COUNTERSPY: NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT UNTHINKABLE; FOR THE PENTAGON IT'S AN OPTION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
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• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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COUNTER ]PIF
The Magazine For People Who Need To Know
Volume 6 Number 4
$2 July-August 1982
NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT UNTHINKABLE;
FOR THE PENTAGON fl'S AN OPTION:
A Documentary History of U.S. Nuclear Threats
Also in This Issue: Princeton University's CBW and Nuclear Weapons Research; CIA plans for
Economic Subversion in Africa; World Bank and Urban Counterinsurgency in the Philippines;
Reagan's Marching Orders for Honduras; British Government Admits IRA Is Anti-Colonialist
Force; U.S. Nuclear Plans for the Pacific; World Bank Moves Against Tribal Peoples.
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Editorial
First use of nuclear weapons has been an
underlying premise of U.S. military policy
since 1945. In a comment about nuclear
weapons use by the United States, State
Department spokesperson William Dyess told
NBC-TV: "This terrible weapon has been
dropped on human beings twice in history,
and it was an American president who
dropped it both times." But asked whether
the Reagan administration was committed to
not using "this terrible weapon" offen-
sive Zy, Dyess replied: "No, Sir."
Secretary of State Alexander Haig has
announced that the U.S. might fire a nu-
clear "warning shot" in a U.S.-perceived
crisis situation. Vice President George
Bush, as a presidential candidate, claimed
that nuclear war is "winnable" - even if
only five percent of the people in the
U.S. survive. President Reagan himself has
implied that he thinks nuclear war can be
"limited." Further, the U.S. government
refuses to rule out nuclear weapons use
against non-nuclear powers. In recent
months, the administration has been forced
to tone down its war rhetoric because of
public pressure. But the President and his
Secretary of State have not retracted
their previous statements.
Nuclear weapons present the greatest
danger to humanity. An all-out nuclear war
would likely destroy life on earth. The
Reagan administration, backed by a cam-
paign of lies about "Soviet superiority,"
is engaged in a massive nuclear arms build
-up centering around first strike weapons
such as 572 cruise and Pershing II mis-
siles for Western Europe and MX missiles
for the United States. It is building neu-
tron and other "tactical" nuclear weapons
for use in the Third World and Western Eu-
rope.
To immediately freeze and reverse the
nuclear arms buildup is among the most im-
portant tasks facing the peoples of the
world. Time is short. The 572 missiles are
scheduled for deployment by the end of
1983. If we do not prevent this deploy-
ment, the world will have taken a giant
step toward nuclear holocaust.
However, the nuclear arms build-up can-
not be fought separately from other Reagan
administration policies. Nuclear arms es-
caZation is closely linked to U.S. inter-
ventionism. As the article "A Documentary
History of U.S. Nuclear Threats" (U.8)
shows, U.S. military intervention, partic-
ularly in the Third World, has often been
backed up by explicit threats to use nu-
clear weapons. In the past 37 years, the
U.S. government has used threats to intim-
idate struggles for liberation and the es-
tablishment of economies independent from
multinational corporations. U.S. nuclear
policy has also been aimed at "containing"
the Soviet Union and China and deterring
them from aiding Third World struggles.
The Reagan administration's arms build-
up is based on economic warfare at home.
The administration is not cutting the bud-
get: it is transferring tens of billions
of dollars from social programs such as
school lunches, health care and social se-
curity to the Pentagon. Cuts of these so-
cial programs are attacks on the liveli-
hood of millions, particularly on Blacks,
Latinos, American Indians and other op-
pressed communities as well as women.
Therefore, the struggle for nuclear disar-
mament is integral with demands for social
and economic equality. We must transform
the economy of the U.S. from one which is
centered on war production and profits for
corporations into a peace economy.
To date, peoples movements against nu-
clear weapons and war, as we explain in "A
Documentary History," have been essential
to preventing nuclear war. Most recently,
peoples resistance stopped the building of
the MX missile "racetrack" system in Neva-
da and Utah, and U.S. polls show an over-
whelming majority favors a nuclear weapons
freeze. In Europe and Japan, millions are
marching for disarmament. Third World
countries have initiated the United Na-
tions Special Session on Disarmament.
We must transform this broad sentiment
into an increasingly militant movement. We
must recognize the links between the
struggle for disarmament and the fight
against the Reagan administration's inter-
ventions in the Third World and its racist
EDITORS: Konrad Ege, John Kelly. BOARD OF ADVISORS (in formation): Walden Bello (associate of Southeast
Asia Resource Center; director of the Congress Taskforce of the Philippine Solidarity Network and the Coali-
tion Against the MArcos Dictatorship.) Robin Broad (doctoral candidate at Princeton University; co-author,
Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines.) John Cavanagh (economist at the United Nations, au-
thor of numerous articles and a book on multinational corporations.) Noam Chomsky (professor at MIT, activ-
ist in the peace movement, has written extensively on foreign policy and ideology.) Joshua Cohen (assistant
professor of philosophy and political science at MIT.) Ruth Fitzpatrick (member of the Steering Committee of
the Religious Task Force on El Salvador.) Ar un Makhijani (consultant on energy and economic development,
co-author, Energy and Agriculture in the Third World.) Martha Wenger (office worker, volunteer at WPFW Ra-
dio, Washington, D.C.; CounterSpy's copy editor.) Organizations for identification only.
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Contents
U.S. Aids Miskitos ............. .....4
CIA in Australia...................... 4
Army Plans for Chemical Action ........ 5
Belau: The People Say
NO to Nuclear Weapons .............. 6
U.S. Nuclear Threats:
A Documentary History .............. 8
ELF: Preparing for a First Strike.... 14
Princeton University CBW and
Nuclear Research .................. 23
CIA Targets African Economies ........ 30
Honduras Gets Marching Orders ........ 39
World Bank Reservations ..............41
Treasury Report on World Bank:
A Double-Edged Sword? ............. 42
The World Bank
and the Urban Problem ............. 45
Document 37: British Admit
IRA is Anti-Colonialist Force ..... 51
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Editorial cont.
and sexist economic and social policies,
and work accordingly. We must not settle
for watered-down "freeze" resolutions
that might take effect within a few years.
We want a nuclear weapons freeze. Now. And
we want it only as a first step toward
complete nuclear disarmament.
News NOT
in the News
Antiterrorism Assistance
In 1974, Congress abolished the notorious
Office of Public Safety (OPS) program of
the Agency for International Development.
In 1982, the Reagan administration is
about to revive it again to the tune of $5
million for the first year of operation.
The name, tough, will be different: The
Antiterrorism Assistance Program.
The request for the "antiterrorism as-
sistance program" is contained in the for-
eign aid bill for fiscal year 1983, yet to
be approved by Congress. If made into law,
any U.S. government agency could be autho-
rized by the President to train local po-
lice and intelligence agencies of other
countries "to enhance their ability... to
deter terrorist groups from engaging in
international terrorist acts." Such as-
sistance, says the foreign aid bill, "may
include training services and the provi-
sion of equipment... related to bomb de-
tection and disposal, management of hos-
tage situations, physical security, and
other matters relating to the detection,
deterrence, and prevention of acts of
terrorism, the resolution of terrorist
incidents, and the apprehension of those
involved in such acts."
The State Department estimates that
about 1,100 persons would be trained under
this program in the first year. The Reagan
administration hopes that this will
"strengthen our bilateral ties with
friendly governments by offering concrete
assistance in this area of great mutual
concern."
The OPS program was also designed to
help "friendly governments." These friend-
ly governments included repressive regimes
in Zaire, Argentina, Paraguay, the Philip-
pines, Pakistan and Guatemala. And the
"assistance" included instruction in tor-
ture techniques and the making of bombs.
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U.S. Aids Miskitos
the role the CIA played in Whitlam's oust-
er.
