COUNTERSPY: CIA-IMF-WORLD BANK-AID: COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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COUNTER
The Magazine For People Who Need To Know
SUMMER 1980/Vol. 4 No. 3
CIA COPS IN
SOUTH KOREA
by John Kelly
MOSSAD IN WEST
GERMANY
by Konrad Ege
MOSSAD'S LONG
ARM
by Robin Rubin
$2
CIA-IMF-WORLD
BANK-AID:
COUNTER-
INSURGENCY IN
THAILAND
By Robin Broad
U.S. AND NATO
BASES IN TURKEY
by Konrad Ege
GHANA'S
INDEPENDENCE OR
VALCO?
by Kojo Arthur
CIA'S CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE IN
ARGENTINA
AID AND IDEOLOGY
IN COLOMBIA
CIA IN SWEDEN
NOTES ON
AFGHANISTAN
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EDITORIAL
Before the U.S. entered World War II,
a wealthy, liberal President, Franklin
D. Rooseveltand a millionaire Wall
Street attorney, William J. Donovan cre-
ated the Office of Coordinator of In-
formation (COI) without the knowledge
or consent of the American people or
Congress. While the COI had covert po-
litical and paramilitary capabilities,
the public and Congress were told it
was solely an intelligence agency. Of
course, FDR in creating a military or-
ganization during peacetime usurped one
of-the Constitutional powers of Con-
gress.
In the minds of FDR and Donovan, the
COI was allowed covert operations by
its directive "to carry out, when re-
quested by the President, such supple-
mentary activities as may facilitate
the securing of information important
for national security and not now avail-
able to the Government".
According to FDR's own cousin, Kermit
Roosevelt, this directive was intention-
ally deceiving. Kermit has written that:
"The order, however, was not to be spe-
cific as to the functions proposed for
the new agency: both the President and
Donovan agreed that, in the delicate
situation then existing, it would be
preferable to have no precise defini-
tion appear."
In effect, two wealthy,pro-corporate
men, one of whom was sworn to uphold the
Constitution, secretly established an
agency, financed by U.S. taxes, which
was to affect the lives of millions.
And, it has'been all downhill for the
Constitution since FDR and Donovan.
1947 saw the creation of the CIA by
the likes of international financiers
Ferdinand Eberstadt and Bernhard Baruch
as well as the wealthy, Wall Street at-
torneys, James Forrestal and C?iark
-Clifford who recently testified that a
prohibition against CIA assassinations
:.would be "demeaning" and "make us look
silly". 'Forrestal forged ahead with
the CIA despite the warnings of two
fellow, militarists, General George C.
Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King.
Marshall had stated that,: "The powers
of the proposed agency (CIA) seem al-
most unlimited and need clarification."
King, according to Forrestal's diary,
felt that the proposed CIA "had ele-
ments of danger" and "questioned wheth-
er such an agency could be considered
- consistent with our ideas of govern
ment".
Forrestal, by the way,, while swearing
before Congress that the CIA would only
gather foreign intelligence, had ini-
tiated Operation Shamrock which secret-
ly surveid telecommunications of the
American People.
With token input from Congress, the
CIA was created in 1947 and like the
COI, was authorized, in?the minds of a
few, wealthy men, by an intentionally
deceiving directive to carry out covert
political and paramilitary operations.
Also like the COI, the CIA, as recom-
mended by Wall Street attorney, Allen
W. Dulles, was "directed by a relatively
small, but elite corps of men".
In 1941, we had FDR and Donovan. To-
day, we have Jimmy Carter and'Stansfield
Turner and matters are as bad and worse.
Two pro-corporate men are running a,'
secret, powerful agency with U.S. taxes
but without the knowledge or "consent
of the governed". As if things were Snot
bad enough, Carter is now expanding the
already extensive powers of the CIA.
King's fears have become a reality.
This all boils down to an either/or
situation. We either have *a democracy
or a CIA. CIA careerist, James J.
Angleton attested to this fact when he
said "It's inconceivable that a secret
intelligence arm of the government has
to comply with all the overt orders of
the government."
Fair. enough. The American people have
been told by the CIA itself that the
choice is between democracy and the CIA.
We end with the words of the late
Senator Wayne Morse speaking of the CIA
in 1956: "What is happening now in the
United States is similar to what has
happened in the history of other free
nations. They flowered in freedom for a
long time, and then gradually a small
clique of government officials in the
executive branch started taking over
their rights, freedoms, and liberties.
The people woke up too late to discover
that they had lost their freedoms,
rights, and liberties. It can happen
in America, if we do not stand on guard
in relation to the principle of checks
and balances under the Constitution."
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CIA COPS IN SOUTH KOREA
by John Kelly .........:....................... 3
MOSSAD. IN
WEST GERMANY
by Konrad Ege ............................... 5
MOSSAD'S LONG ARM
by Robin Rubin ...................... ...... 7
CIA-IMF-WORLD BANK-AID: -
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
THAILAND
by Robin Broad .............................. 8
US. AND NATO BASES
IN TURKEY
by Konrad Ege .............................. 22
GHANA'S INDEPENDENCE
OR VALCO?
by Kojo Arthur .............................. 25
CIA'S CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
IN ARGENTINA ...............:........... 32
AID AND IDEOLOGY IN COLOMBIA ..... 35
CIA IN SWEDEN ............................ 42
NOTES ON AFGHANISTAN ............... 43
CIA COPS IN
SOUTH KOREA
by John Kelly
. (Ed. note: John Kelly is the author
of the forthcoming book "The CIA in
America".)
The recent uprisings in Iran and
South Korea share two'exacerbating
causes: a CIA-created, euphemistical-
ly-entitled intelligence agency and
an exploiting Gulf Oil Corporation. In
Iran, the secret intelligence agency
was the illegal, brutal SAVAK. In South
Korea, it is the equally brutal Korean
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).
Gulf, of course, was one of the U.S.
oil corporations which, along with the
CIA, installed the shah and his 26
years of repression that meant untold
profits for Gulf. Appropriately enough,
Gulf later hired as a vice-president,
Kermit Roosevelt Kho engineered the
CIA's coup and installation of oppres-
sion in Iran in 1953. Roosevelt's
vice-presidential function was to
bribe governmental officials around
the world who facilitated Gulf's pro-
fiteering.
Gulf is also in South Korea where it
owns: 100% of Korea Gulf Oil; 50% of
Korea Oil Company; 49% of South Ko-
rea's refining capacity; and parts of
Hangkuk Sangsa Co.Ltd., the Chin Hae
Chemical Co., and the Ssangtung Ce-
ment Industrial Co.1 By the end of
1977, Gulf had remitted to the U.S.
$33,538,000 in profits from Korea Oil
Co. alone,2 and expected to up that
figure to $36 million in 1978.3
During Roosevelt's vice-presidency,
Gulf made illegal payments to the Dem-
ocratic Republican Party of Park Chung
Hee for National Assembly elections.4
Gulf later channeled $3 million to
Park's 1971 presidential campaign
which payment along with other corpo-
rate payoffs may have created Park's
margin of victory. 5
These three powers: the Korean gov-
ernment, the KCIA, and Gulf Oil dove-
tail in the Korea Oil Co. which is 50%
government-owned. Despite the national
- if pot international - reputation of
the KCIA for brutality, Gulf stooped.
to its level by choosing a former KCIA
Deputy Director, General Park Won Suk
in 1966 to become President of Korea
Oil.6
In 1972, Gulf went to the new Prime
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Minister, Kim Jay Pit, and asked him
to suggest a purchaser for a boat
named the Chun Woo. Kim Jay Pil was
.the founder of the KCIA and had worked
with the CIA in a.coup that put Park
Chung Mee in power in '1961.7 Regarding
the boat deal, Gulf's own special com-
mittee found that: "Gulf's decision to
offer the new Prime Minister an opportu-
nity to select the purchaser of the Chung
.Woo had obvious political overtones and
was designed to gain some favor. with that
high official".8 Even the South Korean
Martial Law Command has now charged Kim
Jay Pit with accumulating $36 million
through embezzlement and bribe-taking.9
Not to be outdone by Gulf in cynical ,
Insensitivity to the Korean people, the
State Department appointed John LaMazza
(House 4976 B, South Post, Tel .Y.4123)
a well-known CIA collaborator, as Embas-
sy liaison officer with Korean church,
human rights, and labor organizations
in July 1976. Not surprisingly, a member
of the American Friends Service Commit-
tee (AFSC) reported that LaMazza "may
in fact be meeting with human rights re-
presentatives primarily to gain intelli-
gence for the U.S. CIA". The same person
felt that LaMazza actually "holds in
contempt the very people for whom on
the surface he has expressed concern".
When-asked by a second AFSC member about
U.S. silence on martial law and politi-
cal prisoners, LaMazza scoffed: "We
can't be protesting'everg point in the
country's legal code."
Completing its contempt for the Ko-
rean people is the CIA's. training of the
South Korean police - yet another com-
monality with Iran. in the interests of
potential victims, we are publishing/ the
names of the following Koreans who Have
,had CIA police training in the U.S. In
doing so, we hope to give a concrete
expression of our support to the strug-
gle of the Korean people to free them-
selves from their governmental/corpo-
rate prison.
Bark, Yang Bae (was trained in the U.S.
from 7/67-11/67), Cho, Ki Soo (7/67-
11/67), Cho, Yong Hak (8/73-11/73),
Choe, Sang Yung (6/73-9/73), Chon,Sok
Bong (3173-5173). Chun, Byung-Suk (4/70
-7/70), Chun, Hae Ryong (2/72-5/72), Han,
Jung Hee (8/73-11/73), Huh, June (no date
given), Huh, Shik (10169-2170);
Hwang, ?In Chul (12170-4171), Kim, Jung
La K (3/72-10/72) ; Kim, Ku I1 (7/69-
10169), Kim, Yong Baik (12/70-4/71),
Kim, Yun-Chol (6170-10170), Kim, Yung
Shik (1/69-5/69), Kim, Yung Hui (9/71-
2/72), Koo, Chul-Hae (8/71-12/71), Kyu
-Bok, Hwang (3/74-5%74), Lee, Soon
Yong (11/74-2/75);'
Lee, Jong Kuck (1/69-5/69), Lee,
Jong Kuck (2/71-6/71), Lee, Kuk Jong
(7/67-11/67), Lee, Kwang'Ui (7167-
11167), Lee, Sang Yang (3/74), Mohk,
?4in Soo (9174-12174), Nam, Sang-Yong
(10169-2170), Paik, Ryung Cho (7/69-
10/69), Pak, Pyong Hyo (3/68-6/68),
Pang, Jai-San,(no date given);
Park, I1 Kong (9/74-12/74), Park,
Sang Lae (3/73-6/73), Park, Sang-Lae
(10/69-2/70), Song, 11 Soon (7/67-
11/67) , Song, In Shik (4169-7169-),
Suh, Jae Myong (6/72-7/72), Tcha,
Sung Kap (1169-5169), Yang, Bo Sang
(3/73-5/73), Yoo, Bong-Ahn (3/74),
Yoo,'Jung-Khun (6/70-10/70), Yoon,
Il-Shik (2/71-6/71);
The following South Koreans were
trained in the FBI National Academy:
Myong, Chung Sok (7/67-11167), Park,
Yang-Bae (3/72-6/72), Park, Yong Kyu
(2/70-8/70), Yi, Sung Ho (7/71-11/71);
The following officials are assigned'
to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul:
DRAGONS, Robert J.. (third secretary)
born: 12/27/46
Embassy Apt. 4C
Dragone is a CIA officer. Seoul is
his first overseas assignment.
HUDKINS, Hugh A. (Attache)
born: 4/1/33
House 491/B South Post
.tel. [phone]
,1(udkins is an intelligence officer
who has served in France, Iraq, Thai-
land, Japan, Liberia, the Dominican
Republic and from'l/76 to 6/77 in the
U.S.
Sinai Support Mission.
LEE,
Maurice H.
(Director of ICA)
born:
8/20/25
Embassy House 7
Lee is an experienced propaganda of-
_.f,'cer. He has been instrumental in
psychological warfare operations, in
Vietnam, where he was the deputy
,director of the Joint U.S. Public Af-
fairs Office in Saigon from 4/70 to
5/71. He attended the National War
College from 8/68 to 7/69.
4
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Footnotes:
1) "Gulf Oil in South Korea: The Influ-
ence of a Global Corporation", Korea
Report, American Friends Service Com-
mittee, April 1979; Asia Wall Street
Journal, December 13, 1978
2) Korea Times, 2/4/78
3) Korea Times, 6/23178
4) AFSC, of supra # 1
5) ibid.
6) ibid.
7) Washington Post, 6/19/80, p.A-27
8) "Report of the Special Review Com-
mittee of the Board of Directors of
Gulf Oil Corporation", December 1975
9) cf supra # 7
MOSSAD IN WEST
GERMANY
by Konrad Ego
On August 9, 1979, the Washington
Post reported on the activities of for-
eign intelligence agencies operating in
the U.S. in violation of U.S. sover-
eignty. Now West Germany has a similar
scandal, and many questions are still
unanswered.
On October 29, 1979, the West German
weekly Der Spiegel reported that, de-
spite governmental denials, the Bundes-
nachrichtendienst (BND, West Germany's
CIA) had allowed MOSSAD (Israeli intel-
ligence) officers to secretly interro-
gate several Palestinians charged with
"terrorist activities" in jails and
prisons in Munich, Amberg, Straubing,
and Landsberg. A number of the summa-
ries of the interrogations - written by
MOSSAD officers - were then to be used
in the court proceedings against the
Palestinians, who were not informed
about the identities of their interro-
gators.
According to the Palestinian news
agency-WAFA, the' SSAD officers did
more than "just",ask questions. WAFA re-
ported that one PLO fighter had been
tortured and administered drugs by Is-
raeli intelligence officers in Strau-
bing, and had been pressured to assas-,
sinate the PLO's intelligence, chief,
Abu Ijad. However, WAFA said, he chose
instead to take his own life.
The West German authorities knew well
the man to whom WAFA was referring. His
name is Abdel Wali Abdel Hafes Aabed.
He and others were arrested on the West
German border when they allegedly tried
to smuggle explosives into West Germa-
ny. While his co-defendants got prison
sentences of several years, Aabed was
sentenced to only four months impris-
onment.
After being released, he went back to
Beirut, Lebanon, where he shortly
thereafter entered a, mental hospital.
As WAFA reports, it was then that he
told Abu Ijad how he had been adminis-
tered drugs in Straubing, and how Isra-
eli officials had s qwn him pictures
of his family, who lives on the occu-
pied West Bank, and told him that he
had better collaborate for their sake.
A few days later, Aabed was found
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dead in`his apartment. In a letter he
left to explain his suicide he wrote
that he felt he was in a "no-way-out"
situation; his resistance had been bro-
ken with drugs in Straubing, and he saw
no other way to protect his family than
to kill himself.
While discounting WAFA's version of
Aabed's death, the West German govern-
-ment was forced to admit two facts:
that Abdel Wali Abdel Hafes Aabed was
interrogated by Israelis in Straubing,
and that he was administered drugs in
prison because, so the official version
goes, "he was depressed" (Sueddeutsche
Zeitung, 11/9/79, p.3).
Having had to admit interrogations of
Aabed and other Palestinians by Israeli
intelligence officers in four prisons,
West German governmental officials were
quick to assert that these cases were
"isolated incidents". New evidence un-
covered in the meantime, however, leads
one to the conclusion that these cases
might rather be part of common practice.
Die Tageszeitung, a left Berlin daily,
wrote on November 1, 1979 that at least
two imprisoned Palestinians were ques-
tioned by a West German plain-cloth
police officer accompanied by an Arabic
speaking "translator" who actually car-
ried out the interrogation. Courts in
Berlin repeatedly refused to examine
these and other charges of "translators"
who were allowed to interrogate Pal-
estinian prisoners.
Reports about these interrogations
have raised several questions about the
role of foreign intelligence agencies
in West German prisons in general. Clne
of the questions is whether the shah of
Iran's secret police, SAVAK, were ever
allowed into West German prisons. While
collaboration between West German intel-
ligence agencies and SAVAK has been
documented, this contention is strongly
denied by West German authorities.
Still another serious and for the West
German government very uncomfortable
question was raised after the publica-
tion of MOSSAD interrogations and the
claims of a West German intelligence of-
ficer in the Swedish social democratic
Aftonbladet. This question is: How did
Gudrun Ensslin, Jan Carl Raspe, and
Andreas Baader die on the night of
October 18, 1977 ? The three were mem-
bers of the Red Army Fraction (an or-
ganization advocating armed struggle)
6
and at the time imprisoned in Stamm-
heim, West Germany's most "advanced"
maximum security prison. The West Ger-'
man government claims they committed
suicide.
Aftonbladet and others have pointed
out that a good part of the govern-
mental version of events is simply in-
coherent. Important details are miss-
ing or remain unexplained. On October
21 last year Aftonbladet wrote: "It
is not just the so called West Ger-
man left that is very sceptical about
the official version of events in
Stammheim. There are people within
the West German intelligence agencies
who refuse to believe it was suicide.
One intelligence officer .. said: 'I
believe they (Raspe, Baader, and
Ensslin) were assassinated, but I
don't believe it was our people who
killed them"'.
Some people now wonder aloud whether
the publication of Israeli activities
in West German prisons might have
brought us one step closer to the
answer of "Who did it ?".
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MOSSAD'S LONG
ARM
by Robin Rubin
On September 12, 1979, two West Ger-
man citizens, Brigitte Schulz and
Thomas Reuter were convicted of "anti-
Israeli activities" by a secret Israeli
military tribunal and sentenced to ten
years imprisonment. The same secret
trial is continuing for three Pales-
tinian defendants, Husain Hadi al-Attar,
Mahmoud Musa Hasan al-Makussi and
Ibrahim Twafiq Ibrahim Yusuf.
The three Palestinians had been ar-
rested by Kenyan authorities in Nairobi
on January 18, 1976, and were interro-
gated -- before being charged -- at
military headquarters in Nairobi by
MOSSAD (Israeli intelligence) officers.
Nine days later, Reuter and Schulz were
arrested in their Nairobi apartment;
and on February 3, the five of them
were taken to a secret military camp in
Israel. They were transferred in a dis-
guised Israeli El Al airplane in bla-
tant violation of international law
since there were no extradition hear-
ings and Kenya does not have a bilat-
eral extradition treaty with Israel.
The five were held incommunicado and
interrogated for four months by the
Shin Beth (Israel's internal intelli-
gence organization) during which they
claim they were severely tortured to
extract confessions of guilt. It was
well over a year after their arrest
that they were charged with conspiring
to shoot down an El Al plane, and be-
fore their lawyer Lea Tsemel, who had
been retained by the Schulz family,
received confirmation from the Israeli
Defense ministry that Schulz was in
custody in Israel. Likewise, it took
the West German Foreign Ministry until
March 19, 1977 to notify the families
that their relatives had been detained
in Israel for over one year.
According to Brigitte Schulz, it is
very likely that West German police
and/or intelligence assisted the Isra-
elis. For example, after Schulz had
arrived in the Israeli camp, Shin Beth
officers showed her an extensive dos-
sier describing her political activi-
ties inside West Germany. Much of the
file dealt with her activities and her
concern with the denial of human rights
to political prisoners in-West Germany.
Presumably, the Israelis were given
this dossier by West German authorities.
in April 1977, an official from the
West German embassy in Israel was al-
lowed into the trial as the only out-
side observer. The families in West Ger-
many learned about the trial date from
the press. Professor Pierre Mertens, a
member of the Belgian League of Human
Rights, who was retained by the parents
to observe the trial, was prevented by
the Israeli government from attending
any court sessions.
The secret military tribunal was com-
posed of military and intelligence of-
ficers. One of the judges, in fact, was
a member of the military intelligence
unit that had extracted "confessions"
in the secret military camp. The secre-
tiveness and the lack of independence
between the judiciary and the police de-
partments violated international stan-
dards for a fair trial.
Two "cover papers" issued by consec-
utive Israeli Defense Ministers, Shimon
Peres and Ezer Weizman, forbade the de-
fendants from testifying on their behalf
about the circumstances surrounding their
arrests, extradition from Kenya, and
interrogation in Israel. The army fur-
ther denied Reuter and Schulz their
choice of attorneys and instituted a
variety of other measures eliminating
any possibility of justice.
