COUNTERSPY: DISINFORMATION IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130006-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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COUNTER
June-August1983
Vol.7 No.4 $2.00
PY
THE MAGAZINE FOR PEOPLE WHO NEED TO KNOW
"They reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat..."
Disinformation in the Reagan Administration
Also in this issue: Michael O'Rourke: Irish Political Prisoner in the U.S. ? CIA to Europe: Take
the Missiles! ? Moonies Move on Honduras ? IMF Pushes Pinochet to Brink ? Klaus Barbie:
Global Nazi ? Casey's Terrorism Math ? The Pope Plot: CIA Production, Inc. ? U.S. Backs
Morocco's Saharan War ? Project Democracy
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CounterSpy Statement of Purpose: The United States emerged from World War II as the world's
dominant political and economic power. To conserve and enhance this power, the U.S. govern-
ment created a variety of institutions to secure dominance over "free world" nations which
supply U.S. corporations with cheap labor, raw materials, and markets. A number of these in-
stitutions, some initiated jointly with allied Western European governments, have systemat-
ically violated the fundamental rights and freedoms of people in this country and the world
over. Prominent among these creations was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), born in 1947.
Since 1973, Counterspy magazine has exposed and analyzed such intervention in all its
facets: covert CIA operations, U.S. interference in foreign labor movements, U.S. aid in cre-
ating foreign intelligence agencies, multinational corporations-intelligence agency link-ups,
and World Bank assistance for counterinsurgency, to name but a few. Our view is that while CIA
operations have been one of the most infamous forms of intervention, the CIA is but one strand
in a complex web of interference and control.
Our motivation for publishing Counterspy has been two-fold:
? People in the U.S. have the right and need to know the scope and nature of their gov-
ernment's abrogation of U.S. and other citizens' rights and liberties in order to defend them-
selves and most effectively change the institutions.
? People in other countries, often denied access to information, can better protect
their own rights and bring about necessary change when equipped with such information.
About Our Cover
The quotation on our cover is a remark made by
President Reagan in a January 29, 1981 press
conference. Referring to the Soviet govern-
ment, he claimed that it reserves the "right to
commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" in order to
attain world revolution. The multi-faceted
disinformation campaign being waged by the
Reagan administration, as documented in this
issue, leads us to conclude that Reagan's state-
ment is an accurate projection of the philos-
ophy under which the U.S. government itself
operates. - The Editors -
Counterspy is available on microfilm from
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Konrad Ege
John Kelly
Dr. Walden Bello
Director, Congress Task
Force of the Philippine
Solidarity Network
Robin Broad
PhD Candidate
Princeton University
John Cavanagh
Economist
Dr. Noam Chomsky
Professor at MIT,
Peace Activist
Dr. Joshua Cohen
Assistant Professor, MIT
Ruth Fitzpatrick
Member, Steering Commit-
tee of the Religious Task
Force on Central America
Dr. Laurie Kirby
Professor, City University of
New York
Tamar Kohns
Political activist
Annie Makhijani
Baker, nursing student
Dr. Arjun Makhijani
Consultant on energy
and economic development
Martha Wenger
Office Worker,
CounterSpy's copy editor
[Organizations for
identification only]
Cover design:
Johanna Vogelsang
couNTERSpy
4 News NOT in the News
CIA Secret Bank Accounts ... Slave Labor? ... Yellow Rain ... U. S.
Base in Haiti ... CIA and FBI Spending Binge
7
3
Disinformation
The Pope Plot: CIA Productions, Inc
Casey's Terrorism Math by John Kelly
CIA to Europe: Take the Missiles
Reagan's "Misstatements": Fueling the Push for Military Superiority
by Konrad Ege
Soviet Military Power, 1983: Inflating the Assessment of Soviet
Strength by John Pike
Disinformation: Excuse for Raids Against Canadian Peace Groups
by Murray MacAdam
Northern Ireland: U.S. Media Peddels British Line by Kathleen O'Neal
Non-Truth at the New York Times by Laurie Kirby
Ell Salvador
Interview with Dr. Charlie Clements: Pilot Against Vietnam, Doctor for
El Salvador
Salvadoran Refugees Testify: "It's a War Against the People"
WAA.T WE AQE INTeRESTED IN IS A CioVt_"ANME T T?"T
WILL 0V6QT+IQ0W TFIf PEoPL`15
40
56
Intervention in Latin America: Case Studies
IMF Pushes Pinochet to Brink by Walden Bello and John Kelly
CIA, Coups and Cocaine: Klaus Barbie - Global Nazi by Konrad Ego
Moonies Move on Honduras
Features
Political Prisoner Michael O'Rourke: The Longest Held Immigration
Detainee by Patricia Grace
The Bronfman Family: Whiskey Barons Smuggle Arms to South Africa
by John Cavanagh
Interview with Polisario Front Representative: U.S. Backs Morocco's
Saharan War by Martha Wenger
Book Reviews
Derrick Knight, Beyond the Pale: The Christian Political Fringe
Robert Berman and John Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces
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News NOT in the News
CIA Secret Bank
Accounts
U.S. District Judge James Paine is having a hard
time bringing a former top aide of Alexander Haig
to justice. Air Force Major General Richard
Collins (ret.), of West Palm Beach, Florida, is
accused of embezzling U.S. government funds
kept in secret Swiss bank accounts while he was
Director of Plans and Policies under Haig in
Stuttgart, West Germany. The Major General
denies the charge; he says that it was his pro-
fessional duty to deal with the secret accounts.
These funds "financed intelligence gathering
on the export pipeline" either.
To Cold War warriors such as the AFL-CIO's
Irving Brown, that apparently doesn't matter. He
subsequently noted in Free Trade Union News that
"in viw [sic] of the past use of unconfined forced
laborers and the current shortage of labor (in the
Soviet Union), it seems that forced labor would
be used along the export pipeline route for com-
pressor station and auxiliary construction unless
the Soviets depart from their usual practice be-
cause of the exposure in the Western media."
Brown also reprinted a drawing of a Soviet labor
camp contained in the November State
Department report, without noting that it is a
CIA drawing and that it does not depict an actual
camp, but rather is an artist's conception of a
"typical" camp.
operations in Europe and covert CIA operations in
Southeast Asia." (Miami Herald, 2/10/83) Collins
claims he handled "millions" of dollars earmarked
for CIA operations. The money was concealed in
Swiss Bank Corp. and Lloyd's Bank International
Ltd. accounts in Geneva. Collins has threatened
to reveal the particulars of CIA operations for
which he laundered money if the government
persists in prosecuting him.
Slave Labor?
The State Department has published a final report
on whether the Soviet Union is using "slave labor"
to construct its natural gas pipeline from Western
Siberia to Europe. A Senate committee had
mandated the investigation in support of
President Reagan's anti-Soviet sanctions. (See
"The Yamal Natural Gas Pipeline: Soviet 'Slave
Labor' Charges Examined," Counterspy, March-
May 1983.)
As did the preceding CIA/State Department
report, released in November 1982, the final re-
port provides no proof for the "slave labor"
claims. In regard to charges that Vietnamese
"slave laborers" work on the pipeline, the State
Department conceded that it has "no independent
evidence to confirm that Vietnamese are working
4 -- Counte(Spu -- June-Auguo t 1983
Yellow Rain
The Reagan administration's campaign of accusing
the Soviet Union and/or Vietnam and/or
Afghanistan of using "yellow rain," i.e.
mycotoxins, as an agent of biological warfare is
rapidly losing credibility. An Australian govern-
ment scientist, Hugh Crone, who analyzed leaf
samples with "yellow rain" traces with the help of
the U.S. government concluded that the samples
were deliberately concocted from local pollen and
fungi spores. He put his conclusion in utterly
clear terms: "The items were fakes." There were
traces of poisonous fungus in these fabricated
samples, he said, but nothing that could be con-
sidered "militarily effective." (See Washington
Post, 3/20/83.)
The "yellow rain" affair has received repeated
play in the U.S. media, but another potential
mycotoxin affair has been given the silent treat-
ment with the exception of one or two paragraphs
here and there: U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet
Union have been affected by a fungus-type
disease known as "scab." This has prompted the
Soviets to buy less grain, and has also led to fears
in the USSR that the wheat shipments "may also
be affected by a poisonous mycotoxin associated
with 'scab."' (Washington Post, 3/26/83.)
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U.S. Base in Haiti
The U.S. government appears to be preparing to
construct a new naval base in the Mole Saint-
Nicolas area of northwestern Haiti. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers is already working in the
area. "The work remains secret; private access to
the area is not allowed and neither the State
Department... nor the Government at Port-au-
Prince will acknowledge the U.S. Army's presence
at the bay." (Sydney Morning Herald, 3/15/83) An
official from the State 'Department's Haitian desk
claimed that a few officers of the Corps had gone
to the area to check out a malfunctioning hydro-
electric dam. There is just one problem with that
explanation: no such dam exists in the area.
Mole Saint-Nicolas is very close to Cuba, only
some 90 kilometers from the U.S. base at
Guantanamo Bay. Counterspy learned from a
h' h-rankin Haitian overnment official that the
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Reagan administration has been negotiating with Secret 1985-89
Haiti's dictator "Baby Doc" Duvalier and has
offered him $500 million in exchange for base
rights. Duvalier refused the $500 million because
it had some strings attached, and the U.S. is now
offering $780 million. Meanwhile, one of
Duvalier's cronies recently bought out Haiti's only
cement factory - sure to be a valuable asset if
construction goes forward - and speculators are
rushing to buy land at Mole Saint-Nicolas.
CIA and FBI
Spending Binge
While 11 to 20 million adults in the U.S. are
unemployed and broke, the CIA, according to
Director William Casey, is increasing its multi-
billion dollar budget along the lines of the
Pentagon's gargantuan increases. The FBI, doing
its part, recently spent more than $1,004,110 in
taxpayers' money for wiretapping costs in a single
case. Additional costs are classified. This was
the bribery conspiracy case centered around Roy
L. Williams, president of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, and former
Democratic Senator Howard Cannon. According
to data squeezed out through a Freedom of
Information Act request, some 30,416 conver-
sations involving 2,013 people were recorded.
Only 4.5 percent of these tapes were of any use to
the prosecution.
Defense Guidance
Reagan administration officials continue to deny
that they believe the U.S. can "win" a war against
the Soviet Union. Secret, as well as public
government documents demonstrate, though, that
the current military buildup is geared toward
enabling U.S. forces to end a worldwide nuclear
war "on terms favorable to U.S. interests." That
is how Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger de-
scribed the objective of the Reagan buildup in a
February 1983 hearing. His Annual Report for
Fiscal Year 1984 says that U.S. forces must be
strong enough to "restore peace on favorable
terms" after a nuclear war.
Weinberger's secret 1985-89 Defense Guidance
is toned down a bit from the 1984-88 version
which stated that "should... strategic nuclear war
with the USSR occur, the United States must
prevail...." But its content hasn't changed: the
Reagan administration is preparing for a pro-
tracted nuclear war against the Soviet Union.
The Guidance also promotes intervention in the
internal affairs of Eastern European countries:
"[The U.S. is to] foster long-term political and
military changes within the Soviet empire that
will lead to a more secure and more peaceful
world order."
It also remains U.S. policy to target the Soviet
command and control centers for immediate de-
struction in case of war: "We should raise the
level of Soviet uncertainty about achieving their
military missions by devising concepts and oper-
ations to disable the highly centralized Soviet
command and control structure." The Guidance
further directs that:
CountenSpy -- June-AuguAt 1983 -- 5
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? The improvement of Command, Control, and
Communications facilities remains a top priority.
They are to be built so that they can function
effectively in a nuclear fallout environment."
? Nuclear war-fighting preparations have to be
integrated so that the President can "execute
controlled-response options." This order implies
that the administration still believes a nuclear
war can be "fought," "controlled," and thus,
limited.
? The United States must build up. a large
nuclear weapons reserve "so that the U.S. will
never be without nuclear offensive capabilities
while still threatened by nuclear forces."
? An anti-satellite weapons system is to be
operational by 1987; it will consist of ,12 F-1S
fighter planes equipped with interceptors, i.e.,
small satellites that can be fired from the air-
craft and then exploded close to the satellite
targeted for destruction. .
? Electronic warfare "must remain an area of
unique U.S. superiority."
? The Air Force is to push ahead with -the
research and development of laser weapons for
warfare in space "to permit decision on an on-
orbit demonstration." The Guidance also men-
tions the Pentagon's increased effort to develop
particle beam and high power microwave
weapons.
? Chemical warfare preparations are to be
stepped up. "Our forces will be equipped, trained
and provided the special support to enable them
to sustain activities for at least 30 days" after the
first use of chemical weapons.
? The buildup of the Special Forces such as the
Green Berets is to proceed rapidly. "With unique
options, they must be ready for employment in
circumstances in which the use of large conven-
;tional forces would be premature, inappropriate
or infeasible."
? The Air Force and the Army are to enlarge
their predeployed arsenals in the Middle East.
The United States must also "develop plans to
counter militarily Soviet, Cuban and Libyan
forces operating from Libyan bases which pose a
threat to U.S. and NATO forces."
e The U.S. "must retain, and, as required,
expand access and transit rights in pro-Western
African states for the deployment of U.S. forces
to Africa, the South Atlantic and contiguous
areas; and work to deny or reverse similar access
and transit rights to the Soviets." "U.S. interests
in Africa will grow in the decade ahead.... Critical
commercial and military LOC's lines of com-
munication traverse and run in close proximity to
this resource-rich continent."
? The Reagan administration plans to
strengthen its military ties with the People's
Republic of China "through a continuing program
of military-to-military contact and prudent assis-
tance.... in defensive weaponry." In case of war,
6 -- Counterr.Spy -- June-Augue-t 1983
Weinberger wants the Chinese to tie down Soviet
forces in the East; an operation that would re-
ceive "logistical support" from the U.S.
To fulfill this 1985-89 Defense Guidance,
Weinberger wants to nearly double military spend-
ing; from $240.5 billion in Fiscal Year 1983 to
$464.7 billion in 1989. Weinberger believes that
this U.S, buildup, and especially its concentration
on areas in which the United States has a tech-
nological lead will "impose still heavier burdens
on a sluggish Soviet economy" - the U.S. arms
buildup as economic warfare. A quick glance at
the effects of Weinberger's military spending on
the U.S. economy to date should be sufficient to
debunk the theory that this country's economy is
strong enough to bring the Soviet Union to its
knees by forcing it to match the U.S. arms
buildup.
(Sources: Defense Week, 3/14/83; Washington
Post, 3/18/83; New York Times, 3/18/83,
372-2/83.)
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Disinformation
The Pope Plot:
CIA Productions, Inc.
Paul Henze, a former CIA Chief of Station in
Turkey, and Claire Sterling, the terrorism guru of
the Reagan administration, are busy these days
writing about the ominous "Bulgarian connection."
By now, this "Bulgarian connection" has been
touted as the key not only to finding the master-
minds behind the shooting of Pope John Paul but
also to uncovering an alleged conspiracy to kill
the former Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa.
Both Henze and Sterling have been driving forces
behind the "Bulgarian connection" campaign;
Sterling with her original Reader's Digest article,
"The Plot to Murder the Pope" in September 1982,
and Henze as a consultant to Reader's Digest and
to NBC-TV, and as the author of an upcoming
book and' numerous articles about the attempted
;assassination of the pope.
Sterling's Reader's Digest article which set off
the Bulgarian frenzy has about the same quality
as her book, The Terror Network: very few hard
facts, but lots of innuendo. Sterling's problem is
to explain why Mehmet Ali Agca, the confessed
assailant and a well-known rightist, should have
tried to kill the pope in the service of Bulgarian
intelligence (which, of course, she points out, is
controlled by the Soviet KGB). In 1979, Agca
murdered the liberal editor of a Turkish daily and
was arrested for the crime. His defense lawyer
was Turun Oezbay, a prominent man of the ex-
treme right in Turkey. Agca was convicted but
managed, rather mysteriously, to escape from
prison.
Agca left Turkey and then criss-crossed
Europe for several months. One of the countries
he visited was Bulgaria; later he spent several
weeks in West Germany where he visited members
of the fascist Grey Wolves terror network.
Sterling concedes that Agca was closely associat-
ed with the Turkish rightists, but that was just a
cover. "Turks close to the [Agca] case" believe,
she claims, that Bulgaria for years has been
instrumental in stimulating terrorism in Turkey to
destabilize this NATO country. The Bulgarians
who were active in Turkey, she suggests, spotted
Agca early on as a potential recruit and meticu-
lously built up his cover as a rightist. Henze
believes the Bulgarians may have first set their
eyes on Agca while he was still in high school.
