COUNTERSPY: LIBYA: U.S. PROPAGANDA AND COVERT OPERATONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140005-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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GOVERMENT MOVES TO
CENSOR COUNTERSPY
COUNTER 7
The Magazine For People Who Need To Know IP,
Volume 6 Number 1 $2 Nov 1981 - Jan. 1982
Libya:
U.S. Propaganda
and Covert
Operations
World Bank
Blueprint
for China
AIFLD: Secret Plan for El Salvador
U.S. Destabilization of Canada?
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Editorial
Unlike his friend Richard Nixon, CIA Di-
rector William Casey cannot claim: "I cur,
not a crock." On May 19, 1981 Judge
Charles E. Stewart, Jr. in New York con-
cluded that Casey had unlawfully misled
investors of Multipionics, Inc. In a
Casey-authorized offering circular, pro-
spective investors were not told that MuZ-
tipioni.cs had assumed X2.7 rill ion in
mortgage debts - Y ?O1, 960 of which was
Casey's personal debt.
The retention of Casey as CIA Director
after this ruling says a Zot about the CIA
and the Reagan administration. The fact
that he ripped off fellow investors, how-
ever, is not the major concern regarding
Casey. Rather, it is his initiation of
worldwide criminal covert operations - in
Afghanistan, Libya., Mozambique, EZ Salva-
dor, Cuba, Mauritius and Iran (just to
name a few) - while simultaneously trying
to silence the U.S. media. Casey and the
CIA are attempting to end press coverage
of CIA operations by promoting passage of
HR4 and 5391, the so-caZZed "Intelligence
Identities Protection Act."
As we go to press, the House has passed
HR4 by a 354 to 56 vote with two amend-
ments. One outlaws the naming of overcov-
er agents even after they retire. The
other amendment, offered by Rep. John
Ashbrook (R.-Chio) outlaws the identifi-
'ation of undercover intelligence
agents by anyone "with reason to believe"
that the identification would impair
U.S. intelligence activities. Ashbrook's
amendment, which has the support of Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan and CIA Director
William Casey, Zed Edward Boland
(D.-Ma.), the chairperson of the House
Intelligence Committee, to vote against
the bill. Boland, who has pushed an "In-
telligence Identities Protection Act" for
years, feared that Ashbrook's amendment
would make HR4 unconstitutional. In its
present forms, HR4 and 5391 (the Senate's
"Intelligence Identities Protection Act")
have very similar wordings. S391 is ex-
pected to pass in the Senate without ma-
jor changes.
In an April 29, 1981 letter to Boland,
Casey admitted that the "Intelligence
Identities Protection Act" is "designed
to deal primarily with the damage to cur
intelligence capabilities. . .emphasis
added) which is caused by unauthorized
disclosures of identities, whether or not
a particular officer or source is physi-
caZZy jeopardized in each individual
case." Intelligence capabilities, of
course, cover everything from assassir_a-
tions and destabiZizations to intelli-
gence gathering.
In the same letter, Casey revealed the
draconian reach with which the CIA wanted
to endow HR4. Even though the CIA is for-
bidden to engage in policy-making, Casey
recommended the addition of a "technical
amendment to HR4... with regard to which
searches and seizures may be conducted..."
Under this amendment the CIA could direct
the FBI to undertake surprise searches of
newspapers and broadcasting newsrooms pos-
sibly preparing CIA exposes. These FBI
searches would be allowed even to uncover
information derived from analysis of pub-
Zicly available data. Included in that da-
ta could be such items as private memos
from reporters to editors. In a few
words, Casey admitted what Counterspy has
contended for years: the CIA intends to
a7 Z but abolish the First Amendment -
which, after all, is only an amendment,
according to former CIA official Ray
Cline.
The CIA's reason for wrapping itself in
secrecy has nothing to do with real na-
tionaZ security. The so-caZZed "InteZZi-
gence Identities Protection Act" is an in-
tegral part of the Reagan administration's
preparations for, and execution of, covert
CIA and, quite possibly, military opera-
tions. CIA covert operations in the past,
such as the 1953 coup in Iran, have not
been in the interest of real national se-
curity, but rather for the benefit of U.S.
multinational corporations. Moreover, they
often undermined national security by
bringing us closer to another war.- There-
fore, it is the task of all citizens to
take strong actions against this legisla-
tion and CIA covert operations in other
countries. A government which ravages
other peoples inevitably turns on its own.
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Contents
Doremus, Ontario Hydro and the CIA.... 4
News NOT
in the News
Ray Cline and James Billington........ 5
U.S. Biological Warfare Against Cuba..6
AIFLD: Secret Plan for El Salvador....8
U.S. Marshall Plan for the
Caribbean: Counterinsurgency ....... 11
Reagan Resurrects Savimbi ............ 15
Libya: Propaganda and
Covert Operations ..................20
Mauritania? Mauritius??...... .......
The Gambia Betrayed ..................40
Secret World Bank
Blueprint for China ................42
The Ascher Memorandum:
Marcos Plugs the Leak ..............44
World Bank Counterinsurgency
in the Philippines .................47
Interview with Ian Adams:
RCMP Demystified ...................49
Is the U.S. Destabilizing Canada? ....... 3
The British Right and Intelligence.. .55
Casey Names Names
Read CIA Director William Casey's speech
to CIA employees. on July 27, 1981. He
defends his business dealings, outlines
future strategy for the CIA, reviews
"progress" made, names names of high
ranking CIA officers, and praises former
CIA Director Richard Helms, a convicted
perjurer. Available from CounterSpy
($1.60, includes postage in U.S., add
1.$.90 for overseas airmail).
CounterSpy is available in microfilm
from: UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS INTERNA-
TIONAL, 300 North Zeeb Rd., Dept. P.R.,
Ann Arbor, MI 481C6; and 30-32 Morti-
mer St.., Dept. P.R., London W1N 7RA,
England.
Forgery
The CIA's Operation CHAOS and the FBI's
COINTELPRO went through great pains in the
late 1960s and early 1970s to destroy the
credibility and in some cases the very ex-
istence of progressive publications. Indi-
cations are, that operations like these
have not stopped.
Earlier this year a major attack was
launched on CounterSpy's credibility when
"someone" produced a "Special Issue" of
CounterSpy "Focusing on the CIA in Germa-
ny." This fprged pamphlet, neatly typeset
and using graphics from back issues of
CounterSpy was mailed to the Frankfurter
Informationsdienst (FI), a progressive
West German publicaticn which is in the
process of publishing a new magazine on
intelligence - the first such magazine in
German. The pamphlet featured an article
"FRG: Made in U.S.A., part two," supposed-
ly written by Konrad Ege, (Ege had written
an article in the real CounterSpy in the
April 1979 issue under the headline "Fed-
eral Republic of Germany: Made in U.S.A.")
as well as the names of 19 "CIA officers"
complete with dates of births, phone num-
bers and addresses in Bonn..
Fl-editors were immediately suspicious.
Without citing any sources, the article
contained numerous charges of CIA infil-
tration and use of West Germany's peace
and environmentalist movement. FI informed
Counterspy of their questions regarding
the "Special Issue." FI and CounterSpy see
this forgery not only as an attempt to un-
dermine CcunterSpy'e credibility but also
as an attack on FI's project to develop a
West German magazine on intelligence.
Sadat's Confession
"Let me reveal this secret. The first
moment the Afghani incident [overthrow of
Haf izullah Amin and Soviet troop movements
into Afghanistan] took place tin December
1979] , the U.S. contacted me here and the
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transport of armaments to the Afghanis
started from Cairo on U.S. planes." So
said Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to NBC
TV on September 22, 1981. For the first
time one of the high government officials
directing-the major covert operation
against Afghanistan admitted publicly the
existence of a large scale joint aid pro-
gram to the Afghan rebels. Sadat also con-
firmed that he would continue to aid the
CIA in its arms shipments to the rebels
"until the Afghanis get... the Soviets out
of their country." Sadat's admission fi-
nally puts the lie to U.S. government as-
sertions that most of the Soviet-made
weapons the rebels have are captured from
the Afghan or Soviet, Army. In reality,
they are Egyptian-made replicas of Soviet
arms.
rying out operations that were considered
too sensitive for the CIA.
Reportedly, Inman decided to end Task
Force 157 when former CIA employee Edwin
Wilson offered to raise more congressional
funding for 157. However, it is not known
what Inman decided about Wilson's sugges-
tion to set up a "counterpart to Task
Force 157." The possibility that a Task
Force 157-type operation is continuing was
suggested by the arrests in 1980 of
DuWayne Terrell and William Thomas as
spies for the CIA and Israeli intelligence
in the Yemen Arab Republic. Terrell and
Thomas were working for Aeromaritime,
which had served as a business front for
Task Force 157 in the early 1970s. Obvi-+
ously, Aeromaritime was not closed down by
Inman.
Only Courage?
"Courage I.s Our Weapon" is a newly re-
d "d ntar " about the Afghan ref-
u
e
l
Doremus Ontario Hydro
and the CIA
y
m
ease oc
ugees in Pakistan. It was shown first at With the Reagan administration threaten-
the Second Annual Afghan, Fair on September ing to take drastic steps to prevent Cana-
25 in Washington, D.C. Prior to the show- da from taking more control over its own
ing, the "Afghan Relief Committee," a U.S. raw materials and resources (presently
organization collecting funds for the ref- U.S. corporations own about 80 percent of ugees hosted a benefit dinner. The guest ~
Canada's resources; see "Is the U.S. De-
list is self-explanatory: CIA Director stabilizing Canada?" in this issue), U.S.
William Casey, former ambassador to Saudi investment in Canada's energy market has
Arabia and Relief Committee official, become a critical issue in U:S.-Canadian
Robert Neumann, former assistant secretary relations. It is somewhat contradictcry
of state Harold Saunders, American Federa- then?that one major Canadian energy compa-
tion of Teachers head Albert Shanker, Pa.. ny, Ontario Hydro, is still trying to at-
kistani ambassador to the U.S., Ejaz Azim, tract U.S. investment through its New York
and self-proclaimed CIA collaborator public relations firm, Doremus and Co.
Arnaud de Borchgrave. Doremus, which was taken over by another
public relations firm, BBDO Co. last year,
157: Alive and Well?
When then-Director of Naval Intelligence
Bobby Ray Inman (now CIA Deputy Director)
decided to close down Task Force 157 in
February 1976, he terminated one of Naval
Intelligence's most secret operations.
Task Force 157, headed'by Capt. Darryl A.
DeM.aris at its closing, was engaged in in-
telligence gathering on Soviet nuclear
weapons, infiltration of international
maritime unions, and in general, was car-
4 -- CounterSpy -- Not'. 81- - can. 82
isn't just "any old company. Its former
clients include some extremely repressive
governments - the late Shah of Iran, the
Marcos regime in the Philippines, King
Hussein.of Jordan, and the Saudi royal
family - and it presently represents the
Turkish military government.
A number of past and present Doremus of-
ficials came to the company from tl(e CIA,
the State Department, and the Pentagon.
They include John W. O'Connell, the former
CIA Chief of Station in Jordan; Doremus
Vice President George L. Fischer who ac-
knowledged in an interview with the Chica-
go Sun es (3/14/78) that he had been
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working for the CIA in the late 1950s; and da's intelligence agency, the Royal Cana-
former Vice President William Codus, As- dian Mounted Police (RCMP). Worthington
sistant Chief of Protocol in Henry has knowingly published RCMP disinforma-
Kissinger's State Department. tion about alleged Communist activities in
Doremus began to work for Ontario Hydro Canada, and has served as an RCMP apolo-
in 1971. In order to attract U.S. inves- gist against justified public criticism.
tors, Doremus places advertisements in (See CounterSpy, vol.5 no.3, p.52 and
U.S. publications and, in general, tries "RCMP Demystified" in this issue.)
to create favorable publicity for Ontario
Hydro in the U.S. Doremus has produced
numerous press releases praising Ontario
Hydro as "Canada's largest utility" which
has made "arrangements with its United Ray Cline...
States interconnections" to reserve on a
first call basis the purchase of its power
by U.S. customers in.times of "peak de- "Dear C.S. Staff: Forget what you've
wands." In a December 2, 1974 press re- read about the C.I.A. up until now.....
lease, Doremus announced that a "total of Prepare yourself for the uncompromising
510,000 kilowatts" of Ontario Hydro's pow- truth about the C.I.A..." wrote Laurie
er is reserved for U.S. customers on a Dustman Tag of Acropolis Books Ltd. in-a
first call basis. letter to CounterSpy on August 10, 1981.
When Ontario Premier Davis visited the She was announcing a new book by former
U.S., Doremus, according to a statement CIA Deputy Director Dr. Ray Cline enti-
filed with the U.S. Department of Justice tled The CIA. It is supposed to be the fi-
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, nal word on the CIA and is described as
assisted him "in certain functions... dur- "fascinating." Dustman Tag wrote that she
ing the week of'May 16, 1977. This assis- is sure Counterspy will "find an excerpt
tance took the form of providing transpor- from the book which will be perfect" to be
tation and other general assistance to the reprinted in CounterSpy. She also wanted
press covering the Premier's visit, assis- to "talk soon."
tance with getting T.V. films en route We didn't find an excerpt. The CIA is
from N.Y. to Canada for use within that hardly informative (most of it is trans-
country...." planted from Cline's previous book, Se-
For Doremus the Ontario Hydro deal has crets, Spies and Scholars) and it is poor-
been financially rewarding. From August. ly written. We couldn't agree more with
1980 to February 1981, for example, I Cline's assessment in the preface that the
Doremus got $143,716 as "professional ser- book might come across as being "egocen-
vice fees and reimbursement of out-of- tric." It is. Cline knows everything and
pocket expenses." That makes Ontario Hydro has all the correct strategies for the
one of Doremus' most lucrative foreign ac- CIA. He gives high marks to CIA Director
counts. William Casey and the Reagan administra-
tion's "new approach" to intelligence.
Casey, according to Cline, did a tremen-
dous job in raising morale in the agency,
and "intelligence officers began to slough
More Disinformation off the feeling of being pariahs - or even
criminals...."
Donald Hunt, the general manager of the A promotional flyer for The CIA an-
Toronto Sun feels that he "could find an nounces: "Watch for Ray Cline on 'Good
audience" for a paper like the Sun in Morning, America' and other major media
Washington, D.C.; and,after the shut,-down this fall." This seems to be the ulterior
of the Washington Star, the Sun hired for- motive of The CIA: to serve as a vehicle
mer Star associate editor Sidney Epstein to get mass media exposure for Cline's
to keep the Sun informed about the possi- right-wing views.
bility of starting a new D.C. daily. The
Toronto Sun, a rightwing tabloid-form dai-
ly, is published by none other than Peter
Worthington who has close ties with Cana-
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...and James Billington
One incident Cline describes in The CIA
involves James Billington, a former CIA
officer who now heads the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars of the
Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D.C.
In 1956, Cline and Billington were taken`
along by then-CIA Director Allen Dulles on
a world-wide trip to CIA stations. "This
was a big break for me," writes Cline,
"because Jim, being very junior, did most
of the briefcase carrying...."
Billington seems to have enjoyed the
trip anyway, since he wrote a groveling
"poem" entitled "The Voyager" honoring
Dulles. The poem concludes:
Mr. D. worked all day
While the others would play
Yet he seldom let loose his thunder
He's a man that his troops
All felt as a group
Mighty glad and proud to be under.
Billington's ties with the CIA did not
end with his departure from the agency
shortly after his trip with Dulles and
Cline as seen in this excerpt from an
April 1958 letter from Dulles thanking
Billington for a copy of a book he had
just written.
I'was interested to hear of your plans
fora trip and would appreciate your let-
ting me'know when details are firmed up.
I would like to have our boys have a talk
with you before you go, if agreeable with
you. In,the meantime I will be looking
forward to seeing you in June if you do
get down to Washington then. Just drop a
note or call the office and Miss Tist-
hammer will arrange a mutually convenient
time for us to get together
Billington, in fact,, continued as one of
the CIA's notorious "Princeton Consul-
tants" while a professor at Princeton Uni-?
versity. In June 1981, Billington also
testified before the Senate Subcommittee
on Security and Terrorism on "Historical
Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism." In this
hearing Billington presented his new defi-
nition for the word "terrorist": the ter-
rorist is the "ultimately committed revo-
lutionary...."
U.S. Biological Warfare Against Cuba
Cuban President Fidel Castro recently well as one of Cuba's vital staples, pork.
made serious charges about a new biologi- The State Department and the U.S. media
cal warfare program against Cuba. On'July were quick to ridicule and discount
26, 1981, the 28th anniversary of the at- Castro's charg s. The Washington Post, for
tack on the Moncada Garrison, the begin- one, claimed that the charge of dengue fe-
ning of the Cuban revolution, Castro stat- ver being introduced into Cuba by the CIA
ed that the government shares "the peo= "makes no medical sense." While it is
ple's conviction and ~harborss the pro- true that there are natural causes for a
found suspicion that the epidemics which dengue fever epidemic, the possibility of
have hit our country, especially the hem- CIA dirty work cannot be dismissed out of
orrhagic dengue, may have been introduced 4iand.
into Cuba by the CIA." He pointed out that The U.S. has a long history of using bi-
over the last seven weeks, 113 people had ological weapons. A top-secret 1956 U.S.
died of dengue fever, and nearly 300,000 Army document, for example, urges that
were infected. In addition, Castro raised "military operational policies, plans and
questions about other plagues that had hit directives dealing with the offensive de-
Cuba during the last two years: African ployment of BW biological weapon s
swine fever, sugar cane rust, and blue against specific targets" as well as "the
mold on tobacco. Castro queried about a fact that specific living agents or their
U.S. government role in introducing these toxic derivatives, identified by specific
pests which debilitated two key Cuban ex- name and/or description, had been stan-
port commodities, tobacco and sugar as dardized for offensive military employ-
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went" has to be kept "top secret." In his
book, Chemical and Biological Warfare -
America's Hidden Arsenal, Seymour Hersh
also quotes a report stating that an in-
ventory at Fort Detrick, Maryland includ-
ed "mosquitoes infected with yellow fe-
ver, malaria and dengue emphasis added ;
fleas infected with plague; ticks with
tularemia, relapsing fever, and Colorado
fever; houseflies with Cholera, anthrax,
and dysentery." In addition, Fort Detrick
facilities, which have been used by both
the CIA and the Army, included "laborato-
ries for mass breeding of pathogenic mi-
croorganisms and greenhouses for investi-
gating crop pathogens and various chemi-
cals that harm or destroy plants."
In 1977 it was further revealed that the
CIA, during the early 1960s maintained a
clandestine "anti-crop warfare" research
program "targeted at a number of
countries." (Washington Post, 9/16/77) In
spite of the 1969 order by President
Richard Nixon to halt research on and
planning and stockpiling of offensive bio-
logical and chemical weapons, the CIA and
the Army have continued research on and
use of such weapons.
Newsday reported on January 9, 1977 that
"with at least the tacit backing of U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency officials, op-
eratives linked to anti-Castro terrorists
introduced African swine fever virus into
Cuba in 1971." The operation was success-
ful. Six weeks.later an outbreak of swine
fever forced the slaughter of 500,000
pigs to prevent a nationwide epidemic.
Newsday described how the biological war-
fare operation was carried out: One intel-
ligence operative was given a sealed con-
tainer with the swine fever virus in Fort
Gulick in the Panama Canal zone. At Fort
Gulick, according to Newsday, the CIA also
"operates a paramilitary training center
for career personnel and mercenaries." At
the time, Fort Gulick was also used as "a
staging area for covert operations in the
Caribbean and Latin America."
From Fort Gulick, the container with the
virus was transferred to members of a
counter-revolutionary Cuban group,, who
took It by trawler to Navassa Island, a
deserted U.S.-owned island between Haiti
and Jamaica. After a stopover in Navassa,'
the container was taken to Cuba and given
to operatives near the U.S. military base,
Guantanamo.
The United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization stated that the swine fever
outbreak in Cuba was the "most alarming
event" of 1971 in the Western Hemisphere,
and Fidel Castro said in his 1971 speech
celebrating the anniversary of the attack
on the Moncada barracks: "The origin of
the epidemic has not yet been ascer-
tained. It could be accidental-or it could
have been the result of enemy activity. On
various occasions the counter-revolutiona-
ry wormpit (Cuban terrorist groups in the
U.S j has talked of plagues and epidem-
ics...."
A proposal for a CIA food study (re-
printed in CounterSpy, vol.4 no.1) serves
as one more indication that the CIA is
targeting Cuban food production in its
continuing war against Cuba. The study re-
quested by the CIA was to "evaluate na-
tional nutrition and health problems and
strengths... as they affect food avail-
ability and consumption requirements of
key less developed countries..." One of
the "key countries" listed in this pro-
posed 1978 one-year study was Cuba. The
study was supposed to answer "questions in-
cluding: "What are the nutrition and dis-
ease factors related to food availability
and utilizations; what is the impact of
the biological/ecological/cultural envi-
ronment on nutrition, health and dis-
ease?"; and finally, "what is the impact
of national food needs and demands which
result in parallel incidence of debilita-
tion and crippling diseases in the labor
force?"
Biological warfare research by the Army
and the CIA is not a thing of the past.
For example, last year U.S. "government
laboratories" were studying the rift val-
ley fever virus for use "as a biological.
warfare agent." Like dengue fever, rift
valley fever is transmitted by mosquitoes;
it causes blindness, severe bleeding and
liver damage, and can cause inflammation
of the brain and death. Col. Gerald A.
Eddy, the chief virologist at the U.S.
Army Medical Research Institute in Fre-
derick, Maryland commented on the danger
of rift valley fever. "We think the
world is relatively unprepared for this
potentially devastating virus." ' According
to Col. Eddy, only the U.S. Army has cer-
tified vaccine, and it is only enough to
immunize some 100,000 people. (Facts on
File, 4/25/80)
That the CIA wants to "keep the option
open" to use biological warfare was con-
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firmed in a "joke" by then-CIA Deputy Di-
rector Frank Carlucci. (He is now Deputy.
Secretary of pefens.e.) Carlucci stated in
a speech given to the American Bar Asso-
ciation in June 1980 that he is opposed
to any prohibition of biological warfare:-
"We've gone through successive itera-
tions of intelligence legislation;
there are some concepts that have
arisen that I personally consider a
bit curious or difficult. One is that
we can reduce every detail of the in-
telligence business to statute. The
original intelligence charter... had
an array of prohibitions... There was
one that said CIA agents should be
prohibited from overtly taking an ac-
tion likely to lead to flood, pesti-
lence, plague or mass destruction of
property. In the CIA there was a
tongue-in-cheek comment that we ought
to oppose this just to keep.our op-
tions open."
In spite of the devastating effects of
successive plagues, Cuba has proven in
the past that the country is able to de-
feat attempts by counter-revolutionary
Cubans and the CIA - including biological
warfare - to defeat the revolution. Far
from destroying it, attacks on Cuba have
strengthened the determination of the Cu-
ban people. Says Fidel Castro: "This
country may be wiped off the face of the
earth, but it will never be intimidated
or forced to surrender."
AIFLD: Secret Plan for El Salvador
by John Kelly
In a searing self-indictment, the Ameri- General Romero was replaced by a civilian/
can Institute fbr Free Labor Development military junta."
(AIFLD) puts the lie to its land reform Cohen would have us believe that El Sal-
program in El Salvador. A draft of AIFLD's vador is still ruled by the 1979 civilian/
1981 working paper on land reform - leaked military junta which, he added, "recog-
to Counterspy - claims the. reform is di- nized the need for land reform so as to
rected toward "a drastic overhaul of the change an archaic, political system land
land tenure system" controlled by the to right extreme social and economic in-
"economic powers of the country."1 In justic (sic)...." Some civilians in the
short, land is supposed to be redistribut- 1979 junta may have viewed land reform as
ed from the landed oligarchy which, ac- such. However, they resigned on January 3,
cording to draft author Bruce Cohen, con- 1980 because "the military has] failed to
trolled El Salvador until 1979 through keep its political-and economic prom-
"the application of extreme economic, po ises."2 Moreover, moderate officers in the
litical andfmilitary power." 1979 junta have either resigned or are now
The AIFLD report ignores that support of dominated by conservative officers who are
the junta directly contradicts the goal of undoubtedly among those who, Cohen says,
drastically overhauling the land tenure consider "land reform" a means to "coun-
system because the.present junta is again teract the appeal. of the left in the coun-
controlled by the oligarchy and the mili- tryside."
tary. This is where the lie comes in - a In effect, AIFLD's land reform is coun-
"reform" that underpins the junta keeps terinsurgency in the service of a junta
the land in the hands of the oligarchy. brutally opposed to true land reform. The
Cohen glosses over this contradiction by primacy of the counterinsurgency role is
writing as if there have been no changes highlighted by Roy Prosterman who, Cohen
since October 1979 when "the government of says, has "devoted extensive time and ef-
(John KeZZy is co-editor of Counterspy
and the author of the, forthcoming book,
The CIA in America.)
8'-- Counterspy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82
fort" to the land reform. Prosterman, who
talks like a politico military strategist
has written that a first goal, of the land
reform is to "broaden the base of the jun-
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ta;"3 and'that a "desperate" junta turned
to AIFLD because "most of the cam esino
peasant] sector in El Salvador was] un-
organized or radicalized by extreme left-
ists."4 In June 1980, he predicted that
"if the reforms are successfully carried
out here, the armed leftist onslaught will
be effectively eliminated by the end of
1980."
Prosterman's involvement leaves no doubt
that the land reform is being subverted
for counterinsurgency purposes. The extent
of his involvement also questions the le-
gitimacy of the reform. According to
Cohen, "these three consultants, (Roy
Prosterman, Jeff Riedinger, and Mary
Temple), especially Dr. Prosterman, worked
extensively on [land reform Decree 207
and the general framework for its imple-
menting regulations. Dr. Prosterman has
Underscoring AIFLD's counterinsurgency
role in EZ Salvador was the foZlouring
statement before the Supreme Court by
then-U.S. Solicitor General Wade McCree
about AIFLD's Michael Hammer and Mark
Pearlman: "... For example -I'm off the
record in answering this - but just re-
cently two Americans were killed in Sal-
vador (sic). Apparently they were some
kind of undercover persons working under
the cover of a labor organization, and
if this person [Philip Agee] identified
them as not by what they appear to be
but as undercover operatives...."
