COUNTERSPY: HAITI: CHOICE BETWEEN TWO EVILS DUVALIER OR IMF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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~1 y
COUNIrE
Volume 7 Number 2 $2 Dec. 1982-Feb. 1983
HAITI: CHOICE BETWEEN TWO EVILS-
DUVALIER OR IMF
Also in this issue:
Nicaragua: A Bay of Pigs
in the Making
U.S. Representatives Say
CIA Lies About
Central America
AirLand Battle: The Army's
New Aggressive Doctrine
Secret U.S. Embassy Report
Affirms Marcos Corrupt
and on Shaky Ground
CIA and West Germany's
Christian Democrats
Pentagon Proposes:
"Peace Through
Protracted Nuclear War"
U.S. Sells Cluster Bombs
to Morocco
CIA Documents on
East Timor
U.S. War Plans Against
the Soviet Union
CIA and the Courts
CIA in Australia
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5
Counterspy Statement of Purpose: The United States emerged from World War II as the world's
dominant political and economic power. To conserve and enhance this power, the U.S. govern-
ment created a variety of institutions to secure dominance over "free world" nations which
supply U.S. corporations with cheap labor, raw materials, and markets. A number of these in-
stitutions, some initiated jointly with allied Western European governments, have systemat-
ically violated the fundamental rights and freedoms of people in this country and the world
over. Prominent among these creations was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), born in 1947.
Since 1973, Counterspy magazine has exposed and analyzed such intervention in all its
facets: covert CIA operations, U.S. interference in foreign labor movements, U.S. aid in cre-
ating foreign intelligence agencies, multinational corporations-intelligence agency link-ups,
and World Bank assistance for counterinsurgency, to name but a few. Our view is that while CIA
operations have been one of the most infamous forms of intervention, the CIA is but one strand
in a complex web of interference and control.
Our motivation for publishing Counterspy has been two-fold:
? People in the U.S. have the right and need to know the scope and nature of their gov-
ernment's abrogation of U.S. and other citizens' rights and liberties in order to defend them-
selves and most effectively change the institutions.
? People in other countries, often denied access to information, can better protect
their own rights and bring about necessary change when equipped with such information.
Instead
of an
Editorial
Third Breast Bites Back, 1982
FBlntegrates to ClAssassins
poison your mirror the British glass, i.e.
to sour your dreams
or which I had two, started out drinking beer
us seeking jobs not knowing why I was here
unsuccessfully
dreams don't pay the rent
william colby's cold dream spy eyes
forwarding us into the fifties see out only
Bush wacked by reaganazism on the way
democracy not possible
in U.S. of CIA
and millionaires unless all are millionaires
democracy don't pay the rent anyways
reverse reverie
lemmings to the sea
nuclear energy
bringing out the rats
in me and you
inactive in the face CIA aid
of radioactive rain on your parade
tea for two
to four billion
thoughts dominant
till thoughts of you
Salvadoran peasant
coming of the pile
of corpses
defying the finite for the infinite
levitate me
making me wish
these words could rise
off the page
to kiss your eyes
light at the end
and beginning
of the tunnel
to undermine to creation
John Kelly
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Editors:
Konrad Ege
John Kelly
Board of Advisors:
Dr. Walden Bello
Director, Congress Task
Force of the Philippine
Solidarity Network
Robin Broad
PhD Candidate
Princeton University
John Cavanagh
Economist, United Nations
Dr. Noam Chomsky
Professor at MIT,
peace activist
Dr. Joshua Cohen
Assistant Professor, MIT
Ruth Fitzpatrick
Member, Steering
Committee of the Religious
Task Force on El Salvador
Laurie Kirby
Professor, City University
of New York
Tamar Kohns
Political activist
Annie Makhijani
Baker, nursing student
Dr. Arjun Makhijani
Consultant on energy
and economic development
Martha Wenger
Office worker,
CounterSpy's copy editor
[Organizations for
identification only]
Cover design:
Johanna Vogelsang
COUNTERSpy
4
13
37
News NOT in the News
Disarmament Disinformation
South Africa's Nuclear "Super Gun"
CIA Documents on East Timor
CIA in Australia
APSA and the CIA
CIA and West Germany's Christian Democrats
CIA Successfully Courts the Courts
Haiti: IMF or Duvalier - Choice Between Two Evils
by Walden Bello
Nicaragua: A Bay of Pigs in the Making
by Jeff McConnell
U.S. Representatives Say: CIA Lies About Central America
by John Kelly
Afghanistan Update
Secret U.S. Embassy Report Affirms: Marcos Corrupt and on Shaky
Ground
Military Issues
U.S. Sells Cluster Bombs to Morocco
by Martha Wenger
AirLand Battle: The Army's New Aggressive Strategy
Pentagon Proposes: "Peace Through Protracted Nuclear War"
by Konrad Ege and Ariun Makhljanl
Reagan's First Strike Arsenal
Documents: U.S. Nuclear War Plans Against the Soviet Union
+LL61W~?? X-523
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News NOT in the News
Disarmament
Disinformation
According to Reader's Digest, "the KGB has
induced millions upon millions of honor-
able,' patriotic and sensible people who
detest communist tyranny to make common.
cause with the Soviet Union." What do
these people do? They are part of the
disarmament movement and advocate a mutual
freeze . in the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons.
Reader's Digest Senior Editor John
Barron "examines" the international peace
movement in the October 1982 issue and
comes to the conclusion that the peace
movement has been "penetrated, manipulated
and distorted to an amazing degree" by
people intent to* "promote communist tyran-
ny." The "proof," for this KGB manipula-
tion is nonexistent. Barron limits himself
to drawing obscure connections between
persons he calls KGB agents and all major
U.S. and some international peace organi-
zations.
The Digest bills " Barron as an expert
on the KGB as the author of the "bestsel-
ler" KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret
Agents. What Reader's Digest doesn't men-
tion, though, 9 -that Barron, according to
the New York Times (12/25/77) consciously
wrote the book for a covert CIA "operation-
al purpose." Barron indeed admitted to the
Times that he received "quite a bit of
help" from the CIA for the book - but only
after he had been exposed by an uniden-
tified CIA official. Given Barron's
history of writing for undercover pur-
poses, one has to take the Reader's Digest
article with a grain of salt, to say the
least.
(An earlier example of the question-
able intimacy between the CIA and the
4 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
Reader's Digest involved then-CIA Director
Allen Dulles and senior Digest writer
Charles J. V. Murphy. They were so close
that Dulles asked Murphy to write his
memoirs and gave Murphy free office space
at CIA headquarters at taxpayers' expense.)
South Africa "s
Nuclear "Super Gun"
There can no longer be serious doubt that
South Africa is a nuclear power. Since
early September 1982, that nation has also
possessed one. of the most advanced mobile
artillery units, the G6, which, according
to South African Defense Minister Magnus
Malan, is capable of firing "North
American nuclear warheads."
The Johannesburg Sunday Times, rather
excitedly, calls the G6 a "super gun" and
a "wonder weapon" which can "shoot further
and faster than any other artillery piece
in the world." The G6 has "excellent"
accuracy over a range of more than 30
If your label reads "R72" or "L72,"
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will remain free of charge. However, we
are asking prisoners now to renew their
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kilometers, and according to South African
officials, is capable of travelling about
100 km/h on the open road, and some 35
km/h on virtually every territory in
Southern Africa. Its operational range is
more than 400 kilometers.
These characteristics make the G6 a
highly dangerous conventional weapon, but
even more important, an effective nuclear
weapons delivery system. A less advanced
G5 artillery unit may have been used to
fire the nuclear weapon detected by U.S.
satellites over the South Atlantic in
September 1979. In addition, the U.S.-
Canadian Space Research Corporation sup-
plied South Africa with 300, 000 shell
casings usable in both the G5 and G6 units
in 1977. A House Foreign Relations
Committee report, released in March 1982,
blames the CIA and the State Department
for "negligence" in allowing that ship-
ment. Numerous press reports charge that
it was considerably more than negligence.
A British Independent Television program,
for example, stated that the arms deal was,
set up by the CIA itself.
South Africa's nuclear weapons capabil-
ity - or most likely actual possession of
nuclear weapons - presents a grave threat
to its neighbors and the liberation move-
ments in Southern Africa. South Africa at
this time is illegally occupying Namibia,
has launched numerous invasions into
Angola, built up terrorist groups in
Mozambique, and launched subversive opera-
tions against Zimbabwe. Still, on balance,
the rule of white minority regimes has
collapsed in most of Southern Africa and
is under strong pressure in Namibia and
South Africa itself. With nuclear weapons,
the South African government apparently
hopes it will be able to hold on to power
in the face of massive opposition for many
years to come.
CounterSpy encourages the use of its
articles in not-for-profit publications.
Other publications interested in re-
printing CounterSpy materials must
request permission in writing. All
reprints of CounterSpy must be credited
and include CounterSp_ y's address. Sim-
ilarly, researchers and journalists
using documents originally obtained by
CounterSpy must credit CounterSpy
magazine.
CIA Documents on
East Timor
Months before the Indonesian military laun-
ched a full-scale invasion of East Timor
in December 1975, the Ford administration,
with intelligence supplied by the CIA and
the National Security Agency, knew about
Indonesia's determination to annex East
Timor. The U.S. government fully condoned
the invasion, even though Indonesia used
U.S. weapons illegally in its aggression.
The CIA's own National Intelligence
Daily, a secret news sheet for high
government officials, revealed these
facts. Copies of the Daily, obtained and
reprinted by the Australian National Times,
show that the U.S. government knew Indo-
nesia was waging "clandestine" warfare
against East Timor, then a Portuguese
island colony on its way to independence,
as early as 1974. The Indonesian govern-
ment was apparently aware that the leftist
and nationalist Fretilin liberation move-
ment in East Timor had strong popular
backing. To counter these "communist
elements," wrote the National Intelligence
Daily on August 15, 1975, Indonesian
"special forces located in Indonesian
Timor are preparing teams of Timorese
refugees to cross the border and establish
guerrilla bases .... The teams have been
given military training and may be used to
stimulate a popular uprising." Indonesia's
operations, commented the Daily three days
later, "may lead to a more serious break-
down in law and order. "
The National Intelligence Daily further
reported that Fretilin was well on its way
CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 5
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to victory in August, despite Indonesian
subversion. Most of the East Timorese army
had joined Fretilin, and Indonesian-spon-
sored "public demonstrations" favoring
"integration" with Indonesia never materia-
lized. Indonesia was following a "two
track approach toward the Timor problem:"
publicly, it claimed to adhere to a hands-
off policy and called on Portugal, the
colonial power, to assist in getting talks
underway between the different Timorese
political groups. But privately, Indonesia
"stepped up covert military operations
inside Timor, including use of Indonesian
special forces units to support pro-Indonesian
Publicly, it claimed to
adhere to a hands-off
policy .... but privately,
Indonesia "stepped up
covert military operations
inside Timor, including use
of Indonesian special
forces units to support pro-
Indonesian Timorese."
Timorese." On September 3, for example,
some 100 Indonesian special forces entered
East Timor; on September 18, 200 more were
added. The Indonesian government had
decided on a strategy of creating chaos
and unrest in East Timor to be able to
launch a full-scale intervention later
with the claim that it was needed to
restore peace and order.
The Indonesian government, which
needed US. arms badly, was extremely con-
cerned about the use of U.S. weapons in
the operations - going so far as to
purchase other weapons from Malaysia. The
government knew that using U.S. weapons
6 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
for an offensive purpose violated U.S.
arms export laws. The National Intelli-
gence Daily referred to this concern
numerous times, but the Ford administra-
tion was not interested in blocking the
invasion. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger laid down the line: U.S. inter-
ests in East Timor, he wrote, "relate
solely to our broader interests" in the
region. "U . S. interests at this time would
appear to be best served by following
Indonesia's lead on the issue."
Indonesia launched the invasion in
early December 1975 - carefully coor-
dinated to begin after President Ford
ended his state visit to Indonesia - when
Indonesian "marine and airborne troops
equipped with U.S. weapons mounted a full-
scale attack" against East Timor's capi-
tal, Dili. As a direct consequence of the
invasion, in the following four years some
100,000 out of the 700,000 East Timorese
people died - killed in a vicious coun-
terinsurgency compaign and starved in the
famine induced by Indonesian crop destruc-
tion.
The Indonesian government continued
to be concerned about foreign reaction to
the invasion. It managed to prevent a
United Nations delegation from visiting
areas still ' controlled by Fretilin and
staged a carefully prepared show for the
delegation in areas controlled by Indones-
ian troops. Planning to keep the delegation
out of Fretilin territory included serious
Indonesian consideration of a plan to
"sink the.frigate with the [ U. N. ] envoy
on board."
On February 13, 1976, the CIA attested
to the fact that the Indonesian army suf-
fered "severe casualties" in the invasion
but also claimed that Fretilin was "disin-
tegrating." Today, after seven years of
Indonesian occupation of East Timor,
Fretilin has yet to disintegrate.
CORRECTIONS: We apologize for two mis-
takes in our last issue. Due to a lay-
out mistake, a paragraph in "U.S. Army
Manuals Say: We Can Win a Nuclear War"
was printed twice (p. 8). In addition,
we omitted the credit for the layout of
our cover page. It was done by Johanna
Vogelsang.
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Better Intelligence
The Reagan administration is not the only
one that is "unleashing" intelligence
agencies and emphasizing their importance.
The Japanese government reportedly is not
satisfied with the quality of its intelli-
gence either. The Foreign Ministry
announced in August 1982 that it will
establish "two new divisions under the
Research and Planning Department to...
strengthen the information gathering and
analysis network to cope with the fast
changing world situation." The intelli-
gence division will be responsible for
setting up a central computerized data
bank "with the ability to store and pro-
vide information 24 hours a day."
CIA in Australia
When Vice President George Bush met with
Australian Labor Party Leader Bill Hayden
earlier this year, Hayden spent most of the
30-minute meeting asking Bush about the
Nugan Hand Bank. While the Nugan Hand
issue has been all but ignored in the U.S.
media (except for a three-part series in
the Wall Street Journal in August 1982),
in Australia it is an almost daily story.
In fact, the scandal could well bring down
the government of Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser.
Nugan Hand was not an ordinary bank.
In January 1980, its director Frank Nugan
was found shot dead in his car. Shortly
after, it was revealed that the Bank was
millions of dollars in debt and had de-
frauded hundreds of investors. Moreover,
enough "U.S. military and intelligence
officers worked for Nugan Hand to run a
small-sized war ." These included former
CIA Director William Colby, former CIA
Deputy Director Walter McDonald, former
CIA Chief of Station in Thailand, Robert
Jansen, Admiral Earl Yates and former Chief
of the U.S. Pacific Command, General Leroy
Manor. Tom Clines, until 1978 director of
training in the CIA's Clandestine Services
("dirty tricks") department, went to
Australia shortly after Frank Nugan's
death and the subsequent collapse of the
bank. He met with Bernard Houghton, a
former U.S. intelligence officer and bank
manager.
Many Australians are convinced that
the Bank collaborated with U.S. intelli-
gence agencies in international arms deals
and drug running, and funneled CIA money
to various political parties. The Bank's
involvement in heroin trade from Southeast
Asia to Australia, Europe and the United
States was made public in an Australian
government investigation.
The CIA denies any involvement with
the Nugan Hand Bank, but U.S. authorities
- CIA, FBI, and Customs Service - stead-
fastly refuse to release documents on the
bank. Yet records found in Frank Nugan's
office include documents which are unre-
lated to banking, such as. "long, periodi-
cally filed reports about military and
political activities" in Indochina. Nugan
Hand people have also been in contact with
former CIA officer Edwin Wilson (now being
tried in the U.S. for allegedly violating
arms export laws) and several -Congressper-
sons.
The Nugan Hand Bank has been involved
in arms sales to South Africa and to the
White Rhodesian minority government before
its defeat. (Australia has reportedly
become a center for arms deals for the CIA
and other agencies, because Australian law
forbids international arms dealing only if
the arms actually pass through Australia.)
According to the Australian National Times
(9/12-18/82), the Nugan Hand Bank was also
used to funnel money to CIA contract opera-
tive Mitchell WerBell. WerBell reportedly
"conducted operations for U.S. intelli-
gence on a regular basis" and was some-
times paid through Nugan Hand. (WerBell
originally became useful for the CIA when
Many Australians are
convinced that the Bank
collaborated with U.S.
intelligence agencies in
international arms deals
and, drug running, and
funneled CIA money to
various political parties.
CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 7
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he designed silencers for machineguns to
be used in the Phoenix assassination pro-
gram in Vietnam, then headed by William
Colby . )
The Australian government investiga-
tion of the Nugan Hand affair, some jour-
nalists and parliamentarians charge,
amounts to a cover-up. One key question
it ignores is why Australia's intelligence
agency, ASIO, aided Bernard Houghton, a
prominent bank officer (and a former U.S.
intelligence officer) in obtaining a
security clearance. And why did high
government officials stop a probe into
Nugan Hand's drug trade links in the mid-,
1970s?
Prime Minister Fraser says he accepts
CIA assurances that the CIA was never
involved in the Nugan Hand Bank. Parlia-
mentarians, however, have refused to let
the matter die. As more and more facts
about the Bank and its international links
reach the public, Fraser is having an
increasingly hard time convincing Austra-
lians that his government has done every-
thing in its power to investigate Nugan
Hand.
APSA and the CIA
Guess who's been studying how to govern
the world? The CIA. According to PS
magazine, the journal of the American
Political Science Association (APSA), Mark
Lichbach of the University of Illinois
(Chicago) recently won a CIA contract "to
develop statistical models of govern-
ability on a global basis . "
PS reported in the same issue (Summer
1982) that a second political scientist -
although not on CIA contract - will be exa-
mining another topic of intense interest
to the CIA: Mexico's food system. (See
"CIA: Plowshares into Swords,", CounterSpy,
vol. 4, no. 1.) Steven E. Sanderson, an
assistant professor from the University of
Florida, will research "U.S. agricultural
food policy and the future of the Mexican
food crisis in the 1980s (May 1983-August
1983)" at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, headed by former CIA
officer and consultant James Billington.
The CIA is making inroads in yet
another "scholarly" field. PS announced
the names of 26 federal executives chosen
8 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
to participate in the 1982-83 "Congres-
sional Fellowship Program." Congressional
Fellows, explains PS, "serve as profes-
sional staff assistants for members of
Congress and congressional committees."
"Agencies engaged in substantial activity
with foreign governments," it goes on,
"were invited to nominate candidates for
the Foreign Affairs Program section."
Robin Schreiber, of the CIA, "assisted"
the selection committee, and two CIA
employees, John P. Maher and Steven E.
Meyer, were selected as Foreign Affairs
Fellows. (Someone should remind the APSA?
that the CIA is prohibited by its own
charter from such governmental activity,
foreign or domestic.)
Other fellows selected included: John
P. Harrod (United States Information Agen-
cy); Carl L. Leininger (Army); William J.
Wight (Army); Timothy K. Sanders (Army);
Gilbert R. Reed (Navy); Donald E. Gillis
(Navy) ; Renee L. Anderson (Defense) ;
Michael A. Hardin (Defense Intelligence
Agency); and Cynthia J. Taylor (National
Security Agency).
Finally, PS revealed the attitude of
the APSA toward "scholarly pursuits" on
behalf of the CIA when it described the
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence
(CST)' as "an institutional focus for the
growing need to articulate a balanced,
coherent understanding of the role of
intelligence in a free society." CSI was
created in 1979 by CIA Director William
Casey and others as a project of the Na-
tional Strategy Information Center. CSI
appeared shortly after a secret CIA plan
was formulated to create just such
"academic" institutions. It is run by
former CIA officials and ultra-rightists
such as Ray Cline and Roy Goodson of
Georgetown University. Perhaps the PS's
only honest admission is that the CSI
strives "to promote professional contacts
among scholars in the field," or, in CIA
jargon, to cultivate academic assets.
CounterSpy is available in microfilm
from University Microfilms Interna-
tional, 300 North Zeeb Road, Dept. PR,
Ann Arbor, MI 48106; and 30-32 Mortimer
St., Dept. PR, London W19 7RA, England.
CounterSpy is indexed in Alternative
Press Index, P. O. Box 7229, Baltimore,
MD 21218.
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VICTORY FOR STRAUSS
To the delight of the Reagan administra-
tion, West Germany has a new conservative
government. The Christian Democrats, led
by Helmut Kohl (now Chancellor) and Franz
Josef Strauss, came to power not by elec-
tion but through a parliamentary maneuver
that ousted the Social Democratic govern-
ment. It is expected that the new govern-
ment - with the exception of the Soviet
natural gas pipeline issue - will follow
the U.S. line closely. Indeed, in one of
his first TV interviews after becoming
Chancellor, Kohl denounced his predecessor
Helmut Schmidt as having created frictions
with the U.S. and moved too close to the
Soviet Union.
As the head of the Bavarian branch of
the Christian Democratic Party, Franz
Josef Strauss is undoubtedly a key figure
in the new government, although he holds
no Cabinet post. He ran for Chancellor in
the 1980 elections but was defeated.
According to a recent article in Der
Spiegel, operatives of the CIA, British
intelligence and French intelligence
(SDECE) actively assisted the Strauss cam-
paign in 1980. Der Spiegel bases its
charges on secret West German intelligence
documents made public by former BND
(Bundesnachrichtendienst, West Germany's
CIA) officer Hans Langemann. (See "CIA,
BND and the Nazis," CounterSpy, vol. 7,
no. 1.)
Langemann wrote a secret memo to
Bavaria's Interior Minister and Strauss-
confidant, Gerold Tandler, in November
1979:
1. The militant-conservative London-
based writer Brian Crozier ... and his
wideranging, international-political
circle of friends are at this point,
in the process of building an anony-
mous action group ("a transnational
security organization") .... Crozier is
a long time CIA operative. We have
to assume as certain that the CIA is
fully aware of his activities.
According to the Langemann memo, former
SDECE Director Meronges, M16 (British
intelligence) Director , "Dickie" Franks,
and Nicholas Elliott, another former high-
ranking M16 official, were involved in the
group.
Crozier, Elliott and Franks recently
met with Mrs. Thatcher for a working
meeting. We have to assume that M16
is fully ,aware of the project, and we
might want to assume that it is one
of the most important sponsors of
this anonymous security organization.
The excellent journalist Robert Moss
has very close ties to Mrs.. Thatcher
and Mr. Franks, together with Fred
Luchsinger [ editor in chief of the
Swiss Neue Zuericher Zeitung ] ... and
others is being used by the group in
the promotion of news items and
articles.
Langemann explained that the secret
organization had two primary goals: to
bring conservative governments to power in
Britain and West Germany. The Crozier
group planned to solicit "certain well-
known journalists in Britain, the USA and
other countries" to write articles and to
use the resources of the various intelli-
gence organizations to promote its goals.
In addition, the Crozier group hoped to
use "covert financial transactions for
political purposes." This money was to be
used "for the execution of international
campaigns aiming to discredit hostile
persons." The Langemann memo continues:
According to a recent
article in Der Spiegel,
operatives of the CIA,
British. intelligence and
French intelligence
(SDECE) actively
assisted the Strauss
[electoral] campaign in
1980.
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2. Crozier, together with his group,
as it appears to the non-insider, did
initiate the project VICTORY FOR
STRAUSS with a journalistic or covert
strategy similar to the one used in
Great Britain (main topics: communist-
extremist subversion of the governing
party and unions, KGB-masterminding
of terrorism, ... etc.).
Langemann identified a second group
of former and present intelligence offi-
cials who were working to assist Strauss
in coming to power: the so-called Pinay-
Cercie, so named after the former French
President Antoine Pinay. Langemann
described this group as a "loosely tied
organization... of conservative-anti-communist
politicians, writers, bankers and VIPs
from other professions." Members included
former CIA Director William Colby, Chair-
person of the Federal Reserve Bank Paul
Volker, Heritage Foundation president
Ed Feulner, South African General Frazer
and persons with close ties to West
European intelligence agencies. In a
January 1980 meeting in Switzerland, the
Pinay Cercle (with Crozier, former Defense
Intelligence Agency Director Stilwell,
Elliott and others attending) decided to
work towards improving " Strauss' inter-
national image.
The Crozier-Pinay Cercle strategy was
not immediately successful. For most West
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. lenam
- The Hulitnationals gad International Security
- lr.J.kt 'Victory for STRAUSS'
2 Aalapn so der beisafisten Notiz
Utardurtb erlauba icb air. sins bier erst.llte Behr vertrsulich.
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Abteiluas I F
Germans, the prospect of having the ultra-
conservative Strauss as chancellor was far
more threatening than whatever, they might
have believed about the KGB subversion of
West Germany Crozier and his cohorts had
warned about. Nonetheless, it seems safe
to assume, that the VICTORY FOR STRAUSS
campaign has not ended with its first
defeat. The Christian Democrats are in
power now, and elections are coming up in
March 1983.