The background: In 1975, the Labor Par-
The Nicaraguan magazine Soberiania asserts ty and the opposition Liberal and National
in its April 1982 issue that the CIA is Country Parties were engaged in a struggle
using a 60-foot houseboat operating under for power. The Liberal-Country coalition,
the cover of a hospital ship to provide led by Malcolm Fraser - today Australia's
arms for Miskito insurgents led by Prime Minister and an ardent supporter of
Steadman Fagoth and based at Puerto Lempi- Ronald Reagan's military policy - was in-
ra, Honduras. Soberiania reports that the tent on bringing down the two-year-old
boat is supposed to be a "clinic ship, do- Labor government by blocking all govern-
nated by an anonymous 'corporation' to the ment appropriations. However, the strate-
executive board of the Panamerican Devel- gy, promising in the beginning, began to
opment Fund for use in Islas Bahia, Hondu- backfire, and the CIA's top secret Nation-
ras." Formal delivery of the ship "was al Intelligence Daily reported on November
made by Mr. Merlan Deardin, president of 8, 1975: "The determination of the Austra-
the International Institute for Field lian Opposition to force a general elec
Studies (IIFS), a nonprofit organization tion is weakening.... Disenchanted Austra-
in Connecticut." The ship was reportedly lians are swinging... in support of
anchored in Cayo Hueso, Florida, and Whitlam's Labor Party,... Some Liberals,
sailed to Honduras in mid-March 1982. worried by the strength of public reac-
Soberiania claims, however, that the cor- tion, are talking of replacing opposition
porate donor of the ship is actually ITT, Leader Fraser."
and that IIFS functions as a "phantom in- The CIA was not willing to accept
stitute." Whitlam's political victory. The Labor
CounterSpy has not independently con- Prime Minister had dared to raise some
firmed the Soberiania report, but it dove- questions about the role of CIA personnel
tails with other information coming out of in Australia. In particular, he accused
Puerto Lempira. Nicaraguan exile groups one CIA officer of funding the Country
are training with Miskito insurgents near- Party. Whitlam was also intent on telling
by. The U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa is in the Australian public about the interven-
contact with Fagoth, who is with other tionist nature of some U.S. intelligence
Miskitos training 50 miles inland at the and military facilities in Australia. For
Honduran military camp near Ruf Ruf. Re- the CIA, this presented a problem.
portedly, U.S. military officers have been It accused Whitlam, Australia's Prime
upgrading military communications facili- Minister of being a "security risk" and
ties at the Honduran army command post at openly threatened to cut U.S.-Australian
Puerto Lempira. An airfield nearby is also intelligence ties. There are strong indi-
being improved to be used for airlifting cations, writes the National Times, that
troops and supplies in an emergency. Like- the "only serious purpose served by the
wise, Argentine officers are working in commotion created by the CIA" was to con-
exile camps, and, according to an NBC-TV vince Australia's arch-conservative Gov-
report, at least one camp run by'the Ar- ernor General Sir John Kerr to dismiss
gentines was being supplied with arms by Whitlam (by using an archaic constitu-
U.S. advisors. tional power), thus turning the tide that
CIA in Australia
Top secret CIA documents obtained by the
Australian newspaper, National Times, shed
new light on the CIA's involvement in the
1975 ouster of Australia's Labor Party
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. These docu-
ments, primarily copies of the CIA's Na-
tional Intelligence Daily, illustrate
4 -- CounterSpy -- July-August 1982
was running against the CIA's favorite
Fraser.
Kerr did dismiss Whitlam on November
11, 1975. By January 22, 1976, Fraser was
in power again and the National Intelli-
gence Daily reported contentedly that "the
Fraser government has underscored the im-
portance of Australia's ties with tradi-
tional allies, correcting what it saw as
the tendency of the Labor Government to
ignore such ties in the pursuit of Austra-
lian nationalism.... Canberra will push
ahead with the construction of a new naval
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base on the Indian Ocean coast of Western
Australia.... On the matter of port calls
by U.S. nuclear-powered warships, Canberra
is not expected to impose obstacles...."
Fraser's leadership was also seen as a
plus for U.S. business interests. "Direct
government involvement in the mineral and
problems and in addition to explain that
some of the attitudes of the underdevel-
oped nations (in particular their abhor-
rence of work and work discipline) are at
the root of many of their difficulties."
In introducing his star witness Robert
Moss (Denton described him as "intellectu-
energy field will be greatly reduced by ally honest") the Senator mentioned many
the Fraser Government, a development which of Moss' activities and writings, but
will tend to reassure potential foreign chose to ignore his book, Chile's Marxist
investors.... The Fraser Government has Experiment, whose writing was reportedly
promised incentives for oil exploration
and production."
Denton Disinforms
One of his main concerns, says Senator
Jeremiah Denton, Chairperson of the Sub-
committee on Security and Terrorism, is
disinformation. It is a technique with
which the Senator is well acquainted: he
uses it himself.
The published biographies of Denton's
supervised by and partly paid for by the
CIA. The Chilean military junta liked it
so much that they bought its complete sec-
ond edition.
The one-page biography of witness James
Billington, inserted in the published
transcript of one of Denton's hearings,
lists many of Billingtons credentials -
founder of the Wilson Quarterly, director
of the Washington, D.C. Woodrow Wilson In-
ternational Center for Scholars, and so
on. The biography, however, omits
Billington's service in the CIA; instead.
it says he "served in the U.S. Army,
1953-6." It also fails to mention his
many years as a covert CIA consultant -
subcommittee witnesses conveniently leave now a matter of public record.
out the intelligence connections of at Senator Denton's omissions of crucial
least three persons. In his published in- parts of his witnesses' careers are seri-
troduction of Hoover Institution Senior ous. CIA journalists and academicians have
Fellow Stefan Possony - who testified on often played important roles in disinform-
"Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terror- ing the U.S. public. But disinformation
ism" - Denton failed to mention Postony's seems to be the purpose of Denton's com-
work as an Air Intelligence Specialist mittee.
with the Department of Air Force in the
1950s. In 1955, Possony wrote a confiden-
tial study for the U.S. government enti-
tled "Ceneral Guide Lines for an American
Long Range Psychological Plan."
As part of an overall psychological
warfare strategy, Possony advised that the Army Plans for
U.S. government "should express its belief
that the peoples of the world are not fun-
damentally unreasonable and that practi-
cally all nations, in time, can develop The Pentagon has had a tough time convinc-
attitudes to political issues which char- ing the public and sectors of Congress of
acterize the common sense behavior of the the need to vastly increase the Army's
Scandinavian peoples, the Swiss and the chemical arsenal. To overcome this opposi-
Anglo-Saxons." Possony advocated that tion, the Army has initiated an "Army
people in "underdeveloped areas" be con- Chemical Action Plan." The Army, according
vinced "that their economic future is de- to Defense Week, wants to neutralize pub-
pendent upon close cooperation with the lic concern about "the immoral and inhu-
western world, including the... acceptance mane nature of CW [Chemical Warfare]; ...
of foreign capital investment." Specif i?- and the fact that the principal target for
cally, Possony said, "an effort will have the chemical weapons will be the civilian
to be made to show that neither Communism population since it cannot be protected."
nor nationalism is liable to solve their The Army's plan calls for improving con-
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tacts with "media/journalists [and] per-
sons who are influential in industry, aca-
demia, etc.," to "explain" the need for
increased chemical armaments.
If details of the Reagan administra-
tion's chemical warfare plans become
known, the Army will have a lot of propa-
ganda work on its hand. Reliable reports,
pieced together by Defense Week, indicate
that the total cost of the program could
be $9 billion over the next decade. The
Pentagon intends to produce 20,000 tons of
chemical agents. In addition, the Penta-
gon is developing a new nerve agent, code-
named EA5774. According to the Defense De-
partment's "Annual Report on Chemical War-
fare and Biological Research Programs,"
this new agent "will have an increased le-
thal agent effectiveness," attacking the
skin and lung simultaneously. The Army
propagandists are going to be severely
taxed to come up with a saleable justifi-
cation for $9 billion more in expenditures
when the U.S. already has more than enough
chemical agents to kill everyone on earth.