(Edward S. Muskie, Secretary of State,
Petitioner, v. Philip Agee, Respondent,
No.80-83, Washington, D.C., Oral Argu-
ment, Supreme Court of the United States,
January 14, 1981, pp.21, 22.)
advised AIFLD, UCS [Union Comunal Salva- "During the first days of the reform -
dorena, an AIFLD-created union] , and to cite one case - 5 directors and 2 pres-
FESINCONSTRANS urban Salvadoran }anion] on. idents of new campesino organizations were
other issues such as the type of surveys assassinated and I am informed that this
needed, the proposed General Law of Agrar- repressive practice continues to increase.
ian Reform of June 1980, and the educa- Recently, in one of the haciendas farms]
tional programs needed to develop in- of the agrarian reform, uniformed members
creased skills in the Agrarian Reform Pro- of the security forces accompanied by
cess."6 Cohen thus admits that the reform someone with a mask over his face, brought
was U.S.-imposed with negligible campesino the workers together; the masked man was
input. The fact that AIFLD publicly por- giving orders to the person in charge of
trays the land reform as an indigenous the troops and these campesinos were
Salvadoran program is hypocritical and un- gunned down in front of their co-workers.
derscores its illegitimacy.7 These bloody acts have been carried out by
Bruce Cohen presents no criticism or uniformed members of the National Guard
even questioning of a U.S.-imposed land and the Hacienda Police, accompanied b
reform used as counterinsurgency in sup- civilian members of ORDEN [death squad,
port of the junta. Flowing from this posi- all heavily armed, including support from
tion is' his incredulous attribution of all tanks and heavy equipment."
violence to "the left and the communists." The natural reaction to such associated
Absolutely no violence is attributed to violence is the rejection of the program
military, paramilitary, or rightwing by its own participants. In February 1981,
forces. This operating principle alone to- land reform head and UCS officer, Leonel
tally discredits AIFLD's land reform in El Gomez, fled El Salvador because of an as-
Salvador because it leaves no doubt about sasination attempt by the military in con-
AIFLD's unquestioning support of the mili- junction with a civilian death squad.9
tary-dominated junta. Upon arriving in the U.S., Gomez said that
Further undermining the land reform's the "problem... is the army"10 in El Sal-
legitimacy is the fact that Cohen ignores vador. In another instance, the Executive
violence directed toward its participants Council of eight UCS departmental organi-
which comes from the military and right- zations participating in the land reform
wing forces. Many first hand reports con- signed a protest statement withdrawing
tinue to verify the existence of this mil- their support from the program.11 This
itary and rightwing violence. Perhaps the withdrawal followed the machine-gunning of
most telling testimony comes from t.'ssis- twelve land reform participants by the Na-
tant Minister of Agriculture, Jorge tional Guard.12 '
Alberto Villacorta upon his resignation A final telling indictment of AIFLD s
on March 26, 1980. commitment, if not legitimacy, is Cohen's
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IFLD's consonance with the Reagan/Haig from their former owners to the 60,000
EZ Salvador was evident in a, peasant families who had been working on
policy then, _ _ _ _ A second reform program...
guest speech to the March 1981 AI LL transferred to El Salvador's sharecrop-
graduating class by Richard T. Booth, pers and tenants all the land being
Inter-American Labor Advisor in the U.S. worked by them, and it thus brought to
State Department. Booth said about AIFLD
that "our government fully supports qur an immediate end the country s tradi-
Zabor movement in this effort." On EZ tional landlord-tenant system.... Farm-
Salvador, Booth said that "Secretary land passed into the de facto posses-
Haig has reiterated our support for the sion of about 150,000 families. ~i (Em
nhaaia added.)
government tea oy rresiaen-t L'UCWie, zic Among those who dispute Cohen's and
its efforts to implement sweeping re- AIFLD's claims are former U.S. Ambassador
h
'
ap-
s speech was met wit
forms." Booth
plause. to El Salvador, Robert White who once in-
pZause. vited Prosterman to promote the land re-
AIFLD Report, March-April 1981, p.2? form before the Salvadoran oligarchy and
revelation that U.S. AIFLD officials now the New York Times. The Times claimed on
reside in Honduras and are accompanied by September 28, 1980 that The -land reform
an armed bodyguard. Since Cohen's dfaft is had "benefitted nearly one million peas-
a working paper and a justification for ants." In a September 1981 interview,
continued funding, it means that AIFLD op- White said that the "second stage of the
erates as if there is no military or land reform had been explicitly canceled
rightwing violence even against land re- with U.S. approval. And the powers that be
form participants. Therefore, AIFLD's pub- are refusing to accept the first phase of
lic admissions of 'large scale military and land reform as a~~fait accompli - they want
rightwing violence are all but meaningless to roll it back. Ts
since.AIFLD does not act accordingly. In its August 3, 1981 edition, the Times
While there is wide variance between reported that about 272 out of 282 land
AIFLD's private and public statements on reform cooperatives were operating at a
the issue of rightwing violence, there is loss. As opposed to Cohen's 62,000 fami-
lies, the Times quotes AID as reporting
one area of agreement. Both say the land only 38,0p0 families participating in
reform is a success. Cohen paints a rosy Phase I. Regarding Phase II, which Cohen
picture: "... the Basic Law of Agrarian said beneffitted 120,000 families, the
Reform was promulgated in March 1980 and Times reported that "the United States Am-
farms of more than 1,200 acres were expro- bassador, Deane R. Hinton, said recently
priated.... The takeover of these large that the second phase of the program would
farms benefitted approxi. 62,000 families not be carried out."16 The third phase, or
and redistributes 615,000 acres to campe- land-to-the-tiller, according to AID, has
sino cooperatives. In April the Government issued about 500 land titles "usually in
approved Decree 207 or land to the tiller ceremonies presided over by a member of El
law. This law gives all renters and share- Salvador's governing junta."17
croppers the rights to the land on which William Doherty recently denied before
they work. By giving stability on the land Congress that AIFLD's land reform in El
to the 150,000 campesino families benef i- Salvador was a "charade." He is correct.
ciaried (sic) by the law...." AIFLD's land reform is a brutal reality
While admitting to bureaucratic impedi- for the Salvadoran people.
ments, Cohen gives the undeniable impres-
sion that 212,000 families have already
benefitted from the reform. AIFLD Execu- FOOTNOTES
tive Director, William C. Doherty, Jr. al-
so told Congress in February 1981 that 1) All references and quotations are from Bruce Cohen's
"over 210,000 families have received con- draft report unless specified otherwise. The copy obtained
trol over the land they till."13 That same by CounterSpy was missing the title page and a few other
pages. Independent verifications were obtained confirming
month, Doherty, citing Prosterman, wrote the validity of the draft and that its author is Cohen.
the following: 2) Washington Post, 1/4/80.
"In March 1980, the 263 estates over 3) ibid., pFree Trade Union News, 6/80, p.4.
?
1,250 acres in size were transferred
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5) El Salvador Gazette, 5/5/80. As quoted in Agrarian Re-
11) Wheaton, p.17.
form in El Salvador: A Program of Rural Pacification, by
12) ibid; see AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News, 2/81,
p.4.
Philip Wheaton, EPICA Task Force (1470 Irving St. NW,
13) ;As quoted in AIFLD Report, March-April 1981, p.l.
Washington, D.C. 20010), 11/1/80, p.17. Regarding counter-
14)
AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News. 2/81, p.3.
insurgency, it is interesting to note that Cohen claims to
15)
The Progressive, 9/81, p.23.
have sent all copies of his report to Jesse Snyder, an
16)
New York Times, 8/3/81, p.A-6.
Agency for International Development (AID) officer sta-
17)
ibid., p.l.
tioned in El Salvador. Snyder previously served in the
CIA/AID/Pentagon counterinsurgency in Vietnam.
6) According to an AID memorandum of August 8, 1980: "It
is closely identified in El Salvador with the U.S. Govern-
ment and the American Institute for Free Labor Development
(AIFLD). Phases III presents the most confusing aspeot of
the reform program, and it could prove to be especially
troublesome for the United States because it was decreed
without advance discussion, except in very limited cir-
cles, and, we are told, it is considered by key Salvadoran
officials as a misguided and U.S.-imposed initiative."
(As quoted in Wheaton, p.16, see note 5.)
7) AIFLD's William Doherty is among those who claim that
the lead reform is indigenous and directed toward the
benefit of Salvadorans. At the same time, he has testified
that there are "three parts" to the "Salvadoran problem."
The first part, according to Doherty, is "the effect on
U.S. national security of Communist aid to the guerrilla
movements in El Salvador." (As quoted in AIFLD Report,
March-April 1981, p.6.)
8) As quoted in: Wheaton, p.13 (see note 5).
9) Washington Star, 2/8/81, pp.A-1, A-11.
10) ibid., p.A-11. Cohen and AIFLD have also ignored
Gomez' charge that government officials have taken $40
million in kickbacks from the land reform program.
U.S. Marshall Plan for the Caribbean:
Counterinsurgency by Robert Holden
Money and guns: for more than eighty El Salvador.
years, these have been the main instru- Not since the rule of Salvador Allende's
ments of U.S. foreign policy in Latin Popular Unity government in Chile from
America. Shifts of emphasis, variations in 1970 to 1973 have U.S. interests been so
approach and some amusing rhetorical gravely endangered in what Pentagon strat-
flourishes have broken the monotony from egists like to call our "southern flank."
time to time, but the main objectives are Washington intervened materially to assist
the old familiar ones: the exclusion of the overthrow of Allende, and is once
"alien interests" and the maintenance of again positioning itself for an, interven-
an open door for U.S. trade and invest- tion more dramatic than the mere transfer
ment. U.S. capital's inexhaustible appe- of arms and advisors. This time, the U.S.
tite for fresh foreign investment opportu- government's attention has been arrested
nities has been matched by Washington's by the popular upsurge in Central America
willingness to apply raw military power on against the oligarchies that have ruled on
its behalf. The policy failed badly only Washington's behalf.
once - in Cuba, an early victim of U.S. The response of the Reagan administra-
imperialism that finally excoriated the tion has been to more than double the flow
beast in 1959. Now, the policy is being of weaponry into Caribbean basin countries
threatened again in Nicaragua, in Grenada, whose leaders are threatened by popular
and on a different level In Guatemala and revolt, and to propose what has become
known as a "mini-Marshall Plan." (All ref-
(Robert Holden is a Cleveland-based erences to the Caribbean basin, or the re-
journalist.) gion, refer to the island nations, the
countries of Central America not counting
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Mexico, and to Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana ican Agribusiness Development Corporation,
and Suriname on the South American S.A.1 "We at AID," added John R. Bolton,
coast.) AID general counsel, "are vigorous advo-
This fall, the administration will begin cates of supply side foreign assistance."
consulting the leaders of industry and This openly neo-colonial strategy is,
Congress to formulate a specific program being echoed at the World Bank which has
for the so-called economic development, or proposed across-the-board currency devalu-
"Marshall Plan" component of the Reagan ations, higher prices for basic goods and
policy. By January 1982, according to the services, the elimination of trade re-
State Department's time table, a second strictions, and private takeover of gov-
meeting of the United States and its des- ernment-owned facilities as a way to es-
ignated partners in this effort - Mexico, tablish'a,"social compact" in which "de-
Venezuela and Canada - will have taken veloping countries would agree to needed
place to decide how the plan will be drawn economic changes in exchange for the prom-
up. As outlined by the administration, the ise of increased aid from the industrial
United States will attempt to encourage would, both in bilateral grants and cred-
development in the region by stressing the its from the World Bank." The United
build-up of local private enterprise States is already implementing this poli-
(through U.S. aid as well as local govern- cy at the Inter American Development Bank,
ment initiative), and the provision by the where the U.S. representative, in an "un-
recipient governments of further incen- precedented" move, vetoed a $20 million
tives for U.S. private investment and low-interest loan to Guyana because it
trade. Mexico, Canada and Venezuela are would have supported government subsidies
supposed to be developing separate plans to rice farmers.3 .
subject to some kind of coordination with Expanded military assistance to friendly
Washington's. governments in the region is an insepara-
As described by Thomas 0. Enders, Assis- ble part of the Reagan "Marshall Plan." In
tant Secretary of State for Inter-American his testimony before the House subcommit-
Affairs in testimony last July 28 before tee, Enders noted that, in addition to the
the House Inter-American Affairs Subcom- economic strategy, "military and political
.mittee, the plan will emphasize "the sup- answers" are needed to "solve the security
ply side... to create new competitive pro- and political problems of the area." Unit-
duction capacity and take better advantage ed Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
of (_the basin's,] existing resources and has also called attention to the impor-
capital." So, Enders continued, "we will tance of granting military assistance in
begin asking these countries as we meet tandem with so-called "development" aid.4
them: What can you do to retain your The increase in military aid in fiscal
skilled labor and capital? How can you year 1982 is colossal. Under the'Foreign
create predictable, favorable conditions Military pales program, the Pentagon has
for enterprise? Such ideas as insurance been authorized to sell an estimated $50.7
against political risk for domestic as million worth of military articles in f is
well as foreign investment, investment cal '82 to eleven countries: Barbados, Co-
treaties ensuring fair treatment, regional lombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
investment codes, and in general more fa- Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ja-
vorable tax and legal treatment for in- maica, Panama and Venezuela. This repre-
vestments should be considered." sents an increase of 135 percent over 1980
Stephen L. Lande,.the Assistant U.S. sales to countries in the region, and a 96
Trade Representative for Bilateral Af- percent increase over 1981 sales. Funding
fairs, told the committee that "the first for military training of the region's
step is to identify the major impediments armed forces personnel will leap 178 per-
to private investment in the basin and in cent from fiscal '80 to fiscal '82, to a
cooperation with the basin countries to total of $4.7 million. Licensed commercial
try to devise approaches to remove these sales of U.S. weapons are estimated to
impediments." An official of the Agency rise 48 percent, to $25.3 million.5
for International Development (AID) called At the same time, the U.S. Department of
for major policy changes to stimulate Justice has permitted the training of
production for export in the region, and counter-revolutionary exiles in bases in
pointed to the example of the Latin Amer- Florida where they are openly preparing
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attacks on Cuba and Nicaragua in violation
of the Neutrality Act.6 Recently, the Cu-
ban government announced the arrest of
five counter-revolutionaries who landed
on July 5, 1981 with weapons, explosives,
and a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro.7
And when Secretary of State Alexander Haig
accused the Soviet Union of stepping up
arms deliveries to Cuba, the Wall Street
Journal reported that "U.S. officials have
said recently that a series of steps, in-
cluding some 'actions,' are planned for
the near fuhure to clarify U.S. policy to-
ward Cuba."
What, precisely, are some of the inter-
ests at stake for U.S. corporations in the
basin? They were plainly, if crudely, ex-
pressed by President Reagan nine days af-
ter his inauguration. Responding to a news
conference question about the election of
a conservative government in Jamaica,
Reagan said: "And I think this opens the
door for us to.-have a policy in the Medi-
terranean (sic) of bringing them back in
-- those countries that might have started
in that direction -- or keeping them in
the Western World, in the free world. And
so, we are looking forward to cooperate
with (Jamaican) Prime Minister Seaga."9
Two months later, a U.S. AID functionary
reminded the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that "The United States has vital
economic and security interests in Latin
America and the Caribbean," which together
account for 77 percent of all U.S. invest-
ment in the Third World. "The continued
health and growth of this large market is
vital to our need to increase export
earnings ...CA]nd the importance of foreign
sales to our income and employment is
likely to be even greater in the fu-
ture."10
At the Pentagon, a spokesperson justi-
fied the expanded U.S. military presence
in the Caribbean (further described below)
as a response to U.S. "strategic interests
and security threats. The two main securi-
ty threats in the Caribbean are Cuban sup-
port of insurgent subversion in various
countries (by providing arms and training)
and the threat to our sea lanes of commu -
nication."
The military stake in the region was al-
so outlined by Florida Congressman Dante
B. Fascell: "We have both a commercial and
a military stake in the Caribbean's sea
lanes -- through which travel... all the
naval and commercial vessels using the
Lateinamerika Nachrichten
Panama Canal, ... a significant proportion
of shipping bound to or from the South
Atlantic and much of America's imported
oil -- and a similar stake in the region
as a prime source for critical industrial
raw materials. Because of the region's lo-
cation, we have a stake in its use as a
military basing point for U.S. installa-
tions and =- perhaps even more -- as a po-
tential one for U.S. adversaries."12
The Caribbean holds about one-third of
all U.S. investment in Latin America, or
about $5 billion worth. Export-import
trade with the region comes to $16 billion
a. year. It is still the United States'
main source of bauxite, an ore needed to
produce aluminum. One-fourth of U.S. pe-
troleum imports are refined or shipped
through the Caribbean,13 and U.S. and
Canadian oil companies are intensifying
their search for oil in the region where
Guyana and Jamaica are said to be the
likeliest sources of rich deposits. Many
of the Caribbean governments are offering
highly favorable concessions to foreign
oil companies, including permission to re-
tain up to 70 percent of their profits.14
Jimmy Carter, of course, understood all
of this as well as Ronald Reagan. Indeed,
Carter should be claiming the credit for
initiating both the "Marshall Plan" idea
and the stepped-up U.S. military pres
ence. In the fall of 1979, Carter's admin-
istration revealed the existence of a mys-
terious Soviet combat brigade in Cuba - a
revelation uninhibited by the prompt ac-
knowledgement of the Soviet Union that the
brigade had been there since 1962.15
Carter used the presence of the brigade to
announce, in a dramatic and war-mongering
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television address'to,the nation on Octo-
ber 1, 1979 the following actions:
- More economic aid to Caribbean
countries "to resist social turmoil and
possible communist domination."
- Expanded U.S. military maneuvers in
the Caribbean basin and surveillance of
Cuba by U.S. intelligence agencies.
- The establishment of a permanent mili-
tary headquarters on Key West, to be known
as the Caribbean Joint Task Force.16
Five weeks later, in a message to Con-
gress, Carter proposed to "expand our sup-
port for development and security in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean" by spend-
ing $175 million in the coming year on
various economic assistance projects. He
added that, "We hope that other nations
and international institutions will in-
crease their efforts to accelerate the so-
cial and economic development of Central
America."17' The spending program had been
planned at least since the-spring of 1979,
as the rebel forces in Nicaragua were
gathering strength for their final victory
that summer. A Caribbean Group for Cooper-
ation and Economic Development was formed
by the United States and international
agencies, and several countries were
pledging to spend $275 million on the Ca-
ribbean in 1980.18
As one consequence of the "Soviet bri-
gade" scare, the annual military maneuvers
in the Atlantic and Caribbean were ex-
panded. By 1981, the war games had become
the "largest U.S. maritime exercise in re-
cent years," combining "a series of previ-
ously scheduled exercises into a com-
pressed time period in order to provide
realistic and integrated training in a war
-at-sea scenario.*19 This year's Atlantic-
Caribbean maneuver was called Ocean Ven-
ture 81, and the Caribbean phase took
place from August 3 to August 20 under the
command of the Joint Task Force in Key
West, with units from the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom participating.20 The
exercise sent 16,870 U.S. military person-
nel into the Caribbean on 12 ships and
more than 100 aircraft.21
This dangerous22 and provocative show
of force may have been Jimmy Carter's
idea, but it is also something Reagan
clearly relishes as he showed by his de-
lighted response to the U.S. provocation
over Libya's Gulf of Sidra in August 1981.
Reagan's recklessness was evident early in
1980, when the presidential candidate told
14 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82
a CBS interviewer that a blockade of Cuba
was one way to-"show the Soviet Union how
seriously we take this aggression of '
theirs" (in Afghanistan). Of course, he
added, that was only a suggestion: "There
might even be.better options than that."23
If successfully implemented, the Carter-
Reagan plan to "help" the countries of the
Caribbean basin will further reinforce
their dependence on the United States '-
politically, economically and militarily.
These countries will continue to be at the
mercy of the United States as their prin-
cipal export market and price-setter for
agricultural products (in a region where
malnutrition is the main health problem)
and raw materials of all kinds. As these
governments offer the required "incen-
tives" to U.S. businesses, the living
standards of their people - already af-
flicted by rising unemployment and price
inflation - will decline further, even as
more profits are shipped abroad, and as
the already stratospheric levels of exter-
nal debt skyrocket. The prices they get
for their commodities will fluctuate'un-
predictably, but ,the prices of imported
goods, often including food, will climb
higher. The resistance that all of this
will evoke among the people will be met by
the bullets that the U.S. government has
thoughtfully provided to the authorities
on generous credit terms. In return for
the unpleasant repression that the author-
ities will be obliged to apply to keep the
peace, the Reagan administration will de-
fend their behavior as necessary "authori-
tarian" measures provoked by "totalitari-
an" Cuba and the Soviet Union.
This is pretty much how U.S. foreign
policy has always been'conducted in Latin
America.' Ronald Reagan has merely restated
its premises more plainly, having inher-
ited a situation in which a new and more
promising level of popular resistance is
taking shape. But like Jimmy Carter and
all the presidents before him, Ronald
Reagan will never understand the lesson
that has been demonstrated again and
again in Asia, Africa and Latin America,
especially in the last twenty years: The
.struggle may be postponed, but it will
never be defeated.
FOOTNOTES:
1) Latin American Agribusiness Development Corporation, S.A.
is a Panamanian-registered corporation whose shares are al-
most entirely owned by 15 U,.S.-owned agribusiness multina-
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tionals. It invests heavily in export-oriented ventures in The United States and Her Southern Neighbors," August 1981.
Central America and the Caribbean. The company has received 13) Ibid., and see testimony of Willard Johnson on behalf
AID loans of $16 million since its founding in 1971. It of TransAfrica before the House Inter-American Affairs Sub-
pays no U.S. income tax because of its foreign registry and committee, 7/26/79.
because its income is derived from foreign sources. 14) WSJ, 6/19/81.
2) Fall Street Journal (WSJ), 8/21/81, p.4. 15) NYT, 9/13/79,p.A-16.
3) Associated Press dispatch in The Plain Dealer (Cleveland) 16) Facts on Filc, 10/5/79, pp.737-739.
8/15/81. 17) Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 11/9/79.
4) Washington Post, 8/19/81, p.A-18. 18) cf supra, 1116.
5) State Department: Congressional Presentation, Security 19) Pentagon news release No.344-81, 7/22/81. In correspon-
Assistance Programs, FY 1982. Commercial sales calculations dence to the author, a Pentagon spokesperson attributed the
in the text exclude Panama because of an unusually large growth of the maneuvers to the increased size of the Navy
purchase of $29 million in 1980.
6) New York Times (NYT), 3/17/81.
7) Granma Resumen Semanal, La Habana, 7/19/81, p.l.
8) WSJ, 7/31/81.
9) Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol.17,
No.S, p.68.
10) U.S. Agency for International Development, prepared
statement of Edward W. Coy, acting assistant administrator
for Latin America and the Caribbean, 4/2/81.
11) Correspondence, Pentagon Public Affairs Office spokes-
person to author.
12) Mimeographed manuscript, "Challenge in the Caribbean:
nouncement of increased military presence in the Caribbean
Basin."
20) ibid.
21) Correspondence, Pentagon Public Affairs Office spokes-
person to author.
22) The Navy "accidentally" fired a live missile while
crusing in the Caribbean in July. The missile, which appar-
ently failed to hit anything, contained 215 pounds of explo-
sives and had a range of 60 miles. See WSJ, 7/16/81.
23) Facts on File, 2/8/80.
Reagan Resurrects Savimbi
by Konrad Ege
At the same time as well over ten thou- sion was to strengthen UNITA; in addition,
sand South African troops were carrying it hoped to destabilize the Angolan MPLA
out a major invasion of Angola, and a few government, and to weaken SWAPO militari-
days before a South African motorized col- ly. The invasion apparently was one more
umn advanced into southeastern Angola with
the aim of restocking supply dumps of
UNITA troops,' U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State Chester Crocker told a Hawaii. audi-
ence that "UNITA represents a significant
and legitimate factor in Angolan -el:-
tics." UNITA (National Union for the To-
tal Independence of Angola), headed by
Jonas Savimbi is, of course, the very or-
ganization aided in its fight against the
Angolan government by South African troops
during their invasion.
UNITA, which re-grouped with' outside as-
sistance after suffering military defeat
by the MPLA (Movement for the. Liberation
of Angola) in 1976, has again emerged as a
crucial component in the South African
strategy to defeat the South West African
People's Organization'e (SWAPO) struggle
for the liberation of South African-cccu-
pied Jamibia. One of the main goals of
South Africa's August-September 1981 inva-
(Konrad Ege is co-editor of CcunterLpy
and a freelance journalist. ;
Atlantic
Ocean
International i'efence & Aid Fund map
CcunterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82 -- 15
M ussende
?
Calucinga Texeira de Sous
Rocades
Calueque
-'~ ? .
Ngiva (Pereira d'Eca)
-- -
--
~ Osh.kango
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step in a South African strategy to create tions, according to Duignan, South African
a "buffer zone" along the Angolan-Namibian troops would remain in Namibia, and only
border which, at least for the near fu- after "an independent Namibia is in a po-
ture, would impede SWAPO's military opera- sition to defend itself, and once guerril-
tions. UNITA is an "ideal" force to occupy la warfare has stopped, South African
this buffer zone. troop will be able to leave the coun-
In order to clear the way for UNITA, try."
South Africa is carrying out a brutal war As of now, the Reagan administration is
against the people of southern Angola. still maintaining that it is determined to
Sara Rodrigues, the Luanda correspondent find a Namibia solution within a United
of the Guardian (New York) wrote: "Preto- Nations framework. However, while these
ria seems determined to leave nothing but statements are being made, South Africa is
scorched, blackened earth, as it contin- on its way to create militarily certain
ues its brutal invasion of Angola.... The realities in Angola and Namibia. Even
brunt of the South African action is in- though the most'recent South African inva-
tended to wipe out the civilian popula- sions stand in stark contrast to working
tion. Villagers are being mown down; wa- toward a peaceful solution to the "Namibia
terholes... occupied or sabotaged...; problem" which the Reagan administration
crops and homes burned to the ground; claims to be committed to, there has been
food stores raided and destroyed; and no visible effort by the U.S. government
cattle... driven across into Namibia or to prevent South Africa from further mili-
slaughtered with automatic weapons."3' tary actions. This silence or acquiescence
The Reagan administration, whose stron- is taken as support by the South African
gest response after weeks of continued regime.
South African aggression was to "deplore"
the violence, vetoed a United Nations Se- SAVIMBI: TREASON SINCE 1972
curity Council resolution condemning the J
invasion. That decision gives rise to Jonas Savimbi plays an important role in
speculation about what the U.S. government the South African strategy, and South Af-
hopes to gain from the invasion. The cre- rica appearscdmmitted to strengthen UNITA
ation of a "buffer zone" might give South to prepare it for an extended role. At the
Africa and the,U.S. an opportunity to same time, the Reagan administration is
"settle the Namibia problem" in a way that pushing Congress to repeal the Clark
will preserve South African military domi- amendment prohibiting U.S. aid to UNITA:
nance over the country but will also pro- Both the U.S. and South Africa were ardent
vide a justification for Western govern- supporters of UNITA during MA's libera-
ments and South Africa to recognize the tion war in Angola against Portuguese cc-
"government" of Namibia and to argue that lonialism. Since 1972, UNITA has served
SWAPO's claims have lost, their validity. pro-Western interests. Savimbi collaborat-
A "Namibia solution" excluding SWAPO ed not only with the South African re
which would benefit from such a buffer gime but also with the Portuguese colonial
zone was outlined in 1977 by Peter army - which was supposed to be his ener?y.
Duignan, Director of the African Program Former Portuguese dictator Marcello
at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, Caetano himself acknowledged that in 1972
California. Duignan, who was a member of the Portuguese occupiers struck a deal
Reagan's transition team and has consider- with Savimbi whereby they wou'.d leave him
able clout In the Republican foreign poli- alone as long as he was fighting the MPLA.
cy establishment wrote that the U.S. "may A September 1972 letter from Savimbi to
well elect" to find a Namibia settlement General Luz Cunha, then Commander-in-Chief
"even if SWAPO and the U.N. refuse to go of the Portuguese army in Angola provides
along. The West could then insist on fair further documentation; in it, Savimbi ad-
elections.... With Western support, the vocates "the weakening of the MPL.A forces
interim government could lead Namibia to within Angola to lead to their liquida-
independence. The West would then be in a tion. This task can be accomplished by the
position to recognize the new government Portuguese military forces and the
formed after the elections, and to help forces of UNITA."5
that government resist SWAPO's 'war of With South African assistance, Savimbi
liberatign. "' During these "free" elec- rebuilt UNITA after his 1976 defeat. To-
16 -- Counterspy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82
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day, UNITA is receiving weapons, fuel, France was providing "millions" for
medical care, training and actual combat UNITA.11 At least officially, French aid
assistance from South Africa. This was to UNITA now has ceased. After the Angolan
confirmed by a number of mercenaries government suspended all French oil pros-
fighting for South Africa, including Jose pecting in Angola, France was forced to
Ricardo Belmundo, an Angolan fighting in sign an agreement in September 1978 in
South Africa's "32 Battalion." He ex- which France pledged to halt all aid to
plained the task of this elite unit: Angolan counter-revolutionaries.
