-
cruitment and for extending the "CIA
infrastructure" in any given country.
Athar, Muhammad (in the U.S. from 8/68'
-10/68); Azeri, G._Selvamony (S/68-
12/68); Aziz-ul Huq (8/68-12/68);
Bakhsk, Khuda (10/68-1/69); Chowdhoury,
Musa Miyan (6/70-10/70); Din, Alaf
(11/69-5/70); Diwan, Muhammad Sabed
(10/68-2/69); Haider, M.S. (3/68-6/68);
Hakiat,S.A. (4/70-7/70); Haque, A.K.M.
Enamul (10/69-5/70)
Haque, A.K.M. Mahbubul (12/68-5/69);
Haque, Mojibul (5/70-12/70); Haque,
Mozammel (2/69-9/69); Haque, Muhammad
Majmul (7/67-11/67); Haque, Nizamul
(2/67-7/67); Haque, Zafar-ul (6/60-
10/70); Hashem, Syed Md Abdul (4/67-
9/67); Hassan, Muhammed Mujtaba (8/68
-12/68); Huq, M. Enamul (7/68-11/681;
Husnain, Raza (6/69-10/69); Hussain,
Ata (4/69-7/69); Hussain, S.L. (no'
(10/68-2/69); Khan, Dil Jan (no time
given);
Khan, Habibur Rehman (5/67-9/67);
Khan, Muhammad Asghar (3/73-5/73); Khan,
Muhammad Aziz (6/73-10/73); Khan,
Sajjad Ali (6/70-10/70); Khan,
Shafiullah (1/69-2/69 - he received
training in the FBI National Academy);
Khasru, Syed Amir (8/68-11/68);
Leghari, Noor Ilahi Khan (no time . U1
given)+? Mahmood, Fazal (10/68-2/69);'
Mahmood, Saiyid Ahmad (7/68-11/68);
Malik, Sher All (5/70-12/70);
Mohmand, Gohar Z. (2/71-6/71);
Murshed, Ghulam (8/68-12/68);
Muslehuddin, A.K.M. (10/68-2/69);
!,Iustafa, Hassan (6/69-10/69); Nagra,
S.A. (6/69-10/69); Najmuddin, Dilshad
(2/71-6/71); QUereshi,. Zafar Hussain
(3/67-9/67); Rahim, Abdur (2/71-6/71)
Rahman Khan, Obaid-ur (8/70-6/71);
Rahman, M.H. (11/68-3/69); Rashid,
Nasim Ahmad (5/68-12/68); Rauf,
Mohamed Mohiuddin Ali (8/68-12/68);
Razaq,
Abdul
(5/70-12/70); Rehman,
A.M.M.
Aminur
(4/69-7/69); Rizvi,
Iqbal
Hussain
( 10/68-12/68); Rizvi,
Iqbal
Hussain
(no time given); Safdar,.
Abul Bashar Sharfunddin (2/71-6/71);
Sayood, S.A. (3/68-7/68); Shah,.
Jamil Haider (1/69-3/69); Shahjahan,
A.S.M. (6/69-10/69); Sheikh,
Muhammad Akram (3/68-6/68); Sheikh
Saghir Husein (7/68-11/68);'Siddigi,
Fazal Ellahi (7/67-11/67); Syed, Anwar
Gilani (10/68-2/69); Zaidi, Syed
Tahir Raza (1/69-3/69);
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ing U.S. aid in general), Zia ul-Haq
wants arrangements "on the basis of
lower visibility" of U.S. aid.56 At
the same time, Zia is seeking aid from
Muslim countries, China, Western Eu-
rope, and Japan, which has already
promised $ 130 million.
Conservative Muslim countries are
not only increasing their support for
the Pakistani dictatorship, they are
also stepping up their aid to the Af-
ghan rebels. An Islamic Conference of
Foreign Ministers - boycotted by
several countries - condemned Soviet
"military aggression" toward Afghan-
istan.
Even though there was no resolution
at the conference regarding direct
aid to the rebels, there are strong
indications that several countries -
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates, and Oman - are providing
them with support. The West German
news agency DPA reported that "five
Arab states ... committed themselves
to support the Afghanistan rebels
with money and arms. ... Among other
things, the two fishing ports of
Gwadar and Pasny along Pakistan's Ba-
luchistan coast (will) be extended
(as well as) existing airports in Ba-
luchistan. ... Harbors and airports
are to be used as collecting points
for aid consignments not only for Af-
ghan refugees but also for Afghan
freedom fighters". 57
EGYPT'S ROLE
Egypt has been the most open in its
direct support for the "freedom fight-
ers", although it was not allowed to
participate in the Islamic Conference
because of its collaboration with the
Begin regime in the Camp David ac-
cords. (The conference even called
upon all Muslim countries to "consider
joining in boycotting the Egyptian re-
gime".58)
On January 24, 1980, Egyptian De-
fense Minister General Kamal Hasan Ali
announced that "army camps have been
opened for the training of Afghan reb-
els" and that rebels are being sup-
plied with weapons from Egypt. 59
Egypt has large stockpiles of Soviet
weapons, such as heat-seeking SA7
shoulder-fired air defense missiles
and RPG antitank rocket launchers. "It
is understood", writes the Boston
Globe, that Anwar Sadat "couldbe per-
suaded to turn these weapons over to
the United States in exchange for mod-
ern American replacements".60
These weapons would come in handy
- they could be supplied to the rebels
who could, in turn, claim they got
them from defecting Afghan soldiers
or captured them. The Sadat regime,
friend of the ex-shah of Iran, is clear-
ly doing some of the dirty work for the
U.S. by providing training for the Af
ghan rebels. The Carter Doctrine has
found a good, new puppet in Sadat,
The rebels, and the U.S. government,
have discovered another close friend:
the Chinese government. China's aid to
the rebels is a well-known fact. On his
visit to Pakistan in January 1980,
Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua pro-
mised tribal leaders that his country
would help "curb Soviet expansionism".61
There have also been reports that
"Chinese irregulars" and "Pakistani
soldiers ... wearing typical Afghan
clothes have been fighting along with
the rebels".62
The collaboration of China and the
U.S. in Afghanistan is no accident; a
Pentagon study. entitled "Asian Security
in the 1980's", published by the Rand
Corporation as a "product of a con-
ference of Asian and U.S. government
analysts" held in January 1979, recom-
mends that in light of the "continued
growth in the Soviet threat" the "loose
coalition " of NATO and China should
be developed into a "security relation-
ship". 63
Afghanistan might be a good test
case for such a "'security relation-
ship". Even before Secretary of Defense,
Harold Brown went to China in January
of this year, it was learned that he
"is under instructions to discuss with
Chinese leaders ... what arms they can
provide to the rebels". It was sug-
gested China "could provide light mor-
tars, antitank land mines and machine-
33
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guns with incendiary bullets". 64
Brown's visit to China was very suc-
cessful. Even though a formal "securi-
ty relationship" between China and the
U.S. might be many years away, impor-
tant first steps were made. They in-
clude a coordination of aid to the
Afghan rebels and the Pakistani dicta-
torship, and the increased sale of
U.S. military equipment (excluding
arms) to China. Influential members of
Congress, like Senate Majority leader
Robert Byrd have urged the sale of
arms to China.