Belau: The People Say
NO to Nuclear Weapons
It is a dramatic and vitally important government report, dubbed the "Solomon Re-
struggle between the 15,000 residents of port" laid out what U.S. negotiations
the Republic of Belau and the U.S. govern- aimed to achieve: "Micronesia is not now a
ment. Belau (also Palau), a Pacific island United States territory; we wish it to be-
nation - independent since January 1981 - come so." To accomplish this, the U.S.
is the only country in the world with a must convince the U.N. and the people of
nuclear-free clause in its constitution. Micronesia that "a measure of self-govern-
However, Belau's sovereignty is limited: ment will be given" to the island people.
the United States is still Belau's admin-
istrator in the United Nations Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia)
and is in charge of defense, and, to a
certain degree, of internal security (e.
g., the FBI's jurisdiction includes Be
lau). Negotiations are presently going on
which would remove Belau from U.N. Trust-
eeship.
The U.S. government has a particular
interest in changing the present relation-
ship. The Pentagon has plans to put a
Trident submarine base on Belau and wants
to station nuclear weapons there. Plans
for a jungle warfare training center also
are reportedly being made. At present, the
U.S. is barred from using Belau for mili-
tary purposes because it is a United Na-
tions Trusteeship. Therefore, for more
than ten years, the U.S. government has
been negotiating a so-called "Compact of
Free Association" to replace the trustee-
ship. As early as 1963, a confidential
6 -- CounterSpy -- JuZy-August 1982
JAPAN ? U.S. PLANS FOR MILITARY AND ENERGY
BASES IN BELAU
A,, ,w Akfkd 0*1..... st.
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To create such a facade of "self-govern- tance for the U.S. military. Pentagon
ment" for Belau, the Carter administration planners see it as an ideal site for a
initiated a Constitutional Convention in forward base in the Pacific and a nuclear
early 1979. U.S. officials were convinced weapons depot. For the people of Belau, it
the convention would support the Compact is their homeland. In a fair election,
of Free Association. chances are very slim that they would vote
Things went differently. The convention for a Compact of Free Association allowing
drafted a constitution which outlawed nu- the military bases.
clear as well as chemical and biological The authors of Palau: Can it Stand uZ
weapons from Belau. The Carter administra- to the U.S.? charge that a number of
tion was stunned; U.S. Ambassador Peter events in Belau since early 1981 smack of
Rosenblatt scrambled to change the consti- outside destabilization. One anti-military
tution. Despite U.S. interference, the organizer was assassinated in October
constitution went to a popular referendum 1981. His alleged murderer was whisked off
and was approved by 92 percent of the vot- to Guam, a U.S. territory, and released
ers. The U.S. managed to have Belau's Leg- there on $6,000 bail. Similarly, an FBI
islature declare the referendum invalid, "investigation" after the seizure of a
and another referendum was conducted with- mysterious ship with sophisticated commu-
out the anti-nuclear clause. Palau: Can it nications equipment, weapons, and $1 mil-
Stand uv to the U.S.?, a publication of lion by Belauan police in early 1981 has
the Bay Area Coalition for a Nuclear Free brought no results. The boat was taken to
Pacific, charges that this second election Hawaii by the FBI and "sold" to the U.S.
was accompanied by bribery and CIA covert Navy.
activity. Nevertheless, the people reject- In September 1981, a violent strike by
ed the revised constitution by a 70 per- ' some Belauan government workers and a
cent majority. Finally, on July 9, 1980, bombing of the President's office prompt-
the people of Belau again approved the ed U.S. officials on Guam to offer to
original anti-nuclear constitution by a send in Marines to "stabilize" the situa-
four to one margin. tion. The offer was rejected by Belau's
The constitution has one loophole, President Haru Remeliik, and many observ-
though, which gives the U.S. government ers suspect that the strike itself was
yet another chance to use Belau for mili- provoked from the outside.
tary purposes. It allows any constitution- Facing tremendous U.S. government
al provision to be set aside if it con- pressure, the people of Belau are in the
flicts with the Compact of Free Associa- final months of a decisive struggle for
tion. This Compact is still being negoti- true independence and a nuclear-free
ated and might be voted on within one country. If they win, a big step forward
year. will have been made for all peoples want-
The Solomon Report recommended that ing to live in a safe and nuclear-free
"the plebiscite should be publicly an- world.
nounced only a few months in advance." (information for this article was
This would "reduce the time in which any drawn mainly from Palau: Can it Stand u
opposition... could campaign against any to the U.S.?, publis by the Bay Area
affiliation" with the United States in ex- Coaion for a Nuclear Free Pacific, 2118
change for economic aid. Indeed, to date, 8th Street, Berkeley CA 94710. For more
very few details of the Compact to be vot- information also write to: Pacific Con-
ed on have been made known. It is appar- terns Resource Center, P.O. Box 27692, Ho-
ent, though, that under such a Compact of noZulu, Hawaii 96813.)
Free Association, the U.S. would be able
to set up its Trident base and a military STOP NUCLEAR WAR - PROTEST AND SURVIVE
base (dubbed "defense site") covering more
than a quarter of Badeldaob, Belau's larg- Edited by E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith,
est island. (See map.) The U.S. also wants with contributions by Daniel Ellsberg,
to construct large oil storage sites and George Kietiakowsky, Ken Coates, Mary
ort KaZdor, Jonathan Leonard and Henry
improve the Malakai Harbor and two air
p
runways. These could be used by Japanese
planes in joint U.S.-Japanese anti-subma-
rine warfare operations.
Belau is an area of strate
g
ic im
p
or-
Nash.
Order from MR Press,
62 W.
14th Street,
New York, NY 10011
$4.95
CounterSpy -- July-August 1982 -- 7
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U.S. Nuclear Threats:
A Documentary History
by Konrad Ege and Arjun Makhijani
I. U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY and indeed the entire foreign policy - was
articulated in NSC-68:
"This is the greatest thing-in history." Fostering a world environment in which
President Harry Truman on hearing of the American system can flourish...
the atomic destruction of Hiroshima. embraces two subsidiary policies. One
is a policy which we would probably
pursue even if there were no Soviet
The government of the United States has threat. It is a policy of attempting
initiated more than twenty first use nu- to develop a healthy international com-
clear threats since World War II, many of munity. The other is the policy of
them against Third World countries. The "containing" the Soviet system. These
use of nuclear weapons has been, and con- two policies are closely interrelated
tinues to be, an underlying premise of and interact on one another.2
U.S. foreign policy. The existence of socialism in the Sovi-
A top secret, presidentially-approved et Union was seen as a disease which would
National Security Council memorandum (NSC- spread to the peoples of the rest of the
68) written in 1950 by Paul Nitze (today world if it were not "contained" by a ju-
President Reagan's chief negotiator for
nuclear arms control) outlined the pur-
pose of nuclear weapons use: "Our over-
all policy at the present time may be de-
scribed as one designed to foster a world
environment in which the American system
can survive and flourish."1 With NSC-68,
"tactical" nuclear weapons and strategic
or,all-out nuclear war joined conventional
military force as integral components of
the U.S. military and political strategy:
to make the "American system... flourish,"
i.e. to establish and expand markets and
multinational corporate investments. The
U.S. armed forces were systematically and
thoroughly nuclearized, and field command-
ers make no rigorous distinction between
the use of conventional and nuclear weap-
ons (see sidebar).
Since World War II, the main threat to
the hegemony of the multinational corpora-
tions-has arisen from the liberation
struggles in the Third World, particularly
THE COMMAND AND STAFF ACTIONS AND PROCE-
DURES INVOLVED IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLE-
AR WEAPONS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE
SEQUENCE OF COMMAND AND STAFF ACTIONS....
INASMUCH AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROVIDE A COM-
MANDER WITH THE MOST POWERFUL MEANS KNOWN
TO DATE WITH WHICH TO INFLUENCE TACTICAL
OPERATIONS, THE COMMANDER MUST DEVOTE PER-
SONAL ATTENTION TO THEIR EMPLOYMENT....
THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN THE EM-
PLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE THE
DEGREE OF TACTICAL ADVANTAGE RESULTING
FROM THEIR USE emphasis added]....
IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
THE MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
COMMANDER ARE - (1) INTEGRATE EMPLOYMENT
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND WITH THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER.... (5)
MAKE DECISIONS TO FIRE OR NOT TO FIRE [THE
NUCLEAR WEAPON].
Department of the Army Pamphlet
No.39-1, Nuclear Weapons Employ-
ment, May 1959, p.133.
those to establish economies independent (Konrad Ege is co-editor of CounterSpy
of multinational corporations. Nuclear and a freelance journalist. Arjun
weapons, therefore, were primarily aimed Makhijani is a consultant on economic and
at thwarting these struggles and at pre- energy matters, and a member of Counter-
venting the Soviet Union and China from St's board of advisors. Special thanks to
aiding these movements for independence. Jack Coihoun and Martha Wenger for their
This direction of U.S. nuclear policy - assistance in writing this article.
8 -- CounterSpy -- JuZy-August 1982
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dicious combination of foreign trade, for- against the Third World: "Our nuclear
eign investment, conventional military forces... must also provide a nuclear
threats and nuclear threats. This policy guarantee for our interests in many parts
of containment required that the United of the world and make it possible for us
States develop and be ready to use nuclear to defend those interests by diplomacy or
weapons in a massive first strike against by the use of theater military forces
the Soviet Union, not in response to nu- whenever such action becomes necessary."
clear threats from the Soviet Union but in Rostow makes clear what he has in mind:
response to challenges to the establish- "We carry on the foreign policy of a na-
ment of U.S. hegemony. NSC-68 was explic- tion with global interests, and defend
The only deterrent we can present to
the Kremlin is the evidence we give
that we may make any of the critical
points [in the world! which we cannot
hold the occasion for a global war
of annihiZation.3
Today, Ronald Reagan's Director of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Eugene Rostow, asserts that "the nuclear
weapon is a persuasive influence in all
aspects of diplomacy and of conventional
them if necessary by conventional means or
theater forces."
This "defense," which includes the
first use of nuclear weapons, has been of-
ficial U.S. government policy for the past
37 years. This policy has been put into
practice by threatening countries with
nuclear weapons whether or not they post-
sest: nuclear weapons themselves. As Daniel
Ellsberg put it, nuclear weapons have been
used in the way "a gun is used when you
point it at someone's head in direct con-
frontation, whether or not the trigger is
pulled."6
II. U.S. NUCLEAR WAR PLANS
"If the problem of the proper use of this
weapon can be solved... our civilization
can be saved."
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, pon-
dering post-World War II nuclear pol-
icy.
Even before the "birth of a new age," as
General Leslie Groves (head of the Manhat-
tan Project that developed the atom bomb)
called the moment of the explosion of the
first atom bomb, he believed that for U.S.
policy, "Russia was the enemy and the pro-
ject was conducted on that basis." Indeed,
it was with the idea of "controlling the
peace of the world" as an aide to Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt put it, that Brit-
ish Premier Winston Churchill had insisted
that neither France nor the Soviet Union -
U.S. allies in the war against Nazi Germa-
ny - be told of the Manhattan Project.
war." In a crisis situation, Rostow says, Roosevelt agreed, and in the context of
"we could go forward in planning the use planning the use of atom bombs wrote, "I
of our conventional forces with great just can not go along with the idea of
freedom precisely because we knew that the seeing the British empire collapse finan-
Soviet Union could not escalate beyond the cially...." On the contrary, historian
local level."4 Martin Sherwin concluded that Roosevelt
Rostow also notes that the strategic wanted to make sure that "economically and
threat to the Soviet Union enables the militarily secure, and armed with atomic
United States to make nuclear threats weapons, Great Britain would he America's
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outpost on the European frontier, the sen-
tinel for the New World in the Old."7
Accordingly, the nuclear war plans that
the U.S. government formulated after World
War II were blue-prints for an all-out de-
struction of the Soviet Union. Air Force
Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining told
a New York audience in March 1954, that
"we simply have to depend primarily on the
most powerful weapons we can create.... We
must concentrate on building powerful
weapons and powerful air forces that could
be decisive against the sources of Commu-,
nist power within the Soviet Union it-
self."8 Eisenhower's Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles argued that the U.S.
should "use the threat of aerial atomic
retaliation of any size and in any place
as a deterrent to Communist aggression or
expansion."9
How such a war against the Soviet Union
might be conducted is described in two
U.S. government documents recently made
public by historian David Rosenberg. Ac-
cording to these documents, the decision
on how to conduct a nuclear war was not
the President's. Instead, the "exact man-
ner" in which the U.S. would fight a nu-
clear war was "known only to General
[Curtis E.] LeMay," the commander of the
Strategic Air Command (SAC). After the
President approved the use of nuclear
weapons, LeMay was to "decide this matter
at the moment, depending on the existing
conditions."
Under an "optimum plan," envisioned by
the U.S. government in the mid-1950s, SAC
would drop 600 to 750 bombs on the Soviet
Union in a simultaneous strike (about two-
thirds of the U.S. stockpile; the Soviet
Union was then estimated to have less than
300 bombs), and "virtually all of Russia
would be a smoking, radiating ruin at the
end of two hours."10
President Truman seems to have had sim-
ilar thoughts when he wrote in his diary
during the Korea conflict in 1950,E that
"the proper approach now would be an ulti-
matum... informing Moscow that we intend
to blockade the China coast... [and] if
there is further interference we shall
eliminate any ports or cities necessary to
accomplish our peaceful purposes." This
means, wrote Truman, "all out war. It
means that Moscow, St. Petersburg [Lenin-.
grad], Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port
Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad and ev-
ery manufacturing plant in China and the
10 -- CounterSpy -- July-August 1982
Soviet Union will be eliminated."14
Ravings such as these by Truman, as
well as actual nuclear war plans, never
mentioned the fact that atomic explosions
would annihilate not only buildings,
military facitities and industrial plants,
but entire populations. A former National
Security Council nuclear strategist de-
scribed how the job of targeting atomic
weapons is done: "Add a pink pin for Minsk
- another 200,000 dead...." The pink pin
represents faceless statistics: here farm-
ers do not plant, people do not cook, and
children do not play. According to this
former strategist, Roger Molander, such
considerations do not enter into nuclear
war planning.12
III. NUCLEAR EXTORTION: CASE STUDIES
"I'll never forget being lectured by an
Air Force colonel about how we should
have 'nuked' the Soviets in the late 1940s
before they got The Bomb. I was told that
if SALT would go away, we'd soon have the
capability to nuke them again - and this
time we'd use it. "
Roger Molander, former National Secu-
rity Council nuclear strategist
According to a Brookings Institution study
prepared in cooperation with the Depart-
ment of Defense, the U.S. government
threatened the use of strategic nuclear
weapons ng3less than 18 times between 1946
and 1970. To complement these plans to
convert the Soviet Union into a "smoking,
radiating ruin," the U.S. also readied nu-
clear war plans against Europe and Third
World countries.