Henze is convinced that Agca seemed to the
Bulgarians destined to be such a capable operative
that they recruited him to do "something big." He
Sterling's problem is to
explain why Mehmet All
Agca, the confessed
assailant and a well-known
rightist, should have tried
to kill the pope in the
service of Bulgarian
intelligence.
believes that after a vigorously anti-communist
Polish cardinal became pope and supported
Solidarity, the "Soviet masters" ordered the
Bulgarians to send Agca to kill the pope. In a
March 3, 1983 speech at the Woodrow Wilson
CountenSpy -- June-Augua.t 1983 -- 7
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International Center for Scholars, Henze outlined
this dramatic scenario, but admitted that there
are many inconsistencies in his version that has
Agca shooting the pope with the direct assistance
of Bulgarian intelligence officers.
Henze concedes that he doesn't have good
answers to such questions as: Why did the
Bulgarians, allegedly Agca's accomplices, not
leave Italy immediately after Agca was arrested?
Why would Agca, supposedly a "professional" ter-
rorist, carry notes on his person indicating who his
alleged co-conspirators were? Why would Sergei
Antonov, whom Henze describes as a leading
Bulgarian intelligence officer, personally drive
Agca to St. Peter's Square for the shooting?
Many of these circumstances, admits Henze, seem
"illogical" and "irrational."
Nonetheless, Henze plunges on: the attempt on
the pope's life is one of the "most significant
events of the latter part of this century," he says;
it has already "exposed an enormous network of
subversion." Henze's motives for driving forward
his "Bulgarian connection" become apparent in the
course of his talk: He reveals that he has worked
closely with the' Voice of America and the United
States Information Agency to publicize his "find-
ings" about the alleged Bulgarian (and therefore
Soviet) involvement. This should, he states, help
to convince people in Eastern Europe of the
ruthless nature of their governments.
In his articles and talks, Paul Henze does not
identify himself as the former CIA Chief of
Station in Turkey. He is simply a "former staff,
member of the National Security Council." When
he is challenged on that point at the Woodrow
Wilson Center gathering, Henze only concedes
that: "I have worked in lots of embassies around
the world." He is also quick to point out to the
questioner - who identifies himself as a Bulgarian
- that he, Henze, is not anti-Bulgarian. The
Bulgarians, Henze says, are a brave and anti-
Soviet people. They proved that, he goes on,
when they were one of the first countries to side
with the Nazis during World War II.
Casey's Terrorism Math
by John Kelly
Effective disinformation requires close collabora-
tion between government agencies and the cor-
porate-controlled press. Specific campaigns serve
different purposes. Some are targeted at creating
a general mood in the population. Others en-
gender acceptance of budgetary shifts, such as
the massive increase in military spending. Still
others are launched to garner support for new
legislative initiatives.
Reagan's "war on terrorism" has worked on all
these fronts. It has been waged from the halls of
the State Department, the Justice Department,
and William Casey's CIA, as well as from the Oval
Office. In the end, with no great resistance from
the Congress or the people in the U.S., the
specter of "terrorism" was used as the pretext to
formally unleash the CIA in the U.S. through a
1981 Presidential executive order. At the same
time, neither the press nor the government have
presented any evidence to substantiate the terror-
ism charge.
Only six days after President Reagan's
inauguration in January 1981, the National
8 -- CountekSpy -- June-Augu6 t 1983
Security Council held its first meeting of the
current administration. The main topic was to
become a familiar one: terrorism. With Reagan
present, Anthony C.E. Quainton, then-director of
the State Department's Office for Combating
Terrorism, briefed the Council.
The President proved an attentive pupil. The
following day, Reagan welcomed back the hos-
tages from Iran with the bold assertion, "Let
terrorists be aware that when the rules of inter-
national behavior are violated, our policy will be
one of swift and effective retribution." Two days
later, on January 28, 19'81, at his first press
conference as Secretary of State, Alexander Haig
was more specific: "International terrorism will
take the place of human rights in our concern
because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights."
Earlier in his statement, Haig asserted that the
Soviet Union is "involved in conscious policy, in
programs, if you will, which foster, support and
expand" terrorism.
Shortly after Haig's press conference, the
CIA's National Foreign Assessments Center, under
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Bruce C. Clark, began readying its annual terror- casualties - as opposed to property damage - also
ism estimate. CIA Director Casey rejected the increased last year, with four out of every 10
Center's first estimate and sent it back for revi- attacks resulting in at least one casualty, com-
sion. According to the New York Times, CIA pared with three out of 10 in 1979 and a cumula-
analysts "complained that Mr. Casey had con- tive average of 20 percent."
sidered the draft faulty because it did not support Without presenting any supporting data, the
Mr. Haig's assertions." Another Times report, report went on to assert that "the Soviets are
based on congressional and administration deeply engaged in support of revolutionary vio-
sources, added that the draft found "insufficient lence, which is a fundamental element of Leninist
evidence that the Soviet Union is directly helping ideology. Such violence frequently entails acts of
to foment international terrorism...," and noted international terrorism." In contrast, the 1979
that Clark was retiring ("personal decision") report had said that "the number of attacks
possibly to be replaced by John McMahon, CIA declined worldwide, however, as did the number
Deputy Director of Operations. and proportion of attacks against U.S. citizens."
McMahon, although not an analyst, did indeed
become head of the National Foreign Assessments
Center (NFAC), and Casey later admitted to "not
accepting estimates in NFAC" - which several
press reports suggested included the terrorism
estimate. Casey said estimates on Latin America
were rejected because they "have not addressed
Soviet interests, activities and influence there."
Casey also refused to accept another study on
terrorism which he himself had requested from
the Defense Intelligence Agency.
"Terrorist" Acts Double Overnight
While Casey's rejected terrorism estimate was
being revised, State Department expert on terror-
ism Anthony Quainton announced that U.S.
Terrorism has emerged in
the 1980s to replace and
supplement the "Red
Menace" as a rationale for
CIA domestic and foreign
covert operations.
government statistics on international terrorism
were being expanded to include threats of terror-
ism. This change, he noted, would approximately
double the number of terrorist "incidents" report-
ed by the U.S. government for the years 1968-79,
while the number of killed and wounded would
remain the same. At the time of this announce-
ment, a Senate staff official told the New York
Times that CIA analysts were being "pushed" to
expand the definition of terrorist incidents to
include "all acts of violence intended to impact on
a wider audience than the victims of the vio-
lence." Another senior staff member of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence charged
that when the CIA did not find what it wanted to,
it simply changed the definition of terrorism.
The estimate in question, NFAC's 1980 report
was due out in April 1981. It was finally released
in June 1981. The 1980 report found 5,954
international terrorist incidents during 1968-79,
and 760 in 1980. The 1979 NFAC report had
found only 3,336 such incidents during the 1968-79
period, with a peak of 413 in 1976 and only 293 in
1979. As predicted, the 1980 report included
"threats" and even "hoaxes" and "conspiracies"
under the definition of terrorism. It also stated
that "international terrorism in 1980 resulted in
more casualties than in any other year since the
analysis of terrorist statistics began 12 years ago.
Government participation in terrorism also in-
creased.... Terrorist incidents aimed at causing
The 1979 report did not single out the Soviet
Union as a sponsor of either revolutionary vio-
lence or terrorism. It found instead that "certain
Communist regimes expressed some interest in
cooperating with the West in combatting terror-
ism.... After all, Communist states were not
entirely immune to terrorist attacks. The Soviets
abroad continued to be attacked by militant
Jewish groups and anti-Communist Cuban exiles.
Soviet official and commercial facilities more
recently have been bombed by Ukrainian exiles
and individuals protesting the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan."
Casey's Different Tune
At the same time that Casey was manipulating
CIA reports to "prove" that the Soviet Union was
a promoter of terrorism, he was whistling a
different tune in a speech to the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce:
Today we live in a world of increasing
nationalism, increasing terrorism, and vanish-
ing resources. These three realities illustrate
the new kinds of problems of concern to
intelligence.
First, the tide of nationalism is running
strong in the less-developed countries of the
world. There is hostility and negativism to-
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~t S ~llt Z WI,s
~"~~tc1~MN ~M, ..
ward free enterprise. There are potential
dangers there for American, European, and
even Japanese multinational corporations.
Local politicians cannot always manage this
distrust of foreigners. Free enterprise from
abroad suddenly appears as foreign domination
or neo-colonialism. It is difficult to predict
when and where this hostility will break out.
Nationalism is not new. Its manifestations
range from restrictive policies to outright
expropriation. What is new today is that it is
accompanied by global distress. This is caused
by the explosive growth of energy costs - in
both industrialized countries and the less-
developed ones.
The enormous cost of fueling economic
activity is forcing the less-developed countries
into austerity and no-growth policies. They
are running out of credit. They cannot meet
the very high interest rates required. All this
intensifies instability.
One form of instability that I'm afraid we'll
see more of around the world is terrorism -
hijacking, hostage-taking, kidnapping, assassi-
nation, bombing, armed attack, sniping, and
coercive threats - mindless acts of violence
designed to create political effect - regardless
of the innocence of the victims....
In short, Casey was revealing that he knew better
than to believe the CIA's own propaganda on
terrorism. He admitted that revolutionary acts of
violence and even armed attacks against U.S.
corporations were not terrorist acts engendered
by the Soviet Union but were responses to politi-
cal and economic conditions and the perception,
at least, of free enterprise economics as a foreign
domination or neo-colonialism. Casey even called
individual acts of violence "political" and placed
them in the context of the global economic crisis.
Casey had also told the U.S. News and World
10 -- CounteASpy -- June-Augua.t 1983
Report that "it was always a false issue whether
the Soviets directed and controlled world terror-
ism. World terrorism is made up of a bunch of
freebooters, and they're all, more or less, in
business for themselves." Perhaps the most tell-
ing note on this issue was the announcement that
the CIA's annual terrorism report is now classi-
fied.
From the "Red Menace" to "Terrorism"
Terrorism has emerged in the 1980s to replace
and supplement the "Red Menace" as a rationale
for CIA domestic and foreign covert operations.
A similar ploy had been used before - a December
5, 1972 memo on Operation Chaos (the CIA's
largest known domestic covert operation) is very
revealing in this regard. The memo recounts a
meeting that day to address a recent review of
Operation Chaos by the CIA's Inspector General
as well as "concern" about Chaos on the part of
"some CIA personnel." The review and the con-
cern were centered around the fact that
Operation Chaos was in clear violation of the CIA
charter's prohibition of domestic programs. Then-
CIA director Richard Helms scoffed at this con-
cern by saying that Chaos "cannot be stopped
simply because some members of the organization
do not like this activity." Helms, however, did
partially respond to concerns by coming up with a
new cover for Chaos. He decreed: "To a maxi-
mum extent possible, [Richard] Ober should be-
come identified with the subject of terrorism
inside the Agency as well as in the Intelligence
community." Since Richard Ober was the director
of Operation Chaos, Helms actually meant that
Operation Chaos should become identified as an
anti-terrorist operation. In short, same operation,
new cover.
Within months, Chaos became the
International Terrorism Group, with Ober as its
head. Yet it continued to conduct the same
illegal operations that were in no way a response
to terrorism. Ober went on to join the National
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Security Council - a key source behind the latter
day terrorism bugaboo.
New Target: Qadhafi
When Casey told U.S. News and World Report that
Soviet-directed terrorism was a false issue, it was
long after his doctored 1980 report had been
issued. Though his Chamber of Commerce speech
suggested that he knew better, Casey hadn't
dropped the terrorism cry, he had only switched
his target from the Soviets to President Qadhafi
of Libya. According to Casey, "if anybody or-
chestrates them [terrorists], it's Libya's Qadhafi.
He made many of them dependent on him....
There are over 25 terrorist and guerrilla training
camps in Libya. Training guerrillas and terrorists
is the second largest industry there -second only
to oil." Casey asserted that the never-proven
Libyan "assassination squads" did exist, and, when
asked whether they still threatened President
Reagan, said, "I think they do. You don't call
those things off." Conveniently dovetailing into
Casey's picture of rampant terrorism is his con-
tention that KGB (Soviet intelligence) activity "in
the United States is very large."
Some version of the rampant Libyan and/or
KGB subversion and terrorism theme was playing
daily in the U.S. media while President Reagan
was preparing his Executive Order (E.O. 12333) on
intelligence agencies which would formally allow
the CIA to conduct domestic operations. This
order, of course, embodied Richard Helm's dis-
ingenuous approach to continuing Operation Chaos
by simply saying that it was directed at terrorism.
Perhaps unwittingly, the New York Times was
right on the mark when it referred to a draft of
E.0 12333 as the "Son of Chaos."
Shortly after Reagan signed E.O. 12333 on
December 4, 1981, Attorney General William
French Smith revealed that the alleged
KGB/Libyan terrorism had motivated Reagan's
signing. In a speech to the Los Angeles World
Affairs Council, Smith charged that "the threat to
our Government and its citizens from hostile
intelligence services and international terrorist
groups was also increasing dramatically," and that
"hostile intelligence agents increasingly operate
in the United States under a number of guises."
Smith claimed a "400 percent" increase in such
activity.
More specifically on terrorism, Smith said
that:
A small number of well-trained fanatics could
change our fortunes overnight. All of you
know from press reports [emphasis added],
that threat is real today. Libya's capability of
sponsoring an effort to assassinate high U.S.
Government officials provides a sobering
example... we must all recognize the grave
threat from hostile intelligence and the need
for more effective U.S. intelligence and
counterintelligence. [Operation Chaos was
falsely categorized as counterintelligence by
the CIA.] But we must do more than merely
recognize such paramount concerns. The
Reagan Administration is firmly committed to
revitalizing the United States intelligence ef-
fort. That commitment is apparent in the
President's recent promulgation of three new
Executive Orders... Executive Order 12333,
signed two weeks ago, clarifies the authori-
ties, responsibilities, and limitations concern-
ing U.S. intelligence...
In sum, the Reagan administration and the CIA,
with the complicity of the U.S. media, created a
straw horse of Soviet/Libyan terrorism, and then
institutionalized Operation Chaos, i.e., domestic
CIA programs, to defend against the straw horse.
Richard Helms must be pleased.
Webster Disagrees
Ironically, it was FBI Director William Webster
who put the lie to the straw horse. In a 1981
speech in Oklahoma, Webster stated that "the
number of terrorist acts at home, in contrast to
the worldwide problem, has dropped [58 percent]
in recent years." Later, on the NBC News pro-
gram "Meet the Press," Webster added, "I cannot
speak about activities abroad. But I can say that
there is no real evidence of Soviet sponsored
terrorism within the United States..., we seem at
this point to be free of direct, deliberate Soviet
domination or control or instigation of terrorist
activity."
Even after receiving CIA reports alleging
Cuban-supported terrorism in the U.S., Webster
told a press conference, "I would discount foreign
support for terrorism at this time.... There have
been efforts by our own domestic groups to make
contact [with foreign forces). We don't think
they've been too successful." Underscoring his
own position on terrorism, Webster asked
Congress for an additional nine agents for FY1980
for the FBI Terrorism Program which he said
"would be a decrease of four Agents which were
funded for Fiscal Year 1979" but would "ensure
the United States Government being in a position
to respond to terrorist acts efficiently and effec-
tively and to anticipate occurrence of these acts
to preclude disruption of the functioning of all
levels of Government, prevention of civil dis-
orders, and possible loss of life."
Thanks to E.O. 12333, the CIA will not be
impeded by the FBI findings of negligible terror-
ism. Under E.O. 12333, "no agency except the
CIA... may conduct any special activity [covert
operation] unless the President determines that
another agency is more likely to achieve a par-
ticular objective." Translated, this means that
the CIA may unilaterally undertake domestic co-
vert operations without coordination with the FBI.
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CIA to Europe:
Take the Missiles!
Complete unity exists within NATO, according to
the Reagan administration: the European allies
want the deployment of hundreds of cruise and
Pershing II missiles on their soil.
Internally, however, the administration is not
so sure that its public "unity" claims are accurate.
NATO governments might agree to deploy the
missiles, but a clear majority of the European
people are opposed. For a President who used to
work as an advertiser for General Electric, Inc.,
the solution to that is simple. You just have to
advertise, or "conduct public diplomacy," covertly
supplemented by the intelligence agencies.
Reagan has even found the man he wants to do
the job: Peter Dailey, U.S. ambassador in Ireland,
an obvious choice. He conducted Reagan's
Presidential elections ad campaign.
Dailey now heads a "special planning group"
which coordinates "public diplomacy" efforts in
Europe. Its job is to convince people there that
they should support Reagan's "Zero Option" nego-
tiating position in the Geneva arms talks and, if
the talks fail, to accept the deployment of the
missiles. ("Zero Option" proposes that the Soviets
destroy all their land-based intermediate range
missiles, even those directed against China, while
NATO would not reduce its intermediate range
strike force but would forego deploying new
cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe.)