In a meeting in mid-March, the U.S.
and Chinese governments agreed to "pur-
sue separate but 'mutually reinforcing'
efforts to counter the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan..... According to
Chinese sources", the Washington Post
reports, "a discussion in broad terms
of aid to the rebels produced an under-
standing that both Washington and
Peking will dooSwhat they can to provide
assistance."
Invited by Harold Brown, China's De-
fense Minister Xu Xianggian will visit
the U.S. in late spring, and Reginald
Bartholomew, the State Department's
director of politico-military affairs,
will go to China in April or May.
(On his China trip, Harold Brown was
accompanied by Undersecretary of De-
fense, Robert Komer. Komer has been
playing an increasingly important role
in the Pentagon. During the 14 years
he spent working for the CIA he was
appointed to head the pacification
program in Vietnam in 1967, and founded
the CIA's Operation Phoenix. He worked
through 5,000 U.S. advisers,, 75 per
cent of them military and 25 per cent
civilian, including CIA personnel.66
Through Phoenix, Komer was responsible
for countless assassinations and cases
of torture. After some years with the
Rand Corporation, he was called back
to the Pentagon by President Carter in
1977.)
THE "INVASION" AND THE U.S. MEDIA
.The recent events in Afghanistan are
being manipulated for several purposes
by the Carter administration. In order
to maintain the interventionist mood
34
in the U.S. created after the seizure
of U.S. hostages by Iranian militants,
the U.S. government must continue a
sustained media campaign about the
Soviet "invasion" of Afghanistan. And
in the government's terms, this campaign
has been going well.
In a manner identical to briefings
in Saigon during the Vietnam war, it
started with reports about the "inva-
sion". In the final days of December
1979, U.S. reporters began receiving
most of their information from the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul, according to the
Ottawa Sunday Post. An embassy officer
provided special briefings restricted
to American journalists. One reporter
recalls that "it didn't take long to
realize that this guy did not really
know what in hell was happening out in
the countryside".67
In one of these briefings it was an-
nounced that "a vital highway had been
mined by rebels and at least 60 vehi-
cles had been destroyed". Two journal-
ists arrived late to the briefing,
having travelled on the highway in
question, and they hadn't seen a
single destroyed vehicle. 68
Another U.S. Embassy report an-
nounced that an entire Soviet divisiofi
had been rushed to the Afghan-Iranian'
border. "Details of the size, strength
and equipment were given and the story
had instantaneous repercussions'in
Washington, Moscow, and Teheran. The
truth is that the division had never
moved from Kabul." 69
One issue that is brought up re-
peatedly in the propaganda campaign by
the U.S. media is the use of napalm
and chemical weapons by the Soviet and
Afghan troops. Proof has never been
offered of the use of either napalm or
chemical. weapons, and even Hodding
Carter had to admit that the State De-
partment is "not able to establish con-
clusively that poison gas has been.
used in Afghanistan".70
On this point, an interesting arti-
cle appeared on February 9, 1980 in
the Toronto Globe and Mail. Victor
Malarek, their correspondent in Pe-
shawar, reported that he witnessed an
Australian TV crew actually stage a'
scene in the headquarters of the
Islamic Party in Peshawar (one of the
"rebel" groups),.in order to portray
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Over a year after the event, the fleet a concerted effort by the (CIA)
State Department has finally released to expose Soviet-backed brutality".7
It contained allegations about in-
an official report about the kidnap- stances of "aggravated rape .. some re-
ing and killing of the late U.S. Am- sulting in the victim's death" and
bassador to rabul Dubs who was killed other "reports" about Afghan and Soviet
on February 14, 1979 (discussed in atrocities. As in the questionable
the last issue of Counter~). The
New York Times observes that the media reports, Turner's allegations
State epa , were admittedly insufficiently docu-
therefore rtment---- 's account "omits and
therefore covers up several important mented.
aspects"; and contains information
that was not recorded in a detailed THE "REBELS" - WHO THEY REALLY ARE
log of the events which was kept by
the Department's Office for Combat- -'
ting Terrorism. Generally, the U.S. government and
For example, two days after the kid- the U.S. media have tried to portray
napping, new messages were entered in all Afghans ashating the Soviets, and
the log "specifying that Mr. Amstutz the rebels as "fierce Muslim fighters".
(then deputy Ambassador) had been If one takes a good look at who the
asked to seek contact with the Soviet rebel leaders really are, one gets
Embassy in Kabul to intercede with quite a different picture.
the Afghan police". According to the One of the most important "rebel"
New York Times, an official who moni- leaders - head of the National Libera-
tored all t71e message traffic at the -tion Front of the Islamic Revolution
time, commented: "I never saw that of Afghanistan - is Sayed Ahmed
message go out." (New York Times, Gailani. Gailani, who has close ties
2/21/80, p.A-9) to King Zaher Shah, was the owner of a
As the State Department report large Peugeot dealership in Kabul.
points out, there are still questions Since December 1978 he has lived in a
p,of yet unanswered by the Afghan spacious villa in Peshawar. Gailani is
authorities. However, it should be an "urbane aristocrat whose ancestral
noted that the report carefully avoids lands in Jalalabad have ... been con-
references to conscious omissions fiscated", and receives much of his
made by U.S. officials which might aid from wealthy Saudi citizens.73
have prevented the tragic outcome of The majority of Gailani's followers
events of February 14, 1979. belong to the different Pathan tribes
living in the northwestern part of Af-
the "freedom fighters" in an appealing ghanistan. They are the largest nation-
way. Malarek writes: "And what is ob- ality in Afghanistan.
vious ... is that many of (the jour- The Pathans are traditionally pro-
nalists) are inventing stories and ducers of opium. About 300 tons of opi-
shooting 'action' films and photo- um were produced in Afghanistan in 1979
graphs that rightly should be cap- (compared to 15 tons in Mexico), most
tioned 'simulated"'. Malarek also of it in Pathan areas. Pathan leaders
quotes a journalist from the Nether- have become wealthy by selling and
lands: "Who cares if there's a hit of smuggling opium - a practice that was
show ? Anyway, these Afghans ..,could- severely restricted under the govern-
use a little help."; and a UPI re- ments of Taraki and Amin leading to
porter: "There's a lot of bull going considerable armed reaction. Interest-
on. It's too bad. But what can you ingly enough, large quantities of Af-
do ?".71 ghan opium are now appearing on the
The CIA itself has interjected itself East Coast of the U.S.