In 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower
asked Congress to "authorize" him to use
the military "as he'deems necessary" to
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"defend" countries in the Middle East
"against overt armed aggression from any
nation controlled by international Commu-
nism."14 With minor changes, Congress
passed this resolution which became known
as the "Eisenhower Doctrine."
the war... on the basis which most favors
the Soviets.... We are attempting to match
men for men and tanks for tanks, instead
of fighting most effectively with those
elements of military supremacy we now have
in the Far East." The document continued:
Eisenhower further outlined his mili- "On the political front the free nations
tary strategy in a secret meeting with Ar- are on the defensive everywhere.... The
my Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor free nations do not in political discus-
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, -sion bring up their prime power advantage,
Admiral Arthur Radford in May 1956: First, the atomic bomb and the capacity to deliv-
"we must concentrate on building up in-. er it. That advantage now gives possible
ternal security forces and local security superiority of power in the free world."18
forces of the regions themselves," he General Omar Bradley, then the Chairman
said. Second, at "truly critical points," of the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed in
U.S. units were to assist these surrogate secret testimony to the Senate Foreign Re-
forces. Finally, "the support forces we lations Committee on February 10, 1953,
provide would use the most efficient weap- that "we have discussed many times the use
ons, and over the past several years, tac- of the atomic bomb, tactically," in the
tical atomic weapons have come to be prac- Korean war. As soon as a "suitable target"
tically accepted as integral parts of mod- in Korea was found, he added, the U.S.
ern armed forces."15 General Taylor re- "would have to consider very seriously the
plied that "if we proceed on the basis of use of the A-bomb."19 President Dwight
needs for actually fighting atomic wars, Eisenhower apparently agreed with
the needs for atomic striking forces... Bradley's assessment. Eisenhower told
are open-ended - practically limitless."16 Bradley and Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles that "we should consider the use of
Yugoslavia, Uruguay and Guatemala tactical atomic weapons in the Kaesong ar-
ea," an area that had been designated
Only a year after the U.S. bombed Hiroshi- through armistice negotiations as a
ma and Nagasaki, Truman threatened to use "sanctuary." Bradley told Eisenhower
the bomb against Yugoslavia when, in No- that this area, approximately 28 square
vember 1946, Yugoslavia shot down a U.S. miles, was now "chock full" of communist
military aircraft. Three months later, troops and materiel. Eisenhower concluded
Truman sent seven B-29s, then part of the that the Kaesong area "provided a good
nuclear strike force, to Uruguay to empha- target" for atomic weapons.20
size U.S. readiness to keep the Americas Eisenhower was somewhat worried about
free from "Communist subversion." In a disagreements with his allies. (After all,
similar move, SAC planes were sent to Nic- U.S. troops were supposedly in Korea under
aragua in May 1954 in connection with the a United Nations mandate.) Still, he felt
CIA's overthrow of the democratically- strongly that it would be impossible for
elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in the United States to maintain its mili-
neighboring Guatemala.17 tary commitments" around the world if "we
Korea
did not possess atomic weapons and the
will to use them when necessary."21 NSC
Secretary James Lay argued that the use of
During the Korean war the U.S. government nuclear weapons in Korea would serve to
worked out specific plans to use nuclear "increase the deterrent effect of our
weapons against Korea, the People's Repub- atomic capabilities on the U.S.S.R., as
lic of China and the Soviet Union. pertains to both global and limited
On November 30, 1950, shortly after war."22
signing NSC-68, Truman told a press con-
ference that the United States would use
every weapon in the arsenal to counter
"Chinese aggression" in Korea, and a 1951
NSC document complained that on the mili-
tary front in Korea, "the free nations are
on the defensive because they are fighting
CounterSpy is available in microfilm
from: University Microfilms Interna-
tional, 300 North Zeeb Road, Dept. PR,
Ann Arbor, MI 48106; and 30-32 Morti-
mer St., Dept. PR, London W19 7RA,
England.
CounterSpy -- July-August 1982 -- 11
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The war against Korea and the nuclear might become necessary to prevent any un-
threats which were a part of it were suc- friendly forces from moving into Ku-
cessful for U.S. policy in that revolution wait."26
in Korea had been "contained."
Vietnam: Trying to Bail out French
Colonialism
Less than a year after the Korea war end-
ed, Eisenhower prepared for the use of
nuclear weapons again. He offered Mark 21
tactical nuclear weapons to French Premier
Joseph Laneul for use against the Vietnam-
ese forces which had surrounded French co-
lonial troops at Dien Bien Phu. One reason
the weapons were not used, according to
Aviation Week and mace Technology, was
that French General Henri-Eugene. Navarre,
the commander-in-chief of French forces in
Indochina, was afraid of unknown side ef-
fects on French troops.23
The Suez Crisis, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan
In October 1956, the Eisenhower adminis-
tration directed an "overt and explicit
threat" against the Soviet Union to pre-
vent it from becoming involved in the Suez
crisis. Two years later, the simultaneous
political crises in Lebanon, Jordan, and
Iraq prompted Eisenhower to threaten again
the use of atomic weapons. In July 1958,
he sent 14,000 troops armed with nuclear-
capable "Honest John" rockets to Lebanon.
The Lebanese government claimed that in-
ternal unrest had been stirred up by the
United Arab Republic (federation of Egypt
and Syria). The United Nations Security
Council sent an observer team to Lebanon
but found no evidence to support that
charge.24
In addition to sending the troops,
Eisenhower ordered increased readiness for
the Strategic Air Command to underscore
U.S. "determination" and moved the Sixth
Fleet aircraft carriers, which then played
a key role in the U.S. strategic force,
to Lebanon and Jordan, which was
shaken by internal opposition. At the same
time, Eisenhower wanted to intimidate
Iraq's revolutionary leaders who, in July
1958, had overthrown the monarchy there
before the U.S. Sixth Fleet could act.25
He ordered U.S. Marines stationed in Ja-
pan to move toward the Gulf area, purport-
edly to prevent Iraq from taking over Ku-
wait. In addition, he ordered the Air
Force to be ready to use "whatever means
12 -- CounterSpy -- July-August 1982
Risking Global War Over Taiwan
The Eisenhower administration risked glob-
al war over Taiwan and other offshore Chi-
nese islands twice, in 1954 and in 1958.
Both times, Eisenhower deployed strategic
bombers in the Western Pacific to "reas-
sure" the Taiwanese government in a con-
flict with the Chinese government.27 The
1954-55 conflict escalated, and Eisenhower
sent the Seventh Fleet into the area. U.S.
News and World Report wrote at the time:
"If fighting starts in the waters around
this island [Taiwan], the first atom-armed
fleet in world history will bear the brunt
of it. That is the role assigned to the
U.S. Seventh Fleet." The article warned
that "the entire China coast would be open
to... attack by the Seventh Fleet's
planes," and there would be no "privileged
sanctuaries." In conclusion, U.S. News and
World Report told its readers that "the
Communist leaders are aware of the fleet's
power," and are unlikely to fight against
"an antagonist that so far overshadows any
force they can throw against it."28
In the 1958 Taiwan crisis, in addition
to deploying SAC planes in the Western Pa-
cific, Eisenhower stationed nuclear-capa-
ble howitzers on Quemoy Island in order to
protect the counterrevolutionaries on Tai-
wan and a few other islands. The howitzers
were a clear message that Taiwan "could
not be taken by amphibious assault, if the
United States should decide to defend it
by the use of tactical nuclear weapons."29
China eventually backed down, but only af-
ter several months of heightened danger of
nuclear war. The Soviet government in-
formed Eisenhower twice, on September 7
and 19, 1958, that the U.S.S.R. would come
to the aid of the People's Republic of
China in the event of a U.S. nuclear at-
tack. In addition, a declassified State
Department report of December 1958 con-
firms that the Soviet government "intimat-
ed that there would be retaliation in kind
to any nuclear bombardment."30
At the same time, the Eisenhower admin-
istration was preparing for various see-
narios in which nuclear weapons might be
used. In November-December 1957, for exam-
ple, U.S. forces conducted an amphibious
exercise in the Philippines for which
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"atomic play" was authorized.31 a key component of the U.S. strategic
Nevertheless, some U.S. officials were force - were readied for redeployment in
not satisfied with preparations for nucle- the Atlantic. Then, on May 5, the U.S.
ar war. The U.S. Commander in Chief for signed an "agreement on cooperation in the
the Pacific area, for example, sent an use of atomic energy for mutual defense
angry telegram to the Chief of Naval Op- purposes" with West Germany's Christian
erations in August 1957, urging that the Democratic government.3-4
U.S. government "hammer away on vital
need to stop pussy footing about use of The Cuban Missile Crisis
atomic weapons." He criticized the "weak-
kneed approach" to use of nuclear weapons
in U.S. military exercises in South East
In 1961, after the U.S. government-spon-
sored invasion, Cuba turned to the Soviet
Asian countries. "In my opinion the Union for military help. The next year,
most important requirement in South East the Soviet government decided to place nu-
Asia today is strong assurance as positive clear missiles in Cuba. The Kennedy admin-
as we can make it... openly proclaiming istration threatened an all-out war. if the
that the U.S. will act to give its full
military support to any non-communist
country threatened by communist aggres-
sion." The "clincher," according to the
telegram, would be "the public announce-
ment that we will use all necessary2weap-
ons as appropriate to the target. 3
Berlin
During the first crisis over Berlin in
1948, the U.S. government considered the
use of nuclear weapons several times, ac-
cordin to the Brookin s Institution's
g
Soviet ships. bearing the missiles contin-
ued to move towards Cuba. The Soviet gov-
ernment gave in, and the U.S., in return,
undertook not to invade Cuba.