At the same time, the Israeli govern-
ment realized that it was in a deli-
cate situation particularly since it
.was not able to provide convincing evi-
dence against the five defendants.
Pressed by growing international aware-
ness of the incident, the Israeli gov-
ernment attempted to strike a deal
with the two Germans: they should
plead guilty to charges of conspiring
to shoot down an El Al plane, and then
they wou,Zd be released after five
years imprisonment. Both refused to
accept this offer, termed "blackmail"
by Amnesty International, since they
saw it as an attempt to coerce them in-
to participating in a cover-up of the
true nature of the case.
On September 12, 1979, Brigitte
Schulz and Thomas Reuter were sentenc-
ed to ten years imprisonment. This was
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the public side of another. secret
agreement, which, unlike the previous
one, was proposed by Schulz and Reuter,
who saw it as the only possibility to
regain freedom in the foreseeable fu-
ture. They agreed to plead guilt to
non-specific "anti-Israeli activities"
in return for the government's drop-
ping of all other charges. Furthermore,
Israel was to agree, in writing,.to
their release in February 1981. The
Israeli government was compelled by
the increasing public-pressure to ac-
cept this proposal.
The fate of the three Palestinians
is still unresolved. Since the Israeli
authorities separated the German from
the Palestinian cases, no informa-
,tibn has been available. Their case
has continued on its original basis,
and it is generally presumed that
their sentences will be much harsher
than that of Brigitte Schulz and
'"Thomas Reuter.
This case-illustrates the Israeli
method for dealing with political oppo-
CIA-IMF-WORLD
BANK-AID:
COUNTER-
INSURGENCY IN
.THAILAND
By news broad
(Ed. note: Robin Broad is working on
her Ph.D. in Princeton University. She
has lived in Thailand, and written ex-
tensively on Southeast Asia.
,This article was completed before Gen-
eral Kriangsak stepped down as prime
minister in the spring of 1980. In his
place the Monarchy put General Prem
Tinsulanond. While cosmetic, this change
is not without significance. Strongly
backed by the royalists, Prem has made
initial'gestures indicating that his
administration will strive further to
accommodate foreign investment. More
over, Prem is shrewdly attempting to
incorporate within his administration
sition from abroad by citizens of other
countries. In the pest few years there
have been an increasing number of po-.
litical charges against foreigners. For
example, a Dutch man, Gerd Dessen, a
member of the Dutch Palestine Solidar-
ity Committee, was kidnapped on the
high seas between Lebanon and Cyprus,
by Israeli authorities and held for a
week in an Israeli prison. The Cypriot
journalist, Panayiotis Paschalis, was
arrested as a foreign agent for inter-
viewing Palestinians and Israelis.
Terre Fleenor and Sami Esmail, both
U.S. citizens and now free, were ar-
rested and sent to prison on charges of
aiding various alleged terrorist orga-
nizations.
it appears likely that this systemat-
ic, cross-border repression of any po-
litical opposition will continue for
Palestinians and foreigners alike un-
til the wider aspects of the regional
and international political situation
of Israel and the Arab world have been
resolved.
those nationalist factors among the
Bangkok, elite who could potentially
form an important component of the
Thai. left.)'
Anyone acquainted with the policies
of Thailand smiles in anticipation as
October rolls around, for October is
the month of coups in that Southeast
Asian country. Destabilitations of Thai
governments have played no small part
in that nation's history. Indeed, since
1932 when the absolute monarchy gave
way to a constitutional monarchy, Thai-
land has weathered the coming and going
of e~even constitutions, twelve elec-
tions, forty-two cabinets and fifteen
prime ministers. The last group has
been split between six military offi-
cers, ruling for a total of thirty-five
years, and nine civilians, whose rule
summed up a mere eleven years in com-
parison. Several of the civilian gov-
"arnments were, in actuality, puppets of
the military.
This article will concentrate-on how
the United Statgs, through the CIA and
its domination of both bilateral and mul-
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tilateral assistance institutions, has
profoundly influenced Thai domestic de-
velopment. Exposes in recent years of
American foreign policy in countries
like Iran and Chile have provided one
model ofU.S. orchestrated destabiliza-
tion -- the CIA 'led coup.
Thailand, however, provides a case
study of a more subtle and predominant
method of control and influence by U.S.-
led forces which cultivate domestic
forces to work in concert with U.S. in-
terests. Through this conditioning and
support, the United States has exercised
a-major role in instilling an authori-
tarian military tradition in Thailand
and in negating the possibility of a con-
stitutional, democratic tradition.
CHRONOLOGY -- THAILAND, 1932-1980
1932 - Constitutional monarchy estab-
lished by coup led by civilian/mili-
tary coalition. Civilian reformer, Dr.
Pridi Phanomyong heads government.
1933 - Military faction of coalition,
led by fhibun Songkram, takes over.
1940-1944 - Japanese forces occupy
Thailand.
1945 - Civilian rule, with Pridi as
prime minister, returns.
1947 - Military coup returns Phibun
as prime minister. Police General Phao
Siyanon ammasses power under Phibun.
1957 -.Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat
overthrows Phibun and Phao regizpe in a
military coup, ushering in reign of
despotic paternalism.
1963 - General Thanom Kittikachorn and
Prapas Churasatiara, power holders
under Sarit, take over after his death.
1973 - Massive demonstrations cause
fall of Thanom-Prapas regime. Three
year period of various civilian co-
alition governments introducing some
reforms.
1976 - Bloody massacre at Bangkok's,
Thammasat University. Military coup
ends "democratic period". Arch-con-
servative Thanin Kraivixien becomes
prime minister.
1977 - General Kriangsak Chamanand re-
moves Thanin in military coup.
1980 - Kriangsak resigns. Army CQmmand-
er-in-Chief Prem Tinsulanond chosen new
prime minister.
On one hand, this process in Thailand
-Will be shown to involve the grooming
of a reactionary military elite. Be-
ginning with the 1954 Geneva accords,
the National Security Council (NSC)
conceived of a strategy for Southeast
Asia that placed Thailand "as the fo-
cal point of U.S. covert and psycholog-
ical operations".1 The United States
has provided "generous" assistance pro-
grams to Thailand which have centered
around counterinsurgency.against
trumped up Communism. A police force
groomed by the CIA, and a military
spurred by the U.S. Department of De-
fense (DoD) have attempted to liquidate
any and all critical factions within
Thai society. The civilian bureaucracy
has been groomed to be technocratic,
apolitical and corrupt -- all charac-
teristics facilitating the U.S.-linked
military's domination of politics.
On the other hand, although rumblings
of popular discontent were a far cry
from an organized revolutionary move-
ment, when counterinsurgency efforts be-'
gan, as the repressive forces consoli-
dated, the outrage grew until the
prophesy of insurgency itself was'
fulfilled.While the Maoist liberation
movement (whose armed struggle was de-
clared in 1965) 'was only a part of the
popular discontent, the reactionary
forces, by refusing to differentiate
between this and the student, labor,
apd farmer movements, pushed all tIIe
"insurgents" into one category, poten-
tially providing them with a sense of
unity and strength. Likewise, the
lumping of liberal elements within the
society together with radical segments
as 'tlhe"enemy" created the possibility
of an insurgent backfire.
Behind the scenes, as will be shown,
a crucial component of the-expanding
repression has been programs of U.S.
economic, military and CIA assistance
as well as those of U.S.-dominated
multilateral aid institutions. Thirty
years ago, after Mao rose victoriously
in China to the great consternation of
the West, Thailand's geopolitical im-
portance led the U.S. to promote a
strategy that distorted Thai develop-
ment for U.S. interests. Unlike Burma,
Cambodia or Sri Lanka (then Ceylon),
Thailand was to become a "modernized"
state, serving as a' strong buffer
Communist Asia. The modernization pro-
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cess was to be of a very specific nature
one that would bring capitalism to the
rural areas and also lead those in po-
litical power to exploit their positions
through influence in the'most important
businesses.
In this way, national independence and
self-determination could be' undercut
from two sides -- first, from reliance
on American-led assistance institutions,
and second, from the expanding presence
of transnational corporations. American
interests in Thailand quickly grew to
be economic as well 'as political. In the
1960's, U.S. exports to Thailand
tripled, totaling $210 million in 1969,
17 per cent of total U.S. exports. One
third to one fourth of all foreign in-
vestment in Thailand was American at
that point in time. Geopolitically,
Thailand and Indochina together were
seen as the pivotal link to the riches
of the rest of Southeast Asia which in-
cluded not only tin, rubber, and coco-
nut, but also promises of oil. By 1975,
with Indochina "lost", Thailand had to
be held at all costs.
This article will trace the effects
of this U.S. interest and intervention
in Thailand on Thai dpmestic develop-
ment. First, the popular movements that
were set into motion by oppressive mili
eery rule will be examined with special
emphasis on their flourishing during.
the 1973 to 1976 "democratic period".
The next section will focus on how the
domestic elite were conditioned,
through U.S. programs, to react and
rule in the U.S.'s interests and in
ways that led to the polarization of
Thai society. The four international
actors whose Thailand involvement will
be analyzed include.U.S. economic and
military bilateral assistance, both
crucial in the first decades of this
pattern; and the World Bank and the in-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), both
of increasing importance later in Thai-
land's history. The last section will
return to the people's movements, ana-
lyzing the possibility of a resurgence
of popular strength capable of breaking
the tradition of reactionary military
rule.
The period between 1973 and 1976 did,
however, give the movements a chance to
'flare, and to test their powers... The
labor movement, previously weakened by
foreign assistance programs that sought
110
to divert labor's attention from polit-
ical demands and keep it focused on
apolitical, technical problems, untan-
gled its arms from-the hold of the coun-
terinsurgent Internal Security Opera-
tions Command (ISOC),6 and'discovered
its voice. Unionism, outlawed during the
1960's was legalized through the new
Constitution. Militant trade union ac-
tivity succeeded, in that three year pe-
riod, in raising the minimum daily wage
from 12 baht (U.S. $.60) to 25 baht
($1.25). In 1973 alone more than 126,000
workers participated in 32J strikes.7
THE PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT HISTORICALLY
Prior to the 1960's, the antigovern-
ment rebellion in Thailand was rather
limited and quiet.. Rumblings among the
dispossessed of the poorest northeast
region ("Isan"),' the hilltribe and Lao
population, were sporadic and unthreat-
ening enough to be virtually ignored
during the 1950's. During the 1960's,
however, counteriisurgency cloaked in
"modernization" programs wreaked havoc
on Thai society, stoking the fires of
the popular discontent and leading`to
violent outbursts in the north and
northeast.
The construction of U.S. airbases
in this area made the quieting of any
mass criticism even more crucial, and
repressive mechanisms were accelerated.
The process of repression and mass re-
actions has been cyclical. By 1965,
with the proclamation of armed libera-
tion struggle by the Communist Party
of Thailand (CPT), the Communist spec-
tre was, for the first time, a real
threat. By the early 1970's, half of
Thailand's provinces were designated
"sensitive" areas. 4
The purpose of this sectioh is to il-
lustrate how, by 1973, various elements'
within Thai society were pushed to?the
point of explosion, triggering the
transition to three years of non-mili-
tary,rule. Symbolically, it was the
central police station in Bangkok that
was set aflame by students during the
1973 demonstration leading to the fall
of the Thanom-Praspas military re-
gime.5 At that point, attacks on the
institution of the Thai"police served
as a link, unifying various liberal
and radical elements in. their outrage.
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Likewise, during rallies that followed
October 1973, students, farmers, and
workers continued to decry the sur-
veillance and subversion carried out
by the Special Branch police, the U.S.
trained political police. Joining the
students in 1973 were movements of
farmers and laborers which together
formed the key components of mass move-
ments that would be crushed by the
bloody October 1976 coup (but would
maintain their inner sense of strength
enough to resurface in'1979)'.
The Farmers Federation of ThailandIFFT)
founded by five or six farm leaders in
1974 began organizing the peasantry
which formed about 80 per cent of the
Thai populace. The organization spread
to 41 provinces, tying one and a half
million farmers together into a movement
of great potential strength. For the
first time ever, farmers marched en
masse to Bangkok protesting unfair land-
lord practices. Students set up seminars
in rural areas for government officials
and foreign development experts to ex-
plain their development programs to the
rural inhabitants who vocalized their
grievances and complaints. Development
was no longer forced upon silent victims.
The student movement clearly provided
the crucial catalyst. The National Stu-
dent Center of Thailand (NSCT), which
had been formed in 1970 to oppose the de-
teriorating economic and social condi-
tions foisted upon Thai society through
military rule, spread into-rural and la-
bor groups, and also backed candidates
for political office.
Nationalist Puey Ungphakorn (former
governor of the Bank of Thailand, with
close ties to the IMF-World Bank group)
served as rector of Thammasat University
and encouraged nationalistic teachings
in the classrooms.8 Students, proudly
wearing the blue work shirt of the
farmers, were charged both with a sense
of the need to set things right for Thai-
land and with an understanding of how
ties to labor and farmer movements pro-
vided the unified strength to do so.
A fourth component of these movements
was the CPT. According to a 1973 stu-
dent leader, the three pre-eminent
characteristics of the Thai student.move-
ment over the years -- independence, in-
volvement with social justice and fair-
ness, and a sense of how their society
should progress autonomously -- made it
difficult for any legal party to domi-
nate the student organizations.
The CPT, however, possessed these
three characteristics. It is not sur-
prising,. therefore, that, according to
this student leader, the CPT maintained
close contacts with the students after
1973 and found fertile ground for CPT's
"anti-establishment, pro-change" ideas.
The trust was both political and per-
sonal, the latter enhanced by the CPT
method of organizing which relied on
the pepsonal#y of an organizer, who
gave and received both friendship and
loyalty.
These combined popular movements had
profoundly cooling effects on foreign
investors. During the first half of
1974 alone, foreign investment dropped
50 per cent. Guerilla attacks forced the
shutdown of some foreign enterprises,9
and exposes of corruptly obtained con-
cessions scared other potential invest-
ors away.10
As the movements became more focused
towards fundamental change, the bour-
geoisie, which, had previdusly allied
with them, retreated. "To hold foreign
employers hostage, to demand the ouster
of foreign executives, to go on strike
all of this is enough to scare away.
all investors," bemoaned the Secretary
General of the Board of Investment.11
"Investors (are) frightened by some
groups which uncompromisingly oppose
foreign investment", added civilian
political leader Kukrit Pramoj, Prime
Minister in 1976. 12
All this changed, when the movements
were silenced by what Business Week
termed a "pro-business junta to calm...
to stabilize the country's economy". 13
The horrifying cruelty with which the
movements were crushed in the October
1976 coup was largely ignored by the U.S.
media. Massacres of those involved in
the popular movements -- labor and farm-
er representatives, student leaders and
progressive politicians (including Dr.
Boonsanong Poonyodyana, Secretary Gener-
al of the Socialist Party) had, in ac-
tuality, started as early as 1974. 14
But the hundreds of young students who
were shot, hung and burnt alive when
U.S.-trained Thai forces stprmed Bang-
kok's Thammasat University on that day
in October 1976 brought a shattering end
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.to the period of flourishing above-
ground movements. The FFT was outlawed;
the NSCT banned. the reactionary forces
had, for the time 'being, gained the up-
per hand. Still, in some university de-
partments, "40 to 661 per cent (of the
students) and a larger per cent of the
facult " fled to the hills to join the
CPT. 1 Thousands of others lived with
nightmarish memories of that brutal day.
U.S. MILITARY/CIA ASSISTANCE
The repression and authoritarian rule
that seems part and parcel of.recent
Thai history are not merely a function
of the "Oriental despot". Throughout,
these thirty years,,U.S. military and
CIA assistance has engendered these
characteristics within the Thai mili-
tary clique..
Right 4fter World War II, the United
States' intentions of maintaining a
close alliance with Thailand and turn-
ing her away from either Britain or
Japan became clear. It was Truman's
Ambassador Stanton who whispered to
Thai Prime Minister,Phibun -- at that'
point, totally illusory -- tales of
encroaching Communist subversion, pur-
ported to be especially strong among
intellectuals, students, priests, and
writers.16
Phibun's Police General Phao Siganon
emerged as a power figure,-and the CIA,
quickly forging close connections with
him, channeled funds and advice for
construction of a repressive police
apparatus, including the Border Patrol
Police..
All this was done quietly through
the Sea Supply Corporation (formally
called the Overseas Southeast Asia
Supply Company), a private company
based in Miami, Florida which was used
as a CIA front. The Sea Supply Corpo-
ration served as a conduit for the
$35 million of CIA money as well as
for retired U.S. military personnel
with close CIA links which together
transformed the Thai military police
force into paramilitary, counterinsur-
gency units.17 The operation was un-
doubtedly strengthened by the fact
that in 2952 William` Donovan, founder
'Of the Office of Strategic Services,
assumed the post of U.S. Ambassador
to Thailand.
12
While a U.S. Congressional restric-
tion of aid to foreign police forces
stood on the books, by 1954, through
CIA assistance, the Thai police force
had grown to a shocking ratio of one
for every 407 people (totalling 42,835
policemen).18
Although the Joint Military Assis=
tant Advisory Group (JUSNAG) was offi-
cially set up in 1953, during Phibun's
time it was the CIA that had the clos-
est Thai connections, and the Pentagon
strived for more direct influence, es-
pecially after "the 1953 Viet Minh in-
vasion of Laos pointed at the throat to
Thailand".-Z9, There was some popular
discontent expressed in Thailand during
Phibun's last few years of rule.
-Subsequently, the U.S./DoD gained
equal influence with the CIA in Thai-
land after Field Marshall Sarit, with
close DoD connections, staged a 1957
coup. Ten years later, Ambassador
Leonard Unger would look back and sum-
marize the official U.S. perception of
Thailand as a crucial strategic loca-
tion for large numbers of U.S. military
personnel:
"The.re is nowhere we have anything
like,, the kind of relationship we have
with Thailand. There is nowhere where
we have the possibility of establish-
ing these various facilities that are
of considerable interest to us..." ?0
The,statement hints at the strengthen-
ing of political links between the U.S.
and Thai military that occurred during
the rule of Sarit and that of his fol-
lowers, Thanom and Praspas.
With the establishment of the Mili-
tary Assistance Command to Thailand of-
ficially under the domain of the mili-
tary Advisory Command - Vietnam, it was
no secret that U.S. interests in Indo-
china were dictating U.S. strategic ob-
jectives and policy in Thailand.~1 U.S.
training of Thai officers widened in
scope as the latter were sent to U.S.
bases to study both conventional and
guerilla warfare.
A fervent disciple of Joe McCarthy
and believer in the domino theory,
Graham Martin,'U.S. Ambassador to Thai
land in the mid-sixties, promoted the
institutionalization of counterinsur-
gency (citing the expanding Communist
movement in South Vietnam) through
joint U.S.-Thai military maneuvers in
the northeast frontier in 1964. Negoti-
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ations between CIA Director William
Colby and Martin prompted the expansion
of the role CIA a~dviogrs played with
the Thai Border Patrol Police.22
Martin's initiative was followed up by
Praspas in the 1965 establishment of
the Communist Suppression Operations
Command (CSOC, the predecessor of ISOC).
Instead of CIA-funding of the police
force, it was now the United States Op-
erations Mission (USOM, the predecessor
of AID in Thailand) that financed the
police's rural security operations --
to the tune of almost $1100 million be-
tween 1967 and 1972.23 U.S. economic
and military assistance merged to cre-
ate a repressive police and military
apparatus, focused on an insurgency that
was still at this point of small mag-
nitude.
Between 1967 and 1972, approximately
30,000 Thais in military, police and
paramilitary units were given training
by the U.S. Green Berets. Within ' "enemy"
lines, however, as a Thai National Secu-
rity Council White Paper on the insur-
gency indicated, from 1966 to 1967 only
687 Thai communists received paramili-
tary training in Vietnam, while in the
earlier period from 1952 to 1957, merely
65 CPT members attended China's Marx-
Lenin Institute for theoretical train-
ing.24
The extensive training of such a coun-
terinsurgency-oriented Thai military
was useful to the U.S. in Korea and
Vietnam as well as in Laos and Cambodia.