"Whenever UNITA had operational difficul- West Germany's Franz, Josef Strauss, head
ties it would contact South African mili- of the rightwing Christian Social Union
tary security, which would call on 32 Bat- refers to Savimbi as a good friend, and
talion to... get UNITA out of trouble. We has been accused in a report by Angola's
would operate on behalf of UNITA in UNITA Paris embassy of being instrumental in
regions." According to Belmundo, who tes- funneling arms to UNITA.12 The Hanns-
tif ied before the International Commis- Seidel-Stiftung, a foundation with close
sion of Inquiry into the Crimes of the ties to the Christian Social Union has
Racist and Apartheid Regimes in Southern provided substantial quantities of medi-
Africa in early 1981, "the 32 Battalion cine to UNITA, according to Savimbi him-
was made to appear like UNITA. We carried self.
Chinese-made AK's...." The existence of 32 Savimbi also seems to work through a va-
Battalion has been confirmed by Colonel riety of channels to obtain arms on the
Leon Martins of the South African Army. 6 international market. One such deal, worth
While South Africa's support for UNITA an estimated $1.2 million was uncovered in
is certainly the largest aid program to early May 1981 in Houston, Texas when cus-
Savimbi, other countries have provided him toms officials arrested t: ree Britons and
with assistance. Morocco's King Hassan, three Austrians and seized a planeload of
himself a recipient of one of the largest some 1,300 guns, 100 grenade launchers and
U.S. military assistance programs in Afri- about one million rounds of ammunition.
ca, has emerged as a.close UNITA ally. The arms shipment, which involved the
About 500 UNITA troops recently went Liechtenstein and Hamburg, West Germany-
through long periods of training by Moroc- based Servotech Company, Austria's Montana
co's U.S.-advised and equipped army.? (In Airlines, and South Africa's Armscor, was
return, Hassan gets South African weapons destined for South Africa, but the London
for his war in the Western Sahara, and Observer made clear that its real destina-
South African advisors are reportedly tion could have only been Savimbi's
training Moroccan soldiers.8) Another UNITA.13
close African ally is Senegal, which pro- In the U.S., there are a number of
vides Savimbi with weapons. UNITA also rightwing organizations which have taken
maintains an office in Dakar, Senegal for up Savimbi's cause. In early 1981 there
arranging arms deals.9 Other donors to were rumors that Savimbi was to come to
UNITA are the governments of Ivory Coast, the U.S. for talks with Reagan administra-
Qatar and Saudi Arabia. :ion officials. At least publicly, the
Savimbi's European contacts include the visit never took place, possibly because
party of former Portuguese Prime Minister there was already considerable public op-
Sa Carneiro. The rightwing Portuguese mag- position to visits by Dirk Mudge, the head
azine A Rua commented that Savimbi's for- of the South African-installed government
mer ties to the fascist Portuguese intel- of Namibia, and by South African Foreign
ligence PIDE/DGS are "the best recommends- Minister Pik Botha. However, then-Acting
tions" Savimbi can provide.10 Assistant Secretary of State Lannon Walker
The right wing of Margaret Thatcher's met with Savimbi in Morocco in March 1981,
Conservative Party has good relations with and Jeremias Chitunda cf uNITA's Celt.-al
Savimbi as well. The Tory Party's foreign Committee apparently has visited the U.S.
affairs committee, for example, hosted him several times over'the last few years.
during his 1980 London visit. According to Savimbi's last known visit to the U.S. was
Reagan foreign policy advisor, Kenneth in late 1979 on a tour organized by the
Adelman, the French government continued rightwing Freedom House and Carl Gershman,
to aid UNITA after the U.S. withdrew its executive director of Social Democrats,
support. Adelman wrote that as of 1978, U.S.A.14 President Reagar himself stated
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during his election campaign that he fa-
vors supplying weapons to UNITA.
Already, CIA Director William Casey is
reportedly writing memos with titles such
as "Draft Covert Operations Planning Docu-
ment Africa-Middle East" which asks for
"improved emphasis added, logistical ca-
pabilities" to support anti-communist
forces "especially in Angola."15 The CIA
had provided massive assistance which in-
cluded weapons and the hiring of mercena-
ries for UNITA in 1975 'and 1976, but had
to cease its aid under a mandate by Con-
gress. The CIA - at least officially -
terminated its aid program with a $540,000
gift to Savimbi for "continuing UNITA ac-
tivities" in April 1976.
JOURNALISTS FOR UNITA
In addition to weapons and money, the
CIA also used to work on getting good
publicity for Savimbi in the U.S. and oth-
er countries. In his book, In Search of
Enemies, former chief of the CIA's Angola
Task Force, John Stockwell, described how
the CIA managed to place disinformation
pieces in the Washington Post and other
U.S. media outlets during the height of
the CIA's intervention in Angola in 1975
and 1976.16 Most of the planted stories
were about alleged successful operations
by UNITA and Holden Roberto's National
Front for the'Liberation of Angola (FNLA,
another CIA-backed guerrilla organization
in Angola) as well as about Soviet and Cu-
ban "subversion" in Angola.
Today, there is little need for the CIA
to place disinformation pieces in the
Washington Post. The Post's deputy manag-
ing editor, Richard Harwood, takes care of
that himself. In July 1981 the Washington
Post ran a seven-part series about
Harwood's exploits while travelling with
UNITA troops. Undoubtedly, the series came
at a crucial time - right before a major
South African invasion. (South African
"incursions" already had been an almost
weekly routine, and the Post often chose
to report them in only a few paragraphs
which stressed that South Africa was pur-
suing SWAPO guerrillas.) Indeed, the U.S.
media has frequently played down South Af-
rican aggressions against Angola. This
misinformation of the U.S. public has been
a major factor in suppressing grassrocts
resistance to the Reagan administration's
stance of acquiescence to the South Afri-
18 -- Counterspy -- Nov. 81 - Jan.82
can invasions.
Richard Harwood, who went to Angola with
British journalist Fred Bridgland? a
"great admirer" of Savimbi, was full of
praise for UNITA's "war of liberation." He
uncritically conveyed Savimbi's views of
the world. Harwood hardly questioned
Savimbi's assurances that UNITA receives
very little outside support, and that
South Africa "provides no weapons and en-
gages in no joint military operations with
UNITA." (Savimbi claims that from 1977 to
1980 he got only $10 million from outside
sources; at the same time Harwood admits
that UNITA pays some $35,000 a trip just
for pilots who fly planes into UNITA ar-
eas.) Harwood said that before coming to
Angola, he had "heard from UNITA critics"
that any military success UNITA might have
acfiieved was the work of South African
troops. During his trip, he concluded that
this "was a racist argument, based on the
prejudice that Africans are not capable of
fighting.... The argument is untrue. These
lads knew what they were doing."
Perhaps the most blatant piece of disin-
formation in the Washington Post was a map
of Angola published with the last install-
ment of the Harwood series. The map showed
only one-third of the country as "govern-
ment controlled." The other two thirds are
"contested" or "UNITA area" (with the ex-
ception of a small area controlled by
SWAPO). Even Smith Hempstone, a Savimbi
supporter and regular contributor to
Reader's Digest and the racist mercenary
magazine Soldier of Fortune conceded that
UNITA is operating in only one third of
Angola.17
Propaganda for UNITA comes from yet-an-
other source - the hierarchy of the AFL-
CIO. Its President Lane Kirkland hosted
Jonas Savimbi in late 1979, and the AFL-
CIY Free Trade Union News devoted most of
its October 1980 issue to an interview
with Jeremias Chitunda and AFL-CIO inter-
national representative and long-time CIA
operative, Irving Brown. Brown praised
Savimbi as a leader "whom I have known for
more than twenty years as a great fighter
for freedom whose concept of democracy
comes as close as anyone in Africa today
to our image of what is a free and demo-
cratic society." Brown went so far as to
ask Chitunda whether it would be possible
for AFL-CIO operatives to come into UNITA
areas in southern Angola to help Savimbi
set up free trade unions! (It would not
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be the first time that Western trade
unions aided counter-revolutionaries in
Angola. In 1978 it was revealed that the
International Confederation of Free Trade
Unioa labor center "set up... by the
CIA" was giving money to Holden
Roberto's "Angolan General League of
Workers" which was all but a front for the
FNLA.)
LOBBYING FOR SAVIMBI
To get favorable press coverage, Savimbi
maintains paid propagandists in the U.S.
One of them is Florence Tate, former press
secretary of Washington, D.C. mayor,
Marion Barry. Tate, president of Florence
Tate Associates, began working for UNITA
in April 1980 for an annual fee of $65,000
plus expenses. She described her political
activities on behalf of UNITA as "lobbying
to deter the diplomatic recognition of
the Luanda regime and to persuade... U.S.
government policy makers to support
UNITA." Her tasks, according to a state-
ment filed with the Justice Department un-
der the Foreign Agents Registration Act
include: "Write pro-UNITA letters-to-the-
editor..., disseminate pro-UNITA news
clips ... Cand] arrange public speaking en-
gagements for UNITA representatives." Tate
also does some speaking herself to "small
selected groups of church and labor offi-
cials, Black organizations, and congres-
sional staffs." She maintains contact with
the Voice of America to "seize any avail-
able opportunity to present political
views of Americans that are favorable to
UNITA's cause" and tries to "maintain good
personal relations with press, through ju-
dicious use of news tips...." Finally, her
work includes arranging "for selected
journalists to visit UNITA areas inside
Angola."
Another paid U.S. propagandist for 'UNITA
is Paul Koerner, a member of the Board of
Directors of the St. Louis, Missouri-based
Strategic Resource.Information Service.
According to an October 28, 1980 agreement
signed by Koerner and Jeremias Chitunda,
Koerner is "the sole Economic Agent" of
UNITA in North America. The agreement
reads, in part ("Principal" is UNITA,
"Agent" is Koerner):
'WHEREAS, Principal claims to be the le-
gitimate representative of the people of
the Country of Angola, Africa, and the
Central Committee is the governing body of
UNITA; and
WHEREAS, Principal wishes to promote the
economic, industrial and agricultural de-
velopment of Angola by and through the
granting of concessions for such develop-
ment; and
WHEREAS, Agent is knowledgeable of the
various economic, industriaZ, mineral and
agricultural deposits and uses in and of
'Angola; and
WHEREAS, Principal is presently engaged
in an armed conflict to determine the gov-
ernment of Angola, which occupies the pri-
mary portion of Principal '8 time and ac-.
tivities.
NOW, THEREFORE, Principal hereby ap-
points PAUL K. KOERNER... as the sole Eco-
nomic Agent of Principal in North America.
The duties of said Agent shall be to
promote the Principal's granting of eco-
nomic concessions in the Country of Angola
to various persons, individual and corpo-
rate.
As this agreement shows, Savimbi has
far-reaching plans. However, in spite of
strong South African backing, it would be
virtually impossible for UNITA to over-
throw the MPLA government. Its popular
backing and support from socialist and
progressive countries is too strong. Even
so, the next months might be crucial as
South Africa seems prepared to create a
"country" for Savimbi in southern Angola
by its invasions. Now more than ever, the
Angolan people who have remained constant
in their total support for the liberation
movement in Namibia, in spite of repeated
South African invasions, need and deserve
international support.
FOOTNOTES:
1) see Baltimore sun, 9/4/81, p.A-2.
2) Address by Chester Crocker before the Foreign Relations
and National Security Committees of the American Legion,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 8/29/81.
3) The Guardian (New York), 8/26/81, p.10.
4) Peter Duignan, L.H. Gann, South West Africa-Namibia,
American-African Affairs Association, Inc., New York, 1977,
p.36.
5) The letter is part of a series of letters between
Savimbi and Portuguese government officials. They were pub-
lished first by the Paris Afrigue-Asie magazine on 7/8/74.
6) West Africa (London), 3/9/81, p.493.
7) Washington Post, 7/22/81, p.A-15.
8) Africa (London), 4/81, p.61; The Nation, 12/20/80,
pp.664,665.
9) see Die Welt, 1/31/79, Informationsdienst Suedliches Af-
rika, 10/80, p.16.
10) as quoted in Antiimperialistisches Informationsbulle-
tin, 11-12/80, p.7
11) Harper's, 9/78, p.22.
(cont. on page 59)
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Libya:
Propaganda and Covert Operations
by Jeff McConnell
The contours of a high-level Reagan ad-
ministration plan to destabilize Libya are
starting to shine through the curtain of
government secrecy. In August 1981, Don
Oberdorfer of the Washington Post reported
that the first "interdepartmental foreign
policy study" ordered by the Reagan admin-
istration shortly after taking office con-
sidered what the U.S. should do "to oppose
Libya and its militant... leader, Col.
Muammar Qaddafi." A few months later,
Oberdorfer continued, "authoritative
sources reported that the administration
had drawn up plans to 'make life uncom-
fortable,' at, a minimum," for Qaddaf i.1
Details of these plans are beginning to
emerge because of. intentional and acciden-
tal leaks (some of which are disinforma-
tion) and because of the controversy sur-
rounding Max Hugel, formerly in charge of
CIA covert operations, and CIA Uirector
William Casey; and as a result of the air
engagement between U.S. and Libyan fighter
pilots over the Gulf of Sidra.
There is even some evidence that the
Casey affair was, in fact, an intergovern-
mental struggle over the wisdom of initi-
ating certain covert operations against
Libya. But whether this is true or not, it
has become quite clear that Libya - like
(Jeff McConnell is a political activist
living in Cambridge, Massachusetts.)
20 -- CounterSpy -- Nov-81 - Jan.82
Cuba, Angola, Afghanistan and Vietnam -
has already been targeted by policy plan-
ners for an intensified campaign of propa-
ganda, isolation and destabilization. The
issue for the Reagan administration, in
Libya's case as in the others, is not
whether to carry out the campaign, but
rather how extensive the campaign can be,
given inherent constraints and the dangers
of public exposure.
I. CIA IN AFRICA: HUGEL'S BRIEFING AND ITS
AFTERMATH
On July 25, 1981 Michael Getler reported
in the Washington Post that members of the
House Select Committee on Intelligence
had written to President Reagan "object-
ing to a Central Intelligence Agency plan
for a covert action operation in Africa,
according to informed sources." Getler'.s
sources added that several Intelligence
Committee members, both Republicans and
Democrats, were "troubled by the plan it-
self, which they felt was not properly
thought through, and the proposed secret
action." They also said that Max Hugel
and Herman J. Cohen (Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Intelligence and Research at
the State Department) first briefed com-
mittee members on the plan and "misgivings
about the plan were voiced to Hugel and
Cohen." The letter was written because
committee members were not confident that
their objections would reach Casey and
President Reagan.
Three explanations have been offered for
this lack of confidence. Former CIA Direc-
tor Stansfield Turner often briefed the
congressional oversight'committees him-
self; William Casey did not, but instead
delegated this responsibility to Hugel, or
to his deputy Bobby Ray Inman. A second
explanation was that Hugel was thought in-
competent, and the third was that the plan
was thought to be so "harebrained" that
Committee members raised questions about
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Hugel's judgement, and about Casey's as
well.2 Whatever the explanation,. the In-
telligence Committee letter was a "highly
unusual" move. Reportedly, it was the
first time in the four years since the
House committee was established that its
members put their views on a CIA covert
operation in writing to the president.3
Both the White House and the Intelligence
Committee confirmed that the letter had
been written and sent.
Soon thereafter Newsweek magazine re-
ported that the target of the covert ac-
tion discussed in the letter was Libya.
The aim was to overthrow Qaddafi - that
is, according to Newsweek's sources,
Qaddafi's "'ultimate removal' from power."
To members of the House Intelligence Com-
mittee who reviewed the plan "that phrase
seemed to imply [Qaddafi's] assassination
.... Casey nevertheless denied that the
CIA planned to kill [Qaddafil - but the
committee, one source said, just doesn't
trust Casey' and fired off its protest."
Newsweek characterized the action as "a
classic CIA destabilization campaign" with
three elements. One element was a disin-
formation campaign designed to embarrass
Qaddafi. Another was the creation of a
"counter government" to challenge his
claim to leadership. A third element - po-
tentially the most risky - was an "esca-
lating paramilitary campaign, probably by
disaffected Libyan nationals, to blow up
bridges, conduct small-scale guerrilla op-
erations and demonstrate that Qaddafi1
was opposed by an indigenous political
force."
Newsweek did not reveal whether Hugel
outlined to the committee a campaign al-
ready in progress or a campaign yet to be-
gin. But it is known that various opera-
tions such as those purportedly described
by Hugel and Cohen have already been car-
ried out against Libya. What is not pub-
licly known is the extent of U.S. involve-
ment in such operations and the extent of
their coordination. Such actions do not
require congressional approval but only a
finding by the president that they are
needed for "national security," and thus
they could have begun before the briefing.
On the other hand, Newsweek reported that
the cost of some aspects of the CIA cam-
paign was so high that the CIA needed con-
gressional approval to draw funds from a
special reserve account. As of late July,
Congress reportedly has not approved the
funds.4
II. DENIALS AND COUNTER-DENIALS
On July 27 the White House explicitly
denied aspects of the Newsweek story. The
White House deputy press secretary, Larry
Speakes, stated: "The briefing described
by Max Hugel (sic) in the current issue of
Newsweek never took place."5 He also said
that Newsweek "is incorrect,. The-letter
did not concern Libya or Qaddafi."6
Speakes declined to provide more informa-
tion, saying: "We don't go into the bIsi-
ness of discussing our intelligence." But
even his limited remarks were a departure
from the White House's usual "no-comment"
policy,and the Washington Post suggests it
was "an apparent effort to assist belea-
guered CIA Director William Casey." Most
papers reported that the White House, and
some that Senator Howard Baker (himgelf on
the Senate Intelligence Committee), had
"denied" the Newsweek story, but few re-
ported the actual content of the denials
or the important fact that Speakes' re-
marks conflicted with only aspects of the
story.
The next day the Washington Post report-
ed that unnamed "administration sources"
had said on July 27 that it was Mauritania
and not Libya that was the subject of the
House Intelligence Committee letter. On
July 29, the Christian Science Monitor re-
ported in an unsigned article that despite
the public controversy over Casey's busi-
ness practices, the "real reason" that
members of Congress wanted him to resign
was his approval of the Mauritania plan.
The plan "raised in congressional minds a
question of judgement." The House Intelli-
gence Committee didn't consider Mauritania
a country of "major importance.... It re-
cently went through a political coup as a
result of which it shifted its association
from Morocco... to Libya.... It might be
desirable to help out King Hassan of Mo-
rocco..., but is it worth a serious covert
operation?"9
Three weeks later, Michael Getler re-
ported that hours after the story on CIA
covert operations in Mauritania appeared,
the Mauritanians "went up the wall" and
demanded explanations from the State De-
partment. The Reagan administration dealt
with this problem in two different ways:
"At first U.S. officials tried to tell
Mauritania that they could not discuss al-
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leged or real covert actions; then they tion's concern about Mr. Qaddafi is so
tried to convince them that the press ac- great that key congressmen have been
count was wrong." Getler then cites "in- briefed on a covert U.S. operation planned
formed sources" as saying that the CIA to check Libyan influence in Mauritius, an
target was not Mauritania but Mauritius, island in the Indian Ocean that the U.S.
and that "the plan involving Mauritius did feared could become a Soviet naval base."
not involve cloak-and-dagger action but Significantly, however, House's piece did
was mainly a quiet CIA effort to slip mon- not appear until August 4, one week after
ey to the government there to help coun- the original Mauritania reports; moreover,
teract financial aid being supplied to she did not connect the Mauritius opera-
forces opposing the government by... tion at all to the committee letter.ll If
Muammar Qaddafi." Getler did not report, the Journal did write it correctly, it
however, on how this money was to accom- seems to have done so inadvertently.
plish its task, or why such an operation Time magazine, at about the same time as
would provoke as strong a response as the House's article was printed, claimed that
committee's letter to the White House. it, too, had been told of a CIA plot
On the other hand, Getler drew attention "aimed at the 'ultimate' removal" of
to a piece by Karen Eliot House in the Qaddafi but had "concluded that the report
Wall Street Journal concerning Egyptian was untrue;" and that certain "CIA
President Anwar Sadat's then forthcoming sources" had fed this "disinformation" to
visit to the U.S.10 In a passing remark, Newsweek. Time charged that "CIA sources"
House had written that the "administra- were behind the Mauritania story also, but
Mauritania? Mauritius??
Almost immediately after "sources" told in iron ore, phosphates (mainly used for
Newsweek magazine that the CIA was plan- fertilizer) and possibly in oil and urani-
ning the "ultimate removal" of Libyan head um. Tensions between Mauritania and Moroc-
of state Muammar Qaddafi, other Reagan ad- co have been running high since it signed
ministration sources leaked information a peace treaty with the Polisario Libera-
indicating that the CIA's target of a co- tion Front in 1979. (Morocco continues to
vert operation was not Libya but another use U.S.-supplied weapons in its war
North African country, Mauritania. In its against the Polisario over the Western Sa-
August 10 issue, Newsweek followed that up hara. The Polisario has been recognized by
with yet another leak: "Reagan adminis- the majority of the organization of Afri-
tration officials concede that a second can Unity member countries.) Strategy Week
operation is planned, not for Mauritania, reported in July 1980 that French intelli-
but for another undisclosed Third World gence had plans to stage a coup ousting
country." Finally, the Washington Post had Mauritania's government which they per-
the decisive word: There had been a mix-up ceived to be too closely aligned with AZ-
between two similar-sounding names: Mauri- geria, Libya and the Polisario. France,
tania and Mauritius, an island nation in along with Morocco, and, until recently,
the Indian Ocean. Mauritius now was the Mauritania's southern neighbor Senegal,
CIA target, and the CIA was rumored to be harbored Mauritanian opposition forces and
pZannin'g to fund a pro-U.S. Mauritian par- gave them room for political maneuvers.
ty for the upcoming elections, scheduled On March 16, 1981 the so-called "AZ-
for late 1981 or early 1982. Ziance for a Democratic Mauritania" (ADM)
Which leak or rumor about a CIA covert staged an unsuccessful coup against Mauri-
operation will turn out to be true remains tania's President Khouna Ould HaydaZla.
an open question as of this writing. How- The rebels came over-land from Senegal
ever, both Mauritania and Mauritius have across a border tightly controlled by that
been the targets of Western covert opera- country's security forces, and, according
tions within the last year. And there are to 8 Days (London), were counting on Mo-
good reasons - from the CIA's perspective roccan assistance in the second stage of
- to step up covert operations in both the coup after capturing leading members
countries. of the government. The coup failed because
Mauritania, a huge desert country with government officials, unexpectedly, were
less than two million people is very rich
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that what the House committee had objected Newsweek claimed that a "second operation
to was "a much broader, proposed CIA oper- was planned for another Third World nation
ation - one that did not involve physical as well. It was not Mauritania, adminis-
attacks on any national leader - to shore tration aides later conceded." Newsweek
up U.S. interests in the Middle East and also acknowledged that: "When a majority
North Africa." However, according to one of the committee protested to the Presi-
senator, this was a "hasty scheme," and dent about the plan, most had the second
Senator Barry Goldwater felt he "just operation in mind, though some thought the
couldn't stand watching a bunch of ama- letter they signed referred to Libya."13
teurs running things." Goldwater thereaf- This acknowledgement indicates that, con-
ter called for Casey's resignation. When trary to Newsweek's original story, the
Casey later testified on his own behalf to House committee's letter may well have not
the Senate Intelligence Committee, Time referred explicitly to any particular co-
reported, members were "less interested in vert operation at all.
his business lYpractices than his leadership About two weeks later, Getler's report
of the CIA." appeared, attributing to "informed
Newsweek defended its original story and sources" the information that the contro-
reported that "White House officials" had versial CIA target was Mauritius. Later,
tried to help Casey by denying the Libya in its August 31 issue reporting or.. the
story and by putting out word that Mauri- Gulf of Sidra incident, Newsweek discussed
tania was the target country. In addition, Qaddafi's "undeclared war" against "Ameri-
not in the capital Nouakchott at the time Berenger, is very likely to win the upcom-
of the coup. (According to a high-ranking ing election. The MV is committed to a
Libyan official quoted in al-Qabas (Ku- demilitarization of the Indian Ocean re-
wait), Libya had provide,q intelligence gion, and has been active on behalf of the
about the coup to the Mauritanian govern- former residents of Diego Garcia since
ment in advance.) Both Morocco and Senegal they were expelled in the wake of the U.S.
have stated that they were in no way in- takeover and enlargement of the military
volved in the coup, but Morocco's support facilities there.
for the ADM is no secret, and Senegal On the economic side, the MMM wants to
closed ADM offices in Dakar only after the take control out of the hands of a small
embarrassment of having the failed coup elite which. controls Mauritius' export and
attempt staged from their country. tourism-based economy. In fact, Mauritius
The situation in Mauritius, from the is in very bad economic shape with one of
CIA's point of view, is even more ripe for the highest inflation rates in Africa. Ito
intervention. According to Roger Faligot foreign debts to the International Mone-
tary in Bulletin d'Information sun tart' Fund and international banks are
VIntervention Clandestine (Paris), the staggering, and Mauritius' economy has be-
CIA has recently stepped its activities come dependent on South Africa. In Parch
on the island under CIA Chief of Station 1981, for example, Prime Minister
Jeff Corydon. The aim of the CIA - as well Ram ooZam,, accepted a $187 million loan
as of British and South African intelli- from South Africa.
Bence agencies - in Mauritius is to pre- This economic hold over the island has
vent an eZecticn victory by the Mouvement given the South African regime consider-
Militant Mauritien (Mk ) against Prime able leverage in Mauritius' politics.
Minister Seewoosagur RamgooZam. The stakes
are high: Port Louis, Mauritius is an *I'm- South Africa is financing opponents of the
portant port for the U.S. Indian Ocean na- ~' most notable the small, extreme
val task force and the French Navy; both r ghttuing Mauritian Social Democratic
the U. S. National Securi.tz.~ Agency (A'SA) Party. As far as U.S. intervention is con-
and the British Government Communications cerned, Carter administration officials,
Headquarters (GCHQ) maintain intelligence according to Berenger, promised not to in-
facilities on Mauritius, and., above all, terfere in Mauritius' elections. Roger
Faligot's article and recent revelations
Mauritius is the legal owner of Diego
in the Washington Post, however, strongly
Garcia, the most important U.S. naval base indicate that this "promise" has been bro-
in the Indian Ocean. It is generally ac-
knowledged that the 1 , Zed by Paul ken. The stakes for the U. S. might just be
too high.
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can interests" as background to the inci-
dent. It reported that the Reagan adminis-
tration "is determined to put pressure" on
Qaddafi "in a variety of ways," which in-
clude "asking friendly nations to help the
United States isolate and condemn"
Qaddafi, "propping up Libya's neighbors,"
and "unleashing the CIA." Newsweek now
characterized the proposed CIA operation
with a slightly different emphasis: it in-
volves not the "hasty scheme" Time report-
ed but rather a "patient" plan, one to
"destabilize and ultimately overthrow"
Qaddafi, but because of his "firm hold on
power" and the unavailability of a "sub-
stantial political counterforce" in Libya
for the CIA to work with, the "Reagan ap-
proach," with memories of the Bay of Pigs
"fiasco" in mind, is to "start with a low-
key, nonviolent effort to recruit reliable
agents from within the Libyan exile commu-
nity and begin the slow, tedious task of
building a viable opposition" to
Qaddaf i.14 Again there was no mention of
plans for assassination.
III. INFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION
It is important to pay close attention
to all the details of'these many reports.
There is surely much disinformation here,
but even such disinformation can be infor-
mative. Some sources believe that there
were CIA people out to get Casey by feed-
ing the press disinformation about covert
operations; Time was most explicit about,
this. Casey was politicizing the analysis
of intelligence to suit the government's
cold war posturing; he was appointing peo-
ple like Hugel; he was approving "bizarre"
covert actions. This made him enemies. On
the other hand, the White House, and per-
haps other factions in the CIA, had an in-
terest in both defending Casey against em-
barrassment and in covering up the details
.of covert operations. The White House also
was interested in settling at least one
diplomatic flap caused by the embarrassing
revelations about CIA operations. And var-
ious congresspersons were interested in
either covering up for Casey or in enlist-
ing the media in their campaign against
Casey and his "hasty scheme."
Finally, however, the Reagan administra-
tion has an undeniable interest in intimi-
dating and testing Qaddafi, and there is a
possibility that some of the stories were
trial balloons to gauge Qaddafi's reaction
24 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan-.82
and the U.S. public's. And some may have
also be n more threats or bluffs than con-
crete plans.. For example, the U.S. naval
operation in the Gulf of Sidra was widely
reported, both before and after the air
engagement, to fill both these functions
.of test and threat. But at the same time
that Qaddafi was tested, the American pub-
lic was tested, too, over the extent that
the U.S. government has succeeded in over-
coming post-Vietnam opposition to military
action. As former CIA analyst Joseph Sisco
approvingly wrote just after the Gulf of
Sidra incident, military actions are now
possible to the extent they are packaged
as necessary to national interests or na-
tional honor.15 Thus the Reagan adminis
tration has a clear interest in leaking
reports of covert action to condition the
public to accept an increasingly broad
conception of "national interests."
The details of the White House denial
are important. Speakes denied that the
briefing described by Newsweek had oc-
curred; he did not deny that Hugel had ev-
er briefed the House committee. This was a
very weak statement; it,only said that no
briefing completely matching the descrip-
tion by Newsweek ever took place. (The ex-
act meaning of Speakes' denial was probab-
ly that the U.S. had no plans to assassi-
nate Qaddafi - a denial which had been
made numerous times before. This is likely
since the focus of Newsweek's article was
the allegation of an assassination plot.)
Moreover, Speakes' claim that the House
Intelligence Committee letter was not
about Libya or Qaddafi is consistent with
its being about many kinds of operations
that involved Libya or Qaddafi in some
way; the alleged Mauritius operation, for
instance, would involve Libya even if a
letter protesting it would not be about
Libya..A number of covert operations could
hide beneath the semantic cover of
Speakes' phrase.
There are several points of agreement
among the later press reports. The leaked
House Intelligence Committee letter was
inexplicit enough} to cause confusion about
its precise subject. Libya was somehow in-
volved. The Time and the later Newsweek
reports are consistent: a number of opera-
tions were discussed in the House brief-
ing; apparently; all focused on Africa and
the Middle East, probably all with coordi-
nated objectives. Both the planning and
the operations themselves seem to have
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been objected to in the letter. armed forces of underdeveloped countries
There is much other evidence that helps as a major 'transmission belt' of socio-
in appraising these reports that comes economic reform and development." In many
from the history of U.S.-Libyan relations of these countries, the authors main-
and from a number of current developments. tained, "the military, as dynamic agents
U.S. covert operations have been taking of social and economic reform represent an
place in Libya for a long time. It is effective alternative to Communist extrem-
thus useful to examine their history and ism." As such, it "should receive the full
the history of U.S. objectives there to support and encouragement of American eco-
understand what factors are currently mo- nomic and military assistance planners."
tivating planners: many of the strategic moreover, "the organizational strength of
issues and the constraints have changed the Communist parties, their unity of pur-
little. pose and the dedication and loyalty of
In many cases, roles have changed re- their leaders, are rarely matched by simi-
cently. The French, under Valery Giscard lar attributes among the democratic
d'Estaing took over covert operations in parties.... Communism may overrun these
Libya while Jimmy Carter was in-office as critical areas of the world unless a po-
part of their aggressive Africa policy. litical and social counterforce, well or-
Ronald Reagan has now taken over there the ganized... and dedicated to common goals
French objectives and tactics, both be- is developed." According to "Annex C," it
cause of Giscard's loss to Mitterrand and is becoming'"increasingly evident that the
France's consequent change in policy to- military officer corps is a major rallying
ward the Third World and because of the point of the defense against Communist ex-
increasingly aggressive U.S. foreign poli- pansion and penetration." The corps can be
cy. It is thus also important to examine involved in "providing stable and eff i-
the history of these operations in the cient government," in "improving the in-
1970s to see what strategies Reagan's CIA ternal security," and in making more ef-
is likely to adopt. Finally it is useful fective use "of their nations' economic
to look in detail at various contemporary resources and foreign economic assis-
developments to see if any picture emerges tance."17
of ongoing CIA activities that supports A CIA study prepared for the Draper Com-
one or another of the reports that fol- mittee at this time confirmed the effec-
lowed the initial House committee leak. tiveness of using military assistance for
these purposes. There was said to be one
IV. WESTERN CONTROL OF LIBYA AND THE category of governments sustained by U.S.
PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION military aid which enabled "the regime to
keep power by more or less authoritarian
In 1959-William Draper, an investment means;" and there was another category of
banker headed the Presidential' Committee states described where "without United
to Study the Military Assistance Program, States military assistance the government
which was composed of generals and former concerned would almost certainly have...
Defense Department employees. The "Draper given way to a Communist or pro-Communist
Committee" submitted a "composite report" regime." The two categories covered about
and a collection of "annexes," or supple- twenty countries.13 The study, however,
ments on U.S. military aid to President neglected to list those countries in
Eisenhower. While the composite report was which the armed forces where in the pro-
approved by the entire committee, its mem- cess of being built up for just these
bers were not necessarily in full agree- purposes.
ment with the "annexes" which were, never- An unpublished and until recently con-
theless, passed along to the president as fidential version of Annex C concluded
independent recommendations.16 with case studies of two Military Assis-
Annex C, "A Study of United States Mili- tance Programs (MAP) - Libya and Brazil.
tary Assistance Programs in Underdeveloped It suggested that Libya .as one of the
Areas," summarizes in general terms many countries in which the U.S. should be
of the problems that countries like Libya building up the officer corps for leader-
presented to U.S. military planners. The ship purposes. The authors began by main-
authors carefully studied the importance taining that although "North Africa does
for Western interests of "the use of the not lie in our strategic jurisdiction,"
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but rather France's, this fact still Libya's budget deficit" since 1955. "Thus
"should not prompt us to belittle the far, despite efforts by extreme national-
strategic importance of the region.... ists to depict the Libyan government as a
The West, should it lose completely its pawn of the Western powers, the Anglo-
strategic position in North Africa, would American presence has not proved a serious,
find its control over the Mediterranean source of tensions. The central govern-,
seriously threatened. North Africa, more- went, however, is under growing pressure
over, flanks the routes which the Soviets from tribal elements" and from Libyans
would follow in their efforts to penetrate "prodded by Radio Cairo" to moderate links
Africa.... Libya... serves as a buffer be- with the West. The U.S. maintained that
tween the Middle East and the Maghreb and its relationship with Libya was "a sound
at least partially shields the latter from business venture" for the Libyan govern-
the full force of Arab nationalism emanat- ment which defended U.S. aid payments more
ing,from Cairo [where Gamal Abdel Nasser as "rental for base rights" than as mili-
was then in power .... So long as Libya tary aid grants. And although the Egypt-
remains friendly to the West,, the West can ians "have been critical of the Base
control the southern shore and part of the Agreement from the beginning," Libyan King
Eastern Mediterranean." Idris realized "how much Libya needed to
Even if the U.S. military base at Whee- have her budget strengthened by the income
luswere to become obsolete, there would ... from the base.... Indeed, the Libyan
still be "compelling reasons" for the U.S. economy would collapse in the absence of
to maintain political and military influ- American economic aid."
ence in Libya. From these considerations, The authors concede, however, that "the
several consequences followed for U.S. initial favor with which most Libyans
policy. Any settlement of the anti-colo- viewed the base arrangements has waned and
nialist struggle in Algeria must "preserve a number of tensions have marred the work-
for the French the responsibility for the ing relationship between Libyans and Amer-
defense and foreign affairs of Algeria." icans." Moreover, "Egypt and Russia both
Moreover, "in the event of an attempted try to exacerbate these tensions in their-
Egyptian coup in Libya..., Bourguiba [the efforts to turn popular sentiment against
Tunisian president] might intervene in the presence of the U.S. base." For exam-
Tripolitania [one of Libya's provinces3 ple, Arabic-speaking members of the Soviet
rather than see it fall under Nasser's Embassy frequently go to areas close to
control. The United States could strength- Wheelus and "through the technique of sub-
en Bourguiba by giving him certain pres- tle questioning, plant doubts in the minds
tige weapons... which would make him the of the Arabs. Is not the noise of these
strongest single Arab leader in the Ma- jets terrible? ... Did you ever stop to
ghreb." think of how much water the Americans use
A major concern among Libyan officials at the base? ... From time to time acci-
at this time was "Egypt's unrelenting ef- dents involving U.S. military vehicles oc-
fort to bring her western neighbor within cur along the road connecting Wheelus and
her sphere of influence.... Today, Egyp- Tripoli.... There have been instances, al-
tians, through a policy of cultural impe- so, of U.S. planes dropping practice bombs
rialism have come to dominate many impor- uncomfortably close to Libyan villages."
tant sectors of Libyan society" including But on the whole "these irritations ...
education and the mass media. The problem have not significantly affected the pro-
of Libya, the authors wrote, contrast Western orientation of the Libyan govern-
sharply with those in "French North Afri- ment.'...The Russians want the Americans
ca," where "the French presence is the fo- out for strategic reasons." And "so long
cus of Arab hostility. In Libya... the as the United States continues to hold the
foreign presence is primarily British and base and to carry on the economic and oth-
American. British troops helped train the er programs associated with it, the Egypt-
Libyan army" and the U.S. had its impor-` ians cannot gain control of the country."
tant base at Wheelus, representing "a The Libyan government "seems to be fully
$150,000,000 investment. Since 1951, both aware of the dangers of communism," but...
Great Britain and the United States have the "people of Libya generally do not seem
heavily subsidized the Libyan economy," to fear the communists as much as they do
with the U.S. assuming "the major share of 'Western imperialists."'
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The pro-Western orientation of the Lib-
yan government was said to be likely to
prevail as long as King Idris remains in
power. During that time, as the authors
saw it, Libya's military problem was one
not of external but of internal security.
The Libyan army was incapable of defending
the country against outright aggression;
the Anglo-American presence, however,
would "discourage any overt attempt at a.
military takeover by Egypt." By training
and equipping the Libyan army and the pro-
vincial police forces, the U.S. and Brit-
ain hoped to forestall internal problems.
Meanwhile, the military should also be
used as a "transmission belt" for develop-
ment; "dramatic hydrological projects" in
a country with severe water problems, fi-
nanced by the U.S., could turn Libya into
a "show window" facilitating Western in-
terests. And, the authors contended, the
military "can make an important contribu-
tion to Libya's unity and independence by
... creating a corps of native Libyan
teachers who are oriented favorably to the
West," thus pushing out Egypt's influence.
Libya, by itself, was said to be "not a
viable country. External financial support
will always be required, and the United
States can expect eventually to have to
bear almost the full burden of subsidizing
Libya." This was a good investment, how-
ever. For relatively modest funds, the
U.S., "as long as it maintains its influ
ence in the formulation of Libya's econom-
ic, defense and foreign policies, will be
able to exercise a counter-weight to the
attempts of extreme nationalists to domi-
nate the entire region from the Atlantic
to the Persian Gulf," attempts whose aims
"converge with those of the Soviet Union."
But there was a problem about succession
- "The future stability of Libya," the au-
thors wrote, "hinges upon the succession
to Idris and the degree of national unity
which can be maintained following his
death. the heir apparent, a young nephew
of the king, is conceded little chance of
commanding the allegiance of diverse ele-
ments in the country." The authors feared
that the greatest danger after Idris'
death might be a secession of "the tribes-
men of Cyrenaica" from the union with Tri-
politania. Should that happen, "the Egypt-
ian underground can be expected to make a
bid for power in Tripolitar.ia. The major
obstacle to such a move, of course, is the
continued presence of the United States
and Great Britain...." But external sup-
port might not be sufficient, and Libya's
"unity and independence" - the aim of the
"show window" scheme - might not have been
achieved as yet by the time of Idris'
death.
Thus the U.S. had to search for a solu-
tion to the succession problem. The au-
thors of the confidential report advised
that "the possibility of grooming a reli-
able military elite for a future governing
role merits thoughtful consideration. The
creation of a national staff unifying the
various forces at the top level may prove
desirable as step toward facilitating the
transfer of political power."19
One ought, of course, to be careful in
not attributing to these remarks more sig-
nificance than they deserve: they were all
part of a confidential portion of a sup-
plement to a report by a Presidential Com-
mission which merely gave recommendations
to the president. Yet they are surprising-
ly similar to language that appears in ac-
tual policy documents. An example is a
summary of U.S. policy in Libya prepared
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early
1957. The Joint Chiefs' summary is brief,
but the Draper Committee "case study"
could be looked at as nothing less than a
detailed statement of the same political
analysis espoused in the summary.
The Joint Chiefs were already in. 1957
concerned that U.S. interests in Libya
were increasing rapidly. "The best inter-
ests of the United States will be served
by taking steps to insure the continua-
tion of a political atmosphere in the Lib-
yan Government which will be amenable to
the continuance of the present base
rights agreement... and the formulation of
additional agreements on reasonable terms.
In addition, the United States should en-
courage the orientation of the Libyan Gov-
ernment toward the West, and away from
Egyptian and Soviet influence. Finally,
the U.S. should assist in the maintenance
of a loyal armed force to insure the Ro-
litical stability of the country emphasis
added after the death of the King.... The
Military Assistance Program objective for
Libya is to assist in the development of
the Libyan Army to have the capability to
maintain internal security and contribute
to the national unity of the country."20 A
later State Department document of the
Kennedy administration indicates how this
was to be accomplished. The U.S. was to
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finance fifty percent increases in the
size of the Libyan armed forces in the
mid-1950s, then again in the mid-1960s,
accompanied by expanded training, at least
in part to Westernize the officer
corps.21
V. OIL, CORRUPTION AND THE COUP
In the 1960s, Libya became important not
only because of Wheelus and its location,
but also because of its oil and the wealth
it created for a small group of people.
Wilbur Eveland wrote in his book, Ropes of
Sand: "Working in Libya, I saw first hand
the factors leading to the overthrow of
that country's monarchy in 1969 and the
emergence of yet another radically anti-
Western regime. Oil company greed, inter-
necine rivalries, and subordination of
corruption sowed the seeds of this further
loss of American influence." Mustafa Ben
Halim, Libya's second prime minister, was
suddenly "a rich man just after negotiat-
ing the first [oil] exploration conces-
sions" and the renewal of the base agree-
ment in the mid-1950s. But he "prudently
elected to allow members of the royal en-
tourage to share in the spoils," giving
them an additional reason to toe the pro-
Western line besides those discussed in
the Draper Committee study.
As Libya's ambassador to France, Eveland
continued, Ben Halim organized "a near mo-
nopoly of all engineering and construction
activities ensuing from Libya's by then
well established oil discoveries." When
Eveland, then a representative for Vinnell
Co. (one construction company interested
in getting a piece of the pie in Libya,
see CounterSpy, May-July 1981) met Halim
in Paris, he learned how business was
done in Libya. "The formula was forthright
and simple: Ben Halim or one of his broth-
ers shared in the contract, with payments
for this 'service' to be made (illegally,
under Libyan law) in a foreign bank ac-
count. In return, Vinnell was entitled to
work and bid for new jobs against its (Ben
Halim-sponsored) competitors." Evelend re-
ported, however, that entrants in the race
to negotiate oil concessions in 1965 soon
made Ben Halim's corruption seem "rela-
tively 'minor league."' When Qaddafi over-
threw the monarchy four years later, nei-
ther "oil companies nor Washington should
have been surprised."22
Whether the U.S. government indeed was
28 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82
"surprised" by the coup is not so clear.
For one thing, the military was being
groomed by the U.S. possibly to succeed
the monarchy, or at least to make the
transition smooth after Idris' death. And
the U.S. warned Idris in 1968 that U.S.
military support for Libya did not mean
protection of his throne. The U.S. recog-
nized Qaddafi's new regime just several
days after the takeover and ignored ap-
peals from friends of the monarch to help.
A few months later, Qaddafi had several
members of his Revolutionary Council ar-
rested after the CIA warned him of a plot
against him. And in 1971,the CIA and Brit-
ish intelligence stood in the way of ef-
forts by royalist opponents to overthrow
Qaddafi.23 Qaddafi was staunchly anti-com-
munist at this point, and this convinced
Western governments that they had paved
the way for the right man.
VI. EFFORTS TO CONTROL LIBYA'S INCREASING
INDEPENDENCE
Qaddafi's increasingly militant support
for Palestinian rights in the early 1970s
led to a revision of U.S. policy. When the
U.S. Ambassador to Libya left his post in
early 1973, he was not replaced.24 Recon-
naissance flights over Libya began in
1972 in response to Libya's first acquisi-
tion of Soviet arms.25 In March 1973, a
Libyan plane reportedly attacked a U.S.
C-130 transport that Libya claimed had en-
tered restricted air space, but the C-130
escaped undamaged.
Growing oil revenues after 1973 enabled
Qaddafi to finance both guns and butter
for Libya, to remain unconcerned about
Western opposition to his support for the
Palestinians and ties to the Soviets, and
in fact to maintain some leverage over the
U.S. and several European countries be-
cause of Libya's oil exports. Anwar Sadat,
over this period, expelled Soviet advisors
from Egypt, turned his back on Nasserism,
and slowly began to reintegrate Egypt into
the Western economic and military system.
Qaddafi took over where Nasser had left
off, and he began encountering the same
hostility from the West that Nasser had
earlier incurred. The U.S. was now faced
with a situation where it had protected
Qaddafi early on in order to control the
spread of Nasserism and of Soviet influ-
ence in Libya after Idris' departure; now
Qaddafi himself needed to be controlled.
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Relations between Egypt and Libya began and provided rationales for both Libya and
to deteriorate after 1973. Sadat withdrew Egypt to buy more Soviet and U.S. arms.
from plans to merge the two countries and There were (and are) large discrepancies
excluded Libya from preparations for the between Soviet and U.S.-Egyptian estimates
1973 Arab-Israeli war. Qaddafi's Islamic of the monetary value of Libya's Soviet
fundamentalism, his opposition to a polit- aims. Qaddafi professed to?want to diver-
ical settlement with Israel, and his radi- sify Libya's arms purchases, but when the
cal support for Arab unity and indepen- U.S. and France responded negatively, he
dence from the West all sharply contrasted continued to buy from the Soviet Union.
with Sadat's positions on these issues. Throughout the 1970s, although Libya be-
They also contrasted with the positions of came increasingly to be portrayed as a So-
some members of Libya's Revolutionary viet surrogate, many experts agreed that
Council, and in August 1975, Omar Mehishi, the chief tie between the two countries
Abdul Menin al Houni, and two other Coun- was arms sales. Several times the U.S.
cil members were accused of plotting blocked export licenses for military
against Qaddaf i. Mehishi and al Houni both equipment for Libya, and, in February
left Libya and were granted political asy- 1978, the U.S. even halted the delivery of
lum in Egypt in early 1976. There they or- spare parts for C-130s Libya already pos-
ganized Libyans in Egypt against Qaddafi, 'sessed; the reasons given were Libya's
and Mehishi began using Egyptian radio to support for "terrorism" and its opposition
transmit anti-Qaddafi propaganda into Lib- to U.S. policies in the Middle East. In
ya. A number of acts of sabotage occurred late 1978 and early 1979, however, the
in Egypt in retaliation, prompting Sadat U.S. agreed to sell two 727s and three
to deploy troops on the Libyan border in 747s, after Libya promised no military use
summer 1976.26 for them and acceded to the Hague hijack-
France reportedly became embroiled in ing convention. The sales were cancelled
the dispute in 1977 because of its growing in 1979, however; U.S. officials argued
ties with Egypt, its long-standing in- that Libya had intervened in Uganda using
volvement in North Africa, and its growing C-130s and stated that the 747s might be
cooperation with the CIA. Roger Faligot used in similar military operations.
wrote in The Middle East that in 1977, This affair, along with Libya's support
Colonel Alain Gagneron de Marolles, then for Iran's revolution, the Polisario
"supervising all French covert actions, forces in the Western Sahara, and Pales-
was allegedly authorized by... Sadat to tinian causes convinced the U.S. that
launch guerrilla raids into Libya from the Qaddafi was a major obstacle to American
Egyptian border. According to reliable interests in the Middle East. The Carter
SDECE French intelligence] sources, the administration escalated its propaganda
CIA had pushed France to the fore in this about Soviet "penetration" in Libya. It
anti-Libya exercise, which failed abysmal- leaked news of a "secret analysis" pre-
ly." Colonel de Marolles teamed up with pared for National Security Advisor
Mehishi in this operation. However, MOSSAD Zbigniew Brzezinski which painted " a dis-
(Israeli intelligence) -was "extremely hos- turbing map of Soviet-backed Libyan-orga-
tile" to this operation. "It saw as a dis- nized disruption... stretching from Malta
tinct threat the possibility of a pro- to the Philippines."29 Newspaper writers
Egyptian government being set up in Libya, with close ties to the CIA and the Penta-
thereby strengthening Egypt's position in gon developed this theme.30 (As far as
any,negotiations."27 Malta was concerned, propaganda and covert
At the same time, there were reports of operations went hand-in-hand. To under-
Egyptian military aid to Chad, and the score "Maltese opposition to Libya," the
Egyptian Vice President visited Chad in British were setting up a phony "Maltese
July 1977. This created in Libya a sense Liberation Front" that claimed responsi-
of encirclement. In one instance) Egyptian bilit for bombings of Libyan build-
soldiers were patrolling inside Libyan ings.31) At the same time, the burning of
territory, and when they did not respond of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in late
to a Libyan order to leave, Libya attacked 1979 and the Billy Carter affair, which
and Egypt counterattacked.28 The four day lasted throughout 1980, offered U.S. pro-
war which followed did not lead to large pagandists still more ammunition against
losses, but it increased Libya's prestige Libya.
CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan..82 -- 29
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Reconnaissance flights over Libya con-
tinued, and in summer 1980, Libya started
intensifying its efforts to intercept the
U.S. planes. On one occasion, the Penta-
gon reported that an order to "arm your
missiles" had been overheard by U.S. pi-
lots, although there was no evidence that
Libya had fired any missiles. Still', in
October 1980, Qaddafi wrote letters to
Carter and Reagan demanding that the U.S.
"keep its naval and air forces away from
the Libyan Arab borders... Otherwise, con-
frontation and the outbreak of an armed
war, in the legal term, would regretfully
be a possibility within view at any mo-
ment."32 It is not known if Carter cut
back reconnaissance flights, but he did
overrule the Pentagon and refrained from
conducting naval maneuvers close to Libyan
coastlines.33 The Carter administration
was convinced that military action against
Libya could create "unforeseen problems."
One such problem would be that of "a gen-
eral war. Sadat's moves in 1977... nearly
touched off a larger North African war,
with Algeria ready to intervene on Libya's
side and Morocco likely to jump in against
Algeria."34 Even so, Carter sought "to
gain African support against Libya."35
VII. NEW FRENCH EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW
QADDAFI
Marolles again ran the operation, and
Faligot claims that British Intelligence's
"Maltese Liberation Front" operation was
carried out in cooperation with SDECE. Al-
so apparently part of the campaign was a
story which appeared in the London Sunday
Times. "French intelligence," it ran, "re-
ports a big build-up of crack Egyptian
forces on the Libyan border. More specula-
tive versions claim that a Israeli gener-
al staff working group has offered Cairo a
blueprint for a fullscale effort" to over-
throw Qaddaf1.3 6
A second aspect of de Marolles' opera-
tion was an effort to contact, unify and
mobilize some of the Libyan opposition to
Qaddafi. Faligot wrote that SDECE agents
were dispatched to Libya "to liaise with
disenchanted officers of the Libyan Army,"
and SDECE is said by Faligot to have
"strengthened the Libyan exile 'govern-
ment' in Cairo."
Egypt was again enlisted in paramilitary
operations. According to Faligot, de
Marolles was given "a free hand by Sadat
to organize border incidents from the
West," and French intelligence reportedly
set up an anti-Qaddafi "Liberation Front"
on Libya's border. On June 16, Egypt im-
posed martial law in the border region
where the Four-Day War had been fought.
Three days later, Libya accused Egypt of
preparing again to wage war. In late Au-
The French government, too, was con- gust 1980 it was reported that there were
cerned about the Libyan threat to its in- 50,000 Egyptian troops facing Libya;37 the
terests in Africa - a threat that had New York Times reported that 40,000 had
i
h
ous year.38
e prev
grown considerably since 1977? A new oper- been moved there over t
ation against Qaddafi was seen to be nec- The object of these preparations, ac-
essary. According to Roger Faligot, the cording to Faligot, was a "military upris-
operation was organized by the SDECE along ing" on August 5, 1980 "to be organized at
the same line as the operation Newsweek the garrison of Tobruk, followed by guer-
said Max Hugel had proposed. One aspect rilla action on both the eastern and west-
was a propaganda campaign, and "psycholog- err. borders. The head of Military Security
ical operations against Qaddafi were orga- in Tobruk, Commandant Driss Shehaibi, had
nized for some six months before the date been recruited by the French to lead the
set for a coup" in August 1980. These in- uprising." At the time AFP released an
cluded interviews with opponents of the unattributed report hinting that "Qaddafi
Libyan government in the French press us- may have died in a shooting incident." In
ing "elaborate leaks and stories planted reality, the French-instigated plot was
by SDECE-connected journalists. A massive foiled and Shehaibi fled the country.