U.S. policy on the use of nuclear weap-
ons remained unchanged. Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara said in February 1963 that
the United States "would propose to use
nuclear weapons or any other weapon when-
ever we f el35our vital interests required
their use.
g Escalation of the war in Indochina led
Force Without War. In that year, six B-29s successive U.S. governments to consider
of the SAC were deployed in Britain.
By the mid-1950s, it was clear that the the use of nuclear weapons there. The
United States would continue to insist first time was in 1961 in Laos. When a
that Germany would be reunified only if it Pathet Lao offensive was underway at the
firmly a part of the capitalist eco- end tant of to April, President Kennedy was reluc-
were conven-
nomic fsystem. This was unacceptable to the intervene massively with conven-
Soviet Union, partly for military reasons tional forces in support of the Royal Lao
Army (which at the time had some 700 U.S.
(the U.S.S.R. had been invaded twice by "advisors"). The U.S. Joint Chiefs of
capitalist Germany). Nevertheless, the Staff "insisted on prior presidential as-
U.S. proceeded to promote the rearming of surances of rapid military escalation, in-
West Germany and West Germany's integra- cluding permission to use nuclear weapons,
tion into NATO nuclear war plans. should North Vietnam or China respond to
This was the fundamental military back- U.S. force."36 In the face of Pathet Lao
ground to the Berlin crises of 1958, 1959, military success, Kennedy sent the Seventh
and 1961. In response to Soviet demands on Fleet into the Gulf of Thailand and or
Berlin, the U.S. government threatened nu- dered the landing of 5,000 U.S. combat
clear war, even as the two parties began troops in Thailand. This prompted a rapid
to negotiate. In March 1959, U.S. Defense
Secretary McElroy stated that "it would be political settlement favorable to the U.S.
and (Laos remained a potential nuclear target
impossible to limit war over Berlin,
for the specter of a preventive war by r the Pentagon. In 1972, a former Air
perceived as Force sergeant, James Walkley, testified
the
ep West if an he the tU U.S.S.R. was per that he previously worked on nuclear tar-
As negotiations over the status of Ber- get planning at Hickam field in Hawaii. A
were to begin on March 11, 1959 , in Laos specialist, Walkley stated that con-
lin ,. ,. - _,_
11--ct tingency plans for nuclear bombings of
with
dated.37) (Cont. on page 1E)
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ELF: Preparing for a First Strike
by Thomas Murphy
The U.S. Navy is on the verge of imple-
menting a communication system which
would greatly enhance the first strike
capabilities of submarine-launched nucle-
ar missiles. The system is called ELF
(Extreme Low Frequency), and it holds the
potential for continuous communication
with submarines while submerged at unde-
tectable depths.
A HISTORY OF CITIZEN OPPOSITION
In 1969, after eleven years of research,
the Navy constructed the first ELF test-
ing installation, the Wisconsin Test Fa.-
eility (WTF) at Clam Lake in the Northern
Woods of Wisconsin. It then announced
plans for "Project Sanguine." The con--
struction.of Sanguine, with its 6,000
miles, would have devastated northern
Wisconsin, covering forty percent of the
miles, would have devastated northern
Wisconsin, covering fourty percent of the
state. Scientific studies also revealed
that exposure of humans to ELF signals
could cause tumors, stress, altered
growth Levels, changes in the heart,
Zion for the Project in 1981 and is ex-
pected to ask for an additional $200 mil-
lion this year.2 Reagan also ordered the
resumption of testing at the WTF. Follow,.
ing Reagan's lead, conservative Wisconsin
Governor Lee Sherman Dreyfus and new-:
right U.S. Senator Robert Kasten have
thrown their support behind ELF construc-
tion in Wisconsin.
If Reagan can force the construction
of Project ELF, the WTF will become the
command center for an entirely new form
of naval communications. The WTF is
currently in operation, sending messages
to submarines. The WTF transmits its ELF
signals underground through an array of
ground wires via a loop antenna system
where a current establishes a very long,
and slow radio wave between the ground
and the ionosphere. This wave then trav-
els out through the earth-ionosphere
over the ocean, where a phenomenon known
as "wave tilting" allows it to bend and
penetrate the ocean depths, establishing
a continuous computerized communications
link with submarines.
blood pressure and functioning of the ELF VS VLF
brain.1 Sanguine was blocked by outraged
Wisconsin citizens and officials and The Navy currently uses a vast network of
abandoned in 1973. Large aboveground radio transmitters and
Two years Later, the Navy resurrected antennas to reach its submarines. It is
Sanguine under a new name, Project Sea- able to communicate with submerged subma-
farer. Seafarer, if constructed, would nines through the transmission of VLF
have covered a third of Michigan's Upper (Very Low Frequency) radio waves. How-
Peninsula. It was firmly rejected by ever, VLF transmissions can only be used
Michigan's citizens. In 1978, Jimmy to communicate with submarines at depths
Carter, acting on a campaign promise of 40 feet or less, requiring submarines
made to Michigan's Governor Milliken, an- to approach the surface at prearranged
nounced the demise of Seafarer.
REAGAN AND ELF
times to communicate by releasing a large
buoyant antenna and trailing it near the
surface.
normall
o
erates its subma-
Nav
Th
y
p
y
e
In 1979, the Navy announced yet another
ELF gambit called Project ELF. ELF would nines at depths of under 120 feet, that
use 28 miles of antenna at the WTF and is, beneath the thermocZine layer; a tem-
130 miles of antenna at Marquette, Mich- perature differential in the ocean usual,-
igan, as well as 3 million watts of power Zy existing at a depth of 60 to 120 feet.
input. The Navy's projected price tag for The submarines travelling beneath the
Project ELF is $490 million. President thermoeline are incommunicado until their
backer of ELF - pres- next scheduled radio rendezvous near the
Reagan - a strong
cured Congress to appropriate $39.9 mil surface: ELF waves can penetrate sea
14 -- CounterSpy -- duly-August 1982
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waters at far greater depths than VLF
signals, and this provides the Navy with
the potential for continuous communica-
tion with its submarines that travel vir-
tually detection free beneath the thermo-
e line . 3
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE FIRST STRIKE
Trident submarines and missiles are an
essential element in the Pentagon's quest
for first strike capability. ELF will
provide the United States with what nu-
clear weapons expert Robert C. Aldridge
has dubbed a first strike "Trigger Fin-
ger," allowing the Navy to direct its
submarines and their missiles in a coor-
dinated effort uninhibited by the limita-
tions of VLF communications.4
Project ELF in its present form cannot
be justified as "defensive" or serving
retaliatory purposes. ELF's continuous
communications Zink makes it particularly
useful for a first strike by the U.S. It
enables submarine-launched missiles to
respond to rapidly changing first strike
target priorities. From a single com-
munications center, a war room commander
could coordinate strikes on targets that
are chosen on a time-sensitive basis,
e.g. enemy missiles that could be
launched in retaliation to a U.S. first
use of nuclear weapons.