Moreover, as the Vietnam era spawned a
massive U.S. presence in Thailand -- at
its height accounting for 40 per cent of
the Thai GNP 25 -- polarization and dis-
content within Thai society increased,
vastly strengthening the insurgency for
which the U.S. had prepared the Thai
Ddlitary.
Thai Foreign Minister during the years
of this multiplying U.S. presence,
Thanat Khoman, later wrote that the bas-
es construction agreement was conducted
without any input from the civilian
part of the government. It was simply Fa
matter of consent between the U.S. and
Thai military elite.26 The U.S. had .
set a pattern for future rule in Thai-
land -- encouraging the military elite
while weakening any civilian legisla-
tive structure and initiative.
The reversal of Thai domestic poli-
tics in 1973 sparked shifts in U.S. bi-
lateral assistance to Thailand. In a
show of keen loyalty, the U.S. mili-
tary assistance soared after 1973, to-
talling around $150 million for the
three year period. On the other hand,
although the divilian governments
spoke of priorities for development
that appeared to coincide with the of-
ficial U.S. economic assistance rheto-
ric, there was no word of encourage-
ment for the Thai democratic experi-
ment. Indeed, economic assistance
plummeted from $39 million in 1973 to
$17 million in 1975.27
While the civilian government under
Kukrit pledged the withdrawal of all
U.S. troops from Thailand after the
Vietnam fiasco, an irritated U.S., in-
tent on maintaining at least its 18
electronic listening sites, sought out
the Thai military for assistance. This
time it was General Kriangsak
Chamanand (proving himself to be an
American friend) and Air Marshall
Thawee who bypassed the civilian gov-
ernment in signing the agreement which
kept American troops on Thai soil.28
The U.S., however astounded by the
chain of Thai political events in 1973,
was not without continuing allies in
the police and military forces it had
helped to build in the earlier decades.
Through U.S. help, the police force
alone had swelled to 82,000 in 1975.
As U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment (AID) Director Daniel Parker
confided in testimony before the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on June 11.,
1974:
"Upward of 9,000 police are sta-
tioned in about 1,000 village po-
lice stations. Fifty-four fifty-five
men provincial action force
units were specially trained and
equipped to augment police presence
at village and district posts. The
Border Patrol Police has been in-
creased from about 7,000 men in
1965 to present strength of 14,000
in view of the growing importance
of its counterinsurgency mission.
The mobility of police elements has
been improved with public safety ad-
visor assistance in the creation of
the Police Aviation Division of 75
fixed wing and rotary wing air-.
craft." 29
On top of this, the increasing military
assistance during the 1973 to 1976 peri-
13.
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od was justified by and in turn rein-
forced the rabid anti-Communist view of
the U.S. Secretary'of Defense Elliot
The "Village Scouts", created by the
Border Patrol police, provided a para-
military rural security force:34 Thus,
Richardson explained to the Senate Armed the U.S.-groomed Thai military spawned
Forces Committee in 1974:
"Priority is given to the advisory
effort and the Military Assistance
Program to support of Thai counterin,
surgency plans and programs. Approxi-
mately 300 U.S. advisers are-partici-
pating in training and advising of
Thai forces."30
The liberalization of.Thai society during
this period was thus watched by this
broadly focused counterinsurgency effort
led by the Thai military elite.'i'General
Kaiyut Koedphon, deputy head of CSOC and
a close ally of the CIA, admitted that
the CIA-was collaborating with a variety
of Thai security agencies, including CSOC,
during this period. Similarly, Deputy__..
Director of Police,,Withun Yasawat, said
he was. receiving CIA advice and reports
as late as 1974.31{
During'this period, the U.S. also
turned increasingly to a subtler conduit
for funds to the Thai National Police De-
partment -'the International Narcotics
Control (INC) program. Established by
President Nixon in 1971, the INC progr
channeled 12.1 million to Thailand be-
tween 1973 and 1976, supplying help sim-
ilar to that of the old controversial
AID Office of Public Safety, whicP, with
the CIA had previously directed U.S.
police training programs for foreign na-
tionals.32
A General Accounting Office (GAO) re-
port to Congress in 1976 made the links
between the INC, money and Thai repres-
sive mechanism quite clear, quoting a
U.S,.Embassy official in Bangkok who ad-
mitted: "It will be almost impossible to
insure that commodities furnished will
be used exclusively for controlling nar-
cotics."33
American indoctrination of the CSOC
and the Border Patrol Police during the
1960's produced U.S.-desired objec-
tives. "Nawaophon", created by ISOC
officers who in turn had close contacts
with the CIA, employed covert tactics
to search out "subversive" elements
.within the Thai population. "Krathing
Daer" (Red Gaurs), also an ISOC cre-
ation, was led by Col. Sudsal
Batsadinthon whose mercenary history.
included working with the CIA to orga-
nize the Moo tribesmen in Laos.
14
its own institutions of terror, whose
vicious activities against the liberal
and progressive elements in Thai soci-
ety increased polarization and brought
tensions towards a breaking point. The
three paramilitary vigilante groups,
along with 4,000 units of the Border
Patrol Police and the Metropolitan Po-
rice,. seemed delighted at the opportu-
nity to storm Bangkok's Thammasat Uni-
versity'in 1976.3'
Under Thaninand Kriangsakinstru-
ments of repression were expanded. In
1977, 40 per cent of the Thai budget
was geared towards counterinsurgency.
U.S. military assistance followed its
same old pattern, simply at an accel
.erated rate. Indeed, the current mili-
tary.build-up in Thailand, purported
to be in response to Vietnamese expan-
sionism, began in 1976. Today, the
U.S. is quietly re-assigning military
personnel to Thailand -- including
U.S.,Army, Air Force and Navy person-
nel In civilian clothing, and CIA
specialists 37-- while verbally re-
iterating past pledges of support and
increasing military aid.38 As in the
late 1960s a heightened U.S. pres-
ence in Thailand, with-its concomitant
polarization of that society, is only
serving.to exacerbate the tensions
and the repression, bringing "insur-
gency" to a head.
U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
While U.S. military assistance has
more blatantly encouraged the pattern of
authoritarian military rule in Thailand,
U.S. economic assistance has served to
buttress and accentuate this trend in
Thai domestic politics. Throughout mod-
ern Thai history, the latter has"perhaps
been as dangerous, in that its humanitar-
ian rhetoric offers a useful, deceptive
cloak. As already discussed, large
chunks of the post-World War II econom-
ic assistance directly financed the
training and equipping of a police force
for counterinsurgency. Other parts of
the economic aid package served comple-
mentary functions. -
The 1950 Economic and Technical Cooper-
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ation Agreement between Thailand and the
U.S. served as an indication of things
to come. Allen Griffen, former deputy di-
rector of the U.S. aid mission to China,
traveled to Thailand to establish the
program. His words conveyed the influence
that Mao's recent triumph would have on
Washington's Thailand policy: "There is
hardly any important economic urgency.
There is political urgency... A country
that has come out solidly for the West,
Thailand needs prompt evidence that its
partnership is valued." 39
With Sarit in power, the strategy be-
came focused and project assistance be-
gan. "Nation building" was the name of
the game. The Council on Foreign Rela-
tions rationalized that this very specif-
ic sort of aid program would effect the
changes necessary to insure "stability
and permit internal development, and ...
security to prevent a take-over by in-
ternational communism".40
A top U.S. economic aid official's
earlier warning that "a quick gesture
calculated to impress Government leaders
and the people -- particularly the edu-
cated elite ...-- may produce more de-
sirable political results than a long
range economic project" 41 was borne in
mind as foreign advisers and technicans
trained Thai technocrats. Thai nationals
sent abroad through U.S. aid to gain
training returned to assume. the role of
"Western"advisers in government econom-
ic agencies.
One month after Vice President Lyndon
Johnson's visit to Thailand in May 1961,
AID Director, Henry L. Labuisse an-
nounced that, in accordance with the
Kenncdy administration's "new look" in
economic aid programs, all supporting
assistance to Thailand would be drawn
to a close by mid-1961. Such official
optimism about Thailand's economic fu-
ture was not long lived, however. U.S.
aid experts in.Thailand launched a se-
ries of politically-motivated protests,
including a number of telegrams from
staunchly anti-Communist Ambassador
Young, filled kvith warnings of a com-
munist insurgency that was sure to
sprout in the northeast in the near fu-
ture.
One such classified telegram from the
U.S. Embassy.to the U.S. Secretary of
State included the following appeal:
"Thailand could become another Viet
nam. We hope public pressures at
home will not force penny-wise and
pound.-foolish reductions in our aid
effort here while communists make
continuing headway in spreading
their influence in the countryside.
In candidness, all this in Thailand
in 1962/63 is beginning remind me'
uncomfortably of U.S. cutbacks and
delays in Vietnam in 1959/60 just be-
fore Viet Cong sprang.terror and in-
surgency on peaceful recovering coun-
tryside." 42
Not surprisingly, an official economic
rationalization for continued eco-
nomic assistance to Thailand was voiced
anew, with a fresh Congressional twist
directing programs to the northeast re-
gion. 43
Out of this grew a variety of rural
development programs, the foremost of
which was termed Accelerated Rural De-
velopment (ARD). The American who con-
ceived the program explained:
"Economic development is, after all,
one of the best counterinsurgency
weapons we have. if we develop among
the rural people a friendship and
loyalty towards their government, we
shall have gone a long way toward
making it possible for them to resist
communist subversive attempts from
the outside."44
The complementarity of such a program
wit)? militaristic counterinsurgency pro-
grams was not lost on the Thai govern-
ment who viewed the program as provid-
ing a means "to win over and sometimes
win back our villagers".45 The program,.
as implemented did little more than
provide basic material infrastructure.
With 90 per cent of its budget.financ-
ing highway building,46 the theory
seemed to be that by expanding the
reach of capitalism's clutches and
lures while increasing the mobility of
the military, anti-Communist forces
would be able to prevail.
By 1969 the acting Director of USOM
could boast to the U.S. Congress that
two-thirds of the Fiscal Year 1969 pro-
grain was "directly oriented to counter-
insurgency". 47 What that meant was
that programs could have been of some
help in alleviating daily problems of
small northeastern farmers, such as the
proposed Bank for Agriculture and Agri-
cultural Cooperatives, could be and
`Id
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were vetoed on the grounds that they
were potentially incompatible with the
counterinsurgency objectives.48
The 1968 'U.S: AID 'Program 'in Thailand
booklet made no.bones about the purpose
of economic assistance to that country:
"The U.S. AID program in Thailand is
concentrated upon a single objective:
supporting the Royal Thai Government in
its efforts to contain, control and
eliminate the Communist insurgency in
rural areas." 49
Alongside rural development, the oth-
er crucial component of this goal in-
volved creating a civilian bureaucracy
which would view development problems
in a similar vein. This necessitated a
spreading of technocratic capabilities
-- but only among certain factions of
the elite. A program to work with the
new, Parliament in 1970 and 1971, for
instance, was vetoed. Parliaments, AID
decided, did not fit in with counterin-
surgency.
Other segments of the bureaucracy and
the military did. USOM and AID reports
seldom failed to mention how receptive
Thais were to Western influence, a fa-
vorable comparison to former colonial
nations experimenting with the voicing
of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist
aspirations', Neocolonialism, it ap.?
peered, had emerged in Thailand without
formal colonial rule, making the whole'
process of continuing and increasing
Western influence much easier.
1973 shook-this view for a time. In
an environment hostile to the aims of
its practicioners, economic assistance
dropped sharply, with only the security
component gaining importance. Ironical-
ly, the democratic period included the
most genuine attempt to institute de-
centralization through Kukrit's Tampon
Development Funds, a program that was
halted immediately after the civilian
parliament procedure was destabilized.
With authoritarian rule back in place
in 1976, AID plunged ahead, increasing
.its commitment to nine times the 1975
level in 1977 ($98.4 million). 50 The
U.S. "seal of 4pproval" was widely
publicized by the Thai regime.
The CIA's direct links with AID in
Thailand during the Vietnam War period
appear to have stopped, but this did
not change AID's objectives,of provid-
4ng counterinsurgency support for re-
actionary military regimes. The 1979
AID Country Development'Strategy State-
ment noted that an important problem
for Thailand to overcome, if it was to
attract foreign itfvestment, was,"the
frequent turnover of governments". U.S.
Ambassador Abramowitz's introductory.
remark to the report put the request
for the-aid program in its geopolitical
context:
"The Thai place high value on that
(U.S:) support for their development
program... Recent events (in Indo-
china) have further enhanced the po-
tential value of any early demonstra-
tion of that sustained U.S: effort."51
AID's projects continue to be built
upon the intertwining of economic de-
velopment and counterinsurgency. The
government followed AID advice in re-
grouping rural cooperatives on the
ampor (district) level rather than at
the village level as in the early 1970s.
Any potential grassroots strength in
the coops was therefore squashed. Sim-
ilarly, AID has sought to encourage the
growth of conservative, pro-government
"non-government organizations" (NGOs)
that concentrated on apolitical, tech-
nical problems; while ignoring those'
more progressive NGOs trying to solve
basic problems through people's par-
ticipation.
? Two representatives from Thai NGOs to
the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian
Reform and Rural Development, whose
trips were financed by AID, were chosen
on the Thai, government's recommendation.
Needless to say, it was the government-
corrupted groups who, received the honor.
Other programs have brought community
development teachers from the north and
northeast regions to Bangkok for two-
months courses in counterinsurgency.
The Mae Chaem "opium replacement"
project, still in planning stages as of
1August 1979, provides an illustration
of AID's development goals for the
1980s. Officially, the project was to
promote the desire of both Thai and U.S.
governments to, turn hilltribes from opi-
um growers into commercial crop mar-
keters.52 TYowever, reliable statistics
reveal that the actual magnitude of opi-
um growing in the Mae Chaem watershed
was, far below the preliminary AID re-
port's estimates.'
When questioned on these statistics,
ig
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the AID rationale for the project was
Switched to one of "good watershed man-
agement" with opium replacement as a
small subgoal. The more likely objec-
tive was counterinsurgency, for as the
Bangkok Post reported:
"Over half the fifty-man militia
force in Mae Chaem District have quit
and the rest are in poor spirits be-
cause of the threats against their
lives by Communist insurgents."
The Governor, the story continued, an-
nounced plans to launch "civic action
under the Mae Chaem River Basin Pro-
gramme to win back the loyalty of Com-
munist sympathizers".53 It therefore
should not have come as a. surprise to
find that the one American consultant
pushing for an expansion of people's
participation in this "opium-replacement
project" was quickly dropped from the
team.
The pattern of support provided by
U.S. economic assistance in Thailand,
although gaining in rhetorical sophisti-
cation, remains the same as in the de-
cades past. As one Western diplomat
told the New York Times, "The Thais are
the best friends money. can buy".54
Since its founding after World war II,
the World Bank, with an array of pro-
jects paralleling AID's, has buttressed
American interests in Thailand. A World
Bank funding request to the U.S. Con-
gress made clear in whose camp the Bank
lay:
"From U.S. national point of view,
these banks encourage development
along lines compatible with our own
economy. They stress the role of mar-
ket forces in the effective alloca=
tion of resources and the development
of outward-looking trading economies...
Our participation in the international
banks will also provide more assured
access to essential raw materials, and
a better climate for U.S. investment
in the developing world.... Most of
the total lending...is to countries...
where we have strong interests..."55
A strong relationship between the Bank
and Thailand's military regimes began
with a 1957-1958 World Bank mission that
led Sarit to form the National Economic
and Social Development Board (NESDB),
the central planning organization whose
technocrats were molded into the World
Bank view of efficiency and development.
With Sarit's attack on Thai inefficiency
and his ushering in the era of private
enterprises in Thailand, the World Bank
sought to pave the way for the penetra-
tion of international capitalism. The
new Industrial Act promulgated'in 1960
followed the advice, offering guarantees,
privileges, and benefits to foreign in-
vestors.56
World Bank projects during the 1960s
maintained a strong emphasis on counter-
insurgency through rural development, in
keeping with Washington's priorities.
The World Bank took over the funding of
infrastructure projects in 1965, provid-
ing the government with better access to
remote areas of the country where resis-
tance was strong.
In the early 1970s, however, the World
Bank voiced,grave doubts about the grow-
ing instability in Thailand. During
those years, the Bank expressed disap-
proval of such liberalizing policies a97
the raising of the minimum wage level.
The 1977-1980 Kriangsak reign wit-
nessed a surge of World Bank projects
that strived to restore an imposed
stability both to sensitive rural ar-
eas and to Thailand's capitalist econ-
omy. The World Bank-funded Village
Development Program, with its goal of
providing heightened penetration of
villages in the Thai-Malay and Thai-
Kampuchean border areas where the Com-
munist Party was strong, echoed the
AID thrust. Funds were channeled to
credit institutions providing loans to
already well-off peasants (rather than
small farmers) in the hopes of creat-
ing a kulak class serving as a bulwark
against Communism. These programs, in
actuality, aggravated rural-tensions
by quickening the formation of a class
of landless peasants, a phenomenon un-
known to Thailand historically, yet
now comprising almost 30 per cent of
all households, almost two times the
urban population.58
In February of 1979, when Kriangsak
journeyed~to Washington to receive the
blessing of President Carter, he se-
cured just as decisive backing from
World Bank President Robert McNamara
who assured him that loans to Thailand
would double in the next year. Further-
more, World Bank analysts told
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Kriangsak that his country had the ca-
pacity to absorb five times the level
of loans at that point. That the World
Bank anticipated variations on AID's
counterinsurgency rural development
strategies was obvious in the World
Bank 1978 Country Report entitled "To-
wards a Development Strategy of Full
Participation";
"The government's efforts to im-
prove national security through its
ARD program is a reflection of the
fact that insurgent activities in
the country are most frequent in those
areas where the bulk of the population
have been left behind by the growth
process. Further efforts to bring
those...into the mainstream of econom-
ic growth would establish a healthier
economy and a more stable political
situation." 59
Unlike many former colonies, Thailand
seldom experienced balance of payment
deficits in the first two decades after
World War II. There was, therefore,
little opportunity for the Internation-.
al Monetary Fund (IMF) to lay down the
ground rules of Thai development by pro-
viding the stringent discipline that
has helped set the stage for enhanced
neocolonial grasps in neighboring
countries like the Philippines.
This is not to imply that during the
1950s and 1960s the U.S. dominated IMF
did not assume an important consul-
tative role in advising highly recep-
tive technocrats as to what sort of pol-
icies would please the West. Indeed, in
the 1950s and 1960s after IMF consulta-
tion, Thailand undertook major changes
in its exchange rate policy.60 Annual
IMF mission visits and special techni-
cal missions (on such topics as fiscal
tariff and financial structure) rein-
forced the ideologically conservative
economic skills of the economic plan-
ners, while encouraging Governor of the
Bank of Thailand, ,Duey to fit the Bank
of Thailand more securely into the inter-
national capitalist structure.
By 1976, however, with the long chain
of foreign loans and the turmoil of the
1973 to 1976 period, Thailand's balance
of payments situation had deteriorated
badly. The Thanin-Kriangsak governments
were not simply borrowing more from cap-
ital markets and public sources, they
were seeking to draw extensively of the
IMF facilities for the first time in
Thai history. The series of IMF loans
-- $68 million for the 1976 Compensato-
ry Finance Facility, the same again in
1977, $32 million for the Reserve Trench
in 1978 and. $45 million for the r?irst
Credit Trench in 1979 -- came easily,
but-so did enforcement of borrowing
stipulations, including targets for
growth, price-levels and credit, and
policies to liberalize import bans, tax
laws affecting foreign banks and conces-
sions to foreign capital.
With the most recent two-year Standby
Credit-Agreement for up to $600 million,
Thailand has surrendered even more of,
its economic management.61 There is
talk of the establishment of a resident
IMP mission in Bangkok to oversee the
policies more closely, as well as ru -
mors of a decision to opt for the IMF's
stringent Extended Fund Facility in
1982. Thailand's changing philosophy
towards more direct international con-
trol and assistance is revealing of the
secure domestic foundation that the
Thai military rule lacks. Cooperation
with international actors has been the
elite approach to maintaining security
and building up prosperity. Such pat-
terns have been followed before in Thai-
land's past, with little but adverse
ramifications for the Thai people.