The Dailey group is guarding its actions in
1secrecy; even the names of the members of the
group and the government agencies from which
they come is classified information. A State
Department spokesperson did, however, admit
that they represent "every agency of the national
security community." The New York Times also
confirmed that the CIA has a representative in
the group.
Dailey is an experienced public relations man.
The customers served by his company, "Dailey and
Associates," have included the Malaysian govern-
ment as well as the Philippine Convention Bureau,
an agency of the Philippine government. Dailey
received hundreds of thousands of dollars from
these two governments for his efforts to promote
tourism in the Philippines and Malaysia.
During the 1972-73 Presidential election cam-
paign, the Committee to Re-elect the President
(CREEP) hired Dailey to head the "November
Group," an association of advertisement experts
who produced ads for Richard Nixon. They ran
what the Washington Post called "the slickest,
12 -- Coun.W Spy -- June-Augua.t 1983
most professional advertising campaign ever con-
ceived and implemented." The campaign wasn't
exactly above board. In one instance, the Dailey
group placed an ad defending Nixon's mining of
Vietnam's Haiphong harbor in the New York Times
which appeared to be an advertisement sponsored
by private individuals. The Justice Department
investigated this apparent violation of election
laws, as it did other actions carried out by
CREEP. These included destroying documents
about Nixon's funders, paying the Watergate burg-
lars to keep them quiet, and hiring Donald
Segretti to spy on and sabotage the electoral
strategy of the Democratic Party.
"Public diplomacy" campaigns such as Dailey's
are playing an increasingly prominent role in
Reagan's foreign policy. At the same time that
the Dailey group was being assembled, Secretary
of State George Schultz and United States Infor-
mation Agency Director Charles Wick announced
"Project Democracy" to "foster the infrastructure
of democracy" by supporting "democratic" organ-
izations worldwide - parties, institutes, univer-
sities, labor unions, newspapers, etc.
The Reagan administration wants to spend $65
million on the project in Fiscal Year 1984. Im-
mediately after their announcement, questions
were raised about CIA involvement in the project.
The State Department quickly asserted that the
CIA would have no role in Project Democracy, but
Wick volunteered at a Senate hearing that CIA
Director William Casey had been involved in plan-
ning the project. Furthermore, the New York
Times reported that a secret State Department
memorandum had proposed a "Covert Action"
component.
This "secret/sensitive" memo, written by State
Department official Mark Palmer stated that the
covert component of the project would be run by
the CIA and Planning Groups of the National
Security Council. "We need to examine," said
Palmer, "how law and Executive Order can be
made more liberal to permit covert action on a
broader scale, as well as what we can do through
substantially increased overt political action."
Prior to writing this memo, dated August 3, 1982,
Palmer had told the Boston Globe that the public
relations effort "has to be organized by private
citizens, not the government and particularly not
the State Department."
Robert McFarlane, deputy director of the
National Security Council, claims that Palmer's
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memo was rejected and that the CIA was "put
firmly out of the program." While that might be a
bit difficult to believe in light of the contra-
diction between Palmer's public statement to the
Globe and his secret memo, there is no question
that a number of the organizations the adminis-
tration wants to fund under Project Democracy
have worked with the CIA and/or have received
CIA money in the past. These organizations in-
clude the Asia Foundation (slated to receive $10
AND NOW
FORTHE
RADIO MARTI
)YEWS -
BROUGHT TO YOU BY
THE U.S GOVERNMENT.
million), the AFL-CIO's international programs
and some "democratic [i.e. anti-Communist]
unions abroad" ($13 million), and the Inter-
American Press Association ($50,000). Wick's
testimony in Congress also indicated that organiz-
ations whose charters prohibit accepting govern-
ment money might be given money "laundered"
through third organizations.
The administration plans to be quite generous
with its Project Democracy funds:
? $1.5 million for the "Study of Democratic
Principles and Practice for Military Leaders in
Developing Nations." To cultivate future military
heads of state, "suitable organizations will be
chosen to launch a series of symposia on the
nature of democratic society for selected military
leaders who presently hold or are likely to hold
traditionally civilian government positions." Such
a program is needed because, according to the
State Department, "military-led institutions of
the political process can retard the development
of a democratic form of government." (The
Pentagon is already training foreign military of-
ficials to become heads of state: according to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Posture Statement for Fiscal
Year 1984, 25 current heads of state were at one
time "trained in U.S. senior military schools.")
? $1.5 million for a "Transoceanic Leadership
Project" which is supposed to "establish positive
ties" between U.S. citizens and foreigners "based
on a perception of shared values."
? $1 million to support "a number of European
organizations whose objective is to support and
strengthen the Atlantic Community." A similar
program is currently run by the U.S. Atlantic
Council whose directors include CIA chief William
Casey.
? $500,000 for "Leadership Training for Latin
American Students."
? $920,000 to "assist Liberia's Transition to
Democracy."
? $1 million for the establishment of a
"Center for -Free Enterprise" which will propagan-
dize about the supposed link between "democracy"
and the "free market" economy.
? $500,000 for a "new Center for the Study of
the Soviet Union" which is to become "a focal
point for recent emigres."
? $100,000 for "Middle East Peace and
Development Conferences" which will "bring
.THE ANASTASIO SOMOZA
FOUNDATION THE BAY OF
PIGS MARCHING SOCIETY,
THE U.S. COMMITTEE TO
RESCUE THE PLATT
AN-ENDMENT, THE
FULGENCIO BATISTA
MEMORIAL FUND,
AND ANONYMOUS
CORPORATE DONORS.
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Thatcher's Public Relations
In England, the United States Information Agency
has already been feeding anti-Soviet propaganda to
the media and the public. Papers routinely dis-
tributed include State Department reports about
"Soviet Active Measures," (i.e. alleged covert
Soviet operations to influence internal policies in
NATO countries), a monthly publication, "Soviet
Propaganda Alert," which purports to "analyze"
Soviet attempts to influence the Western media, as
well as numerous pamphlets on the alleged KGB
subversion of the European peace movement.
These include a glossy reprint of John Barron's
Reader's Digest smear, "The KGB's Magical War for
'Peace,"' (See "The Secret Work of John Barron,"
Counterspy, March-May 1983) with no indication
that it is being distributed by the U.S. govern-
ment.
British Prime Minister Margaret, Thatcher is
also conducting a "public relations" campaign.
Widespread opposition forced her to abort a larger
scale effort, but the British government still as-
sists groups advocating high defense expenditures
and missile deployment. For instance, the govern-
ment funds the "British Atlantic Council" and has
chosen it as "the major vehicle to put the NATO
case in the context of the CND debate." (CND is
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, a
coalition of peace. groups.) Other pro-nuclear
groups have little popular backing but more than
sufficient funding. Some of the British groups also
receive assistance from rightwing U.S. organiza-
tions. For instance, the British Coalition for Peace
through Security which consists of just a few
people gets aid from the U.S. Coalition for Peace
Through Strength.
Attacks on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarma-
ment have not been limited to smear campaigns by
rightwing groups such as the Coalition for Peace
Through Security - which published several pam-
phlets attacking CND as a pro-Soviet "pressure
group which wants Britain alone to give up its
defences." Twice last year, anti-nuclear groups
suffered physical attacks: a large library of the
Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace
was destroyed in a rather suspicious fire, and a
CND peace camp near the U.S. Army base at
Caerwent, Wales, was attacked at night by about
twelve men.
Israeli and Arab intellectuals together." Such
conferences used to be run by the CIA-connected
American Friends of the Middle East.
? $4,455,000 for a "worldwide book publishing
project." At present, says the State Department,
"books reflecting democratic views are lacking" in
many countries while "books bearing the Marxist
dialectical philosophy are readily available, often
at low prices." A previous large book distribution
venture was aided by Evron Kirkpatrick's think
tank "Operations and Policy Research, Inc." and
was funded in part by the CIA. Jeane Kirkpatrick
worked with the project as well.
? $1 million for a "Central American Media
program" which might include the establishment
of a "regional newspaper for the rural populations
in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. The
newspaper would provide information in such
areas as family health, agricultural management
as well as the merits of supporting democracy."
During Fiscal Year 1983, the Reagan adminis-
tration spent $20 million for Project Democracy
without any Congressional appropriations. , The
money was drawn from the State Department, the
USIA and the Agency for International Develop-
ment. Its projects shed light on what is in store
for the future:
? $50,000 for the ultra-right National
Strategy Information Center (founded by CIA
Director Casey) to pay for the trips of U.S.
"Social Democrats" to go to Socialist Inter-
national meetings. These "Social Democrats"
included Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (ret.), a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Nixon
and Midge Decter of Commentary magazine, who
14 -- CountenSpy -- June-Augub.t 1983
has received CIA money in the past.
? $60,000 to the Center for Education and
Research in Free Enterprise. The Center held
conferences on free enterprise for some Guate-
malans who were said to be worried about the
"socialist threat" to their country.
? $162,000 to the business lobby group "Mid-
America Committee" to fund trips to the United
States by the press spokespersons of Latin
American dictators to teach them how to handle
the U.S. media; and
? $200,000 to Ernest Lefever's Ethics and
Public Policy Center. Lefever, whom Reagan
unsuccessfully nominated to head the State
Department's Human Rights Office, got money to
write about Soviet "sponsorship" of the peace
movement and to conduct seminars with pro-
disarmament European church officials to con-
vince them of the evils of the Soviet Union.
When Wick presented the Project Democracy
budget to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, some Democrats criticized what they
called "Project Rightwing Democracy." They are
concerned that the Reagan administration will use
the project primarily to fund organizations of the
far right. In addition, some pointed out that the
Project Democracy might not be effective enough
because it is so closely identified with the U.S.
government.
Some Democrats on Capitol Hill claim that
the West German government seems to have
found a way to handle the problem., Each of the
major parties - with the exception of the Greens -
has a "foundation" which gets a large part of its
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Reagan's "Misstatements":
Fueling the Push for
Military Superiority by Konrad Ege
Faced with public opinion polls indicating that
less than 20 percent of the people in the U.S.
favor large increases in military spending, the
administration has mounted a concentrated offen-
sive to garner support for a 10 percent hike (after
inflation) in the military budget. In this cam-
paign, the Commander in Chief and his troops
haven't hesitated to falsify the facts about the
U.S. and Soviet military budgets. And most of the
time, they get away with it even though Reagan is
fond of blaming the media's steady "drum beat" of
criticism for eroding popular support for military
spending.
In reality, Reagan should be thankful to most
of the corporate-controlled newspapers, maga-
zines and TV and radio networks for reporting
about the U.S. military budget the way they do:
They rarely challenge the statistics and data
supplied by the administration to back up its
claim that a large military spending increase is
necessary to "catch up" with the Soviet Union.
For instance, Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger's statistics on the "Production of
Selected Soviet Weapons, 1974-82" presented in
colorful charts during this year's budget hearings,
have not been challenged though they are contra-
dicted by the Pentagon's 1983 Annual Report on
Research and Engineering. Weinberger also gets
away with claiming that the ratio of U.S. to
Soviet technicians working in the Third World is
1:20. To arrive at that figure, he simply redefin-
ed all Soviet troops in Afghanistan as technicians.
Some aspects of the U.S. government's disin-
formation about the military (which is examined
below) are designed to achieve short-term goals -
to push through the current military budget in-
creases. Others, especially statements made by
Commander in Chief Reagan, are based on his
ignorance of the most fundamental facts about
military matters. The most serious aspect of the
government's public relations campaign is the
institutionalization of disinformation. "Long term
disinformation" - such as systematically exagger-
ated data about Soviet military spending - has led
the United States on a very dangerous course. It
has also stymied the U.S. public in its attempt to
understand fully and participate in an informed
way in the discussion about the Pentagon budget
and military strategy.
A Decided
Advantage?
"Today, in virtually every measure of military
power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advan-
tage." (Ronald Reagan, November 22, 1982)
When Reagan was asked several weeks after he
made that statement whether he would
trade2U.S. forces for Soviet forces, he replied,
"No." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General John Vessey, gave the same answer in a
1982 Senate hearing.
There are certainly some areas in which the
Soviet Union has at least a quantitative advan-
tage. Reagan officials acknowledge, though, that
the U.S. has an overall technological lead over the
Soviet Union (Chart I). In other areas, e.g. the
number of "strategic" warheads - which appears
to be a rather crucial one - the U.S. even has a
numerical lead (Chart II).
How the CIA
Figures Soviet
Military Spending
"Soviet leaders invest 12 to 14 percent of their
country's gross national product in military spend-
ing, two or three times the level we invest."
(Ronald Reagan, November 22, 1982)
Even if that were true, it would not indicate that
the Soviet Union was dramatically outspending
the United States in actual dollar figures, since
the U.S. GNP is twice that of the Soviet Union.
The task of comparing U.S. and Soviet spend-
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ing is a very difficult one. Most of the statistics
the U.S. government relies on come from the CIA,
and the CIA has a unique way of comparing
military spending in the two countries. Its comp-
utations assure beforehand that Soviet spending
figures will be found to be considerably higher
than they are in reality.
In order to determine how much the Soviet
military spends, the CIA assigns a dollar value to
Soviet equipment and other costs; i.e. it deter-
mines how much it would cost to reproduce the
Soviet military forces in the United States. That
leads to gross misrepresentations of actual Soviet
cost. For instance, if steel prices go up in the
U.S., the CIA figures a show a rise in the Soviet
military budget because it would cost the United
States more to produce tanks similar to the ones
that roll off Soviet assembly lines. The actual
cost of a Soviet tank, of course, is not affected by
price increases in the U.S.
What leads to an even greater exaggeration of
Relative U.S./USSR Standing in the
20 Most Important Basic Technology Areas*
Soviet military expenditures is that the CIA's ac-
counting ignores tie different structures of U.S.
and Soviet forces. The Soviet Union has more
personnel but less equipment per soldier, while
the U.S. has a smaller all-volunteer force and a
clear superiority in high technology equipment. In
the Soviet Union, conceded former CIA Director
Stansfield Turner in a Joint Economic Committee
hearing, "military hardware is much more expen-
sive than manpower ... while in the United States
manpower is relatively more expensive." By
computing how much it would cost the Pentagon
to reproduce Soviet forces, the CIA ignores that
differential. Assigning U.S. manpower costs to
the Soviet forces, as the CIA does, will make the
Soviet military budget appear much larger than it
is. Even former CIA Director William Colby and
Defense Intelligence Agency Director Daniel
Graham acknowledged before the Joint Economic
Committee on July 21, 1975, that dollar compar-
isons of the U.S. and Soviet military budgets
"were doomed to produce misleading results."
Until 1976, the CIA listed Soviet military ex-
penditures in rubles as some 6 to 8 percent of the
Gross National Product. But when President
Gerald Ford appointed George Bush as CIA
Director, that assessment changed virtually over-
night. Bush appointed "Team B" - made up of
hardcore anti-Soviet ideologues Richard Pipes,
Daniel Graham, Paul Nitze and others. . These
outsiders, in a highly unusual process, were allow-
ed to examine the CIA's top secret data to figure
out whether the CIA's assessment of the Soviet
threat was accurate. Given the composition of
Team B, the nature of its findings was a foregone
U.S.
U.S./USSR
USSR
BASIC TECHNOLOGIES
SUPERIOR
EQUAL
SUPERIOR
1. Aerodynamics/Fluid Dynamics
X
l
d C
2
A
X
utomate
ontro
.
3. Conventional Warhead (including
Chemical Explosives)
X
?. Computer
X
S. Directed Energy
X
6. Electro-Optical Sensor
X i
(including IR)
7. Guidance & Navigation
X-0-
U.S. Always Ahead of Soviets in Strategic Weapons
$. Microelectronic Materials
X
A Integrated Circuit
10000
Total Stratptc Nucltear Weapons
Manufacture
United StWe-Soviet Union
9000
9. Nuclear Warhead
X
8000
U.s.
10. Optics
X
11. Power Sources (Mobile)
X
7000
12. Production/Manufacturing
X
8000
13. Propulsion (Aerospace)
X
5000
14. Radar Sensor
X
4000
15. Signal Processing
X
U
S
R
S
16. Software
X
3000
.
.
.
.
17. Stealth (Signature Reduction
X
Technology)
2000
1g. Structural Materials (lightweight.
X-
high strength)
1000
19. Submarine Detection
X~
0
(including Silencing)
fpp f~yp f(~p {mp
^ I~ ^ A A r. rE 1~ Yew
2D. Telecommunications
X
0 w 01 W
m go a W a T w ^s
Chatft I (SouAce: FY 1984 DoD Repoift on
Re6eanch, Deve.eopment and Acqu,i4.. ti.on)
lo -- CounteJSpy -- June-Augue,t 1983
Chat II (SouAce: Center Lon Debenbe
I n Lonmat1on )
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conclusion: that the CIA was underestimating the
Soviet threat. Bush claimed that "new evidence"
as well as a "reinterpretation of old information"
made it necessary to revise the estimate of Soviet
defense expenditures upwards to 11 to 13 percent
of the GNP.