Chemical Warfare
Preparations
The Pentagon is not only getting ready for
nuclear war in Europe, but chemical and
biological war as well. The U.S. Army is
building a $1.65 million nuclear, biologi-
cal and chemical warfare training facility
at Grafenwoehr Army base in southern Ger-
many. Unlike other facilities at Grafen-'
woehr , this site is to be "utilized by
U.S..forces only."
Preparations for the construction of
the facility are underway at a time when
many Europeans have sharply criticized
U.S. chemical war plans. Several German
publications and TV programs recently
revealed that U.S. forces maintain a large
secret chemical weapons storage site near
Fischbach, West Germany. Numerous citi-
zens and organizations in the Fischbach
area are pressuring the West German govern-
ment to provide information about the
nature of the facility, and to remove it
from West Germany. The government has
been forced to acknowledge that large
quantities - estimated at thousands of
tons - of highly lethal materials are
being stored in Fischbach.
Previously, most U.S. chemical
weapons in Europe were stored in France,
but President Charles de Gaulle, in the
1960s, forced the U.S. to remove their
chemical weapons. The West German govern-
ment, however, claims it is powerless to
move the site from Fischbach since, under
the NATO Treaty, West German sovereignty
does not extend to U.S. military faeilties
on its soil.
Langemann memo to Tandler
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Prejudices
Some U.S. State Attorneys are making re-
markably frank statements these days.
Peter K. Nunez, the prosecuting attorney
in the case of Benjamin Sasway, the Cali-
fornian who refused to register for the
draft, stated in court that "Mr. Sasway's
actions have not been based on any moral
or religious conviction, but on his poli-
tical beliefs." The judge in the case,
Federal Magistrate Gordon Thompson, Jr.,
apparently had no qualms about convicting
Sasway for his political beliefs. He
handed down a two-and-a-half year sentence
- two years more than the prosecutor had
demanded.
Meanwhile, in a different vein, a
Federal prosecutor in Richmond, Virginia,
David P. Baugh, confronted Federal District
Judge D. Dortch Warriner in the following
courtroom exchange on September 23, 1982:
Baugh: "Very often, people, including
me, have gotten upset with the coddling of
'white-collar crimes,' but from reviewing
the records, it appears the color of the
collar is not the key."
Warriner : "Are you
the court sentences people
their race?"
suggesting that
on the basis of
Baugh: "Yes, Your Honor."
Warriner: "You are wrong."
Prior to this exchange, Baugh had com-
pared the judge's sentences for two White
men with those of two Black men. One
White man got a 6+-month sentence for con-
spiring to obstruct justice, threatening a
witness, and income tax evasion. Another
White man got a 10-month sentence and a
$25,000 fine for income tax evasion, making
false statements, and attempting to in-
fluence a grand jury witness in a million-
dollar gambling case. In sharp contrast
to these rulings, the judge gave a 14-
month sentence and $5,000 fine to a Black
man for stealing $3, 000 worth of military
jackets, and 21 years to another Black man
for stealing twelve rifles.
Baugh is scheduled to become chief of
the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office in Tyler, Texas. The New
York Times reported that Judge Warriner
called Baugh's assertion "despicable." A
Richmond civil rights lawyer, Oliver Hill,
countered that Baugh's statement was "not
despicable or irresponsible but has a
whole lot of basis behind it in the black
community." The Old Dominion Bar Associa-
tion has called for an investigation.
CIA Successfully
Courts the Courts
"Whatever the truth may be, it remains
either unrevealed or unconfirmed. We can-
not assume, as the appelants would have
us, that the CIA has nothing left to hide.
To the contrary, the record before us sug-
gests either that the CIA has something to
hide or that it wishes to hide from our
adversaries the fact that it has nothing
to hide."
(D. C. Court of Appeals, 1981 in
Military Audit Project v. Casey.)
So-called "national security" concerns are
becoming an increasingly decisive factor
in court decisions regarding intelligence
agencies and constitutional rights. In one
recent decision (Gardels v. CIA), the U.S.
Court of Appeals (Washington, D.C. Circuit)
affirmed a lower court ruling that the CIA
could refuse to confirm or deny past or
present contacts at the University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles. It based its decision
on section 403(d)(3)' of the National
Security Act of 1947 "that the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure" -
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even though the CIA could not "prove
conclusively that, if it responded, some
intelligence source or method would in
fact be compromised." This decision, of
course, confirms, that ? there are covert
CIA operatives on U.S. campuses, espe-
cially since the CIA itself furnished
affidavits and depositions asserting that
it "Uses as intelligence sources, covert
contacts with American academics and stu-
dents at American schools, and in general
has continued to maintain such contacts."
The court admittedly made its decision on?
the basis of the "good faith" of the CIA -
an agency which has a documented history
of duplicity. (The Office of Strategic
Services, the CIA's predecessor, used to
give a course entitled, "Lying.")
The court strongly supported the
CIA's need to hide its academic agents
from foreign intelligence services because
"the CIA has the, right to assume that
foreign intelligence agencies are zealous
ferrets." The court, however, ignored
(and the CIA didn't mention) the fact that
some of these covert operatives spy on,
sabotage, assess and recruit U.S. students
and academicians. One such operative, for
example, was in the habit of sending the
confidential files of some Princeton
University students to the CIA without
their knowledge. This practice is nothing
short of a police state operation. It so
undermines the functioning of academic
life that even the upper echelons of
Harvard University and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology - who have worked
closely with the CIA - have rejected it.
The CIA has refused to end this practice
and the court's decision contributes to
this continuation.
In a second case, Navasky v. CIA, the
Supreme Court let stand a ruling by the
Court of- Appeals (New York) that the CIA
is not, obliged to reveal the names of
authors, titles and publishers of some
1,000 books it published in the 1960s.
While deciding for the CIA in both cases
on the basis of the National Security Act'
of 1947, the courts conveniently ignored
equally important components of that Act
violated by the CIA. The CIA is bound by
law only "to correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to the national
security" and is prohibited from "internal
security functions." For the courts to
piously invoke the National Security Act
to cover CIA actions prohibited by the
same act goes beyond duplicity to complic-
ity with the CIA.
12 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
The D.C. Court of Appeals also sided
with the CIA in the case Halkin v. Richard
Helms, et al., which concerned Operation
CHAOS, the CIA's largest known illegal,
domestic operation. If one were to
substitute "DINA" (Chilean Intelligence)
for "CIA," the decision would read like
one by General Pinochet's rubberstamping
courts in Chile. Typical of the police
state reasoning involved was the court's
refusal to issue an injunction forbidding
the CIA and the National Security Agency
(NSA) from future interceptions of private
communications" by U.S. citizens. The
court conceded that such interception, If
proven, would constitute "an injury in
fact." But the plaintiffs, said the
court, could not prove that the NSA had
intercepted their private , communication
even though it was demonstrated that the
CIA had submitted "watchlists" of their
names to the NSA. The court did not con-
sider this proof adequate, particularly
since the NSA, under state secrets privi-
lege, did not have to say whether it had
intercepted conversations of persons on
these watchlists. Summarizing its deci-
sion, the court said, "As in the 'other
cases in which the need to protect sen-
sitive information affecting the national
security clashes with fundamental consti-
tutional rights of individuals, we believe
that 'The responsibility must be where the
power is.'"
There was no denial of the charge of
this case that the CIA surveilled,, moni-
tored, compiled files, and intervened in
the legal political activities of the
plaintiffs. Depite this fact, the court
refused to declare that Operations CHAOS
and related operations had been illegal;
denied any relief or damage to the plain-
tiffs and refused an injunction against
future CHAOS-type operations even though
the plaintiffs pointed out that President
Reagan's Executive Order 12333 allows such
operations.
As in the NSA component of the deci-
sion, the court allowed the CIA to with-
hold information - supposedly essential for
the plaintiffs to prove their case. The
extent of the court's complicity was demon-
strated by the shallow defense it gave for
allowing the CIA to withhold information.
It argued that the naming of covert sour
ces and agents (who were violating the law)
would undermine national security. More-
over, it said, since this was a question
of national security, the court was not
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Features
Haiti: IMF or Duvalier -
Choice Between Two Evils
by Walden Bello
Events in Haiti are building toward a dra-
matic climax. Over the last year and a
half, the superficial stability of the
reign of Jean Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier,
son and successor of the late Papa Doc,
has been shattered by the country's most
severe economic crisis and worst political
infighting in over a decade.
The crisis has triggered a struggle
between the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and dominant factions of the Duvalier
ruling coalition over Haiti's economic
policy. In February 1982, the Fund was
able to impose, Marc Bazin, a World Bank
technocrat, as Finance Minister. Bazin's
Fund-orchestrated drive against corruption
and mismanagement, however, only succeeded
in alienating the opposing factions of the
Duvalier elite. In a rare display of unity,
these cliques managed to oust the Fund's
man in July, after only five months in
office.
Roots of the Crisis
The context in which the Bazin affair un-
folded was a seemingly irreversible un-
raveling of the "export-oriented model" of
development imposed on Haiti in the early
seventies by a fragile alliance of "enlight-
ened" elements of the Duvalier elite in
control of the state machine; the mulatto
business class; and foreign capital. The
strategy, which was copied from Puerto
Rico, consisted of expanding primary pro-
duct exports, like coffee, to the U.S. and
other markets; attracting foreign investors
to set up reexport, "assembly-plant" indus-
tries by offering dirt-cheap labor and
numerous tax exemptions; developing tour
ism; and drawing large quantities of aid
from the U.S., World Bank, and other multi-
lateral lending institutions.
The Haitian economic configuration
which emerged by the late seventies mani-
fested all the contradictions of this pat-
tern of development. More than 250 foreign
companies--most of them U.S. firms with
political risk insurance from the U.S.
government's Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC)--had set up shop, taking
advantage of the $2.60 minimum daily wage..
Being mere assembly plants, importing most
of their raw materials and producing mainly
for export, these enterprises did not trig-
ger the "forward" and "backward" linkages
necessary for an integrated and viable
industrial sector. And since their markets
were abroad, both foreign capital and the
new Haitian entrepreneurs could afford to
turn a blind eye to the grinding poverty
of most Haitians. According to a secret
World Bank memorandum obtained by Counter-
(Walden Bello is the director of the Congress
_Taskforce of the Philippine Solidarity Network
and the Coalition against the Marcos Dictator-
ship. His book, Development Debacle: The World
Bank in the Philippines (coauthored with David
Kinley and Elaine Elinson) has just been re-
leased by the Institute for Food and Development
Policy, 2588 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA
94110.)
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, Haiti's economic growth did not even
touch the vast majority of the country's
four million people. As of 1976, the top
0.4 percent of the population absorbed
43.7 percent of the national income, while
more than 80 percent of the people had an
average income of less than $100 a year.2
Directed by the IMF and
the World Bank, Bazin
initiated a number of
dramatic "reformist"
efforts which pushed
him into direct
confrontation with the
ruling coalition.
Agriculture was largely sacrificed
to the demands of the export-oriented
industry. Between 1970 arkd 1979, agricul-
tural growth was negative. 3 Perhaps most
symbolic of this subjugation of agricul-
ture, on which 70 percent of the popula-
tion depends for its livelihood, is the
Canadian-proposed project to flood the
Artibonite Valley, which contains some of
the most fertile land in Haiti, to supply
electricity to the foreign-owned export
industries in the capital city, Port-Au-
Prince.
Together with the destruction of
agriculture, the other significant nega-
tive impact of export-oriented industriali-
zation has been the rapid denationalization
of the country's land and other resources.
Ninety-nine-year leases for choice tracts
of land have been awarded to many U.S. and
other foreign investors. At one point,
the government even considered leasing the
whole island of Tortuga to a huge textile
subsidiary, Dupont Caribbean.
"Pirate Capitalism"
Side by side with the activities of foreign
capitalists, a freewheeling "pirate" capi-
talism practiced by Haitian businessper-
sons with strong ties to Duvalier and con-
14 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
nections with the underground in the U.S.
emerged. Some gathered blood plasma from
islanders and shipped it to the United
States. Others took advantage of the rural
crisis which is driving out Haitian peasants
by smuggling them at exorbitant prices to
Florida. Still others, many of them in
the military and bureaucracy, made huge
profits selling thousands of Haitians to
virtual slavery in the sugar-cane fields
of the Dominican Republic. According to
the Anti-Slavery Society of London, many
Haitian cane-cutters have been sold for as
little as $3.30 per head.5
The Model Comes Apart
This dream of making Haiti the "Taiwan of
the Caribbean"--to use the words of the
U.S. Agency for International Development
administrator Peter McPherson -came crash-
ing down in 1980. Coffee exports, which
normally account for over 50 percent of
foreign exchange earnings, were savaged by
Hurricane Allen in the summer of 1980 and
by falling prices. From $89 million in
fiscal year 1980, export , earnings from
coffee plummeted to $35 million in fiscal
year 1981. The decline in coffee earnings
was paralleled by a decline of earnings
from Haiti's other primary product exports,
bauxite and essential oils.
With exports taking a nose-dive while
imports kept rising--the classic dilemma'
of the neocolonial economy--Haiti experi-
enced a severe balance-of-payments crisis.
The deficit reached a record $55 million
in 1981. Foreign exchange reserves were
quickly exhausted. Haiti's currency, the
gourde, became virtually inconvertible,
and payments arrears to external creditors
and suppliers hit $20 million by March
1982. The inability to get hard cash to fin-
ance necessary imports, Haitian finan-
cial authorities informed the IMF, "has
further eroded private sector confidence
and has led to a massive outflow of
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capital."7 Prominent U.S. firms led the
pack of deserters: The American-owned
Campagnie des Tabacs Comme 11 Faut, Haiti's
only manufacturer of cigarettes; Reynolds
Metals, the only producer of bauxite; and
First National Bank of Chicago.
Debts and Payoffs
The balance of payments deficit could only
be bridged by external loans. Haiti had
negotiated a three-year Extended Fund
Facility Agreement with the IMF in 1978,
but drawings from this source were sus-
pended in 1981, when public expenditures
escalated and the budget deficit reached
an all-time high. What particularly
incensed the Fund was that Haiti's system
of institutionalized corruption was seri-
ously aggravating the crisis. Reliable re-
ports confirm that Baby Doc and his people
in the bureaucracy skimmed off as much as
38 percent of tax revenues. This left
central authorities no other option than
to finance necessary expenditures by going
into deficit--i.e., creating money. This
corruption and its impact on the economy
intensified even further in 1981, when
Duvalierists began to pocket significant
amounts of the loans from multilateral
banks which were supposed to bridge the
balance-of-payments deficit .... An IMF cred-
it of $20 million, for instance, vanished
without a trace !
Donors Put on the Squeeze
It was at this juncture that the Interna-
tional Committee of foreign aid donors to
Haiti--composed of governments of countries
with major investments in the island--
pulled together behind the IMF to demand
stringent conditions on the use of aid'
funds . Canada suspended its biggest aid
projects on the ground that funds were
being misused by Haitian project staffers,
and this provided a precedent that other
donors found tempting to follow. Threatened
with economic collapse, Duvalier agreed
to the appointment of technocrat Bazin in
February 1982. An important factor which
secured Duvalier's compliance with the IMF-
directed move was pressure from a signifi-
cant sector of the mulatto bourgeoisie
whose operations were being swallowed up
in the absence of foreign exchange.
Directed by the IMF and the World
Bank, Bazin initiated a number of dramatic
"reformist" efforts which pushed him into
direct confrontation with the ruling coali-
tion. He tried to ram through an institu-
tional separation between the Central Bank
and the National Bank of Credit--the key
institutional link in the siphoning off of
millions of dollars of aid money to Duva-
lier and his cronies. Bazin also organ-
ized an "anti-corruption drive" directed
at smugglers and important personalities
illegally exempted from paying import
duties and other taxes. This brought him
directly up against Ernest Bennett, Duva-
lier 's father-in-law, who controls key
sectors of the export-import trade, includ-
ing coffee, cars stolen from the U.S.,
Eastern European vehicles, and large
segments of the country's drug traffic.
In return for Bazin's appointment,
the Fund ? prepared a $40 million standby
program for Haiti, But the conditions
were stringent. Just a few weeks before
Bazin was fired, the. Haitian authorities
agreed with the IMF to make drastic cuts
in government spending, limit central Bank
lending to the private sector, and "defi-
nitely" separate the Central Bank from the
National Credit Bank. Perhaps the most
important index of the loss of control
represented by the agreement was the
Haitian government's agreement to get the
assent of the Managing Director of the
Fund before approving any economic project
requiring priva8te financing from inter-
national banks. In other words, with the
excuse of putting the house in order, the
IMF was demanding the same broad powers
which have led to its virtual control of
official economic decision-making in many
other Third World countries (e.g., the
Philippines).
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Duvalierists Stymie the Fund
Bazin and the Fund posed a threat to all
sectors of the ruling coalition and forced
them into a rare show of unity. They
decided to sack Bazin in July. In this
instance, Bennett, through his daughter
Michelle (Baby Doe's wife) managed to form
a momentary alliance with his archrival,
Jean-Claude's mother, Simone, who is re-
garded as the "guardian of the revolution"
and the bulwark of Papa Doe's "Old Guard"
Duvalierists. While expelling Bazin, Duva-
lier nonetheless promised to follow the
.Fund agreement to the letter--a promise no
one believed.
The key actor is the U.S.
government, which still
has to decide whether
Baby Doc's staunch anti-
Communism outweighs
the costs of his
repressive rule and
economic
mismanagement.
In the wake of Bazin's departure, how-
ever, events in Haiti have become even more
volatile. With their common enemy gone,
Ernest and Michelle Bennett successfully
exiled Simone Duvalier to Paris. They
have thus gained the edge in determining
the succession to Baby Doc, said to be
seriously ill with lupus. But they have
also won the undying enmity of Papa Doe's
still wide following, the Tonton Macoutes
(an ,organized gang of thugs acting as
NNYARN M.
af~ue
we
-rance 1
Benin Chad C anne loo 11
Congo DI I bou 11 Ivory Coast
Gabor Niger Senegal Togo,
U p per Volta French Guiana.
Guadeloupe. Martinique.
Fleun,o
Europe 250 F F
Others 300 F F
security force" loyal to Duvalier).
"
Significant sections of the mulatto busi-
ness class, foreign investors, and the IMF
now seriously distrust Baby Doc, and the
potential for a powerful coalition against
him exists in Haiti. The key actor is the
U.S. government, which still has to decide
whether Baby Doe's staunch anti-Communism
outweighs the costs of his repressive rule
and economic mismanagement.
For the vast majority of the Haitian
people, however, such a regime change
would mean nothing positive whatsoever.
Nevertheless, the deep economic and poli-
tical crisis and instability might provide
an opportunity for the further emergence of
a genuine democratic opposition in Haiti.
1) Business Week, May 3, 1982.
2) World Bank, Memorandum on the Haitian Economy
(Washington, D.C., World Bank, May 13, 1981.
3) Ibid.
4) Quarterly Economic Review of Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Puerto Rico, Haiti, Third Quarter, 1982,
p. 20.
5) New York Times, Aug. 30, 1982.
6) Statement Before House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs,
April 21, 1982.
7) International Monetary Fund, "Haiti-Standby Agree-
ment," Aug. 11, 1982.
8) Ibid.
Please fill end return to :
AFRIGUE?AS1t,13, no d'Uzes, 75002 PARIS
NAME: ..........................................................................
Firstname :....................................................................
Address :.......................................................................
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Nicaragua:
A Bay of Pigs in the Making
by Jeff McConnell
A new Bay of Pigs invasion appears to be
in preparation. Evidence is mounting that
the Reagan administration is planning a
major military assault against Nicaragua,
the nation from which the CIA's invasion
of Cuba originated in 1961. Rumors of
preparations by the Honduran armed forces,
their anti-Sandinista allies, and their
U.S. advisers have been accumulating since
mid-summer 1982. A Wall Street Journal
dispatch from Tegucigalpa, for instance,
reported that prominent "Honduran and U.S.
sources here keep whispering about a
November or December 1982 invasion."1
Whether these whispers are intended to
provoke or inform, they indicate a readi-
ness or perhaps an eagerness for war.
Yet, longstanding 'internal conflicts in
the anti-Sandinista coalition working out
of Honduras and Costa Rica, which have
become severe since July, probably caused
the Honduran armed forces to abort an
invasion of Nicaragua planned for late
July or early August.
This information converges with two
other recent suggestions of such war
plans. The Washington Post reported that
an unnamed "senior State Department
official" (possibly Assistant Secretary of
State Thomas Enders) has stated in a
background briefing that "the level of
opposition to Nicaragua's Sandinista
government has become substantial and is
continuing to grow." The official also
said that "there is a belief among its
neighbors that Nicaragua, as presently
constituted, may be incompatible with the
rest of Central America. This basic
question will have to be faced in the
future. "2 A week later, on August 31,,
Colonel Leonidas Torres Arias, head of
Honduran military intelligence from 1976
to January 1982, held a press conference
in Mexico City to raise "a voice of
alarm." (The government had sent him into
"diplomatic exile" in April.) He claimed
that Honduras' military chief, General
Gustavo Alvarez Martinez and his "cronies"
were planning an "adventure of madness"
against Nicaragua. The Honduran high com-
mand subsequently discharged Colonel
Torres Arias and accused him of treason.
Subversion, Phase I
Reports of this kind have circulated twice
before. Each time, they have appeared in
the wake of National Security Council
meetings (in November 1981 and in late
March 1982) during which U.S. covert poli-
cies against Nicaragua were finalized. In
these meetings, the NSC reportedly approv-
ed a large covert aid program for groups
and individuals throughout Central America
in order to "achieve long-term stability
in Central America by creating, nurturing
and supporting new political coalitions of
centrist forces in Nicaragua and other key
countries ."4 The overt counterparts of
this program are the Caribbean Basin plan
of trade and investment incentives for
U.S. business and the enlarged program of
military aid to the region. The covert
(Jeff McConnell is a political activist living
in Cambridge, Massachusetts.)
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program consists - of CIA-directed intelli-
gence, political and paramilitary opera-
tions. Twenty million dollars was
allocated for covert paramilitary opera-
tions against the Sandinistas , and
"significantly" more for an aid program
for "moderate economic and political
forces" in . Nicaragua. 5 The NSC also man-
dated dramatic increases in the embassy
staff in neighboring Honduras, largely in
the CIA and Department of Defense person-
nel. According to numerous reports, the
CIA has been providing training, money and
arms to former Nicaraguan National Guard
members for paramilitary operations, using
representatives from Honduras, Chile,
Colombia, Ve iezuela and Argentina as
intermediaries.
Ronald Reagan approved the first
phase of the paramilitary plan in November
1981. Almost immediately the State
Department orchestrated a propaganda cam-
paign against Nicaragua (portraying its
government' as totalitarian, bent on domi-
nating Central America, and sold out to
Moscow), and other signs indicating that
an offensive was upcoming appeared.
Indeed, soon after, former Nicaraguan
National Guard members based in Honduras
and their Honduran military allies launched
A new Bay of Pigs
invasion appears to be in
preparation. Evidence is
mounting that the
Reagan administration is
planning a major
military assault against
Nicaragua, the nation
from which the CIA's '
invasion of Cuba
originated in 1961.
"Operation Red Christmas." They attacked
isolated Nicaraguan border settlements in
the Atlantic Coast region and killed at
least sixty Nicaraguans.
18 -- Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
At the same time, fabricated atrocity
stories provoked many Miskito Indians in
the area to flee to Honduras and join the
ex-Guard members, while the Sandinista
army moved other Miskitos away from the
border and farther to the south. Newsweek
reported that the Honduran army "snapped
to 'Orange Alert' status and was prepared
to invade Nicaragua until officials discov-
ered that the report triggering the. alert
- a rumor that Sandinista troops had
crossed into Honduras and massacred 200
Miskito Indians - was false." Significant-
ly, "Operation Red Christmas" coincided
with a background briefing by a "senior
State Department policymaker" who stated
that the Nicaraguan counterrevolution was
growing and worthy of U. S. support. The
choice before the Reagan administration,
which it would have to "face up to ... in the
next six months," the official said, was
"whether to allow Nicaragua to consolidate
its Marfist-Leninist regime...or -act to
stop it."
Fighting deescalated, but soon after
the March 1982 meetings of the NSC, there
were fresh rumors in the Honduran armed
forces that some kind . of military showdown
between Honduras and Nicaragua would occur
by July.8 The Reagan administration had
apparently faced
the third week
versary of the
fighting broke
up to
its
choice.
During
of July,
on
the third
anni-
ouster
of
Somoza,
heavy
out in
the
remote
border
areas when Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries
and their Honduran military allies staged
terrorist raids into Nicaraguan territory.
Forty Sandinistas and at least that many
invaders were killed. At the same time,
two air strikes against key Nicaraguan oil
installations near Managua and on the
Pacific Coast were carried out from inside
Honduras, 9 and Honduras mobilized its
reservists for the first time since its
1969 war with El Salvador.