While the mass mdvements of 1973 and
the brutal repression that the reac-
tionary forces launched against them
have been well documented, there has
been little international recognition
of renewed popular discontent surfac-
ing in Thailand today. Although after
October 1976, no more than five people
could legally congregate without spe-
cial government permission, the re-
birth of worker militancy is evident
in the recent wave of strikes at large
,and medium-scale businesses in Bangkok.
Employers fire the striking laborers
at the flick of a wrist, and labor
organizers are arrested almost as rap-
idly by the regime's police force, but
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the labor militants appear not to be
dissuaded.
In summer 1979, as oil prices soared
to the point of putting a subsistence
diet out of the reach of common labor-
ers? 10,000 people gathered to,decry
the oil price increases in spite of a
government warning that they were vio-
lating Martial Law.62 The site was
Sanam Luang, the huge field directly
across from Thammasat University cam-
pus where the last demonstrations in
Thai history had ended in tragedy. Al-
though it was officially organized by
the Labor Congress of Thailand, reli-
able sources indicate that the alliance
behind the rally included student
groups. The speeches by labor leaders
were fiery and quickly strayed from
the narrow subject of oil to a broad-
ened analysis of the roots of Thai
problems, focusing not only on the
current government, but also on for-
eign capitalists.
Kriangsak reacted to the rally with
moderation rather than risk a growing
radicalization of the movements. The
minimum wage was increased to 45 baht
per day for the Bangkok area (still far
below what the workers were asking),
and, later in the year, the govern-
ment backed down from a proposed elec-
tricity price hike of 55 per cent as
protest spread.63
The July 1979 assassination of
Chamras Muangyarm, an ex-president of
the FFT and one of the few farmer lead-
ers who had neither been killed nor
fled to the jungles after October 1976,
indicates that something was stirring
in the mobilization of the peasantry
once again. Chamras was said to have
been in the process of revitalizing
the FFT by attempting to provide a cru-
cial link between the 50 farmer leaders
alive (and not in the hills) today.
At this point, the conditions of the
rural areas have deteriorated to the
point where movements are beginning
almost spontaneously. With annual per
capita income in Bangkok approximately
$600 as against the northeast where
the figure is $90,64 the large rural-
urban disparities focus the farmers'
complaints. The repression that greets
the protests only serves to intensify
and enlarge the scope of?the rural
outrage.
The resurging student movement in
1979 is one that has grown in caution
and sophistication as well as determi-
nation as a result of its bloody histo-
ry. Through an ad hoc alliance, the
students have moved on to political con-
scientizing events. Their leaflets and
lectures on the international forces be-
hind the oil price hikes spread out onto
the Bangkok streets. They joined workers
to protest a proposed bus far increase.
Thammasat once again has become the
hub where critical students from Bang-
Jok's universities congregate. Radical
bands mix the old, now outlawed lyrics
with the new in daring defiance since
the new musicians know well that the
leaders of the old bands were among the
first to be killed by repressive forces
during the democratic period. It is not
as easy to get official permission to
use Thammasat auditorium as it was in
those days, but every official assembly
is used to make a political statement.
One of the skits in the Law Day
program, for instance, revealed the
depth of anger and agony that Chamras'
assassination provoked among the stu-
dents with whom he had been very popu-
lar. The play, depicting an unmistak-
able re-enactment of Chamras' assassi-
nation to anyone familiar with the de-
tails of his death, extended into the
imaginary realm by ending with Chamras'
children joining the CPT.
While the resurgence of progressive
activity has been occurring on all
fronts in 1979/80, the only well publi-
cized event internationally, has been
the split within the Communist Party
of Thailand. Some of the intellectuals
who fled to the hills in 1976 -- the
potentially powerful leaders, accord-
ing to most views -- have broken away
to form a pro-Vietnam faction that may
evolve into a new Communist Party. The
split is less over Indochina loyalties
than over the question of revolution-
ary tactics suitable for the Thai re-
ality. The new group, arguing what has
beed dubbed the "Soviet line" (as op-
posed to the CPT's "China line"), be-
lieve that Thai society has advanced
to the stage of possessing a national
bourgeoise large enough to be used as
the vanguard of the revolution.
The government would like to view
the split as an indication that prob-
lems with the guerilla insurgency are
-drawing to a close. The view, needless
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to say, is far from accurate. First of
all, most of those leaving the CPT are
not returning to the government's out-
stretched arms, but to other growing
movements
More importantly, however, the CPT
will undoubtedly remain a force that
has to be reckoned with since it has
mass support from rural areas as well as
from the majority of progressive stu-
dents. The split is not a major one for
the CPT whose'seven person Politburo re-
mains intact, and there are indications
that the Party maintains enough flexi-
bility to learn from past mistakes.
One would like to be able to view
these mounting movements with optimism.
Yet, the outpouring of repression
against popular movements has been too
well indoctrinated into reactionary
forces in Thailand through these de-
cades of counterinsurgency programs for
that sort of confidence to exist. .
Government'control is being tight-
ened these days. "Communist" books are
now being seized at the Bangkok air-
port. News of popular demonstrations
in Iran and Nicaragua is the main tar-
get of the newly-formed censorship
committee for international news re-
ports, a committee which includes mem-
bers of the U.S.-trained Special
Branch Police. The CIA appears to be
aiding this increased surveillance.
According to a reliable source, CIA-
affiliated U.S, academicians are re-
ceiving appointments in the depart-
ments of Bangkok universities where
some of the government's more vocal
critics teach, and study.
As social and economic conditions
deteriorate, the military regime is
experiencing increasing., political in-
stability. Should a popular movement
replay the events of 1973, it seems
probable that the pattern of ensuing
repression through a. reactionary back-
lash will also be followed.
U.S. interests in Thailand have ex-
panded even further today. Not only
has the U.S. recently, edged out Japan
in applications for new, foreign in-
vestment but also the U.S. needs the
reassurance of knowing that Thai pow-
-er rests in the(hands of friendly
generals who allow America to accel-
erate its covert and overt Southeast
Asian activities from Thailand's stra-
tegic location.65 The favor is likely
20
to continue to be granted in exchange
for further increases in military and
economic assistance programs to Thai-
land, often geared to counterinsurgency
-- which will, in turn, only renew ten-
sions within the population.
It seems likely that, at some point
in the near future, a truly successful
popular movement, with a stronghold
among the farmers, will break this pat-
tern of force and counterforce. If
from nothing else, such optimism
arises from the awareness of the endur-
ing,'and ever-expanding strength and
commitment within those Thais leading
the fight for true self-determination.
1) Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The Washington
Connection and Third World Fascism, South End
Press, Boston, 1979, p.229, quoting National Se-
curity Council, 5429/2, 8/20/1954
2) Sarit was on the boardof directors of 22 dif-
fermi companies.
3) "Thailand in a Changing Asia", Indochina
Chronicle, May-June 1975, p.3
4) Southeast Asia Chronicle, Nov.-Dec. 1978, p.23
The Communist Party itself was established in the
1940s; the armed struggle launched in 1965.
5) Thomas Lobe, United States Security Policy and
Aid to the Thai Police, Monograph Series in World
Affairs, Volume 14, University of Denver, Colora-
do Seminary, Denver, 1977, p.115
6) For more about ISOC, formerly called CSOC, see
military assistance section of this article.
7) Far Eastern Economic Review, 10/18/74; Indo-
china Chronicle, May-June 1975, p.4
8) Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, Best Wishes for Asia,
Klett Thai Publications/Znterpart Thailand Li-
mited, Bangkok, 1975
9) Time (European edition), 5/26/75
10) David Elliott, Thailand: The Political Econo-
m1 of Underdevelopment, Unpublished Thesis for MA
of Social Sciences, Institute of Social Studies,
The Hague, July 1975, p.62
11) Indochina Chronicle, lay-June 1975, p.6
12) A,Turton, J. Fast and M.. Caldwell, Thailand:
Roots of Conflict, 2ussell Press Ltd, Nottingham,
England, 1978, p.86
13) Business Week, 11/8/76
14) Thirty-seven leaders of FFT were assassinated
between April 1975 and March 1976. Dr.
Boonsanong's death remains shrouded with indica-
tions of a CIA-aided plot, complete with a young
woman, fluent in Thai, supposedly doing research
in northern Thailand.
15) of supra, 9 5, p.122
16) Frank C. Darling, Thailand and the United
States, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C.,
1965, p.168
17) Thadeus Flood, The United States and the Mi-
litar Coup in Thailand: A Background Study, In-
dochina Resource Center, Washington, D.C., 1976,
p. 1;` cf supra # 5, p.23
18) cf supra # 1, p.22
19) cf supra # 11, p.11
20) U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Secu-
rity Agreements and Coamiittments Abroad, Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee, 1969
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21)
of supra #
17, p.2
22)
of supra #
5, p.48
23)
J. Alexander Caldwell, American Economic Aid
to Thailand, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, MA,
1974, pp.19,46
24) of supra # i7, p.2
25) 'Southeast Asia Chronicle, Dec. 1978, p.22
26) of supra # 17, p.2
27) of supra # 12, p.29; WIN Magazine; 10/21/76
See next section on economic assistance.
28)
of supra
#
12, p.88
29)
of supra
#
3, p.13.
30)
Michael
T.
Klare, Supplying Repression:
U.S.
Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad,
Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.,
1977 quoting U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization for
Military Pr rocureement He rrings,,93rd Congress,
1st Session, 1973, Part I, p.163
31) of supra # 17, quoting reports from the
Thai press
32) of supra # 30, ).26,29
33) Controller of the U.S., Stopping U.S. As-
sistance to Foreign Police and Prisons, Report
to Congress, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 1976
34) see of supra # 8, p.10; and of supra # 1,
pp.224-225
35) Chaianan Samudavanija and David Morell, Re-
forms, Reaction and Revolution: Political Con-
flict in Thailand (unpublished manuscript),
chapter 12
36) of supra # 12, p.95
37) Manchester Guardian Weekly, 12/2/79, p.7,
quoting one Asian embassy's analyst and a mili-
tary analyst from Western Europe; Business Week
11/26/79, p.63
38) U.S. agreed in early 1979 to increase mili-
tary aid to Thailand by $6 million during that
fiscal year. Thailand Information Center,
2/15/79, p.4
39) of supra # 23, p.4
40) As quoted in Southeast Asia Chronicle, Nov.-
Dec. 1978, p.23. The statement was made in 1960.
41) of supra # 23, p.39
42) U.S. Embassy/Bangkok, Telegram to Secretary
of State, 3/30/63 (now declassified)
43) Chira Charoenloet, The Evolution of Thai-
land's Economy, Thai Watana Panich Press Co.Ltd.,
Bangkok, 1971, pp.53
44) of supra # 23, p.135
45)'Prasong Sukham, Secretary General of ARD Of-
fice in Thailand; "Talk to Rotary Clob", Bangkok,
1966, as quoted in of supra # 23, p.137
46) of supra # 12, p.117; Ralph Thaxton,"Noder-
nization and Counter-revolution in Thailand'
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,?Dec. 1973,
p.32
47) of supra # 23, p.50
48) see of supra # 23
49) Ralph Thaxton,"Mtodernization and Counter-
revolution in Thailand.' But etin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Dec. 1973, p.32
50) of supra # 12, p.89
51) U.S. AID, Country Development Strategy State-
ment, Bangkok, Jan. 1979, p.24 and introductory
remarks
52) Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/14/79, p.42
53) Bangkok Post, 7/31/79
54) As quoted in Indochina Chronicle, may-June
1975, p.17
55) U.S. Department of Treasury, Statement of
John A. Bushnell, Deputy Director for Developing
Nations Before Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
of the House Appropriations Committee, 3/16/76,
pp.2-5
56) of supra # 43, p.68
57) Far Eastern Economic Review, 10/18/74
58) Far Eastern Economic Review, 7/13/79 , p.48
59) World Bank, Thailand: Toward a Development
Strategy of Full Participation, A Basic Economic
Report No. 2059-TH (confidential), East Asia and
Pacific Regional Office, World Bank, Bangkok,
Sept. 1978, pp.V,131
60) see Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, Finance and Commerce
-- Text of Address to American Chamber of Commerce,
The Commerce and Accounting Journal, doy.1963
61) Far.Eastern Economic Review, 12/14/79, pp.94
-96
62) The crowd estimates are from Bangkok Nation
(7/20/79). A huge rainstorm in the middle of the
rally dispersed the crowds while their numbers
were still growing making estimations difficult.
63) Far Eastern Economic Review, 12121/79, p.38
64) Business Week, 10/22/79, p.107
65) Thailand Update, Feb.79, p.4; Business America,
8113/79, p.12; The general need not be Kriangsak,
rohose cpntrol is shaky. Indeed, in the near future
it will likely be General Serm or General Prem who
leads the next reactionary military coup. Prem
seems the likeliest candidate since he possesses
the "youth", and the royal backing Serm lacks.
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U.S. AND NATO
BASES IN TURKEY
by Konrad Ego
(Ed. note: Konra.d'Ege is an indepen-
dent journalist. He has worked with
CounterSpy magazine for two years.
This article is the second in an on-
going series of the U.S. role in Turkey.
An article in the last issue detailed
the influence the CIA has over some
Turkish labor, unions through the Asian-
American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI).
An upcoming article, will explore the '
role that the CIA and the U.S. military
have. in suppressing progressive move-
ments in Turkey and in keeping Turkey
open,for U.S. corporations.)
"U.S. policy on military aid to Tur-
key... should be based on the necessity
of... strengthening Turkish efforts to
oppose communist pressure, and to pos-
sible utilization of Turkey for U.S.
strategic purposes." This is what the
CIA's Review of the World Situation
stated as early ads February 1949. At
that time, military collaboration be-
tween the U.S. and Turkey was already
running in high gear.
Three months after President Truman
had announced in his doctrine that Tur-
key and Greece needed to be protected
against internal communist subversion
and Soviet aggression, the U.S. and
Turkey signed an agreement, on military
Assistance. In 1950, the Turkish gov-
ernment sent 5,000 troops to fight on
the side of the U.S. in Korea. Two
years later, Turkey joined NATO, and in
1955, the Baghdad Pact, which was to
become CENTO after Iraq left the pact.
In,October 1959, the Turkish and the
U.S. governments concluded negotiations
about the stationing of nuclear weap-
ons there. The U.S. argued that this
was necessary from a military standpoint,
and the Turkish government allowed the
stationing of one squadron of Jupiter
missiles with nuclear warheads.
Even though it was stated in the agree-
ment that a decision about the launching
of nuclear missiles would have to be
agreed on by Turkey and the U.S., a re-
cently declassified State Department
telegram claimed that as of 1962, "the,
22
Turks really have no say over Jupiter
now because of custodial arrangements" -
that is, the U.S. had retained control
over the use of the missiles.
U.S. "rights" in Turkey go much fur-
ther. A 1959 treaty grants that "in case
of an aggression against Turkey, the U.S.
government, upon request, will take nec-'
essary steps ... including the use of
military force, for helping the Turkish
government". This phrasing is inten-
tionally vague..' What it means in prac-
tice is that if the pro-U.S. government
in Turkey is threatened by internal oppo-
sition - ruhioh, of course, can be inter-
preted as "Soviet backed" aggression -
and asks for (I S. troops, the U.S. mili-
tary could aid the Turkish rulers by
breaking strikes and demonstrations, and
would probably even occupy the country
to prevent a change in government.
Despite several disagreements and con-
flicts between the U.S. and Turkey. since
1962, the military collaboration between
the two countries was never seriously
endangered. The U.S. has built more
than 100 military and intelligence fa-
cilities on Turkish soil. The Turkish
government, controlled by a smallrul-
ing oligarchy, and by sectors of the
army, iizai4tained a deepening connection
with and dependency on the U.S. govern-
ment.
Opposition by large sectors of the
Turkish society to the U.S., presence in
Turkey and Turkey's NATO membership,, as
well as to the increasing economic domi-
nation of the U.S., has.become more and
more substantial over the years. The
Turkish government, with logistical sup-
port from the U.S., has responded with
brutal repression and continues its cam-
paigns against progressive movements.
February 1975 saw the most serious
crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations, when
the U.S. Congress banned all arms sales
to Turkey in retaliation for the Turkish
military action in Cyprus.. The Turkish
government responded by closing most of
the U.S. military and intelligence bases.
in spite of the advanced development of
spy satellites which could perform many
of the functions of the intelligence
bases, this closing dealt a serious blow
to U.S. strategic interests. (For de-
tails on the importance and nature of
U.S. bases in Turkey, see map below.)
However, the arms embargo was lifted
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again in September, 1978, the U.S. bases
were re-opened, and the Turkish and U.S.
governments began to negotiate' about a
new, long-term base agreement.
On March 29, 1980, this new Turkish -
U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement was
signed, and later presented to the Turk-
ish parliament. While the new agreement
limits the use of the bases for NATO pur-
poses and. prohibits their use by the
U.S. in a war in the Middle East it can
be assumed that there are loopholes fa-
vorable to the U.S. since the annexes to
the agreement have not been published.
Also, as we saw the agreement on the
Jupiter missiles had no binding on the
U.S.
Already, a Turkish member of Parlia-
ment, Ismail Hakki Oztorun charged in a
speech on January 8, 1980, that U.S.
paratroopers stationed in the Incirlik
air base were put on alert after Irani-
ans had taken over the U.S. Embassy in
Teheran.
Recently, U.S. officials have re-
emphasized that the "importance of a
stable, democratic pro-Western Turkey
has never been clearer. Turkey is the
southeastern anchor of NATO. It occu-
pies a unique geopolitical position
(and) provides a highly useful loca-
tion for U.S. military installations..".
After the forced closure of U.S. in-
telligence facilities in Iran, the spy
Luleburgaz
J~. katgaburun Bartin Sinop
Iumurtalik
Iskenderun
Mediterranean Sea
Locations of
symbols are
approximate
M 1 MM
I i
? M 1 .+w....
Diyarbakir
I*"Pirinclik
Incirlik ? Mardin~~
bases in Turkey, aimed at the Soviet
Union, Bulgaria and some Middle Eastern
countries, have indeed become more im-
portant for the U.S. government.
In the past, the U.S. bases in Tur-
key have played a decisive ? role in
U.S. objectives in the Middle East.
The U.S. air base in Incirlik, for ex-
ample, was a focal point in the U.S.
invasion of Lebanon in 1958; and U.S.
planes flew supplies from Adana to
Amman, Jordan to assist King Hussein in
his massacre of thousands of Palestin-
ians in the "Black September" of 1970.
Israel has also been receiving valuable
logistical support via U.S. bases in
Turkey.
There can be little doubt that the
Turkish bases will play an important
role in the use of the Rapid Deployment
Force (RDF). In this way, Turkey would
almost certainly be drawn into any mil-
itary conflict between the U.S. and a
Middle Eastern country.
The following map details U.S. and
NATO military and intelligence facili-
ties in Turkey. Their number and
nature explained below makes clear
once more the importance. Turkey has for
U.S. strategic interests. Needless to
say, these U.S. and NATO bases make
Turkey a prime target in case of a mil-
itary confrontation in which the U.S.
is involved.
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NATO Air Defense Ground Environment
(NADGE) station. The NADGE system
consists of 84 radar sites in nine coun-.
tries. It is able to detect bomber-size
aircraft at a 500km. distance and to
differentiate between hostile and friend-
ly aircraft.
The NADGE system was finished in 1973 -
by which time, ground-based radar sys-
tems, like NADGE were already, in a cer-
tain sense, obsolete, since the sta-
tions themselves cannot be sufficiently
protected against attack and are unable
to detect low-flying objects. In the
early 1970's, this task had been taken
over by sophisticated satellite surveil-
lance.
This suggests another purpose for
NADGE. NADGE could be used for attacks.
Peacetime surveillance (that is, con-
tinued determination of their location)
by NADGE station in Turkey of Soviet,
Bulgarian, and presumably Syrian, Iraqi
and Iranian forces makes it possible for
U.S. and'NATO Air Forces to "neutralize"
them in a preemptive attack. NADGE
could also control and monitor a U.S.
attack on these countries, e.g. by moni-
toring U.S. bomber planes sent into the
other country and detecting and inter-
cepting defense responses by the at-
tacked country.
U.S. Defense Communication System
(DCS) facility. The Yamanlar station
connects the DCS in Turkey with the DCS
stations in Greece through the Mt.