into the Afghan media campaign. In ear- Another "rebel" leader is Gulbuddin
ly March, CIA director Stansfield Hekmatyar, head of the Islamic Party of
Turner wrote a letter to Sen. Lloyd Afghanistan, the most extreme fundamen-
Bentsen and gave him permission to pub- talist group. Hekmatyar, who says that
lish it. The letter appeared "to re- his party is based in the intelligentsia,
35
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rejects even King Zaher Shah as being
too "left-wing". So far, Hekmatyar has
resisted all calls for "rebel" unity,
including those from the deposed King,
who has been living in Italy since 1973,
and recently urged the "rebel" leaders
to "unite immediately" in order to
"achieve unity in goal and action".74
Hekmatyar claims that "among the re-
fugees there are more than 250,000 peo-
ple linked to (the Islamic Party)".75
The Washington Post writes that out of
six major "rebel" groups Hekmatyar's
group is "the largest and best orgs'-
nized" 76. However, "rebel" leader
Gailani claims that 70 per cent of the
fighters are under his command. 77
According to Le Monde Diplomatigue
limited resistance to the Afghan gov-
ernment also comes from some tribes in
the south, and from two Maoist parties
in the northwest, which are about ten
years old and receive support from a
small part of the population. 78
Given the variety of "rebel" organi-
zations (including bandit groups who
pose as "rebels"), their lack of a dis-
ciplined strategy and disorganization,
it proves difficult for the CIA and
other aid donors to decide whom to help.
Arms are a major source of income for
some "rebels", and a good number of the
arms supplied to fight the Soviets are
likely to show up one day in the hands
of people in Pakistan fighting Zia ul-
Haq.
Many "rebels" also use the "holy war"
to enrich themselves. Zia, Nassry de-
scribed the problem himself: "On one oc-
casion tribesmen captured a number of
(light tanks), drove them home and re-
fused to give them to us. ... I had to
get the religious leaders to talk to the
tribesmen and tell them it was their re-
ligious responsibility to give us the
tanks to fight a holy war."'79
Nick Downey of the British Broad-
casting Company (BBC), who spent four
months with rebel groups in Afghani-
stan, said that "they were bitterly
divided..., give little thought to
events outside their province, and
(are) fighting to retain their feudal
system and stop the Kabul government's
left-wing reforms which (are) con-
sidered anti-Islamic". 80
The U.S. State Department - as duly
recorded in the media - claims that
The following officials, presently
assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul,
are CIA officers.
ALEXANDER, Joseph N.
(Attache)
born: 7/26/1930
He has served previously in Sudan,
England, Bolivia, Taiwan, and Indo-
nesia.
LONG, Arnold C.
(Second Secretary)
born: 12/30/1943
Long has worked in Calcutta and New
Dehli, India, before he came to Af-
ghanistan.
MARIK, Warren J.
(Vice-Consul)
born: 6/30/1945
Marik has served previously in Turkey.
TURCO, FrederickA.
(First Secretary)
born: 7/10/1938
Turco has been assigned to Bangla-
desh; Rawalpindi,' Pakistan; and Cal-
cutta, India.
the "rebels" are inflicting heavy* casu-
alties on the Soviet and Afghan armies.
However, after over three months'of
fighting, little gain by the "rebels"
can be seen. In fact, it appears that
the Afghan government with the help of
Soviet troops, has been able to main-
tain control of most of the country.81
Contrary to many U.S. press reports,
it seems that the role of the Soviet
army in Afghanistan is largely limited
to supporting the Afghan army, which
carries out most of the duties.
Unrest - the strike of shopkeepers
and, for one day, of governmental work-
ers - was reported in Kabul shortly
after February 20, the deadline Presi-
dent Carter had set for complete with-
drawal of Soviet troops. This strike
was accompanied by armed demonstrations,
lootings and burnings of shops and
governmental buildings.
According to the Afghan government,
the unrest was instigated by "agents
and saboteurs" paid by the U.S., China,
and Pakistan. In any case, the city
calmed down soon; a demonstration set
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for February 29 never materialized, and
the Afghan army and a newly created
peoples' militia controlled the city
again, while the Soviet troops engaged
only in the protection of the Soviet
Embassy and areas where Soviet civil-
ians live.82
The U.S. media seized on the unrest
in Kabul as new proof of massive op-
position to the government of Babrak
Karmal. In reporting the disturbances,
however, journalists had to rely on
rumors and second-hand reports, since
they were restricted to the Intercon-
tinental Hotel at the time.
By all accounts, it appears to be
very unlikely that the Afghan "rebel
movement" will be able to gain con-
trol over the country. Other than a
very peculiar branch of Islam, oppo-
sition to reforms, and hatred of Com-
munism, the rebels have little to
offer to the Afghan people.
What happens in Afghanistan in the
coming months and years depends a lot
on the U.S. government, China, and
Pakistan. The U.S. activity that can
affect the course of events most is
the continued or increased support
of the "rebels" with weapons and lo-
gistics. Shculd the U.S. and other
countries end their intervention, the
Afghan revolutionary program, though
badly damaged under Amin, would take
its course.
Most likely, the rebel activities
would die down, the Soviet troops
could be withdrawn, the Afghan govern-
ment would be able to promote and en-
act urgently necessary reforms, as-
sist the peasants in the spring sow-
ing, set up health programs, and
further the democratization of soci-
ety.
Given U.S. governmental interests,
it is not likely that U.S. intervention
will end soon. For the U.S. government
it is a small effort to aid the "re-
bels". And, Carter administration offi-
cials have vowed repeatedly that they
want to make the Soviet "invasion" as
costly as possible.
As, it looks now, the Afghan revolu-
tion will have to deal with foreign
aggression for a long time.
In February 1980, the Pakistan Na-
tional Trade Union Federation sent a
message to the Afghan trade unions
pledging support for the people and
the government of the Democratic Re-
public of Afghanistan and expressing
its willingness to establish closer
working relations with the Afghan
unions.
Another organization supporting
the revolution in Afghanistan is the
Pakistan-Afghanistan Friendship Soci-
ety. It recently released a statement
protesting the military training of
"Afghan counter-revolutionary forces"
in Pakistan.
Likewise, the Organization of Pro-
gressive Pakistanis call-ad for an
"End to subversion in Afghanistan;
withdrawal of all facilities ..given
to 'refugees', and their repatriation
back to Afghanistan; (and) closure of
all 'guerilla' bases inside Pakistan"
at its September, 1979 convention in
New York. (see: Pakistan Progressive
P.O.Box 8, Cathedral Station, New
York, NY 10025)
1) Washington Post.(WP), 1/5/80, p.
A- 7 2) The Sunday Times, London, 1/20/80
p.1
3) WP, 2/23/80, p.A-10
4) Indian Express, 2/13/80, p.6; as
quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Middle East F, North Africa
(FBIS, ME & NA), 2/21/80, p.S-1
5) Washington Star (WS), 12/27/79, p.
A-1
6) The Sunday Times, London, 1/6/80
7) New York Times (NYT), 1/24/80, p.