The ELF system, based in one unpro-
tected command center (unlike the VLF
and other communication systems whose
transmitters are Located in well over a
hundred different places) is a prime
target in any nuclear confrontation. ELF
would be wiped out in an enemy strike,
and therefore, would play no role at all
in a retaliatory strike. While they can
also be used for a first strike, VLF
communications are equally suited to a
retaliatory nuclear strike. In fact, in
order to conduct a retaliatory strike,
communication stations might not even be
necessary: the Pentagon has developed
contingency plans in which a submarine
commander, in a retaliatory scenario,
would fire his nuclear arsenal if unable
to establish VLF communication over a
prolonged period of time. This ensures
a retaliatory nuclear strike in the
event that VLF transmitters have been
destroyed by an enemy first strike.5
Again, the ELF system can not be justi-
(Thomas Murphy is a political activist
and freelance journalist living in
Baraboo, Wisconsin.)
fied as an enhancement of this already
existing second strike capability. ELF
can only be seen as a preparation for a
U.S. first strike.
THE "ELUSIVE VOICE": MOBILE ELF
The first strike technology of ELF sys-
tems may prove to be a precursor of a
communications system to coordinate all
U.S. nuclear forces. ELF waves have the
capacity to penetrate the earth at great
depths and may provide for a communica-
tions command post to be operated from a
"doomsday center." Such a center to house
and protect the "button-pushers" would
have to be built deeper than a hydrogen
bomb crater. This great depth would make
normal radio communications virtually im-
possible, but with an ELF system, a com-
munications Zink could well be devetopea
between "underground" war executives and
"aboveground" strategic nuclear forces.
The technological potential exists for
ELF to become the communications coordi-
nator not only for submarines but also
for the full complement of U.S. nuclear
assault forces from MX and cruise mis-
siles to B,1 Bombers.
The Navy is also conducting secret re-
search into the establishment of mobile
ELF systems or, as the Navy refers to
them, "Elusive Voices." The "Elusive
Voice" ELF concept operates from the al-
ready developed technology to package a
small ELF system's components in a "ready
-to-assemble" fashion and store them in a
transport vehicle. These vehicles would
then be sequestered in secret "hardened"
places. In the event of war, the vehicles
would be withdrawn from their shelters
and assembled in a few hours to send com-
puterized ELF orders to submarines and
"hardened" missile silos for a "third" or
"fourth" nuclear strike.
The Navy, unless funding can be
halted, will continue to use ELF technol-
ogy as another stepping stone in the es-
caZating U.S. preparations to fight a nu-
clear war, and to maintain U.S. political
and economic dominance through the threat
of nuclear destruction.
FOOTNOTES
1) Terry O'Laughlin, Project ELF: The Zapping 9L the
North LAoda, Pure/Wager, Madison, 1981, p. 16.
2) Jeraty Speicher and John Stauber, STOP PROJECT ELF
Bulletin, Madison, December 28, 1981.
3) Cf supra, #1.
4) Robert Aldridge, "ELF - First Strike Radio: The
Underground Trigger Finger," The Nation, June 16,
1979, p.714.
5) Ibid.
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(Cont. from page 13) "ridiculous" to suggest that he was con-
Vietnam sidering the use of nuclear weapons. But
on July 15, 1969, he sent a message to Ho
In November 1961, Assistant Secretary of Chi Minh: "Unless some serious break-
through had been achieved by the Novem-
Defstronger U.S. "involvement" in Vietnam. He 1 deadline," Nixon would regretfully
find himself obliged to have recourse
"considered it probable that the United it
States would have to take over the war to measures of great consequence and
from the South Vietnamese and possible force," i.e, the use of the atom bomb. A
to war with China few weeks later, Secretary of State Henry
that it would have to go
Kissinger it intervened militarily." According to ssinger repeated that messae to Viet-
Bundy, U.S. "punishment" of North Vietnam namese negotiators in Paris. ~~
and possibly China - if it intervened - (In 1969, Nixon also declared his Doc-
would include "at least" the threat to use trine" in Guam, announcing that from then
nuclear weapons.38 on, the United States would make every ef-
President Lyndon Johnson began his pre- fort to keep its troops out of Third World
parations for overt war in Vietnam in the countries. Instead, the U.S. would provide
spring of 1964 with a massive CIA opera- military and economic assistance to "those
tion to deceive the U.S. Congress and the nations willing to accept the responsibil-
people. He used the "Gulf of Tonkin'inci- ity of supplying the manpower to defend
dent" to launch bombing raids'on North themselves." As Nixon describes it in his
Vietnam. In 1968, Johnson was advised by memoirs, the "Doctrine" included the pos-
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he might sibility of the first use of nuclear weap-
have to order the use of nuclear weapons ons: "In case a major nuclear power en-.
to free U.S. troops who were surrounded at gaged in aggression against one of our al-
Khe Sanh, about 25 miles from Quang Tri, lies or friends, I said that we would re-
spond with nuclear weapons. 42)
and only a few miles south of the 1954
cease fire line. General William Westmore- The nuclear threat against Vietnam had
land, then the commander of U.S. forces in a personal touch. It was made according to
South Vietnam thought that the use of nu- the "Madman Theory" described in the mem-
clear weapons might help-end the war oirs of Nixon 's advisor, H.R. Haldeman.
quickly. He stated in his memoirs that Khe Nixon, confronted with massive opposition
Sanh would indeed hive been an almost ide- at home, would create the impression to
al occasion to use tactical nuclear weap- the Vietnamese that he had "reached the
ons. "If Washington off icials.were so in- point where [he] might to anything to stop
tent on 'sending a message' to Hanoi, the war." He told Haldeman, "we'll slip
surely small tactical nuclear weapons the word to them that, 'for God's sake,
would be a way to tell Hanoi something, you know Nixon is obsessed about Commu-
just as two atomic bombs had spoken con- nism. We can't restrain him when he's an-
vincingly to Japanese officials during gry - and, 4he has his hand on the nuclear 3 World War II and the threat of atomic button.
However, North 1' atnam and the National
bombs induced the North Koreans to accept
meaningful negotiations during the Korean Liberation Front did not give in. Their
War."39 resolve was strengthened by the nuclear
On August 6, 1968, presidential candi- parity of the Soviet Union and the anti-
date Richard Nixon told the Republican war movement in the United States. Nixon
convention in Miami howto "get out" of acknowledged in his memoirs that his ene-
mies knew
the Vietnam war. "I'll tell you how Korea that the U.S. President did not
was ended. We got in there and had this have the popular backing in the U.S. to
messy war on our hands. Eisenhower let the drop the bomb.
word go out - let the word go out diplo-
matically - to the Chinese and North Kore-
ans that we would not tolerate this con-
tinual war of attrition. And within a mat- The Nixon administration brought the world
ter of months, they negotiated."40 Nixon close to the brink again in 1973 during
was referring to Eisenhower's threat of the October Arab-Israeli war. According to
nuclear weapons. Kissinger 's memoirs, a nuclear alert was
using
In public, Nixon maintained that. it was issued for all U.S. forces under the di-
16 -- CounterSpy -- July-August 1982
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rection of Kissinger himself along with
White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig.
The two considered themselves to be in
charge because the President was "too dis-
traught" to make such decisions, and
Gerald Ford had not yet been confirmed by
Congress to replace Spiro Agnew as Vice
President.
py~d...?y ?"~F f'r~RMKG'.~Ai's
III. PARITY: PLANS FOR "FLEXIBLE" NUCLEAR
WAR
Vietnam was a turning point: for the first
time, a U.S. nuclear threat could not pre-
vent the defeat of the U.S. military.
Three factors were responsible: the deter-
mined resistance of the Vietnamese people,
the anti-war movement in the U.S., and the
achievement of rough strategic nuclear
parity by the Soviet Union. (Strategic nu-
clear parity does not mean equal numbers
of nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles:
it means that each side would have enough
nuclear weapons left after being hit by a
first strike to retaliate massively.) It
was under these circumstances that SALT I
was negotiated.