I h h
d
drive was undertaken... to'promote
Lapierre and Collins' book The Fifth
Horseman, a political fiction about
naAAafI blackmailing Carter with an...
d
d
vIsoLs... tippe
atomic bomb." There was also a "spate of out roreign military a
on Qaddafi as 'mastermind" him off." 9
it
di
ems
. me
a
of all 'terrorist groups,"' intended to However, spurious reports persisted, at-
intimidate and isolate Qaddafi. Colonel de tributed to Egyptian and other Middle
1
30 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 Jan.82
ater tat e "had
Claudia Wright reporte
apparently invited Qaddafi to inspect mil-
itary facilities at Tobruk. Plans were
made to fire on [his] plane as it landed,
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Eastern sources that the "uprising" viewed him "as an agent of the interna-
against Qaddafi was continuing. The New tional Soviet-backed terrorist conspira-
York Times reported that according to dip- cy,"46 and was said to have characterized
lomatic sources, "a mutiny broke out Aug.7 Libya as "a cancer that has to be re-
in two battalions... in Tobruk under the moved."47
command of Maj. Seyyed Idris. Major Idris In adopting a harder line, the Reagan
attempted to exploit discontent... with administration has dismissed some of the
the help of infiltrators form Egypt,... considerations that motivated Carter's
but when Libyan authorities responded with more restrained approach. The administra-
negotiations with the troops, the mutiny tion let it be known that a. cutoff of Lib-
failed and Major Idris escaped to yan oil to the U.S. would have no harmful
Egypt."40 effects, and the day after Libyan diplo-
Later, after Libya's intervention in mats in the U.S. were expelled in May
Chad, SDECE Director de Marenches proposed 1981, representatives of 35 U.S. companies
French military action. But Giscard re- were summoned to the State Department and
fused, "fearing to antagonize one of urged to cut back their personnel in Lib-
France's main oil suppliers and French ya. They were told that if "trouble devel-
public opinion six m nths before the Pres- oped" in Libya, the U.S. government "could
idential elections." 1 Instead he began to do nothing to help." One official report-
negotiate with the Sudanese and the Egypt- edly stated later: "We're not predicting
ian governments for covert action against an imminent crisis, but we warned the com-
Qaddafi.42 Several months later, Sadat ad- panies that the potential for trouble is
mitted that Egypt was supplying Hissene very great." Another commented: "We don't
Habre's Chadian rebel forces based in Su- want to have another hostage crisis."48
dan to destabilize Chad and drive the Lib- The oil companies have largely ignored the
yans out. warnings, after receiving assurance from
Qaddafi about the safety of their person-
VIII. REAGAN AND THE "CANCER THAT HAS TO nel.
BE REMOVED" The Reagan administration also seems
prepared to risk disagreement with its Eu-
Under Francois Mitterrara, France has ropean allies, who depend heavily on Libya
moved toward more cordial relations with for oil, and it seems willing to risk the
Libya. However, it appears that Ronald regional conflict in North Africa that
Reagan has "taken up where Giscard left
off."43 The interagency review of "how to
handle" Qaddafi, which Oberdorfer de-
scribed, was originally hampered by dif-
ferences within the State Department. The
"Africa specialists" were said to view
Qaddafi as a "regional problem," solved by
backing existing anti-Libya resolutions by
the African states and encouraging them
and France to "get the Libyans to change
their ways."
A "more confrontational" line, espoused
by the policy planning staff was said to
'
"
s surrogate, sow-
as Moscow
view Qaddafi
ing the seeds of disruption in a band from
Morocco ...[to] Saudi Arabia."44 Later,
Oberdorfer wrote that "Haig was reported
to have rejected an early report from
within the State Department setting forth
the substantial risks to Americans and
American policies of taking direct action
against Libya." Haig wanted a tougher re-
sponse.45 As early as March 1981, it was
reported that he was "slightly obsessed
VIM I- YES. TAE C.1.A. DID PLOT
A6SA551NATION ATTEMPTS ON
VARIO05 FOLIT(CAL LEADERS,
our ThERE W45 CERTAINLY NO
HARM INTENDED."..
with knocking... Qaddaf i from power." Haig C COLLEGE MEDIA SERVICES-
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Carter was not. And it is perhaps prepared tives'besides punishing Libya for "ter-
even to confront the Soviet Union over rorism." Moreover, the selective applica-
Libya. There are several thousand Soviet tion of the "terrorism policy" also sug-
and East European advisors in Libya. As gests other motives: the recent. murder by
the Wall Street Journal observed: "Dealing Taiwanese security forces of a Taiwanese
with these forces would pose serious prob- dissident teaching at Carnegie Mellon,51
lems for any anti-CQaddaf i] military oper- and the indifference shown to the case by
ation mounted by a neighboring U.S. ally, the administration, is a controlled-ex-
such as Egypt. And since such forces would periment verification of the insincerity
want guarantees of U.S. support, any mili- of the "terrorism policy." The long-
tary operation would r~s sk a direct U.S.- standing ties of terrorist Cubans to the
Soviet confrontation. CIA and other U.S. agencies; and the
More speculative is Claudia Wright's re- presence in the U.S. of Nicaraguan coun-
port that part of current contingency ter-revolutionary groups are further in-
plans for U.S. military operations in dications of U.S. insincerity.
trouble areas of the Middle East and North And at the same time the'U.S. was acting
Africa - areas like Libya - is the plan to against Libya in May, it was moving toward
supplement the'main "Triple Squeeze" (as better relations with Iraq, which has long
Haig calls it), consisting of three kinds been excluded under law from U.S. weapons
of direct military operations - ships, ma- purchases because of its alleged support
rines, emigre paramilitary operations - ` for international terrorism; after all, as
with a "fourth squeeze, to be prepared in Haig observed before Congress.in March,.
tight secrecy and flashed at the Soviet there seems to be "some shift in the Iraqi
Union to deter it from coming to its cli- attitude," related to "greater sense of
ents' rescue." This "squeeze" will come concern about the behavior of Soviet impe-
from nuclear weapons, stocked in Turkey rialism in the Middle East area." Thus
and Greece "but available for dispersion what the campaign against "international
around the western Mediterranean if the terrorism" in its not-so-public side is
secret part of talks with Spain and Portu- really about are the long-standing Ameri-
gal can be settled as Haig would like."50 can aims of propping up clients fighting
It is not simply the existence of such the Soviet Union and progressive govern-
plans which is the most frightening, for ments. Otherwise, why be concerned just
such operations have been planned for many with "international" terrorism and not al-
years,++but rather the openness and con- so with the "domestic" terrorism of the
cretene~ss with which U.S. officials now kind the U.S. exports to El Salvador, Ar-
boast of them. gentina, Guatemala,.Thailand, Indonesia,
The efforts against Libya have to be un- and many other nations?
derstood as part of the Reagan administra- Like France the year before, the U.S.
tion's so-called campaign against "inter- now considers Libya to be a major obstacle
national terrorism." This campaign-has a to its policies in Africa. U.S. officials
public side and a not-so-public side. Its have stated that it was Libya's interven-
public side emphasizes state-sponsored tion in Chad that opened their eyes to the
international "terrorism" and the "ter- "Libyan threat." Curiously, African states
rorism" of national liberation movements. were more indifferent to the intervention,
On May 6, 1981 when the administration according to Andrew Young: "A Libya-domi-
closed the Libyan Embassy in Washington, nated Chad caused little alarm initially,
the State Department justified the action because Africans saw it merely as an ex-
as a response to Libya's "wide range of pulsion of French influence. But... Muslim
provocative behavior and misconduct, in- riots in Kano, Nigeria, and the fears of
cluding support for international terror- Senegal's former president Leopold Senghor
ism. Officials also stated that the ac- raised a question of malicious mischief
tion was catalyzed by the attempted mur- which could be damaging to Sudan, Cameroon
der of Faisal Zagallai, an opponent of and Mali - all countries with complex bal-
Qaddafi attending school at Colorado ances of Christian and Muslim popula-
State University. Claudia Wright, how- tions."52 Perhaps Egypt should now be
ever, reported that the expulsion was added to this list, after Sadat's Sep-
"one of the first and last schemes de- tember 2 mass arrests of Muslim and Chris-
vised by Max Hugel," suggesting other mo- tian opponents (among others) who he said
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threatened "national unity." Reportedly,
there is also a fundamentalist Muslim fac-
tion in the armed forces that increasingly
opposes Sadat's policies on Israel and
other matters,53 a faction that could at
some point respond to a call by Qaddafi.
Several times U.S. officials have reiter-
ated Senghor's assertion that Libya is
dedicated to establishing a Saharan empire
uniting Muslim tribes throughout northern
Africa south to Zaire. No evidence has
ever been offered to support this claim.
At the same time, U.S. officials have
seen other kinds of Libyan influence as
obstructive to American interests. Libya's
oil has, enabled it to offer generous for-
eign economic aid, and the U.S. has sever-
al times countered Libyan offers of aid
with American offers. Qaddafi will be
chairman of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) when it meets in Tripoli in
1982, and the Reagan administration tried
unsuccessfully to get member nations to
revoke that honor.
Libyan influence, further, is seen as a
foot in the political door for the Soviet
Union. In the new cold war atmosphere
since the collapse of SALT II and the
shifts of power in the Persian-Arabian
Gulf, the Soviet connection has come in
government circles to be more than mere
propaganda. There is much variation among
estimates of the size of Libya's military
purchases from the Soviet Union, but it is
emphasized repeatedly that Libya, with its
small number of troops, could never make
use of it all. On the other hand, the So-
viet Union's Libya connection is useful
for U.S. planners who find talk of "inter-
national terrorism" politically unsatisfy-
ing and seek to reformulate the issues in
traditional cold war terms. Of course,
these planners are ably served by journal-
ists with whom they have close ties.54
A central document in the campaign
against terrorism has been Claire
Sterling's The Terror Network. She devotes
a chapter to Qaddafi, who she calls "the
Daddy Warbucks of international terror-
ism." The chapter was reprinted in March
1981 in the neo-conservative The New Re-
public under the ominous headline: "A mur-
derer, a maniac - and Moscow's man." The
book conforms closely to Haig's conception
of international terrorism and the Soviet
Union's role in it.55 Thus the U.S. gov-
ernment has done its best to promote The
Terror Network, and the International Com-
munication Agency (ICA) "has arranged for
its... centers around the world to make
sure the book is promoted to local read-
ers."56
In June 1981 the CIA issued another cen-
tral document in the campaign, its new an-
nual report on international terrorism.
Not surprisingly, Libya was said to be the
"most prominent state sponsor of interna-
tional terrorism." A review of intelli-
gence on terrorism was ordered soon after
Haig's first remarks on the subject. The
resulting CIA report was rejected by Casey
because it did not support Haig's asser-
tions on terrorism. Casey then ordered a
second report to be prepared by the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, but that one
too was rejected. A third report was then
begun, using new material as well as mate-
rial from the two rejected reports. It is
unclear if this third report was issued as
the annual report on terrorism, but those
familiar with it told the New York Times
that it concludes that "the Soviet Union
has not played a direct role in training
or equipping traditional terrorist groups
such as the Red Brigades.... It does find
that the Soviet Union has provided aid to
organizations and nations, including the
Palestine Liberation Organization and Lib-
ya, that support terrorism and engage in
it themselves. "57;
The efforts against Libya also reflect
the importance the Carter administration
started to attach to covert operations af-
ter the fall of the Shah of Iran and their
even greater importance to the Reagan ad-
ministration. Because of past actions and
revelations making it more difficult for
the CIA to conduct its own operations,
Reagan appears to have decided to collabo-
rate more closely with anticommunist
forces abroad. Moreover, public concerns
in the U.S. that led to restrictions on
CIA covert operations haven't disappeared:
Casey himself stated that openness "could
panic an American public which has not yet
recovered from the Vietnam morning-after
syndrome."58
The CIA is reported to be working
through counter-revolutionary Cubans in
Central America, through Egypt in Afghani-
stan and against Iran, and in collabora-
tion with China against Vietnam. CIA Di-
rector Casey seems to be calling for a
sort of "Nixon Doctrine" for covert ac-
tion, in which the U.S. would supply in-
creased aid, but place the primary respon-
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sibility on the nation assisted. But U.S.
allies, too, are reluctant for the CIA to
undertake such actions, thus requiring
"increased conditioning" of allies to the
necessity "for covert operations against
Soviet surrogates and revolutionary
forces" to be coordinated by the U.S.
Given the constraints imposed on the
CIA, successful operations require four
kinds of efforts discussed by Newsweek:
(1) isolation of target countries; (2) a
propaganda campaign; (3) mobilization of
to train the Liberian military) in order
to make it unnecessary for Liberia to ac-
cept Libyan aid.60 Indeed, Liberia broke
off relations with Libya when Qaddafi vis-
ited Moscow in April 1981, and this break
was surely related to U.S. pressure.
Similarly, the U.S. has urged non-Afri-
can countries to join the campaign against
Libya. A Wall Street Journal report
stressed that the.U.S. "has been pressur-
ing France, Italy, West Germany and Brit-
ain to take a tougher line" against
opposition forces; and (4) military action Qaddafi, even though "these countries have
from neighboring countries through emigre' extensive commercial relations with Lib-
forces or regular troops, assisted, if ya."61 The Reagan administration has un-
necessary, by the U.S. Each of these ef- dertaken an especially intense effort with
forts was part of the French campaign Italy. The previous Italian cabinet re-
against Libya in 1980, and now that the portedly agreed tentatively to a visit by
Reagan administration has taken over that Qaddafi in summer 1981. But the plan was
campaign, and apparently approved policies opposed by the U.S., and Haig and Defense
that enable it to proceed with each of Secretary Caspar Weinberger "made strong
these kinds of efforts, it is important to efforts to block the visit."62 Italy's new
look at each category for evidence of how Premier, Giovanni Spadolini, is anti-Arab
the campaign against Libya is proceeding. and very pro-American, and the visit has
been cancelled.
IX. ISOLATING LIBYA
A diplomatic campaign against Libya has
X. THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST LIBYA
been going on for some time, and State De- Propaganda against Libya has had five
partment officials are said to assert that major themes: (1) that Qaddafi is the "pa-
"the administration would be willing now tron saint of terror," as Haig put it; (2)
to encourage actions against the Qaddafi that Libya is militaristic and "imperial-
regime. However, it is up to the African istic;" (3) that Libya is a Soviet surro-
states themselves to take the lead."59 Mo- gate; (4) that Qaddafi is a madman and the
rocco, for example, reportedly lobbied "most dangerous man in the world;" and (5)
strongly against Libya in the months prior that, domestically, Libya is mismanaged
to the OAU meeting in late June 1981, and and not meeting its people's needs, that
it is hard to imagine that the U.S. did it is repressive, and that there is an op-
not coordinate strategy with Morocco. position in Libya that is large, growing,
Condemnations and breaks in diplomatic and worthy of support.
relations are two other ways by which col- Phil Kelly wrote in The Middle East that
laborating nations can "publicize their disinformation on Libyan terrorism regu-
hostility." The U.S. has taken the lead in larly enters the West from Egyptian, Mo-
these actions, and a number of African na- roccan, Tunisian and Israeli sources. An-
tions have followed. The U.S. has also other source of disinformation is the Pha-
tried to reduce the incentives for Libya's langists' Voice of Lebanon radio station
neighbors to move toward closer relations. which carried a report alleging that "ter-
Military assistance has increased to Tuni- rorist leader 'Carlos' was in Libya, near
sia, Egypt and Sudan. Tunisia's acquisi- the Sudanese border, training terrorists
tion of M-60 tanks is specifically to "de- to attack the oilfields of Libya's oppo-
ter further Libyan adventurism." Increased nents." This item resurfaced in Egypt's
military aid has also been discussed with government-controlled Middle East News
Morocco and Algeria. Further south, the Agency (MENA) in June 1981, this time
U.S. has devoted much attention to stabi- claiming "King Khaled of Saudi Arabia
lizing Liberia's economy with loans and would be a target during his state visit"
grants and to initiating increased mill- to England. The story was repeated in many
tary cooperation (including the arrival of British newspapers, "quoting MENA to the
100 Green Berets in Monrovia in April 1981 effect that an attempt on King Khaled's
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life would be made by Carlos and two Pal- group in April 1977, along with an Egypt-
estinian groups with 'the backing of Colo- ian saboteur and his accomplices were the
nel Qaddafi. "'63 first executions in Libya since the 1969
In the U.S., the Billy Carter affair has coup; according to Gideon Gera, "death
returned to the realm of non-events from sentences on prominent monarchists had]
which it came. But another scandal has de- either been commuted or pronounced on ab-
veloped over the activities of ex-CIA op- sentees."70 And contrary to the Reagan
eratives Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil, administration's pronouncements, the Lib-
giving the press and the government a new yan government claims that the so-called
forum for horror stories about Qaddafi. A "liquidation campaign" of Libyan dissi-
handful of government agencies appear to dents is not run by the government. The
be providing the press with a steady fact,.little mentioned, that victims have
stream of well-planted leaks. been mostly minor opposition figures
The disinformation on Libya's interven- would seem to support this.71 Of course,
tion in Chad - the main example offered of such subleties matter little to the ad-
"Libyan imperialism" - is extensive.64 ministration, which ordered out Libyan-
First, it is useful to note, as the press diplomats because of the "liquidation
and government spokespersons usually do campaign" long after everyone else had
not, that the Libyan military is small - agreed that it was over.
much smaller than the 100,000-man force Another-subject prominent in the propa-
that Sadat now has deployed on Egypt's ganda is that of coups against Qaddafi.
border with Libya65 - and that "Qaddafi is Coup attempts in Libya get reported regu-
viewed as unlikely to extend his military larly whether or not they have actually
incursion beyond Chad. His 60,000--men occurred. An impression of widespread dis-
armed forces, with more than a tenth of satisfaction is nonetheless created.
their manpower in Chad, are said to be too Kelly, for example, wrote: "A story about
strained logistically in that country to an attempted coup in Tripoli last January
do more than consolidate their positions C198IJ began in the Cairo daily Al-Ahram
and yet [Qaddaf i'sJ threat has helped jus- and found its way into the BBC monitoring
tify military buildups and requests for service, and so into Western press 'back-
aid by Egypt, Tunisia and Israel."66 grounders' by February."72
Other articles in the .U.S. media have
suggested that Qaddafi has mismanaged XI. CREATING AND r'.CBILIZING OPPOSITION
Libya's oil wealth, buying vast amounts of TO JADDAFI
weapons but not providing for the people's
needs.67 But even Newsweek acknowledged
that since 1969, "Libya has built 200,000
houses and planted 400 million trees." In
addition, the average annual wage rose
from $1,700 to $10,000 over the past "ten
years. "'You don't see poverty or hunger
here,' says one Western ambassador in
Tripoli. 'Basic human needs are met to a
greater de ree than in any other Arab
country ."'98 Qaddafi has initiated a num-
ber of changes in the economy since early
1980, including the phasing out of most
private businesses. This has created some
opposition from the middle class and a
number of arrests have occurred. The fig-
ure of 2,000 has been widely quoted as the
number of those arrested, but the State
Department's own human rights report on
Libya asserts that "abuses of this magni-
tude have not been confirmed."E9
For all the writing on Qaddafi's "mur-
derous" policies it should be pointed. oest
that the executions of 22 of Iehishi's
The CIA strategy of trying to work
through surrogate forces, Haig's willing-
ness to employ a "mixture of expatriate
subversives and mercenaries, who can pa-
rade as national liberators recognized by
k'ashington"73 as the third part of the
"Triple Squeeze," and a collection of re-
ports specifically about Libya all give
credence to the report by Newsweek that
the administration's approach to Libya in-
cludes an effort to "recruit reliable
agents from within the Libyan exile commu-
nity" to build a "viable opposition" to
Qaddafi. Newsweek quoted one senior U.S.
official as stating: "I don't think any-
thing is going to gear up from this side
until there is a clear sense that there is
something to work with," implying it will
'''en there is.74 The Wall Street Journal
earlier reported that ever- though there is
no official confirmation, "the U.S. is
widely believed to be working with the
Libyan exiles in the hope of developing an
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organized resistance movement."75 Another
report stated that, although U.S. off i-
cials will not confirm such contacts, "ex-
iled Libyans, including supporters of
Abdul al Houni] ... who ... now leads
Libyan emigres in Egypt, say they have
asked the United States what it would do,
if anything, to help neutralize or over-
come the Soviet Bloc security forces sup-
porting Qaddafi."76
An even clearer indication of CIA con-
tacts concerns Yahya Omar, a Libyan busi-
nessman who was sentenced to death in ab-
sentia by a Libyan revolutionary court in
March 1981, and who is mentioned in two
prominent articles on the Libyan exile op-
position which appeared in May 1981. Ac-
cording to Newsweek, the U.S. government
"has warned Yahya Omar,-an Arab multimil-
lionaire with ties to U.S. intelligence,
that he may be on the hit list drawn up by
terrorists acting for .Qaddaf i,]," because
FBI agents found his name at the home of
Eugene Tafoya, who has been charged with
Zagallai's attempted murder. Omar, who was
part of Libyan King Idris' entourage when
Qaddafi overthrew him in 1969 escaped
aboard a U.S. Air Force plane, and took
with him a fortune in crown jewels,. Since
then, Omar has been an advisor to the Sul-
tan of Oman. "On some of his frequent
trips to Washington, Omar has. stayed at
the apartment of James Cr itchf field, a for-
mer chief of the CIA's Middle East divi-
sion."77 One can speculate that this item
was leaked as part of the effort to em-
barrass Libya with the Wilson-Terpil af-
fair (Tafoya worked for Wilson), but the
article points to another fact: the CIA
was directly involved in Libya until the
early 1970s, and its contacts with monar-
chists, and early Qaddafi supporters as
well, apparently continues.
The aftermath of the July 1981 seizure
by Libyan students of the Libyan mission
to the United Nations is also revealing.
The students ousted the diplomats and
staff, destroyed papers, books and pic-
tures of Qaddafi, and barricaded them-
selves inside for three hours. When ar-
rested, they were booked only on charges
of criminal trespass, a misdemeanor; and
the judge reportedly "adjourned the
cases 'in contemplation of dismissal'
and released the protesters on the
equivalent of six months, probation."
Although U.S. officials were reported-
ly "disturbed" that the case was treated
36 -- Counterspy.-- PNov.81 - Jan.82
lightly, the U.S. attorney's office in
Manhattan declined to prosecute. For the
"disturbed" U.S. officials, the issue
was, as one State Department employee
put it: "What better way [than to prose-
cute to prove that we are [a] responsi-
ble overnment]?" A spokesperson for
the S. attorney's office in Manhattan
refused to state reasons for the failure
to prosecute.78 (The week before the sei-
zure of the mission, anti-Khomeini Irani-
ans seized the Iranian interest section in
Washington. and are now being prosecuted
for a felony in federal court. These Ira-
nians, however, were leftists and presum-
ably would not be the kind of Iranians the
U.S. could "recruit as reliable agents"
against Iran.)
The anti-Qaddafi Libyans are a different
story. Although Mohammed Mugarieff (a for-
mer Libyan ambassador to India who re-
signed last year)-has expressed bitterness
about the CIA role In Libya and called on
the U.S. to "leave us alone in our strug-
gle" against Qaddafi,79 some of the Libyan
opposition in the U.S. is notably pro-
American. The Washington Post reported in
May 1980,-for example, after about 130
hooded anti-Qaddafi demonstrators marched
through downtown Washington, that the dem-
onstrators were "largely pro-American, an
experience some Washingtonians, remember-
ing the sometimes violent demonstrations
held by hooded anti-Shah Iranians in the
past, found a little difficult to come to
terms with. ,80 For all the propaganda
about opposition to Qaddafi, little is
said about its political orientation; one
report stated only that there are "Arab
nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists,
progressive, or left, and liberal fac-
tions."81 The fact is that the organized
opposition is nearly entirely the kind the
U.S. can work with, and despite problems
progressives might have with Qaddafi's
policies, no substantial opposition has
developed from the left.
On the other hand, as the Wall Street
Journal reported, "there isn't any sign
that grumbling among ordinary Libyans has
been organized into an effective internal
opposition that could work with the ex-
iles." Qaddafi's "biggest domestic worry
is the widespread unpopularity of his eco-
nomic measures:" recent edicts national-
ized all businesses and placed heavy re-
strictions on inheritance and large sav-
ings accounts.8`
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Although there is talk of the "slow, te- stories about opposition and instability
dious task" of building an opposition, it in-Libya. One, unsigned, appeared in the
is clear that the difficulties in carrying Washington Post the day the expulsion or-
out that task make U.S. planners think, as der was reported and seems thus to have
they have always done in the case of Lib- been in preparation for some time;87 an-
ya, in terms of a coup from the military, other appeared later in the month , almost
This is made plain by the attention devot- coinciding with the events inside Libya.88
ed to the problem of a possible successor Both articles would have required much ad-
to Qaddafi, whose removel "might simply vance research, and the information for
open the way for the installation of a new them would consequently appear to have
leader who is even closer to the Sovi been supplied by Libyan organizations or
ets;83 European governments also claim U.S. government sources, both having an
this concern, as well as the concern that interest in publicizing the issue. A Daily
a successor may reduce oil output and for- News story that the U.S. was drafting a
eign exports. More explicit is a statement plan to overthrow Qaddafi was deliberately
made by "one U.S. official" to the Journal leaked in May 1981, about a week before
some time after the warnings to oil compa- the arrests.8- Its possible connections to
nies about personnel in Libya: "The compa- the coup attempt remain unclear, but it
nies won't get another warning. We're reports that the U.S. was drafting a plan
playing confrontation politics, and we to encourage Egyptian sponsorship of a
want them out, whether there is a coup in coup against Qaddaf i.
the works or not."84
Moreover, Don Oberdorfer wrote that Lib-, XII. MILITARY PREPARATIONS AGAINST QADDAFI
ya was an important topic in the conversa-
tions in early August 1981 between Reagan Libya is reported to figure prominently
and Sadat. Sadat reportedly said that Lib- in Haig's "Triple Squeeze" plan: around
yans inside the country, rather than overt Libya, for example, there are pressures from the outside, which the can reinforcements and staging facilities
Reagan administration has focused on in in the Egyptian western desert, covert aid
its public posturing, are the most effec- for [Habre's Chadian] guerrilla force in
tive opposition force.85 Given the confir- south-west Sudan, on the Chad border,
mation of the thrust of the Newsweek-Time close-in Sixth Fleet patrols in the Gulf
report by various independent sources, of Sidra], and improved air defense and
Oberdorfer's little-noticed report is surveillance operations from Tunisian ter-
quite astonishing. It affirms that plan- ritory."90 These preparations, in addition
ning for a covert operation against to the increases in military assistance,
Qaddafi - perhaps a coup - is being con- are to play a large role in the project
ducted at the head of state level. Oberdorfer later corroborated, after the
These reports are especially noteworthy initial report by Time, "a long-range en-
because of indications that the U.S. and terprise which concentrates on placing
Egypt had at least foreknowledge of a May pressures on Qaddafi from outside his
1981 coup attempt in Libya. Claudia Wright country." Oberdorfer's sources confirmed
pointed out that Sadat"s use of an AWACS much of what Newsweek and Time had report-
plane to fly to Sudan to meet with Jaafar ed earlier and, as the White House had
Nimeri at about the same time the plotters done, focused their denial very narrowly
were arrested suggests that the plane was or. the claim that the plan included "an
being used not to protect Sadat against an assassination plot."91 (But even this de-
attack as he claims, but to give the U.S. nial may be'misleading. Columnist Jack
and Egypt knowledge of the plot's effec- Anderson claimed that his associate Ron
tiveness and warnings of moves by Syria McRae discovered schemes involving hit men
and the Soviet Union to come to Qaddafi's posing as mercenaries for Qaddafi and poi-
aid.86 These events occurred two weeks af- sons with delayed effects. The details
ter Max Hugel's plan to expel Libyan dip- sound fantastic, and Anderson gives no
lomats was carried out and the oil compa- solid evidence, but after the operations
nies were warned to get their personnel against Cuba in the 1960s and the other
out of Libya. The expulsion and warning reports about Libya reviewed here, they
generated front-page news, much publicity cannot be dismissed.92)
about "Libyan terrorism," and several These reports all tend to verify the
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story reported by Lars Nelson in the New
York Daily News on May 17, 1981. "The
Reagan administration," he wrote, "is
drafting a secret strategy to use Egypt
and other moderate Arab states" to topple
Qaddafi."But the effort to neutralize him,
a senior State Department official in-
sisted, would not take the form of assas-
sination." Rather, the administration
would "encourage" conservative Arab states
that feel threatened by Qaddafi, "most
notably Egypt, to take action of their
own, either through direct invasion or
sponsorship of a coup. If the Arab attempt
appeared to be near failure, the U.S.
would provide direct assistance, one offi-
cial indicated.... The operation against
[Qaddafi] would be done in such a way that
the U.S. would be able to claim that it
was not directly involved. But senior ad-
ministration officials are saying private-
ly that the U.S. would give direct assis-
tance to the Arab states to make sure that
it succeeds."93
There is something very unreal about
Nelson's report, in which "senior" offi-
cials are surprisingly; talkative. There is
no reason to think that these are leaks
from one faction out to embarrass another,
as was later the case with the Casey ad-
fair. More likely, the aim was to intimi-
date Qaddafi into policies more acceptable
to the U.S. or to send signals to allies
and potential allies that the U.S. would
be tougher and more reliable in protecting
its friends. Still, these statements seem
to violate Casey's edict against openness,
and questions thus remain about the moti-
vations behind the statement-s. It is, of
course, just possible that they are boasts
from men who are ready to exercise power
and undisturbed at who knows it.