A-1
8) Kabul New Times (KNT), 1/1/80, p.1
9) Times, London 1/5/80, p.4
10) Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 1/7/80,
p.12
11) WP, 1/24/80, p.A-12
12) as quoted in The Nation, 3/8/80, p.
263
13) NYT, 1/11/80, p.A-8
14) as quoted in FBIS, ME F7 NA, 1/25/80,
p.C-1
15) as quoted in FBIS, ME FT NA, 1/31/80,
pp. C-i, C-2
16) WP, 1/24/80, p.A-14
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17) ibid.
18) Harvey E. Smith, Area Handbook for
Afghanistan, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 1969, pp.235,236
? 19) American Friends of the `fiddle East,
4th Annual Report, New York
20) ibid.
21) Rampart's, April 1967, pp.24-26
22) WP, 3/30/67, p.A-10
23) cf supra, # 21
24) ibid.
25) Time, 12/18/78, p.41
26) NYT, 2/9/80, p.A-3
27) International Herald Tribune (IHT),
9/17/79, p.1
28) KNT, 1/22/80,.pp.1,2
29) MY, 1/27/80, pp.1,2
30) cf supra, # 4
31) as quoted in FBIS, ME F, NA, 12/26/79
p.S-ll
32) WP, 2/2/79, p A-23
33) Neue Zuericher Zeitun (NZZ),
2/7/79, p,4
34) see WS, 4/30/79, p.A-3; NYT,
4/16/79, p.A-l; WP 4/23/79, p.A-16
353) NYT, 8/12/79, p.A-13; NYT, 8/24/79,
p.A-24;new left review, n9 M, p.26
36) WP, 4/3/79, p.A-12
37) NYT, 6/12/79, p.A-5
38) Th Patriot (India), 1/13/79, p.2
39) Harpers, June 1977, p.64
40) as quoted in a soon to be released
WHUR (Howar University, Washington, DC)
radio show to be distributed over the
National Public Radio's Independent
Channel. Check your local radio pro-
gram guide.
41) as quoted in WP, 2/15/80, p.A-28
42) WP, 2/15/80, p.A-28
43) as quoted in Call-Chronicle (Allen-
town, PA), 2/24/80, p.A-4
44) David Chaffetz, Afghanistan
Russia's Vietnam ?, The Afghanistan
Council of the Asia Society, Special
Paper # 4, summer 1979
45) Soldier of Fortune,April_1980,
p.45
46) MacNeil/Lehrer Report, # 5032,
transcript, p.2
47) Boston Globe, 1/5/80, p.2
48) WP, 1/28/80, p.A-22
49) WF, 1/26/80, p.A-20
50) as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA,
2/20/80, p.S-9
51) cf supra, # 43
52) as quoted in FBIS, ME F, NA,
2/4/80, p.3-20
53) WP, 3/8/80, p.A-21
54) ibid.
55)'WP, 1/23/80, p.A-25
56) WP, 3/8/80, p.A-21
57) DPA, 2/1/80, as quoted in FBIS, ME
& NA, 2/5/80, p.A-1
58) as quoted in FBIS, ME F NA,
2/12/80, p.S-19
59) MENA, Cairo, as quoted in FBIS,
ME F NA, 1/25/80, p.1)-S
60) cf supra, # 47
61) WS, 1/21/80, p.A-1
62) Indian"Express, as quoted in FBIS,
ME Fr NA, 2/12/80, p.S-7
63) WS, 12/28/79, p.A-3
64) cff supra, # 47
65) WP, 3/21/80, p.A-29
66) TPie Sunday Oklahoman, 3/25/73, p.1
67) The Sunday Post (Ottawa), 2/17/80
68) ibid.
69) ibid.
70) In the State Department daily
briefing, 3/5/80
71) Globe and Mail (Toronto), 2/9/80,
1
P.
WP, 3/10/80, p.A-18
73) Afzal Khan, "With the Afghan Re-
bels", NYT magazine , 1/13/80, pp. 32,
33
74)
AFP,
1/4/80, as quoted in FBIS,
ME
$ NA,
1/4/80, p.S-6
75)
FBIS,
ME & NA, 2/6/80, p.S-8
76)
WP, 1/26/80, p.A-16
77) Der Spiegel, 1/21/80, p.112
78) Le Monde Diplomatique, 2/80
79) cf supra, # 45, p,44
80) as quoted in FBIS, 14E $ NA,
12/31/79, p.S-13
81) cf supra, # 70
82) NYT, 2/29/80, p.A-7
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CIA IN AMERICA
by John Kelly
(Ed. note: The following are in-
tended excerpts from a forthcoming
book, The CIA in America, by John
Kelly, to he published by Lawrence
Hill and Company. The excerpts are
but a sampling of the books overwhelm-
ing evidence that the CIA treats the
United States as an "enemy nation",
penetrating all sectors of society in
its attempt to achieve its devious
ends.)
The CIA's politicization of U.S. po-
lice forces was epitomized in the case
of the Chicago police! Initiation of
this relationship came from the CIA as
seen in a memo of August 11, 1967 to
then DCI Richard Helms from Howard J.
Osborn with the concurrence of R. L.
Bannerman. According to the memo,
'Helms had approved bringing together
U.S. officials for a police liaison
seminar "to promote an exchange of
views on mutual problems..." (The memo
said that the exact agenda was at-
tached, but this attachment has not
been released by the CIA.)
The memo suggested that Helms host a
dinner for the police officials; that
stand-by aircraft be always available;
and finally that the police officials
be personally briefed about the impor-
tance of concealing the identity of
the CIA base. James B. Conlisk, then
superintendent of the Chicago Police
Department (CPD) accepted an invita-
tion to this seminar.
Osborn responded to Conlisk's ac-
ceptance with a letter indicating that
"Mr. Helms has a keen, personal inter-
est in our meeting and ... will host a
dinner in your honor...". Osborn also
advised that the CIA would make all
the arrangements;'that a CIA agent
would accompany Conlisk on his flight;
and that fishing, swimming, tennis and
golf facilities would be available.
With this type of treatment, it was
not surprising that Conlisk later
wrote Helms to state: "I should very
much like to avail this Department
(CPD) of the opportunity of an evalu-
ation of our procedures and advice
and counsel in areas which you sug-
gested."
Conlisk's next sentence indicated
that he invited the CIA for political
operations. To wit: "The recent an-
nouncement that this city will be the
site of the Democratic National Con-
vention in August, 1968, suggests to
me that the city may well experience a
substantial measure of activity in
sensitive areas for some considerable
period of time prior to that event. I
am, therefore, anxious to move as ex-
peditiously as possible in order to
provide for every contingency."
A month later, Helms, apologizing
for his delay, wrote Conlisk that two
CIA officers would be going to Chica-
go.
Helms himself briefed these two CIA
officers, indicating the significance
attached to this mission by the CIA.