Pateras terminal there. it is also
linked to the Karamursel and Yaluva ter-
minals, and to sites in European Turkey.
Slmadag is linked to the Samsun communi-
cation facility and the Karatas terminal.
Karatas, in turn, is connected to the
Malatya terminal, which has a link to
Diyarbakir.
Diyarbakir contains an earth terminal
for the Defense Satellite Communications
System; it is linked directly to the
Lakehurst Naval Air Station in New Jersey.
Diyarbakir has been termed "irreplacable"
by U.S. officials.
In addition, there are some other 40
minor U.S. and NATO comntunication.sta-
tions not marked on this map in the
Ankara, Izmir,.Izmit, Diyarbakir,
and Incirlik area as well as in Eu-
ropean Turkey.
* U.S. Intelligence Base. The Belbasi..
station contains seismographic detec-
tion equipment which registers under-
ground nuclear tests. It is linked. to a
world-wide network of similar stations,
whose data is evaluated in the National
Security Agency's (NSA) Seismic! Data
Analysis Center in Alexandria,-Virgin-
ia.
Sinop is run by the NSA. It spies on
Soviet naval and air activity in the
Black Sea and on missile testing.
Samsun, with functions similar to
Sinop, is run by Turkish personnel and
the U.S. Air Force Security Service
(USAFSS). It is part of the NSA's intel-
ligence network.
,Karamursel is run by Turkish per-
sonnel and the USAFSS. It spies on na-
val traffic in the Sea of Marmara.
Diyarbakir spies on Soviet missile
testing. It is a part of NSA's-global
intelligence system and is closely as-
sociated with Pirinclik Air Base.
U.S. Air Base. Incirlik Air Base is
the most forward deployed land base
of the U.S. Air Force. Planes there are
capable of carrying out nuclear strikes.
It is also..used as a training facility
for U.S. pilots in Europe, and as a re-
fueling point for transports to and from
the Middle East. Cigli Air Base is
mainly utilized in NATO exercises.
U.S. Naval Base. The Iskenderun and
Yumurtalik facilities also harbor
the most important storage centers for
petroleum, oil and lubricants for U.S.
and NATO forces in the eastern Mediter-
ranean. Kargaburun naval base also con-
tains a Loran C communication facility.
Loran C is a long range navigation sys-
tem for ships, submarines, and aircraft.
It is under the auspices of the U.S.
Coast Guard. Its main purpose is mili-
tary.
NATO Land Southeast Command and 6th
Allied Tactical Air Force Command in
I01,ir and TUSLOG (Turkish-U.S. Logistical
Group) in Ankara. TUSLOG is the central
logistical, and support command for all
U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean
and the Middle East.
0 U.S. nuclear storage site.
0 NATO nuclear storage site.
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Sources:
Info-Tuerk Agency, Jan. 1980
Turkey's Problems and Prospects: Implications for
J.6. Interests, Report prepared for the Subcom-
mtittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, by the Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, March 3,
1980
Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Re-
lated to NATO and the Middle East, Report prepared
for the Special Subcormu[ttee on Investigations of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, by the Congres-
sional Research Service, Library of Congress, Feb.
28, 1975
The Military Aspect of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey,
Bearing before the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, June 28, 1978
Counterspy magazine, April-May 1979
Intelligence Installations in Norway: their Num-
ber, Location, Function, and Legality by Owen
Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch, IPRA, :lrway,
Air Force Magazine, September 1979
Chicago Tribune, March 30, 1980
Facts on File, Jan. 11, 1980
Washington Star, April 11, 1980
U.S. Military Installations and Objectives in the
Mediterranean, Report prepared for the Subcom-
mitee on Europe and the Middle East of the Com-
mittee on International Relations by the Congres-
sional Research Service, Library of Congress,
March 27, 1977
Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1979
Burriyet, Feb. 27, 1980; October 10, 1979
Partner Tuerkei: Oder Foltern fuer the Freiheit
des Westens ?, by Brigitte Heinrich and Juergen
Roth, rororo aktuell, Reinbek, March 1973
GHANA'S
INDEPENDENCEOR
VALCO?
by Kojo Arthur
(Ed. note: This article was re-
searched at the Center for Development
Policy, a Washington, D.C. non-profit
research facility. It is excerpted
from a forthcoming publication on the
entire Volta River Project to be pub-
lished by the Africa Research and Pub-
lications Project (P.O. Box 1892,
Trenton, N.J. 08608).
While examining Kwame Nkrumah's eco-
nomic development plans carefully and
critically, the author does in no way
want to diminish the progress made
under Nkrumah in other areas, e.g. ed-
ucation and agriculture, and the im
portant role Nkrumah played in Pan-
Africanist and anti-imperialist strug-
/
gles.)
The ten months old civilian govern-
ment in Ghana headed by Hilla Limann
has come under intense pressure in re-
cent'weeks to move against some multi-
national corporations - particularly
three U.S. subsidiaries in Ghana, Star
Kist, Firestone and Valco. In launch-
ing his administration's two-year "New
Deal" agricultural program in may 1980,
President Limann condemned the fact
that the country's "resources (are) un-
used or exploited cheaply by others
and taken away from us a ld Valco,SS 1a'
.Firestone type of naked and conscience-
less exploitation of poor undeveloped
countries by rich developed countries".
On February 8y 1962 Valco (Volta Alu-
minum Company) and the Ghana govern-
ment signed a 30-year agreement for the
sale of hydroelectric power to Valco.
Behind this agreement lay the concen-
trated use of bargaining power by the
U.S. government, the British govern-
ment, the international lending insti-
tutions (spearheaded by the World Bank),
and the "six sister" companies in the
aluminum industry itself. This arti-
cle will attempt to look into the in-
trigues that occurred (and are continu-
ing) as this concentrated bargaining
power was exercised to further develop
Ghana's underdevelopment.
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The Valco cash, has extraordinary im-
plications, and any move by Ghana
against the company will be followed
closely by U.S. 'corporations who have
more than $40;billio_n invested in de-
veloping countries'. International lend-
ing institutions - notably the World
Bank - will be following Limann's plans
with more than keen; interest. But more
importantly, U.S. reaction to Limann's
moves will be watched closely by third
world governments. U.S. reaction will
give an indication of the true, stand
of the advanced western countries on
the New Internat Onal Economic Order
(NIEO).
in a neo-colonial economic development
structure by maintaining their monopoly
over capital and technology in order to
maximize their profits. At one point or.
the other, the multinational companies
have had the tacit, subtle or open sup-
port of their home governments who
found the project an important tool for
international power plays.
The initial attempts in the 2920s to
exploit Ghana's resources remained "on
paper". Aluminum production, using ad-
vanced technology, was protected by pat-
ents and other devices of a few firms.
The aluminum industry was characterized
both by the international division of
markets and by domestic monopoly. The
monopoly companies were vertically in-
tegrated: that is, they controlled the
whole process of production from baux-
.te, through initial chemical reduc-
tion to alumina. to further electrolytic
reduction to aluminum and finally to
fabricated aluminum products. Until
World War II, the U.S. and'France were
the world's major producers. Added to
that, the smale-scale level of the in-
dustry at that time meant that the baux-
its deposits of the U.S. and France
were sufficient to meet domestic and ex-
ternal demands.
However, World War II catapulted alu-'
minum to the foreground as a most strate-
gic metal. Britain was unique in being a
major power of those times without an
aluminum industry or reserves. Britain
renewed its interest in the Volta River
Project for this and other reasons. In
the course of the war, France's bauxite
deposits and aluminum industry were being
lost to Germany. At the same time, the
rapid growth of the aluminum industry in
the U.S., funded by massive government
aid, marked the beginning of the period
of intense worldwide expansion of the-
aluminum industry.
The U.S. government's decision that all
national deposits of strategic minerals,
- including bauxite - should be kept in
reserve for wartime needs led the. intense
scramble for overseas bauxite sources-by
U.S. corporations. As mentioned, Britain
renewed its interests in Ghana's bauxite
as a measure to protect its claim to
Ghana's resources. In addition, to help
stabilize the tottering British currengy,
the Volta River Project was regarded an
important sterling area (Ghana, as a
Valco is an aluminum smelting facil-
ity owned by the California-based
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemicals Corpora-
tion (90 %) and the Virginia-based
Reynolds Aluminum and Metals Com-
pany (10 %). The smelter uses low-cost
electricity from a World Bank-funded
hydroelectric plant on the Volta River
in Ghana. The V'.5., and Britain also
provided loans to Ghana for the con-
struction of the hydroelectric project.
Ghana met half Of the-cost of the
scheme,which was to be one aspect of
the Volta River Project.
Other components were to be an inte-
grated aluminum Industry, irrigation for
a large agricultural "program, cheap wa-
ter transportation: over the lake to be
created by damming, the Volta, River, and
fishing industry on the human-made lake.
The integrated aluminum industry was to
mine, refine, smelter and process alumi-
num using Ghana's vast bauxite deposits.
The aluminum industry was to be the cat-
alyst for transforming Ghana's mono-crop
(cocoa) economy to'a modern industrial
base.
The desire tO t #p Ghana's rich baux-
ite deposits. and hydroelectrical potency
dates as far back as the 1920s when Ghana
(then called Gold Coast) was a British
colony. Following,the gold rush in the
colony at the time, and with the in-
creased demand for the strategic metal -
aluminum - after. World War I, the Gold
Coast Geological Survey Department drew
the colonial government's attention to
this industrial potential in Ghana.-
However, riqht- from its inception to
the present, the Volta River Project has
been manipulated.-The multinational cor-
porations are';determined to keep Ghana
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colony of Britain, used the same currency)
source of aluminum. Together with the
newly created Cocoa Marketing Board, the
aluminum project would be used to defray
Britain's war debts, and to stabilize
the British currency and devastated
economy.
Renewed British interest resulted in
the issue of a Government White Paper
of November 1952, entitled "The Volta
River Aluminum Scheme". The White Paper
made it clear that Britain's only in-
terest was in acquiring supplies of
aluminum from a sterling area source.
The White Paper also admitted that
Britain's interest in the Volta River
Project was not so much because of.
Ghana's bauxite, but the hydroelectric
power potential available for smelt-
ing. No concern was expressed for
Ghana's development as such.1.
By the mid-1950s Britain's interest
in the Volta River Project was on the
wane again, this time for both economic
and political reasons. Economically,
it was unfeasible for the British to
carry out the project since by the time
they had finished the preparatory stud-
ies, a surplus had developed in the
world aluminum market. Also, thanks to
the surplus capital accummulated and
transferred from the colonies to Brit-
ain through the Agricultural' Marketing
Boards, Britain's economy had recov-
ered sufficiently from its war losses.
Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board and Ma-
laysia's rubber money contributed
largely to this rapid recovery.
Politically, the upsurge of nation-
alism in 1948-51 in Ghana added a new
dimension to the project. "Responding
to nationalist agitation (for indepen-
dende), the Watson (Commission) Report
of 1948 had suggested that the Volta
scheme, as the colony's largest pro-
ject, should now be considered a nation-
al scheme, with substantial local equity
investment and ultimate local owner-
ship."2 Earlier proposals were that the
project should be a private enterprise
to be owned by Duncan Rose's (a South
African speculator and adventurer) com-
pany, WAFAL, or by the government-sub-
sidized British Aluminum Company (BAC).
The Watson Commission's suggestion ap-
pealed more to the new nationalist party,
led by Kwame Nkrumah; the Convention
People's Party (CPP). The CPP included
the immediate realization of the Volta
scheme in its election manifesto, and al-
so in the party's first five-year de-
velopment plan when the party came to
power in 1951. A major feasibility
study was undertaken during the years
1953-55. The result of this study -
the Preparatory Commission Report pub-
lished in 1956 - highlighted the tech-
nical and economic aspects of the pro-
ject. "It did not consider such impor-
tant questions as whether so much elec-
tricity out of the total available
ought to be allocated to aluminum pro-
duction, not whether the aluminum com-
panies should be allowed permission to
import alumina rather than process Gha-
na's bauxite." 3
The Preparatory Commission Report
priced the project at about $900 mil-
lion. The high price tag and other eco-
nomic and political factors clearly in-
dicated that negotiations would not
lead to a satisfactory agreement for
the immediate realization of the pro-
ject as Nkrumah and his CPP wanted.
"The aluminum companies (Alcan, BAC),
whose participation was necessary, had
indicated that they did not favor the
idea of mixing private and public
funds." 4
Local critics - inside and outside
the Legislative Assembly - feared the
envisaged arrangements suggested by the
Preparatory Commission might mean eco-
nomic enslavement of Ghana. One Bediako
Poku (a CPP back-bencher) in proposing
an amendment to a motion in the Legis-
lative Assembly on the project said:
"...Since this scheme might be the ba-
sis of our expanding economy, the gov-
ernment should endeavor to avoid a
second Abadan, that is, a possible
Anglo-Gold Coast (Ghana)-Canadian dis-
pute. The country should own the scheme,
but if that proves difficult, at least
more than half of each section of the
entire scheme. Since, if the whole cap-
ital should come from foreigners, it
might mean economic enslavement."
In spite of all criticism of "sell-
out to imperialists" both the critics
and supporters of the project believed
that the project together with other
development schemes would help revolu-
tionize the economy of Ghana. The dif-
ferences were over how the project was
to be financed, and over ownership.
Foreign investors, particularly Brit-
ish and Canadian, would control 90 per
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cent of the equity shares and assume
responsibility for the operation of
an aluminum smelter. The British gov-
ernment,through loans to the Ghana gov-
ernment, would build the required dam
and the hydroelectricel plant. Ghana
would be responsible for the new port
and railroad, resettlement and other in-
frastructure services.
Nkrumah compromised in order to have
the project consummated at that time
for he feared that to do otherwise
would have jeopardized the scheme and
also cost Ghana its political indepen-
dence. Nkrumah was well aware of events
in another British colony., Guyana in
South America where during this period
4n 1953, the radical nationalist party
of Dr. Cheddi Jagati, fol3owing an elec-
toral victory, had asd power in an
internal; self-go entarrangement.
The British co1onia .,government revoked
Guyana's constitutipn'and delayed grant
ing independence to ,..ythe _"extremist"
Nkrumah did not?want'Ghana to suffer
the. same fate by Jung so-called a trem-
ist positions on the Volta River Project.
He had taken a similar conpromising-po
s'ition on the Cocoa `marketing Board
(CMB). As has been-.ponted out above,
the British had formed the CMB and other
agricultural marketing boards to trans-
fer much needed ftnancecapital from
the colonies to stabilize -Bri-tain's war
shattered econov y. Ghana was able to
make available substantial dollar re-
serves LQ me srerl..zng area oecause 2r
sold large a~dounts- of cocoa to the
United States.
The British had a d1ftr vested inter-
est in the continuation of these CMB pol-
icies following the rise of the CPP to
political power in:Ghana in 1951. Had
Nkrumah broken the'CMB's marketing mono-
poly or used the. CMB reserves within Gha-
na as articulate sections of Ghanaian
farmers wanted, the British economy's re-
covery program would have been seriously
affected. This would have led to a con-
frontation with British colonial power
and Ghana's poll?tical independence would
have been in doubt.
By 1957 when Ghana won its political
independence from Britain, Nkrumah had
secretly resumed talking-to other (espe-
cially U.S.) aluminus.companies. This
was to put pressur$ on"Alcan andBAC and
the British govoxn At with whom.Ghefp
was having open,negotletions for the
`itrmediate realization" of the project.
Nkrumah's mediator in the secret talks
was Dr. Horace Mann Bond (father of
Georgia Senator Julian Bond), formerly
President-of Lincoln University in
Pennsylvania where Nkrumah was a stu -
dent in the forties.
The U.S. companies that showed inter-
est in the secret talks included Ana-
conda, Reynolds, Alcoa, and later,
Kaiser. With Alcoa controlling most of
the U.B. bauxite deposits, Reynolds and
Kaiser (earlier known as Permanente
Metals) had looked overseas for their
material supplies. The Ghana scheme in-
volving cheap hydroelectricity and a
smelter was very appealing to these ris-
ing major competitors to Alcoa's mono-
poly.
When Vice President Richard Nixon re-
presented the U.S. government at Gha-
na's independence celebration in March
1057, he assured the Ghanaian leaders
of the U.S. government's willingness
to encourage U.S. private investment
in Ghana. A host of speculators and
investors from the U.S. descended on
Accra to try and pick up the contract
for the Volta River Project.
Reynolds was represented by Adlai
Stevenson and Sir Robert Jackson, an
Australian, Kaiser was represented in
the initial stages by Secretary of
State .john. 2Pbster Dulles - Kaiser's
legal and political advisor. President
Eisenhower showed personal interest
by introducing Henry J. Kaiser to
Kwame Nkrumah. "As a result of this ap-
proach, the U.S. explored the situa-
tion with American aluminum companies
and after it was determined there was
sufficient interest on their part,(the
U.S.) offered'to pay half the cost of
a reassessment of the Preparatory Com-
mission's 1956 Report."-6
Kaiser Engineers and Constructors
were awarded the'contract to reassess
the Preparatory Commission's feasibil-
ity study,. Kaiser Engineers supposedly
trimmed the costs of the, project and
made it a financial possibility. "In
fact the Kaiser cost estimates were
not essentially different from those
of the Preparatory Commission. All that
was done was to omit most of the ex-
penditure on public works such as
roads, railways, land acquisition and
resettlement." 7
By such omissions, Kaiser was able
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to trim the costs to about $300 million,
about one-third of the price tag the
Preparatory Commission had proposed.
The Kaiser Report also stated that
there were ample reserves of acceptable
quality bauxite in Ghana to support a
substantial aluminum. But later on
Kaiser was to abandon any plans to use
Ghana's bauxite, thus putting aside
more than one-half of the original Vol-
ta River Project proposals.
Following the Kaiser Report, what was
purported to be a consortium was formed
to bid for the contract for the smelter.
The so-called consortium comprised
Alcoa, Alcan, Kaiser, Reynolds, and Olin
Mathieson. Four of the "six sisters"
were in the consortium specifically
formed to give one-sided leverage to the
giants in the aluminum industry to pre-
empt competitive bidding. When it be-
came obvious that the consortium would
win the contract, all but Kaiser. and
Reynolds dropped out.
Alcoa and Alcan had no real need for
additional smelter capacity, but this
was exactly what Kaiser and Reynolds,
with newly acquired ample bauxite depos-
its in Jamaica, required. The integrated
aluminum industry was scaled down by the
omission of the alumina plant that would
have used Ghana's bauxite. Other ancil-
lary facilities that could have stimulat-
ed Ghana's industrial development were
also omitted. Ghana's original intention
of acquiring 40 per cent of the smelter's
equity shares was sacrificed at the high
altar of monopoly corporate interests.
Ghana accepted these trimmings though
not without a fight.
By the 1960s Nkruma was the "golden
voice of solidarity" not only in the
Pan-African movement but also in the
non-aligned movement. He openly sup-
ported Patrice Lumumba, and vigorously
condemned U.S. involvement in the Congo
(now Zaire) crisis in 1960.. But the
biggest U.S. worry was what the intel-
ligence agencies had assessed_to be a
growing Soviet influence in Africa, no-
tably in Nasser's Egypt and Nkrumah's
Ghana. Following the Suez Canal crisis,
the U.S. had lost out on Egypt's Aswan
High Dam project to the Soviets. Then
Western intelligence sources discov-
ered that the People's Republic of Chi-
na and East Germany had sent "experts"
to Ghana.
In the Cold War atmosphere of the
1960s and the alleged growing Soviet
influence in the newly independent Af-
rican countries, the Volta River Pro-
ject was to be used by the U.S.with the
help of British "Prime Minister
Macmillan in attempting to turn Nkrumah
on a reasonable course". 8 Irving L.
Markovitz writes that: "Since his
pro-Algerian independence speech as
a senator, President Kennedy has been
considered as a friend of nationalist
regimes.. He pursued a foreign policy
that was disguised by its sophistica-
tion from the crude anti-,communism of
the Dulles-Eisenhower era. Yet he
sent several missions to Ghana
headed by men such as Henry McLoy,
head of the Chase Manhattan National
Bank, to find out whether Nkrumah was
or wasn't a communist." 9 Following the
Cuban missile crisis, Nkrumah was con-
sidered "a Castro" rather than "a
Nasser", and it was felt that if the
U.S. "should 9o ahead (to fund the pro-
jectt).we ought to get something in re-
Some African leaders like Liberia's
William Tubman, Ivory Coast's Houphouet-
Buigny, Nigeria's Tafewa Balewa and Gha-
na's K.A. Gbedemah and K.A. Busia lob-
bied against U.S. funding of the Volta
scheme. (Busia was the leader of oppo-
sition in the Ghana Parliament at the
time Ghana was negotiating with the
U.S. for funding. He testified before
the U.S. Internal Security Sub-Committee
against U.S. support for the project.