The Ford administration immediately used
that new estimate to push for a hike in the
Pentagon budget, even though the CIA stated that
the revised military expenditures to GNP ratio did
not imply that the Soviet military had greater
capabilities than previously thought.
The CIA's ruble estimate of the Soviet mili-
tary budget is also exaggerated because it is
calculated in 1970 rubles.4 Military equipment
that was in its early developmental stage or had
not gone into full production in 1970 would have
been very expensive then, but much cheaper five
or ten years later when it was mass-produced. By
measuring the costs in 1970 rubles the CIA ignores
that factor. Professor Franklyn Holzman of Tufts
University in his study, "Soviet Military Spending:
Assessing the Numbers Game", estimates that
because of its 1970 rubles estimates the CIA
might be exaggerating Soviet military spending in
1980 by as much as 30 to 50 percent.
There are signs of controversy within the
Reagan administration about the, data on the
"Soviet threat" which the CIA has provided over
the last few years. The Defense Intelligence
Agency is disputing recent CIA reports which re-
vise previous projections of growth in the Soviet
military budget downward from almost four per-
cent annually to less than two percent. (From 1982
MILITARY EXPENDITURES:
OUTLAYS
A Comparison of NATO Military Expenditures
with Estimated Dollar Cost of Warsaw
Pact Defense Activities
MILITARY EXPENDITURES
OUTLAYS
1965 1970 1975 1980
CALENDAR YEAR
Chant III (Source: FY 1984 DoD Repot on
Rueanch, Development and Acquizition)
to 1983 the Pentagon budget rose by approxi-
mately 10 percent after inflation). In its count of
Soviet weapon?, the CIA also found fewer than it
had expected.
Under CIA Director William Casey, the CIA
has stopped publishing its "Dollar Cost Compari-
son of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities." The
CIA claims that this is just part of an overall
move to limit the number of publicly available
CIA studies. The Armed Forces Journal, though,
quotes one CIA analyst wondering "whether the
report on Soviet expenditures was being dropped
because it would disclose a leveling out or drop in
the rate of growth in Soviet defense spending 9nd
equipment production over the last two years."
Who Outspends
Whom?
"Even when we include the allied efforts on each
side, we find that the Warsaw Pact has out-spent
and out-produced the NATO countries." (Caspar
Weinberger, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1984)
According to the Pentagon's Fiscal Year 1984 An-
nual Report on Research, Development and Ac-
quisition, as well as Weinberger's own 1982 report,
NATO has always outspent the Warsaw Pact
(Chart III).
REAGAN MILITARY SPENDING COMPARED TO
1962-82 AVERAGE IN CONSTANT 1983 DOLLARS
FY 83
ESTIMATE
AVERAGE
SPENDING
1962-1982
FY 84
ESTIMATE
FY 8S
ESTIMATE
Chant I V (Sowcce: DoD)
CountvSpy -- June-Augua-t 1983 -- 17
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A Decade of
Neglect?
"During the past decade, the Soviet Union has
built up its forces across the board. During that
same period, the defense expenditures of the
United States declined in real terms." (Ronald
Reagan, May 9, 1982.)
Not true. According to Pentagon figures, military
spending (in constant FY 1983 dollars) was $187.5
billion in 1972 and $227.8 billion in 1982.
Pentagon Budget:
Lower than in
1962?
billion budget on military tasks;
? the Veterans Administration has a budget of
$25 billon;
? the Maritime Administration spends bet-
ween $500 million and $1 billion a year for
military related projects;
? the Department of Education subsidizes
schools used by "dependents" of military personnel
to the tune of $500 million a year; and
? according to Adams, part of the annual
interest payments on the national debt - $30 bil-
lion, conservatively estimated - is directly related
to military programs.
That adds up to more than $60 billion of the
federal budget which should be added to the $274
billion Pentagon budget as military or military-
related expenditure.
Reagan's
New Math
"In 1962, when John Kennedy was President, 46 "In constant dollars, the defense budget is just
percent, almost half of the federal budget, went about the same as it has been all the way back to
to our national defense. In recent years, about 1962." (Ronald Reagan, January 6, 1983)
one quarter of our budget has gone to defense."
(Ronald Reagan, November 22, 1982)
Comparing military expenditures in 1962 and 1982
in percentages of the federal budget is misleading
because the budget structure has changed consid-
erably in the last two decades. A number of
This statement is contradicted by the Pentagon's
own published figures. In constant Fiscal Year
1983 dollars, the average military spending from
1962 to 1983 is $196.8 billion. Spending in Fiscal
Year 1984 is scheduled to be $264.4 billion, in
Fiscal Year 1985 $293.8 billion (Chart IV).
items that make up a major part of the 1983
budget played no role or a very limited role in
1962: interest payments on the national debt, for
instance, and certain entitlement programs.
Other items in the 1982 budget, e.g. social secur-
ity, Medicare and unemployment benefits are
almost exclusively funded by seperate trust funds
and do not come out of the money the government
raises from income taxes.
According to a study by Dr. Gordon Adams of
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, under
the Fiscal Year 1984 budget, 50~ out of every
dollar the government collects in income taxes
goes to military-related programs. If Reagan's
five year military buildup plan is funded by
Congress, that figure would increase to 65 on the
dollar.
In addition, many items in the U.S. budget that
are not counted as military expenditures are in
reality items that belong in the military expense
account:
? costs for the production of nuclear war-
heads (about $7 billion) are counted as part of the
Energy Department budget;
? NASA spends at least 25 percent of its $5
18 -- CounteASpy -- June-Augue.t 1983
Conventional
Inferiority
"Our strategic nuclear weapons unfortunately are
the only balance or deterrent that we have to the
massive buildup of conventional arms that the
Soviet Union has now on the western front - on
the NATO front." . (Ronald Reagan, May 13, 1982)
The claim that NATO cannot defend itself suf-
ficiently with conventional weapons is a key asser-
tion used to explain the Reagan administration's
refusal to adopt a policy not to use nuclear
weapons first in case of war. Reagan and
Weinberger are fond of quoting endless statistics
of Soviet superiority in the numbers of soldiers,
tanks, fighting vehicles and several other categor-
ies.
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Some of these figures may be accurate as far Central Europe or after a Warsaw Pact mobili-
as they go. But in his Fiscal Year 1984 budget zation without a NATO response. Former CIA
request Weinberger carefully avoids showing in his Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman believes that
red and blue charts those categories where the such a Soviet mobilization would be detected:
U.S. has a numerical advantage. Nor does his "This country is more capable today than it has
"bean-counting" approach take into account the ever been in its history to detect and understand
technical superiority of many NATO weapons sys- the implications of Ale massing of Soviet forces
tems. In fact, writes Carl Jacobsen, director of outside its borders."
Soviet studies at the University of Miami, the
Reagan administration's approach to military
h
f
o
armer w
force comparisons is like that of a
compares his neighbor's 50 orange trees with his
own orchard of 100 apple and 20 orange trees, and
says: 'He has twice as many orange trees that
proves he has more fruit trees than I have."'
The administration's claim of NATO's inferior-
ity in conventional armaments has been widely
accepted as a fact by the U.S. media. Yet
General Frederick Kroesen, the Commander of
the U.S. Army in Europe, is on record as saying
that "We can defend the borders of Western
Europe with what we have. I've never asked for a
larger force. I don't think that conventional Yon-
nuclear] defense is anywhere near hopeless." In
addition, the annual posture statements that were
written under former Defense Secretary Harold
Brown indicate that NATO would be able to ward
off a conventional attack on Western Europe with
conventional arms. Since NATO has been out-
spending the Warsaw Pact (Chart III) and since
Warsaw Pact and NATO forces have not under-
gone major structural changes in the last few
years, that would appear still to be the case
today.
To demonstrate "Soviet conventional superior-
ity," the Reagan administration is quick to point
to the Warsaw Pact's 2.5 to 1 advantage in tanks
and 2.8 to 1 advantage in artillery. This numbers
comparison ignores NATO's technological lead in
both categories. In order to create a more
reliable accounting system the Pentagon devised
the "armored divisions equivalents" measure
which takes into account all principal character-
istics of each weapons system such as firepower
and survivability. Under that calculating system,
NATO's disadvantage is reduced to I to 1.2.
In order to launch a successful attack over-
whelming NATO, the Soviet Union would need a
numerical advantage of more than 3 to I because
of a defending force's inherent advantage. NATO
officials also believe that a defending brigade can
hold out against an initial attack if it has to
protect no more than 15 kilometers of border.
NATO troops are stationed in Europe in such a
way that this is possible along the entire West-
East border.
The only conceivable scenario whereby the
Warsaw Pact could overwhelm NATO defenses, as
detailed in a study published in International
Security, would be a massive Warsaw Pact attack
after additional Soviet forces had been brought to
The Reagan adminis-
tration's approach to
military force comparisons
"is like that of a farmer who
compares his neighbor's 50
orange trees with his own
orchard of 100 apple and
20 orange trees, and says,
`he has twice as many
orange trees; that proves
he has more fruit trees
than I have.' "
If the Reagan administration, sincerely believ-
ing in NATO's conventional inferiority, were at
the same time seriously interested in a "no first
use" policy, it could be moving in that direction
by following the suggestions outlined in a "No
First Use" study conducted by retired military and
Defense Department officials under thel~uspices
of the Union of Concerned Scientists. This
study proposes gradually moving toward a "no
first use" policy while gearing military doctrine,
strategy and training onto this new track. But the
Reagan administration has shown no interest in
those suggestions. On the contrary, the new U.S.
Army doctrine, AirLand Battle, while claiming to
rely more on conventional weapons, postulates
that nuclear and chemical weapgy are most use-
ful if used very early in a battle.
In the final analysis, Reagan's fear-mongering
about Soviet superiority is based on the assump-
tion that the Soviet government might intend to
attack Western Europe or the United States. This
notion obviously is based on Reagan's ideological
world view and not on any intelligence projections
of Soviet intentions. Admiral Noel Gaylor, a
former head of the National Security Agency, told
CountenSpy -- June-Augub.t 1983 -- 19
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the National Press Club in February 1983 that
"there is no evidence whatever in my judgement
that the Soviet Union has any intention of attack-
ing the United States because they think our
guard is down, now or in the future. All the
evidence is in the other way and in point of fact
any such idea would be so terribly risky from the
standpoint of the Soviet leadership that it really
isn't a concern that we should have."
violating an understanding reached after the
Cuban missile crisis that no missiles that could
reach 114e Soviet Union would be based in
Europe.
Carter's Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
confirmed in an interview with the West German
magazine Stern that it was the Carter adminis-
tration that provided the "leadership" at the time
when NATO made the decision to deploy cruise
and Pershing II missiles in Europe. NATO
The European
Nuclear Balance
"In Europe, for example, the Russians had a
missile called the SS-20, a nuclear missile. It was
called an intermediate range, because it couldn't
come across the ocean and hit us, but it was
targeted on all the cities of Europe. And Europe
had nothing to counter it. So, our NATO allies
asked us if a weapon that we have designed,
called the Pershing missile, could be made and
installed in Europe to counter this threat of the
SS-20 so the Russians would know if they tried to
use those, the Europeans had something to use
back" (Ronald Reagan to high school students,
May 10, 1982.)
The claim that the Europeans asked for the deploy-
ment of hundreds of cruise missiles and Pershing
II ballistic missiles (and that therefore the
European protests against these missiles are
completely unjustified has become a mainstay of
the Reagan administration's nuclear weapons
propaganda. Yet they cannot cite a single state-
ment by any European governrrfft asking for the
deployment of these weapons. What actually
happened was that former West German chancel-
lor Helmut Schmidt complained in a 1977 London
speech that the Soviet Union was deploying inter-
mediate range missiles which could hit Western
Europe but not the United States. Therefore, the
SS-20s were not covered by the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty (SALT). Schmidt later explain-
ed that he wanted to pressure the Carter admin-
istration to include intermediate range weapons in
SALT IL
Schmidt's speech was met with silence by the
Carter administration, but in January 1979 Carter
responded by proposing the deployment of the
intermediate range nuclear weapons. Schmidt and
other West European government leaders agreed,
even though it was apparent that deployment of
missiles in Europe that. could hit vital Soviet
facilities would be viewed as a grave provocation
by the Soviets. In Soviet eyes, the U.S. would be
20,-- CounteASpy -- June-August 1983
agreed that the missiles were to be deployed only
if negotiations with the Soviet Union failed. The
Reagan administration apparently views things
differently. Its chief arms control negotiator
Edward Rowny, when asked why the adminis-
tration had decided to go ahead with intermediate
force reduction talks, stated that this decision
was made "in the interest of getting some ground-
launched cruj%e missiles and some Pershing Ils
into Europe." This answer appears to contradict
the NATO decision to have arms talks in order to
avoid deployment of the missiles.
Reagan's claim that NATO has "nothing" with
which to counter the Soviet SS-20s is inaccurate.
In addition to thousands of "battlefield" nuclear
weapons, NATO has a sizable European-based
nuclear weapons arsenal that can hit the Soviet
Union, including 156 F-111 bombers with two
nuclear weapons each; 60 FB-111 bombers with
two bombs each; 240 A-6E and A-7E bombers
which can carry nuclear weapons; and 267 nuclear
capable F-4 bombers. (According to NATO stat-
istics, some of the A-6Es, A-7Es and F-4s are for
conventional operations; however, they can be
equipRwith nuclear weapons in crisis situa-
tions. ) In addition, the U.S. Navy has hundreds
of missiles on submarines in European waters, and
France and Britain at present have hundreds of
warheads directed at the Soviet Union. Both
Francois Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher are
rapidly building up their countries' nuclear strike
forces. Mitterrand is improving primarily sub-
marine-launched nuclear weapons (France's new
sub, L'Inflexible, carries 16 M-4 missiles with -six
independently targetable warheads each; their
range is 4000 km.) If Thatcher's buildup continues
on schedule, by 1995 Britain's nuclear strike force
will be capable of delivering more than 5000 nuc-
lear warhet9s that can reach virtually every
Soviet city.
Footnotes:
1) See Anthony Cordesman and Benjamin Schemmer,
"The Failure to Defend Defense," Armed Forces
Journal, March 1983.
2) Mark Green, "Reagan's Reign of Error," The Nation.
3/5/83, p.263.
3) This segment draws on two detailed articles by
Professor Franklyn Holzman of Tufts University,
"Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on
Defense?," (International Security, Spring 1980) and
SEE REAGAN, page 29
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Soviet Military Power, 1983
Illustrated Disinformation
by John Pike
Soviet Military Power, the 107-page centerpiece of
the Reagan administration's military propaganda
campaign, was released by Defense Secretary
Caspar Weinberger in March 1983. It claims that
the Soviet Union is engaged in a massive arms
buildup to achieve "military superiority in all
fields." The U.S. answer to that, according to
Weinberger, is clear: The United States "must have
the resolve to work unceasingly for the security of
all free nations" and to match the Soviet effort.
With the 1983 edition of Soviet Military Power (a
first edition was released in September 1981),
Weinberger wants to counter the critics of his
spending binge by demonstrating that the, Soviets
are going to conquer the world if not contained by
the U.S. armed forces. U.S. agencies have printed
and distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of
the booklet and handed them out all over the world.
Weinberger's approach to "proving" Soviet super-
iority is simple: count the weapons systems, and
focus on those where the Soviet Union has a numer-
ical advantage. Ignore differences in capabilities of
these weapons systems. Do not mention that the
United States has a clear technological lead in most
areas. And above all, don't forget to stress again
and again that whatever the Soviets do, it is offen-
sive, while the United States is just trying to stand
up for the interests of the Free World. (For a more
detailed analysis of the Reagan administration's
disinformation campaign on Soviet military
strength, see the previous article in this issue.)
Soviet Military Power contains numerous mis-
takes and inconsistencies - even if one considers it
on its own terms. For instance, on page 106 it
claims that "there is no sign of abatement in the
scope of buildup" of Soviet forces. Yet pages 78 to
80 contain annual production figures (from 1978 to
1982) for 27 categories of Soviet weapons, 16 of
which show a decline in these four years, four
categories show no change, and only seven show an
increase in the annual production rates.
The Pentagon also uses drawings to exaggerate
the Soviet threat. Many of the illustrations of
Soviet weapons in Soviet Military Power contain
major mistakes (which is rather mysterious since
Weinberger should have the budget to hire decent
artists to illustrate this keystone document). Take
the example of the Oscar class submarine. Pages
104 and 105 show a detailed photo of the boat, but
on pages 70 and 71 we find an artist's concept of the
submarine that bears only passing resemblance to
the photo. Paintings of yet to be developed Soviet
anti-satellite weapons on page 64 and 65, and the
radar on page four, contain major technical mis-
takes as well.