Joint "Exercise"
A week later, U.S. and Honduran troops
began what was called a "joint military
exercise" in Durzuna, 35 miles north of
the border with Nicaragua and 45 miles
inland from Puerto Lempira, where numerous
ships have been delivering heavy arms
throughout 1982.10 Durzuna is also within
fifteen miles of three armed camps
(Morccon, Auca and Twbila) directed by
Steadman Fagoth, the anti-Sandinista
leader of a faction of Miskito Indians who
left Nicaragua in December 1981. U.S.
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television networks filmed camouflaged
American C-130 transports that flew 1,000
troops of Honduras' Fifth Infantry
Battalion into Durzuna. The planes also
reportedly delivered crates of automatic
rifle cartridges, machine gun shells and
mortars, and boxes of long-range patrol
rations. The transports had originally
come from the U.S. Southern Command in
Panama, as did at least four helicopters
used. The involvement of U.S. troops
based in Panama in this operation prompted
the Panamanian government to protest to the
U.S. against the use of its territory for
hostile acts against Nicaragua.
The objective of the "joint exercise"
was reportedly "the establishment of a
permanent Honduran base at Durzuna, home
for "an infantry battalion, supported by
an artillery battery and an engineering
unit" and site of an airstrip "capable of
handling large transport planes and jet
fighters." A Honduran Army major stressed
the proximity of Durzuna to Puerto Cabezas,
Nicaragua, an important Sandinista base in,
the isolated Atlantic region.
While these events were unfolding in
Durzuna, a U.S. landing ship, the Portland,
docked at Tela on the north coast of
Honduras on August 1, 1982. U.S. embassy
personnel referred to it as a "routine
port call," but senior Honduran Army 'offi-
cers said that "the marines who came
ashore were an advance party for a major
exercise scheduled for November." An uni-
dentified Honduran business leader told the
New York Times, "There's no doubt that
there is a warlike mentality," and omi-
nously spoke of "soldiers who said that
the peace would not last until November."11
On August 14, at the completion of the
two-week maneuvers at Durzuna, Honduran
officials stated they would be repeated in
December. Nicaraguan sources, however,
maintain that the same high level of acti-
vity continued in this area throughout the
summer' and into the fall. An official
Honduran army announcement confirmed that
700 Honduran soldiers remained at Durzuna
after the formal completion of the "exer-
cise," presumably with a number of U.S.
advisers. The announcement stated that
they were working with Miskito refugees at
nearby Morocon.
It is unclear from these statements
whether Nicaragua should brace itself for
a major invasion or should expect a more
limited border incursion. The likelihood
of a more limited operation is supported
by the lessons of past attacks, which
appeared to be designed to provoke raids
into Honduran territory in order to jus-
tify retaliatory air strikes or "punishment
raids."12 Even the rumors that attacks
from Honduras are imminent could serve
this purpose. A former Honduran army
officer told the Wall Street Journal that
high-ranking Honduran -army o ficers
informed him that the "plan is to keep
Nicaragua feeling so threatened that it
comes down even harder on the growing
internal opposition.... The more repressive
the Sandinistas become, the greater the
opposition," he said. "First you destabi-
lize the Nicaraguans, then you get them to
come charging over the border to divert-
attention from internal problems, and then
you ask for U.S. troops to help." This
expectation of a "slow-moving Bay of Pigs"
appears to be shared by the Sandinista
leadership.13
There is also evidence that the Hon-
duran military might mount a larger and
more direct invasion. The Wall Street
Journal reported that the Honduran mili-
tary thinks "a war is necessary because....
Honduras and the rest of Central America
will never have peace with the Sandinistas'
Marxist government in nearby Nicaragua."
Some ranking officers also appear to be
"eager for battle because it would greatly
strengthen the army's hand" in internal
Honduran politics. Even this officer told
the Journal: "The guys at the top want a
war with U.S. help, because they aren't
ready to go back to the barracks yet."14
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Back1i the Slow Motion Plan
The Reagan administration apparently backs
the "slow motion" plan, but it appears to
be concerned that it may be unable to keep
General Alvarez in line. The Honduran
military has become more openly supportive
of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, and
hostile toward the Sandinista government,
since the transition to civilian rule
under President Roberto Suazo Cordova who
was inaugurated on January 26, 1982.
General Policarpo Paz Garcia, head of the
military junta until this time, stepped
down, and Colonel Alvarez, soon promoted
to general, took over the leadership of
the Superior Council of the Armed Forces.
Alvarez had headed FUSEP, the Honduran
internal security force, and was thus
already a very powerful man. He is also
ambitious (Torres Arias called him "a man
blinded by personal ambitions" who "lusts
for power"), and he and his supporters in
the military, along with their Reagan
administration patrons, have made the
transition to civilian rule merely cosmetic.
There are indications, however, that
Alvarez and his supporters are more
interested in achieving specific military
objectives whose success can immediately
be gauged and in manipulating tensions in
order to consolidate their own power than
in becoming subservient to the United
States, by playing parts in a longer-term
plan, which they do not control and whose
outcome is less certain. In such an
effort, Alvarez could depend on the fervor
created by the somewhat successful govern-
ment propaganda campaign about the increas-
ing threat to Honduras from terrorism and
outside aggression. He has also been able
to count on unity among leading Honduran
officials since an August shakeup. At the
same time, while Honduras and Nicaragua
(not counting militias and reserves) would
have roughly equivalent troop strengths in
the event of a major war, Honduras would
have , superior air power, which could,
contrary to State Department statements,
give it a decisive advantage.15 The Sand-
inistas might also be forced to fight on a
number of fronts, at once, given the border
encampments of anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans
in both Honduras and Costa Rica. And
because of its political isolation, Nica-
ragua would have only Cuba (and perhaps
Mexico) to rely on, while Alvarez, probably
correctly, believes that Honduras could
depend for logistical aid on the United
States, Argentina, Chile, and its other
20 -- Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
current patrons, as well as a number of
Rio Treaty signatories.
The tactic of provoking retaliation
could also be used to start a full-scale
war. Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega has
claimed to have "intelligence information"
about a plan to start a war "by having anti-
Sandinist guerrillas dress in uniforms of
the Nicaraguan Army an attack the guerrilla
bases inside Honduras."1$
Not Another Fiasco
U.S. concern with Alvarez appears not to
be over the creation of tensions with
Nicaragua or the possibility of a war, but
over its timing. With the Bay of Pigs
fiasco presumably on their minds, adminis-
tration officials surely do not want to
start a war before it is in their interest
to do so or before their forces are pre-
pared to fight one. More importantly,
they certainly do not want to fight one
this time in a context in which they would
be on the wrong side of public opinion.
According to a State Department source,
the Honduran government discovered soon
after anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans began
their mid-July series of border attacks
that the Sandinista Army might be preparing
The choice before the
Reagan administration,
which it would have to
"face up to ...," the
official said, was
"whether to allow
Nicaragua to consolidate .
its Marxist-Leninist
regime ... or act to stop
it."
to launch counterattacks into Honduras.
Alvarez, according to this source, was
about to launch a pre-emptive attack on
Nicaragua when he was blocked by the State
Department. The U.S. was reportedly con-
cerned that Honduras should not be viewed
as the aggressor.17
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Some observers believe that Torres
Arias' public revelation of Alvarez's
planned "adventure of madness" was a
warning to Alvarez from the United States.
One well-informed source speculated that
the CIA may have played a role. Torres
Arias, after all, had close ties to the
CIA while head of military intelligence.
Arias' statement has reportedly led to new
divisions inside the Honduran leadership.
There were signs after his press con-
ference of a slowdown in war preparations,
but at the same time, Alvarez' opponents
continued to disappear and the government
and its allies were exploiting the take-
over of the San Pedro Sula Chamber of
Commerce in mid-September to promote
domestic hysteria over external threats to
Honduran security.
U.S. officials are presumably unified
in seeking to keep Alvarez in line, but
there are said to be divisions within the
CIA itself over just how the Honduran
armed forces should be used. And, there
continue to be conflicts between the U.S.
Embassy and the contingent of Argentine
advisors in Honduras. Earlier differences
over support for former Nicaraguan National
Guard members appear to have been resolved.
The Argentines had backed these former
Somoza supporters, but the CIA opposed
that, maintaining that to do so would dis-
credit the anti-Sandinista efforts. Now,'
the Honduran armed forces are playing a
larger role in the military effort against
Nicaragua. The Somoza supporters are
allied with former Somoza opponents (led
by Jose Cardenal) and the faction of
Miskito opponents of ' the Sandinistas led
by Steadman Fagoth to form the FDN
(Fuerzas Democraticas Nicaraguenses). The
U.S. appears to be supgying and training
the several FDN factions . Thus the U.S.
appears to have shifted away from backing
realistic alternatives to the present
Sandinista leadership toward simply
seeking to destabilize the junta to a
point where the U.S. believes it can exact
concessions.
Still, Alvarez' Argentine advisers,
pushing for a more aggressive Honduran
posture are reported to be very influ-
ential. >'9 Argentine money cemented the
FDN iance.20 A number of press reports
concluded that Argentina had removed its
advisers during the Malvinas /Falklands
war, but this conclusion was based on the
false belief that Argentine forces were
merely surrogates for the U.S. In fact,
Argentina has been involved with former
Somoza supporters in Honduras since May
1981, and probably before, and had ini-
tiated talks over cooperation with the
U.S. only much later. Z' The reasons for
the early Argentine involvement are
simple: beyond the thrill of foreign in-
volvement and the connections created by
the Argentine counterinsurgency training
school, the Argentine officers involved
were motivated by a desire to draw
Honduras and the Somocistas into a new
Condor-like operation against their own
leftist opponents, the Montoneros, some of
whom now live in Nicaragua.
With the Reagan administration
reapprising its policies once again in
light of these variables, there may be
room to act to stop what Torres Arias
called the "bloody and criminal campaign"
against Nicaragua. If political forces in-
side the United States do not make clear to
the Reagan administration that its war pol-'
icy is unacceptable, however, the opportun-
ity to make a difference may disappear.
1) Wall Street Journal, 9/28/82; see Latin America
Week1 Re ort LAWR , 9/17/82.
2) Washington Post WP), 8/27/82.
3) New York Times ZNYT), 9/1/82.
4) WP, 3/10/82.
5) WYT, 3/11/82; 3/17/82.
6) In These Times (ITT), 3/26/82; The Nation,
3/6/82; Miami Herald (MH) 3/22/82.
7) San Francisco Exa im ner 12/30/81, Newsweek,
3/1/82, p. 20.
8) LAWR, 3/12/82.
9) LAWR, 7/30/82; 8/6/82.
10) ounterSpy, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 4; Latin America
R ional Reports (LARR), 8/13/82.
11 NYT, 8/3/82.
12) 7Y-supra, #9.
13) NYT, 8/29/82.
14) 15-f supra, #1.
15) NYT, 9/11/82.
16) Cf supra, #13.
17) LARR, 9/24/82.
18) Excelsior (Mexico City), 8/10/82.
19) LAWR, 9/24/82.
20) NYT, 3/14/82; MH, 3/25/82.
21) WP7 5/31/82.
Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 21
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U.S. REPRESENTATIVES SAY:
CIA Lies About Central America
by John Kelly
"Successful collection, rigorous analysis
and able presentation do characterize most
of U.S. intelligence performance world-
wide," and there is "much fine performance
by the intelligence community" with regard
to Central America. This is according to.
a September 22, 1982 staff report of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation
of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. An example of perhaps the
"greatest" intelligence achievement was
the El Salvador White Paper, continues the
report - even though this "White Paper" on
alleged Soviet-Cuban subversion in Central
America has been debunked by critics
ranging from the Wall Street Journal to
former CIA officer Ralph McGehee. (See
also: "El Salvador White Paper?," Counter-
, vol. 5, no. 3; and "El Salvador White
Paper- (-Cont.)," CounterSpy,vol. 5, no. 4.)
Because of-this generally pro-CIA
attitude of the report, its criticisms of
the CIA are even more devastating, par-
ticularly since they seriously challenge
every major assertion by the intelligence
agencies about El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Addressing the March 4, 1982 briefing by
CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman (which
received national front-page coverage as
well as TV coverage on all three networks),
the Congressional report says that "the
presentation was flawed by several instan-
ces of overstatement and overinterpreta-
tion" which "detracted somewhat from the
creditibility of the presentation." For
example, says the report, the briefing
stated that "lots of ships have been
traced" from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua.
Upon closer questioning, intelligence ana-
lysts produced "only a very few examples."
Another statement the CIA made at the
briefing was that "you don't plan an
operation like what is being run in El
Salvador if you haven't gone to somebody's.
command and general staff college." The
Intelligence Committee took this statement
to mean that the revolution in El Salvador
was being directed by graduates of military
schools in the Soviet Union or Eastern
European countries. Upon questioning,
though, the committee was told that this
statement was a "figure of speech...."
A briefing slide, captioned "Guer-
rilla Financing (non-Arms)" indicated that
outside sources were providing the Salva-
doran guerrillas with $17 million annually.
Described as "slightly inaccurate or mis-
leading" by the staff report, this state-
ment turned out to be simply untrue.
The briefing also presented slide
illustrations on so-called guerrilla pro-
paganda. A prime example of guerrilla
propaganda that reached the U.S. public,
according to the briefers, was a Febru-
ary 14, 1982, Washington Post article by
Philippe Bourgois which reported an indis-
criminate attack by the Salvadoran mili-
tary against some 1,000 women and children,
and guerrillas who had separated them-
selves from the non-combatants. The slide-
listed five charges made by Bourgols.
Next to this list were intelligence asser-_
tions which were supposed to belie Bour
Bois' report. After' Intelligence Committee
members questioned them, the officials
were forced to admit that Bourgois "proba-
(John Kelly is co-editor of Counterspy.)
22 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
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Inman Complains
If its true, it's a first:
Democrats in the House Commit-
tee on Intelligence are pro-
testing certain aspects of the
CIA's covert operations abroad,
according to recently-resigned
committee consultant, and for-
mer CIA Deputy Director Bobby
Ray Inman. In an Associated
Press interview published in
the Boston Globe (10/15/82),
Inman claimed that the Demo-
crats had written letters to
President Reagan "critical of
CIA covert actions" possibly
including those in Central
America. This disagreement,
Inman argued, led the Democrats
to vote for the public release
of the committee's report,
U.S. Intelligence Performance
on Central America. The
charge was denied by committee
officials.
Inman resigned because of
the report and complained that
it "reflected a bias against
U.S. policy in Central Amer-
ica.'o In fact, the report
fully endorses U.S. policy
there. It was even cited by
State Department Public
Affairs Advisor Jeffrey R.
Biggs in a letter to the New
York Times (10/14/82) as abso-
lute proof backing up the
Reagan Administration's propa-
ganda campaign which accuses
Nicaragua of directing and
arming revolutionary forces in
El Salvador.
In the process of com-
plaining, Inman leaked an
important fact: the committee's
report, he stated "failed to
say [thatla key'House briefing
on alleged outside control of
the Salvadoran insurgency was
given by operational officials
'deeply enmeshed' in covert
actions, not by intelligence
analysts." It is not apparent
what Inman is arguing here.
But his assertion does do two
things. It ironically con-
firms charges that the CIA's
"dirty tricksters" are indeed
active in Central America.
And it demonstrates that Con-
gressional briefings, which
the CIA promotes as unbiased,
factual reports, are in fact
sometimes given by covert
agents, who can hardly be
detached observers.
bly was truthful in describing what he
saw." The report concluded that "it was
misleading to present the article as an
example of guerrilla 'propaganda;' no frau-
dulent media manipulation has been shown."
Yet after making these criticisms,
the staff report stated that the intelli-
gence briefing was "based on a skillful
and professional examination of data
obtained from various sources. The analy-
sis was impressive and of definite value
to policy makers." The subcommittee also,
felt that the briefing provided "convinc-
ing intelligence that the Salvadoran insur-
gents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua
for certain headquarters and logistical
operations," and that there is "persuasive
evidence" of Cuban and Nicaraguan support
for the insurgents.
The second major CIA achievement
cited by the committee report was the
Special National Intelligence Estimate,
"Soviet Support for International Terrorism
and Revolutionary Violence." Suffice it
to say that CIA Director William Casey
sent back two drafts of this study because
it did not conform to his preconceptions
of worldwide terrorism directed by the
Soviet Union and Cuba. (In spite of these
overall findings supportive of the CIA and
other intelligence agencies, House Intel-
ligence Committee consultant Bobby Inman
resigned his post when the report was
published. He described it as "seriously
flawed" and complained that he had not
been consulted before the report came out.
Apparently, Inman wanted to influence this
Congressional report investigating CIA
performance during the time that he him-
self was deputy director--in fact eva-
luating some of the very briefings Inman
had given.)
Perhaps the most damning finding of
the report is that "intelligence has pro-
vided little firm information about the
subject of violence by the [Salvadoran ]
right and security forces... [and ] Infor-
mation about political killings that might
permit such attribution is not systemati-
cally collected or analyzed." Granting
the many difficulties in this area, "the
staff has found that they L intelligence
analysts] have simply not considered the
subject of Salvadoran rightist violence as
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a target for collection."
Though the report refuses to draw
this conclusion, the lack of reporting on
rightist terrorism is a clear-cut case of
intelligence agencies reinforcing and act-
ing in complicity with U.S. government
policies in El Salvador. This complicity
is . exemplified by the case of the ultra-
rightist Roberto d' Abuisson, president of
the Salvadoran Constitutent Assembly, death
squad organizer and reported graduate of
the CIA's International Police Academy.
After the Christian Democratic government
in El Salvador arrested d'Abuisson, the
U.S. in May or early June 1980, obtained
documents captured in connection with the
arrest. They detailed meetings, names,
addresses, phone numbers, and equipment of
Salvadoran rightists, and their connec-
97th Congress }
Sd gsssion
U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE ON
CENTRAL AMERICA : ACHIEVEMENTS
AND SELECTED INSTANCES OF
CONCERN
STAFF REPORT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND EVALUATION
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
tions to assassinations. D' Abuisson was
directly linked through the documents to a
coup attempt and various assassinations,
including the murder of Archbishop Oscar
Romero. The subcommittee report traced
the ,treatment of these documents as follows.
[Then U.S. Ambassador Robert] White
reports giving the documents to the
Chief of Station, and requesting that
CIA examine them closely. After this
their whereabouts is unknown. The
CIA analyst who covered El Salvador...
did not examine them closely.... CIA's
DDO [Directorate for Operations] could
find no record of the documents or of
any analysis. DIA [Defense Intelli-
gence Agency] analysts in Washington
never received or analyzed the docu-
ments.
Washington Post article
The 4 March 1982 intelligence community
briefing on external support to the Salvadoran
insurgents included a section on guerrilla pro-
paganda. The presentation focused on a slide,
paraphrased below, which contrasted the way a
Salvadoran military sweepl peration was report-
ed in the Washington Post with what was known
from available intelligence:
Salvadoran Government
Operation Cabanas Department November 1981
As reported in Washington Post article of Feb. 14
* Peasant Farmers
* 1,000 women, children attacked -
* Guerrillas keep away from peasants to draw. fire
away.
* No sophisticated weapons WW-II vintage
rifles.
* Little ammunition.
As reported by Intelligence
* Guerrillas forced by Government to flee
* Guerrilla force totaled less than 1,000 people
military and civilian.
* Element needs help from other units in meeting
Government forces.
* This unit, like others, equipped with automatic
rifles, machine guns,' mortars.
The Bourgois article reported that the Sal-
vadoran military attacked guerrillas and non-
combatants indiscriminately, and described the
latter as separate and distinguishable from
the fighters. The briefer presented the slide
as an illustration of the problem'of guerrilla
U.B. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OPTIC'
al-Sm 0 WASHINGTON: 1982
24 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
11) The author, Philippe Bourgois, an American anthropology
student, had entered El Salvador's Cabanas Province to ex-
plore the feasibility of a research project, and had found
himself caught in an Army sweep and unable to leave for 14
days. The Post article detailed his experience as he and
other noncombatants sought to escape the fighting that en-
circled them.
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Policymakers at the State Department
learned of the documents through
Ambassador White's June 1980 cable,
but chose not to make any immediate
use of the documents... .During the
two years since their capture, these
documents had been virtually ignored
not only by policymakers, who felt
they had no immediate use for them,
but more importantly by the intelli-
gence community. They did not re-
ceive the kind of routine intelligence
evaluation given to a large number of
the Salvadoran guerrilla documents,
captured later that year."
The subcommittee report ends by detailing
intelligence lies regarding President,
Reagan's certification that the Salvadoran
government is gaining control over its
armed forces; the Salvadoran military's
massacre in El Mozote; the Miskito Indian
situation in Nicaragua; and the alleged
military build-up in Nicaragua. Regarding
the latter, government claims made publicly
about a burgeoning Nicaraguan military
preparing to invade other countries were
"quite distinct" from facts presented in
closed hearings, according to the subcom-
mittee report.
(Copies of the report, "U.S. Intel-
ligence Performance on Central America:
Achievements and Selected Instances of
Concern" may be obtained by calling (202)
225-4121. The documents on d'Abuisson are
discussed in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee report, "The Situation in El
Salvador" of March 18 and April 9, 1981.
Call [phone].)
"propaganda" reaching the U.S. public.
Following the briefing, the Committee asked
whether there was evidence that Bourgois mis-
represented himself or that the article was
fabricated by others. In a written response,
the intelligence community claimed to have in-
formation that "Bourgois was with an FMLN
(guerrilla) fighting unit." This undermined
Bourgois' claim that he was with noncombatants.
When the staff asked to review the relevant
intelligence report, intelligence officials re-
sponded that there was no single item that
dealt specifically with Bourgois, but that
their statement that he was with an FMLN fight-
ing unit represented an "analytic judgment;'
based on much information which reflected the
type of fighting going on in the area. The
staff then reviewed this information.
A careful review of these items and subse-
quent conversations with intelligence personnel
revealed that, although the intelligence was
valid, the presentation was misleading:
-- Available intelligence on deployment of
guerrillas in the area, which encompass full-
time organized units, part-time militias, and
noncombatants, had enabled intelligence ana-
lysts to identify with certainty the guerrilla
unit which resisted the Army's sweep operation
on the dates when Bourgois was present. How-
ever, no intelligence existed to contradict
Bourgois' claim that he was with noncombatants.
Concerning Bourgois' claim that the guerrilla
fighters kept their distance from the noncom-
batants, an intelligence official explained, "I
collectively call the guerrillas and their fol-
lowers a 'group."'... He added that Bourgois
probably was truthful in describing what he
saw.
-- The presentation appeared to imply that
each of the four statements on the slide drawn
from the Bourgois article was contradicted by
the intelligence extract opposite it - a mis-
leading implication, since the extracts were
not parallel. In interviews, the responsible
intelligence personnel insisted that the slide
was not intended to imply a contradiction, al-
though they recognized that the presentation
could have had that effect. Another intelli-
gence official recalled that the extracts were
selected to "shoot down" Bourgois' claims. Ad-
ditionally, the slide suggested that the total
number of military and civilians comprising the
"guerrilla force" represented assets to the
guerrillas, when the evidence from which this
figure was taken indicated that they consti-
tuted a burden as well....
It was misleading to present the article as
an example of guerrilla "propaganda"; no fraud-
ulent media manipulation has been shown. Intel-
ligence officials explained that the intention,
instead, was to overcome what they viewed as
excessively negative coverage of the Salvadoran
military in the U.S. press. The written intel-
ligence community response stated: "(Bourgois)
did not talk with the government forces in-
volved in the campaign.... Instead his report
represents an image of poor peasants, women and
children being bombed and killed by an unfeel-
ing Salvadoran military. This is exactly the
image the guerrillas want to have presented to
the outside world." An intelligence official
emphasized in an interview, "There are two
sides of every story," and up until February
1982 the U.S. press was reporting "mostly from
the guerrilla viewpoint."
This approach is questionable as an inter-
pretation of the mission of the intelligence
community. Clearly, U.S. policymakers must not
be limited to information "from the guerrilla
viewpoint," and it is important for intelli-
gence producers to be aware of media coverage
The remedy is to provide policymakers with
first class, dependable intelligence products -
not to present as "propaganda" a newspaper ar-
ticle which is simply one-sided in its perspec-
tive.
(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)
CowzterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 25
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Disciplining of Salvadoran military personnel
In January 1982, the President certified
that El Salvador "is achieving substantial con-
trol over its armed forces," and Assistant Sec-
retary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders
then testified that "substantial progress" has
been made toward the goals of controlling vio-
lence and bringing murderers to justice. He
noted specifically that the Salvadoran authori-
ties had "transferred, retired, cashiered or
punished over a thousand soldiers for various
abuses of authority or for their cooperation
with the violent right."