His testimony was released with other
documents under the title "is U.S. Mon-
ey Aiding Another Communist State ?"
with a three page introduction by Sen-
ator Dodd on July 15, 1963. Busia be-
came Prime Minister of Ghana (Oct. 1969
-Jan. 1972) after the CIA-backed mili-
tary coup overthrew Nkrumah's govern-
ment in February 1966.
These African leaders were not op-
posed to the imperil design of the Vol-
ta scheme, they wanted Nkrumah chastized
by U.S. withdrawal; otherwise, they-
"would feel indignant that Ghana had
been accorded the priority in assis-
tance which they believed they had
earned".11 But the U.S. reasoned that
these African leaders who opposed
Nkrumah "would have to realize that U.S.
backing for the Volta project would be
needed to counter-balance Ghana's in-
creasinglq close relations with'the
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(Soviet) Bloc". 12
It is evident from the above that
from the very inception of the Volta
River Project the industrialization of
Ghana was not the concern of the Brit-
ish and U.S. governments and the alu-
minum companies involved. Britain was
more interested in harnessing Ghana's
water and mineral resources to meet
Britain's aluminum needs. The U.S. gov-
ernment wanted a vehicle to carry out
its Cold War against the Soviet Bloc.
Ghana became a pawn in the hands of ex-
ternal forces.
Faced with an apparent coincidence
of interest between U.S. foreign poli-
cy and Kaiser's own corporate invest-
ment logic, the company "asked the U.S.
government for special guaranties of
their proposed investment against poli-
tical risks. The guaranties requested
are more extensive than those normallyy
extended by the U.S. government...'.13
Howbeit, to get Kaiser to go along,
the U.S. government did not only guar-
antee bargain-rate loans from the U.S.
taxpayer-funded Export-Import Bank
(Eximbank). The U.S. government also
awarded Kaiser with extremely generous
insurance terms from the U.S. taxpayer-
funded Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration (OPIC).
Kaiser had some difficulties wran-
gling similar concessions from the Gha-
na government. In 1963 the kaiser Alu-
minum Company had still not committed
itself to the constructing of the huge
aluminum smelter that was to use the
dam's electricity. The U.S. government
pressured Ghana into signing "a satis-
factory arrangement with the Volta
Aluminum Company or Valco" or else the
U.S. would not release funds totalling
$30 million for the dam.
Dean Rusk, in testimony before the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
made it clear that the United States
would not provide additional capital
for the all-important Volta scheme if
Nkrumah were to "steer Ghana down a
road that is hostile to the United
States .. interests there".14 Beside
the U.S. pressure, "a $40 million loan
from the IBRD (World Bank) and $14 mil-
lion from the U.K. (Britain)" were "al-
so contingent on Ghana reaching a
'satisfactory agreement' with Valco".15
The forces mounted against Ghana
were overwhelming. Why did Ghana go
30
along in the face of such unfavorable
odds ? Why was Nkrumah, the author of
Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Im-
perialism, in favor of a project which
was repeatedly described in Ghana as
imperialist and colonialist ? What did
the parties involved (Ghana, Kaiser
and the U.S. and its allies) gain in
the Volta River Project ?
The author of this article does not
profess to have answers to all of these
questions. Before we offer our answers
let us see what others have to say.
Kaiser, for its part wondered, "Where
else could we get a.,120,000 ton smelter
costing $150 million of which 85 per
cent was supported by debt and 90 per
cent of that covered by the American
Government ?"
A study. by the CIA's Office of Nation-
al Estimates offers the following an-
swers: "The Ghanaian President would
use the Volta-Project to reassure moder-
ate elements within the ruling Conven-
tion People's Party (CPP) that he is
able to get aid from the West and to
demonstrate that playing-off East and
West can prove rewarding... This would
probably hearten the moderate elements
in the CPP and Armed Services who oppose
closer ties with the (Soviet) Bloc."16
In a statement before the U.S. Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, then Assis-
tant Secretary of State for African Af-
fairs, G. Mennen Williams explained:
"...it is our estimate that in the long
run there are favorable factors that
will prevail. This is an area where the
British'developed a very soundly based
civil service, a well-trained military...
I think when you put the thing in bal-
ance that over the long run we could
hope for a government which would at
least be non-aligned."17
Eugene Black, President, Executive
Director and Chairperson of the World
Bank between 1947 and December 1962 (the
period when most of the Volta River Pro-
ject's negotiations were underway) had
,this to say: "... our foreign aid pro-
grams constitute a distinct benefit to
American business. The three major ben-
efits are: 1.) foreign aid provides a
substantial and immediate market for
U.S. goods and services. 2.) foreign aid
stimulates the development of new over-
seas markets for U.S. companies. 3.)
foreign aid orients national economics
towards a free enterprise system in
which U.S. firms can prosper..."18
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David Hart, author of The Political the Volta dam has saved Kaiser over
Economy of a Development Scheme: The $100 million in operation cost alone
Volta River Project identified at since 1973 when OPEC took control over
least three reasons why Nkrumah was in oil pricing.
favor of the way the project was car- The Volta scheme has not helped Gha-
ried out. 1.) Nkrumah "believed, na to industrialize either through the
naively, that the conflicting Ghanaian electric project or the aluminum pro-
and non-Ghanaian interests could be ject. In 1966 when Nkrumah was over-
brought to a satisfactory compromise". thrown in what has been alleged to be
2.) He was convinced that "an indigenous. a CIA-backed military coup, the Inter-
energy source was absolutely necessary national Monetary Fund (IMF) sent the
for the industrialization of his country Harvard Development Advisory Service
and that the only way he could get this (DAS) Team headed by Dr.Gustoph
was through foreign capital investment... Papanek to Ghana. (Interestingly enough,
He failed to properly consider smaller Papanek led another IMF team to Indo-
hydroelectric schemes which Ghana-could nesia after the 1965 coup there. The
have built largely by herself". 3.) IMF and the World Bank had also a close
Nkrumah "was misled by his Western ad- working relationship with the DAS in
visors and by his own Western education Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, Argentina,
into believing that Ghana's development and Tanzania - all major clients of
would have to be led by foreign cap- these two lending institutions.) The
ital".19 team advised the military government of
The Western advisors that Hart alludes Ghana to cancel Nkrumah's industrial
to include banker George D. Woods who projects that would have benefited
was then with Boston First National and from the cheap hydroelectric power. As
served as Kaiser's "banker and finance a result, electric power surplus was
minister". He later succeeded Eugene created and Valco quickly expanded its
Black as the President of the World Bank smelter capacity to the point that the
from 1963 to 1968. Another Western ad- smelter alone consumes about 70 per
visor to Nkrumah was the Harvard econo- cent of the hydroelectricity from the
mist Sir W. Arthur Lewis whose "pioneer- Volta dam. Ghana has to import electric
ing work in economic development in de- power from neighboring Ivory Coast.
veloping countries" won him a Nobel The Volta dam has created an exten-
Prize. None other than Edgar Kaiser and sive, under-utilized. lake which has
his associate Chad Calhoun also advised caused severe social, environmental and
Nkrumah. ecological disruptions. The still wa-
The Volta River Project had been at ters of the lake have created condi-
the top of the Nkrumah's government in- tions favorable to the spread of a se-
dustrial plan for Ghana since 1951. By rious and virtually uncontrollable dis-
compromising, Nkrumah wrote, "One of my ease called schistomiasis (bilharzia)
greatest dreams was coming true".20 which the World Bank calls "one of the
He also envisaged using the Volta River worst scourges of mankind".
Project to further his African Unity The Volta River Project, as carried
ambition - "we would be more than will- out, clearly illustrates that post-co-
ing to share its benefits with our im- lonial imperialism involved subtler
mediate neighbours within a common eco- forces than direct or even indirect in-
nomic framework".20 tervention. The same forces will con-
From the point of view of Kaiser and front President Limann's government if
the U.S. government, the Volta scheme Limann moves against some of the multi-
as carried out has been a success. national corporations whose activities
Valco's Managing Director Ward B. in Ghana he condemns. Does he have the
Saunders in a reply to a critic wrote, courage and his people's support to
"We take great pride in the Valco or- steer off the "proper" course ?
ganization and the Ghanaian people who, if he is able to rewrite the Valco
through their efforts, make it the ex- agreement to the benefit of Ghana, such
cellent enterprise it has become".22 a success will be considered an impor-
Valco alone represents about 20 per tant victory in the struggles of de-
cent of Kaiser's world wide operations veloping countries for economic inde-
and the low-cost hydroelectricity from pendence.
31
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Footnotes
1) David Hart, "The Political Economy of a Develop-
ment Scheme: The Volta River Project", Internation-
al Relations, Vol.VI, No.1, May 1978, p.246
2) "Imperialism and the Volta Dam", West Africa,
3/31/80, p.520
3) of supra # 1, p.246
4) of supra # 2, p.521
5) Legislative Assembly Debates, Issue 1,, Vol. 1,
Accra, 1953, pp.471-472
6) Declassified State Department Documents, "Back-
ground and Status of Volta River Project", 3/6/61,
p.1
7) of supra # 1, p.247
8) Notes for Record: National Security Council Meet-
ing on Volta Dam, The White House, 12/5/61, p.1
9) Irving L. Markovitz, Power and Class in Africa,
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977? p.80
10) cf supra # 8, p.2
11) Memorandum for the Director, "Likely Conse-
quences of Various U.S. Courses of Action on the Vol-
ta Dam", CIA Office.of National Estimates, 11/16/61,,
p.4
12) ibid., p.3
13) cf supra # 6, p.2
14) W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-
66, p.272, as quoted in Markovitz, op.cit.
15) of supra # 6, p.2
16) cf supra # 11, p.3
17) as cited in C. Allen and R.W. Johnson, African
Perspectives, C.U.P., 1970, p.263
18) H. Nagdoff, The AAge of Imperialism, Monthly Re-
view Press, New York, 1969, p.176
19) cf supra # 1,'pp.255-256
20) Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, International
Publishers, New York, 1963, p.117
21) ibid., p.169
22) Daily Graphic (Accra), 3/7/80, p.3
CIA'S CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE IN
ARGENTINA
(Ed. note: We have agreed to publish
this article anonymously since the,
author -travels frequently to Latin
America.)
"Latin America has about 80 per cent
of the total U.S. private investment in
the development world",1 said Henry R.
Geyelin, the President of the Council of
the Americas in a Senate hearing in Oc-
tober, 1978. The Council of the Ameri-
cas is the traditional. voice and re-
search Institution for multinational
corporations in the area.
With headquarters in New York ( 684
Park Avenue, New York City 1002,1), the
Council had offices in most countries in
Latin America until 1973, when a growing
awareness of the new style of U.S. mul-
tinational imperialism (especially af-
ter Nelson Rockefeller's trip to Latin
America in the late 1960's) forced the
Council to close all of its field of
fives.
It became a think tank for issues con-
cerning multinational operations such as
foreign investment analysis, legal envi-
ronment in different countries, etc.;
and remained a powerful tool for corpo-
i
rations in influencing U.S. governmental
decisions. Today, the Council has a de-
cisive role in the strategizing process
of the Trilateral Commission which un-
derpins Jimmy Carter's foreign and do-
mestic policy as it had in the writing
of the Rockefeller Report of 1969 which
gave direction to Henry Kissinger's and
Richard Nixon's policy toward Latin
America.
Henry Geyelin outlined in the above
mentioned Senate hearing why Latin Ameri-
ca is of such high importance. "U.S. ex-
ports to Latin America in 1977 alone
amounted to $19 billion - two and a half
times higher than just five short years
ago. We now sell.more machinery, consum-
er goods, and chemical products to this
area than to the rest of the world com-
bined. ... Nearly 20 per cent of our pe.r
troleum imports come from the region, and
even larger proportions of copper, baux-
ite, tin manganese, lead, zinc, and other
commodities including food stuffs. Our
relationship promises to become even more
important in the future since this hemi-
sphere is estimated to have the world's
largest potential for energy development
both in hydrocarbons and non-traditional
energy sources. Mexico alone is estimated
by some to become a second Saudi Arabia...
Brazil has the single largest totally re-
newable, non-polluting energy source in
the world today. it is the Amazon River
out of which flows over 20 per cent of
all,the fresh water of the world..." 2
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In the same hearing, former Assistant
Secretary for Latin American Affairs,
Viron P. Vaky:emphasized the role the
Council is playing in the State Depart-
ment's decision-making process and said
that State had a "quasi-formalized re-
lationship" with the Council as an or-
ganization which "does embody the busi-
ness, community".3
However, since the Council had to
close down its field offices in Latin
America, another organization--has
stepped in to take over this function.
This organization is the Association of
American Chambers of Commerce in Latin
America (AACCLA). President Carter con-
sults with them on a regular basis4,
and wrote in a letter on the occasion
of AACCLA's sixth year meeting in Bra-
zil in November, 1979: "I would sin-
cerely appreciate if you would devote
a portion of your meeting to a discus-.
sion of the export policy and I would
be grateful to receive a summary of
your deliberations."
Since 1969 AACCLA is housed in the
central Washington, D.C. building of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It counts
as members Chambers of Commerce in 16
Latin American countries and boasts
17,000 individual members from the
U.S., Europe, and Latin America. AACCLA
openly acknowledges the increase of
U.S. investment in Latin America from
$10.3 billion in 1967 to ,$24.3 billion
in 1978 with exports from the U.S. qua-
drupling in the same period.
AACCLA describes itself as a lobby
group which articulates policy posi-
tions on "critical issues", represent-
ing the interests-of multinational
corporations. It has lobbied even
against the so called "human rights
policy" of the Carter administration
and maintained that business is busi-
hess, and "should be carried out solely
on the basis of sound social and eco
n~mic considerations".6
AACCLA's "business is business" rule
doesn't always apply since it gets di-
rectly involved and works closely with
U.S. governmental officials - including
the CIA - in order to maintain power
structures in Latin America. A personifi-
cation of this strategy is AACCLA's Vice
President, Alexander Perry, Jr. He was
described.by former CIA officer, Philip
Agee as the one who arranged non-official
covers for CIA officers in Uruguay in
1966 where they were to carry out opera-
tions against revolutionary groups. Perry
was a golfing companion of the local CIA-
Chief of Station, Edward P. Holman and
worked as General Manager of Uruguayan
Portland Cement Co., a subsidiary of the
U.S. based Lone Star Cement Co. which
gave explicit approval to place a CIA of-
ficer,in the Uruguayan Portland Cement
Co.7
In 197,3 the post of CIA'Chief of
Station in Montevideo was taken over
by Gardner Hathaway, who had served in
Brazil during the U.S.-backed overthrow
of President Goulart in 1964. In July
1974, Hathaway was transferred again,
this time to Argentina, where he had
served as CIA officer during the mili-
tary dictatorships ruling that country
from 1967-72.
In March 1977 famed Argentine jour-
nalist Rodolfo Walsh denounced Hathaway
as one of those responsible for what has
become known as the "genocide": the mass
disappearances of thousands of Argen-
tinians and their assumed assassinations
at the hands of the Argentine military
who took power in March, 1976.
"The certain participation in these
crimes of the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs of the Federal Police, directed by
officers trained by the CIA through AID
such as Police Commissioners Juan
Gattei and Antonio Getter, who them-
selves take orders from Mr. Gardner
Hathaway ... is the seedbed of future
revelations similar to those which today
shock the international community. These
revelations will not be exhausted when
they expose the role of the CIA along
with senior officers of the army headed
by Benjamin Menendez in the creation of
the 'Libertadores de America' lodge
which replaced the 'Triple A' (Argentine
Anti-Communist Alliance , a paramilitary
rightwing organization) until its...
functions were assumed by the junta..",9
wrote Walsh in an open letter to General
Videla.in March 1977. only to be kid-
napped himself the next day. Recent tes-
timonies indicate that he was assassi-
nated shortly afterwards.
Interestingly enough, Alexander Perry
of AACCLA moved to Argentina at about
the same time as Hathaway. He now lives
in Buenos Aires as managing director of
the Argentine Portland Cement Co.(which
has 1,258 employees and is lobated at
Defensa 113, Buenos, Aires). Like the
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Uruguayan Portland Cement Co., it is a
subsidiary of the CIA-connected Lone
Star Cement Co.
Perry has come to Washington several
times to lobby for business interests
in Latin America and testified at the
same hearing as Vaky and Geyelin.
Perry praised the Videla regime for
putting an end to the "human rights
violations" that existed in the early
1970's by eliminating "terrorist groups'What Alexander Perry does not say is
that Videla unleashed an almost unprec-
edented system of terror - kidnappings,
torture, imprispnment, assassinations -
on the Argentine people in order to do
away with the "human rights violations"
of leftist groups waging an armed
struggle against the repressive govern-
ments.
What Perry likewise doesn't mention
is the substantial involvement of the
CIA in the build-up of the fascist
forces in Argentina. From 1972 onwards
there was a major CIA offensive in Ar-
gentina in face of the mounting pop-
ular movement, particularly with the ar-
rival of Robert Hill as Ambassador in
1974. Hill had worked with the CIA's
predecessor, the Office of Strategic
Services and has always worked closely
with the CIA. He was a personal friend
of Spain'.s fascist dictator Francisco
Franco and was involved in the-1954 CIA
coup in Guatemala.10
In Argentina, Ambassador Hill's
good friend Lopez Rega organized the
Trip~e A, which was responsible for some
2,000 assassinations up to 1976 when
Videla incorporated it into his counter-
insurgency taskforce.11.Special forces
of the U.S. Army were also training Ar-
gentine troops in counterinsurgency
warfare 12, and the CIA penetrated the
powerful Argentine labor movement
through the American Institute for Free
Labor Development (AIFLD),
Alexander Perry, undoubtedly, knows
of these facts. One has to wonder, what
form - other than lobbying in the U.S.
- his, active participation in the sup-
pression of the popular movement in Ar-,
gentina takes today, given. his close
collaboration with the CIA in a sizfilar
situation in Uruguay.
While AACCLA and the Council of the
Americas are the most important busi-
ness,organieations influencing the de-
cision-making process in the U.S. gov-
ernment, there are other rightwing
groups that work hard to promote U.S.
corporate interests in Latin America
and to preserve repressive regimes. One
of them is the American Security Coun-
cil (ASC), based in Culpepper, Virginia
with a branch office on 499 South Capi-
tol Street,in Washington, D.C.
The ASC was founded in 1955 by an
initiative coming from the extreme
right. It proclaims to uphold American
security and dedicates itself to lobby-
ing against and intelligence gathering
on, allegedly "dangerous" situations
and people. Its members and advisors
include: Dr. Lev Dobriansky.of George-
town University, one of the founders of
the World Anti-Communist League (WACL);
Marvin Liebman, a Madison Avenue public
relations expert and another founder of
WACL; former Navy Secretary Charles
Edison., and former Ambassador to Argen-
tina, Spruille Braden - both members of
the John Birch Society. ASC has also
links to the Young Americans for Free-
dom (YAF), a group. instrumental in
Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign.
Recently, ASC sponsored a visit to
the U.S. by Roberto D'Abuisson, the
former intelligence chief of E1 Salva-
dor. He is an acknowledged leader of
the terrorist rightwing Union Guerrera
Blanca, and was implicated in?the re-
cent assassination of Archbishop Oscar
Romero. He came to the U.S. only one
week after that crime, and met with
Robert Pastor of the National Security
Council.13
In December, 1979, ASC also sponsored
a visit of retired Generals John K.
Singlaub and Daniel Graham to Guatema-
la, at which time they called on?Pres-
ident Carter,to support the military
and the oligarchies in Latin America
more directly and openly. ASC was also
involved in the formation of the Amer-
ican Chilean Council in 1975'to back
the Pinochet regime, and the American
Nicaraguan Council to support and lob-
by for Anastasio Somoza.