Perhaps the most extreme case of threat ex-
aggeration-by-dra wing is that of the T-80 tank. The
T-80, called a powerful new "supertank" which, we
were told, hadn't found its U.S. match, was the
featured star of the 1981 edition of Soviet Military
Power. The painting of the T-80 published in that
edition was remarkably similar to the American M-1
Abrams tank which at that time was under heavy
criticism. The readers were assured that the pic-
ture "while not precise in every detail" was "as
authentic as possible."
The 1983 version of Soviet Military Power tells a
different story. A photo of-that same supertank,
the T-80, shows that it actually bears very little
resemblance to the M-1. In fact, only by looking at
the photo rather closely can one distinguish the T-80
from its predecessor, the T-72. The technical data
Soviet Military Power gives for the T-80 is identical
to the data for the T-72 with the exception that the
T-80 is one ton heavier, which probably represents
the weight of the fender skirts which were missing
from the T-72.
The T-80 episode is a good example of one way
in which the Pentagon engages in threat inflation.
(A T-85 scare might be just around the comer as an
updated version of the T-80 is supposed to be tested
soon.) Soviet tanks are assigned a T-series number
according to the first year that they enter service,
thus the T-80 entered service in 1980 (it was the
updated version of the T-72, and so on). What this
means, for U.S. propaganda purposes, is that each
time the Soviets modify their tanks, the Pentagon
credits them with having developed a totally new
weapons system: thus, says the Pentagon, "the
Soviets have been developing an average of one new
tank every five years" while the United States has
fielded none.
The T-80 scare is just one instance of the
Pentagon's use of designations of weapons systems
to exaggerate the Soviet military buildup. The
Defense Department also claims that a new Soviet
fighter plane, the "Foxhound" will be deployed soon
with an advanced radar system to shoot down U.S.
bombers. On closer examination, though, the
John Pike is a member of the National Committee of the
Progressive Space Forum.
Counte'rSpy -- June-Augue.t 1983 -- 21
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Foxhound turns out to be yet another version of the in fact been deployed.. The U.S. Poseidon has been
Mig-25 Foxbat, variations of which have been in tested with as few as 6 and as many as 14 warheads,
service for more than two decades. During the and it is generally agreed that various combinations
same time period, the U.S. F-15 Eagle has appeared have actually been deployed. But for Soviet
in four updated variations, F-15A, F-15B, F-15C and Military Power, you just have to know how to count
F-15D. But because all these versions retain the F- 'em: A Soviet missile with four different warhead
15 designation, the Pentagon counts them as only configurations becomes four missiles, but a U.S.
one single plane type. missile deployed with different payloads is still one
missile.
The use of drawings also enables the Pentagon to
confabulate currently existing weapons (usually U.S.
It is the aim of the weapons) and future systems (always Soviet). Soviet
Military Power shows a drawing on page 68 com-
Reagan administration to paring the U.S. Space Shuttle which has been flying
for over two years with three future Soviet space
create fear among the launch systems. Of the Soviet rockets pictured, the
largest was unsuccessfully tested on three
people, because . . . occasions, with each test ending in a spectacular
"democrat%eS will not explosion. The other two have yet to fly.
Turning to page 46, we find an illustration of
sacrifice to protect their Soviet transport aircraft, including a "New Heavy
p Transport" which bears an uncanny resemblance to
security in the absence the American C-5 - the subject of an intense
procurement battle last year. Rumors of this new
of a sense of danger. plane, designated the Antonov 40, have been float-
ing around for several years,even though the Soviet
And every time we create Union apparently lacks. the ability to manufacture
the engines needed to get it off the ground.
the impression that we Moving from the unlikely to the impossible, turn
to page 28 and consider the map of the Soviet radar
and the Soviets are coverage, specifically the immense ability of the
coo eratin diminish Soviet over-the-horizon radar (OTH) which pur-
e g we portedly can track targets from the Soviet Union
that sense of over the North Pole all the way across the United
States and down to Central America. This would be
apprehension. ? a remarkable feat. OTH radars work by bouncing a
radar beam off the ionosphere, much like a clear
channel AM radio station. But the ionosphere is
severely disrupted over the polar regions which is
why the U.S. OTH plans do not include polar OTH
The same is true for the B-52 bomber, which has radar. Soviet Military Power, however, credits the
made it up all the way to the B-52H. And yet, USSR with two such radar installations with a range
Ronald Reagan is still using his tired old B-52 of at least 8,000 miles, rather unlikely given the
example ("Some of the B-52s are older than the fact that the Soviet Union does not have a lead in
pilots that fly them") to "prove" that the U.S. hasn't the OTH technology.
deployed a new bomber in decades. In reality, says Soviet Military Power has a clear mission - to
Col. Robert Durkin of the 28th bombardment wing convince people in the United States that there is a
at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, the B- huge Soviet threat. The Russians are coming if a
52s have been improved constantly: "I would be U.S. military buildup doesn't stop them. It is the
surprised if there is an original rivet in any of those aim of the Reagan administration to create fear
airplanes... It's been rewinged, it's been rescanned, among the people, because, as Assistant Secretary
its been retailed... 11 (Christian Science Monitor, of Defense for International Security Policy Richard
4/3/83) Perle has said, "democracies will not sacrifice to
Another instance of disinformation-by-dra wing: protect their security in the absence of a sense of
on page 20, Soviet Military Power depicts four danger. And every time we create the impression
variations of the Soviet SS-18 Intercontinental that we and the Soviets are cooperating and mod-
Ballistic Missile, each with a different mix of war- erating the competition we diminish that sense of
heads. Two pages later we are shown but a single
U.S. Poseidon Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. apprehension. 11 (Long Island Newsday, Weinberger 's creation of a "sense of danger" by
y
Clearly, the Soviets seem to have the upper hand. releasing Soviet Military Power doesn't bode well
But not so. The four modifications of the SS-18 for arms reduction agreements. Such "cosmetic
merely represent the four different types of pay- agreements," says Perle, are "in the long run fatal
loads that it has been observed carrying in tests. for the democracies of the west."
There is no indication that all of these variants have
22 -- CountenSpy -- June-Augue.t 1983
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Disinformation:
Excuse for Raids Against
Canadian Peace Groups
by Murray MacAdam
Political bombings can have a silver lining - at
least for some people. Canadian police and
governmental authorities have latched onto the
bombing of a controversial weapons factory in
Toronto, Canada, in an attempt to discredit the
country's blossoming peace movement.
It all began on October 14, 1982, when 550
pounds of dynamite were exploded at Litton
Systems Canada, builder of the guidance system
for the U.S. cruise missile. The bomb injured
seven people, one seriously, and caused $5 million
in damage. A group called Direct Action claimed
credit for the bombing and issued a communique
explaining why they did it.
Litton has long been the target of non-violent
protests led by a Toronto peace group, the Cruise
Missile Conversion Project (CMCP). Over the
past three years, activists have held a series of
peaceful rallies and civil disobedience actions to
protest Litton's involvement in nuclear war prep-
arations. The government seized on the bombing
to thwart these peace activists. At a November
11 protest, an army of 400 police, many of them
mounted, prevented 800 demonstrators from get-
ting near the Litton factory. During the protest,
police arrested 62 people for blocking the roads
into Litton.
Soon afterwards, at the sentencing of one of
the protesters, David Collins, Crown Attorney
Norman Matusiak unleashed a vicious red-baiting
attack on the peace movement. He read excerpts
from the diary of Ivan LeCouvie, another pro-
tester. The diary had not been introduced as
evidence, but had been taken from LeCouvie by
the police on the day of the demonstration.
Matusiak claimed that the diary showed a
"Russian connection" to CMCP because it indi-
cated that LeCouvie had attended a conference in
Prague and had stopped in Moscow. Matusiak
made allusions to the KGB, taking advantage of
the fact that Collins had no lawyer present to
make an objection to these wild charges.
LeCouvie had attended the Prague conference
of the World Federation of Democratic Youth as a
member of the Canadian Youth for Peace group,
which Matusiak called a "Communist youth
group." He claimed that the Prague conference
was a "Communist youth movement attended only
by special invitation" from Moscow. "It was a
reward for services rendered." There were refer-
ences in the diary, Matusiak went on, to Soviet
youth organizations and the Komsomol. "The
Komsomol, according to what I learned at uni-
versity, is a Communist youth organization." One
of the references, he said was to the Soviet
overseas intelligence service.
Outside the courtroom, Matusiak repeated his
"Soviet connection" allegations to the press. He
not only showed the diary to reporters, but he, or
someone working for him, actually gave photo-
copies of the diary to the press. The media
willingly obliged. Blowups of the diary were
shown on TV. "Diary links Litton protest to
Soviets: Crown" screamed the headline of the
Toronto Star, Canada's largest circulation daily.
Around midnight on December 7, the days
Crown Attorney Matusiak made his claims, the
police arrested LeCouvie and told him he would
be charged with murder or some other count
connected with the bombing of the Litton plant.
For nearly 12 hours, they interrogated LeCouvie
about the diary and many other unrelated matters
before releasing him with out charge. The in-
cident was clearly illegal since in Canada the
police have no power to "arrest for questioning."
The police continued their harassment by ex-
ecuting five search warrants against offices and
homes of people allied with CMCP and other
peace groups. They claimed that they were
looking for evidence concerning the Litton bomb-
ing. The raids occurred within days of Matusiak's
ludicrous charges. And the information given by
the police to obtain the search warrants contained
not a shred of evidence to justify the searches.
On December 8, 1982, police raided yet an-
other peace group, the World Emergency (WE)
project based at Trent University in Peter-
Murray tincAdam is a Canadian freelance writer.
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borough, Ontario. The police failed to notify the
university, as is usual when carrying out a search.
The raid angered the Trent community, including
university president Donald Theall who called WE
a "reputable organization." The police claimed in
an affidavit filed in support of their search war-
rant that they had "learned that the originals of
the communique issued by Direct Action [about
the Litton bombing] were at this address." Need-
less to say, they found nothing of the sort.
The Cruise Missile Conversion Project's office
was raided six days later. Four police officers
scrutinized the office for four hours, even check-
ing the garbage twice. They seized a number of
documents, including minutes of meetings and
names of some CMCP members. The office of
the Ontario-wide Alliance for Non-Violent Action,
which organized the November 11 protest, was
also raided, as were the homes of several peace
activists. The police also seized documents dur-
ing these raids. At one house, six police officers
interrupted a Christmas gathering and subjected
the occupants to four hours of questioning and
sarcastic, sexist remarks.
The raids led to no arrests in connection with
the Litton bombing. On January 21, police arrest-
ed five people in the province of British
Columbia; three have since been charged with
the bombing. None of them had been active with
CMCP or any other peace groups in Ontario.
CMCP called the raids "blatant harassment of
a peace movement, and a violation of our legal
and moral rights to organize and work for social
change." Along with the Alliance for Non-Violent
Action, CMCP has demanded that the police
apologize for the raids and return all confiscated
material. As of late March this had not been
done. Neither the police officers responsible for i
the raids, nor Crown Attorney Matusiak have been
reprimanded or disciplined in any way.
Despite the repression and smear tactics,
groups such as CMCP and the broader peace
movement continue to grow. Litton's cruise mis-
sile involvement and the planned testing of cruise
missiles in the province of Alberta have become
major political issues in Canada. The U.S. wants
to test the cruise missiles in Alberta because the
terrain is similar to parts of the Soviet Union.
A Gallup poll released in January 1983 found
that 52 percent of Canadians oppose the cruise
testing in Canada, while 37 percent support it.
On February 10, Canada and the United States
signed a weapons testing agreement which paves
the way for cruise testing in Alberta. Two days
later protest demonstrations erupted across
Canada, including a Toronto rally of 5,000 in
bitter cold. Leaders of Canadian trade unions and
of major churches have publicly opposed the tests.
Even an association of World War II veterans has
joined the anti-cruise movement.
Cruise missile testing has become a major
issue here because it so clearly shows the hypoc-
risy of the Trudeau administration and its com-
plicity with the Pentagon's plans for nuclear war.
In 1978, Prime Minister Trudeau won widespread
international support when he proposed a strategy
of "suffocation" of the arms race. One element
of that strategy was a ban on flight testing of new
strategic weapons systems - including, obviously,
cruise missiles.
Canadian peace activists are also angry about
tax subsidies to war industries such as Litton.
Under the Defence Industry Productivity
Program, the Trudeau administration gave Litton
a $26.4 million grant as well as a $22.5 million
loan to subsidize the production of the cruise
missile's guidance system.
The government has claimed that Canada's
NATO commitments oblige it to permit the tests.
"For Canada not to play its part in NATO is a
very unwise thing, because our security has been
Canadian police and
governmental authorities
have latched on to the
bombing of a controversial
weapons plant in Toronto,
Canada, in an attempt to
discredit the country's
blossoming peace
movement.
24 -- Counte.Spy -- June-Augua.t 1983
protected over 35 years by NATO," claims Exter-
nal Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen.
Yet the air-launched cruise missile to' be
tested in Canada is not even part of the NATO
arsenal, but rather part of the independent Amer-
ican arsenal. It's the ground-launched version of
the cruise which NATO plans to deploy in Europe.
Canada has already committed itself to a non-
nuclear role in NATO, and thus has no obligation
to test cruise missiles here.
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Northern Ireland: U.S.
Media Peddles British Line
by Kathleen O'Neal
In a cartoon in London's Punch on October 29,
1881, the noble Britannia is shown shielding a
barefoot and weeping Hibernia from a stone-
throwing Irish anarchist. The drawing is one of
hundreds published by the Victorian press to
"explain" the perennial Irish question to the
British people. Central to the explanation was
that Irish revolutionaries were criminals. Usually
they were invested with gross simian (ape-like)
features as evidence that they occupied the very
lowest level of the homo sapiens hierarchy. At
the same time, the "good" Irish people, i.e. those
deserving British protection, were portrayed as
impoverished and helpless, while Britain was al-
ways invincible and honor-bound to save the good
Irish from the barbaric revolutionaries.
More than one hundred years later, little has
changed. Britain still occupies Ireland, the Irish
are still rebelling, and the British people are still
being fed crude propaganda. Only today, people,
in the United States are also being targeted by
the British propaganda and the medium of choice
is no longer blatant chauvinist cartoons but rather
seemingly "objective" news stories.
A typical reader of U.S. newspapers will ex-
plain the war in northern Ireland as a religious
war. Britain's effort to stop this bloody Catholic-
Protestant feud, they will explain, is frustrated by
the terrorist Irish Republican Army (IRA). The
more assiduous reader might add that the IRA
members are gangsters, fascists, or Marxists, that
Irish people fear them, that naive Irish-Americans
are duped into sending them money for arms and
that the IRA is part of an international terrorist
conspiracy financed by the Soviet Union.
Before examining how such nonsense gains
access to the American consciousness, it is first
necessary to understand what is largely denied
access: the Irish republican version of the war in
Ireland.
'The 800-Year Struggle for Ireland
The current era of the 800-year-old struggle
against British rule in Ireland dates back to 1922
when Britain attempted to defuse a revolutionary
PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CII.\RIYAItt.-Ocrum S9, ISSI.
TWO FORCES.
Source: L. Pervcy Cu t z, Apes and Ange.P4:
The I LL hman as V-Lc-torc i.an Caru.catu'e
government while six of Ulster's nine counties
were gerrymandered td provide a loyalist bastion
under direct British rule. The arrangement se-
cured British financial, industrial and agricultural
interests throughout Ireland and prevented the
realization of a true Irish republic.
The linchpin of the partition scheme was and
continues to be keeping the north loyal to
England. This is accomplished by punishing the
nationalist Catholic community with institution-
alized discrimination and intermittent pogroms
while rewarding the loyalist Protestant commun-
ity with a relatively higher standard of living.
y
y
e
nationalist movement by partitioning Ireland. The
is reinforced by a peculiar
alt
Protestant lo
Th
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Orange mythology.* Similar to the myths which
are used to justify white supremacy in South
Africa, Orange myths provide an erroneous
nationalist identity for the Protestant community.
This identity is exacerbated by an atavistic fear
of Catholicism. The Orange myths create and
sustain the appropriate siege mentality among
.Ulster's Protestants which, in turn, justifies the
British army occupation.
In the late 1960s, the nationalist community's
resistance to their enforced underclass status
took the form of a non-violent civil rights move-
ment. When this was brutally attacked by loyalist
paramilitants and the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(the northern Ireland police), the Irish Republican
Army emerged. Their initial mission was to
protect the nationalist community, but the strug-
gle soon rekindled their republican aspirations. In
1971, the IRA declared war against the British
forces, and in 1972, Britain unleashed an anti-
.civilian counterinsurgency campaign.
The fact that little of this version of the war
in northern Ireland figures in the popular
American conception can be attributed to the
British propaganda machine and the U.S. news
media. The link between them, of course, is not
formal. No American reporter or editor is going
to admit that he or she merely touches up British
government press releases. There is evidence,
however, that Britain actively works to use the
American news media for its propaganda on
northern Ireland, and there is substantial evidence
suggesting that the U.S. media is a highly co-
operative carrier.