Again, this report is not intended to judge
the appropriateness of either the presidential
certification or Mr. Enders' testimony. In-
stead, the report examines the intelligence
relative to such policy decisions and state-
ments. This examination reveals that the intel-
ligence community supported policy claims with
assertions based on little more than official
statements of the Salvadoran military. '
Asked by a member of the Committee whether
the government of El Salvador has control of
the military, a CIA official in early February
1982 replied that much progress has been made,
as evidenced partly by the fact that "hundreds
and hundreds of military personnel" had been
transferred, retired or disciplined. Asked to
provide details on the latter point, the CIA
official doubted whether any reporting could be
found, citing disruption caused by a recent
move of his analytic offices within the head-
quarters building. Responding to a further que-
ry from the Committee staff, CIA provided a
memo that acknowledged that "we have only frag-
mentary information on disciplinary actions
taken by the Salvadoran armed forces against
members of the military in 1981."
The memo showed that essentially the only
source for the assurances consisted of state-
ments by the Salvadoran Ministry of Defense
that armed forces personnel had been demoted,
dismissed, or transferred. The offenses ranged
from such infractions as drunkenness, coward-
ice, AWOL, and disobedience, to deserting,
thievery or murder; only a fraction of these
were the types of brutality considered politi-
cally motivated. In one statement, the Salva-
doran Ministry of Defense in March 1981 replied
to an inquiry from the U.S. Congress by stating'
that 28 members of the Army and security forces
had been sent to trial for homicide since Janu-
ary 1980. However, in reporting this reply, the
Embassy cautioned that it did not know whether
any of these crimes were committed for politi-
cal reasons rather than as common crimes; it
did not know whether the crimes occurred prior
to January 1980; and it did not know how many
of the trials ended with verdicts of innocence.
Virtually the only information to corrobo-
rate these official Salvadoran statements came
in a closing paragraph of an Embassy cable,
which reported:
... (S)ome individuals believed to be
involved in repressive activities
have been transferred in an effort to
remove them from troop commands or to
break the local level alliance with
land owners that has existed here for
decades. We do not know how many
transfers would have been made for
these reasons rather than as a result
of normal rotation.... (T)ransfer in-
stead of discipline has been used to
curb repression because military lead-
ers feel that the latter would drive
some individuals into open opposition
to the government.
Since so little intelligence basis could be
found for CIA's assurances about the disciplin-
ing of military personnel, the Committee staff
asked the State Department for the basis for
the Assistant Secretary's February 1982 state-
ment. The Department responded that the basis
for the statement was the Department's own
1980 Country Report on Hwnan. Rights Practices.
That report said that "about 1400 enlisted men
reportedly have been cashiered... for various
abuses" during that first year following the
October 1979 military coup. It qualified this
by continuing, "There are indications that some
of these men have been recruited subsequently
into rightist terrorist squads. Government for-
ces have broken up few right-wing groups, most-
ly because the right does not attack the secu-
rity forces."
Thus, the February 1982 statement was based
on a 1980 figure, the exact significance of
which was uncertain even when it first ap-
peared. However, it is the intelligence commu-
nity's participation in these assurances that
concerns this report. Intelligence displayed a
willingness to claim greater certainty than
warranted by the evidence, and a complacent ac-
ceptance of official Salvadoran claims whose
limitations had already been acknowledged.
El Mozote investigation
Also in his February 1982 testimony, Mr.
Enders challenged news reports of a massacre in
the Morazan Province village of El Mozote. Ac-
cording to the testimony given to Congress, two
Embassy officers had been sent to investigate
these reports, and "no evidence could be found
to confirm that government forces systematical-
ly massacred civilians, nor that the number of
civilians killed even remotely approached the
733 or 926 victims variously cited in press
reports." Recognizing the difficulties inherent
in investigating such cases, the Committee
staff examined closely the intelligence pro-
cess underlying the Assistant Secretary's
statement and found the following:
Only the last paragraph of the long
(nearly 2000 words) Embassy report on the field
investigation explained that the investigators
never reached the towns where the alleged
events occurred. Because the area was consid-
'ered to be guerrilla controlled, the two inves-
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tigators could not reach El Mozote nor, appar-
ently, any of the other nearby towns in which
the military had allegedly slaughtered civil-
ians. The investigation, which occurred a month
after the event, was conducted by interviewing
individuals who had been in the area and by
overflying El Mozote in a helicopter.
--- The cable appears to assume that there
was a fight, rather than a massacre of noncom-
batants. Yet a close reading of the cable shows
that the only confirmation of this from any of
the refugees the investigators spoke with was
that a man from a town several miles away from
El Mozote "intimated that he knew of violent
fighting in El Mozote and other nearby canto-
ns." The cable reported that he was unwilling
to discuss the comportment of government for-
ces.
-- The lead sentence of the Embassy report,
which appeared in both the summary and the con-
clusion, stated: "Although it is not possible
to prove or disprove excesses of violence
against the civilian population of El Mozote by
government troops, it is certain that the guer-
rilla forces who established defensive posi-
tions in El Mozote did nothing to remove them
from the path of battle which they were aware
was coming and had prepared for, nor was there
any evidence that those who remained attempted
to leave." This seemingly spurious point was
made less certain by the body of the cable,
which reported that an aged couple from El Mo-
zote (apparently the only refugees from El Mo-
zote interviewed) as well as refugees from
other cantons near El Mozote, said that the
guerrillas warned them of the impending Salva-
doran military operation and urged them to
leave because they were old.
-- Another report at the time contained
some reservations and qualifications bearing on
whether there had been a fierce firefight in El
Mozote, yet the subleties and uncertainties
which had been carefully conveyed in this re-
port were disregarded by a State Department in-
telligence analyst in explaining what had hap-
pened. Similarly, a later message issued by the
State Department in response to an inquiry
abroad cited the account with fewer indications
of uncertainty than in the original field re-
ports, even though no additional intelligence
on the matter had been received in the interim.
Familiar weaknesses in the intelligence pro-
cess are evident in this case. The Embassy
field report suggested greater certainty about
whether a firefight occurred, and about the ac-
tions of the guerrillas, than was warranted by
its own information. Uncertainties which did
appear in field reporting were lost in subse-
quent presentations. The Embassy field report's
lead sentence (not fully consistent with the
body of the cable) implying callousness by
guerrillas and/or civilian support for the
guerrillas, suggests a desire to "balance" pub-
lic reports of massacres. ...
Briefing on Nicaraguan Military Build-up
A briefing on Nicaragua's military build-up,
which was given to the Committee by DIA on
March 24, 1982, and was aired publicly earlier
that month, presented a different problem. The
briefing was structured around a presentation
of the evidence concerning each of the elements
of the military build-up, including the growth
of Nicaragua's army and militia, construction
of new military bases, expansion of airfields,
and acquisition of new equipment. Throughout,
the emphasis was on how each element increased
the army's capability to launch offensive oper-
ations outside of Nicaragua.
This format obscured DIA's analytical judg-
ment on the difficult, but essential, question
about the significance of the build-up: what do
Nicaragua's leaders intend to do with it, and
what is the likelihood of Nicaragua's initiat-
ing various sorts of offensive operations
against its neighbors? These issues were ad-
dressed directly in a separate classified
briefing, whose analytic judgments about Nica-
ragua's intentions were quite distinct from
those that appeared implicit in the briefing
on the build-up. Therefore, the concern in this
case is not that important analytic questions
were neglected, but that the format of this
particular presentation did not permit them to
be addressed in a deliberate way. The result,
that the briefing conveyed an implicit judgment
about Nicaragua's objectives not entirely con-
sistent with DIA's reasoned judgment, detracted
from its informative value.
NOW AVAILABLE: Reprint from Counterspy
U.S. NUCLEAR THREATS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
50C each for 1-4 copies; 40C each for
5-25 copies; 30C each for 26-99 copies;
20C each for 100 or more copies. Add
$1.00 postage for first 20 copies, and
50C for each additional 50 copies. For
sample, send SASE (37C postage) to
CounterSpy.
CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 27
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Afghanistan Update
Negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakis-
tan under United Nations auspices, appear
to be moving the "Afghan conflict" closer
to a political solution. At the same
time, outside support by both private
organizations and governments for the so-
called rebels in Pakistan continues to
hinder such a political solution.
With U.N. Intermediary Diego
Cordovez, Afghan Foreign Minister Shah
Mohamed Dost and his Pakistani counter-
part, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan met in Geneva
for several days in June 1982. Cordovez
has since kept in close touch with the two
governments. He does not believe he will
achieve a quick solution, but he says some
progress has been made, and a basic
"package of understanding" has been reached
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The Afghan government has announced
that it is willing to hold talks with all
opposition groups fighting the government,
with the exception of the groups based in
Pakistan. It is these Pakistan-based
groups who have been able to attract con-
siderable foreign support. Pakistan pro-
vides facilities and allows shipments of
arms to the rebels; while the U.S.,
Egyptian, and Chinese governments have
been aiding the rebels with a covert
multi-million dollar support program. In
addition, the U.S. has provided more than
$200- million for the Afghan refugee camps
in Pakistan, which are tightly controlled
by the various rebel factions.
Western European governments and the
Reagan administration are also engaging in
propaganda campaigns for the rebels by
organizing events such as an "Afghanistan
Solidarity Day" on March 21, 1982. U. S.
celebrations of this day were coordinated
by Richard Nixon's Secretary of State,
William Rogers, who wrote In his proclama-
tion that the "courageous struggle by the
Afghan freedom fighters serves as a
deterrent to Soviet invasion of Poland."
Private organizations and individuals
actively aiding the rebels attest to a
strange mixture of politics, ranging from
the extremely rightwing Soldier of Fortune
magazine to evangelist Pat Robertson o the
Christian Broadcasting Network and repre-
sentatives of the French and Italian
28 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
Socialist Parties. The activities of the
European groups are coordinated by the
Bureau International Afghanistan (BIA) in
Paris. The Bureau, which is working to
collect money for the rebels, , sees itself
as a public relations agency to "educate"
people in Europe about the necessity to
"support the resistance of the people of
Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation."
The BIA has organized trips for several
rebel leaders, including Sayed Gailani
(formerly a wealthy landowner and car
dealer), to meet with government officials
and parliamentarians in Europe. The
Bureau was set up during a meeting of the
International Committee in Solidarity. with
the Afghan resistance in Rome in 1980.
In March 1982, European Afghanistan
committees, again with Gailani and also
Sibghatullah Mujadidi (another former
landlord with ties to the ultra-rightist
Muslim Brotherhood) met to strategize
about gaining diplomatic recognition for
the rebels by European governments. The
conference also aimed to "help to gain
acceptance for the Afghan resistance in
Private organizations
and individuals actively
aiding the rebels attest
to a strange mixture of
politics, ranging from
the extremely rightwing
Soldier of Fortune
magazine to evangelist
Pat Robertson of the
Christian Broadcasting
Network and
representatives of the
French and Italian
Socialist Parties.
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left-wing circles;" its vice president was
Carlo Ripa di Meana, an Italian Socialist
member of the European parliament.
Afghanistan committees in London and
Paris have raised money for seven radio
transmitters for the rebels. Some of the
Russian language programs for the trans-
mitters are prepared by Soviet "dissidents"
in England, including Vladimir Bukowsky.
In the United States, most of the
"Afghanistan solidarity work" is done by
organizations on the far right, such as
Freedom House, which has an Afghanistan
Information Center and publishes occa-
sional "News Leads" and other materials on
Afghanistan. Similarly active is the
Committee for a Free Afghanistan. (Its
executive director Karen McKay claims the
Soviet move into Afghanistan is a step
toward the "Soviet encirclement of the
Persian Gulf.") A scholars' committee on
Afghanistan is run out of the Center for
Afghanistan Studies at the University of
Nebraska in Omaha. (The Center was
founded in the early seventies as the
first and only Afghanistan Studies Center
in the U.S.). In addition, the openly
racist Soldier of Fortune magazine has set
up a special fund for the "freedom
fighters."
In short, the Italian and French
Socialists and other "left circles" find
themselves in questionable company when it
comes to "Afghanistan solidarity work."
But more than that, it is striking, to say
the least, that they would work "in
solidarity" with organizations that advo-
cate antisocialist policies.
Many of the "rebel leaders" they sup-
port are the feudal landlords who left
Afghanistan in 1978 and 1979 shortly after
a progressive government that advocated
land reform came to power in Kabul.
According to the conservative Swiss Neue
Zuericher Zeitung, "the social conditions
of the Afghan tribal areas continue to
exist in the refugee camps. That is espe-
cially true for the domination of men over
women - which is parallel to the domina-
tion of the landowners over the peasants."
Neue Zuericher Zeitung writes that aid
from the United Nations, governments and
private organizations helps perpetuate
these relationships. In many cases, the
Afghan refugees get more money from the
U. N. than local Pakistanis can earn :
"Financial help to the refugees in
Baluchistan," for instance, "is larger
than the amount of money budgeted by the
Pakistani government for the whole
province."
The Christian Democratic daily Welt
(West Germany) reports large-scale misuse
of U.N. and Western donations to the refu-
gees. ' A significant part of the goods
sent to the camps are sold on the open
market for the profit of the rebel leaders
and other dealers. The rebel leaders have
even built up their fiefdoms in Pakistan.
One of them, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, controls
the public transportation system in
Peshawar, where the rebel headquarters are
located.
These rebel leaders' interests are
certainly better served by the present
situation than by a political solution to
the conflict in Afghanistan. Yet it appears
very unlikely that they will achieve mili-
tary victory, especially given the intense
infighting between the various groups. At
the same time, the Afghan government is
demonstrating in its negotiations with
Pakistan and by other internal policies
that it is striving for a political solu-
tion. The Afghan government also appears
to have been able to broaden its base.
Journalists for the Swedish Svenska
Dagbladet who visited Afghanistan in
September 1982 wrote that "although there
were explosions, shots and artillery fire
during the night and occasionally during
the day," the central sector of the
country "made a relatively calm impression."
High ranking government officials now tra-
vel to villages around the country.
Dagbladet also reported that the govern-
ment provides weapons and ammunition to
"civilian self-defense groups" which have
been set up "among the civilian population
against the rebels' often ruthless demands
for money, shelter and food... A general
view - also among Westerners in Kabul - is
that criminal behavior by guerrilla groups
has increased considerably in recent
months." All in all, according to
Dagbladet,? "there is nothing to indicate
that the Barbrak Karmal regime is not
firmly in the saddle."
(For background articles, see: "CIA
Intervention in Afghanistan," CounterSpy,
vol. 4, no. 2; "CIA Rebels Supply U.S.
Heroin," "Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan,"
CounterSpy, vol. 5, no. 1; "Who Wants
Peace in Afghanistan?," CounterSpy, vol.
5, no. 3.)
CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 29
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5
Secret U.S. Embassy Report Affirms:
Marcos Corrupt and on
Shaky Ground
The following confidential report by the
U.S. Consulate in Cebu, Philippines was
leaked by State Department sources to
CounterSpy and the Congress Task Force of
the Philippine Solidarity Network in
August 1982. Written by Consul G. S.
Sheinbaum, the document focuses on a poli-
tical and economic assessment of Mindanao,
the second largest Philippine island. The
document's significance lies in the frank-
ness with which it acknowledges the in-
creasing brutality and corruption of the
Philippine government and the rising
strength of the New People's Army, the
military arm of the Communist Party in the
Philippines. This is the kind of candid
analysis which never makes it into the
official reports of the State Department.
The Sheinbaum report was penned in
the context of escalating support for
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos from
the Reagan administration, which welcomed
him warmly during his state visit in mid-
September 1982. According to the State
Department source who leaked the report,
"I think he [Sheinbaum ] is trying to
signal us that a policy of supporting
Marcos will mean more than just supplying
military aid pretty soon."
(CounterSpy is reprinting only the
political section of the document. The
complete report is available for $3.00
from CounterSpy. )
TO : SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBAS' Y MANILA
INFO :CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DEPT PASS: CINCPAC ALSO FOR POL'AD
I0ya2_z'
CUFIP!?I
F.OM : AMCONSUL CEBU DATE: APRIL 13, 1982
SUBJECT : EASTERN MINDANAO AND AN OMINOUS FUTURE
REF
TAGS: PINT, ECON, MILL, SHUM, RP
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1. C - Entire Text.
2. Summary and Introduction. Visits over
the past three months to all but two of the
provinces of Eastern and Northern Mindanao, Re-
gions X and XI, lead to the conclusion that
whatever is good there may only be-temporary
and whatever is bad may only get worse. This
may sound like a worst-case scenario, but pres-
ent circumstances are not encouraging and the
future is ominous. A change could come about
with a stunning recovery in the economy (espe-
cially coconut oil prices), continued quietude
in the GOP's relations-with the Muslim popula-
tion, and more effective local government, but
Mindanao residents are not optimistic for ei-
ther'the short or the long term. Even the ap-
parent truce that exists with the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), while encouraging of
itself, is not expected to last for long; some
believe that when the GOP [Government of the
Philippines], because of budgetary constraints,
begins to reduce sharply its aid to Muslim reb-
els and ex-rebels, the MNLF may take up arms
again.
3. The year 1980 brought with it the appar-
ent truce with the MNLF and a terrible slump in
the domestic copra market. In 1981, the \xili-
tary shifted forces from Western Mindanao and
the Sulu archipelago to Eastern Mindanao to
offset the increased activity of the New Peo-
ple's Army (NPA) which had begun in early 1981.
Copra prices continued to be low, bringing down
other aspects of the economy and leading to a
resurgence of malnutrition in many areas. Gov-
ernment programs are unevenly distributed, of-
ten poorly planned and poorly managed, and -
except for some superficial attention to the
Muslim segment of the population - it is gener-
ally agreed that the greater the distance from
Manila, the less the GOP interest in the re-
gion, Ilocos excepted. Prime Minister Cesar
Virata has made a determined attempt to become
acquainted with the southern Philippines by
visits to all regions, relying on Regional De-
velopment Councils to provide a profile on
their areas. However, senior government offi-
cials, including members of the cabinet, seem
to travel to Mindanao only when there is a cri-
sis, such as after floods and typhoons, or for
some political event. President Marcos has not
been to Mindanao in three years.
4. The United States role in Mindanao af-
fairs is perceived to be mostly limited to US
companies which have substantial enterprises in
the area; US aid programs there are overshad-
owed by efforts of the World Bank, Asian Devel-
opment Bank and the Japanese. Yet, somewhat
surprisingly, attitudes toward the US - includ-
ing in the Muslim areas - appear to be margin-
ally more positive than in Visayas, e.g., peo-
ple in Mindanao are generally less inclined to
blame the country's ills on US support for
President Marcos.
5. The military has saturated NPA areas,
bringing with it reports of some increased
abuses and the heavily criticized "hamletting"
in Davao del Norte. (Military behavior in less-
contested areas seems to be better.) The NPA in
those saturated areas have lowered their pro-
file and are reportedly laying plans in areas
where neither they nor the military have been
active before. We are not convinced that,
should the military reduce its forces in those
areas, the people and their local leaders are
now so committed to the government's cause that
they will be able to resist a return of NPA in-
fluence. The GOP's involvement, measured in
terms of financial resources, is not good. And
the poor economy will not help. End Summary and
Introduction.
6. Consul Cebu visited ten northern and
eastern Mindanao provinces in past three
months. On the surface it appears that peace
and order in that area is more prevalent than
at any time in the past several years. First,
the Muslim conflict has abated over the past
year. Second, the NPA, seemingly on the rampage
in early 1981, has taken a wait-and-see atti-
tude because several Army and Constabulary (PC)
units were moved from the now-quieter Muslim
areas to those areas being harrassed by the
NPA. However, this does not necessarily mean
that the future is brighter, and various local
observers, civilian and military, suggest that
this might only be the lull before the
storm(s).
7. MNLF Conflict. The two Lanao provinces
were suspiciously quiet, and the last ambush
(as of the time of our visit in December) along
the Marawi-Iligan road took place in August, a
relatively long period without such incidents
there. (However, another ambush occurred in
March.) Military checkpoints along the road
were still numerous, but soldiers on duty were
noticeably casual in behavior, even upon the
arrival of an Army officer at their location.
Because of seemingly improved security, some
units have been moved from Lanao elsewhere and
there is decidedly less of a military presence
in Marawi City itself as compared with our last
visit in March 1981. Nonetheless, local resi-
dents are still tense and cautious in their be-
havior and movements around the area, and the
city is virtually dead at night. The MNLF con-
flict, we were told, only heightened existing
animosities and acts of revenge still occur
regularly, although less often than during the
height of MNLF activity.
8. Muslims and Christians alike in the two
CONFIDENTIAL
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Lanao ish d provinces agree that the MNLF has lost
some of its glamor as well as most of its ex-
havi
ternal support. Internecine conflicts among alth
various MNLF factions, including acts of re- fice
e the relative
cohesion that perviously ex-
isted. Several apparently neutral observers ad-
mitted that the GOP's program of "attraction"
has been.perhaps more effective than they orig-
inally gave it credit. Distribution of the gov-and
ernment's largesse to surrenderees, however,
has been erratic, and some jealousy has emerged west
because more recent surrenderees receive less
than earlier ones. A more imposing problem is
that many surrenderees had expected government-
al support to be for an indefinite future and
would be accompanied by land allocations, jobs,
and even cash. Overzealous GOP agents may have
oversold the program but, so far at least, no
to the hills to fight. (There are substantial
reports of softcore MNLF who have "surrendered over
large number of MNLF surrenderees have returned Norte in p
more than once, but we believe this practice
has been contained because the military will
not accept as a surrenderee anyone who does not
bring in a weapon.) There is also a widespread
f 1
feeling that a more liberal GOP attitude toward more
the Muslims has enticed many less-committed
MNLF members down from the hills outside the
surrenderee program. Such reports are sketchy
but may indeed be among various valid reasons
for the quieter situation.
9. Brigade commanders in both Iligan and
Marawi told us that, despite a decrease in
their own strength because units have been di-
verted elsewhere, their military position is
stronger than even a year ago. They attribute
this to the surrenderee program, a better work-
ing relationship between the military and Mus-
lim awareness that the military are no longer'
seeking to locate and destroy MNLF elements.
Both officers separately expressed some concern
that they might be enjoying a false sense of
security, but they are sure that their intelli-less,
gence is accurate and that, especially without
help from abroad, the MNLF conflict in the La-
nao and Cotabato areas will continue to abate
until it becomes non-existent. Muslim leaders has i
in Lanao not associated with the government be-
lieve such a forecast pay be accurate, but be-betw,
10. Banditry and the Military. Army`and~'PC
commands in both Lanao o
provinces said they are has'
now more concerned with NPA activity and the'
banditry problem which is historically endemic
throughout Mindanao. Regarding banditry, they
acknowledge that individual servicemen, and whic
perhaps even some small units, are involved
since the types of weapons and clothing dis-
CONFIDENTIAL
32 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
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For Release 2010/06/14:
venge for a wide variety of causes, have dimin-
lieve that the tenser situation in Sulu and Ba-
silan is likely to endure much longer fortes"oa-
riety of other factors.
played, the manner of the bandits and their be-
or all suggest that military are involved,
11. Upsurge of NPA Activities. NPA activity
in Lanao del Norte is a recent development and
is said to be emanating from Misamis Occidental
(to the West). There have been recent teach-ins
tion in November of a woman barangay captain in
bers and threats to other local officials. NPA
activity in Lanao Norte has over the past year
grown slowly but steadly.
12. NPA propaganda and recruitment through-
out northern and eastern Mindanao seems to be
following the same pattern as that in Lanao
: slow but steady. The rash of incidents
y in the year in the Agusan provinces, Sur-
Sur and Bukidnon were attributed to spill-
roaming the Davao and Cotabato provinces. When
peace and order improved in the latter areas,
the rate of NPA incidents in the more northern
provinces increased markedly. Yet, now that
northern provinces and the situation is quiet-
er, there are still continuing reports of in-
creased NPA propaganda and recruiting nonwith-
standing the military presence. Few officials
or military with whom we spoke could identify
local NPA commanders, apparently because NPA
presence is new. It was thus not possible to
verify if NPA commanders were natives of the
provinces in which they were operating. It was
clear, however, that the present period may be
peaceful but the future is ominous. Most
blamed the poor economy: low copra prices, loss
of land, poorly-planned relocations to make way
for large agro-business, little government at-
tention to the rural areas except where planta-
tions or large projects are located, and (to a
13. In Bukidnon, Task Force Diamond was
created in October and based atMaramag, 50kms.
south of Malaybalay. One of its two battalions
leaving only the 29th (HQs in Valencia, halfway
Task Force's pressure, traffic on the roads
from Bukidnon to both Davao and Cotabato cities
or condition owing to the fact that there
Mindanao conflict began in 1972. ...