Other, better known institutions
lobbying for U.S. corporate interests
and the preservation of dictatorial
regimes include the CIA-connected Cen-
ter for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) at Georgetown Universi-
ty, and the American Enterprise Insti-
tute (.AEI) for Public Policy Research,
which recently started a new project,
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the Center for a Definition of Hemi-
spheric Priorities, headed by Otto J.
Reich and Pedro Sanjuan, who formerly
served in the Departments of Defense
and State as well as in the White
House. The AEI project is conducted
through AEI's Foreign and Defense Stud-
ies program with such advisors as form-
gr CIA Director, William Colby, Senator
Barry Goldwater, Senator Sam Nunn, and
corporate officials.
The Council of the Americas, CSIS,
AACCLA and a few other far right wing,
pro-business organizations are called
upon fairly often to testify in Con-
gress. Comprised mainly of former gov-
ernmental officials and corporate exec-
utives, their influence reaches far for'
the benefit of a few.
2) ibid.
3) ibid., p. 175
4) see AACCLA Report, Vol.9, No.1, pp. 1,2
5) AACCLA Report, Vo1.9, No.1, pp. 1,2
6) cf supra # 1, p. 56
7) Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary,
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, England, 1975,
p. 49.#
8) North American Congress on Latin America,
Argentina in the Hour of the Furnaces, Berke-
ley, CA, 1975, p. 52
9) A copy of this letter is available from
Counterspy.
10) cf supra #8, p. 53
11) Charles Goldman (ed.),"World Anti-Commu-
nist Leaque", The Public Ems, Vol .11, Issues
1 and 2, p. 26
12) T.E. Weil, Area Handbook on Argentina, Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1974, p. 337
13) see Washington Post, April 20, 1980, p.C-1
1) U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Af-
fairs, Major Trends and Issues in the United
States Relation* with the Nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean, October 4,5, and 6,
1978, pp. 49, 50
AID ANDIDEOLOGY
IN COLOMBIA
(Ed. note: We have agreed to publish
this article anonymously since the au-
thor travels regularly to Latin Amer-
ica.)
The Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) and other U.S. governmental
agencies play an important role in the
maintenance of U.S. corporate interests
and the pacification of the exploited
sector in Colombia. This is done overt-
ly through U.S. training and supplying
of the Colombian police and military,
and simultaneously in a more disguised,
but perhaps more effective way, through
ideological manipulation and control.
if the exploited people can be led to
Colombia is the forth most popu-
lated country (estimated population
of 25 million) in Latin America.
With 440,000 square miles, it is
about as large as Texas, Oklahoma,
and New Mexico combined. Colombia
borders on Venezuela, Brazil, Peru,
Equador, and Panama. Its main ex-
ports are coffee, bananas and other
food stuffs as well as chemical and
metal products.
in many ways, Colombia is a typ*
ical Latin American country, except
in one respect: until recently, it
has maintained a facade of democra-
cy. Colombians, of course, have
known that this image of democracy
was just a facade. Now, however,
the facade has crumbled in the
eyes of the world in light of
widespread arrests, torture, and
political assassinations by the
government recently confirmed by
Amnesty International after an ex-
tensive 'investigation.
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believe that they have no power to
change the system into one which would
meet their needs, then they will be
quiet and become subservient consumers.
In Colombia, where the facade of de-
mocracy can no longer hide the reality
of exploitation and repression, AID has
provided substantial funding to Accion
Cultural Popular (ACPO) - or Popular
Cultural Action -'and its powerful ra-
dio network, Radio Sutatenza. Through a
series of transmitters, Radio Sutatenza
is beamed to all regions of Colombia,
and ACPO provides radio receivers to
the rural population. .
Through extensive radio broadcasting
and through courses. and seminars, ACPO
seeks to.train Colombian peasants in
practical techniques of agriculture,nu-
trition, health etc., but also "edu-
cates" them about "proper" values and
attitudes."Without denying the value of
the former, the latter will be examined
in this article. A thorough review of
ACPO textbooks and other material of
ACPO reveals an ideological content
which clearly serves the interests of
the U.S. government.
ACPO, so far, has received a total of
over $4 million from AID including a
$2 million loan to make it "financially
elf-sufficient", and a special grant
of $970,000 to help spread the ACPO
ideology and system of values to Central
America. ACPO got its first U.S. govern-
mental grant in 1965 ($65,000); it was
administered by 'the Catholic Relief Ser-
vice (CRS,,which at that, time was work-
ing closely with the CIA in other parts
of the world). In addition to giving
grants to ACPO, AID has also had a
$786,000, three year contract (1976-79)
with Florida State University-which was
to evaluate ACPO's operations and exam-
ine its effectiveness.
ACPO was founded by Joaquin Salcedo,
a Catholic priest. He was, supported by
the Jesuit, Vicente Andrade, a well-
known anti-communist who was instrumen-
tal in founding the Union de Traba ado-
res'de Colombia (UTC, Union of Colom-
biann Workers) and who has remained'a
special advisor to the UTC. Th3p UTC
originated as an effort to combat the
more progressive elements in the Colom
bian?labor movement and is currently
favored with AID largesse through the
American Institute for Free Labor be-.
veelopment, (AIFLD)j which promotes
36
"bread and butter" unionism and is con-,
trolled by U.S. corporations, the CIA,
and the AFL-CIO hierarchy.
The nature of Andrade's UTC work was
seen in a letter of August 8, 1975, of
Robert A. Hurwitch, then U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the Dominican Republic, de-
scribing his previous work as a labor
attache in the U.S. Embassy in Colom-
bia: "I worked to strengthen the non-
Marxist Colombian trade union movement.
I worked particularly closely with the
UTC... and was especially associated
with ... Father Vicente Andrade, the
UTC spiritual advisor."
One direct way in which ACPO's Radio
Sutatenza spreads U.S. propaganda is by-t
using material, from the International
Communication Agency (ICA, formerly
USIA). ACPO also willingly promotes
"responsible parenthood", a prerequi-
site for U.S. aid, even though it is
tied to the Catholic church. Reasoning
that "overpopulation" is a cause for
poverty in Colombia, AID and other U.S.
institutions insist on population con-
trol. While not opposed to birth control
as such, a growing number of Latin Amer-
icans oppose U.S. promoted birth con-
trol, particularly since it is often
applied without much care for health;
has taken the form of forced steriliza-
tion of women in many cases; and reaps
untold profits for U.S. medical supply
companies.
The application of birth control is al-
so seen as a reformist attempt by the
ruling elite to keep the lid on an ex-
plosive status quo, e.g. living condi-
tions in overcrowded slum areas, while
only a systematic change will truly
transform the lives of the people. Re-
vealingly, the hierarchy of the Catho-'
lic church in Colombia, which is noto-
riously conservative on social issues,
has been quiet about the population
control programs promoted by ACPO and
the Colombian and U.S. governments.
A look at the basic textbooks used by
ACPO in its courses for peasants re-
veals more of the reformist ideology
paid for in part by U.S. AID. In the
preface to a series of booklets, we
find mention of those who dominate the
peasants and who prevent their true de-
velopment. But then the question is
posed: "What is the cause of your bad
situation ?" The answer: "The real
cause is your ignorance." The solution:
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"Education, skill training, and soli-
darity."
The individual peasant is told: "It
is up to you to improve yourself."'And
ACPO states its goal: "The integral
Christian education of the people - in
order to awaken in them the spirit of
initiative." Critics of ACPO point out
that ignorance and lack of initiative
are indeed part of the problem but
that they have their roots in a system
of exploitation and oppression which
must be addressed and changed rather
than ignored.
The U.S. Army's Area Handbook for Co-
lombia (1970)' aptly describes the role
ACPO and the conservative sector of the
clergy play in a country where the Cath-
olic church is extremely powerful: "Gen-
erally the reforms and social programs
advocated by the Church and other major
institutions have been paternalistic,
presenting no threat to the established
order. The upper class has retained its
control of these institutions and is
therefore responsible for the develop-
pent of the reformists' ideology and
the administering of the programs...
Members of the clergy have worked
through their own organizations, such
as.... ACPO, to aid socio-economic de-
velopment" (p.124). The acceptance of
ACPO by the U.S. Army speaks for itself.
While "blowing with the wind", ACPO
still has a definite religious dimension
to its work. That this is more akin to
the traditional religion of domination
("opiate of the people") rather than to
the theology of liberation (which sees
religion as a force for freedom and jus-
tice for the poor, and is taken up by
an increasing number of Christians in
Latin America) is evident in the text-
book entitled Christian Community. The
peasant is advised: "When entering the
church, let us make sure that our shoes
are clean, and let us try not to cough."
Coming to the seventh commandment, "Thou
shalt not steal", ACPO gives this ex-
planation: "No one is entitled to take
what belongs.to another, neither money
nor land nor anything else in his pos-
session. You must return loans and.repay
your debts, even when there are no re-
ceipts or other official documents.
What belongs to another will always be
another's, even though the owner cannot
prove it before the authorities." So
much for land takeovers by landless and
hungry peasants in search of survival,
which are becoming more and more frequent
in Latin America and which are supported
by the more progressive sector of the
church.
Another textbook used in ACPO's courses
states that "...we should maintain good
relations with the authorities...", and,
"when we go to see an official, let us
takeoff our hats. Whenever we have to
make a complaint to the authorities, let
us do it with respect".
This booklet also promotes acertain
attitude towards structures of authority.
"The priest, the civil authorities, the
teacher, those who have received a
higher level of education and who have
experience in certain things can be the
ones to give us direction." Clearly, ACPO
promotes subservience, and there is no
mention of the right to question illegit-
imate authority; if the priest belongs to
the kept clergy of the upper class; if
the civil leaders are on the payroll of
the landowners; or if the teachers are
the Ideologues of the oligarchy.
Patriotism, which, according to one
well-known critic of the American system,
is often the last refuge of scoundrels,
is pushed in the peasant sector without
question: "Our flag should fly, as a sign
of happiness, on all Colombian homes on
the national holidays." There is no re-
cognition that such holidays commemorate
historical events which made little im-
provement in the life of the majority
and which merely substituted the native
oligarchy for the foreign conquistadores.
ACPO textbooks also teach the citizen's
prayer: "Help me,Lord, to stand tall, but
without hatred or arrogance. Keep me away
from the bullet and from weapons in gen-
eral. Accompany me on election day-to
vote for honorable men, without fanati-
cism or violence, and to put out the bon-
fires which are'set in the village
squares by the bad sons of Colombia." The
prayer ends on a note of business ethics:
"Help me,.Lord, to pay my debts."
The prayer to avoid hatred and weapons,
though in itself acceptable to all Chris-
tians, Is easily used as an ideological
tool to turn public attention away from
the institutionalized violence which al-
ready exists and to mislead the victims
into believing that social change is con-
flict-free. And, the prayer clearly oup-
ports the electoral process, which in
Colombia, as in other parts of Latin
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America, is boycotted'by about half the
potential voters because elections are
frauds manipulated by the upper classes.
Finally,. the "bad sons of Colombia" and
their incendiary actions undoubtedly re-
fer to revolutionaries and their approach
to-social change; the convenient label of
evil is smeared on them.
The ACPO textbook entitled Wake Y21
Peasant is equally heavy with this ideolo-
gy. The students are told that "there are
those who delight in tossing off-subver-
sive and insulting discourses full-of com-
plaints about misery and injustice.
This book (by contrast) is to communi-
cate a teaching and to give an optimis-
tic message of progress and improve-
ment." Those who criticize are subver-
sives who take a perverted pleasure,in
complaining; 'people should listen
rather to an optimistic message since,
by implication, the present system -
in spite of some "individualistic,
selfish and atheistic" aberrations ac-'
knowledged by ACPO - is good and can
be made to work for the benefit of all.
In a booklet on productivity, capi-
talistic values are again promoted
with enthusiasm, by means of such'slo-
gans as: "Wealth is the mother of
wealth", or "Dead capital is that which
is put under the mattress; not produc-
ing interest, is an injury to society."
Furthermore, "there is an obligation to
make capital produce according to
the principles of social justice."
Another slogan, "productivity is ben-
eficial for all" attempts to disguise,
the discrepancies between owners and
workers and who actually benefits. For
instance, the skyrocketing productivity
of some Latin American countries has
done-nothing to improve the conditions
of the vast majority.
Production and Profit, another ACPO
textbook, regurgitates such stale bits
of capitalist ideology as: "Those who
have more goods have received them from
God for their own perfection and for
the benefit of others":; and "Profits
compensate for the efforts and risks
which the businessmen run in.trying to
meet the needs of the market". Thus, it
is the will of God that a small percent-
age constitute the wealthy elite, and
this arrangement is for everyone's
good. And, businessmen are devoted to
meeting the needs of the market, inci-
dentially receiving some profit for'
48
their effort and. risk. Nothing is said
about the manipulative advertising
which creates the market, nor about the
military force which protects the In-
vestment.
Basic Education and Integral Develop-
ment, a working paper produced in-1967
by ACPO's Department Of Sociology, dis-
cusses an individual characterized by
lack of knowledge of his/her own value
and dignity, lack of knowledge of his/
her rights and duties, and lack of job
training. Such a person "can fall for
demagogic promises and false illusions
about easy, violent solutions and can
be taken in by the suggestion that all
his misfortune is due to 'others' who
possess more than he does". Here again,
revolutionary violence is discredited
as illusory.
On the cover of an ACPO booklet en-
titled The Rights of the Citizen we
find the slogan: "Colombians: weapons
have given you independence, the laws
will give you freedom." The booklet
goes on: "No one can excuse himself
from fulfilling the laws for any rea-
son other than those which are fore-
seen by the same law. That is, t]e law
is obligatory." Such blind obedience
to the letter of the law has a para-
lyzing effect on social change, espe-
cially in a situation where labor
strikes are declared illegal and
"squatting" on desperately needed land
is a crime.
ACPO seeks to provide an ideological
underpinning for its subservience to
the law by presenting the tired old
rationale that the law protects every-
one: "The law is for all and protects
equally all the citizens of a country,
no matter what their race, religion,
level of culture, economic condition,
or profegsion or office." This illus-
trates ACPO's ideology: rationalization
in the service of those in power. ACPO
does not ask: Who devised these laws ?
Whose interests do they protect ? And
who directs the enforcers-?
Basic Education and Integral'Develop-
ment also explaiins why there is a divi-
sion between the desperate masses and
the comfortable oligarchy, and describes
it as "margination" of those who "do
not participate in the advantages of so-
ciety". It should be'noted that the word
itself, Margination is based on the
image of unexplained juxtaposition At
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the edge of society rather than on the
reality of large sectors of society being
pushed into a marginated status through
exploitation by the ruling class.
Not surprisingly, the author refers
the reader to the work of Roger Vekemans
for a more complete definition of mar-
gination. Vekemans is the Belgian Jesuit
who received millions of dollars from
AID and the CIA to promote the Christian
Democrats as a "safe" alternative to
Salvador Allende in Chile. Vekemans is
now based in Colombia where he is an ad-
viser to the official hierarchy of the
Latin American Bishops Conference. Arch-
bishop Lopez-Trujillo of Medellin (the
current president of the Conference) and
Vekemans are perhaps the chief opponents
of the theology of,liberation. For them
margination is the cause of social ills
to be remedied by re-integration; where-
as theology of liberation sees violent
exploitation a~ the cause of social
problems and thus recommends a more re-
volutionary, conflictual approach as
the only possible solution. Obviously,
the concept of margination is no threat
to the'U.S. or the native elite.
The author of Basic Education and in-
tegral Development talks about the lack
of. progressive organizations and attrib-
utes this to the people's lack of abili-
ty to organize, which in turn, is due to
their individual inadequacies. "This
lack.of ability shows itself in lack
of interest, laziness, inactivity, and
in promising but not fulfilling the
promises. This has forced us to think of
the urgency of motivating people, and
such motivation must come from an out-
side agency which will get the marginal
groups to feel the need of integrating
themselves into the national community."
This is once again a case of blaming
the victims and seeing external motiva-
tion as the solution to their "lazi-
ness". The goal is not systemic change
or radical redistribution of resources,
but rather one of "jacking up" the in-
dividual into playing the game.
Integrating the individual into the
system, or at least promoting the il-
lusion that it-is possible for all to
"make it", stems from a desire to pre-
vent revolution: "To the extent that
dissatisfaction grows, the extremists
begin to operate, in order to accentu-
ate the existing disparities between'
the poor and the rich, between the
haves and the have nots, between those
who are and those who are not. They
turn the masses to hatred and,put
forth as their goal the destruction of
the society."
Margination is further described as
the simultaneous existence of an econ-
omy of abundance and an economy of sub-
sistence, with no causal links being
analyzed. Latin American countries are
said to depend on the more developed
countries for all kinds of goods and
services. Solution: "to break the
circle of poverty, these countries need
heavy investment of foreign capital."
This kind of propagandizing is one
important service performed by U.S.
foreign aid for U.S. business, and in
Colombia ACPO is the instrument at hand.
(The author does give a brief word of
caution about development based "en-
tirely" on aid from abroad, noting that
this, is against human dignity in that
it makes. people beggars.)
ALPO explains poverty and lack of ed-
ucation as follows: "In Latin America
the political and administrative struc-
tures are not adequate to take effec-
tive measures to achieve the minimum
goals which are indispensable to the
common welfare." ACPO radio schools
"supply what the peasant masses cannot
obtain, due to the scarcity of resources
and the lack of adequate funds. Due to
topographical difficulties, a large
percentage of the school-age rural popu-
lation does not attend primary school."
While all this is true, it is only a
symptom of the real problems in Colom-
bian society, i.e. resources are scarce
for a large sector of society because
they are not distributed equally. But
such a comment is not to be found in
ACPO's literature.
Clearly, ACPO's fear of revolution-
ary change is at least,part of the moti-
vation for development-style education:
"An ignorant people is easy prey for po-
litical demagogery,, for exploitation,
for hatred, and for false ideas which
propose easy solutions based on violent
revolution. In this environment vio-
lence, misery, robbery, assaults, and
social and moral insecurity flourish;
and these are the ingredients for the
establishment of totalitarian regimes."
(The obvious implication is that the
regime in Colombia in 1967, when this
was written, was not totalitarian, which
3G
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A recent visitor to one of these insti-
tutes asked a class of about thirty, in
the presence of their instructor, wheth-
er they'had ever talked about land take-
overs or "squatting". The question was
met with a tense silence. When the vis-
itor asked whether the students could
justify "squatting" on a small plot of
land by desperate peasant family:
again there was a nervous silence. Fi-
nally, a few students commented that
this could be justified.
The reticence might well have been due
to the presence of a foreigner who was
asking the questions and perhaps to the
presence of the ACPO instructor. But,,it
seemed clear that such controversial is-
sues were generally sidestepped in the
institute. The visitor went on to explain
the heavy dependence of ALPO upon U.S.
aid, a fact which was obviously unknown
to the students.
In a 1971 ACPO paper entitled Comamni
cation Media for Rural Develokment we
find a reiteration of ACPO philosophy:
"The purpose of the basic education is
the evolution of the person as an agent
of development; the changing of external
structures must be the'result of con-
scious efforts of qualified and motivated
individuals, for the attainment'of said
purpose."
The author finds the ACPO approach de-
ficient in some ways: "It would be illu-
sory to suppose that in some regions,
where cut tivation of only one product is
predominant and where the techniques of
production have only reached the first
phase of modgrnization, the enlargement
of certain basic knowledge and the adop-
tion of some new practices have exerted
a significant influence on'the economic
and income structures. The correlation co-
efficients and the weak connections which
they imply could better be interpreted as
a confirmation of the fact that the im-
provements produced on the individual lev-
el (family) are not sufficient in them-
selves to cause outstanding multiplica-
tion effects on the macro-social,or macro-
economic level." Thus, we can see that
ACPO itself admits that. focusing on indi-
vidual "capacitation" does not lead to
large-scale social change.
The author concludes that "the success
of ACPO's activities pre-supposes a certai,
minimum welfare or progressiveness among
the peasant families which the institution
presumes to influence. In general the
poorer class from the isolated population
is not the most receptive to the in-
fluence of ACPO, but those who due to
their more favorable socio-economic con-
ditions expect to improve their situa-
tion through their own effort. No doubt
these socioeconomic conditions are re-
lated, to the conditions of land tenure."