Army Psychological Operations
The generation of propaganda, which is an inte-
=gral part of the counterinsurgency operation in
Ireland, is the responsibility of the British Army's
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). PSYOPS in-
cludes a full spectrum of activities - from the
speedy dissemination of news releases to posting
of counterfeit IRA posters throughout the nation-
alist community. British Brigadier General and
counterinsurgency expert Frank Kitson stresses in
Low Intensity Operations that PSYOPS should be
expanded to other countries as well:
The propaganda battle has not only got to be
won in the country in which the the insurgency
takes place but also throughout the world
where governments or individuals are in a
position to give moral or material support to
the enemy.... It can be achieved either by
direct action... or by efforts to inform and
influence the media.
To influence the media Britain maintains a
large information service in Ireland which fur-
nishes instant events-related press releases. The
;objective, of course, is to be there first with the
26 -- CountenSpy -- June-Augu6.t 1983
"news" and consequently have an advantage in
influencing what will be reported and how it will
be reported. According to Information on Ireland,
a Britain-based organization, the British army in
northern Ireland had a staff of 40 army press
officers and 100 support personnel in 1976. The
Royal Ulster Constabulary had 12 full-time press
officers and the government employed 20 Belfast-
t?ased press officers.
Bolstering this effort in the United States are
the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., the
consular officers throughout the country, and the
British Information Service in New York City.
During critical periods, this apparently isn't con-
sidered adequate. The IRA hunger strike in 1981
brought a team of 15 PSYOPS specialists to
Washington, D.C. to convince the U.S. Irish com-
munity that prisons like H-Block are among the
best in Europe. (See "British Propaganda,"
Counterspy, August-October 1981.) The team was
selected by high-level British intelligence person-
nel, including M16 chief Arthur Franks, Security
General Jim Glover (security and intelligence
There is evidence ... that
Britain actively works to use
the American news media
for its propaganda on
northern Ireland, ' and there
is substantial evidence
suggesting that the U.S.
media is a highly
cooperative carrier.
coordinator for northern Ireland), and Francis
Brooks-Richard, former intelligence coordinator
in Margaret Thatcher's cabinet. One of the
team's many activities was distributing thousands
of copies of "H-Block: The Facts" to the U.S.
news media.
No matter how sophisticated a propaganda
operation is, however, it cannot be effective
unless the message is distributed by a credible
carrier. This is where the U.S. news media fits in.
*Orange mythology relates to the 16th century when
William of Orange (Protestant) defeated King James I
(Catholic) at the Battle of the Boyne, thus establishing the
Orange ascendancy. Today, Orange myths perpetuate the
notion that Protestants should, by natural and divine order,
have a more privileged position in northern Ireland.
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It wittingly (because of sympathies with Britain's
role in Ireland) or unwittingly (because of reliance
on British press releases out of convenience) has
proven highly cooperative in disseminating British
war propaganda.
The Washington Post
A close examination of the Washington Post's
coverage of the 1981 hunger strike reveals the
persuasiveness as well as the subtlety of British
war propaganda. The hunger strike was essential-
ly a struggle against one of Britain's most insid-
ious propaganda ploys, the criminalization of Irish
political prisoners. Britain's response to the
dramatic increase of political prisoners in the
mid-1970s was to build bigger prisons and abolish
their "special," i.e. political status. The repub-
lican prisoners refused to cooperate and initiated
a series of protests which culminated in the
hunger strike. In 1981, ten men starved to death
in order to shatter Britain's definition of what
they were.
The hunger strike is a good example to anat-
omize because it received widespread coverage,
which U.S. observers of media treatment of
northern Ireland as well as the Washington Post's
London correspondent Leonard Downie, Jr. con-
sidered more balanced than previous coverage.
One Irish American activist called the Post's
coverage a "breakthrough" while Downie said that
the reporting about the hunger strike "had broad-
ened most American coverage beyond just British
news sources."
If the Post's reporting about the hunger strike
was indeed a breakthrough, it was still far from
truly "balanced" reporting. A counting of attri-
buted sources during the first twelve months of
the hunger strike (September 1980 to August
1981) reveals that the ratio of British government
and loyalist sources to republican sources was
approximately two to one. However, even in
articles with more pro-republican sources than
British government sources, the context provided
by the Post was always consistent with the British
government position that the conflict is essential-
ly religious, that the "terrorist" IRA is responsible
for the war in Ireland and that the British army
plays a peacekeeping role. An April 11, 1981
article on Bobby Sands' (the leader of the 1981
hunger strike) election to Parliament is a case in
point.
The article written by Downie, contained two
pieces of information attributed to a republican
and one to a British government source. The lead,
however, referred to Sands as a "convicted Irish
Republican terrorist." Later in the article,
Downie wrote that the "hidden danger" in Sands'
Fermanagh district is symbolized "by the
Fermanagh widows, a group of 60 Protestant
women whose husbands have been murdered in the
past decade, mostly by IRA gunmen on hit-and-
run strikes from enclaves in Ireland." Downie
ignored the fact that "convicted terrorist" Sands
was sentenced by a non-jury court after being
held incommunicado for seven days under the
Diplock Court system (the Diplock courts were
established in the early 1970s for political cases).
Only in the last paragraph did he explain that
Sands was sentenced to nine years in prison, not
for "terrorism" but for gun possession. Sands
denied even this charge. Downie further failed to
mention that in northern Ireland gun possession is
illegal for the Catholic nationalist community but
legal for the loyalist Protestant community.
Perhaps the most deceptive portion of
Downie's article was the coining of the
Fermanagh widows as a victim, symbol. By iden-
tifying the widows as Protestant, Downie implied
that their husbands were murdered because they
were of the Protestant faith. Since the IRA is not
anti-Protestant and its targets are military and
economic, it is far more likely the anonymous
widows' late husbands had been members of a
loyalist paramilitary organization or in some way
worked for the British army or the Royal Ulster
Constabulary. And if this were the case, they
were not murdered, as Downie wrote, but killed in
the course of a declared war.
In his search for symbols of the violence-
plagued province, Downie overlooked a recent and
bloody assassination spree against the leadership
of the H-Block Armagh Committee. The commit-
tee was a 32-county organization formed to bring
attention to the deplorable treatment of Irish
republican prisoners in British jails. The assassi-
nations would have served as a far more eluci-
dating symbol of Ulster violence since there was
growing evidence that the British army's covert
Special Air Services (SAS) had organized the
loyalist squads which carried out the assassina-
tions. The link between SAS and the loyalist
squads was confirmed in March 1982 when an
Ulster Defence Association member admitted,
after his murder trial, that he was working for the
SAS.
Ignoring Essential Facts
Among the most salient areas omitted from the
Washington Post's coverage of the hunger strike
were: the British army's and the Royal Ulster
Constabulary's atrocities against the civilian
nationalist community; the objectives outlined in
the Eire Nua program of Sinn Fein (the political
wing of the IRA); and the workings of the justice
system in northern Ireland. As knowledge of
these issues is essential to understanding the war
in northern Ireland as well as the hunger strike,
and since information pertaining to these three
areas would have been easily accessible, their
omission from the Post's prodigious coverage of
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the hunger strike was clearly deceptive.
Washington Post articles repeatedly vilified
IRA members as "murderers" and "terrorists"
throughout the the hunger strike. It intensified
this image by presenting the IRA as disembodied
from its own historical perspective, current anal-
ysis or revolutionary objectives - all of which are
layed out in Sinn Fein's Eire Nua program. Had
the Post used any part of Eire Nua in the interest
of furnishing readers a more complete under-
standing of the war in Ireland, the IRA's villainous
image would have significantly dissipated. More-
over, the program shows that Britain's reason for
occupying northern Ireland is to protect its exten-
sive economic interests there.
The very first line of the Eire Nua program
declares that "the wealth of Ireland belongs to the
people of Ireland and it is theirs to be exploited
and developed in their interest." Other sections
of the program assert that the republic will
control the import and export of money; that only
Irish citizens can own land and that all other
segments of the economy will be run by and for
the people. If this program were implemented,
British investors and landowners would clearly
have the most to lose.
Had the Post reported the escalating atro-
cities against the nationalist community by the
British army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
readers would have had a far more accurate
28 -- Coun.teASpy -- June-Augub.t 1983
picture of the real criminals in northern Ireland.
Perhaps the most horrible atrocity against the
community during the hunger strike was the
maiming and killing of unarmed civilians with
plastic bullets. During this period eight civilians
(seven children) were killed by plastic bullets and
hundreds were injured. However, no description
of the benign sounding projectiles was included in
the Post's coverage. The few times casualties
were. reported, it was in the context of the
unsought consequences of dispersing riots. (See
Kathleen O'Neal, "British Plastic Bullets Kill,"
Counterspy, March-May 1983.)
The crux of the hunger strike, as mentioned,
was whether Irish republican prisoners should have
criminal or political status. Margaret Thatcher's
famous tautology "a crime is a crime is a crime"
made the British government's position on this
point crystal clear. What Thatcher failed to
mention and what the Post subsequently didn't
report was that some crimes are less equal in the
United Kingdom. Under the Prevention of
Terrorism and Emergency Provisions Acts, sus-
pected political offenders appear before the
Diplock Courts, which have no juries and a 93
percent conviction rate. Confessions are often
extracted from suspects after several days of
torture. Should the defendant not be able to
physically appear in Court, Royal Ulster
Constabulary officers often stand in to
"verbalize" the defendant's confession.
Why does Britain maintain such a phoney
judicial system when direct internment would be
more expedient? In August 1971, before the
Diplock Courts were established, Britain rounded
up and interned 1,400 republican suspects without
charges or trial. This, however, only solidified
the nationalist Catholic community and elicited
international outrage. Britain responded by
developing a system which would appear to the
not-so-careful observer to have some judicial in-
tegrity but which would in no way impede the
internment process. As Pace University Law
Professor David Lowry writes, the Diplock Court
system was introduced merely to "add a public
relations gloss by using the imprimatur of law."
During the hunger strike, when the Diplock
Court system was ripe for exposure, the
Washington Post opted for the PR gloss. For
instance, in an April 26 article about Irish politi-
cal prisoner Charles Crummley, Post reporter
Virginia Hammill omitted any substantive infor-
mation Crummley had offered about his torture
by British prison officials and referred to the
Diplock Courts merely as "special courts."
Post editorials consciously lied about the
Diplock Courts. In the first editorial on the
hunger strike, Post editorial writer John Anderson
claimed that the hunger strikers were convicted
by "due process." When asked in an October 1981
interview whether he believed that due process
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exists in the Diplock Courts, Anderson equivo-
cated and said "Yes, but not the way most
Americans think of due process."
Irish Americans Don't Trust the Media
Nothing in this article is meant to suggest that
the Washington Post has been more derelict in its
coverage of nothern Ireland than the rest of the
corporate-controlled news media in the United
States. In fact the Post's reporting and editorial-
izing has been remarkably consistent with that of
the rest of the American news media - a uniform-
ity suggesting that coverage of northern Ireland
largely flows from a single source.
In The Real Terror Network, Edward Herman
suggests that a device for understanding the.
enormity of the bias in the news media of the
"Free World" is to take a story, place it in a
Soviet context, and imagine the media response.
Imagine, strictly for comparison, how the
Washington Post would report about Soviet troops
occupying Poland, and Soviet soldiers killing
Polish children by firing plastic bullets.
Though the news media's control over the
"news" from northern Ireland is formidable, it is
not impregnable. Gradually the truth about the
war in Ireland has been filtering through - though
mostly to inner city Irish Americans. A survey
published in January 1983 by the Center for Irish
Studies in Philadelphia found that local Irish
Americans were practically unanimous in their
.belief that the British presence in northern
Ireland is unjustified and based on illegitimate
claims, and that IRA violence is justified. Only a
few respondents mentioned religion as a major
factor in the troubles. Very few listed the news
media as a source of information on Ireland.
Instead, they mentioned (in order of degree)
books, visits to Ireland, Irish organizations, and
friends and family as their major source of in-
formation.
As truth about the war in northern Ireland
slowly seeps through to the American conscious-
ness, it is proving to be every bit as dangerous as
the British government had feared. A vociferous
supporter of the IRA was chosen by the conser-
vative Ancient Order of Hibernians to lead New
York City's St. Patrick's Day parade this year. A
divestiture movement has already successfully
pressured Rochester County, New York, to divest
from Barclay's Bank and the state of
Massachusetts to divest from businesses supplying
weapons for use by British soldiers in northern
Ireland. A campaign for congressional resolutions
against the use of plastic bullets in northern
Ireland hopes to expose the anti-civilian nature of
Britain's war in Ireland, and a further consequence
of the growing awareness of the nature of the
war, particularly among Irish Americans, is the
development of a healthy skepticism of anything
reported by the reputedly fair and objective U.S.
news media.
Sources: The British Media and Ireland, Information on
Ireland, London; Belfast Bulletin, Belfast Workers Research
Unit, Spring 1979; L. Perry Curtis, Apes and Angels: The
Irishman as Victorian Caricature, Smithsonian Institution
Press, Washington, D.C., 1971; C. Desmond Greaves, The
Irish Crisis, International Publishers, New York, 1972;
Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in
Fact and Propaganda, South End Press, Boston, 1982; "The
Irish People," Irish Northern Aid, New York, 1980-82; Kevin
Kelley, The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA,
Lawrence Hill and Co., Westport, Conn., 1982; Frank
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, Faber and Faber,
London, 1971; Professor David R. Lowry, "The English
System of Judicial Injustice in Northern Ireland," Political
Education Committee, Ancient Order of Hibernians and
American Irish Association of Westchester Irish Issues
Committee, 1980; "They Shoot Children," Information on
Ireland, London, 1982.
REAGAN, bnom page 20
"Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers
Game," (International Security, Spring 1982).
4) The CIA consistently uses 1970 ruble figures. See
CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, USSR: Measures of
Economic Growth and Development, 1950-80, pre-
pared for the Joint Economic Committee, 12/8/82.
5) New York Times, 3/4/83, p.A-2; Washington Post,
3F4 83, p.A-2
6) Cf supra, #1.
7) Dr. Carl Jacobsen, "The Military Balance: Superiority
is a Mirage," Miami Herald, 3/13/83.
8) Baltimore Sun, 3 6 83.
9) Statistics in the segment discussing NATO's defensive
capabilities are from John Mearsheimer, "Why the
Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," Inter-
national Security, Summer 1982. Some of the details
of this study have been omitted for lack of space.
"Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central
Europe" is a remarkable study which should be read
by all who want to look beyond the conventional
forces numbers game.
10) Dayton Daily News, 2/26/83.
11) No First Use, A Report by the Union of Concerned'
Scientists, Cambridge, Ma., 2/1/83. Former U.S.
officials who participated in the study include
McGeorge Bundy, Admiral Noel Gaylor, George
Kennan, Robert McNamara, Herbert Scoville - and
Gerard Smith.
12) See Konrad Ege, "AirLand Battle: The Army's New
Aggressive Strategy," Counterspy, vol.7, no.2.
13) James Goldsborough, "The U.S. Missiles Bonn Never
Asked For," New York Times, 2/15/83.
14) "Wenn es jetzt nicht reicht, dann nie," Der Spiegel
(Hamburg), 1/31/83.
15) Stern (Hamburg), 8/9/79.
16) Christopher Paine, "Nuclear Combat: the Five-Year
Defense Plan," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
November 1982.
17) Cf supra, #15; also see: "The Military Balance
1982/83," Air Force Magazine, December 1982.
18) See "Ein Boot ist staerker als eine ganze Flotte," Der
Spiegel, 1/31/83; "France: An Oft-Forgotten Part of
the Nuclear Balance," Defense Week, 11/29/82.
CountenSpy -- June-Augu6-t 1983 -- 29
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Non-Truth at the New
York Times by Laurie Kirby
Have you ever watched the news, or read one of
the "establishment" newspapers, and had the un-
comfortable feeling that you were being misled?
That in spite of a variety of viewpoints being
presented, the whole thing seemed hopelessly
biased in a way you couldn't put you finger on?
We all need information - to change the world,
we need to understand it. In turn, it is vital that
we recognize the techniques used to make us
misunderstand events. Some of the techniques
are well known. There is the barrage of lies and
half-truths ("disinformation") which pours out of
the corporate media and government agencies.
There is selective truth - for example, concen-
tration on the human rights situation in the Soviet
Union while ignoring the records of gpvernments
.which serve U.S. business interests. There is
the showbiz-truth of TV news, indistinguishable
from the commercials and trivia surrounding it,
and presented by a superstar newscaster.