16. NPA forces in southern Agusan del Sur
are now the target of three army battalions
Davao) based at Trento, Agusan Del Sur, near
the Davao del Norte border. TF Aguda has been
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actively pursuing several small NPA units roam-
ing the hilly and mountainous border areas, and
then last August-September extended its operat-
ing zone into the newly-created municipality of
San Vicente, Davao del Norte, an area previous-
ly known as La-ac. TF Aguda was assigned there
by the Central Mindanao Command (CEMCOM) under
B.Gen. Jose Magno, headquartered in Cotabato
reported officially and therefore the authori-
ties have no way of verifying information or
can even be directed to conduct an investiga-
tion. He commented, nonetheless, that he sus-
pects military or ex-military to be responsible
for at least some of the kidnappings, based on
the sparse information he received. He acknowl-
edged to us, that military commanders in the
city have never been able to reduce this prob-
lem, and he said that several wealthy families
had already begun to move temporarily out of
17. NPA
7
of Davao del vorbeeas appear to be
the Davao lyorte well brewin
o
other
sinc f Davao Orie capit um' The area rea alog in
ntal al, Tag g the roadpar from
e travel eon th1981 and Sine Feb escene the of
cOastal provinfro
small, a at road Davao we were advinumero ce
Pparent avao Ori advised incidents
ins and recruitiY Isolated NPAIncental has
a also ed to
e in orther g durjng the idents as reported
pavoeopidla` 1jYnin J n
auarvao Oriental ev c Six months elandS11, 000
have crossfire Y, movie a
since between militarY and Carry d their homes
because of returned Additional uathe te .000
in Order to
areas of the ea to ing concessioproblems are eThey
by Priests who `rn Part of n' I;Z tradit expected
serve that Davao e1 Nortzonal tribal
area.
`~ .. .] reported
City. According to Magno and others, the NPA in
San Vicente began to organize there five years
or so ago and, because of the terrain, low ag-
ricultural productivity and little government
attention, had quietly grown in strength and
became more important than the local government
structure. NPA from San Vicente were used in
the 1981 battles in the Arakan Valley of North
Cotabato, were probably involved in various in-
cidents in Davao City, and finally attacked the
municipal halls of Maco, Montevista and a few
other places in Davao del Norte. The latter in-
cidents led to the formation of TF Aguda, which
after some weeks discovered the NPA stronghold
in San Vicente and led directly to the "hamlet"
scheme decreed by the TF Aguda commander.
19. Davao City remains potentially turbu-
lent because of street crime and general law-
lessness, much (if not most) attributed to the
military and ex-military. In the period Decem-
ber 1981-February 1982, there were several kid-
nappings of wealthy people. One 24-year-old son
of a wealthy Chinese was kidnapped and appar-
ently murdered before the ransom was paid, but
the others we believe have all been released.
Brig.Gen. Alfredo Olano, PC Commander of Region
XI, stated that none of the kidnappings were
Davao to the Visayas or Manila. Ex-Mayor Luis
Santos, a former police chief who had been may-
or for ten years, said that while he was still
mayor he had proposed that the PC be removed
from the city because his own police force
could handle it. Santos is well known for using
extreme methods, no matter how effective. He
noted that before he left office in April 1981
he was able to keep large-scale gambling out of
the city but, under the new administration of
Mayor Elias Lopez, gambling has been allowed to
flourish openly and the PC are benefitting fi-
nancially. Another source estimated that Olano
himself has a weekly income of P5,000 from the
syndicates that have resurfaced.
20. Various sources in Davao City, not in-
cluding Mayor Lopez who played it down, report-
ed that the NPA has become more active in pro-,
paganda and recruiting in the city, although no
incidents have lately been attributed to the
(word missing).
21. Overall NPA strength. The regional
chief of the National Intelligence Security
CONFIDENTIAL
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Agency (NISA), Commander Adolf Borje, the larg- accompanied by propaganda explaining why the
est of the combined military intelligence ser- NPA took those actions. This leaves some doubt
vices, informed us in February that the two NPA in our minds that they were in fact committed
commands in Eastern Mindanao now number 950 by the NPA. Nonetheless, these new reports per
with a total of 288 weapons. He said that this haps presage a more advanced stage of NPA de-
is a 30-50% increase over the past two years. velopment, the liquidation of known bad ele-
The NPA are almost equally divided into the ments. We are told that during the Hukbalahop
Southern Command, based in Davao City, and the movement of the 1940s and 1950s, the terrorism
Eastern Command based in Tagum, Davao Del Nor- stage immediately preceded the more widespread,
te. He said that the Eastern Command is also organized and well-coordinated attacks of in-
responsible for NPA activity in the Agusan and surgents on small military units and municipal
Surigao provinces as well as Davao del Norte centers. It should be recalled that the NPA at-
and Davao Oriental. (It should be noted that
Manila's Bulletin Today reported on February
10, 1982, that there are 1,300 "regular" NPA in
Region XI with 1,800 active support elements
and 18,400 mass base sympathizers. The newspa- eases lr.
per cited military sources.) t itlcr whale
3. In some areas visited on this trip it
2
ors that the NPA has instituted a low level
appe
deliberate terrorism, particularly execu-
of d
of erring officials or civilians. In Agu-
san
kidnapped
father that his behavior toward other ba-
her
rang
a barangay captain was assassinated for
Norte
tions informing. In Davao Oriental, the husband of a
info
thy physician was assassinated after having
weal
been
ties and other abuses of poor residents
tivi
cease. However, it appears that most of
should
e alleged NPA terrorist incidents were not
th es
CONFIDENTIAL
other provinces may not yet be at the same
u
and well?e the a1Ieo obserV S of the P art of rLeot1 c? d ~, 11 S he rnmert corditi? the wOr St dePet'de action an lists '
t he p??` e;,d opus af tune of 1 for pro Padar
Eastern regard b are : Ot 1 arg Ze1%
in thahave beerost helP;u
they ?r e the m tacked several municipal centers in early 1981,
"N F th to Sr w rove t red recruit fag s , Pries neaber s X sn? Zr-
uoht Mae ;iay:~sSts
ca to lewo, e t ?ffic m?St 1;? P,
on r?da ,-zmer that ? t t a
Qa- to or
ro. agn-ee ale r. sa~-d of opP e of
c ivlllar aPP2a t ecause t~ey who area Policy i id: ff e ayd that
peo? ar`{ jzt b _k lehave Pract f?rma;lce at we sP?~e
ca
ated A pool p2s with who t two yeZeountry
Ile ad, Sen
agreed teaeMote a does erteed
ever ally the n?t ao cite has` tot
22 ' Z aVe C~urr SaS t on, ly hat.reparip g ice se and ty
Strerti? t h, activit y stzetigt~'stages ?M P itary Of uriv oesbe
stage of development but in Davao del Norte NPA
terrorism and the attacks on municipal centers
appear to be the underlying rationale for TF
Aguda to "hamletize " San Vicente.
24. Military Behavior. Abuses have been at-
tributed to be among the reasons for NPA re-
cruiting success. Although - except for Davao
City - abuses by the military occur most fre-
quently where military units are actively con-
fronting insurgents. PC units are consistently
cited as being the most abusive (although not
all PC units are included in this generaliza-
tion) while the Army and the Marines enjoy bet-
ter reputations. Generally speaking, PC units
are responsible for peace and order in built-up
areas, hence they have more contact with the
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local populace and likely to have more confron-
tations with the latter. Army and Marine units,
on the other hand, normally operate in less-
populated areas and are not responsible for en-
forcing peace and order in population centers
as are the PC and the Integrated police.
Throughout Eastern Mindanao, as elsewhere, the
Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) gets mixed re-
views. Some local officials and military offi-
cers say they are very reliable and responsible
since they, more than other military branches,
operate in their home base areas, are known to
the residents and therefore their families can
be made to suffer for any abuses. In other
places, the CHDF enjoy bad reputations because
they are poorly trained, lack discipline toward
civilians, are often consuming alcoholic bever-
ages, and are too reluctant to pursue NPA who
may be members of families known to them and
who may in turn retaliate against the CHDF mem-
bers' families.
25. Governor Carlos Fortich's major com-
plaint in Bukidnon was the crime and corruption
conducted by his provincial PC command. Aside
from running a few businesses of their own and
harrassing people, the then provincial command-
er (now transferred to Misamis Oriental),
brother of Assemblyman Navarro of Surigao Nor-
te, was said to be rarely in the province. His
most senior officers take as little action as
possible, Fortich added, leaving everything
involving the NPA to the Army task force....
27. The recent departure of Col. Teofilo
Bulosan as Provincial PC Commander of Davao del
Norte may have brought a new day to the prov-
ince; Bulosan's successor, Col. Milton Tiburcio
is reported to be taking a much stricter view
toward abuses in his command. (General Olano
told us that he gave Tiburcio clear orders to
reduce abuses by military and civilian offi-
cials.) It will be recalled that Maryknoll Fr.
Ralph Kroes, the church representative of the
province's Church-Military Liaison Committee,
was expelled from the country because of a con-
frontation he had had with Bulosan.
28. At a committee meeting which had been
discussing the then rampant abuses by the mili-
tary, Kroes reportedly pointed at Bulosan'and
accused him of deliberately allowing the abuses
to continue. Bulosan then apparently enlisted
the aid of his mentor, Antonio Floirendo, ba-
nana plantation owner and friend of the First
Lady, who arranged for Kroes' expulsion. The
previous Region XI PC Commander, BGen. Buena-
ventura Casenas, told us early last year that
he had left the region because Bulosan ignored
his orders, particularly with regard to his
command's poor discipline. It is widely be-
lieved that Bulosan is financially supported by
Floirendo, in whose company he was seen more
often than some observers thought was warrant-
ed....
41. Development. Development planning in
Eastern and Northern Mindanao is spotty. At a
meeting of town mayors in Agusan del Norte, the
mayors, when asked, replied that their priori-
ties were (a) improved agricultural production,
(b) better health care, and (c) farm-to-market
or barangay roads. In other provinces, there
was more stress on roads, and the only real de-
velopmental impact of any sort is being made by
donors such as the World Bank and the Asian De-
velopment Bank for road programs, including a
few major highways. Agriculture needs an up-
lift, but the GOP appears to use most of its
funds in agriculture for supporting large com-
mercially attractive projects such as oil palm,
ypil-ypil, and mining, not that they are ill-
advised, only that little comparatively is
spent on simple needs for the small farmers.
There is also the problem of convincing gov-
ernment workers to visit areas where they are
most needed, but this is impeded by poor
roads and, in many places, the NPA.
42. In Muslim areas, development is linked
with the surrenderee program. For example, the
Southern Philippines Development Authority
(SPDA) is beginning to pump substantial funds
into Lanao del Sur, heart of the Maranao coun-
try. A fish cage project around Lake Lanao, to
assist 1,500 surrenderee families, will cost
P13 million and is already taking shape....
44. Health programs in the area are sorely
neglected. The floods of early 1981 and early
1982 in Northeastern Mindanao resulted in nu-
merous deaths from illnesses contracted by peo-
ple who did not have access to even a modest
form of health care. Not many community water
projects were visible during these trips; water
is plentiful but also quite polluted in the
many areas where there are agro-industrial
projects operating or getting under way.
45. A basic problem is that of leadership.
For national officials visit these provinces,
except the larger cities of Davao and Cagayan
de Oro. Even regional officials, with some no-
table exceptions, do not venture far from their
offices. Without proper and constant observa-
tion,,there is weak knowledge of what is needed
in the remote areas - or even the urban slums,
for that matter, no matter how close to the
center of town. The little provided for devel-
opment funding is skimmed rather heavily, we
were told in all areas, and GOP programs where
loans are involved have not been effective in
maintaining the revolving-fund concept for the
capital allocated to each program.
46. This problem has bred discontent,
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ng
av
the ADB and the Japanese, the latter
heightened by the declining economy. It is
built the Maharlika highway throughout the
probably the single most important factor in
country, part of which links Surigao City w
the expansion of the NPA during the past year
Davao City. US presence is marked mainly by
or two. Unfortunately, even were GOP officials
operations of Del Monte and Dole, both of w
to begin taking a more active interest, NPA
to have good reputations in their re
presence in many areas adds to the risks faced appear
spective areas; nonetheless, they are often
by each official seeking to visit areas of dis-
linked in a very general sense to other pla
content. Moreover, a military escort for civil-
tions whose reputations for dealing with lo
ian officials could well be disadvantageous as
residents is clearly not good....
it would link those officials with the mili-
tary.
47. US aid programs are far less visible to
local residents than those of the World Bank, on the
s
hr ive
. to
the lgN t~entlon a esse-
notea, nnent aria (t? that
tunes ' ~ot~y gov 11) area , the V a lg0 S ari till
t_ r eC?. not fille o- the i. ri to
49 one t?? any (buy-, the hPA e,y?a ; e oa;'Pa gas well
bas needs in ? eeukbalt ok QaSna ar efA.eotb a
eXte;, ab ~;~: tent urid e7;isted Sri far ~? eCeive s gal erv
exited- Cover Zori that eratlon then as a rlw'he=e
195ps , min Luilitar i ?p din ?orily n? a take v attentlbe-
the vaCuke it the coon ion , and scene an Hers Fads us to st
0
OJ~ as er par ~s on of att eriu4?n the S , tion le not 1A e~ t?
to- e eitY'er inst=uot an of r,
0~h ;rifusi n. co gew r it%
'rL to ty tlhas left i gs , ana a 01 - assts 'ha ave be Alt Ylouoh In
the Ma Xist - t 1.2 p n I4arx st rhetoric
t? eve that 1 tr nines Of MarXi
or rid wheav~ dose
a earlier generation rural people would have
aV?Z wanted to be left alone, critical needs an
pirations (aided by the media, mainly radio)
appear to have made them more involved. They
know that assistance is available somewhere and
they are, generally speaking, not getting their
fair share...
CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12
required to evaluate this against the
titutional rights of the victims.
C
ons
Thus, even though it is sworn to i hold
the Constitution, the court claimed,, that
national security interests predominate.
The court also allowed the CIA to, with-
hold the names of foreign intelligence
agents and agencies which had worked for
Operation CHAOS. Release of this infor-
mation, the court said, would endanger
national security because it would be
"embarrassing" to foreign governments, and
these foreign agents might refuse to spy
on U.S. citizens abroad.
(Copies of these decisions may be
36 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
i
h
ith
the
hom
nta-
cal
obtained from Counters
mailing costs
are 25.00.
Copying and
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5
Military Issues
U.S. Sells Cluster Bombs
to Morocco by Martha Wenger
While the issue of Israel's use of cluster
bombs in its Lebanon invasion occupied U.S.
headlines for weeks, the U.S. Department
of Defense's admission that it had sold
the deadly weapons not only to Israel, but
to 17 other nations as well, has provoked
little comment. The Pentagon said cluster
bombs (often referred to as CBUs, Cluster
Bomb Units) and cluster shells (fired from
a 155mm artillery gun) had been sold to
some Arab countries, and to the Shah's
Iran, but claimed that the list of purchas-
ers was classified.'
CounterSpy has now learned that one
of these countries is Morocco. When
confronted with specific data about U.S.
sales agreements with Morocco, a Pentagon
spokesperson confirmed in September 1982
that the U.S. delivered 100 CBU-58s and
fuzes (each costing about $2,000) to
Morocco in November-December 1981. And
Morocco has more on order. ? Defense
Security Assistance Agency data2 reveals
that the U.S. agreed on January 19, 1982,
to sell Morocco 252 additional CBU-58s and
fuzes for $561,773; and again on April 22,
1982, to sell $1,909,623 worth of CBU-71
bombs, fuzes and related materials. The
U.S. apparently has not yet delivered the
latter two purchases.
The sale to Morocco--a close U.S.
ally under the Reagan administration--is
of particular concern because Morocco,
like Israel, is engaged in a war. For
seven years, Morocco's King Hassan has
poured $1 million a day into a no-win con-
fict with the Polisario Liberation Front
of Western Sahara over his attempt to
annex that former Spanish colony. The
native Saharawi people are demanding self-
determination, and in 1976 declared the
independence of the Saharawi Arab Democra-
tic Republic (SADR). Twenty-seven African
nations have officially recognized the
SADR, and the Organization of African
Unity admitted the nation as its 51st
member state in February 1982 in a hotly
contested move which threatens to split
the organization. King Hassan, intensely
interested in the phosphate wealth3 of this
Martha Wenger is a member of CounterSpy's advisory
board. She is co-author with Joe Stork of Military
and Political Aspects of U.S.-Israeli Relations:
The Case of Cluster Bombs, prepared by the Middle
East Research and Information Project for the
American Middle East Peace Research Institute,
September 1982.
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otherwise barren region--which together
with Morocco's own deposits would make it
a world leader in phosphate reserves--
continues to fight. It is in this war
that Morocco is most likely to put the
cluster bombs to use.
Cluster bombs are fragmentation
weapons : they kill by inundating a large
area with deadly shrapnel fragments, expel-
led outward at extremely high velocities.
The bombs, used extensively by the U.S. in
the Indochina war, were specifically de-
signed as antipersonnel weapons. Arms
developers have increased the velocity of
the fragments to such an extent that some
varieties can penetrate tanks and armoured
vehicles, but antipersonnel applications
obviously have not been lost. Each Cluster
Bomb Unit is made up of hundreds of one to
two pound "bomblets" packed into a bomb-
shaped dispenser, or "mother" bomb. The
bomb is air-dropped, the dispenser opens
in flight and disperses the bomblets--each
of which explodes separately--over a wide
The 100 U.S.-made
cluster bombs Morocco
already has, and the
hundreds more on order,
strengthen King
Hassan's refusal to
negotiate with the SADR
and provide him with a
particularly abhorrent
weapon with which to
pursue this losing battle.
area.
The Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) describes the
CBU-58 supplied to Morocco as an antiper-
sonnel/antimateriel bomb with 650-670 golf
ball-sized steel bomblets packed inside a
seven foot metal cannister. The CBU-71 on
order, a more recent variety, contains" 650
fragmentation bomblets, each equipped with
a random delay fuze. (Many of the CBU
casualties in Lebanon were caused by indi-
vidual cluster bomblets that had been re-
38 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
leased from the dispenser, but had not ex-
ploded on impact. They went off only later
when accidentally moved or picked up by
curious people.) These bombs are effec-
tive killers: a single, modern CBU muni-
tion "has the equivalent effect of a well-
aimed barrage of 600 simultaneous rounds
of 81mm mortar fire."4
Lebanese and Palestinian doctors, and
the Vietnamese before them, found cluster
bomb injuries uniquely damaging and hard
to treat. Dr. Ammal Shamma, head of the
emergency room of a Beirut hospital for
seven years, told the Philadelphia Inquirer
she had never seen anything like it: "The
number of people who lose limbs....We've
had children literally brought in in
pieces. It's the most hideous group of
injuries' I've ever seen in my career." A
Norwegian , doctor working in Beirut said
that a cluster bomb fragment in the heel
could be so devastating that doctors are
forced to amputate above the knee; "Begin
amputations," he called them.5
The gruesome capabilities of cluster
bombs to maim and kill, massively demon-
strated in the U.S. bombing of Indochina,
spurred efforts to outlaw the weapon,
similar to those made to ban napalm. The
U.N. General Assembly in 1975 adopted by
consensus a resolution prohibiting or
restricting the use of indiscriminate or
excessively injurious conventional weapons.
The Swedish government has officially re-
commended to a Diplomatic Conference
charged with developing international lave[
that "cluster warheads" be banned entirely."
But no specific ban has been adopted to
date and the U.S. and five other nations
continue to produce and export the bombs.
Cluster bombs will be a particularly
useful weapon for Hassan's 40,000 troops.
In spite of their tremendous numerical and
arms superiority, the Moroccans have been
unable to defeat the Polisario fighters,
who know the desert terrain intimately and
have used it to their advantage. In fact,
the Polisario Front now controls 90 percent
of th7 Western Sahara's 127,000 square
miles, having steadily forced the Moroc-
cans to retreat into an enclave around the
(now abandoned) phosphate mines. There,
Hassan's troops are dug in behind a defense
line of sandbanks, mines, barbed wire, and
an electronic detection system supplied by
Westinghouse Corporation. . They seldom
range into Polisario-controlled territory.
Polisario keeps up frequent harrassing
raids on Moroccan bases, and even into
Morocco proper.
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The sole remaining strength of the
Moroccan military is its monopoly in air
power. (The U.S. has sold Morocco 20 F5-E
jet fighters and six OV-10 "Bronco" coun-
terinsurgency aircraft since 1976.8)
While the Polisario forces provide few of
the typical targets of air strikes--mili-
tary installations, tank formations, radar
command centers--the cluster bomb is de-
signed precisely for use in such wide open
spaces, and in situations in which the tar-
get is an entire area (and all the people
in it), rather than a specific point (such
as a tank). The CBU-24 used in Vietnam,
for example, covers an area approximately
300 meters wide by 1 kilometer long, 9 and
"it is a virtual certainty that any person
located within the pattern area will be
killed or wounded.1110 Thus the 100 U.S.-
made cluster bombs Morocco already has, and
the hundreds more on order, strengthen
King Hassan's refusal to negotiate with
the SADR and provide him with a particular-
ly abhorrent weapon with which to pursue
this losing battle.
1) Associated Press story in Chicago Tribune,
6/22/82.
2) Obtained by the Institute for Policy Studies,
Washington, D.C., in a Freedom of Information Act
request.
3) Phosphates are used primarily to produce fer-
tilizer, but in recent years chemical corporations,
among them Westinghouse, have developed technology
for extracting uranium from phosphates. Multina-
tional Monitor (November 1980, pp. 5-6) reported
that Westinghouse would like to sell its technology
to Morocco. The corporation already has cordial
relations with King Hassan who bought the $200
million electronic detection system from Westing-
house that now protects the Moroccan-held area of
Western Sahara.
4) Tom Gervasi, Arsenal of Democracy II (NY: Grove
Press, 1981), p. 2 .
5) Philadelphia Inquirer, 6/20/82.
6) The full name of the body is the Diplomatic
Conference for the Reaffirmation and Development of
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.
Eric Prokosch, "Technology and its control: Anti-
personnel Weapons," International Social Science
Journal 28, 2 (1976), pp. 343, 353.
7 A rica News 2/15/82.
8) a ""Arms Sales in North Africa and the Conflict
in the Western Sahara: An Assessment of U.S. Pol-
icy." Hearing before a subcommittee of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, March 25, 1981, p. 6.
9) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
Arms Uncontrolled (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1975), p. 71.
10) Michael Krepon, "Weapons Potentially Inhumane:
The Case of Cluster Bombs," Foreign Affairs 52, 3
(April 1974), pp. 596-7.
KNOW THE ENEMY
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COUNTERSPY
Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 39
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AirLand Battle: The Army's New
Aggressive Strategy
The U.S. Army has a new doctrine called
AirLand Battle. It is designed to deal
with "worldwide challenges." The Army
maintains that the purpose of AirLand
Battle is to deter war, but even the con-
servative U. S. News and World Report
states that AirLand Battle is "highly
sensitive politically, because it seems so
aggressive as to hold out the possibility
of a U.S. attack." One military analyst,
John Mearsheimer of Harvard University,
comments that the AirLand concept "comes
very close to calling for pre-emptive
strikes." As have past Army doctrines,
AirLand Battle ultimately relies on first
use of nuclear weapons. The key dif-
ference, however, is that nuclear - and
chemical - weapons are to be used very
early in the conflict. From the start,
these weapons are to be employed not on
the front line of battle, but deep in
enemy territory.
A recent article in the Army's
Military Review charges that the old Army
doctrine .. codified in Field Manual 100-5
TRADOC Brigadier
General Donald
Morelli ... declares that
"AirLand Battle is the
attempt to bring the lead
the Army has in the
laboratory to the
battlefield."
(published in July 1976; see CounterSpy,
vol. 7, no. 1) was inadequate because it
viewed "nuclear and conventional wars as
separate entities requiring wholly dif-
ferent approaches." "If we are going to
be responsible professionals" in the
40 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
"business of war-fighting," says Col. Gary
Werner of the Army's Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) in Fort Monroe, Va.,
nuclear and conventional weapons have to
be integrated, and the Army has to be pre-
pared to use conventional, nuclear and
chemical weapons.
Two elements are key in AirLand-
Battle, according to the new Field Manual
100-5 (published in August 1982) : "Early
initiation of offensive action" and
"attacking the full depth of the enemy."
Says FM 100-5, "any U.S. force operating
anywhere in the world must secure the ini-
tiative as early as possible and exercise
it aggressively. It will use every
weapon, asset and combat multiplier and
throw the enemy off balance with a power-
ful blow from an unexpected direction. It
will follow up rapidly to prevent his
recovery." FM 100-5 emphasizes further
that
surprise, concentration, and
violence can give the attacker his only
significant advantage - the initiative."
After gaining the initiative, U.S. troops
are urged to maintain it through
"relentless exploitation" until the enemy
is "destroyed."
Nuclear and chemical weapons are,
recommended for use 'against enemy troops
before they engage in battle. "Supported
with nuclear or chemical weapons, small
forces attacking at high speed may achieve
the same success as larger forces sup-
ported with conventional fires. Nuclear
or chemical preparatory fires may so
reduce the enemy's strength that deep,
multiple ... attacks are possible."