Helms' briefing also spoke to the
mission's political objectives in
that it was suppose to pass on to lo-
cal police spy units the lessons from
the so-called racial riots in Detroit
and Newark in 1967. The briefing also
revealed that Helms wanted to trans-
plant the CIA's foreign police opera-
tions to the U.S. "As a concerned
citizen, Mr. Helms felt that the ex-
perience and the techniques that the
CIA has developed in foreign intelli-
gence operations should be made
available to law enforcement agencies
in this country."
As known, the CIA's foreign police
operations have been clearly politi-
cal, extra-legal, and involved in
crimes such as the creation of as-
sassination squads. Helms, himself,
was personally involved in the for-
mation of the charming entity known
as SAVAK. Apparently, he and the CIA
wanted to do for the U.S. what they
had done for Iran and other countries.
The most telling proof of the CIA's
transplanting of its foreign pro-
grams to the U.S. was the training of
U.S. citizens at the CIA-controlled
International Police Services, Inc.,
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Office of Public Safety and Interna-
tional Police Academy (IPA) which
were programs for foreign officials.
According to a State Department docu-
ment obtained through a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request the
following Americans attended the IPA:
Jesus Jesus Cruz (6/2/72-9/29/72);
Louis Moongog (1/24/74-5/24/74); Juan
Garrido Roberto (6/3/72-7/24/72 --
Roberto also attended the CIA's bomb
school then in Los Fresnos, Texas);
Gregorio Sablan (1/24/74-5/24/74);
John Stole (1/24/74-5/24/74); and
Benny Santos Wuintugua (6/2/72-
9/29/72)? Two Americans, both named
Juan P. Ignacio attended the OPS at
an unknown program and time period.
On December 11, 1967, two CIA offi-
cers, visited Conlisk, and John
!iulchrone, then Deputy Superintendent.
Accordingly, "First order of business
was a discussion of the need to limit
knowledge of the relationship between
the Chicago Police Department and CIA,
particularly in view of a recent wave
of newspaper disclosures about the
C.P.D.". It was then agreed that
William J. Duffy, then Director of
the Intelligence Division/CPD and
Pierce J. Fleming, then Deputy Su-
perintendent of the Bureau of Staff
Services/CPD would be informed of
the "CIA affiliation".
According to the CIA, their two
emissaries were suppose to provide
the CPD with assistance in "system
analysis, filing, collation and the
assessment of intelligence informa-
tion". The CIA has not released the
so-called "survey" of their two em-
issaries. However, an accompanying
memo indicated the political nature
of the visit as well as at least one
CIA directive for a clandestine,
extra-legal change by the CPD. Re-
garding the former, the memo stated
that, "In addition, the team went on
an evening drive-along with a Task
Force car patrolling,one of the
city's trouble spots to get a feel-
ing,for the realities of reporting
and controlling incidents in the
slum areas."
The extra-legal activity "concerned
the automation of special files on
subversive groups and on organized
crime..." The CIA team stated that
"these files are too sensitive to be
incorporated in the CPD General Name
Index which is, in effect, open to
the public..."
In other words, there was a need to
conceal these files because of their
questionable legality. Rather than
suggesting the cessation of these fil-
ings, the CIA team "recommended that-
CPD personnel come to Washington for
a detailed briefing on a computer sys-
tem which the Clandestine Services
uses to collate and retrieve infor-
mation on organizations..." In short,
to hell with constitutional rights,
just get a deeper cover for your op-
erations.
The most glaring example of the
CIA's takeover for politicization
was seen in the cases of William J.
Duffy and John Mulchrone. According
to point 5 of the same CIA memo: "An-
other problem that the team noted is
an uncertainty about the mission of
the Intelligence Division. Director
Duffy, by background and inclination,
feels that his Division should be
concentrating on long-range intelli-
gence operations against organized
crime. However, for the past two
years, his assets have been pressed
into service to gather tactical in-
telligence on civil disturbances.
This 'problem was not discussed with
Conlisk, but it was discussed with
Mulchrone who is Duffy's superior."
Two months later Duffy was demoted
from Director of the Intelligence
Division to district watch commander.
John Mulchrone was another story.
"He impressed the team as a rising
star in the'Department and a person
well worth cultivating."
So much for systems analysis.
?...In.1967, the same year the CIA
began its training and equipment
programs with the Prince George's
(P.G.) County police, two county of-
ficers, Joseph D. Vasco and James
Fitzpatrick, directed what the Wash-
ington Post called "Death Squad" op-
erations 3 A subsequent investigation
by the Maryland State Police# direct,.
ed by Corporals A. Wayne Cusimano and
Francis L. Donaldson confirmed the
occurence of these "Reath Squad" op-
erations at the "instigation" of
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Vasco and Fitzpatrick. Vasco, former
acting chief of P.G. County;
Fitzpatrick, now P.G.'s supervisor of
police training; and retired Lt.
Blair Montgomery, former head of the
P.G.'s detective squad refused to
take lie detector tests and were, ac-
cording to the state police report,
"for the most part, unable to recall
many of the details". Involved police
informants did, however, take lie de-
tector tests, "and none has indicated
deception in the opinion of the exam-
iners".
According to the report, on June 8,
1967, a High's store at 9101 Riggs
Road in Adelphi (MD) was held up by a
police informant, Gregory Gibson, and
two accomplices he had recruited at
the instruction of Vasco. P.G. police
were staked out at the High's in pre-
paration for the robbery. They riddled
with bullets the hold-up car, which
they had obtained for Gibson, and
killed 18-year-old William H. Mathews,
Jr. of Takoma Park (MD). Vasco's role
in this robbery amounted "to the actu-
alal planning of the robbery". Former
P.G. detective, John R. Cicala told
The Post that he had driven around
with Gibson and Vasco selecting the
store to be robbed5
Five weeks later on July 13, 1967,
Gibson who obviously knew of Vasco's
involvement in the High's killing,
was critically wounded by Vasco him-
self during an attempted burglary in
College Park (MD). Gibson contends he
was set up by another Vasco informant.
Vasco's official report stated he had
received an anonymous tip before the
burglary. The State Police report
found that Vasco knew the caller, Joe
Bonds, "then under threat of arrest
on an open warrant by Vasco unless he
provided criminal information...
Gregory Gibson was encouraged by Joe
Bonds to break into a jewelry store".
Furthermore, Ron Cook, a former P.G.
detective who accompanied Vasco, tes-
tified that Vasco's report "did not
reflect the incident as he now re-
calls it... (and he) was uncomfort-
able with what happened and remains
so today".
The aforementioned John R. Cicala
later refused to act as a store
clerk for another staged robbery
planned for November 24, 1967 at a
7-Eleven store in Cheverly (MD). For
his refusal, he was fired .6
Despite Cicala's refusal, the
staged robbery did take place. A po-
lice informant, John Crowley, lured
Pedro Gonzales into the robbery.