This article will examine yet another tech-
nique - the non-truth. This is a piece of infor-
mation or analysis which may itself be true, but
which is surrounded by such a sea of distortions
that it loses its original meaning. The infor-
mation is being used not to convey what it was
originally saying, but to reinforce the overall
message that the media wants to present. Within
that context, its original meaning and whether
or not it was true - no longer even matters.*
Ronald Reagan (or rather his team of speech-
writers) frequently uses the non-truth. In a major
speech to fundamentalist religious leaders in
March 1983, for instance, Reagan broke off from
a diatribe against the nuclear freeze movement
("A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its
enormous and unparalleled military buildup") to
intone this selection from C.S. Lewis's Screwtape
Letters:
The greatest evil is not now done in those
sordid "dens of vice" that Dickens loved to
paint. It is not done even in concentration
camps and labor camps. In those we see its
final result. But it is conceived and ordered
(moved, seconded, carried, and minuted) in
clean, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted
offices, by quiet men with white collars and
cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who
do not need to raise their voice.
freeze slanders, what C.S. Lewis was originally
referring to hardly matters. (He had Nazi Ger-
many in mind; the contemporary reader of this
passage may be forgiven for thinking of corporate
boardrooms.) Reagan goes on to use the emo-
tional impact of Lewis's powerful prose to support
his version of morality, which he equates with
military might. ("I urge you to speak out against
those who would place the United States in a
position of military and moral inferiority.")
The advertising industry is a master of the
non-truth. For example, a cigarette advertise-
ment aimed at women proclaims "You've come a
long way, baby!" and emphasizes the relative
freedom from certain social restrictions that
women have gained during this century. This
statement contains some truth (though it is at
best a half-truth, since it fails to mention that
there's still a long way to go). But its truth is
irrelevant in this context. It has been appro-
priated (along with the struggles that have given
it such truth as it contains); its truth has been
drained from it, and it has been assigned a new
function, that of selling cigarettes. Beyond en-
hancing tobacco profits, this function of course
also abets the campaign to persuade women that
they are already "liberated" in this profoundly
patriarchal culture.
The non-truth is a device particularly suited to
"respectable" media which wish to appear objec-
tive and weighty. A New York Times message to
corporations, designed to attract their adver-
tising, reveals the conscious use of non-truth as a
technique. The Times says of itself: "Its environ-
ment of integrity surrounds your message; fram-
ing it, elevating it, separating it,from the crowd.
With an immediacy that brings it additional pow-
er." Inasmuch as the purpose of the "paid cor-
porate message" is not merely to state what it
states but also to enhance the image as well as
When sandwiched between Reagan's anti-
30 -- Coun.tertSpy -- June-Augu.bt 1983
* In philosophical logic, a statement (such as "it is
raining") is sometimes said to lose its truth-value when
used referentially. Thus the statement "John says that it is
raining" may be true or false quite independently of
whether or not it is in fact raining. Quine calls this
phenomenon "referential opacity." In the device of the
non-truth we see a similar kind of opacity. When carefully
embedded in an ideological framework, a statement or
even a whole symposium can perform an ideological func-
tion quite independent of what it was originally saying.
This might be called "ideological opacity."
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the interests of the paying corporation, it be-
comes a non-truth. And the Times is advertising
itself as a medium which allows this non-truth
mechanism to work by making the message "stand
out;" whereas, corporate advertising in business
publications is "blending into one amorphous
logo".
A closer look at an article from this "respect-
able" paper will show how the non-truth is used to
distort reality for ulterior political motives with-
out actually lying. On September 26,1982, the
New York Times devoted a page of its "Week in
Review" section to a symposium on the state of
the American Left. D.J.R. Bruckner of the Times
staff interviewed six people - "four of them most
often identified as leftist thinkers and two as
conservatives," and all of them prominent as
'We'll be back Ina minute with Harlan Harris' Sports Extra, Jul" Bernmeier and
the weather. Jimmy Cunningham's Entertainment Plus, Judith Enright's Fashion
Notes, Grady O'Tool's Celebrity Interview, Maria Dellago's Budget Center,
Murray Vaughn's Mr. Fix-it Shop, and me, BIN Brogan, with a note on tha newt
Guandi,an/ cp 6
political thinkers. Several of them managed (de-
spite the limitations of space and of the ques-
tions) to provide challenging insights into the
current evolution of liberal and radical thought.
But what did the reader encounter before
these brief interviews? First, the headline - "The
American Left Still Searches for a Clear Political
Direction." Inasmuch as this is not a useless
generality (for when has the Left, or the Right, or
the center, not been searching?) it reflects the
opinion given by just one of the six interviewees -
the conservative Nathan Glazer - although it may
perhaps be read into Eugene Genovese's remarks
as well. But it tends to ignore, or even negate,
what the other four had to say. Since many
readers will get no further than the headline
before turning the page, and will have their views
on the state of the American Left influenced
accordingly, this is no minor distortion.
But it is the (unsigned) introduction to the
interview which definitely sets the scene. Three
italicized paragraphs lead into brief descriptions
of the six "experts," and then the interviews
themselves. The first paragraph asks, "Is there a
future for left-wing politics in this country?" and
sketches in the background: "Among leftists now
there is a growing debate about what to do."
The second paragraph (more than twice as long
as the first) begins:
All this comes at a time when six people,
including members of the radical left splinter
group, the Weather Underground, are awaiting
trial in Rockland County on murder charges
stemming from an October 1981 robbery of a
Brink's truck in which two policemen and a
guard were killed.
Then the "political theater" in the Brink's trial
courtroom is described in entertaining detail: a
defense lawyer argues for the defendants' right to
wear tee shirts bearing political slogans, and,
even more sinister, the defendants shout "Long
live Palestine."
This second paragraph is a sudden and utter
disgression into the visceral: the linking of
"Palestine" with "terrorism." And the term "ter-
rorism" is used to invoke a disproportionate hor-
ror, worse than all the horrors perpetrated in the
world today by government officials and generals.
This pattern of connections, after years of con-
stant reinforcement, is now firmly engraved in
the reader's psyche. Mention of a buzz word such
as "Palestine" is enough to unleash a whole host of
negative associations. (The media attention given
to the Beirut massacres does not seem to have
changed this. An example of the emotive and
extreme statements still common in the U.S.
media, which was published in late 1982: "The
PLO is to the slaughter of risen, women and
children what France is to wine." )
The third of the introductory paragraphs on
the "American Left" is short and crucial:
Few students of politics would argue that
there is any but a factitious connection be-
tween the holdup and the killings and the
tradition of the left in this country, but many
worry about the popular impression the pub-
licity surrounding the trial will leave.
Webster's Dictionary defines "factitious" as "arti-
ficial; sham... induced or produced artificially or
by special effort."
Yet what the New York Times has just subjec-
ted us to in the second paragraph is precisely a
special effort to strengthen the connection be-
tween anyone on the Left and the whole factitious
web of evil associations arround the word "ter-
rorism." This connection will not be unmade in
the reader's mind by a pious disclaimer added as if
by an afterthought in the third paragraph.
Anything the six "experts" say matters little
now because they have (unwittingly) said it in this
framework. Their insight has become non-truth:
the function of the prestigious interviewees is not
to say anything in their own right, but to lend
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support to the ideological framework that sur-
rounds their words.
The function of the third paragraph is to
legitimize the rather blatant manipulation of the
second paragraph. "You may think that was a
huge red herring," It tells the reader, 'but look!
we do too - we're pooh-poohing the whole idea.
You can't even think that we're contributing to
that popular impression after we've called it fac-
titious. We're balanced, rational, and academ-
ically hygienic."
So this third paragraph, having nothing to do
with its truth or falsity, is itself a non-truth.
Whether the assertion it makes is in fact true
matters so little to the author (or editor) that no
evidence is adduced for it, save for asking only
one of the six "experts" about it - the only time
the Brink's "connection" is mentioned anywhere in
the interviews. (And here, right at hand, were
five other "students of politics" who could have
been called upon to provide support for the asser-
tion.)
Another ideological device running through the
entire page - the "Sixties Connection" - reinforces
the function of this third paragraph. The inter-
viewer repeatedly asks his "experts" to link and
period pieces; Sixties nostalgia. Any real or
meaningful links between current opposition
movements and those of the 60s are appropriated
and drained of their validity by this factitious
connection. They become, in the context of this
device, non-truths.
It is not just an academic exercise to learn to
recognize non-truths, and all the other ways in
which the media propagate and implant an ideo-
logy - a world-view which is manufactured to suit
,the needs of business leaders. This ideology is one
of the foundations of a system of repression and
exploitation, and often directly supports
repressive acts. The Brink's affair itself has been
used as an excuse for a crackdown on Leftists and
Black Liberation groups. A federal grand jury is
questioning people "suspected" of links to radical
groups, and (at the time of writing) fourteen
people have been jailed for refusing to testify
about the political activities of themselves and
others.
Each time we break free - and free others -
from the devices which are used to trap us into
warped judgements, we are striking a small blow
against the ideology which supports repression.
compare the 60s protest movement with the pres- Footnotes:
ent-day Left. Small portraits of the "experts" are
inset against a large photo from the archives
showing a dramatic scene from a 1960s demon-
stration. (Odd to choose this picture for an
article on the present state of the Left?)
The "Sixties Connection" is a well-known de-
vice for trivializing and diffusing any present-day
radical activities by turning them into mere
PROPAGANDA, #nam page 14
funding from tax money. However, recipients of
the foundation money can claim it is "clean" and
not associated with the West German government.
Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas stated that it
might be a good idea to have a similar arrange-
ment in the United States. After all, the foun-
dation of the West German Social Democratic
Party, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, provided mas-
sive aid to the Portuguese Social Democrats in
the 1970s to prevent the Communists from com-
ing to power. And that, say these liberal critics,
the U.S. government could never have done.
A staff person of Senator Edward Kennedy's
office echoed Tsongas's sentiment: "It's basically
a good idea and we support it," he told the Boston
Globe. "Our. concern... is that it not become an
exercise is Reaganitis or a vehicle for the
Heritage Foundation to put into effect its view of
the world. We want to see the sophisticated
European model adopted and not a return to the'
1950s hardline anti-Communist policies."
See for example: Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman,
The Political Economy of Human Rifthts, South End
Press, Boston, 1982.
2) New York Times, 3/9/83.
3) New York Times, 11/4/82.
4) Mark Helprin, "American Jews and Israel," New York
Times, 11/7/82.
Nuclear War and The
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32 -- Cow te.Spy -- June-Augue.t 1983
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El Salvador
Interview with Dr. Charlie Clements
Pilot Against Vietnam,
Doctor for El Salvador
Dwc ing the U.S. wan in Vietnam,
Chantie Ctementa btew U.S. A i.n
Foace medical evacuation mi66don6
and C-130 detiveny soat.ie6 to U.S.
ba6e6 - 8ometime6 to secret bases
in Cambodia. A6ten the wan,
Clements 6tud.ed medicine and to-
day he 6eave6 as a doctoa boa the
c.ivitian poputation in a very di6-
6eAent wan zone: the Guazapa Faont
in Et Satvadoa. About 10,000 ci-
v.itian6 LLve in that 50 Equate
mite area contjtoteed by the Fana-
bundo Marti. Na.ti.onat L.ibenation
Faont (FMNL), Just a hew mite6
64om the capital city, San Satva-
doa. Since Febauany 1982, C.temen.t6
has woaked as a 6amity phy6.ician,
taained heatth woakea6 and 6upea-
v.ieed a public health campaign .in
that "contaotted zone."
Da. CLement6 has 4een U.S. m .L-
itaay aid at woah there - at a
coat o6 ten6 o6 thou6and6 o6
tive6. He 6ay6 the patattet to
Vietnam .c.6 tu4: in Vietnam in the
19606 and in Et Satvadoa in the
19806, the U.S. government .c.6 in-,
vo.tved ma66.ivety in a wait without
tetting -i t6 in citi.zen6 how deep-
ty it .w .involved.
Konaad Ege .inteav.iewed Da.
Ctement6 to Match 1983 in Wa6hi.ng-
ton, V. C. where he wa6 Aai.6.ing
money boa medicat eupptie6 and
6h t. Jig h,is eyewi tne.66 account o6
the cuaaent condition6 in Et Sat-
vadoa.
in a controlled zone which means
essentially a zone in which enemy
soldiers, government soldiers
can't enter without facing stiff
resistance from the guerrilla de-
fensive forces. But that also
means that the government forces
don't allow food or medicine to
enter the zone. So the population
- which is characterized by the
United Nations as being one of the
most malnurished in Central Amer-
ica - is faced with large inva-
sions that burn their food stocks
and destroy the crops that are in
the fields.
It's part of the army's
scorched earth policy: to destroy
all food supplies of the popula
tion during an invasion. And im-
posed upon this situation of mal-
nutrition and shortage of food,
there's an acute shortage of medi-
cine. In El Salvador, simply car-
rying medicine in an area where
there is guerrilla activity is
sufficient evidence to be labeled
a sympathizer. A U.S. citizen with
a German mother, named Michael
Kline, was killed recently in El
Salvador, and the accusation of
the government soldiers who killed
him was that he was a communist
sympathizer because he carried
How has the wan a66ected the
people in the Guazapa Faont?
There are about 10,000 civil-
ians there and 40 percent of them
are under age twelve. They live
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medicine and oil. The oil he car-
ried was for his boots, and the
medicine was Alka-Seltzer.
So,the civilians in the front
suffer from an acute shortage of
modern medicines and there are ep-
idemics of malaria, of parasitic
disease, of dysentary, of many
conditions that you would encoun-
ter in a developing country in the
tropics. Superimposed on top of
this are the almost daily attacks
by the Salvadoran military.
I can't remember a day since
July that the Guazapa Front hasn't
been attacked by American C-37
fighter-bombers, strafed by Huey
helicopters, or rocketed by Cessna
Skymaster observation planes, and
sometimes all three. And that in-
cludes Christmas Day and New
Year's Day. There's also random
mortar fire from any of the number
of military outposts that surround
the zone.
Do you have any aen6e ob what
the U.S. adv.i.6on6 axe .teaching
.the Salvadoran army?
I don't have any specific in-
fprration on that. The prisoners
of war have told me that they are
trained in these search and de-
stroy operations which they have
been told by the advisors were
very effective in Vietnam. Another
deserter told me that he was
trained in techniques of torture
by U.S. Green Berets.. But all of
this information is second hand
and I don't have any first hand
experience with it.
holding action and slowly re-
treated behind the civilians.
The government forces entered
the village, killed all the live-
stock, destroyed practically all
.the possessions there, and killed
an old man, Miguel, who had become
a personal friend when I treated
him for arthritis. Earlier that
afternoon, Miguel had said that he
was not going to flee, because he
was. tired of fleeing and, he
said, "What would they do to an
old man anyway?" All of us knew
that he was saying, "I'm ready to
die."
Later we found his body with
very definite signs of mutilation
and torture. This is typical of
Ib .theAe any possible mi.P_itaAy
ju6ti,bi.cati.on bon the Salvadoran
military .to c.a'dcy out .thee e Fii.nde
ob operation?
Well, the justification is very
clear. One of my functions in the
Guazapa Front is liaison to the
International Red Cross to arrange
You would bay that .there .i.,6 a what I've seen. I've seen a baby
very deliberate policy ob going with a bullet hole in its forehead
ab.ten the c viti,an population? with powder burns, indicating that
I don't have any doubts about it was shot from a very close dis-
that. I have been in the zone when tance. And it's general knowledge
there have been large government among any one in the zone that if
sweeps. A typical operation oc- you are caught, you'll be killed.
curred in October 1982 when I was There is an army operations
in a small village that was cut plan the guerrillas captured re-
off by a rapid intrusion of one of cently, and they asked my opinion
the Salvadoran army battalions of it, as a former military offi-
that have been trained in the U.S. cer. I said that what struck me was
The village sent a defense force that in the very detailed logis-
to slow down their entrance, which tics plan of operations there was
gave the villagers time to make no mention of prisoners. Yet ear-
"The Salvadoran army prisoners
of war have told me ... . that
they're taught to kill women and
children because all women are
potential factories for more
guerrillas and children are the
guerrilla seeds that need to be
eliminated from their country."
the release of prisoners. The FMLN
has recognized the neutral status
that I prefer to keep, both as a
Quaker and as a physician. And the
Salvadoran army prisoners of war
held by.the guerrillas have told
me, when questioned why they par-
ticipate in such operations, that
they're taught to kill women and
children because all women are po-
tential factories for more guer-
rillas and children are the guer-
rilla seeds that need to be elimi-
nated from their country.
tortillas, to bury food stocks and
what few precious possessions they
had. As nightfall approached and
the government soldiers were close
enough, they began mortaring the
village. The civilian population'
was evacuated under the noses of
the enemy. I had prepared tran-
quilizing cocktails made from Va-
lium for the children to keep them
quiet because their crying would
give away their positions. The ci-
vilian population fled into the
bills. The defense force fought a
Tier in the operations plan, it
said they expected to encounter as
many as 1,000 civilians and sever-
al hundred armed forces. The only
statement made in the operations
plan was that the enemy dead will
be burned on the spot. So I think
there's a very deliberate plan of
not taking prisoners of war.