Many similar questions are raised about.
the Gulf of Sidra inc id ent . It, too, seems
to have been exploited to intimidate Libya
and to rally allies. A number of points
are important to keep in mind: (1) Michael
Getler reported in the Washington Post
just after the incident that U.S. offi-
cials had said "the basic decision to hold
the naval exercise off Libya was made by
Reagan at a NationalSecurity Council
meeting late in July. These officials also
said there were considerable discussions
before within the Pentagon about a possi-
ble postponement until after the summer.
One reason is that there are several hun-
dred additional American dependents in
38 -- CounterSpy -- Ncv.81 - Jan.82
Libya during the school vacation period."
(2) The commander of the Navy task force
conducting the maneuvers off the Libyan
coast "was called back to Washington be-
fore the exercise by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to make sure that all operational
rules, including the rules of engagement
in which fire is returned, were under-
stood. High level sources said the brief-
ing on the exercise extended to the Na-
tional Security Council."94 (3) Given the
limits of their planes which are more
bombers than fighters, the Libyan pilots
had virtually no chance of hitting the
U.S. planes. This raises questions "about
whether the Libyan firing was an accident
or a nervous reaction by the pilot, since
earlier in the two-day Mediterranean, exer-
cise about 40 other Libyan planes had come
out to probe U.S. defenses, with no mis-
siles being fired."95 If other actions
were open to the U.S. pilots besides the
return of fire, there is reason to think
that the incident was provoked. (4) The
Navy later admitted that the incident had
occurred outside the area the U.S. had
warned air and sea traffic to avoid in
preparation for the exercise.96 (5) The
Newsweek item that warned the Libyans that,
the exercise had been undertaken to "test"
Qaddafi is thought by many observers to
have been a deliberate leak to provoke the
Libyans.97 Newsweek, in fact, first re-
ported the exercise in its July 20 issue,
at about the same time Getler reported
Reagan was approving it in the NSC.98 (6)
The Newsweek article reports that Egypt
was conducting military maneuvers on its
border with Libya consecutively with the
naval exercise, and although U.S. offi-
cials insisted that this was a "coinci-
dence," they were eager to see how Qaddafi
would react.99
Egypt, of course, is central. to all mil-
itary plans against Qaddafi because of its
long-standing hostility toward Libya, its
100,000 troops in the border area as of
January 1981, and the size of its arms
purchases from the U.S., which will nearly
double in 1982. All scenarios for military
action project it coming mainly from
Egypt, whether from emigre' groups (as in
the French operation) or from the Egyptian
military. Oberdorfer wrote, however, that
Sadat's emphasis on Libya's internal oppo-
sition in his talks with Reagan "may have
reflected a reluctance on the part of
Sadat to'confront Libya militarily at this
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time. 11100 1
Along similar lines, Newsweek emphasized
that only when the U.S. succeeds in build-
ing up the opposition to Qaddafi will the
CIA "then support more expensive and more
visible ropaganda and paramilitary opera-
tions."1~1OOn the other hand, there has
been more speculation recently about Isra-
eli military cooperation with Egypt
against Libya now that Israel's relations
with Egypt are largely normalized. Then
agricultural minister Ariel Sharon was
given a tour of Egyptian deployments in
the border region in late May 1981, and
this fueled the speculation.102 Sharon, of
course, is now Israel's defense minister.
XIII. THE FUTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
LIBYA
The possibility of an Egyptian invasion
of Libya with U.S. backing may seem re-
mote, but so did the possibility of an
Iraqi invasion of Iran before it began
just over a year ago in circumstances that
bear some similarities to present ones.
Iran had successfully been isolated inter-
nationally through U.S. efforts; the pro-
Shah opposition to the Iranian revolution
had made an alliance with Iraq and was in
contact with U.S. officials; a campaign of
propaganda had successfully pictured
Khomeini as a madman and a mastermind of
international terrorism (see CounterSpy,
Nov.80 - Jan.81).
The Reagan administration seems intent
to learn from the Iran "adventure." Wheth-
er Reagan intends to repeat Carter's Iran
strategy completely - by cutting off oil
imports, declaring an economic boycott and
urging other nations to do the same, ban-
ning travel, deporting Libyans, and creat-
ing incidents that might provoke. the sei-
zure of hostages or some other reason for
confrontation - is hard to know, but the
precedents are there.
Two years ago Michael Klare reported in
The Nation on U.S. efforts at that time to
"cure the Vietnam syndrome."103 He warned
of the danger of so-called "humanitarian
intervention" - i.e., "Entebbe-type raids
to free civilian hostages or campaigns to
topple such troublesome despots as, say,
Colonel Qaddafi or the Ayatollah
Khomeini." Iran soon afterwards saw such
a raid and such a campaign, both justi-
fied as "humanitarian." Reagan, Haig and
Casey now work to fulfil the remainder of
Klare's prediction, justifying their ac-
tions with the same rhetoric. However,
there are still many who can be counted
on to oppose any U.S. military interven-
tion in the Third World no matter how it
may be disguised.
FOOTNOTES
1) Washington Post (WP), 8/20/81, pp.A-1, A-17.
2) Newsweek, 8/10/81, p.24.
3) WP, 7/25/81, pp.A-1, A-14.
4) Newsweek, 8/3/81, p.19.
5) WP, 7/28/81, p.A-2.
6) Chicago Tribune, 7/28/81, p.3.
7) of supra, #5.
8) New York Times (NYT), 7/28/81, p.A-13.
9) Christian Science Monitor (CSM), 7/29/81, p.4.
10) WP, 8/15/91, p.A-3.
11) Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 8/4/81, p.30.
12) Time, 8/10/81, p.18.
13) of supra, #2.
14) Newsweek, 8/31/81, pp.16-17.
15) WP, 8/20/81, p.A-29.
16) See Blanche Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, Garden
City, NY11981, pp.329-332.
17) Supplements, Annex C, March 1959, pp.55, 78-80.
18) CIA Report, "Certain Problems Created by the U.S. Mili-
tary Assistance Program," cited in Cook, cf supra, #16.
19) "Case Studies of the Military Assistance Program in
North Africa (Libya) and Latin America (Brazil)," in "A
Study of the United States Military Assistance Program in
Underdeveloped Areas," unpublished version, Eisenhower Li-
brary, pp.52-65.
20) Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Aid for the Middle.
East, JCS 1887/340, 2/1/57, p.2555.
21) State Department, "North Africa in the Mediterranean
Littoral," 8/9/63, p.22.
22) Wilbur C. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, W.W. Norton, New
York, 1980, pp.316, 317.
23) Foreign Policy, Spring 1981, pp.81-82.
24) ibid., p.84.
25) NYT, 10/24/80
26) Gideon Gera, "Libya," in Colin Legum (ed.), Middle
East Contem porary Survey, vol.1, 1976-77, New York, 1978,
p.535.
27) The Middle East, August 1981, p.34.
28) cf supra, #26, p.536.
29) Sunday Times (London), 6/20/80, p.10.
30) see NYT, 3/14/80, p.11; Business Week, 3/3/80.
31) cf supra, #27, p.36.
32) of supra, #25.
33) NYT, 8/21/81, p.10.
34) of supra, #23, p.91.
35) NYT, 6/3/81, pp.1,12.
36) of supra, #29.
37) NYT, 8/24/80, sec.IV,
38) NYT, 8/19/80, p.12.
39) of supra, #27, p.23.
40) of supra, #38.
41) of supra, #27, pp.34-36.
42) New Statesman, 8/21/81, P.O.
43) ibid.
44) WP, 3/21/81, p.A-3.
45) of supra, #1.
46) WP, 3/22/81, p.A-1; according to this article and WP,
8/20/81, pp.A-1, A-17, these impressions are the result of
of interviews with Western European foreign ministers
who visited Reagan and Haig.
47) quoted anonymously in New York Daily News, 5/17/81,
p.2; attributed to Haig by Claudia Wright, New Statesman,
8/28/81, p.11.
48) NYT, 6/27/81, pp.1,37.
49) WSJ, 7/14/81, pp.1,16.
50) New Statesman, 4/10/81, p.2.
51) Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/4/81, p.34; WP, 9/14/81,
p.C-15.
52) Foreign Affairs, vol.59, no.3, p.664.
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53) 8 Days, 8/22/81, p.13.
54) E.g. Robert Moss, New York Times Magazine, 11/2/81.
55) NYT, 5/3/81, pp.1, 36.
56) New Statesman, 8/21/81, p.16.
57) of supra, #55.
58) WP, 8/26/81, p.B-18; WP, 8/27/81, p.C-31.
59) cf supra, #35.
60) African Index (Al), 6/15/81, p.33.
61) cf supra, 049.
62) cf supra, 039, p.18.
63) The Middle East, August 1981, p.24.
64) See Louis Eaks, et. al, From El Salvador to the Libyan
Jamahiriya, London, 1981, pp.61-82.
65) WP, 1/16/81, p.A-27.
66) VP, 5/7/81, p.A-21.
67) cf supra, #35.
68) Newsweek, 7/20/81, p.42.
69) State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Per-
spectives, 2/2/81, p.1039.
70) cf supra, #26.
71) cf supra, #42.
72) cf supra, #63.
73) cf supra, #50.
74) cf supra, #14.
75) WSJ, 7/14/81, pp.1, 16.
76) of supra, #66.
77) Newsweek, 7/27/81, p.13.
78) Boston Globe, 8/28/81, p.12.
79) of supra, #66.
80) WP, 5/24/80, p.B-4.
81) NYT, 5/27/81, p.A-8
82) WSJ, 8/31/81.
83) ibid.
84) ibid.
85) of supra, #1.
86) of supra, #42; The Middle East, September 1981, p.16.
87) of supra, #66.
88) cf supra, #81.
89) Daily News, 5/17/81, p.2.
90) cf supra, #50.
91) cf supra, #1.
92) WP, 8/25/81, p.B-15.
93) cf supra, #89.
94) WP, 8/20/81, pp.A-1, A-16.
95) WP, 8/21/81, p.A-15.
96) WP, 8/25/81, p.A-13.
97) Such as Adm. Eugene Carroll (ret.), CBS Evening News,
8/21/81.
98) cf supra, #66, p.46.
99) Newsweek, 8/24/81, p.13.
100) cf supra, #1.
101) cf supra, #14.
102) Newsweek, 6/15/81, p.25.
103) The Nation, 10/13/79.
The Gambia Betrayed by Konrad Ege
On August 4, 1981 hundreds of Gambians
and Senegalese marched through Washington,
D.C. and other cities in the U.S. carrying
posters such as "Diouf is a French Wolf in
Africa," "Senegalese Troops out of The
Gambia," and "I.M.F. is a Bad Pill that
Kills." The demonstrations had been
called by the Washington-based Student Co-
ordinating Committee on The Gambia (SCCG)
to protest the "Franco-Senegalese invasion
of The Gambia." At the time about 2,500
Senegalese troops - close to one third of
Senegal's armed forces - were in The Gam-
bia.
The invasion began on July 30, 1981, most reporters knew only that The Gambia
less than twelve hours after a group of was staunchly pro-Western and believed it
progressive Gambians, apparently led by was a "model of democratic government."
Kukli Samba Sanyang, the head of the out- (see Washington Post, 8/3/81)
lawed Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRP) For most Gambians, things looked some-
had taken over key buildings in Gambia's what different. Economic conditions were
capital Banjul and announced that Presi- disastrous, partially due to dry weather
dent Sir (.') Dawda Jawara was overthrown. which had destroyed much of the peanut
Jawara, who had been the head of Gambia's harvest (Gambia's main crop), but mainly
government even before Gambia's indepen- because of corruption and an inefficient
dence from British colonialism in 1965, government bureaucracy. Austerity condi-
was attending the royal wedding in London tions imposed by the International None-
at the time. By many accounts, the coup tary Fund didn't do much to alleviate the
was welcomed by most Gambians in the capi- economic misery, and a number of anti-
tal Banjul, and received support from a government demonstrations occurred in
large sector of the country's security 1981, several of them in the week before
forces. The U.S. media had difficulties the coup.
reporting about the insurrection since On October 30, 1980 Jawara banned two
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legal political parties, the Movement for ons captured from the rebels were "for-
Justice in Africa/Gambia and Sanyang's eign arms that were not in the armory"
SRP. Also, during October, several hun- before the rebellion. Other U.S. media ac-
dred Senegalese troops entered The Gambia counts emphasized that the rebels were
claiming that Libya was using The Gambia armed with Soviet weapons. This story,
as a base to overthrow the Senegalese however, had to be discounted even by the
government (see Le Monde, 7/31/81). Jawara regime. It conceded on August 11
Jawara explained the troop presence as that the Soviet-made Kalashnikov rifles
part of "combined military maneuvers" af- used in the coup had been purchased by
ter he had first asserted that they were the Gambian field force itself.
there to pay last respects to the head of The only foreign intervention that took
Gambia's security forces who hard.been place in The Gambia was by Senegal,
killed. At the time, according to Africa France, and England. France, which has
Now (London), "elements hostile to the 1,200 infantry marine troops in Senegal,
government began suggesting that Dakar was and dozens of military advisors in the
planning an invasion if disturbances got Senegalese armed forces, all but controls
out of hand." the Senegalese military. It is inconceiv-
These "elements" proved to be correct. able that Senegal, one of the most reli-
The invasion came less than a year later, able and willing defenders of French in-
and there can be little doubt that Jawara terests in Africa would have staged the
would have been ousted without the Senega- invasion without French collaboration.
lese troops. Jawara apparently asked Pres- Likewise, the British Special Air Service
ident Abdou Diouf to send in the troops (SAS) did its share to keep the British-
while still in London. Diouf claimed that installed Jawara in power. SAS played a
his invasion was justified under an agree- key role in crushing the revolt when it
ment between the two countries signed on freed Jawara's wife Thielal N'Diaye who
February 18, 1965 (the very day of Gam- had been held hostage by the rebels.
bia's independence) which obligates mutual Jawara himself acknowledged that he had
assistance if one of the two governments- received "excellent technical advice" from
faces external aggression. Senegalese the British on how to handle "certain del-
President Diouf and newspapers close to icate situations." (The London Times,
the government argued that the coup was a 8/10/81)
form of external aggression. Several Af- President Jawara, who set up his head-
rican newspapers and politicians - includ- quarters in the Senegalese embassy after
ing Nigerian Vice President Alex Ekwueme - returning to Banjul (under the protection
declared that the intervention was a clear of fourteen sharpshooters of the Senega-
violation of Article 3 of the OAU (Organi- lese mobile gendarmerie squad) on August 2
zation of African Unity) Charter which first announced that Senegalese troops
prohibits interference in the internal af- would leave The Gambia "as soon as the
fairs of member countries. crisis is over." Several weeks after the
It took the Senegalese troops several invasion , things look quite different.
days to recapture all of Banjul. Reports Diouf continues to assert that Senegal's
of casualties ranged from 300 to 2,000 security is linked to stability in The
dead, and hundreds were wounded. Many of Gambia. The Senegalese occupation forces,
the rebels, protected by sympathizers in whose actions were met with resistance and
the population, especially in poor areas, resentment by a large sector of the Gam-
apparently managed to merge with the peo- bian population from the very beginning,
ple after being defeated militarily. Their seem to be digging in for a long stay. The
supporters reportedly also were able to Gambia's own security forces have been
hide away a large number of arms in sew- dismantled, and Senegalese military and
ers and trenches. intelligence officers are training new
From the very beginning, Diouf and Gambian units. For all practical purposes,
Jawara emphasized that the coup was "for- Senegal is in charge of security in The
eign inspired." U.S. Ambassador to The Gambia.
Gambia, Larry Piper did his part to pro- At an August 20 press conference, Diouf
mote the theory of foreign intervention and Jawara announced plans for a closer
when he stated at an August 5 press con- alliance between the two countries.
ference in Banjul that some of the weap- Jawara told reporters that. the coup at-
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tempt "opened our eyes to the need to go Senegalese party strongly condemned the
further" in joining Senegal. One of the invasion, and, consequently, will be op-
first projects is the "integration" of the posed to Senegal's annexation of The Gam-
'
security and intelligence services. Sene-
gal has been pushing Gambia for over fif-
teen years to join in forming "Senegam-
bia." Gambia's English-speaking elite,
however, has resisted that demand out of
fear of being simply annexed and domi-
nated by the French-speaking Senegalese
elite. But now, Jawara claims it is his
"duty" to find "a better form of coopera-
tion which goes beyond the integration of
the security forces."
For the immediate future, the integra-
tion of the two countries will satisfy
Jawara's desire for stability and fullfil
Senegal's annexationist ambitions. It is
also likely to provide even more opportu-
nities for multinational corporate expan-
sion and seems to be in line with U.S.
and West European regionalist designs.
Realizing that colonialist domination of.
individual countries is coming to an end,
West European countries and the U.S. are
playing key roles in creating regional
organizations (such as the African Devel-
opment Bank) which can be used to ma-
nipulate African countries. An integra-
tion of Senegal and The Gambia, especial-
ly if it includes full economic integra-
tion, is another step in the direction of
regionalization.
However, the integration
countries also might serve
of the two
to strengthen
in The Gam-
rightwing
and unite progressive forces
bia and Senegal. All but one
s most
bia. The same is true for Senegal
powerful Muslim leader who publicly de-
nounced Diouf's invasion, obviously con-
tradicting Jawara who had urged crushing
the rebels because they were Marxists who
"denied the existence of God."
Thus, in spite of its military defeat,
the Gambian coup might turn out to have
positive results for African liberation
movements. The case of the Senegalese in-
tervention in The Gambia is not an in-
stance of one independent African govern-
ment aiding another one under threat of
external aggression. Rather, it was an
unsuccessful attempt by opposition forces
to get rid of ,a government that had been
installed by European colonialists - in
this case the British. The Jawara regime
was rescued by another client government
of a former colonial-power, the Senega-
lese. Senegal's President Diouf, who is
also aiding UNITA forces in Angola, is
dependent on French military assistance
to guarantee the very survival of his
government. Thus, the Gambian coup was de-
feated through an intervention by proxy
and teaches a sad lesson about the foreign
policy of Socialist French President
Francois Mitterrand. Without French sup-
port of the Senegalese invasion - in what-
ever form - Jawara's r}i1e almost certainly
would be over.
Secret World Bank Blueprint for China
by Walden, Bello
China: Socialist Economic Development, a
World Bank document recently leaked to
CounterSpy provides a candid picture of
how one of the key institutions of the in-
ternational financial system seeks to in-
tegrate the world's most populous nation
back into the capitalist world. The docu-
ment was the product of a 17-person World
Bank mission that visited the People's Re-
public of China in the latter half of
1980. While there, the mission was hosted
by the Ministry of Finance and other state
42 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82
economic agencies. Acceptance of the gen-
eral conclusion of the nine-volume study
was a precondition for the granting of a
$200 million loan for technical education
in June 1981. The Bank mission took place
(Walden Bello teaches rural development
at the University of California (Berkeley)
and is Director of the Congress Task Force
of the Coalition Against the Marcos Dicta-
torship and the Philippine. Solidarity Net-
work.)
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in a wider context of increasing U.S.-Chi- Third World nations for capitalist markets
na cooperation against the Soviet Union that are already shrinking due to "stag-
and Vietnam. Before he left the World Bank flation" and protectionism. The World Bank
presidency on June 31, 1981 Robert prescription is, indeed, suicidal, for the
McNamara had vetoed further aid to Vietnam protectionist wave among capitalist
to appease the U.S. Congress while propos- countries is increasing. As McNamara him-
ing a $9 billion loan program for China self admitted during the Conference of the
over the next four years. United Nations Trade and Development Agen-
The main thrust of the World Bank report cy in 1979: "Since 1976 there has been a
is the prescription of a pattern of "ex- marked increase in protectionism in the
port-led growth" for China - that is, to industrialized nations, and the pressures
gear its manufacturing industries toward for even further restrictive measures are
capitalist export markets. strong.... The devices utilized to provide
Given the shortage of foreign exchange, such protection have multiplied."2
and the knowledge to be gained from ex- To finance China's export-oriented
posure to world markets, expansion of growth, the World Bank recommends that
manufactured exports must have high pri- the country assume a foreign-borrowing
ority. The outlook is promising, given strategy that would have China's debt,out-
the abundance of skilled Zow-wage labor standing go from $3.4 billion in 1980 to
and the enormous potential for economies as much as $79 billion (in 1990 dollars)
of seale.1 by 1990. This would put China in the top
Wage levels, according to the report, are group of severely indebted countries like
much less than in Hong Kong and South Ko- Brazil, South Korea and the Philippines.
rea, and the World Bank predicts that The leverage that international financial
"China's manufactured exports could grow institutions would derive from this condi-
at 10-15 percent in the 1980s if suitable tion would be enormous.
policies are followed and if new markets Among other things, the report pre-
can be aggressively penetrated." China: scribes the introduction of capitalist
Socialist Economic Development asserts, management techniques, more freedom for
however, that to be successful, "Chinese markets, moves away from price control
industries must produce goods styled and and more "freedom" for technocrats and
designed for the world's bigger and more technical personnel. The objective quite
open markets. To do this, Chinese manufac- clearly is a gradual dismantling of the
turers and designers need to be exposed to socialist economy. As the report admits,
foreign manufacturing methods, product de- the development strategy it proposes
signs, tastes, styles and practical re- "might tend to increase relative inequali-
quirements; and direct measures are also ty.19
needed to strengthen Chinese design capa-
bilities." FOOTNOTES
What all this means is a drastic reori- 1) All footnotes, except when indicated, are from
enting of many sectors of Chinese industry World Bank, China: Socialist Economic Development,
from serving domestic needs, as well as an Washington, D.C., June 1981.
2) Robert McNamara, Address to UNCTAD Conference,
intensification of the competition among World Bank, Washington, 1979, p.10.
This is the World Bank's plan
China: to incorporate China into the
monopoly capitalist system.
Socialist Economic Development The Chinese government is cup-
The Main Report
June 1, 1981
East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
pressing the report jar obvi-
ous reasons.
Available from CounterSpy,
P.O. Box 647, Ben Franklin
Sta., Wash. D.C. 20044, U.S.A.
$20 (add $1 for postage, $4
airmail overseas.)
CounterSpy -- Nov. 81, - Jan. 82 -- 43
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The Ascher Memorandum:
Marcos Plugs the Leak by Roberto Oda Rosa
(Ed. note: In early December 1980, Coun- sought to belie World Bank control over
terSpy and the Filipino solidarity group the Philippine economy, the months follow-
Congress Task Force Leaked a confidential ing the publication of the Ascher memo
World Bank memorandum entitled "Political witnessed the Marcos regime trying every-
and Administrative Bases for Economic PoZ- thing in its power to,win back a gold star
icy in the Philippines," more popularly from the World Bank. Marcos initiated pol-
dubbed the "Ascher Memorandum" (after icies and changes to deal with what the
William Ascher, the author of the report). World Bank called "potential problems." He
The memorandum assessed the staying power lifted martial law, secured the techno-
of the Philippine dictator Ferdinand crats' role, made steps tc placate the
'Marcos. (See CounterSpy, Februariy-April discontented national bourgeoisie, and at-
1981.) Roberto Dela Rosa, a CounterSpy, tempted to camouflagewidespread poverty.
supporter in the Philippines, traces the
Philippine government's responses to the FACELIFTING MARTIAL LAW: PURE COSMETICS
Leaked Ascher Memorandum.)
The Ascher memo had expressed concern
A glossy photo of World Bank Regional over the "increasing precariousness of the
Vice President for Asia and the Pacific, current administration" which "could re=_
Shahid Husain, beamed paternalistically at suit in the lifting of martial law." Mar-
the Filipino public from the front page of tial law, it warned, had served its pur-
one of the Philippines' tightly controlled pose and "increasingly has become a lia-
newspapers. Husain - dining royally with bility." Marcos got the message: two
Marcos and his powerful wife Imelda just months after the memo was leaked, martial
one week after the "lifting" of martial law was "lifted;" six months later, "elec-
law - "congratulated the First Couple on tions" were held. Not that the lifting
the government's efficient management of meant much in concrete terms. Threats to
the economy."1 Embarrassed by the leaked ,national security" by "subversives" were
Ascher memo, Marcos had Manila's newspa- still reason enough for arbitrary arrest;
pers falsely-trumpeting World Bank conf i- the press remained clamped in the fist of
dence in the Philippine economy. Articles its owners - Marcos' family and cronies.
quoting World Bank publications that the Strikes were illegal in broadly defined
Philippines was "one of the brightest "vital sectors." Even Newsweek magazine
lights in the region" due to the govern- termed it a "cosmetic" lifting.
ment's "impressive record in managing the The election was just as fraudulent.
economy" riddled Philippine newsprint ad Marcos is said to have paid a member of
nauseam for months.2 the pro-Marcos Nationalists Party, Alejo
This was all part of a not-too-subtle Santos, to run against him. About a month
public relations job to polish Marcos' im- before the election, Santos resigned as
age tarnished by the leaked Ascher report. Chairman of the Board of the Philippine
The confidential World Bank memo examined Veterans Bank (where, by his own admis-
disturbing trends in the Philippines sion, he "was practicallyy an employee of
which, it argued, were making Marcos' rule the 11arcosJ government"3) to become
increasingly "precarious." At the same Marcos' major opponent. A threat of six
time, the memo revealed the Bank's marked months imprisonment hung over any Filipino
preference that Marcos himself and not an who failed to vote. But, for international
elite opposition member - Benigno Aquino, public opinion, the World Bank could now
for example - hold the reigns of power in cite both the lifting of martial law and
the near future. Marcos is a dictator the election to claim that the Philip-
whose personal allegiance and institutions ?
pines was a "democracy" resting upon popu-
have evolved to serve the bank well. lar support.
Although the government-controlled media
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RESCUING THE TECHNOCRATS
Marcos is valued by the World Bank in
good part for the unsullied technocrats
who underpin him. The World Bank was ex-
tremely concerned, as Ascher noted, about
"the vulnerability of the technocrats in
retaining their economic policy management
positions if the administration should
change." These young graduate-educated ad-
ministrators brought in by Marcos are the
inside allies who enable the World Bank to
have as much influence as it does in de-
termining Philippine economic policy.
Should Marcos fall to an opposition
leader who dismissed many of these techno-
cratic allies, might not World Bank de-
signs on the Philippines be seriously
crippled? The Ascher Memorandum perceived
a way out: the technocrats could, in an
altered environment, become a political
force, and ultimately one of their ranks
could succeed Marcos.