Gonzales was wounded and subsequently
sentenced to prison. According to
Crowley, if he "had not been pres-
sured (by Vasco and Fitzpatrick) into
asking Gonzales to participate in
this crime, neither he nor Gonzales
would have done this crime".
On November 26, 1967, William C.
Harris was killed by police during an-
other staged robbery of a 7-Eleven
store in Chillum (MD). David E.
Wedler, another participant, was ap-
prehended and subsequently sentenced
to prison. Wedler insisted he had
been encouraged by Sidney J. Hartman
who turned out to be a police infor-
mant. Hartman told the State Police
investigators that he had been re-
cruited to arrange the robbery and
procure participants by Vasco and
Fitzpatrick in return for their help
in quashing a public drunkeness
charge that could have returned him
to-prison since he was then on parole.
The State Police investigation also
found three other instances in which
Vasco and Fitzpatrick allegedly "en-
gineered crimes in order to allow the
scenes to be staked out and the per-
petrators arrested".
Prior to the State Police investi-
gation, Prince George's County Execu-
tive Lawrence Hogan (a former FBI
agent) and State's Attorney, Arthur A.
Marshall, Jr. initiated an internal
county investigation which they
claimed disproved any police wrong-
doing or the existence of a Death
Squad 7 However, the State Police
charged that there were "major dis-
crepancies" between the county and
State Police investigations. And,
when Marshall received a copy of the
State Police report he refused to re-
lease it to the public.8
When the State Police report was re-
leased, Hogan and Marshall -- as they
did after the county investigation --
defended the police actions on the
basis that standards for police be-
havior were different in 19679 Thus,
police actions in 1967 should not be
41
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judged against the standards of today.
Similarly, Vasco stated that: "I am
still satisfied that what was done by
members of this department in 1967
was proper at the time and not in
violation of any federal, state or lo-
cal laws. These-actions must be eval-
uated in the proper context, and com-
pared to the standards of 12 years
ago."10 To this,-the Washington Post
editorialized: "However dim recollec-
tions of 1967 may be, the conduct de-
scribed in the report was no more ac-
ceptable then than it is now."11
Aside from the concurrent CIA train-
ing, there is no evidence of CIA in
volvement in the P.G.'s.police death
squad operations. They do, however;_
bear'an unnerving similarity to death
squad operations executed by CIA-con-
trolled police in Latin America.
1) The data on the CIA and the.Chicago
Police came from CIA documents released
in discovery proceedings in the Alliance
to End Repression et.al.v.-James
O'Grady, et.al. law suit. Copies of
these documents are available from
CounterSpy. All the quotations in the
text are from-these documents. Articles
with excerpts from the documents, were
also published in the Chicago Sun-Times
(5/10/78) and the Washington Post
(4/24/78).
2) "Report C190 - Accumulative Depar-
tures = Programs Completed", Report
dated Deb. 1977, p.1
3) Meyer, Eugene L.and Feinstein, John
"Probe Links P.G. Police To Holdups",
Washington Post, 10/27/79, pp.A-1,A-11
4) Maryland State Police Report on
Prince George's County Police, 1979.
The facts and quotations in the text are
from. this report unless signified other-
wise. A copy of the report is available
from CounterSpy.
4)
cf supra # 3
5)
ibid.
6)
ibid.
7)
ibid.
8)
ibid.
9)
ibid.
10)
ibid.
11)
"The
Prince George's Police Report"
Washington Post, 10/29/79 (Unsigned ed-
itorial).
42
The Church Committee, that is part of
it, looked at the CIA's past relation-
ship with the U.S. press and media. The
committee did not interview, either in
open or closed' sessions, any reporters,
editors, publishers, or broadcast exec-
utives involved with the CIA.
William B. Bader, who had come from
the CIA, supervised and controlled the
committee's inquiry.1Following his ser-
vice with the committee, Bader returned
to the CIA as a deputy to director
Stansfield Turner. Bader was assisted
by David Aaron who went on to join the
intelligence community as' a deputy to
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's
national security adviser.
Bader from the outset was opposed --
as was the CIA -- to naming journalists
and media personnel who worked for the
CIA 2- thus continuing the pall over
all journalists. He also believed that
the CIA had not intentionally manipu-
lated the U.S. press or media. As he
said in the Church Report: "In pursuing
its foreign intelligence mission the
Central Intelligence Agency has used
the U.S. media for both the collection
of intelligence and cover." Moreover,
Bader felt that the CIA had gone to
great lengths to restrict domestic pro-
pagandizing as seen in the inclusion of
William Colby's-misleading statement in
the Church Report: "We have taken par-
ticular caution to ensure that our op-
erations are focused abroad and not at
the United States in order (not) to in-
fluence the opinion of the American
people about things from a CIA point of
view." 3(This is the same William Colby
who has been presenting the CIA point
of view almost non-stop throughout the
U.S. since his termination as CIA di-
rector.)
With Bader at the helm, so to speak,
the committee agreed to the following
CIA restrictions 4 Stiff directors
William Bader and William "tiller would
examine the sanitized CIA files of 25
(out of 400 journalist files) journal-
ists which would not contain the jour-
nalists' names or their news organiza-
tions or involved CIA officers. Of
these 25 files or past operations,
Senators Church and Tower could examine
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five which were unsanitized. Bader,
Miller, Church, and Tower were sworn
to secrecy regarding the contents of
the files and could tell nobody about
them not even the other members of the
committee. Furthermore, the CIA gave
the committee no information on its
current relationship with the press
and the media.
One committee member observed that:
"From the CIA point of view this was
the highest, most sensitive program of
all... It was a much larger part of
the operati%al system than has been
indicated." (The Pike Committee also
charged that the CIA's media and press
operations constituted "the largest
single category of covert action pro-
jects undertaken by the CIA".) That
was about the extent of the commit-
tee's revelations. Bader never dis-
cussed his findings with the full com-
mittee, and he drafted the 11-page
"Covert Relationship with the United
States Media" section of the Church
Report of which committee member Gary
Hart stated "It hardly reflects what
we found" 6 Bader in a frank moment
also observed that: "None of the im-
portant operations are affected in
even a marginal way"7
One unidentified committee member
pinpointed another role Bader served
for the CIA since he had seen 400 sum-
maries of CIA media and press files.
To wit: "It was smart of the Agency to
cooperate to the extent"of showing the
material to Bader (who showed it to
nobody else). That way, if one day a
file popped up, the Agency would be
covered. They could say they had al-
ready informed the Congress."
Bader has now been hired by Senator
Church as staff director for the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee.
The?CIA's?use of the press was seen
in the case of Charles Bartlett, a
syndicated columnist who was given an
internal ITT document on September'23,
1970 9 written by CIA operatives Hal
Hendrix and Robert Berrellez.10 This
document exposed the on-going ITT/CIA
plotting against Allende. It stated,
in part, that the U.S. ambassador to
Chile had received the "green light to
move in the name of President Nixon...