In depth attack, the second key con-
cept in AirLand, means that U.S. forces
should immediately expand the battlefield
into the enemy territory and not limit
themselves to fighting enemy troops in the
actual battle zone. By attacking enemy
formations and facilities far to the rear
of the battlefield, AirLand wants to pre-
vent enemy troops there from ever reaching
the battlefield. To this end, according
to FM 100-5, "nuclear weapons are par-
ticularly effective in engaging follow-on
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formations or forces in depth because of
their inherent power and because of
reduced concerns about [ friendly ] troop
safety and collateral damage."
The Army also has plans far beyond
AirLand Battle. AirLand 2000, a further
development of the aggressive AirLand con-
cept, is being drawn up to guide the Army
into the next century, when the battle-
field will have changed substantially.,
Its characteristics in the future,
according to TRADOC, are "large quantities
of sophisticated combat systems... battle
expanded into the airspace and depth of
enemy formations (300+ km) ; intensive
battle at the decisive points" instead of
a slow-moving battle of attrition and "le-
thality." There will be "more casualties
and more varied types of wounds ."
In order to win on such a battle-
field, says the Army, "we must achieve
combat advantage through the quality, not
the quantity of our weapons systems. This
means more accurate weapons, better sur-
veillance and reconnaissance equipment,
and more effective command and control
systems." On this battlefield of the
future, according to TRADOC, it is even
more important to gain the initiative from
the very beginning. Unlike the prolonged
wars of the past, future wars are likely
to be decided in the first battle. .
Col. Werner is optimistic about U.S.
capabilities twenty years from now. He
believes that the U. S. has a lead over the
Soviet Union (the assumed enemy) in high
technology and communication and recon-
naissance systems. U.S. superiority also
reaches into the area of electronic war-
fare which, according to TRADOC, "will be
a major component of combat power" and
will "include offensive weapons of
destruction." TRADOC Brigadier General
Donald Morelli agrees that there is a U.S.
technical advantage and declares that
"AirLand Battle is the attempt to bring
the lead the Army has in the laboratory to
the battlefield."*
Most of the scenarios played through
by the Army in preparation for the AirLand
*Increased reliance on electronic warfare has of
course stirred quite some excitement in the elec-
tronics industry. A recent editorial in Defense
Electronics lauded the development of the AirLand
Battle 2000 concept as "virtually unparalleled in
U.S. military history" which, "simply translated
means more lucrative opportunities for the electro-
nics industry."
A Substantial Step Toward Future Capabilities
CSWS (Corps Support Weapon System)
GLCM (Ground-Launched Cruise Missile)
MLRS (Multiple-Launch Rocket System)
Pershing II
Copperhead
FASCAM (Family of
Scatterable Mines)
ASAS (All-Source
Analysis System
(Corps/Division))
RPV (Remotely
Piloted Vehicle)
TACSAT (Tactical Satellite
Communications Subsystem)
SOTAS (Standoff Target
Acquisition System)
TACFIRE (Tactical Fire Direction System)
* C31 (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
MILITARY REVIEW
Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
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Nuclear and chemical
weapons are
recommended for use
against enemy troops
before they engage in
battles
doctrine take place in Germany. In case
of war in Central Europe, says TRADOC, the
Army, in its effort to gain the initiative
early on, would have to carry out "cross
border operations" especially along the
"inter-German border." More simply put,
U.S. or NATO troops will have to invade
the German Democratic Republic. According
to General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe, the NATO
allies have accepted the AirLand concept
and agreed on a new Allied Command Europe
doctrine based on it. The other NATO
countries agreed to AirLand even though
they had not been consulted in the pre-
parations for the AirLand doctrine. The
Reforger Maneuvers in Europe in early fall
1982 explored AirLand doctrine in practice
for the first time in concert with
European forces.
AirLand and AirLand 2000, together
with the procurement of highly sophisti-
cated weapons systems and more and more
nuclear weapons, push the U.S. and Europe
closer to war. Army public relations
efforts emphasize that AirLand is a
doctrine 'designed to counter Soviet or
Soviet-inspired invasions. Nonetheless,
even if one were to ignore the aggressive
role of the U.S. Army in the past, an exam-
ination of AirLand Battle itself uncovers
the overwhelmingly offensive aspects of
the doctrine. - Konrad Ege -
FM 100-5, August 1982 (Excerpts)
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
The object of all operations is to destroy the
opposing force. At the foundation of the US
Army's operations are the principles of war
and their application to classical and modern
theories. The Army's basic operational concept
is called AirLand Battle doctrine. This doc-
trine is based on securing or retaining the
initiative and exercising it aggressively to
defeat the enemy....
AirLand Battle doctrine takes a nonlinear view
of battle. It enlarges the battlefield area,
stressing unified air and ground operations
throughout the theater. It distinguishes the
operational level of war - the conduct of-cam-
paigns and large-unit actions - from the tacti-
cal level. It recognizes the nonquantifiable
elements of combat power, especially maneuver
which is as important as firepower. It acknowl-
edges the importance of nuclear and chemical
weapons and of electronic warfare, and it de-
tails their effects on operations. Most impor-
tant, it emphasizes the human element, coWaa-
geous, well-trained soldiers and skillful, ef-
fective Leaders.
In execution, AirLand Battle may mean us-
ing every element of combat power from psycho-
logical operations to nuclear weapons. The bat-
tlefield includes every area and enemy unit
that can affect the outcome of the immediate
fight, and it extends into the area of interest
where future operations will take place. An in-
novative approach to fighting at botl} the tac-
tical and operational levels, all arms, all
services, and all means of support.
To insure success, AirLand Battle doctrine
concentrates on -
?Indirect approaches.
.Speed and violence.
?Flexibility and reliance on the initiative
of junior leaders.
.Rapid decision-making.
.Clearly defined objectives and operational
concepts.
?A clearly designed main effort.
.Deep attack.
AirLand Battle offensives are rapid, vio-
lent operations that seek enemy soft spots, re-
main flexible, and exploit successes promptly.
The attacker creates a fluid situation, main-
tains the initiative, and destroys the coher-
ence of the enemy defense. Using supporting and
reserve units flexibly, the attack must contin-
ue as long as it takes to assure victory....
Whether attacking or defending, any US
force operating anywhere in the world must se-
cure the initiative as early as possible and
exercise it aggressively. It will use every
weapon, asset and combat multiplier to gain the
initiative and throw the enemy off balance with
a powerful blow from an unexpected direction.
It will follow up rapidly to prevent his recov-
ery.... At both the tactical and operational
levels and for all levels of command, initia-
tive, depth, agility, and synchronization are
the essence of AirLand Battle doctrine....
Surprise, concentration and violence can give
the attacker his only significant advantage -
the initiative. If the attacker loses the ini-
tiative, even temporarily or locally, he will
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jeopardize the success of the entire operation.
To maintain the initiative, the attacker must
see opportunities, analyze courses of action,
decide what to do, and act faster than the ene-
my - repeatedly. Aggressive maneuver, respon-
sive firepower, and effective deep attack are
essential to maintaining the initiative.
On today's battlefield the attacker must
maneuver rapidly, penetrate deeply, survive
powerful counterfires and countermeasures, and
above all, maintain momentum by maintaining
the initiative. If the attacker does not pre-
serve the momentum, the enemy will recover from
the shock of the first assault. He will identi-
fy the attacker's main effort and mass forces
and fires against it.
METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops
and time available), weapons, and the higher
commander's concept of operations determine the
conduct of an offensive operation. Whatever the
plan may be, CONCENTRATION, SURPRISE, SPEED,
FLEXIBILITY, AND AUDACITY are fundamental....
The battlefield is lethal, and the attack-
er must succeed early and maintain a rapid
pace. Thus, division and corps commanders
should concentrate for the attack and employ
every combat capability available to them. They
should allocate enough combat, combat support,
and combat service support units to permit them
to adjust missions and task organizations. Such
support and flexibility will allow the attacker
to exploit opportunities as they arise.
Every level of command practices concen-
tration of effort. However, it is most effec-
tive at division level and higher, where all
combat power, logistic resources, can be coor-
dinated in support of the plan. When concen-
trating forces for the attack, commander must
avoid patterns or obvious movements which indi-
cate the attack's timing or direction. Mobili-
ty, speed, security, and deception are essen-
tial to concentrate forces successfully.
Offensive operations, especially those in-
volving air-land operations, require arms and
services to cooperate closely to achieve con-
Mid-term objectives: The DoD
will acquire a more robust, reli-
able and survivable military
space capability through such
techniques as survivability en-
hancement, proliferation, mobili-
ty, reconstitution and the main-
tenance of adequate numbers and
types of space and launch vehi-
cle assets to provide for peace-
time failures and wartime attri-
tion. The DoD will deploy and op-
erate satellite and launch con-
trol facilities using organic DoD
resources to the maximum extent
practical and remove vulnerable
critical nodes from our space
system.
centration of effort. Air-ground operations are
complementary. Ground maneuver forces will be
the critical elements in an attack, but their
progress will depend on Army and Air Force re-
connaissance, close air support, and tactical
interdiction. The attacker's advance causes the
defender to concentrate and to move forces.
This, in turn, can create lucrative targets for
air attack. Air attack on enemy reserves and
defenses in depth promotes ground maneuver.
Concentration of combat and logistic sup-
port is also essential to maintaining offen-
sive momentum. Historically, disrupted engineer
assistance, air defense coverage, field artil-
lery support, communications, and logistic sup-
port have limited, the success of large offen-
sives. These functions require integrated staff
planning.
Nuclear and chemical weapons dramatically
increase the possibilities for sudden altera-
tions on the battlefield, which attacks can ex-
ploit. Troop concentrations should be brief,
deception should be of highest quality, and
plans should be flexible enough to accommodate
sudden changes. These imperatives, however,
represent only an extension of the characteris-
tics of a sound attack. Although risks will be
greater, the attacker will gain considerable
protection from nuclear fires by disrupting the
defender's fire support system and by confusing
him with speed.
Under nonnuclear conditions, developing
schemes of maneuver and then planning fire sup-
port to achieve their objectives are normal.
When nuclear weapons are available, planning
such fires and then basing schemes of maneuver
on their effects may be preferable....
Tactical schemes for the nuclear or the
chemical environment must stress rapid move-
ment, minimum massing, alternative routes, and
violent execution of simple plans even when
communications are lost. Nuclear or chemical
fire support may allow smaller units to accom-
plish missions that would require the massed
forces in a conventional battle.
The DoD will establish a pro-
gram for identifying, modifying
and integrating national intelli-
gence and civil space resources
into military operations for cri-
sis and wartime support or for
denying their use to an adver-
sary. In capabilities and opera-
tions planning, the military de-
partments and unified and speci-
fied commands should consider
these capabilities as supplemen-
tary except where system require-
ments such as tasking responsive-
ness and wartime endurance are
ducted in such a manner as to di-
minish the enemy's knowledge and
capability to discern specific
missions among the population of
national security satellites.
As a matter of policy, the DoD
will:
? Improve the survivability, per-
formance, and coverage of space
systems used to warn us of a So-
viet ballistic missile attack and
to assess its size and scope.
? Pursue an operational antisat-
ellite system.
?Accelerate those areas of tech-
assured. nology offering the potential for
The DoD will plan, control, and significant military advantage
operate national security shuttle and develop those space systems
missions. To maintain secure mil- that have been shown to enhance
i ary space operations, the mili- the U.S. military balance of pow-
tary space program will be con- er.
CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 43
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Pentagon Proposes:
"Peace Through Protracted top Nuclear War by Konrad Ege and Arjun Makhijani
The Reagan administration is preparing to
fight and win a nuclear war. President
Reagan has sent a strategic master plan to
the National Security Council to "give the
United States the capability, of winning a
protracted nuclear war with the Soviet
Union. 111 This plan is designed to put into
operational effect Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger's Defense Guidance for Fiscal
Years 1984 to 1988. The Guidance calls
for building up U.S. forces so as to be
able to "render ineffective the total
Soviet (and Soviet ? allied) military and
political power structure." It states
that in a "strategic nuclear war with the
USSR... the United States must prevail and
be able to force the Soviet Union to seek
earliest termination of hostilities on
terms favorable to the United States."'2
According to Webster's Dictionary, "pre-
vail" means to "gain victory by virtue of
strength or superiority; win mastery;
triumph."
These plans to wage and win a nuclear
war are the ultimate step in a general
strategy of aggression against the Soviet
Union. But they also target countries
striving to be independent from U.S. domi-
nation and liberation movements, which,
the administration believes are essen-
tially conspiracies hatched in Moscow.
The U.S. nuclear buildup has an economic
aspect as well. The administration is
intent on forcing the diversion of Soviet
resources from the civilian to the mili-
tary sector in the hope of provoking re-
volt or economic collapse or both. Failing
that, the administration plans to use the
nuclear superiority it hopes to achieve to,
"change Soviet behavior." Nuclear weapons
are seen as "the ultimate military guaran-
tor of American security," and the 1980
Republican National Platform proclaims,
that "we will build toward a sustained
defense expenditure sufficient to...reach
the position of military superiority.... "3
Richard Pipes, the National Security
44 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
Council's senior adviser on Eastern
Europe, believes that the Soviet Union must
choose between its socialist system and
war. Colin Gray, a presidentially-
appointed advisor on arms control, wrote
in a 1980 article in Foreign Affairs that
"the United States should plan to defeat
the Soviet Union and to do so at a cost
that would not prohibit U.S. recovery.
Washington should identify war aims that
in the last resort would contemplate the
destruction of Soviet political authority
and the emergence of a postwar world order
compatible with Western values." Gray's
statement is echoed by James Wade, Princi-
pal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, who told a
Congressional panel in secret testimony
that the Reagan nuclear program will
guarantee that "U.S. postwar posture and
international influence" are maintained
after a nuclear war. 4 Navy Secretary John
Lehman is even more blunt : "You have to
have a war-winning capability if you are
to succeed;" and a war-winning capability
depends in part on "clear maritime
superiority. "5
The Reagan administration's concerns
about nuclear war fighting are directed
towards deploying first strike weapons and
expanding the nuclear arsenal so as to
have a large number of weapons left after
both the Soviet Union and the United States
have been hit in a* strategic "nuclear ex-
change." This second aspect of the Reagan
strategy was confirmed by Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Strategic and
Theater Nuclear Forces, Thomas K. Jones.
He was pressed in a Congressional hearing
about the exact number of U.S. and Soviet
nuclear warheads, and then criticized for,
giving a figure for U.S. warheads lower
than official Pentagon numbers. Commented
Jones: "I may have been in error and con-
(Konrad Ege is co-editor of Counterspy magazine
and a freelance journalist. Arjun Makhijani is
a consultant on energy and economic matters.)
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fused -[the present number of warheads] tive measures of military power. But
with the balance at the end of the Soviet there are also qualitative dimensions
strike or the... exchange, because we no where we have countervailing strengths and
longer, in the Department [of Defense] advantages" over Soviet forces. Weinberger
compare the static indices of what each says that the final years of this decade
side has in its inventory." Instead, might be crucial for U.S.-Soviet confron-
Jones said, "we are more concerned with tations: "By the end of the 1980s, the
the balance that would follow a Soviet Soviets may encounter major economic dif-
attack on our strategic forces and the ficulties, just when the U.S. military and
balance after the U.S. responded in allied programs are beginning to show
kind."6 fully the effects of major improvement
According to Weinberger's Guidance, efforts." The U.S. government "should use
it might not be possible to build up U.S. this opportunity to help shape the future
forces sufficiently to win a protracted competition in ways which are advantageous
nuclear war within the next five years, to the United States."
and in any case, "our allies and we cannot In order to reach the point where the
expect to match the Soviets in quantita- U.S. will be in a position to "win" an
Who's Ahead ?
President Reagan's contention strike weapons is not designed include constant improvement
that U.S. nuclear forces must to achieve parity. It is an of the B-52 bomber, force;
be built up rapidly is based offensive program. introducing multiple indepen-
on charges that the Soviet The administration propa- dently targetable reentry
Union has a "definite margin gates another myth: that the vehicles (MIRVs) on Poseidon
of superiority." Nevertheless, large nuclear weapons buildup submarines (some 5,000 war-
Reagan does not believe the. is necessary because of the heads); adding 76 FB-111 bomb-
Soviet Union could win a nuc- previous "decade of neglect." ers to the Strategic Air Com-
lear war, and U.S. commanders Reagan goes so far as to say mand; taking into commission
have said repeatedly that, that the U.S. has been "uni- 356 F-111 nuclear capable
given the choice, they wouldn't laterally disarming." This is bombers; and retrofitting 900
switch forces with the Soviet simply not true. For most of MK12A weapons on 300 Minuteman
Union. It is obvious that this "decade of neglect," the III missiles. In addition,
Reagan's statements about a U.S. has been deploying new the U.S. developed a new
Soviet lead are either deliber- nuclear warheads at a rate of "family" of nuclear weapons -
ately misleading or based on three per day. Modernization the neutron bomb.
erroneous assumptions. Accord- programs in the last ten years
ing to figures based on Defense
Department, CIA, and Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic
Studies (London) statistics, II,
the Washington-based Center
for Defense Information states
that NATO has some 10,000
strategic nuclear weapons; the
Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO), 7,800. Half of the U.S.
strategic forces are on sub-
marines, which are virtually y
invulnerable. Each Trident
submarine alone can carry
enough nuclear weapons to
destroy 250 Soviet cities -
every city of over 100,000
people.
Clearly deterrence is as-
sured. While the Soviet Union
has an advantage in some weap-
ons systems, the U.S. is ahead J
in others. Overall, parity
exists. Therefore, Reagan's
"modernization program," intro- ~A1W NOyrouph!
ducing hundreds of new first
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extended nuclear war against the Soviet
Union, the administration has budgeted
$222 billion for its strategic program.
Two hundred twenty-two billion dollars is
the official figure only, though, and,
rather deceptively, does not include the
cost for the actual nuclear warheads of
the weapons systems to be built. The Con-
gressional Budget Office further estimates
that the Pentagon might be underreporting
the cost of the strategic program by some
25 percent. Therefore, the real cost of
,.-preparing to "win" an all-out nuclear war.
with the Soviet Union is at least $300
billion for the next five years. Rear
Admiral Eugene Carroll, who retired two
years ago as a high-ranking Pentagon
planner for conventional and nuclear war,
comments: "I think that that [ expenditure ]
is clear evidence of the implementation ~of
a new strategy shifting the United- States
from the idea that we are going to deter
nuclear war to a position designed to
fight, survive and win a nuclear war."7
nuclear bombs exploded over the United
States might be sufficient to render use-
less the entire C3 system. Pentagon offi-
cials admit, that even the improvements-
financed by the Reagan administration will
not be able to establish a fully "surviv-
able" C3 system. Therefore, any C3 up-
grading has to be seen primarily as an
offensive program.
When the C3 network was established
in the 1960s, its main functions were "to
detect and confirm an attack and to relay
the President's retaliation directives to
the nuclear forces;' Because of the Ore-
For Reagan, the era of
detente, of coexistence
and arms control
agreements with the
Soviet Union is over. The
era of relentless
confrontation has begun.
Reagan is preparing for
war against the Soviet
Union if other measures
to "change Soviet
behavior" fail, and he
believes the United
States can prevail in
such a war.
.II. Decapitation and Counterforce
The Defense Guidance indicates three prin-
cipal aims of U.S. nuclear war strategy
against the Soviet Union:
? Elimination of the leadership and
political structure in the Soviet Union
(decapitation) ;
? Destruction of the Soviet mili-
tary, particularly its nuclear weapons and
its industrial capacity to produce more
weapons (counterforce); and
? Preservation of the U.S. leader-
ship with large numbers of nuclear weapons
"sufficient for trans- and post-attack
protection and coercion."
The Pentagon is at present developing
and deploying weapons systems to fit the
requirements of the Defense Guidance -
primarily so-called counterforce weapons;
that is, extremely accurate missiles with
a capability to destroy hard targets such
as missile silos and command centers. The
key requirement for a nuclear war fighting
strategy is an integrated command, control
and communications (C3, pronounced C-cubed
system to coordinate U.S. forces. C
systems, which consist of ground-based.
radar installations, early warning sat-
ellites, military command centers and
communications networks, are inherently
vulnerable to nuclear weapons. (Nuclear
explosions give off a powerful electro-
magnetic pulse which destroys communica-
tions systems.) It is estimated that 50
dR __ ('rnrnt~+~c+^+ -- r1a^ 10R2 _ Fch_ 19R3
cently redefined U.S. strategic doctrine,"
says a Congressional Budget Office report,
the C3 system will have to be "dramatic-
ally" improved to be able to function "in
both the trans-attack [during a nuclear
attack on the U.S.] and post-attack
periods. 118 Air Force officials describe
C3 improvements as "top priority." In
Weinberger's words, "I can't think of any
higher priority than improving the C3
aspects" of , the strategic program.9
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Donald
Latham, the man in charge of the C3
program, stated in a secret Senate hearing
that a C3 system with "balanced capabili-.
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ties" would best be able to achieve "peace
through protracted nuclear war.1110
The administration has budgeted a
total of $18 billion (in 1982 dollars) for
strategic C3 system improvementll with
$3.8 billion to be spent in Fiscal Year
1983.12 In addition to upgrading the
North American air defense network, the C3
improvement program is to enhance the
"survivability and capability of command
centers that would direct U.S. strategic
forces during a nuclear war," and to
deploy "survivable" communications links
between the co mand centers and U.S
nuclear forces. l" Upgrading of the C
system will include the completion of the
Extreme Low Frequency (ELF) system in
Michigan and Wisconsin, 14 designed to give
orders to deeply submerged submarines; the
"hardening" of communications links to
"protect" them against the electromagnetic
pulse created by nuclear explosions; the
deployment of additional airborne command
posts; and the development of a new,
extreme high frequency and purportedly
jam-resistant satellite communications
system, MILSTAR.
The weapons and delivery systems to
be connected by the improved C3 system are
designed to fit into the strategy of decap-
itation and counterforce: the Pershing II
ballistic missiles, the MX intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the B-lB
bombers, the Trident submarines with their
D-4 or advanced D-5 missiles, anti-satel-
lite weapons, and the thousands of ground-,
sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles.
Each system has its place in the "win-
nable" nuclear war strategy. The Pershing
IIs to be installed in West Germany in
late 198315 are probably the most impor-
tant and dangerous element of the U.S.
buildup for a first strike capability.
Their flight time to the Soviet Union is
only six to eight minutes. John
Steinbruner, Director of the Foreign
Policy Studies Program of the Brookings
Institution noted that the Pershing Its
"could attack much of the central command
system of the Soviet Union.. . it looks that
it might be used, or intended to be used
as the spearhead of a preemptive attack
and is therefore a particularly threat-
ening v~-eapon from the Soviet point of
view.n16 Pershing Us , with special
"earth penetrator" warheads are ideal
weapons to use to destroy hardened under-
ground Soviet command centers - to
"decapitate" the Soviet military.
The MX missile is 'another first
strike weapon. Air Force Chief of Staff
Gen. Lewis Allen conceded in Congressional
testimony that these extremely accurate
counterforce weapons "have some first
strike capability," although he hastened
to add that a first strike capability is
"not our goal."17 MX missiles would most
likely be used very early in a conflict
since they are virtually unprotected
against enemy missiles.
Cruise missiles - the Pentagon plans
to buy about 8, 000 - are very flexible and
accurate weapons, ideal for "nuclear war
fighting" because they can be launched,
from virtually any land-, sea- and air-
based platform. They are to be used
against Soviet nuclear forces and radar
installations, for war fighting on the
battlefield, and against what the Pentagon
calls the "industrial/economic base of the
Soviet Union."
Many air-launched cruise missiles
will be carried on B-52G and B-52H bombers
and the newly develped B-1B. (Reagan
plans to buy 100 B-lBs.) With 22 cruise
missiles each, every B-lB bomber will be a
"superfortress," able to wipe out a dozen
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or more Soviet cities and military facili-
ties in one launch. Bombers are, of
course,, the most flexible and the most
important reusable nuclear delivery
system.
Ballistic missiles on Trident II sub-
marines, most notably the D-5 missiles
which will be operational in 1989, are
highly accurate and can therefore be used
as counterforce or first strike weapons.
The Reagan administration is planning to
build twelve Trident U submarines with 24
missiles; each missile has eight indepen-
dently targetable 100 kiloton warheads.