Like other AID-funded programs, ACPO is
oriented to the propertied class while
keeping the exploited,in line. -
. Some years ago ACPO published a
statement entitled Our Ideological Po-
sition. It began by noting that "peas-
ants, students,, many priests, especial-
ly the young ones, and in general the
needy people of the developing
countries are hoping for miraculous
formulas and solutions". The statement
then cautioned against hopes for rapid
change and repeats the familiar saying:
"Underdevelopment is in the human
mind."
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is mersly to take a superficial glance
at the facade of democracy.
The same author, in a 1970 paper pub-
lished by ACPO entitled How Opinion
Leaders Operate in Communitg Develop-
'man t; gives another accolade to the
ss m and to its possibilities and
blames its deficiencies on the'individ-
ual"s ignorance of how to use the mech-
anisms which are waiting to serve people.
"For development it is necessary that
the citizens learn how to use the var-
ious services which outside agencies
offer, such as .t. (there follows a list
of governmental and other agencies). Ex-
parlance shows that a great obstacle
to development is not a lack of ser-
vices, but Ignorance on the part of
many that-such services exist."
A working paper published by ACPO in
1972 entitled Informal Education for Ru-
el Development gi es an indication of
ACPO's attitude toward, those in power:
"A large-scale educational program must
earn-the support and approval of the lo-
cal power structure, if it is to be ef-
fective within certain communities. In
Colombia the pastor is the prominent
figure in this power structure; in other
countries a similar position of power
could be held by a local chief or mayor."
In addition to its radio schools, ra-
dio programs and textbooks, ACPO has
"peasant institutes" where groups of peo-
ple from various parts of Colombia live
and study for several months at a time.
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Not surprisingly, ACPO's ideological
position includes a rather favorable
view of the history of the "developed"
countries: "The people of the developed
countries received training and educa-
tion,and they got organized; their com-
munities were and continue to be the
basis of their social organization; they
worked and saved; thus they were able
to produce and consume their wealth and
the fruits of their industry; they
solved their own problems and now we are
even asking them to help solve ours."
This historical view of the developed
countries says nothing about their pro-
motion of colonialism which was one
source of wealth for their industrial
development (in the case of the European
nations); and, it conveniently ignores
the historical facts of slavery, persis-
tent racism, the displacement and
genocide of indigenous populations, the
exploitation of immigrants, and other
aspects of the. U.S. experience. Success
is attributed to education, hard work,
and thrift rather than to exploitation
and domination within and outside the
borders.
Seven years ago an interesting ex-
change took place between a noted Colom-
bian economist-attorney and Monsignor
Salcedo of ACPO. The attorney grants
the validity of ACPO's position that
any kind of development requires the
people's participation and that this is
not possible when people are ignorant,
but "on the other hand ACPO condems con-
scientizacion (consciousness-raising)
concerning the causes which maintain a
state of 'domination-dependency'". ACPO
discusses the problem "as if the people
themselves were the ones responsible for
their ignorance and marginality and as
if overcoming those inhuman conditions
depended entirely on their own will."
Rather, those who dominate the poor
"will not be convinced by good advice
but through the pressure of the people
aware of their rights. Marginality or
lack of participation in society is the
other side of the coin of the concentra-
tion of political, economic, and social
power".
in response, Salcedo insists that ACPO
does not condemn conscientizacion and
does not deny the importance of the con-
cept of domination-dependency "but only
tries to clarify these as a problem of
lack of capacity". This fundamental fo-
cus on individualism is repeated sev-
eral times, and Salcedo argues that an
educational institution should not be
expected to intervene In political
questions. (Our examination of ACPO
material has shown that it is indeed
deeply involved in promoting certain
political and economic values.) While
granting that the people themselves do
not bear the entire responsibility for
their ignorance, Salcedo sees fit to
insist that "their share of responsi-
bility cannot be denied".
The attorney emphasizes the structur-
al realities of Colombian society which
oppress the majority and keep them ig-
norant: "Half of the agricultural land
is owned by 2% of the families? 2% of
the population gets one third of the
national income; and in industry 2% of
the shareholders own more than 60% of
the shares.
He also addresses another cruc4al is-
sue: "It seems that you operate under
the fear of class struggle and of in-
evitable revolution. We Christians are
not inventing class struggle; neither
was it invented by Marx. Marx only dis-
covered it and formulated it clearly.
It does not need to be touched off by
counsciousness-raising on the part of
Christians, but it finds sufficient
kindling in the growing misery and in-
justice suffered by the masses and in
their growing awareness." In reply,
Salcedo says that he is not afraid of
class struggle "nor of class hatred,
but?I affirm that it is a Marxist in-
vention expressly condemned by Chris-
tian and Catholic principles".
Summing up, the attorney writes that
ACPO's position is not entirely incor-
rect but rather insufficient: "It is
possible to train people in such a way
that the system is sustained, and in
fact this is what is done when consum-
erism and the economic values which
support capitalism are encouraged. Ed-
ucation must be consciousness-raising,
that is, committed to social change."
In a later letter, the attorney
states that education can be opposed
to social change "if it limits itself
to 'inoculating' students with the
values of the traditional society or
if it omits all questioning, merely
providing students with training for
good conduct as pillars of the estab-
lished system... The survival of un-
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150003-8
just structures is due in large part
to their being supported by certain
talented people of the lower classes
who are absorbed by such structures and
who uncritically assimilate their
thought patterns and habits".
He situates the basic cause of Latin
American problems in the internal and
external dependency, "and ignorance is
an accompanying cause and at the same
time an effect of dependency". In this
view, "education should provide the
intellectual tools for the planning of
political action, especially if it is
education through the mass media. And
here is our essential difference: I
CIA IN SWEDEN
The following officials are assigned
to the U.S. Embassy in.Stockholm,
Sweden:
BREISKY, Arthur E.
born: 2/3/32
Breisky, head of.the political section,
was a political officer in the Domini-
can Republic at the time of the U.S.
invasion in 1965; he has worked in the
Department of Defense, and was an ad-
visor to the U.S. Naval Academy in
1974.
DOBERMAN, David
Dubarman is a CIA officer who has
served in France.
HAND,DIN, James M.
born: 10/10/41
Handlin has served in the Department
of Air Force as "administrative assistant"
from 1968-1969 and following
that with AID in Laos. At the time,
AID programs were an important part
of and cover for the U.S. counterin-
surgency programs.
HARPOLE, Mark A.
born: 10/2/36
Harpole's official biography (State
Department Biographic Register, 1972)
lists the following positions: high
school principal American Community
School, Saigon 1962-64; University of
42
hold that education, especially through
the mass media, is prophetic". He ar-
gues that politicians, economists, so-
ciologists, communicators, and others
should work to transform the society of
consumerism and the political system
which supports it into a more rational
society and system.
But an educational program directed
toward fundamental systemic change
rather than merely cosmetic reform
would quickly be cut off from U.S. gov-
ernment and foundation support, for
it would'no longer provide the ideolog-
ical service which is one of the prod-
ucts purchased by "foreign aid".
Saigon 1965-66; legal officer airline
in Laos 1968-70; AID in Laos as public
administration advisor from 10/70 on.
HILLER, LeMoine E., Jr.
Hiller is a CIA officer. He has also
served in Mexico.
KUNIYUKI, Yukio A,
born: 11/1/34
Kuniyuki, listed as U.S. Information
Agency employee in his official bio-
graphy, has participated in psycho-
logical warfare operations in the De-
partment of Defense from 1973-75.
McBRIDE, Michael G.
McBride is a CIA officer. He has
also worked in France.
McLAIN, George H.
born: 5/8/32
McLain is a CIA officer. He has served
in Indonesia during the 1965 coup, and
in India.
MELTON, Marilyn E.
Melton was the secretary of the CIA
Chief of Station in London before she
was transferred to Stockholm.
PETERSON, Jeffrey G.
born: 7/13/41
Peterson is a CIA officer. He has
served previously in Bolivia and Ec-
uador.
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150003-8
NOTES ON
AFGHANISTAN
FROM THE EDITORS:
After publishing the last issue, Again, we would like to express our
CounterSpy learned some new details re- thanks for the support of our readers
garding the CIA's involvement in Afghan- during the last three months, particu-
istan: larly to people who have helped Counter-
1) After Mohammed Daoud took power in Spy to widen its circulation, who have
1973, the U.S. government was afraid that written with their suggestions and com-
he actually would carry out the reforms ments, and who have supported us finan-
he had announced, and would follow a cially.
"leftist"course in his politics. The U.S. Of course, we continue to need your
response to this "threat" was to have support, especially in the area of cir-
Afghan "rebels" trained by the CIA. The culation. Please be sure to let us know
training took place in a camp in Attock, about bookstores and newsstands in your
Pakistan; the men who received the area which might be interested in Coun-
training belonged to the following of terSpy.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is today one of Our financial situation has remained
the most reactionary "rebel" leaders. "unchanged", that is, we have received
After the U.S. government realizedithat enough money through subscriptions,
Daoud's policies hadn't turned out to be sales, and donations to keep going. How-
"left", the training was stopped, and, ever, in order to make some necessary
it appears, the "rebels" were never improvements, we ask you to support
used - until after the People's Demo- CounterSpy financially; e.g. by taking
cratic Party took power in April 1978. out gift subscriptions for other people
2) A number of newspapers, including or sending donations.
the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Talla- You can already look forward to the
hassee Democrat have reported about next issue. Articles will include topics
direct CIA aid to the Afghan "rebels". like:-CIA in Turkey, analysis of the
The Democrat stated that "CIA agents International Communication Agency, an
have been buying rifles, pistols, and update on Chile's Colonia Dignidad (see
ammunition on the world's open arms vol.3 no.3), and possibly an expose of
market for secret shipments to Afghan- U.S. activities in the New Hebrides. Un-
istan. Most of the purchases have been fortunately, due to lack of space we
of Soviet, German, Belgian and Israeli were unable to include all the articles
manufacture." (6/9/80, p.1) we had planned for this issue. We hope
3) Over the last few months the to publish some o them in the up-
Carter administration and the U.S. media coming issue. (We did not publish a re-
have continued to misinform the public sponse from TransAfrica because as of
about events in Afghanistan. While Coun- press time, they had failed to submit'a
terSpy does not claim to know exactly letter as promised in March 1980.)
what is happening there, we know very
well that most reports reaching the U.S.
are based on such sources as correspon-
dents who are outside Afghanistan, who
in many cases use information supplied
by the "rebels". The majority of these
reports have been grossly exaggerated or
even completely false.
U.S. officials have suggested that
poison gas is being used by the Soviet
military in Afghanistan in their fight
against the counter-revolutionaries. The
evidence, however, is remarkably thin,
and based on scattered accounts from
(cont. on pg.44)
43
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150003-8
Cont. from
refugees and the "freedom fighters".
Soldier of Fortune; a mercenary maga-
zinet hat is also involved in recruiting
for Afghanistan, has repeated that
claim. '
The following is a report by Tim
Frasca, acting bureau chief of the
Pacifica National News Service. Coun-
terSpy thanks him and Pacifica for. per-,
mission to reprint this transcript of
the report, which was broadcast on
June'll, 1980.
Tim Frasca: "Daniel Gearhart picked
up a copy of Soldier of Fortune back in
1975. in it,, he saw an ad foout-of-
-work ex-soldiers, part of a campaign to
recruit white mercenaries to fight in
Angola'. Gearhart signed up. His side
lost, however, and he was executed after
the famous mercenary trials in Luanda.
"After that, Soldier of Fortune
printed more romantic articles about war
opportunities in Africa, one featuring
color photos of white mercenaries in
Zimbabwe equipped with weapons to fight
in the bush.
"Soldier of Fortune publisher Robert
K. Brown, also of Omega Press Service,
calls his publication a 'true-life ad-
venture magazine', and the next issue's
true life adventure will be featuring
Afghanistan, where Galen Geer, a former
P.R. (public relations) man for the
armed forces in Korea, spent 11 days on
assignment. Brown, himself a former
Green. Beret in Vietnam, described some
of the thrills Soldier of Fortune read-
ers can look forward to reading about in
the August issue."
Robert Brown: "The interesting thing
about it was that Mr.Geer brought this
out, it was an,80 pound unit, brought
it out on a camel. Once again, something
that the CIA has not been able to ob-
tain."
Tim Frasca: "Brown was referring to a
chemicalfilter that is standard equip-
ment on some Soviet military vehicles.
Geer's findings on Soviet use of nerve
gas added little to official statements
on the matter - based entirely on uncon-
firmed refugee accounts, often describ-
ing tear gas-like agents.
"But Geer brought back home some
Soviet equipment that he-said was extra-
ordinary. For example, Brown displayed a
bullet - or a ,round' as he called it -
known as a hollow-point, especially
built to cause more severe wounds."
Robert Brown: "After having sectioned
a round, which means simply cutting it
in two, and analyzing it, the basic
analysis-indicates that it appears be-
cause of the design of this round, which
is a round they would be using in their
assault rifles, that the Russians are
attempting to circumvent the Geneva Con-
vention."
Tim Frasca: "However, Gary Hankins of
the Metropolitan Police Department in
Washington, had this to say about hollow;
point."
Gary Hankins: "We have been using the
hollow point for two years now."
Tim Frasca: "Reporter Geer said he
tur ed over some of the equipment he
found in Afghanistan to 'an agency, of
government' though he wouldn't say
which 'agency' it was. Gee'r's reports
were quoted on the floor of the Senate...
by Robert Dole of Kansas. Dole labeled
the Soviet hollow point 'incredibly more
lethal than any bullet in our arsenal'."
Senator Dole's speech is a good exam-,
of the way unreliable or just plain
incorrect reports about Soviet military
actions in Afghanistan are used in the
U.S. to push up the defense budget and
call, for increasing the chemical and bio-
logical weapons arsenal of the U.S. (Re-
cently, a similar push for chemical
weapons has also been launched by members
of the ruling conservative party in Great
Britain.) Here is more from Dole's speech
on June 6, 1980:
"During a recent briefing by Mr. Galan
Geer (who) ... observed the (Soviet) in-
vasion firsthand for Soldier of Fortune
magazine, convincing evidence was pre-
sented that the Soviets had developed a
chemical capability that extends far be-
yond our greatest fears... X-gas, as
Mr. Geer choses to call it, is unaffected
by ... our gas masks and leaves our mil-
itary defenseless. ... The gas renders
its victims unconscious... providing the
perfect opportunity for the aggressor to
move in for the kill."
Mr. Geer's "observations" are about all
Dole offers as "convincing evidence",.but
it becomes clear what he is really aiming
at. "To even suggest a leveling off of
defense spending for our Nation ... at
such a critical time in our history .is
unfathomable." Dole also calls for "an
immediate and intense examination of our
chemical and biological defense capabil-
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150003-8
ities". (Congressional Record, 6/6/80,
pp.S6375, S6376)
As CounterSpy goes to press, the Mil-
itary Construction Appropriations Bill
is being debated in the Senate. It was
passed on from the House on June 27,
where it was approved by a 308 to 19
vote. The bill includes an appropriation
of $3.1 million for the construction of a
so-called binary chemical munitions pro-
duction facility at the Pine Bluff Arse-
nal in Arkansas, whilh is nothing less
than a plant to produce nerve gas. A re-
port that accompanied the bill to the
Senate stated that the project was neces-
sary "in response to Soviet chemical war-
fare activities". (Washington Post,
6/28/80, p.A-6)
With promoters such as Senator Robert
Dole and his reliable reporter Galan Geer,
there is a very good chance that the
bill will also be passed in the Senate,
again, of course, not for aggressive rea-
sons, but just "in response to Soviet
chemical warfare".
It is always good to have someone like
Geer on hand, but even some conservative
Senators and Representatives will have to
admit that it is pretty low, to say the
least, to rely on reports from a man who
works for a magazine that promotes merce-
nary atrocities all around the world.
THE AFRICA RESEARCH & PUBLICATIONS
PROJECT
P.O. BOX 1892
TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08608
THE AFRICA RESEARCH &'PUBLICATIONS PRO-
JECT IS A COALITION OF AFRICAN
ACTIVISTS. ITS OBJECTIVE IS TO PROMOTE
A?DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE AMONG AFRICANS
AND THEIR FRIENDS ON VITAL ISSUES AND
PROBLEMS FACING AFRICAN PEOPLES.
THE SHORT-TERM GOAL OF THE PROJECT IS
TO FUNCTION AS A CLEARINGHOUSE FOR AF-
RICAN MOVEMENT PUBLICATIONS. IN ADDI-
TION, THE A. R.P.P. WORKING GROUP WILL
ENGAGE IN AND PROMOTE CRITICAL RESEARCH
ON SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS REGARDING AF-
RICA 'S DEVELOPMENT, AND DEVELOP INFOR-
RATIONAL MATERIALS ON AFRICA'S QUEST
FOR DEMOCRATIC AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL
STRUCTURES AND THE STRUGGLES FOR NA-
TIONAL LIBERATION.
WRITE TO A.R.P.P. REGARDING THEIR PUBLI-
CATIONS AND MORE INFORMATION.
WHAT IS HAPPENING
IN IRAN TODAY?
Just Mubpshedt three Spttfai Issues of MERIP Reports pro-
vide the most comp`ehensivearid incisive coverage of the Iranian
revolution available in any large, MERIP authors know Iran
Intimately, and they convey the 'facts. with .a deep regard for
historical context and social nuance. These issues include exclu-
sive interviews, photographs and documents, and provide unparal-
leled access to understanding Trans revolutionary dynamics today.
#86 The Left Fortes features Ervand Abrahamian's history of
Iran's guerrilla movement a major piece of contemporary historical
research, and Fred Halliday's interviews with spokesmen of the
major left organizations.
#87 The Rural Dhlsenslon examines the extensive participation
of young Iranians of village origin in the revolution. First-hand ac-
counts from the countryside explain the fusion of social and econom-
ic demands with-the nationalist and religious ideology that mobilizes
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#88 The First Year evaluates the revolution's accomplishments
and limitations so far, with a particular focus on the urban situation
and the workers' councils that have become a feature of Iranian
factory life. Includes a full translation of Khomeini's New Year's
speech of March 1980, the most comprehensive statement yet of his
world-view.
? Only S1.65 each. All three for 64.75
? Get any one issue free when you sNhscribe to
MERIP Reports,for one yearf9issues/S12.o0) _
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Outside US additional postage _
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MERIP/Dept B, P. O. Box 1247, New York, NY 10025
Name
Address`
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150003-8
1980 ANNUAL CONVENTION
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Chairperson: John Kelly (author of
forthcoming book, CIA in
America
Paper Title: "CIA in America with
Particular Reference to CIA's Use of
U.S. Police Departments"
Kathie Sarachild (editor of Feminist
Revolution, an Abriged Edition with Ad-
ditional Writings)
Paper Title: "Censorship of Women's
Writings"
Dr. Jason W. Smith (author of Founda-
tions of Archaeology)
Paper Title: "CIA in Academia"
Jonathan Friedman (freelance journalist)
Paper Title: "CIA in Media"
Place: Washington Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C.
Time: August 30, 1980, 10:30 A.M.
An extensive study on the CIA's
role in Australia was published
by:
Denis Freney
THE CIA'S AUSTRALIAN CONNECTION
Available from:.
Denis Freney
P.O. Box A716
Sydney South, NSW 2000
Australia
They Thought the NORTHWEST'
PASSAGE was an All-Water Route
NEWS FROM OMAN (Dhofar Letter)
-- analyzes the development in Oman
within the framework of regional and
international development
-- brings information about inter-
national support work done for. the
PFLO
-- covers events in Yemen
NEWS FROM OMAN is published 6-8
times a year. Send for sample copies
and subscription details.
KROAG, P.O.Box 86, 1003 Copenhagen K
Denmark
to India.
41111
little did they know it was actually a newspaper in the Puget Sound 1
I area that covered such topics as the women's movement, labor, nuclear
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Today we know it is not necessary to send underpaid crews on dan-
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Subscription rates: $8.00/year. Add 75 cents/year for Canadian subs, $1.25 for foreign.
NAME ................................................................................................................................... '
AODRES
IPy~:.y ...yr -wow .aw.. arr urn afire yr~ yrr.yrc 4ow- n:..Jew.
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C f:
. ~~~er=rte
 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150003-8
That's a shame, because the Guardian has comprehen-
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