(with) maximum authority to do all
possible -- short of a Dominican Re-
public-type action -- to keep Allende
from taking power".11 Furthermore,
the Chilean army "has been assured full
material and financial assistance by
the U.S. military establishment" 12
and ITT has "pledged (its financial)
support if needed" 13 to the anti-
Allende forces.
Bartlett wrote a column on September
28, 1970 based on this document.14
But, rather than expose, and possibly
stop, criminal ITT/CIA operations, he
wrote that Chile was threatened by a
"Classic communist-style assumption
of power" 15 about which there was
little the U.S. could "profitably
do" 16 and besides "Chilean politics
should be left to the Chileans".17
Obviously, the ITT official who
gave Bartlett the document knew what
he was doing. Bartlett's article not
only failed to expose the CIA but also
gave the impression that the U.S. wis
uninvolved -- which Bartlett knew was
a lie.
1) Bernstein, Carl, Rolling Stone,
10/20/1977 (see also: "Did Senate
Panel Cover For CIA ?", Washington Star,
9/12/77; "Journalism Links to CIA Al-
leged", Christian Science Monitor,
(UPI), 9/26/77; and Sei , Charles B.
"The Press/Spy Affair : Cozy and Still
Murky", Washington Post, 10/14/77)
2) Bernstein, Carl, Rolling Stone,
10/20/77
3) ibid. (as quoted by Bernstein)
4) ibid.
5) ibid.
6) ibid.
7) ibid.
8) ibid.
9) Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
Alfred Knopf, New York, 1974, p.350
10) "U.S. Counter-Revolutionary Appara-
tus: The Chilean Offensive", NACLA,
v.VIII, no.6, July-August 1974
11) ibid. (Memo, as quoted in NACLA)
12) ibid.
13) ibid.
14) Washington Post, 9/28/70
15) ibid.
16) ibid.
17) ibid.
43
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C.I.A. - ACADEMIA
Harvard economist Arthur Smithies
Dean Franklin L. Ford (12/7/67) :
"The Central Intelligence Agency has
instructed its consultants to inform
their official superiors of this con-
nection with the Agency. I hereby in-
form you of my connection of 10 years
duration. I wish I could add that
there is something subtly interesting
or sinister about it."
Ford to Smithies:
"Acknowledge. Should we have a con-
fidential file on such relationships
outside personal files ?"
The significance and direct con-
nection between academicians and CIA
covert operations were illustrated in
the CIA's tracking of Che Guevara in
Bolivia. CIA academicians often claim
a ,distinction or separatedness between
their work and "dirty tricks". As the
following shows, there is no such sep-
aration.
Not long after his murder at the
hands of the CIA, Albert Sug:erman
charged that "Military research car-
ried on at the University,of Michi-
gan's Willow Run Laboratories was di-
rectly responsible for the capture and
death of Che Guevara in Bolivia just
over one year ago".l
Sugerman's charge was directed at
surveillance and reconnaissance tech-
nology and equipment developed at the
University of Michigan. In a remark
reminiscent of his fellow president
John Hannah of Michigan State Uni%Ver-
sity, University of Michigan presi-
dent, Harlan Hatcher made clear that
the university knew the purpose and
application of their research. To wit:
"The importance. to national de-
fense of some of the present and past
research programs of the Willow Run
staff, especially in reconnaissance
and surveillance technology, -was
brought into sharper focus by the sit-
uation in Vietnam, where allied forces
rely heavily upon aerial surveillance
for military intelligence.".
Sugerman charged that it was this
precise technology that the CIA and
the Green Berets used to track down
Che. The man who helped develop this
technology and equipment was George
Zissis, then head of the Infrared
Physics Laboratory at Willow Run.
Zissis was also fully cognizant of
the intended use of his work since he
was personally asked by the Depart-
ment of Defense Advam' ed Research
Projects Agency (ARPA-- which also
works with the CIA) to come up with
equipment to help the Royal Thai mil-
itary to track down guerillas. Asked
why APRA approached him, Zissis re-
plied: "We know what parts to order,
what systems to design, how to build,
how to interpret information, and
what to watch for."3
The devices, developed by Zissis
and his colleagues, measure, from a
plane, the different temperatures ra-
diating from objects on the ground.
In effect, they photograph the heat
produced on the ground below. With
these photographs and the knowledge
of what radiation temperatures ema-
nate from the natural terrain, it is
possible to identify human beings
with their body temperature of
98.6?F.
Following his development of this
equipment Zissis remarked:
"The Thais are using it to find
communist guerilla activity. Then the
Thai military can send in forces to
capture the communist ringleaders...
Generally, the Thais are doing a darn
good job. We feel proud of our stu-
dents." 4
It is now well established that in
1967 the CIA and the Green Berets
were assisting the Bolivian Rangers
hunt Che and the guerillas fighting
with him. There was even a "Che
Watch" run by the CIA and the Pentagon.
This consisted of people who studied
military and CIA intelligence relat-
ing only to Che.
During the summer of 1967, Mark
Hurd, Aerial Surveys, Inc., of Minne-
apolis, was to conduct aerial sur-
veys of Bolivia for the Agency for
International Development (A.ID) using
techniques developed at University of
Michigan's Willow Run lab. According
to then Hurd vice-president, Dean
Hanson: "The firm conducted aerial
survey missions in the Rio Grande
Valley area of Bolivia, where the
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guerillas were known to be active dur-
ing June-November, 1967.''SHanson also
said that infrared cameras had been
used and that the films were given to
AID -- which, of course, works hand-
in-glove with the CIA.
Again, according to Sugerman, "It
seems highly likely that the informa-
tion on that film was interpreted by
the Special Forces members trained by
the University of Michigan scientists
who were in Bolivia under CIA and
Pentagon orders." 6
Whether or not one can attribute
Che's capture and death to Zissis and
the Willow Run staff, their conscious
servicing of the operations in Vietnam
and Thailand is a searing indictment
of the CIA on campus and the academi-
cians who serve the CIA.
Finally, it~should be noted that the
Army Math Research?Center at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin/Madison partici-
pated in 1967 in "Project Michigan" in
the development of airborne sensors
for the detection of guerillas operat-
ing in dense foliage. Despite being
destroyed by a planted bomb, the.Cen-
ter continues and has received more
than $7 million in the last four and a
half years for similar research.
The CIA on campus was personified in
Barnaby Conrad Keeney, president of
Brown University from 1955-1966.
Keeney attended Harvard University
when "the same people controlled
staffing for history departments and
for the analysis division of the in-'
telligence services.... Barn? Keeney
was roped into that network". In 1951
while dean of Brown's graduate school,
Keeney took a leave of absence to work
for the CIA. (The year before Joseph
Sisco, who was to become president of
American University, was working for
the CIA.) For some unknown reason,
Keeney apparently was skilled in de-
veloping CIA agents as he spent the
year helping CIA officials design a
training program for new CIA recruits,
according to Lyman Kirkpatrick.8 Kirk-
patrick, by the way, is a CIA/campus
story himself. He is a former CIA ex-
ecutive-director who has been a polit-
ical science professor at grown since
1965.