The D-5 missile will be able to carry up
to 1% warheads and has a range of 11,000
km.1
Space warfare will play an increas-
ingly important role in nuclear lgnd con-
ventional war in years to come. Anti
satellite weapons, capable of destroying
enemy early warning and communications
satellites, are crucial for a first strike
strategy. Two hundred eighteen million
dollars are budgeted for the anti-satellite
weapons program in Fiscal Year 1983;20 the
Air Force will have its first anti-
satellite weapons program operational in
the mid- or late 1980sZ1
To give its commanding officers a
chance to practice the use of these
weapons systems, the U.S. government has
greatly stepped up "realistic" exercises
for nuclear war. The Strategic Air
Command (SAC) has "made sweeping changes
in its training philosophy " to exercise
"the way it would fight."2Z From March 1?
to 5, 1982, the administration conducted
"Exercise Ivy League 82," which was "the
first complete exercise of the military
and 'civilian command structures and com-
munication . systems to be used in all-out
nuclear war since 1956.n23 The Pentagon
announced Ivy League 82 simply as "a
Reagan's First Strike Arsenal
Pershing II
Hundreds of thousands of West Germans have
demonstrated against the deployment of
Pershing II ballistic missiles in West
Germany, and some three million have signed
an appeal against the missiles. The reason
for this wave of protest is obvious: The
deployment of the Pershing II is not just
a "modernization" of nuclear forces in
Europe, and it is not a defensive program
to counter Soviet missiles; Pershing Us
are first strike weapons. According to
secret NATO documents, the NATO Nuclear
Planning Group decided in 1977 to deploy
the missiles.
The Pershing . Us are the most
dangerous and destabilizing weapons in the
U.S. arsenal. Their flight time to the
Soviet Union is less than ten minutes-
their margin of error is 25 meters. i
Former Army Secretary Clifford Alexander
explained that the Pershing Us are espe-
cially "credible" weapons because of this
accuracy and their "warhead option:"
either air burst/surface burst or "earth
penetrator.n2
These characteristics - extremely
short flight time and hard target capabil-
ity - make the Pershing Us a weapon
system uniquely suited to hit Soviet com-
mand and control centers early in a war.
The Pershing IIs' purpose is to
"decapitate" the Soviet government: "The
basing of the Pershing II on West German
soil," writes Blaetter fuer deutsche and
internationale Politik, a respected West
German monthly, "gives the American
president... the unprecedented option of
being able to threaten to decapitate
another world power permanently and out of
the blue. And all that from West Germany,,
far away from the Pentagon and the White
House." This is a "permanent and deadly
threat," and the Soviet Union has no
defense against it whatsoever."
The official number of Pershing Us
to be deployed in West Germany is 108.
The actual number is considerably higher.
The Department of Defense, without any
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routine [ ! ] worldwide command post ex-
ercise." The "scenario" for Ivy League,
stated a Pentagon Press release, was "a
fictitious series of worldwide events
leading to increased tension and conflict
among nations, thus providing headquarters
staffs, and the unified and special com-
mands with the opportunity to test plan-
ning and communication procedures in that
fictitious environment. "2'i During the
exercise, the United States was hit by a
massive - 5,000 megaton - nuclear attack
(the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had
the strength of one-fiftieth of a megaton).
Still, the Wall Street Journal wrote that
the exercise reportedly convinced Presi-
dent Reagan that "the nation has the plans
and the capability to maintain continuity
of government during a nuclear strike."
Beginning in 1983, the U.S. Army War
College in Carlisle, -Pennsylvania, will be
equipped with a new computerized war game
called Janus. Janus, with input from the
Defense Mapping Agency, can display any
part of the earth on its screens and si-
mulate a battle in progress. The Janus
project is designed to help officers learn
when and how to use nuclear weapons. Most
of the scenarios played take place in West
Germany. Janus Director Donald Blumenthal
of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory com-
mented that the officers using the com-
puter game tended to employ nuclear
weapons rather indiscriminately. "If they
were caught out of position, they would
try to retrieve the battle with nuclear
weapons."25 The Army argues that such
training will help officers to make intel-
ligent decisions in a real battle. But it
could have the opposite effect, too,
according to Massachusetts Institute of
Technology sociology professor Sherry
Turkle, by "numbing" the officers and
making nuclear war more thinkable.
public discussion, has found a fascinating
way to increase the number of Pershing Us
from the 108 approved by NATO to nearly
four hundred. The Army has ordered no
less than 385 Pershing II missiles. This
ingenious Pentagon mathematics counts not
the actual missiles but the launchers to
be deployed in separate units. Each unit
contains nine launchers and thirteen
Pershing II missiles. In addition, each
unit will have, according to an analysis
in the West German weekly Stern, ten spare
missiles. Moreover, Pershing II launchers
are easily reloadable, and the U.S. Army
The official number of
Pershings lls to be
deployed in West
Germany is 108. The
actual number is
considerably higher.
The Department of
Defense, without any
public discussion....
has ordered no less
than 385 Pershing 11
missiles.
plans to fire at least two missiles from
each launcher. All this adds up to the
almost 400 Pershing II missiles that the
Pentagon has on order. (The Army has even
taken into consideration that a mass move-
ment opposed to the Pershing Us might
prevent the Army from deploying them. In
that eventuality, the Army would substi-
tute short-range Pershing II missiles
capable of hitting targets within a 750 km
range. These short-range missiles could
be transformed into full Pershing Us
without major technical problems.)
The deployment of the Pershing Us
in West Germany scheduled for the end of
1983, will immediately increase the danger
of war. The Soviet government has warned
that the deployment may lead to a new
"launch on warning" posture. Under this
policy, Soviet nuclear missiles targeted
against the United States and Western
Europe "would be programmed for almost
instant action if computerized Soviet
intelligence monitoring facilities report
an imminent American threat to the Soviet
Union.114 There would be no time for
diplomacy, even of the "hot line"
variety.
Cruise Missiles
In addition to Pershing 11, NATO has de-
cided to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs) in Europe by the end of
1983. These missiles are extremely
accurate, and, with a 2,500 kilometer
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M. "We Must Not Fear War. "26
In an attempt to make nuclear war
"more thinkable" for the population as a
whole, the Reagan administration has insti-
tuted a civil defense program, with de-
tailed plans to solve the numerous pro-
blems that would arise from a "nuclear
exchange." At the same time, this program
is part of an effort to gain military
superiority. Ronald Reagan pointed out in
his budget message that "civil defense, as
an element of the strategic balance, should
assist in maintaining perceptions" that
the U.S.-Soviet balance of nuclear weapons
"is favorable to the U.S." (Emphasis
added. Reagan believes that his civil
defense program will "provide for survival
of a substantial portion of the U.S. popu-
lation in the event of nuclear attack pre-
ceded by strategic warning, and for contin-
uity of government, should deterrence and
range, can strike deep into the, Soviet
Union.6 (See Figure 1.) GLCMs are very
small weapons - only 219 inches long - and.
THEATER NUCLEAR TARGET COVERAGE
T .~ . \
111.11M \
~.OI~IM
I Ai
are hard for radar installations to
detect. Although they have a flight time
considerably longer than the Pershing II,
with their hard target capability they are
first strike weapons. Major General Niles
Fulwyler, head of the Army's Nuclear and
Chemical Directorate, confirmed in secret
testimony to Congress that a typical GLCM
target "would be a command center, a
nuclear delivery unit," or, added General
Robert Russ of the Air Force, "air defense
master centers. Thosc would be a high
priority sort of target."
Cruise missiles, based on land, sea
and air, are ideal "nuclear war fighting"
weapons. They are easy to retarget and
easy to transport. The Air Force has
escalation control fail. "27
The director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), Louis Giuffrida,
claimed that Reagan's civil defense pro-
gram is a "moderate, orderly, responsible
and inexpensive [ $4.1 billion ] way to
implement a complete population protection
program by the end of FY 189.11 Civil
defense programs are intimately tied to
overall planning for strategic war. Under
Reagan, the Pentagon has set up a Direc-
torate for Emergency Planning which is
responsible for coordinating "all Defense
Department emergency planning efforts...
and for ensuring that FEMA's planning for
nuclear attack preparedness is appropria-
tely integrated with other strategic
nuclear attack planning in the Department
of Defense."28
Obviously, the Reagan civil defense
program to provide "complete population
protection" can only lower the threshold,
already begun to deploy air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) on B-52G bombers;
the B-113s scheduled to be built will be
equipped with cruise missiles as well.
ALCMs have pinpoint accuracy. In a war,
they are likely to be launched - first from
bombers flying outside Warsaw Pact terri-
tory to attack air defense systems. The
way would then be clear for B-52s and
B-1Bs to penetrate deeper into Soviet
territory to destroy other targets.
The Air Force is expected to purchase
some 3,800 ALCMs while the Navy is buying
some 4,000 sea-launched cruise missiles
(SLCMs). Secretary of the Navy- John
Lehman sees the deployment of the SLCMs on
surface ships and submarines as "by far
the most rapid and cost-effective way to
distribute strike capability throughout
our naval forces." More than 100 U.S.
ships are to be fitted with Tomahawk
cruise missiles over the next five years,
beginning in early 1983. The Navy is
equipping four submarines with Tomahawk
cruise missiles already this year.9
The SLCM's are a key part of the
administration's desire to achieve a
nuclear war fighting capability, according
to Rear Admiral Frank Kelso, the Director
of the Navy's Strategic Submarine
Division. Kelso stated in a secret 1981
Senate hearing that the deployment of the
cruise missiles on ships and submarines
(most can be targeted against both ships
and land targets) "will result in a distri-
bution of significant firepower from a
wide variety of platforms.... The net
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of nuclear war. Some administration offi-
cials indeed seem to believe that a large
part of the population will survive a
nuclear war. Said Thomas Jones : "Every-
body's going to make it if there are
enough shovels to go around....Dig a hole,
cover it with a couple of doors and then
throw three feet of dirt on top. It's the
dirt that does it."29
In reality, it is questionable whether
humanity would survive an all-out nuclear
war. Some of the long-term results from
the explosion of thousands of nuclear
weapons all over the world (military bases
and other facilities used by U.S. and
Soviet forces in third countries would
certainly be targeted) are unpredictable.
The destruction of the ozone layer, for
instance, would allow high doses of ultra-
violet rays from the sun onto the earth
which would cause skin burns in humans and
animals and could destroy a large part of
the earth's vegetation; the resultant cli-
mate changes could lead to worldwide star-
vation.
As far as immediate protection for
the people in the U.S. against nuclear
explosions is concerned, the Reagan civil
defense program is unrealistic. It is
based on questionable assumptions such as
that cities will be evacuated in an
orderly way and people will leave their
guns behind; that the rural communities
where people are to be relocated will
welcome them; and that the Soviet Union
will wait until everybody is moved out of
the cities before it fires its missiles
and will not retarget them.30 Government
planning also fails to deal with - indeed,
cannot deal with - other dramatic con-
sequences of nuclear explosions. These
include widespread fires with few people
left fit to fight them; large amounts of
radiation emitted from destroyed nuclear
result is a survivable force of signifi-
cant capability.... In addition, the United
States would, in any post-nuclear exchange
environm nt, retain a measure of coercive
power."10
MX Missiles
The administration plans to build 100 MX
Intercontinental ' Ballistic Missiles, each
containing ten multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).
Former CIA Deputy Director Herbert
Scoville calls the MX a first strike
weapon which "will be ineffective if n9t
used to start a strategic nuclear war." 1
This is the case because the MX, although
extremely accurate and powerful enough to
destroy , hardened targets such as missile
silos, is itself unprotected against a
missile attack. (The "dense pack"
deployment strategy, or basing of the MX
in existing silos will not decrease this
vulnerability.) The MX is a classical
example of a "use them or lose them"
weapon.
A joint statement by Air Force
Secretary Verne Orr and Air Force Chief of
Staff Gen. Lewis Allen illustrates this
point: "With greater accuracy and more
than three times as many warheads as our
newest Minuteman missiles, the MX will be
able to hold at risk high value Soviet
targets such as hardened command posts,
nuclear storage sites, and missile
silos ."12 Yet Allen and Orr conceded that
the MX is vulnerable to a Soviet attack.
For public consumption, the MX is
billed as a "defensive" weapon. The
rationale put forward by the Pentagon is
that the U.S. needs to upgrade its land-
based ballistic missiles because a Soviet
attack would wipe out most of the current
force. This is a specious argument: if
the Soviets can wipe out the current
force, they can certainly target some of
their missiles at the new land-based MX
which will remain virtually unprotected
irrespective of the deployment mode. The
MX would have then proved useless except
if used in a first strike. Indeed, Paul
Nitze, Reagan's chief arms control nego-
tiator warned three years ago that to
deploy the MX in a vulnerable basing mode
"would increase crisis instability"
because it has "the negative feature of a
threatening but vulnerable U.S. first
strike counterforce capability."13
The Carter administration originally
proposed deploying the MX in the "race
track" system designed to hide it and pro-
tect it from a Soviet attack. The fact
that the Reagan administration is going
ahead with the MX deployment without any
real effort to protect it underscores the
first strike character of the MX.
President Reagan is supposed to
announce an interim MX basing decision by
the end of 1982, and, if the MX is to be
deployed on schedule, a permanent deploy-
ment mode will have to be determined in
time for the Fiscal Year 1984 budget. The
administration is considering a variety of
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power plants; "tens of millions, ' 31 of
human and animal cadavers; flooding from
broken dams; exploding fuel storage sites
and gasoline tanks in cars; and widespread,
outbreaks of disease due to unsanitary
water. Above all, the civil defense plan-
ners assume that people will obey orders
from the government - if there is a govern-
ment left capable of communicating with
the country.
A number of administration officials
fail to grasp these horrible realities.
,Vice President George Bush, for example,
was asked in a 1980 interview to comment
on the statement that any quantitative
advantages in nuclear weapons make no dif-
ference in light of the fact that the
United States is certain to be devastated
in a nuclear war. Bush replied that the
statement "makes a little sense.. .if you
believe there is no such thing as a winner
in a nuclear exchange... .1 don't believe
that." When pressed for a definition of
"winning," Bush mentioned "survivability
of command and control, survivability of
industrial potential, protection of a per-
centage of your citizens, and...a capabi-
lity that inflicts more damage on the
opposition that it can inflict on you,"
and stated that for him, winning would
also mean that more than 5 percent of the
people in the U.S. would survive. 32
IV. Making Sure the Bombs Survive
Reagan administration officials who
believe that a civil defense program can
"save a substantial portion" of the people
in the U.S. obviously are not reconciled
to the idea that the Soviet Union has
achieved nuclear weapons parity, and that
therefore, strategic nuclear war will in-
evitably end in global destruction. These
officials - and they , hold key posts in the
White House and the Pentagon - talk about
a "post nuclear exchange environment" in
which the U.S. would once again have un-
questioned nuclear superiority based on
its larger and more advanced nuclear
weapons stockpile. Indeed, having nuclear
weapons left after a prolonged war- while
the enemy has none appears to be the defi-
nition of "prevailing" and the basis for
shaping the world according to "Western,
values," as Colin Gray put it.
The emphasis on the "survival" of
options for both the interim and permanent
basing. Several of the options under con-
sideration would violate existing arms
control agreements. However, Defense
Secretary Weinberger seems little con-
cerned about violating or "revising" such
agreements. Overall, "in more than one
respect, the present U.S. Administration
is envisaging a future in which the
deployment of strategic nuclear weaponry
is not constrained by treaty."14
Footnotes
1) See F. Clifton Berry, "Pershing II:
First Step in NATO Theatre Force
Modernization," International Defense Re-
view, August 1979, p. 1303.
2 Ibid., p. 1304.
3) Karl Bredthauer, "Von der Anti-Hitler
Koalition zur Anti-Reagan Koalition?
Wiederholt sich die Geschichte?," Blaetter
fuer deutsche and internationale Polt k
No. 8, 1982.
4) Washington Post (WP), 4/11/82.
5) The Pentagon might have plans beyond
the deployment of the 464 GLCMs. It is
buying a total of 560 Tomahawk GLCMs.
6) Sverre Lodgaard, "Long range theatre,
nuclear forces in Europe," in The Arms
52 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
Race and Arms Control, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute,
1982, p. 144.
7) Department of Defense Appropriations
for 1983, Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, House
of Representatives, 97th Congress, Second
Session, Part 4,
p.
429.
8) Ibid., Part 2,
p.
290.
9) Ibid., Part 2,
p.
13.
10) Strategic
Force
Modernization
Programs, Hearings before
the Subcommittee
on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, 97th Congress, First Session,
October 26-30; November 3, 4, 10, 12, 13,
1981, p. 203.
11) See Jack Coihoun, "White House Fumbles
and Bumbles on MX," The Guardian (New
York), 5/12/82, p. 7.
12) Cf supra, #7, Part 2, p. 302.
13) R. Jeffrey Smithf "Reagan's Plan for
MX Attracts Fire," Science, 4/9/82, p.
150.
14) Frank Barnaby and Randall Forsberg,
"Strategic Nuclear Weapons," in The Arms
Race and Arms Control, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute,
1982, p. 88.
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nuclear weapons and the command, control
and communications facilities essential to
use them is further underscored by the
Reagan administration's plans to build a
"surge capacity" for plutonium production
- a capacity far beyond the needs of even
the expanded nuclear weapons program now
underway. (Today, the U.S. has some
28,000 nuclear weapons in its stockpile.
President Reagan has called for a "drama-
tic increase in warhead production," and
over the next ten years, the Pentagon
wants to produce 23,000 nuclear warheads
(about 6 per day), some of which are to
replace out-of-date systems, others are
entirely new types of weapons.33)
The strategy of the Reagan admini-
stration to "prevail" in a nuclear war
is based on the reactionary desire to go
back to the good old days of nuclear mono-
poly or clear superiority when the U.S.
could freely use nuclear threats against
the Third World and make plans to turn the
Soviet Union into a "smoking, radiating
ruin" with impunity. Since it has been in
possession of nuclear weapons, the United
States government has worked out numerous
plans for atomic destruction of the Soviet
Union. (Some of the plans are excerpted
in the annex to this article.) Many of
these strategies, though essentially
aggressive in nature, were wrapped in the
cloak of defensive operations to counter a
Soviet attack on Western Europe. Others
openly contemplate a first strike against
Eastern Europe.
OPLAN 100-6, a nuclear war plan for
Europe in the 1960s, for instance, pro-
vided for such a first strike. According
to OPLAN 100-6's "Attack Option I," the
objective of a preemptive strike "is the
destruction or neutralization of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear deli-
very forces posing a threat to the U.S.
and its allies and allied forces over-
seas." "Attack Option II" in OPLAN 100-6
included "Option I plus the destruction or
neutralization of other elements of
Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces and mili-
tary resources in being."34 Under this
option, the U.S. planned to wipe out thir-
teen (out of twenty) Soviet divisions and
ten (out of twenty) allied divisions sta-
tioned in other Warsaw Pact countries.
OPLAN 100-6 was also designed to sow
dissention and conflict among Socialist
countries. It was to "exploit military
and political opportunities ... generated to
penetrate into certain European satellite
areas in order to create situations fav-
ourable to successful satellite rebellion
against Soviet domination." (OPLAN's stra-
tegy that a selective use of nuclear
weapons against "centers of Soviet power"
would lead to uprisings by the "captive
nations" of Eastern Europe is still pre-
sent in some strategic thinking today.35)
A secret Air Force Nuclear Yield
Requirements manual of the early 1960s
prescribes that in the event of a nuclear
war, U.S. forces could drop 18-20,000
megatons of nuclear weapons on Europe
within 24 hours. The yield requirements
manual provides for atomic bombing of
Eastern Europe and U.S. allied and
A secret Air Force
Nuclear Yield
Requirements manual of
the early 1960s
prescribes that in the
event of a nuclear war,
U.S. forces could drop
18-20,000 megatons of
nuclear weapons on
Europe within 24
hours ... In addition,
there were some fifty
other targets in Iran,
Syria, Iraq and Egypt.
friendly countries, such as West Germany,
Iran and Austria, as well as Finland and
Yugoslavia. Other targets to be bombed
with nuclear weapons - presumably to pre-
vent the Soviet Air Force from using them
as bases - were three airfields close to
Cairo, three in Tehran (other Iranian
targets were Abadan, Hamadan, Kermanshah
and Tabriz), one airfield in Baghdad and a
British air base in Habbinayah, Iraq. In
addition, there were some fifty other
targets in Iran, Syria, Iraq and Egypt.
For West Germany, the Pentagon had a
"radioactive earth" strategy, should it be
taken over by Warsaw Pact forces. Under a
"Barrier and Denial Plan," U.S. commanders
were prepared to blow up dozens of atomic
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demolition mines on major West German
roads (prepared chambers for these mines
still exist) , and to destroy all major
bridges. Worse yet, in order to "deny"
them to a potentially advancing enemy, the-
U.S. was prepared to drop nuclear bombs on
a number of West German cities. U.S.
plans also say that enemy troops are to be
maneuvered into nuclear "killing grounds"
- areas with large concentrations of atom-
ic demolition mines, or areas certain to
be bombed. (In addition to destroying and
irradiating West Germany with nuclear
weapons, a 1962 document signed by U.S.
Lt. Gen. John Michaelis orders U.S. troops
to empty their petroleum and other fuel
storage sites into rivers and ignite them
before retreating.,36 )
V. Reagan Takes It to The Brink
Achievement of nuclear parity by the
Soviet Union in the late 1960s/early 1970s
did not deter Pentagon planners from forg-
ing ahead with a counterforce strategy.
"The only plausible reason" for developing
such a counterforce capability, wrote
nuclear weapons researcher Robert Aldridge,
"is to acquire the capacity to launch an
unanswerable first strike against the
Soviet Union."37 A counterforce strike
makes sense only if it is delivered before
the enemy fires its missiles; otherwise it
hits only empty missile silos.
In the early 1970s, President Richard
Nixon approved the so-called Flexible
Options Strategy (National Security Deci-
sion Memorandum 242). NSDM 242 was a
nuclear war fighting doctrine, discarding
the idea of mutually assured destruction
in the event of a global nuclear war. The
Carter administration went even -further in
its nuclear war fighting plans with the
approval of Presidential Decision 59.
According to secret Carter administration
testimony, "PD 59 specifies the develop-
ment of plans to attack a comprehensive
Soviet/Warsaw Pact target system, with the
flexibility to employ these plans, should
deterrence fail, in a deliberate manner
consistent with the needs of the situation
and in a way which will deny an aggressor
any gain." PD 59 acknowledged that the
role of U.S. strategic forces goes much
further than deterring a Soviet 'nuclear
attack : "Our strategic forces also must
deter... the nuclear coercion of, or attack,
on, our friends and allies. Our strategic
forces..-.must also contribute to deterrenc9
of conventional aggression as well. "
54 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
As with all other U.S. nuclear strategies
and plans, PD 59 relies on first use of
nuclear weapons.
Ronald Reagan was not the first pre-
sident after parity was attained to order
a nuclear war fighting strategy. His
strategy is a gradual development of those
By further escalating the
strategy contained in PD
59, Ronald Reagan has
taken the people of the
world to the end of the
spiral of nuclear war
plans. The next step is
nuclear war itself.
outlined in NSDM 242 and PD 59. But by
further escalating the strategy contained,
in PD 59, Ronald Reagan has taken the
people of the world to the end of the
spiral of nuclear war plans. The next
step is nuclear war itself.
More than the Carter administration,
Ronald Reagan ? and his administration are
engaged in an economic and ideological war
against the Soviet Union. For Reagan, the
-era of detente, of coexistence and arms
control agreements with the Soviet Union,
is over. The era of relentless confron-
tation has begun. Reagan is preparing for
war against the Soviet Union if other
measures to "change Soviet behavior" fail,
and he believes the United States can pre-
vail in such a war.
Confrontation with the Soviet - Union
is the driving force behind Reagan policies.
The administration believes that destroying
the Soviet political and economic system
will solve most problems confronting the
U.S. government and U.S. corporations
today. For the sake of being able to
spend an unprecedented amount of money on
war preparations, this administration has
been forced to do away with the "guns and
butter policies" of the past which pre-
vious administrations had used to promote
and maintain anti-Sovietism in the United
States. The Reagan administration is the
first government to cut and eliminate
social programs in order to pursue more
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A Suicidal Illusion
Contrary to what the adminis- sufficient to completely des- Who would a U.S. commander
tration believes, it is impos- troy each country. Nuclear talk to in the Soviet Union
sible to acquire military devastation of the United about "controlling the nuclear
superiority over the Soviet States is assured in case of escalation" or stopping the
Union. Assertions of an nuclear war, no matter how war once the Soviet leadership
"American capacity to outbuild many additional nuclear weap- is wiped out - even if the U.S.
the Soviet Union" (Eugene ons Reagan orders. All the communication system is still
Rostow, Director, Arms Control administration can do - and is functional?
and Disarmament Agency) are doing - is to build up huge Retired Air Force Lt.
based on illusions. The arsenals . of first strike Gen. Brent Scowcroft recogni-
Soviet government has stated weapons that might result in a zes this as "a real dilemma
repeatedly that it will not U.S. government perception of that we haven't sorted out."
allow the U.S. to achieve nuclear superiority, thereby He pointed out during a 1982
nuclear superiority, and if greatly increasing the danger meeting by the Air Force
past Soviet successes in of war. Electronic Systems Division
catching up with U.S. tech- The nuclear war will be that "the kinds of controlled
nical advantages are any indi- unwinnable because, once be- nuclear options to which we
cation, the Soviet Union will gun, it would be impossible to are moving presume communica-
make good on that promise. end. This is particularly tions with the Soviet Union;
In any case, quantitative true given the U.S. strategy, and yet, from a military point
superiority based on having a as described by the National of view, one of the most effi-
larger number of nuclear Security Council's Richard cient kinds of attack is
weapons is meaningless in an Pipes, to attack first "mili- against leadership and command
age in which a small fraction tary objectives, command and and control systems." (See
of the nuclear forces of control, and the nerve system Washington Post, 7/22/82.)
either the U.S. or the USSR is of the Soviet leadership."
adamantly an anti-Soviet policy. Again
for the sake of "confronting" the Soviet
Union, Reagan is willing to create deep
frictions within the NATO alliance.