Enter Cesar Virata, Minister of Finance
and the World Bank's and the International
Monetary Fund's closest Philippine friend,
confidant and trusted technocrat. Under
the new parliamentary system, Virata as-
sumes the prime ministership for at least
the first year of Marcos' six-year presi-
dential term. Virata's appointment signals
an almost certain end to the World Bank
fear of a violent succession crisis should
anything happen to Marcos. As prime minis-
ter, Virata becomes head of a seven-person
executive committee which includes the
leading technocrats and on whose lap the
presidential powers will fall should
Marcos be eliminated.
PLACATING THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE
The central thrust of the Ascher Memo-
randum was its prophecy of accelerating
domestic opposition to the deepening
transnational corporate (TNC) penetration
into the domestic economy. Marcos' recent
spate of generous incentives for foreign
corporations' trade and investment was un-
der heavy attack. The World Bank's worry:
should the national bourgeoisie, the do-
mestic class devastated by the TNC expan-
sion, transform complaints into political
demands and join forces with the more na-
tionalistic and radical opposition, it
could spell the end for World Bank plans
for the Philippines. I
Privately, some government officials
felt that the World Bank voicing its fear
was somewhat underhanded. After all, the
policies provoking bourgeois opposition
had been set by the Bank itself as condi-
tions for a major loan. (That fact was
neatly glossed over by the Ascher memo.)
Marcos himself had sought earlier to re-
voke some of the policy changes that were
eliciting this vehement protest from do-
mestic entrepreneurs, but had given in
under World Bank pressure.
Discontent among the national bour-
geoisie presented enough of a threat to
require Philippine government World Bank
talks on a remedy. As revealed recently
by a Philippine government official, a
solution was quickly hammered out. The
government, far from making real changes,
was to'remain on course with World Bank
programs contrary to the interests of the
national bourgeoisie. At the same time, it
was to create a mechanism which would al-
low it to feign concern for the bourgeoi-
sie's plight.
"Consultations" became the new key word,
and the months of March and April saw the
government initiating numerous "consulta-
tions" with the domestic business sector.
As part of this program, Manila's finan-
cial newspaper Business Dgy set up a two-
day conference (with government prodding)
at which members of the national bourgeoi-
sie could pay one hundred dollars a day to
hear government officials explain why
Marcos' economic program was in their best
interests. Concomitantly, the Marcos-con-
trolled press inundated the public with
articles stressing the futility of moder-
ate businessmen aligning with radicals.
The regime went so far as to suggest that
Lenin be quoted and distorted by colum-
nists who argued that communists, by defi-
nition, manipulate nationalist entrepre-
neurs to extend communist victories.
POVERTY: CAMOUFLAGE IT!
The Ascher Memorandum recognized the
"almost universal perception in the Phil-
ippines that the income distribution is
deteriorating." Since 1972, Marcos' public
rationalization for restricting certain
basic freedoms had been that his "New So-
ciety" program marked a shortcut in pover-
ty alleviation. The brutal reality, how-
ever, was that after eight years of mar-
tial law, average Philippine nutrition
levels had fallen to the second lowest in
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Asia after Bangladesh. And, if there was responded to World Bank criticism just as
less freedom and less bread, the World quickly and decisively - but, lacking In-
Bank could well grasp that it was likely donesia's massive petroleum cushion, in a
"to detract from the popularity of the different direction. Rather, Marcos metic-
Marcos administration." ulously carried out World Bank suggestions
As a remedy, the Ascher Memorandum coun- in hopes of currying favor and keeping the
seled the Bank to exert "greater pressure Bank from channeling its support else-
on the administration to alter the reality where.
and perceptions of income concentration." A Filipino privy to high level internal
This solution, needless to say, did not Philippine government discussions ex-
set well with the Marcos regime, but a plained the reaction. The regime, he said,
compromise of sorts was'worked out - if "looked at the (Ascherl report as an at-
the.reality could not be changed,'at least tempt to protect the reputation of a
the perception of that reality could be. friend. We wanted our reputation pro-
Toward this end, presidential spokesper- tected. So we heeded the advice."
son Adrian Cristobal called together the The strategy, it seemed, worked smoothly
writers who were working on what will be - at least in the short term. In reward
billed as Marcos' latest book, Progress. for initiating the changes well in advance
The president, the writers were told, had of Marcos' June 30, 1981 inauguration, the
expressed dissatisfaction over the initial Philippines was graced by the presence of
drafts. His instructions: cite more for- Vice President George Bush at that event.
eign sources showing that poverty had de-. Bush toasted Marcos, saying, "We stand by
creased since the declaration of martial the Philippines.... We love your adherence
law. The writers hesitated. It was an im- to democratic principles and democratic
possible task, they Claimed. Well then, processes."
suggested Cristobal, go to the rural areas Memo author William Ascher would have
for a day and create your own evidence to applauded. But George Bush may eat his
argue that the peasants' state has im- words, as did Jimmy Carter after, his infa-
proved. So they did. mous - and glaringly similar - New Year's
toast to the Shah on the eve of the Irani-
A GOLD STAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES an revolution.
When, following the Ascher Memorandum FOOTNOTES:
revelations, CounterSpy magazine leaked a
World Bank report on Indonesia criticizing
the government's economic policies, the 1) Bulletin Today (Manila), 1/21/81.
2) Times Journal (Manila), 2/25/81; Times Journal, 2/4/81;
Indonesian government reacted quickly and Business Pa (Manila), 2/17/81,
decisively. Indonesian Central Bank files 3) Philippine Liberation Courier, 6/81, p.2.
suddenly were laced off limits to World 4) Par Eastern Economic Review, 7/10/81, p.8.; see Counter-
y p spy', May-July 1981.
Bank missions. The Philippine government 5) Par Eastern Economic Review, 7/10/81, p.13.
FROM THE EDITORS attacks by the right-wing against Counter-fpy (several Congresspersons repeatedly
If your label reads "P61" or "L61", this named CounterSpy as one of the reasons HR4
is your last issue of CounterSpy -,so - the "Intelligence Identities Protection
please renew right awai and don't miss a Act" - had to be passed) we need your sup-
single issue. port more than ever. We also urge you to
CounterSpy is one of the very few maga- help us distribute CounterSpy, and to in-
zines that has not raised its subscription form the media in your area about the
price in the last three years in spite of grave danger HR4 and-its Senate counter-,
increasing printing, mailing, and produc- part present to the freedom of the press,
tion costs. And we have no plans to raise and to what is left of "democracy" in the
it in the near future. We want to make ' U.S.
sure that you won't have to stop subscrib- (For our subscribers, we are enclosing
ing because CounterSpy is too expensive. a promotional brochure for MERIP Reports
However, if you can add some dollars to with this issue. We are sure that you'll
your subscription renewal or give us a find MERIP's reporting on and analysis of
contribution, please do. With stepped-up events n -the Middle East useful.)
46 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82
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World Bank Counterinsurgency in the
Philippines by Walden Bello and John Kelly
A forthcoming book, provisionally enti- ties first.... Fundamental to the effort
tled Development Debacle: The World Bank is getting to them irst--ahead of the
in the Philippines to be published jointly subversives. [Emphasis added. This
by the Philippine Solidarity Network and means an immediate effort to expand our
the Institute for Food and Development Personal contact with all the tribes and
Policy charges that the World Bank is "in- a Longer range program to address their
timately involved with the [Philippine] problems and convince them that the gov-
government's counterinsurgency program."1 ernment way is best.2
According to Development Debacle, the Bank
works directly with the Marcos govern- SAMAR
ment's Integrated Aid Development (IAD).
As its name suggests, IAD is supposed to On the island of Samar, the World Bank's
provide a variety of developmental ser- counterinsurgency role is even more mani-
vices to Filipinos. Instead, IAD (as its fest. IAD programming for Samar began in
American counterpart, the Agency for In- 1974; the same year signs of insurgency
ternational Development (AID) often does) appeared on the island. In 1976, the Phil-
doles out counterinsurgency and repres- ippine government created the Samar Inte-
sion. grated Rural Development Office at least
partly in response to the escalating in-
MINDORO surgency. At the same time, 9,000 troops,
including the notorious 60th Constabulary
One instance detailed in Development De- Battalion, were rushed to Samar. According
bacle is the IAD project in Mindoro begun to'human rights groups such as the Task
in 1975. Among the key parties in that. Force Detainees (the main human rights
project are the Civic Action Group of the agency connected to the Philippine Cath-
Philippine Army, a key counterinsurgency olic Church),these troops pillaged, plun-
unit; and the Presidential Assistant on dered and terrorized Samar. They estab-.
National Minorities (FANAMIN). PAP?AMIN, lished fire free zones - raising again the
with $600,000 from the World Bank, was to specter of Vietnam and My Lai. In these
dispense medical and agricultural assis.- zones, the'International Commission on the
tance to 20,000 Manggyan families, Mindo- Militarization of Samar reported, "any
rots indigenous tribal group. PANAMIN was non-military person is shot on sight. The
also supposed to "grant legal. titles for victims are often farmers who have not re-
ancestral lands traditionally used by ceived word that their farm is now so de-
these communities...." signated."
Instead, PANAMIN created government-con- In the midst of,this, the Samar Develop-
trolled reservations not unlike the stra- mert Office began negotiations for financ-
tegic hamlets of Vietnam. The objective, ing.with the World Bank and the Australian
of course, was to totally control the and Japanese governments. As a World Bank
Manggyans and cut them off from revolu- press release explained., the Bank and the
tionary forces. In fact, a leaked PANTAMIN Australian projects are coordinated and
document admits its counterinsurgency complementary. "The Samar] project is
role. part of the overall development plan for
With the success of the anti-subversive the island and complements separate pro-
campaign. in the cities, the subversives jects being assisted by the Government of
now will seek sanctuaries secure from Japan and Australia."
government forces. The remote areas in- The counterinsurgency input of the Aus-
habited by the tribes offer many heaaens tralian component was admitted in a conf i-
(sic).... It would be tragic if the ene- dential memorandum of the Australian De-
mies of the Republic succeeded simply velopment Assistance Bureau leaked by
because no one else reached the minori- World Bank employees. The area referred to
Counterspy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82 -- 47
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140005-7
is precisely where the mobility of the velopmentJ project designed to benefit the
60th Constabulary Battalion has been se- poor with nearly all that money going to
verely restricted. road building and port improvement."
The Far East coast of northern Samar, i.
e., the Manapano-Gamay-Lapining area is FOOTNOTES
at present entirely isolated from the
rest of northern Samar with access Zim- 1) All references, unless otherwise indicated, come from
ited to ocean going pump boat when the chapter on rural development of the book provisionally
weather permits or to foot travel. It 28 entitled Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Phil-
ippines, scheduled'for release in late 1981. Authors are
thus almost impossible for authorities Walden Bello, Robin Broad, Vincent Bielski, David
to provide adequate education, health or Kinley, and David O'Conner. The documents on Samar were
leaked'to CounterSpy and the Congress Task Force (CTF) and
security services in the area. As a con- were released at a press conference on September 1, 1981.
2) PANAMIN, mimeographed confidential report, undated,
Sequence, even though construction g provided to CounterSpy and CTF by a Filipino source.
the road would be difficult and expen- 3) Australian Development Assistance Bureau, Briefing
Notes and Project Documentation for Selected'Consultants,
~s-ive- amain arhaps not strictly justified Northern Samar Integrated Rural Development Project,
Dal. economic argument, it is intended Philippines ^-eAustralian Development Assistance Program,
this
-
~_ {A./Y ~u.c-~y o Vuc-v ,vc r"u,u.a viY
~~
4) The World Bank project is detailed in: World Bank,
tion O the East Coast Feeder rega . Samar Rural Development Project Appraisal Report, Wash-
less of economic priorities (Emphasis ington, D.C., November 1979.
added.)
For its part, the World Bank is concen-
trating on Eastern Samar where four gov-
ernment battalions are carrying o21t, exten
sive search-and-destroy missions. The
Bank is financing the revamping of the
port of Catbalogan and improvement of
200kms. of the coastal road. At the same
time, the International Commission on the
Militarization of Samar stated, two mili-
tary engineering battalions have been
"building roads and airstrips which have a
primarily strategic value." According to a
first hand report cited in Development De-
bacle, "the regime has been pushing the
construction of many large ports for the
boats of the Philippine Navy, airstrips
for the planes of the Philippine Air
Force, and highways for the quick movement
of troops."
The relevance of the Bank's financing to
the needs of the people of Samar, one of
the poorest Philippine islands, is not 'i
readily apparent. Indeed, Development De-
bacle quotes'a middle-level Bank staffer
who has said as much: "Don't think we're
blind.,How could anyone fail to see that
the Samar stuff had military potential,
with all the news about a military build-
up in 1979?" This same person further re-
ported that on two separate occasions (at
a "decision meeting" in mid-April 1979,
and at a key Executive Directors meeting
in December 1979) World Bank officials ex-
pressed concerns about the military sig
nificance of the project. While Bank
higher-ups claimed "political neutrali-
ty," one Executive Director did uestion
"whether this was in fact an RD Rural De-
48 -- CcunterSpy --,Nov.81 - cTar.82
WORLD BANK DOCUMENTS
WORLD BANK POVERTY REPORT ON THE PHILIP-
PINES
According to the Far Eastern Economic
Review (3/27/81) this report created
"considerable disquiet about the way
things are going in the Philippines."
FEER also revealed that after CounterSpy
leaked the report, the World Bank pro-
vided Marcos with a revised version less
critical of the government. In the pub
lie interest, CounterSpy is making
available the original report. ($15)
WORLD BANK REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN INDONESIA
According to FEER: "Bank officials have
worked hard trying to keep the sole
leaked copy of the draft... from appear-
ing in the press." (5/29/81) Read what
the World Bank did not want you to read
about Indonesia; a report that forced
Suharto to personally issue a major na-
tional address. ($20)
WORLD BANK REPORTS ON SOUTH KOREA
Two confidential Bank reports including
the Bank's five-year plan for South Ko-
rea. The second report admits that Pres-
ident Chun is more repressive than his
predecessor but will be fully supported
by the Bank. ($20)
(Add five percent for postage in the
U.S.; 15 percent overseas airmail.)
Reports are available from CounterSpy,
P.O. Box 647, Ben Franklin. Station,
Washington, D.C. 20044, U.S.A.
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140005-7
Interview with Ian Adams
RCMP Demystified
Ian Adams, a Toronto-based journalist interrogated John Watkins, the former Ca-
has written widely on the Royal Canadian nadian ambassador to the Soviet Union, in a
Mounted Police (RCMP), Canada's inteZli- Montreal hotel room on October 12, 1964,
gence agency. CounterSpy interviewed Adams and that Watkins died while under interro-
in August 1981 and revised the text'with gation. The story they'd put out before
him in late September. Adams' most promi- was that the Security' Service hadn't been
nent work is the novel S: Portrait of a there, and that Watkins had died at din-
Sit (Virgo Press, 69 Sherbourne St., Toron- ner, or something like that.
to, Ontario). "S" is an important work
for someone trying to understand the "pow- Your book, even though a novel, raises
ere-that-be" in Canada and U.S.-Canadian many questions about the nature of the
intelligence relations. RCMP and portrays it as a somewhat undemo-
CounterSpy: The paperback edition of crlatic institution. Do you think that a
your book, S: Portrait of a Spy is billed novel was the only way that questions like
as a "devastating bestseller." What is that could have been raised at the time?
devastating about the book? Yes. Let me go back a bit to how I first
Ian Adams: Well, devastating wouldn't be got started writing about the RCMP. In
1973, I was covering the coup in Chile. I
my word, but I suppose what makes it
unique in Canadian terms is that it was became aware of the liaison between the
and the CIA in Chile. And that came
the first book ever, fact or fiction, to RCMP
be written about the RCMP Security Ser- about because the Canadian government put
official story that no Chileans
vice. Hundreds of books have been written out the
about wanted to come to Canada as political ref-
the KGB, the but CIA, no the book British has ever M15
beanden writtabouten ugees. Meanwhile the contrary was true. I
about the RCMP Security Service. "S" is . went to the Canadian embassy in Santiago
also unique in that the book itself became every day, and it was just jammed with
the catalyst for the former head of the people trying to get out of the country
Security Service, Leslie James Bennett, to through what they thought would be the
launch a libel suit against me. He charged neutral offices of the Canadian embassy.
that "S" was a fictionalized version of Some of the people who tried to get exit
his own career. And in the course of the visas were well-known, including prominent
pretrial process we learned something that labor people.
had never been revealed before in Canada: It was about three weeks after the coup;
that Bennett had indeed been suspected of things were quite desperate. The National
being a spy and had been interrogated by Stadium was full with 14,000 political
the Security Service at great length. prisoners, and the smaller Chile Stadium
held another 4,000 or so. People were des-
Are there other details that have come perate to get out of the country. Well,
to light in the Bennett case? what the Canadian government was doing,
Well, just recently Bennett was inter- apparently, through the RCMP Security Ser-
viewed by the Australian Broadcasting Com- vice, was giving the CIA the names of the
pany TV. Hd said a number of remarkable people who were trying to get out of the
things, and charged that a death squad had country. At that time, the CIA had the
been established by the RCMP to get him if most extensive documentation on who was
they ever obtained proof that he was a who on the political scene in Chile. Pres-
double agent. Bennett said he'd been ident Allende's personal bodyguard, Grupo
warned about this by a fellow RCMP officer Amigos Personales, had infiltrated In-
he'd known for a long time. The other vestigacciones, the police force, and de-
thing that came out was that Bennett and stroyed most of their files on the politi-
RCMP liaison officer to the CIA, Inspector cal opposition. So the U.S. embassy had in
Harry Brandes were among the people who its hands the most complete files.
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I reported all this, and the stories
were published by newspapers and magazines
in Canada. The reaction was incredible.
The Department of External Affair's phoned
up the editors and complained about it,
and the RCMP complained bitterly because I
had identified RCMP officers who were down
there. And then things became quite diffi-
cult for me. Some writing contracts I had
were terminated. It was difficult for me
to get work. The RCMP put out the story
that I was a member of a "subversive" or-
ganization, which is totally untrue. I
have never belonged to any political orga-
nization. But some newspaper editors be-
lieved it. So there was a smear campaign
and I said to myself, I have to find out
more about these guys in the RCMP.- -
I had been a journalist in this country
for about ten or twelve years, and I
didn't know anything about the Security
Service, nor did I know any other jour-
nalist who did. But I just knew they had
enormous power. Obviously,they did, if
they could pull things like the campaign
against me. I, began to slowly build a body
of information on the structure of the
RCMP Security Service, to make contact
with people who had retired from it, who
were disgusted, and with people who had
been harassed by the organization. Through
all that research I discovered-two issues,
that kept coming up all the time. One, no
other international intelligence organiza-
tion trusted the Security Service, they
sort of were considered "sick" - sick
being the parlance in intelligence terms
for an organization that's. been penetrat-
ed; and two, never in the history of the
RCMP Security Service had they ever
caught a spy.
And that's 'what they are suppcsed to do?
Yes. Their primary function is counter-
espionage, counter-intelligence, and sur-
veillance of foreign intelligence organi-
zations that operate in Canada. They're
supposed to track down the spies - they've
done all kinds of things against progres-
sive Canadians - but they've never caught
a spy. So I put that together to suggest
that the classic situation had occurred -
the Security Service had been penetrated.
Now strangely enough, when "S" came out,
there was this reaction by Mr. Bennett,
who was the former head of counter-espio-
nage, and who had retired under very
strange circumstances in 1972 - no one had
50 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82
ever been informed as to why and how. And
it came out through my pretrial process
that he indeed had come under suspicion of
being a mole, that he had infiltrated the
Security Service for Soviet intelligence.
The novel portrays the CIA-RCMP rela-
tionship as one in which the CIA is clear-
ly the dominating force. Going from the
novel to reality, ie that the way you
would describe the actual relations be-
tween the CIA and the RCMP?
Well, recently it may have become a bit
more sophisticated. However, it wasn't
long ago that a CIA man could more or less
just give orders to a Security Service of-
ficer without any consideration that he-or
she was an officer of a foreign intelli-
gence apparatus. I think that to some de-
gree that has changed. But the agreement
between Canada and the U.S. in regards to
sharing secrets' is totally dominated by
the U.S. intelligence, partly through the
ability of the CIA and the National Secu-
rity Agency to obtain enormous amounts of
raw data - which they selectively share
with the Security Service.
Beside the incident in 1973 in Chile,
were there other times when the P.CMP did
some of the CIA's dirty work?
A lot of middle management deals occur
all the time. For example, when the CIA
has an agent that's too hot somewhere in
Latin America, the RCMP might make it eas-
ier by allowing the agent to cool off in
this country.
And then you have the Warren Hart ar-
rangement. Hart came from the U.S. to Ca-
nada to infiltrate the Black movement, and
also tried to infiltrate the Native Indian
movement. But everyone knew he was an
agent. He was too obvious, and it was a
joke among people here. I went to a meet-
ing once dealing with the occupation of a
park by a militant political group. Hart
was there, and he was openly drawing dia-
grams of bombs and passing them around. He
was the most indiscreet agent they've ever
turned loose up here, but he was around
for quite a while. People would say to a
well known Black leader, whom Hart was
supposed to,spy on, "Hart is an agent, why
do you keep him around?" This guy would
reply, "listen, I don't have any money, I
can't pay for my apartment. I don't have a
car, and he has one and drives me around."
This, of course, was a bit naive.
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Hart appeared again in a very strange
case, though, which still hasn't surfaced,
and that was the Canadian Space Research
Corporation case.
Is that the corporation that was selling
arms to South Africa with the help of the
CIA?
Yes. The man who was directing internal
security at Space Research was a former
RCMP Security Service officer. His name
was Don McLeary.And lo and behold who
turns up as the man on Antigua where Space
Research was smuggling from, as the public
relations man between the corporation and
the local people but Warren Hart. Now it
seems that McLeary must have been one of
Hart's case officers when he was in Cana-
da. And they later employed him on this
job in Antigua for Canadian Space Re-
search. So all these connections exist,
and who knows who takes the responsibili-
ty, and at what level the executive of
the CIA and the RCMP are involved.
Would you say that the CIA treats Canada
as -some sort of extension of the U.S.?
Sure, and because it's outside of the
U.S. they don't have to worry about their
mandate. Just one reason they're here is
the labor union structure in this country,
which is an extension of the American
unions, and the CIA and the RCMP have a
very strong interest in the union struc-
ture and in the "legitimate" left such as
the New DOmocratic Party,
originally the RCMP was set up to pro-
mote White expansion into the West, push-
ing out native peoples. Does the RCMP
still play a major role in the suppression
of Native peoples?
The RCMP operates as a contract police
force for ten of the provinces, only Que-
bec and Ontario have their own provincial
police forces which would be similar to
the state troopers in the U.S. So at
that level the RCMP functions as the pro-
vincial police. In British Columbia, Al-
berta and Saskatchewan where there are
heavy concentrations of Native people
their job is to keep those people down...
because of White society's encroachment on
the land and resources of the Native peo-
ple.
The RCMP has historically had the func-
tion of keeping the lid on Native dissent,
and for that reason they're deeply feared
and hated on most of the reservations. In
the provinces which have their own provin-
cial police forces, that's Ontario and
Quebec, the RCMP has responsibility in
terms of immigration and drug enforcement,
and certain federal responsibilities such
as tax fraud and, of course, national se-
curity. The major activity of the RCMP
Security Service, along with military in-
telligence in Quebec, outside these feder-
al functions, has been focused on the Que-
bec drive for independence.
What about RCMP connections to the me-
dia? You pointed out that it was a well
organized job that was done on you. Can
you identify specific media outlets in Ca-
nada that are used by the RCMP?
It's a very insidious thing. Even what
is supposedly the most responsible news-
paper in Canada, the Toronto Globe and
Mail, has a reporter called Peter Moon,
who's sometimes referred to as Corporal
Moon. His job is'basically to get as close
to the RCMP as possible, and get as much
information from it as he can without ever
being critical about it. Whenever the
Globe and Mail makes up its mind to write
something critical about the RCMP, when
things become so obvious that they have to
report something, it's assigned to another
reporter. The other reporter usually gets
]rne.d on the assignment and subsequently
has to take a bureau job in another city.
There has always been a fearful rela-
tionship between the media and the RCMP
which I think comes from the colonial men-
tality which still exists to some extent
in Canada today - the publishing world in
Canada has always refused to take upon it-
self the kind of responsibility and power
that it potentially could have. In the
U.S. you have corporate publishing with
all its problems, but at the same time
it's not always going to let a government
agency dictate what it should and should
not say.
one newspaper with F.C1.P ties that you
point out in "S" is the Toronto Sun. What
is the nature of these ties?
Sun editor Peter Worthington has had
quite close connections with the RCMP Se-
curity Service for years. That was re- .
vealed by Bennett during the libel suit.
He had known Worthington for fifteen years
or more, and had used him as a pipeline
for information. In most other countries,
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a revelation like that would have started
a debate about the ethics of journalism.
But in this country the media wasn't in-
terested. The nature of the Sun, a tab:-
loid, is "tits and crime," very rightwing,
re-evoking,all that 1950s Cold War non-
sense.
Here in the U.S. we are witnessing
what's called an "unleashing" of the CIA,
involving an increase in covert opera-
tions. It's questionable whether the CIA
has ever been leashed; but anyway, does
this resurrected Cold War-atmosphere,
which calls for strengthening intelligence
agencies, also exist in Canada?
Since there's such a close collaboration
between the RCMP and the CIA, that's also
happening here to a certain extent. Let me
go back a bit. In the early 1970s when a
lot of draft resisters came to Canada, the
CIA and the RCMP developed strong middle-
management functions in terms of exchang-
ing information about political organiza-
tions and "dissident" groups on both sides
of the border and using their agents to
infiltrate groups on both sides of the
border. And, of course, Canadian intelli-
gence officers are always attending CIA
courses in Langley.
Now, as in the U.S., there have been
commissions investigating the RCMP. The
McDonald Commission into the RCMP's ille-
gal activities has just reported its find-
ings to the federal government. The evi-
dence is pretty damning. The Commission
recommends that the RCMP Security Service
be disbanded, and a civilian agency simi-
lar to the CIA, but with responsibility
to both domestic and foreign security,
be established. However, there's no guar-
antee of civil liberties in these struc-
tural changes. In fact, the government
will through legislation make it legal
for the secret police to break in, tap
phones, and open mail.
What kind of organized opposition is
there to RCMP excesses?
Well, there's really not very much. One
organization, the Law Union, a national
group of lawyers who are a minority group
as opposed to the Law Associations, con-
sistently puts forward a position which
says the RCMP should'be more heavily po-
liced. There are also some political
groups in Quebec and other provinces. But
in Canada, the RCMP enjoys such a mythi-
52 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82
cal role that to question it in any way
is almost to commit political suicide. In
a way, the Mountie is the last mythical
figure in our society.
The RCMP has this "clean" image even in
the U.S. where the figure of an RCMP of-
ficer in his scarlet uniform is used by
Windsor in their ads for Canadian whis-
key; the officer is usually on a horse,
somewhere in the wild, under the caption,
"One Canadian Stands Alone."
About four months ago, I went across the
country on a speaking tour. I went from
city to city doing interviews on radio and
TV stations, and discovered there's almost
a generational difference in attitude -
any TV or radio host over forty tended to
try to put as much distance between them-
selves and me as possible to make sure
that their audience would not in any way
think that the host condones this investi-
gation of the RCMP. Younger persons were
much more matter of fact.
The RCMP myth is so strong in our .coun-
try because we're a country that has so
few myths. In a time of high economic anx-
iety and great political uneasiness, peo-
ple start to hold on to myths, especially
those related to law and order. To start
questioning these myths is to create even
more anxiety. That's when the public turns
against the bearer of "bad" news: the com-
mission investigating the RCMP, or the
newspaper that's writing stories about it.