Ray Cline, a former CIA deputy direc-
tor of Intelligence, now esconced at
Georgetown University, wrote about
Kirkpatrick's going to Brown as if it
were a CIA assignment. "One of this
group, Lyman Kirkpatrick, has become a
principal academic expositor of the or-
ganization and functions of U.S. intel-
ligence. He left CIA in 1965 to take a
position as professor at Brown '-niver-
sity. In addition to teaching about the
intelligence profession, he has written
two solid books describing CIA and
other intelligence agencies; The Real
CIA (1968) and The Intelligence Com-
munity (1973)."
Returning to Keeney, in 1951 he did
inform Brown that he was working for
the CIA. -iowever, he did not inform
them that he continued working for the
CIA upon his return to Brown and
throughout his entire presidency. In-
terestingly, at the time of Keeney's
appointment to the presidency in 1455,
Kirkpatrick, at the time CIA Inspector
General, wrote that "Naturally, I hope
that the best of Brown will be encqD 10
aged to make intelligence a career".
Under Keeney, Brown faculty members
received CIA requests for references
for students unaware of being checked
by the CIA. Obviously, Keeney secretly
provided Brown as a deep CIA labor
pool.
Keeney has now admitted his CIA em-
ployment and that he was'advising the
CIA on ways of setting up covert
funding procedures which he claimed
were necessary to cover the CIA's
presence from "enemy nations"11A 1957
Kirkpatrick memo indicates otherwise.
The CIA was, in fact, hiding their re-
searchers from their colleagues who
might have viewed the CIA work as "un-
ethical and... (bordering) on the il-
legal"..
A later CIA memq reconfirmed that the
CIA intent was to hide their academi-
cians from their colleagues and not
"enemy nations". Another CIA report
from its Inspector General, written a
year after Keeney's participation, ob-
served: "a. Research in the manipula-
tion of human behavior is considered
by many authorities in medicine and
related fields to be professionally
unethical, therefore the reputation of
professional participants in HKULTRA
program are on occasion in jeopardy.."
45
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New Times magazine had also discov-
ered that in 1962 Keeney became chair-
person of the Human Ecology Fund, a
front for. the CIA's domestic operation
MKULTRA. Keeney, like the CIA, claims
the drug research was defense-orient-
ed. Internal CIA documents indicate
the'drug research had early on devel-
oped offensive objectives.
One,was "to get control of an indi-
vidual to the point where he will do
our biddings against his will and
even against such fundamental laws of
human nature as self-preservation".
Frank Olson was_an unwitting American
subject of CIA's LSD experimentation
c4ho committed suicide during the test-
ing period.
In fall 1977, the CIA notified 44
colleges and universities that MKULTRA
research had been conducted at their
campuses. The CIA did not inform
Brown of Keeney's work for the Human
Ecology Fund or any other aspect of
his CIA work while'\,at Brown. When
Brown's current president, Howard,
Swearer was told of Keeney's involve-
ment he was nonplussed. He observed:
"Given the fragmentary nature of the
information which the CIA provides " 'it
probably doesn't matter much that we
weren't informed." He refused to elab-
orate. 12
1) Sugerman, Albert. G .: "Michigan,
Che and the CIA", New Republic,
10/9/68, pp.9-10
2) ibid. As quoted by Sugerman
3) ibid. As quoted by Sugerman
4) ibid.
5) ibid.
6) ibid.
7) Sommer, Andrew and Cheshire, Marc
"The Spy Who Came In From The Campus"
New Times, 10/30/78, p.I4
8) ibid.
9) Cline, Ray Secrets, Spies and
Scholars, Acropolis Books, Washington
D.C., 1976, p.194
10) New Times, cf supra # 7
11) ibid.
12) ibid.
From the Editors
The response to our last issue was
overwhelming. We would like to thank
all our readers who have written ex-
pressing their solidarity and/or their
criticism, and have supported us fi-
nancially with contributions and sub-
scription renewals. Our financial sit-
uation has improved - however, not yet
to the point of being "satisfactory".
Therefore, we need your continued
contributions, as well as your feed-
back. ,
In the next issue we will feature an
article on U.S. involvement in Thai-
land, by Robin Broad of Princeton Uni-
versity, and an analysis of the explo
sive situation in Turkey - focusing on
U.S. and NATO attempts to keep Turkey
in the pro-capitalist, pro-western
sphere.
Other articles will examine U.S.
support for Morocco's King Hassan in
his war against the Polisario libera- ?-
Lion movement, by Akyaaba Addai-Sebo,
and U.S. governmental propaganda oper-
ations overseas, using AID-funded ra-
dio programs in Columbia as a case
study. CounterSpy will also print a
response from TransAfrica to a Wash-
ington Post article quoted in our last
issue.
A fifth article will provide back-
ground on the British intelligence
agencies MI-5 and MI-6 which rocketed
into headlines recently with the un-
precedented publication of the names
of their directors. (Names revealed
included Howard Smith, Director Gen-
eral of MI-5, who has served in Mos-
cow, Northern Ireland, and in the Cab-
inet Office; Arthur Franks, Director
General of MI-6 who has been pre-
viously identified as a Counsellor at
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
and one MI-6 officer, Hamilton
McMillan, who has served in Austria
and Italy.)
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150005-6
THE AFRICA RESEARCH & PUBLICATIONS
PROJECT
P.O. BOX 1892
TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08608
The Africa Research & Publications Pro-,
ject is a coalition (a working group)
of African activists. Its objective is
to promote a democratic dialogue among
Africans and their friends on vital
issues and problems facing African
peoples.
The short-term goal of the Project is
to function as a clearinghouse for Af-
rican movement publications. In addi-
tion, the ARPP Working Group wi.li engagq
in and promote critical research on
specific problem areas regarding Af-
rica's development, and develop infor-
mational materials on Africa's quest
for democratic and progressive social
structures and the struggles for na-
tional liberation.
Write to ARPP regarding their publi-
cations and more information.
An organization working on East Ti-
mor in the U.S. is the Emergency
Committee for Human Rights in Indo-
nesia and Self-Determination in East
Timor (P.O. Box 27, Thurston Courts
Apts., Ithaca, NY 14852).Write them
for more information.
To Secret -
A Closer Loo At Australia's Secret
Service
is available from
The Committee for the Abolition of
Political Police (CAPP)
c/o Joan Coxsedge
8 Leicester Street
North Balwyn, Victoria 3104
Australia
Contact CAPP for details and infor-
mation about other publications.
An extensive study on the CIA's role
in Australia was published by
Denis Freney
The CIA's Australian Connection
Available from Denis Freney
P.O. Box A716
Sydney South, NSW 2000
Australia
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150005-6
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