No one should be fooled. Government,
documents such as Weinberger's Defense
Guidance and Reagan's order for a master
plan to win nuclear war have been made
public. People in the United States and
the world over do know about the adminis-
tration's war winning plans. Some seem to
have a hard time believing what the admin-
istration is planning. But the administra-
tion is not only planning, it is acting by
deploying first strike nuclear weapons
systems. As announced in the Defense
Guidance, it is opening up "new areas of
major military competition" by deploying
the cruise and Pershing II missiles and
developing weapons systems for space war.
The administration is also engaged in
a build-up of conventional forces which,
according to the Guidance, "in conjunction
with those of our allies, should be capable
of putting at risk Soviet interests, in-
cluding the Soviet homeland." To ensure
that those allies are prepared to do their
part, the Reagan administration is
pressuring Western European countries and
Japan to hike their defense budgets. The
Guidance announces that the U.S. is pre-
pared to "exploit political, economic and
military weaknesses within the Warsaw
Pact." The administration is trying to do
just that with its natural gas pipeline
embargo and attempts to force other NATO
countries to go along.
One could point to virtually every
prescription in the Defense Guidance and
then, by examining the Reagan military
buildup and other policy measures, confirm
that the administration is acting on it in
detail. We are left with no choice but to
accept the Guidance's key dictates as the
literal parameters of the Reagan strategy:
In a strategic nuclear war, "the United
States must prevail." In the late 1980s,
the U.S. will have, and should use, the
"opportunity to help shape the future
competition" with the Soviet Union "in
ways which are advantageous to the United
States."
Footnotes:
1 Los Ang eles Times (LAT), 8/15/82.
2) All quotations from the Defense Guidance are
cited in articles in the Washington Post (5/25/82,
5/27/82, 6/2/82, and 6/19/82; and the New York
Times (5/29/82, 6/4/82, 6/5/82, 6/6/82_,_6/_7_F82_,
6/13/82, 6/19/82, 6/20/82, 6/21/82, and 6/22/82.)
3) 1980 Republican National Convention Platform, p.
31. -
4) Department of Defense Authorization for 1983,
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
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Appropriations, House of Representatives, 97th
Congress, Second Session, part 4, p. 462.
5) See ibid., part 2, pp. 5-22.
6) Ibid., part 4, p. 403.
7) Interview with Pacifica Radio, Washington, D.C.
8) Strategic Command, Control and Comrpunications:
Alternative Approaches to Modernization, Congres-
sional Budget Office, Washington, D.C., October
1981, pp. IX, X, 19.
9) Strategic Force Modernization Programs, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Nuclear
Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, 97th Congress, First Session, 1981, p. 233.
Most of these hearings were held in executive ses-
sion and are now available in a heavily censored
form.
10) Ibid.
11) Ibid., p. 256.
12) Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Hearings be-
fore the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
97th Congress, Second Session on S.2248, 1982, part
2, p. 946.
13) Cf supra, #9, p. 212.
14) See Thomas Murphy, "ELF - Preparing for a First
Strike," Counterspy, vol. 7, no. 1. The ELF system,
as advocated by the Reagan administration, consists
of an 84 mile grid of cables - down from the 6,000
miles originally planned. ELF is a prima facie
first strike system. Vice Admiral Gordon Nagler,
Director of Command and Control in the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged under
intense questioning by Michigan Senator Levin that
ELF is not a survivable system in the event of a
nuclear war. Therefore, its construction makes
sense only with the intent to use it before nuclear
weapons hit the United States.
15) Irrespective of the political opposition to the
Pershing U deployment in West Germany, deployment
might be delayed for technical reasons. As of
October 1982, the Army has yet to successfully
testfire a Pershing II. Thomas K. Jones, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, was asked in a
Congressional hearing about the difficulties
resulting from the deployment of a missile that has
not been tested sufficiently. He said there would
be no problem since the Soviets "will have little
choice but to assume that our missiles will work."
16) Interview with Pacifica Radio, Washington, D.C.
17) As quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pentagon Moves
Toward First-Strike Capability," Science, 5/7/82,
p. 596.
18)Frank Barnaby and Randall Forsberg, "Strategic
Nuclear Weapons," in The Arms Race and Arms Con-
trol, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, Stockholm, 1982, p. 90.
19) See John Pike, "Reagan Prepares for War in
Outer Space," Counterspy, vol. 7, no. 1.
20) Cf supra, #4, part 2, p. 305.
21) Cf supra, #12, part 1, p. 702.
22) Major Bruce Eickhoff, USAF, "SAC Trains the Way
it Would Fight," Air Force Magazine, February 1982,
p. 62.
23) Wall Street Journal, 3/26/82, p. 1.
24) News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense, No. 86-82, 2/26/82.
25) Time, 8/16/81, p. 59.
26) Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
James Wade to the House Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee, 9/15/81.
27) Air Force Magazine, June 1982, p. 73.
28) Ibid., pp. 72, 73.
-- Counteru'r, -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
29) LAT, 1/15/82.
30) See Washington Post (WP), 4/24/82.
31) Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Effects of
Nuclear WE, April 1979, p. 25.
32) LAT, 1/23/80.
33) See William Arkin, Thomas Cochran and Milton
Hoenig, "The U.S. Nuclear Stockpile," Arms Control
Today, April 1982, p. 1. See also their Nuclear
Weapons Data Book, prepared for the National fie-
sources Defense Council.
34) All quotations are from The Statesman, 6/27/80,
pp. 959-960. These nuclear war plans were sent ano-
nymously to several British publications and poli-
ticians. Similar documents were obtained by the
West German magazine Stern ten years earlier.
Military officials have coon imed that the docu-
ments are authentic; they claim that they were
obtained and then made public by Soviet intelli-
gence.
35) See Gary L. Guentner, "Strategic Vulnerability
of the Soviet Multinational State," Political
Science Quarterly, Summer 1981. Guentner argues
that the use of nuclear weapons against "central
areas of the USSR" with a high concentration of
ethnic Russian people would "significantly increase
Soviet vulnerability." He states that if these
Russian areas were attacked, other Soviet national-
ities and Eastern European countries might rise up
against the Russians. "Prevailing wind patterns
throughout the year ensure that early fallout (the
most lethal) would cover areas with the highest
population density and with the highest concentra-
tion of ethnic Russians. The implications are
clear: in the event of a nuclear attack, Soviet
minorities have a far better chance of survival
than ethnic Russians."
36) Stern, Hamburg, No. 6, No. 7, 1970.
37) See Robert Aldridge, The Counterforce Syndrome,
Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.,
1981.
38) Nuclear War Strategy, Hearing before the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th
Congress, Second Session, 9/16/80, p. 29. The
hearing was "sanitized" and published on 2/18/81.
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DOCUMENTS: U.S. Nuclear War
Plans Against the Soviet Union
1948
Only seven weeks after the end of
World War II, U.S. military offi-
cials had drafted their first war
plan against the Soviet Union. A
Joint Intelligence Staff docu-
ment, "Strategic Vulnerabilities
of Russia to a Limited Air At-
tack," called for dropping twenty
atomic bombs on Soviet cities. In
late 1945, General Dwight Eisen-
hower, then Commander in Chief in
Europe, produced another war plan
against the Soviet Union, symbol-
ically entitled "Totality." These
two plants, while not immediately
militarily feasible, laid the
groundwork for a number of plans
to destroy the Soviet Union with
nuclear weapons and to occupy it.
Operation Dropshot - its full
title was "Long Range Plans for
War with the USSR - Development
of a Joint Outline Plan for Use
in the Event of a War in 1957" -
was prepared for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff with President Harry
Truman's authority. It argues
that "the ultimate objective of
the leaders of the USSR is the
domination of the world" and
calls for U.S. forces to crake
heavy atomic attacks on the Sovi-,
et Union and eventually to occupy
it. Operation Dropshot claimed
that the U.S. would be waging a
defensive war after a Soviet at-
tack on Western Europe. Neverthe-
less, it explicitZ.y contemplates
a "preventative" nuclear attack
against the Soviet Union.
1. Under the over-all strategic
concept it is essential that (a)
the air offense be initiated im-
mediately, (b) it be initiated
and sustained in sufficient force
to be effective, (c) targets or
target systems destroyed-be those
which contribute most to the re-
duction of war-making capacity,
and (d) the results of the effort
be reflected immediately in the
reduction of the offensive capa-
bilities of the Soviet military
forces, particularly with respect
to their capability to employ
weapons of mass destruction.
2. The use of atomic weapons in
a strategic air campaign against
the U.S.S.R.... is considered es-
sential to the provision of ade-
quate initial destructive capa-
bilities to that air effort....
For planning purposes herein it
is assumed that the development
of atomic munitions in the
U.S.S.R. will give the U.S. a
quantitative advantage, on D-Day,
in the order of 10 to 1 and that
the Soviets lag slightly behind
the U.S. in technical development
of both offensive and defensive
weapons.
3. Target systems selected for
atomic attack, and the timing and
magnitude of the initial attack
are based on the reggirement for
early and effective preventative
attack if such action becomes
feasible and on the requirement
for destruction of their off en-
sive capabilities against our own
war potential. They are extended
to include the early destruction
of selected elements of the Sovi-
et war making capacity. The fol-
lowing general considerations are
deemed pertinent to atomic target
selection at present and in 1955.
a. Destruction of stockpiles of
atomic bombs or other weapons of
mass destruction, stocks and pro-
cessing plants of fissionable ma-
terials, and any known operation-
al supplies of such weapons must
be destroyed as soon as possible
after the outbreak of hostili-
ties.
b. The initial atomic campaign
must provide for its employment
against the political, govern-
mental, administrative, and tech-
nical and scientific elements of
the Soviet nation. They include
urban areas as an essential ele-
ment in basic industries. Insep-
arable from the destruction of
urban areas, major destruction
would be accomplished on industry
itself. No over-all change in the
location of Soviet centers of in-
dustry and population can be ex-
pected to occur during the next 8
years, with the exception of ad-
ditional development of limited
extent, hence, weapon require-
ments will be modified primarily
by the effectiveness of available
bombs, and means of delivery,
rather than through revision of
the over-all target complexes.
c. The use of atomic weapons in
reasonable quantity will permit
the achievement of great physical
destruction with relatively small
CounterSpy
effort within a-short time. In
addition to this physical de-
struction, it seems reasonable to
anticipate that the use of the
weapon would create a condition
of chaos and extreme confusion.
Operation Dropshot was a plan not
only for full-scale war, but also
for "cold war." In striking simi-
larity to the Reagan administra-
tion's current Defense Guidance
dictates, the Dropshot planners
emphasized the need for an anti-
Soviet campaign in time of peace.
U.S. OBJECTIVES AND AIMS VIS-A-
VIS THE U.S.S.R.
19. To counter the threats to our
national security and well-being
posed by the U.S.S.R., our gener-
al objectives with respect to
Russia, in time of peace as well
as in time of war, should be:
a. To reduce the power and in-
fluence of the U.S.S.R. to limits
which no longer constitute a
threat to the peace, tational in-
dependence, and stability of the
world family of nations.
b. To bring about a basic
change in the conduct of interna-
tional relations by the govern-
ment in power in Russia, to con-
form with the purposes and prin-
ciples set forth in the U.N.
charter.
In pursuing these objectives due
care must be taken to avoid per-
manently impairing our economy
and the fundamental values and
institutions in our way of life.
20. We should endeavor to achieve
our general objectives by methods
short of war through the pursuit
of the following aims:
a. To encourage and promote the
gradual retraction of undue Rus-
sian power and influence from the
present perimeter areas around
traditional Russian boundaries
and the emergence of the satel-
lite countries as entities inde-
pendent of the U.S.S.R.
b. To encourage the development
among the Russian peoples of at-
titudes which may help to modify
current Soviet behavior and per-
mit a revival of the national
life of groups evidencing the
ability and determination to
achieve and maintain national in-
dependence.
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c. To eradicate the myth by
which people remote from Soviet
military influence are held in a
position of subservience to Mos-
cow and to cause the world at
large to see and understand the
true nature of the U.S.S.R. and
the Soviet-directed world Commu-
nist party and adopt a logical
and realistic attitude toward
them.
d. To create situations which
will compel the Soviet government
to recognize the practical unde-
sirability of acting on the basis
of its present concepts and the
necessity of behaving in accor-
dance with precepts of interna-
tional conduct, set forth in the
purposes and principles of the
U.N. charter.
1950
A 1950 plan, codenamed HARROW,
directed the Air Force to uni-
laterally initiate action in case
of "sudden hostilities." In 1950,
the Soviet Union had virtually no
deliverable nuclear weapons.
Department of the Air Force
Memorandum for: CHIEF, WAR PLANS
DIVISION
bombs will be limited by produc-
tion. The most rapid and reliable
initial provision of the assem-
bled bombs in the United Kingdom
can be obtained by transporting
bomb components, partially assem-
bled, in modified aircraft to the
forward assembly point. In this
plan we use the 509th Bomb group
for that purpose, and at present
all modified aircraft would be
scheduled individually from the
Zone of Interior to the forward
base areas and on to the target,
and then returned to the United
States to prepare for the next
mission.
... the entire initial effort
is devoted primarily to achieving
success in the atomic offensive.
However, concurrently with the
atomic strike, deceptive missions
must be flown by conventional
bombers, and conventional bombers
must accompany the atom carriers
to cover their flights and pro-
vide counter-electronic measures.
In this plan, reconnaissance and
divisionary missions, flown from
every theater, will support the
atomic offensive. Everything pos-
sible must and will be done to
make the enemy believe that every
airplane over their territory is
a potential atom carrier and they
may not concentrate their defen-
sive action on atom carriers
alone.
'ATTACK ALONG THE ROUTES WE HAVE
ESTABLISHED. THE CARRIER TASK
FORCES, SUPPORTED BY THEIR UNDER-
WAY REPLENISHMENT GROUPS, ALSO
WILL ATTACK APPROPRIATE TARGETS.
THIS CAREFULLY EVALUATED CONCEPT
DOES NOT CALL FOR THE AIRLIFT OF
HUGE LAND ARMIES TO THE BATTLE
AREA DURING THE FIRST HOURS OF A
GENERAL WAR. THE FULL CAPABILI-
TIES OF AIR MOBILITY WOULD, ON
THE OTHER HAND, BE UTILIZED TO
APPLY THE MAXIMUM FORCE IN THE
MOST TIMELY MANNER. OUR EVALUA-
TION INDICATES THAT THE AVAIL-
ABLE AIRLIFT, IN BEING, AND PRO-
GRAMMED FOR THE FUTURE, WILL SUP-
PORT THIS CONCEPT.
FOLLOWING THE MASSIVE ATOMIC
ATTACK, OUR MILITARY AIR TRANS-
PORT FLEET, AUGMENTED BY A FULLY
MOBILIZED CIVIL RESERVE AIR
FLEET, CURRENTLY CONSISTING OF
SOME 350 FOUR-ENGINE AIRCRAFT,
AND FURTHER AUGMENTED BY THAT
PORTION OF OUR HUGE TANKER FLEET
WHICH COULD BE DIVERTED TO A
TRANSPORT MISSION, WOULD BE
AVAILABLE TO SUPPLEMENT OUR SEA-
LIFT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MORE
PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES, AND UNITS
FOR THE FOLLOW-UP OFFENSIVE AC-
TION.
1980
Subject: Commanders' Conference at
Hq USAF - 17 and 18 April 1950
HARROW is a unilateral Air Force
emergency plan. At the time it was
put oil paper there was no jointly-
approved concept of operations,
and the Air Force was without a
current plan of action to meet an
emergency situation. HARROW pro-
vided a basis for initiating ac-
tion in the event of sudden hos-
tilities, and it provided a yard-
stick for measurement of Air Force
capabilities and an indication of
the action required to improve our
current. position....
. The initial atomic and conven-
tional air offensive against the
Soviet Union will be conducted
from the United Kingdom and Kara-
chi, and, until they are neutral-
ized, Triploi, Abu Sueir in the
Cairo-Suez area and Dhahran.
Practically all of the major ob-
jectives can be reached from
bases in the United Kingdom and
Karachi without refueling. Until
the initial stockpile of A-bombs
is consumed, the rate at which
atomic bombs can be delivered
will be limited by the current
availability of bomb assembly
equipment and bomb assembly
crews. Thereafter delivery of
1957
U.S. strategy in the late 1950a,
a time of overwhelming U.S. nu-
clear superiority, called for a
massive strategic bombardment of
the Soviet Union in case of war,
according to a top secret White
House briefing given to "Congres-
sional leaders" on January 1,
1957.
THE INDIGENOUS FORCES OF OUR
ALLIES, AUGMENTED BY DEPLOYED
U.S. GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR
FORCES WITH ATOMIC CAPABILITIES,
WILL HOLD ANY ATTACK LAUNCHED BY
THE ENEMY. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE
SHALL LAUNCH OUR FULLY ALERT AND
MOBILE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, AND
FAST CARRIER TASK FORCES, IN A
MASSIVE ATOMIC ATTACK AGAINST THE
WARMAKING CAPABILITIES OF THE EN-
EMY. THIS CONCEPT MAKES THE MAXI-
MUM USE OF THE INHERENT MOBILITY
CHARACTERISTICS WE HAVE BUILT IN-
TO-THOSE FORCES. IN A MATTER OF
HOURS, OUR READY STRATEGIC AIR
COMMAND, SUPPORTED BY ITS OWN IN-
TEGRAL TRANSPORT AND AERIAL TANK-
ERS, AND BY THE MILITARY AIR
TRANSPORT SERVICE, WILL LAUNCH AN
,'residential Decision 59 was pro-
claimed by the Carter administra-
tion in 1980. It is still a clas-
sified document, but was ex=plained by Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown. in a top secret Sen-
ate hearing on September 16,
1980. PD 59 is a war fighting
doctrine. While it proclaims to
have deterrence as its top prior-
ity, it clearly emphasizes the
"need" for the ability to fight a
"flexible" nuclear war. Some of
Brown's statements indicate that
U.S. nuclear weapons use was not
limited to countering a Soviet
attack but would also be an op-
tion if the Soviet Union tried to
"coerce" a U.S. aZZy. Consistent
with U.S. policy, PD 59 reserves
the "right" to a first nuclear
weapons use.
PD-59 specifies the development
of plans to attack a comprehen-
sive Soviet/Warsaw Pact target
system, with the flexibility to
employ these plans, should deter-
rence fail, in a deliberate man-
ner consistent with the needs of
the situation and in a way which
will deny an aggressor any gain,
or would impose costs which
clearly exceed his expected
gains. This could entail initial
58 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5
retaliation on military and con-
trol targets while retaining the
capability either to withhold for
a relatively prolonged period, or
to execute, broad retaliatory at-
tacks on the political control
system and on general industrial
capacity. These individual target
systems, which we feel the Soviet
leaders value most, include lead-
ership and control, military
forces both nuclear and conven-
tional and the industrial/econom-
ic base. Highlights of targeting
aspects include an increased num-
ber of situation-oriented op-
tions, and more flexibility for
selectively attacking all catego-
ries of targets.
PD-59 requires the option to
attack a full range of industri-
al/economic targets be retained.
PD-59 also places more emphasis
on how to improve the effective-
ness of targeting retaliation
against Warsaw Pact leadership
and control, nuclear forces, and
conventional forces in a wartime
situation. In contrast to some
pronouncements by the press, the
United States has never had a
doctrine based simply and solely
on reflexive, massive attacks on
Soviet cities. Instead, we have
always planned both more selec-
tively (options limiting indus-
trial/economic damage) and more
comprehensively (a range of mili-
tary targets in addition to the
industrial/economic base). Previ-
ous Administrations, going back
well into the 1960s, recognized
the inadequacy of a strategic
doctrine that would give us too
narrow a range of options. The
fundamental premises of our coun-
tervailing strategy are a natural
evolution of the conceptual foun-
dations built over the course of
a generation. PD-59 is not a new
strategic doctrine; it is not a
radical departure from past U.S.
strategic policy. Our counter-
vailing strategy, as formally
stated in PD-59, is in fact, a
refinement, a codification of
previous statements of our stra-
tegic policy. PD-59 takes the
same essential strategic doc-
trine, and restates it more
clearly, more cogently, in the
light of current conditions and
current capabilities....
Deterrence remains, as it has
been historically, our fundamen-
tal strategic objective. The
overriding objective of our stra-
tegic forces is to deter nuclear
war. But deterrence must restrain
an adversary from carrying out
any of a far wider range of
threats than just that of massive
attacks of U.S. cities. We seek
to deter any adversary from any
course of action that could lead
to general nuclear war. Our stra-
tegic forces also must deter nu-
clear attacks on smaller sets of
targets in the United States or
on U.S. military forces overseas,
and deter the nuclear coercion
of, or attack on, our friends and
allies. Our strategic forces, in
conjunction with theater conven-
tional and nuclear forces, must
also contribute to deterrence of
conventional aggression as well.
1982
The following is a compilation of
quotations from the 1984-88 De-
fense Guidance which have ap-
peared in the Washington Post
New York Times and Defense Week.
United States conventional forces
in conjunction with those of our
allies, should be capable of
putting at risk Soviet interests,
including the Soviet homeland.
[In Western Europe,] first prior-
ity will be to stop the initial
Warsaw Pact thrust with minimal.
loss of territory.... Emphasis
will be given to offensive moves
against Warsaw Pact flanks to
force diversion of Pact resources
from the central front.... To
exploit political, economic and
military weaknesses within the
Warsaw Pact and to disrupt enemy
rear operations, special opera-
tions forces will conduct opera-
tions in Eastern Europe and in
the northern and southern NATO
regions. ...
Should deterrence fail and
strategic nuclear war with the
USSSR occur, the United States
must prevail and be able to force
the Soviet Union to seek earli-
est termination of hostilities on
terms favorable to the United
States. This requires:
? Forces capable, under all con-
ditions of war initiation, of at-
tacking a wide range of targets,
even when retaliating to a mas-
sive strike received without
strategic warning....
'Employment plans that assure
U.S. strategic nuclear forces can
render ineffective the total So-
viet, and Soviet allied, military
and political power structure
through attacks on political/mil-
itary leadership and associated
control facilities, nuclear and
conventional forces and industry
critical to military power....
'Forces that will maintain,
throughout a protracted conflict
period and afterward, the capa-
bility to inflict very high lev-
els of damage against the indus-
trial/economic base of the Soviet
Union and her allies so that they
have a strong incentive to seek
conflict termination short of an
all-out attack on our cities and
economic assets.
? U.S. strategic nuclear forces
and supporting [control, command
and communications systems] cap-
able of supporting controlled nu-
clear counterattacks over a pro-
tracted period while maintaining
a reserve of nuclear forces suf-
ficient for trans- and post-at-
tack protection and coercion....
Our allies and we cannot expect
to match the Soviets in quantita-
tive measures of military power.
But there are also qualitative
dimensions where we have counter-
vailing strengths and advantages.
... By the end of the 1980s, the
Soviets may encounter major eco-
nomic difficulties, just when the
U.S. military and allied programs
are beginning to show fully the
effects of major improvement ef-
forts. We should use this oppor-
tunity to help shape the future
competition in ways which are ad-
vantageous to the United States.
It is essential that the Soviet
Union be confronted with the
prospect of a major conflict
should it seek to reach oil re-
sources of the Gulf. Because the
Soviets might induce or exploit
local political instabilities,
their forces could be extended
into the area by means other than
outright invasion. Whatever the
circumstances, we should be pre-
pared to introduce American
forces directly into the region
should it appear that the securi-
ty of access to Persian Gulf oil
is threatened....
The United States space program
will contribute to deterrence of
an attack on the United States
or, if deterrence fails, to the
prosecution of war by developing,
operating, and supporting space
systems which:
? Ensure free access to and the
use of space for us and our al-
lies in support of U.S. national
interests;
?Enhance the effectiveness of
U.S. and our allies' military
forces in preparing for and wag-
ing war;
? Deny the use of space of op-
posing forces in those instances
where foreign space operations
would be injurious to the effec-
tiveness of U.S. and our allies
in waging war;
? Support the defense of the ter-
ritory and military forces of the
U.S. and our allies from attack.
CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 59
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