At the same time, the U.S. government
made plans to reestablish nuclear weapons
as an effective instrument. "We are pay-
ing much more attention than previously
to planning for the possibility of these
kinds of selective strikes we have been
talking about," 44 said Defense Secre-
tary James Schlesinger. In 1975 he sent a
revision of the Single Integrated Opera-
tions Plan (SIOP, "the blueprint to fol-
low if the United States went to war") to
the SAC ordering its pilots to undergo
Kissinger: "Limit"
Nuclear War!
Soviet development of missiles and long
range bombers presented a serious problem
to U.S. foreign policy: it could no lon-
ger make nuclear threats without the fear
of retaliation. Though it continued to
possess overwhelming military superiori-
ty, the U.S. establishment early began to
formulate nuclear war plans in the con-
text of the imminent acquisition of de-
terrent power by the Soviet Union.
This was the doctrine of "limited nu-
clear war "developed by Henry Kissinger,
then a young Harvard professor and prote-
ge of the Rockefeller family. He pro-
pounded this theory in Nuclear Weapons
and Foreign Policy, written for the pow-
erful Council on Foreign Relations. The
theory was adopted by Pentagon planners
in the late 1960s and constitutes the ba-
sis of the assumption that a limited nu-
clear war could prevent the destruction
of the United States itself, while the
U.S. government would retain the "free-
dom" to use nuclear weapons in almost all
conflicts, including those in Europe.
Kissinger promises that with "proper
tactics" nuclear war "need not be as de-
structive as it appears when we think of
it in terms of traditional warfare." He
reduces the question of nuclear weapons
use to a fairly simple level: Will it be
effective or not? Generally, Kissinger
writes, the use of nuclear weapons in a
"limited" war appears to have great ad-
vantages for the U.S.:
The choice between conventional and
nuclear war then becomes an essential-
ly practical one: which side is likely
to gain from adopting limited nuclear
war....? For a nation with a superior
industrial potential and a broader
base of technology, the strategically
most productive form of war is to uti-
lize weapons of an intermediate range
of destructiveness, sufficiently com-
plex to require a substantial produc-
tive effort, sufficiently destructive
so that manpower cannot be substituted
for technology, yet discriminating
enough to permit the establishment of
a significant margin of superiority.
It would seem that the weapons systems
appropriate for limited nuclear war
meet these requirements.
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specific training for "limited" nuclear
war.45
In 1974-75, there was also renewed
discussion about U.S. nuclear strategy in
Korea. U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea are
only 35 to 50 miles from the Demilita-
rized Zone. In case of an armed conflict
between North and South Korea, these
weapons are so located that their use
could be rationalized as necessary to
prevent their capture by the North Kore-
ans. "As the United States becomes less.
willing and able to provide manpower on
the Korean front line... tactical nuclear
weapons are seen by some as a logical,
relatively inexpensive and powerful re-
placement,"46 according to the Washington
Post. "We cannot foreclose any options,"
said Schlesinger. The nuclear option
would be used "in a flexible way in our
national interest."47
The realization of this doctrine of
"flexible response" and the first use of
nuclear weapons by the U.S. government was
laid out in a September 1975 study commis-
sioned by the U.S. Defense Civil Prepared-
ness Agency (see sidebar). The study "de-
picts a sequence of hypothetical strate-
gic events which create an intense nuclear
crisis in the summer of 1979." The Soviet
Union is the "bad guy," in this scenario
which centers around Warsaw Pact blockage
of U.S. access to Berlin and a simulta-
neous Soviet-inspired Arab attack on Isra-
el. The United States uses nuclear weapons
first, thus unleashing nuclear war in Eu-
rope. Then the U.S. strikes "military tar-
gets" in the Soviet Union with nuclear
weapons. Next, the U.S. government pre-
sents an ultimatum: Stop or mutually as-
sured destruction! 48
IV. FOR THE U.S., PARITY IS. NOT ENOUGH
Jimmy Carter's presidency began with vague
promises of reductions in nuclear weapons,
but ended with highly dangerous nuclear
war. plans. In one of his major military
decisions, Carter signed Presidential De-
cision-18, "a five page memo classified
'top-secret' though the contents are well
known in defense policy-circles." PD-18,
in essence, was simply a restatement of
Eisenhower's Middle East Doctrine. It for-
mally widened U.S. "vital interests" to
encompass "the major oil-exporting area,
which geographically includes Israel."
What that means in plain language, com-
mented Fortune magazine, is that "the U.S.
THE NUCLEAR CRISIS OF 1979
by
William M. grown
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Washington. D.C. 20301
This study depicts a sequence of hypothetical strategic events
which create an intense nuclear crisis in the summer of 1979. A parallel
sequence sketches U.S. civilian responses to these frightening develop-
wenti including, eventually, the ordering of a mass movement of the
urban population into the less risky host areas--generally the smaller
towns and rural regions. Some of the major problems anticipated for the
planning of this civil defense option without increasing the current
modest budget are discussed. Most of the physical preparations are
handled by a rapid mobilization of the civilian population and existing
resources that becomes effective, since the scenario provides several
weeks for the mobilization and the population responds vigorously to the
perceived threat. The survival prospects appear to be quite promising
If the federal government can provide timely legal and financial policies
together with technical assistance while avoiding undue bureaucratic
requirements. A series of vignettes portrays an unfolding picture of
the nuclear crisis, the mobilization which leads to the relocation of the
population, the movement and the reception in the host areas, and the
responsei during a somewhat protracted evacuation. 'The final scenarios
resolve the crisis in two possible ways: a negotiated peace and a large
malevolent attack. In each case the aftermath is presented and briefly
analyzed.
Evelyn W. Staples
Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative
DCPA Review Notice
This report has been reviewed In the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency and approved for publication. Approval
does not signify that contents necessarily reflect the views
and policies of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.
18 -- Counterspy -- July-August 1982
March 15-30 Anti-Israeli war propaganda increases sharply In Arab
countries.
April 2-15 Large Soviet arse shipments to Middle East denounced by
U.S.
Soviet "advisors" and "volunteers" arrive In Egypt and
Syria. NATO protests.
May 3-10 Soviet propaganda barrage. Stated goal: East-West
European conference without U.S.
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would go to war... to keep the Persian
Gulf from falling into the hands of the
Soviet Union or its proxies."49
In early 1978, Defense Secretary Harold
Brown ordered an extensive study entitled
"Capabilities in the Persian Gulf." It be-
came the most extensive military study of
the area ever done by a U.S. administra-
tion. The study envisioned the use of nu-
clear weapons in Iran. Setting a scenario
in which Soviet troops would attack Iran,
the report concludes that to "counter"
that, "we might have to threaten or make
use of tactical nuclear weapons."50 Presi-
dent Carter chose his 1980 State of the
Union speech to announce his "doctrine" on
the Middle East. He said it was needed to
offset the "Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan," but he was merely seizing the occa-
sion to announce a policy that had been
decided on at least one year before.
In fact, the President was only "making
public what the Soviets had undoubtedly
always regarded as sufficiently obvious
implicit nuclear threats of nuclear ini-
tiatives to preserve U.S. influence in the
oil regions," explained Daniel Ellsberg.
"Carter was also acting to legitimize such
threats in future cases where the public
was less likely to perceive either an ur-
gent threat from a rival superpower or to
a 'vital national interest.'"5'
Carter signed at least two other Presi-
dential Decision Memorandums that height-
ened the danger of nuclear war. PD-59
IN ORDER To PRoTEcT
AMERICAN INTTRESTS
IN T PEIISIAN
WE ~!FREINSTATE-ITHE
DRAFT REG61 ATION;So
IF THE NEED ARISES WE
CAN Qu(cKLY Mobil IzE
OUR TROOPS
TIlE SoIAETS MUST KNOW
WE WILL NEVER ?