Psychologically one can understand the
phenomenon, but it doesn't do much to ad-
vance our cause.
What do you think are the main issues
between Canada and the U.S. today?
The Canadian dollar has collapsed in the
last few days. Part of the collapse, Fi-
nance Minister Allen MacEachen claims, is
due to the fact that some Canadian corpo-
rations are trying to buy U.S. corpora-
tions. But I don't think it's as simple as
that. There's a sustained campaign going
on at various levels against [Prime Minis-
ter Pierre) Trudeau's energy package which
aims to Canadianize our resources. The at-
tack on the Canadian dollar which has
really shaken up the country has put tre-
mendous pressure on the: government. We had
this incredible statement by MacEachen a
few days ago when he asked the banks not
to lend money to Canadian corporations who
want to buy U.S. corporations.
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Is the U.S. Destabilizing Canada?
Referring to Prime Minister Pierre be hurt by Trudeau's energy plan, the
Trudeau's plan to buy back about one-third U.S. government should step in. If the
of the Canadian energy corporations pre- government of Canada "determines to use
sentZy owned by U.S. companies, the AtZan- its very considerable powers" to control
tic Council warned in a July 1981 study and direct the economic relationship be-
that~"the new energy program... casts con- tween the two countries "in a manner it
siderable doubt over future general energy deems helpful to Canada, the U.S. private
cooperation" between the U.S. and Canada. sector and the U.S. government must .
The Atlantic Council further warned that determine whether or not the effect is
oil and gas production in Canada might be detrimental to their interests, and de-
impeded. Presently, about 80 percent of cide, if necessary, on an appropriate
Canada's energy resources are owned by course of remedial action."
U.S. multinationals. As of October 1981, there is little
U.S. Policy Towards Canada:'The Neighbor doubt that the Reagan administration has
We Cannot Take for Granted was written by decided to take "remedial action," since
the Atlantic Council's Working Group on U.S. corporate officials have complained
the United States and Canada which con-
sists largely of former U.S. government
officials and corporate executives with
financial interests in energy and raw ma-
terial development. Given the Council's
board of directors at the time of its
writing (including present Secretary of
State Gen. Alexander Haig, CIA Lirector
William Casey, Henry Kissinger and Paul
Nitze) the paper undoubtedly has been
studied closely by the Reagan a6rinfstra-
tion.
The Atlantic Council paper clearly
voices its concern about the Canadian en-
ergy program - "Canada's economy is now
more subject to government direction and
control than has been the case... in the
past," - and is equally open about the
U.S.'s desire to further expand corporate
investment in Canada; "The United States
needs Canadian resources, Canadian mar-
kets, and opportunities for investment in
Canada. "
In a key statement, the Council urges
the U.S. government to "seek to assure
that energy projects affecting both
countries are handled with genuine reci-
procity." In other words, the Reagan ad-
ministration should oppose and take steps
against Trudeau's energy program which
favors Canadian over U.S. companies as
developers of Canada's vast energy re-
sources.
The Council is surprisingly frank in
describing its attitude toward who should
have the final say about Canada's energy
development: If U.S. corporations are to
bitterly about Canadian plans to buy back
some of their own resources. Time maga-
zine commented that the "real victims" of
the energy progrcon are U.S. companies
that have "invested approximately $10
billion in Canadian... energy enter-
prises." Before they went into summer
recess, two U.S. Congressional committees
passed bills against the Trudeau program
- one would impose a nine month moratori,
um on the purchase of more than five per-
cent of the voting stock of U.S. energy
fre..orrpanies by Canadian corporations.
In cwnmer 1981, the Reagan administra-
tion mailed questionnaires to the execu-
tives of the 500 largest U.S. corpora-
tions asking them about their problems in
dealing with the Trudeau government. The
administration also threatened "tough
retaliatory sanctions" against Canada if
it continues its nationalization plans.
one of the retaliatory actions being con-
sidered by the administration is to in-
voke a section of the 1974 Trade Act
which gives the president the power to
alter all trade agreements with Canada.
Given U.S. control over Canada's economy
(according to the Atlantic Council "Cana-
da is the locus of the largest proportion
of American foreign investment"), it
wouldn't be too difficult for the U. S. to
wreak economic havdc in Canada. For the
Trudeau government, it appears, a crucial
time has come. It is being forced to dem-
onstrate how serious it is about its
plans to control Canada's own resources.
CcunterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan.82 -- 53
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I have a theory that the CIA and the trarily nationalize our resources but just'
State Department are out to punish us for buy them back, after years of being ripped
daring to want to own and control our own off. There are other reasons why the
energy industry. And part of this concert- Reagan government would want to bring Ca-
ed attack is to bring down the Trudeau nada in line. They want all the rest, they
government, just as they brought down the want our water, they want the rest of our
Whitlam government in Australia in 1975. power. There's a scheme to set up nuclear
U.S. corporations control about 80 per- rower stations north of the border to sup
cent of our resources, and the U.S. in- ply electricity to the U.S., so that all
vestment in Canada is something like $90 environmental problems are shifted out of
billion. Now in Chile it was about $6 bil- the U.S.
lion, I think. Look at the length the CIA
and ITT went to save and protect that in- What is the time frame of the Trudeau-
vestment. Obviously they-'re not going to program to buy back Canada's resources
stand by and allow the democratic process from U.S. corporations?
to take place here, even if we don't arbi- It's supposed to be the objective of the
licty identified, in particular Richard
Australia 1975 Stallings, a CIA employee in charge of
the'U.S. intelligence facility at Pine
Gap and a close friend of Anthony's.
At first, the Australian establishment The CIA was extremely worried and con-
media ridiculed accusations that the CIA eluded that further discussion about U.S.
had played a leading role in the'ouster intelligence in Australia could "blow the
of the Labor Party government of Prime Zid off" the installations where the
Minister Gough WhitZam in 1975. But evi- named CIA officers had been working. The
dence that has come to light since then CIA also warned that if the existing
strongly indicates that the CIA was very problems - that is publicity about U.S.
interested in getting rid of WhitZam and intelligence facilities in Australia and
played a key role in his ouster. Whitlam's questions about the CIA -
WhitZam was dismissed by Governor Gen- "cannot be solved the CIA does not see
eral Sir John Kerr in a "constitutional how our, mutually benefitting relation-
coup" in November 1975. (Kerr used an ar- ships are going to continue." In effect,
chaic constitutional power which, al- the top secret CIA cable stated that the
though it may have been technically Ze- Australian Prime Minister was posing a
gal, had never been. exercised before in threat to U.S. intelligence bases in
Australia's history.) The CIA wanted Australia.
WhitZam out because, as a top secret ca- On November 8, 1975 a senior Australian
ble leaked to the Financial Review shows, Defense officer went to Sir John Kerr and
it feared that WhitZam's government might informed him of this cable. Three days
inquire into and publicize the nature of later, Kerr dismissed WhitZam. Interest-
U.S. intelligence facilities in Austra ingly enough, Kerr has longstanding ties
Zia. According to the former head of CIA to the CIA and had been working with Aus-
counterintelligence, James Angleton, traZian military intelligence. Kerr
these installations "elevated Australia played a prominent role in the CIA-funded
in terms of strategic matters unlike any Australian Congress for Cultural Freedom
other similar installation that may be in and personally went to the U.S. in the
any other place in the free world." The early 1960s to get money from the CIA-
1975 coup came after several incidents in connected Asia Foundation for his Law As-
which, in the opinion of the CIA, Whit lam sociation for Asia and the Western Pacif-
had damaged national security interests. ic.
.On November 2,,1975, for example, Whitlam Like-Canada, Australia is supposed to
stated publicly that he knew that the CIA be a democratic country and a close ally
had given money to the rightwing National of'the U.S. And yet, the 1975 "constitu-
Country Party of Dough Anthony. In the tional coup" shows that these factors
course of this revelation and general de- don't prevent the CIA from intervening
bates on the role of U.S. intelligence in, anywhere it perceives U.S. strategic or
Australia, several CIA officers were pub.- economic interests to be threatened.
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eighties. They started PetroCan which is bourgeoisie, by selling out to U.S. corpo-
sort of the equivalent of the Mexican rations through the fifties and sixties
Pemex, and they've bought a couple of and by the give-away of our natural re-
smaller oil companies. But those deals sources by successive Liberal governments,
have been accompanied by scandals, and has created a very powerful and wealthy
some people with ties to Trudeau's Liberal middle class. They're the ones who don't
Party have made enormous profits. So it's want anything upset. They want to keep the
business as usual with the Liberals: enor- colonialist and imperialist relationship
mous corruption is accompanying their so- with the U.S. intact'because they are the
called reforms. That's going to make peo- management class who have benefitted so
ple cynical... and there isn't really a enormously. It's the class that histori-
concerted attempt to take over the biggies cally turns on the government when the
like Gulf and Esso. government, in the larger interest of the
country, tries to regain control of our
In the U.S. we have very little news natural resources. The Liberal government
about Canada, and people were probably in our country understands this very
more aware that the CIA and the corpora- well, so their "nationalization" program
tions were destabilizing Chile than they will only be in force as long as it is
know that something might be underway just politically useful.
north of the border. When I talk about U.S. destabilization
Some Canadians are very sensitive about of Canada, I'm sure I'm going to be ac-
this, but I think the vast majority cused of paranoia and belief in the cosmic
doesn't want to hear about it. They would conspiracy. But these things like the par-
like to have this comfortable colonial- tial collapse of the Canadian dollar just
ized structure continue. In the fifties don't happen. Who would have thought ten
there was heavy investment by American years ago that the CIA would oust the
corporations that suddenly gave the Cana- Whitlam government in Australia? Yet it
dian bourgeoisie tremendous wealth. The happened.
The British Right and Intelligence
by Richard Shaw
Over the last decade, England has seen The influence of these institutes, which
the rise of a number of powerful rightwing also maintain high-level contacts with
"research" and "public policy" institutes. foreign rightwing and racist organizations
These organizations include the Institute and governments, has spread rapidly
for the Study of Conflict (ISC), the For- throughout the media and cabinet-level
eign Affairs Research Institute (FART), governmental circles. Their strength is
the Monday Club, and the National Associa- comparable to U.S. organizations such as
tion for Freedom (NAFF, recently re-named the Heritage Foundation, the Georgetown
the Freedom Association); each of which University Center for Strategic and Inter-
purports to be independent and "objec- - national Studies, the American Enterprise
tive." In reality, however, they have been Institute and the Hoover Institute in
working closely with Western intelligence Stanford, California. The Monday Club,
agencies and act as ideological conduits FARI, the ISC and NAFF contributed sub-
for a variety of disinformation and propa- stantially to the rise to power of the
ganda campaigns aimed at strengthening in- present government of Margaret Thatcher.
telligence agencies and rightwing parties
and organizations. Some of these organiza- THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT
tions have even received money from intelr
ligence agencies such as the CIA. The ISC is a supposedly "authoritative"
(Richard Shaw is a British freelance information center which commissions writ-
) ers to produce "factual" articles on in-
list
rn
a
.
ou
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ternal security, military affairs and in- tion" came "into our writer Robert Moss's
ternational communism. Brian Crozier, a hands." Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave are
CIA contract agent, founded ISC in 1970 as co-authors of the disinformation novel
a "registered charity" with about 1-20,000 The Spike and leading "experts" on ter-
"donated" by multinational corporations rorism. On the inside flap of The Spike,
like Shell and British Petroleum,) plus its publisher Weidenfeld (British edi-
money from the U.S. National Strategy In- tion) noted that Moss and Borchgrave have
formation Center (NSIC) and Forum World had access to information from all major
Features (FWF).2 In 1973, ISC received 75 Soviet defectors. Earlier this year, the
percent of its funds from the CIA, and was two also boasted of having regular contact
staffed-by what the U.S. Senate Select . with the CIA and French intelligence on
Committee on Intelligence called "CIA col- (former CIA officer) William Buckley's TV
laborators."3 show, "Firing Line."
At the same time that he founded ISC, In 1975, hundreds of ISC internal docu-
Crozier was in charge of FWF which ap- ments were dropped anonymously in the'let-
peared to be just another news agency but ter box of Time Out magazine. The docu-
actually was in the "propaganda business." ments revealed regular contacts between
An internal CIA memo to the then Director, the Institute and rightwing regimes and
of Central Intelligence Richard Nelms, intelligence agencies around the globe,
noted that in its first two years, FWF notably the Rhodesian secret service and
"has provided the U.S. with a significant South Africa's BOSS. The documents also
means to counter Communist propaganda and shed light on ISC's contacts deep inside
has become a respected features service the British establishment, even the Cabi-
net office.7
ISC's U.S.-based supporter, the National
Strategy Information Center, was founded GEOFFREY STEWART-SMITH
in 1962 by present CIA Director William
Casey.5 One of its main activities, as~ Beside having served as advisor- to the
Casey told the Senate-Intelligence Commit- British Military' Voluntary Force which un-
tee, has been the building of "academic successfully tried to send mercenaries to
responsibility" for the practice of intel- the Congo, Biafra, and Southern Africa,8
ligence in various countries. The NSIC is former conservative Member of Parliament
supported by the Mellon family, heirs of_ (M.P.), Geoffrey Stewart-Smith is a pivot
the Gulf Oil fortune.6 al link between three somewhat shadowy
ISC council members include numerous propaganda organizations. He is the editor
people with intelligence connections: Vice of East West Digest and director of For'
Admiral Louis Le Baillywas Director Gen- eign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd. (both at
eral of Intelligence at the British Minis- 139 Petersham Road in Richmond), and di-
try of Defense from 1972 to 1975; Sir rector of the London-based Foreign Affairs
Edward Peck is the former'head of the Se- Research Institute (FARI).
cret Intelligence Service (SIS) clankies- East West Digest is published twice
tine operations in Berlin; Major General monthly. Its ideology is glaringly obvious
Richard Clutterbuck (ret.) is regarded as in the table of contents of any issue. The
one of those principally responsible for duly 1980 issue (No.14), for example, con-
the British Army's counterinsurgency oper- tained articles entitled "Toward a Western
ations in Northern Ireland; and Sir Robert Grand Strategy for Global Freedom," "De-
Thompson is a one-time Nixon favorite ad- spite Carter's Words, High Technology
visor and proponent of the "strategic ham- Trade Continues with USSR," "Afghanistan:
lets" concept of counterinsurgency war- the Worst Reported War of Our Time," and
fare. "Communist Gulags in Angola Denounced."
As FWF's ideological heir, the ISC re- Free copies of the Digest are,sent to all
ceives CIA information and acts as its M.P.'s.
propaganda conduit. In fact, Robert Moss, The Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. is a
a senior member of ISC up to mid-1980, is major publisher of rightwing books in Eng-
a regular recipient of CIA information. land and features titles such as "Inside
The Daily Telegraph wrote on August 6, the KGB," "The Communist Challenge to Af-
1979 that one CIA report on Nicaragua, rica," and "The Assault an the West," etc.
classified "Secret:.o Foreign Dissemina- Since the company is a private limited.
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company, its accounts are not available to very popular with the South African gov-
the public. It is known, though, that the ernment. FARI's deputy director Ian
company is an agent for the Swiss Eastern Greig's book, The Communist Challenge to
Institute based in Berne which analyzes Africa, was published as a joint venture
the development of Eastern Europe from an by FARI and the South African Freedom
"objective," rightwing perspective. For- Foundation (SAFF), a propaganda organiza-
eign Affairs Publishing Co. is also an tion founded by the South African Depart-
agent for the International Documentation ment of Information. SAFF also paid for
and Information Center (Interdoc) in Hol- visits to South Africa by Robert Moss and
land. Interdoc has published a Who's Who General Sir Walter Walker, former NATO
and What's What on progressive activists Commander-in-Chief for Northern Europe.11
in Europe. It is run by the East-West In-
stitute, an organization which according THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR FREEDOM
to Time Out magazine has had close con-
tacts with the rightwing British Monday NAFF, recently re-named Freedom Associa-
Club (see below) and Dutch intelligence.9 tion, came into being in 1974 following
Strategically located at Whitehall, near the election victory of the Labour Party.
the Foreign Office and other centers of Lord De L'Isle (Chairperson of Phoenix As-
government, the Foreign Affairs Research surance, one of the largest insurance com-
Institute (FARI) is a mini-version of, and panies in Britain) became, and still is,
resembles, ISC. In 1979 Conservative M.P. its head, and former Tory M.P. John
Sir Frederick Bennett was the chairperson Govriet became administrative director.
of FARI; and Robert Moss and Brian Crozier The director was Robert Moss; he resigned
have also been on the FARI council.. Ac- recently and the position is now vacant.
cording to Eschel Rhoodie, the former head Other ISC luminaries joined the NAFF coun-
of the infamous South African Department cil, including Brian Crozier. NAFF's aims
of Information, FARI was set up by South are laid out in a 15 point "Charter of
Africans in 1976,10 and since 1976 has Freedom which puts great stress on the
been subsidized on an annual basis of sanctity of private property,... the
185,000. The South Africans aimed to in- freedom not to join a trade union and
fluence government opinion in the West on freedom from oppressive taxation." in a
the strategic importance of the sea lanes number of industrial disputes, NAFF has
around South Africa and its raw materials played a major strike-breaking role. For
- both of which FARI claims are threatened example, when two anti-union employees at
by the Soviet Union. A conference on West- British Rail were dismissed for refusing
ern commitment to South Africa, sponsored to join the union, NAFF took their case to
and organized by FARI, ISC and NSIC, was the European Court of Human Rights, which
held in Brighton, England in June 1978. they won in August 1981.
Attendants included Brian Crozier, Stewart THE MONDAY CLUB
-Smith, Air Vice Marshall Stuart Menaul
(ret.), Lord Allen Chalfont, George K.
Tanham, and the former head of the South
African Defense Force, Admiral James
Johnson.
Naturally, FARI's activities have been
A June 25, 1981 letter ("Dear Bill")
from Stewart-Smith to WilZican E. Green
of AZtawaiZ Trading Enterprises, London
which was obtained by CounterSpy indi-
cates FARI collaboration with the Em-
bassy of Saudi Arabia in London and the
nature of FARI's funding today. Stewart
-Smith mentions a .5~2, 000 donation from
Lockheed and asks Green to arrange con-
tributions from, AZtawaiZ and General
Dynamics.
The Monday Club was formed in reaction
to the "pink" policies of then-Prime Min-
ister Harold McMillan in January 1961, by
Ian Greig (who would later become FARI's
deputy director), Cedric Gunnery, Anthony
McClaren, and Paul Bristol. Its main goal
is to influence the Conservative Party and
move it to the right. Bristol was the
Club's first chairperson, and in the be-
ginning, meetings were held on Mondays in
his home with a dozen or'so people attend-
ing. After one year, the Club had fifty
members divided into five research groups.
Members of Parliament and other prominent
rightwingers also joined the Club when it
was still in its infancy, including Ronald
Bell, Patrick Wall, and Harold Soref, a
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former M.P. and intelligence officer. At
the end of 1963, the Club had about 250
members, eleven of them M.P.'s.
During the Club's first few years, it
concerned itself with "the surrender of
British responsibility in Africa," espe-
cially in Rhodesia. In.November 1963,
Soref organized a reception for Ian Smith,
then Rhodesia's Prime Minister. In No-
vember 1965 the Club held a meeting on
Rhodesia at which it called, for friendship
and cooperation with the racist govern-
ment. The event ended in three cheers for
Ian Smith. The Monday Club,unan1mously
protested sanctions against Rhodesia; a
"Scrap Sanctions - Talk Now" meeting was
held in Westminster in February 1966. The
publicity resulting from this event
brought the first substantial increase in
membership. In April 1969, membership ex-
ceeded 1,500 - an increase of 90 percent
in one year, and by its tenth anniversary
(1971) the Club had the largest membership
of any conservative organization in Eng-
land, with branches in Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland.
The 1970 election of Conservative Edward
Heath as Prime Minister was a breakthrough
for the Monday Club, and it was able to
dramatically increase its representation
in Parliament. Twenty-nine members, in-
cluding Stewart-Smith, were elected to the
House of Commons, increasing the number to
thirty-five. Although Heath was considered
too moderate, the Club was able to in-
fluence him on such matters as arms sales
to South Africa which he dealt with "to
the satisfaction of,the Monday Club...."
In 1970, the Club held a "Conference on
Subversion" attended by 250 members.
Speakers included General de Lorenzo, for-
mer head of Italian Security and a fas-
cist; Charles Lyons of the FBI; and Sir
Robert Thompson. The panel for discussion
included Ian Greig, Harold Soref, and
George K. Young, former head of counteres-
pionage, 21st Army Group.
Continuing its support for the regimes
of South Africa and Rhodesia, the Monday
Club organized numerous meetings on South-
ern Africa such as one on October 4, 1977
featuring Cas de Villiers, director of the
Foreign Affairs Association of South Afri-
ca (FAA), and one on July 12, 1979 with
John Launder, an editor of the Rhodesian
Broadcasting Company as a speaker. Only
last year, the Club's Africa Group invited
Johan Adler of the South African embassy
58 -- CounterSpy -- Nov.81 - Jan-82
in London to give a talk.
Senior members of the Conservative Party
regularly attend Monday Club meetings, and
the list of military Club speakers reads
like a military Who's Who. It includes
Sir Neil Cameron, Marshall of the Royal
Air Force; S.W.B. Menaul, director of the
Royal United Institute for Defence Stud-
ies; and Sir Peter Hill-Norton, Admiral of
the Fleet. One favorite war horse of the
Club is Sir Walter Walker, who was busy
forming his private "army" called Unison
in the mid-1970's. It was subsequently re-
constituted under the name "Civil Assis-
tance."
SOME SUCCESS
The propaganda of FARI, the Monday Club,
NAFF, the ISC and similar organizations
has been important in preserving the domi-
nation of U.S. military and strategic in-
terests over Britain since World War II.
In the political sphere, such bodies cer-
tainly helped bring rightwing British pol-
iticians 4 la Margaret Thatcher to power.
Naturally, the U.S. government does not
want a leftwing government in Britain
which might opt to withdraw from NATO, ex-
pell the approximately 25,000 U.S. troops
in Britain,-nationalize U.S. firms, and
end the close collaboration of U.S. and
British intelligence agencies. In 1974,
the Ford administration was alarmed about
the election victory of a left-leaning
Labour government. Such a move had to be
stopped. Within two years the U.S.-con-
trolled International Monetary Fund, by
imposing drastic economic conditions on a
loan made to Britain, forced the Labour
government to apply unpopular conservative
policies. At the same time, rightwing pro-
paganda organizations stepped up their ef-
forts to insure that the Labour government
would be replaced by a government of their
liking. To this end, Robert Moss, an Aus-
tralian citizen, returned to Britain and
became the speech writer for a little-
known M.P., Margaret Thatcher. One of
Moss's speeches, attacking the alleged So-
vietization of Britain, earned Thatcher
the nickname "the Iron Maiden," and gave
her much media exposure. Moss took over
important positions in the ISC, and helped
to organize NAFF. Thus, he was able to
figure prominently in a propaganda cam-
paign to manipulate the British media in
support of the return of a rightwing gov-'
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ernment.
Propaganda was used to agitate around
two actual crises: a series of serious
strikes, and escalating repression and re-
sistance in Northern Ireland. Moss a.:d his
cohorts, through their propaganda, skill-
fully turned strikes from being ordinary
conflicts between workers and owners intc
"communist encroachment" and the "march of
the left," charges which were duly "af-
firmed" and detailed in the British media.
In turn, the British population, especial-
ly during the winter of 1978 to 1979, was
psyched into a national crisis mentality,
and many were giver, to believe that only a
"strong and firm" Conservative government
could "sort out" the "industrial wreckers"
and assorted "communist thugs."
As it turned out, the Soviets did net
take over Britain, but the rightwing shad-
ow government, assembled in part by Moss,
did. However, some sectors of the extreme
right in Britain might have been prepared
to counter a Labour victory with illegal
methods. Just before the 1979 election,
the late Airey Neave, M.P., Monday Club
supporter and one of Thatcher's closest
allies, discussed plans for an undercover
"army of resistance" in the event of a La-
bour victory, according to Lee Tracey, a
former British intelligence officer and
electronics expert. Other options brought
up by Neave were possibilities to stop La-
bour leader Tony Benn from becoming Prime
'Minister by violent means. Tracey was
asked to consider whether he would join a
team containing intelligence specialists
who would do the dirty work on Benn.
Tracey stated that his conversation with
Neave was based on his assumption that the
"communists" were capable of taking over
Britain.12 Tracey and Neave agreed on a
further meeting, but P;'eave was killed by a
car bomb near the House of Commons a week
later.
"COLOSSAL DISTORTION"
In a December 1980 article, Hugo Young,
political editor of the Sunday Times, re-
ported that during the 1970s, a colossal
distortion was permitted in the work of
British intelligence. An inordinate
stress on the "communist threat" led to
massive propagandizing about "communist
subversion" in universities, trade unions
and other institutions, i.e. the Labour
Party.13 FARI, ISC and other organizations
described above were major contributors to
this distortion. Their dissemination of
disinformation about leftist subversion
was and is aimed to convince Parliament
and the public of the need for strong in-
telligence agencies; and ".strong" intelli-
gence agencies, they argue, are incompati-
ble with public scrutiny. This campaign,
coupled with Britain's Official Secrets
Act and rigid libel laws has allowed Brit-
ish intelligence to maintain a fairly low
profile as far as their illeg. 1 activities
are concerned.
British history over the last decade.
provides numerous examples of how a
country car. be manipulated in tc cold war,
anti--worker politics. Main actors in Brit-
ain included these non-elected orga.,niza-
ti-ons buttressed by the British intelli-
gence services, and used by foreign intel-
ligence agencies and governments a propa-
ganda transmission t:rlts. Thus, rightwing
"research" institutions have been able to
affect the political scene in many ways of
which the public has not always been cog-
nizant.
FOOTNOTES
1) Daily Mail, 12/22,176.
2) State Research Backv~rcund 2a 1(1/77, p.2.
3) Guardian, 12/20/76, p.9.
4) ibid.
5) The Leveller, no.52, 1981, p.10.
6) One member of the Mellon family, Richard Scaife Mellon,
purchased Forum World Features fro,? r, ;lay 501toes, a
witting CIA collaborator.
7) see also Searchlight, No.20, 11977, pp.3-6. The tenta-
cles of the institute stretch to lesser known organiza-
tions. Based in Richmond, for example, is also the Soviet
Analyst whose editorial board includes Brian Crozier.
The Analyst is a bi--weekl y newletter which purports to
analyze the Soviet Onion.
8) Sunday _Iimes, 4/23/72.
9) Time Out, 8/29/75.
10) Peoples News Service, 3/17/-O,
11) People's News Service, 2/6/79.
12) New Statesman, 212C/81, p.3.
13) Sunday Times, 12/14/80.
(cont. from page 19!
12) Infcrmationsdienst Suedliciiee Africa, 5/80, p.32.
13) The Observer (London), 5/17./
14) Southern Africa, 1/80, p.11.
15) Washington Post, 8/26/81, p.B-18.
16) John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, W.W. Norton and
Co., New York.
17) see Reader's Di est, 2/81, pp 106, 107. In its June
1981 issue, Soldier of Fortune features an article by one
of its staff writers Al Venter, a` out his actual partici-
pation in a South African raid intc Angola.
18) Philip Agee, Inside the Compauv__ CIA Diary, Penguin
Books, Harmondsworth, England, 1C71-, p.611.
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