CAN THE MILITARY WIN?
You were in the Guazapa Front
bon some time bebone the ma,6,6i.ve
U.S. .tta.i.ning o j Salvadoran .btoops
began. Has .tyre .t4ai.ni.ng made any
di.bbenence?
I don't think that the troops
trained by the U.S. are particu-
larly more effective than the oth-
er troops. I think that they're
perhaps a little more brutal. But
I don't think they're making any
substantial gains for the Salva-
doran military. In my work as li-
aison to the International Red
Cross, and in treating the prison-
ers of war, I have come to know
many of the soldiers well, and I
don't feel any amount of U.S. mil-
itary aid, any number of U.S. ad-
visors, or any amount of training
is going to give the Salvadoran
army the capacity to.fight.
I've seen prisoners of war as
young as 15 years old and I've
never met one who was a high
school graduate. 'Many of them are
illiterate. All of them describe
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being conscripted, and some of
them forcibly, into the military.
They participate reluctantly in
those types of operations.
When I asked why they don't de-
sert I repeatedly heard the same
story: it is well known what hap-
pens to the families of deserters.
They describe pictures of desert-
ers in their barracks with perhaps
a photo of their dead families be-
low it with an inscription such as
"killed in a crossfire." The POWs
speak of being able to buy their
way out of patrols if you can af-
ford to. They speak of knowing of
officers who occasionally sell
arms or ammunition to the guer-
rillas. I just don't think that
they have the morale to win any
sort of military victory.
The Salvadoran military has ex-
perienced a widespread demoraliza-
tion since the guerrillas started
returning prisoners of war. The
guerrillas did this because the
prisoners of war that were being
returned when I first arrived were
being killed. While those deaths
were blamed on the guerrillas,
other prisoners of war told us
that they were killed because they
were suspected of being collabora-
tors or they were accused of being
cowards for having surrendered in
the first place. In Guazapa, the
prisoners of war are often guarded
in homes, so they see families,
they see clinics, they see some of
the elementary schools. They re-
turn very different people, if
they return - many of them choose
to stay.
One of the earlier prisoners of
,war that I got to know well was an
evangelists, which is the term
used for Protestant in El Salva-
dor. He asked if he could write a
letter to his minister explaining
why he was going to stay in Guaza-
pa with the guerrillas. And he
wanted this letter read to his
congregation because if there were
reprisals against his family, he
wanted them to understand why.
This young man spoke very movingly
in this letter about seeing more
Christianity practiced in Guazapa
than he had ever seen practiced on
the outside. He said he felt com-
pelled to stay and help build the
society that the guerrillas were
building.
How many can uatti.ea do you
think the Satvadoran ra'. ny .ia
4u&hi.ng?
During the year I've been there
the casualties have usually ranged
from 10 to 20 army casualties for
every guerrilla casualty. I don't
have exact figures, but I think
that the Salvadoran army suffered
EL SALVADOR
Is ANOTHER
VIETNAM.. .
WHY THEY AREN'T
EVEN SPEUED
THE SAME.
at least the loss of one full bat-
talion in the last year. Perhaps
more important than the deaths is
the fact that between June and De-
cember about 250 soldiers surren-
dered. That was in the whole coun-
try. And as many of the prisoners
of war returned to their units and
began telling their fellow sol-
diers about the guerrillas - that
the guerrillas were campesinos
(peasants) like themselves who
treated them with respect and gave
them medical care - more began to
surrender. Army soldiers began to
surrender in numbers of 30 and 40.
In Chalatenango an entire company
with more than 100 surrendered
with all their arms. In January
and February 1983 more than 300
soldiers surrendered.
The guerrillas have begun to
fight as much with bullhorns as
with rifles. They will tell the
government soldiers: Your lives
will be respected, you have no
reason to die to defend the inter-
ests of the oligarchy, as they re-
fer to the wealthy class of El
Salvador. They. tell them that the
guerrillas are camoesinos like
them, that the soldiers have more
in common with them than they do
with the officer corps and the
wealthy whose rights they are de-
fending. And many of them surren-
der.
i
One wondena how tong .ti" can
go on?
I think the feeling there is
that it can't go on for more than
a couple of more years. Military
aid can make it a bloodier and
more destructive revolution, but
it cannot win the revolution for
the Salvadoran government.
CAPTURED WEAPONS
How have you seen U.S. mi.XL-
.tah y aid at wok?
I described the daily bomb-
ings, strafings and rocketings
that we experience in the Guazapa
Front. Of course the FMLN is be-
ginning to capture large numbers
of weapons. I think they have
captured more than 3,000 automat-
ic weapons in the last six months
there. All of the weapons that I
have seen augment the arsenal of
the guerrillas this year have been
captured from the army. Those are
M-16 machine guns, M-79 grenade
launchers, 9O. mm recoilless ri-
fles, 88 mm mortars - all weapons
that have been captured from the
El Salvadoran army and were sup-
plied by U.S. military aid.
Most recently, as a physician,
I was warned in November to pre-
pare the population and the health
workers in whatever way that I
could to treat napalm wounds.
Longshoremen reported that napalm
was being unloaded in the port of
Acajutla. Then in December we ex-
perienced the first napalm drops
against the civilian population.
Since then it's been used twice
more.
You treated peopte with napatm
woundo?
Yes, that's correct.
CounteaSpy -- June-Augub.t 1983 -- 35
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Do you get the beet ling that the
U.S. government .i4 a4,6i4tti.ng the
Sa.tvadonan miti tany in wayb beyond
what the adn niataatLon pubticty
admit ?
I think that's fairly obvious
and I think that's characteristic
of U.S. foreign and military poli-
cy. Only recently, there was an
announcement that there are ap-
proximately 150 intelligence oper-
atives in Central America, includ-
ing E. Salvador. Not ineluded in
that figure are the 55 military
advisers that are operating there.
The guerrilla intelligence sources
reported in January 1983 that
weapons are being unloaded at
night, on the beaches, which means
that they are bypassing the port
of Acajutla where there is a vigi-
lance of sorts over what kind of
weapons enter the country. So I
think it's fairly obvious that the
U.S. is supplying weapons in ways
that are not obvious even to the
U.S. Congress or to the U.S. pub-
lic.
What about the U.S. mi Ltany
"tA inekb." Do you have evidence
indicating that theih note goes
beyond a.i.mpte tnain.ing?
I don't have evidence of that,
but during the last invasion of
the Guazapa Front in January 1983,
a commandante (guerrilla commander)
asked me to come and monitor the
radio for a half an hour because
he felt there were a lot of Amer-
icans talking on the radio. In
fact there were at least three
American voices, back and forth on
the radio, frequently, speaking in
a code. I could not understand
what they were saying - in English
- because of the code, but it was
obvious to me that they were prob-
ably actively involved in the in-
vasion that was happening.
THE NEW SOCIETY
You've indicated how the gue.-
aittab aeea to .to the Salvadoran
GAM conac& pta. Can you bay Aome-
thing about how they tetate to the
c..v . ana in the Guazapa Front?
The guerrillas are the sons and
daughters and sisters and brothers
of the people that live in Guess-
pa. And they're building a society
there. It's a society that's
marked by a hunger for social jus-
tice. The roots of that society
sprang from the work of priests
like Rutilio Grande and others
who started basic Christian commu-
nities and reflection groups that
were not by any means Marxist, but
simply reflected on the Christian
36 -- Coun teASpy -- June-Augua.t
teachings and the reality of peo-
ple's lives. Most of the military
leaders are Marxists. And the two
co-exist there in building a soci-
ety that's very different than
anything I've lived in before. For
instance, in the large U.S. hospi-
tals that I have worked in, 40
percent of the hospital admissions
were in one way or another related
to alcohol use or domestic vio-
lence. In the Guazapa Front and in
other FMLN fronts, alcohol and
drugs are not permitted. In one
year there, and despite people
living under very stressful condi-
tions, I have never seen a sign of
domestic violence in women or
children.
There are 30 elementary schools
that they're operating in the
zone, there are two hospitals and
15 clinics where medical care is
provided free. There is a great
respect for the lives of civilians
and the guerrillas are trying to
win the confidence of the people.
So I would contrast this, for in-
stance, with the discipline within
the government forces which does
not seem to exist. There have been
an estimated 40,000 civilian
deaths in the last 40 months, as
well as the murders of eight Amer-
icans, none of which have ever
been brought to trial. On the oth-
er hand, with the guerrillas,
there have been military actions
around Guazapa in which civilians
have been inadvertently killed.
And after each of those actions
there was a balance, an investiga-
tion of sorts to see if there had
been poor execution or poor plan-
ning or acts of indiscipline. I
have seen guerrillas punished for
a breach of their code of ethics
- robbing people on the highway,
for instance. There was a guer-
rilla who was executed for a rape
that occurred outside the front.
The guerrillas do operate with a
very strong sense of code of con-
duct.
FOREIGN SUBVERSION?
Th ere' e a tot o J talk in the
U.S. about the, gueMLUaa getting
a.kmb #.tom Cuba, NicaAagua, the
Soviet Union, etc. Do you have
any evidence ob that?
I haven't seen any evidence of
that. For instance, the only weap-
on that I've seen in the entire
time that I have been there that
could even be from an Eastern bloc
country is an RPG2, that's a rock-
et propelled grenade, and that is
clearly available on the black
market. The arms of the guerrillas
are M-16s, G-3a and FALs, all
1983
standard Salvadoran government is-
sue. I see the numbers of weapons
the guerrillas fight with. For in-
stance, earlier in the year, in
Guazapa there were no mortars.
Since then they've captured two
mortars, and they captured about
12-15 rounds of ammunition for
those. When those rounds were ex-
hausted, they had to plan another
mission to capture more ammuni-
tion. I've seen the small numbers
of. rounds of ammunition they dis-
tribute to the guerrillas before
the large government offensives
against Guazapa. It doesn't appear
that there is any massive flow of
arms from anyplace except the U.S.
I have never net a Cuban or a
Nicaraguan in Guazapa. There are
more U.S. citizens serving in Gua-
zapa than there are Cubans or Ni-
caraguans. In addition, I have
been privileged to be an observer
in assemblies-and congresses that
have occurred in the Guazapa zone.
And-I see no evidence of anything
except?a strong nationalism that
is?datermined to end 50 years of
U.S. economic and political inter-
vention.
The Reagan a&niniAthatLon
cha tgea that the FDR- FMLN .c dic-
.taton i.o2 and authoni taAian. How
does the government in the con-
tnotCed zone, the gueMitta gov-
e'tnment work?
Every village has a political
structure. it will have somebody
who has the responsibility of
health care, somebody for educa-
tion, food production, military,
and a mayor, you might say, who is
called efe politico. Those are
called popular committes. They
meet regularly with popular com-
mittees that represent three or
four villages put together. Some-
times those people, are selected by
the villages, as often as not
they are people who have. evolved
into positions of leadership.
I have seen those people re-
moved from positions of leadership
when they were not doing a good
job or it was felt that there was
too much self interest involved.
The popular assemblies are defi-
nitely controlled by the campesi-
nos. I have seen them object to
military leaders who they felt
were offending the population by
their policies, and I have seen
those military leaders removed.
There's a balance that occurs be-
cause often military considera-
tions dictate that decisions are
made on the basis of security.
Most of the campesinos don't
know what Marxism is. They have a
strong sense of social justice
which is the basis for their po-
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litical involvement. It's impor-
tant to understand that the early
organizing in the Guazapa Front
was done by priests who were not
organizing Marxist collectives,
but were organizing basic Chris-
tian communities. From those
sprang up agricultural coopera-
tives that became early targets of
repression from the rightwing pa-
ramilitary death squads. While
there are no priests in the zone
now, the Christian reflection
groups continue to meet and now
they're beginning to take on a po-
litical as well as a religious na-
ture.
They've experienced capitalism,
and they feel that those interests
haven't served them very well. I
suspect that some form of social-
ism will emerge from this revolu-
tion. But the socialism that will
emerge will be Salvadoran. It will
not be Cuban, it will not be Nica-
Viet Cong sympathizers, that is,
peasants who were only suspected
of having sympathies with the Viet
Cong, were assassinated without
any form of due process or trial.
It's one of the darker episodes in
U..S. covert operations. And here
that's spoken about openly, with.-
out any hesitation. And, more sad-
ly, without any reaction from the
U.S. Congress or public. It sad-
dens me a great deal.
'.the FMLN at the ggnaaahoo.ta Level,
what do you .th.i.ngt w.ifl happen when
the FMLN w.cna?
I hear from our government that
there will be a bloodbath if there
is an FMLN victory. This is absurd
- the bloodbath is occurring today
Most human rights organizations -
the Legal Aid office of the Salva-
doran Archdiocese, Amnesty Inter-
national, Americas Watch - agree
that there are almost a thousand
civilians a month being killed in
non-combat situations. I think the
estimates are 40,000 killed in the
last 40 months of the revolution.
So, to my way of thinking, the
bloodbath is occurring now. When
the U.S. refuses to negotiate and
refuses to encourage a dialogue,
they are encouraging the bloodbath
to continue.
I have heard from commandantes
within the FMLN as well as from
many campesinos that they hope
that the struggle can end in a ne-
gotiated settlement. In fact, they
prefer that it does not end in a
military solution, for the follow-
ing reasons: First, a military
solution will lead to much more
bloodshed and perhaps the kind of
crazy desperation that marked the
final days of the Somoza military
regime in Nicaragua when the mil-
itary struck blindly and destroyed
many civilian targets without re-
gard to who was supporting whom.
Second, that military victory
could lead to widespread economic
destruction, worse than what is
presently existent in the country.
Third, a military solution could
also lead many of the business in-
terests in the country to flee
and that a flight of capital would
leave the country further economi-
cally paralyzed.
The economic program of the FDR
-FMLN calls for a mixed economy,
with a strong private sector. This
flight of capital would certainly
paralyze those plans and perhaps
push the government toward a more
pure form of socialism. The com-
mandantes also state that the FDR
is made up of a pluralistic polit-
ical spectrum: Christian Demo-
crats, Social Democrats, trade
unions, associations of profes-
sionals, associations of campesi-
nos, of slumdwellers, and Marxist
elements as well. A military solu-
tion may make it more difficult
for the more moderate elements to
share in the political process, if
the government is put in a posi-
tion of having to defend their
gains because of U.S. covert or
overt actions.
For instance, the guerrilla
leaders say very clearly that it
appears to them that there are two
You sewed in the U.S. AiA
Force in Vietnam. Do you a ee pan-
aPLe.& .to EL Satvadot?
I don't think that one can draw
exact parallels between the reason
that the people of El Salvador are
engaged in this revolution and the
reasons that the Vietnamese were
fighting in Southeast Asia. But
the parallel I draw very strongly
are the rhetoric of the adminis-
tration, its use of exaggerations
"In my work as liaison to the
International Red Cross ... I
have come to know many of the
soldiers well and I don't feel any
amount of U.S. military aid, any
number of U.S. advisors, or any
amount of training is going to
give the Salvadoran army the
capacity to fight."
raguan, it certainly will not be
Soviet. And it will be influenced
heavily by the martyrs such as the
late Archbishop Oscar Romero for
whom they have so much love.
VIETNAM AND EL SALVADOR
Thene'a LaLk now that U.S. mit-
#taty aid .ce not enough. Maybe the
U.S. wiee have to 6 end mote advi-
a ota - even eventually combat
troops. What would that do?
What personally frightens me
is when I read the U.S. newspapers
quoting a government official say-
ing that in addition to the vil-
lage development program the ad-
ministration would like to start a
Phoenix-like program again. People
in the U.S. have a very short mem-
ory, but the Phoenix program was
basically a CIA-run operation in
South Vietnam in which over 25,000
to justify U.S. military aid. An-
other parallel that I see is the
slow escalation of U.S. involve-
ment without the approval of the
American public. For instance, be-
tween January 1981 and March 1982,
the U.S. government sent $116 mil-
lion in military aid to El Salva-
dor, only $36 million of which had
the approval of the U.S. Congress.
I see the administration waging
ah undeclared war without the per-
mission of the U.S. public. It
makes me feel that the U.S. public
is not in control of their govern-
ment, which is an irony in perhaps
the world's most famous democracy.
AFTER THE FMLN VICTORY
Ptesiden.t Reagan claim that .ij
the FMLN-FDR .taken power, it will
create a dictatotahAp in EL SaLva-
dot. 8a6ed on your expen.tence with
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"in Guazapa, the prisoners of war
are often guarded in homes, so
they see families, they see clinics,
they see some of the elementary
schools. They return very
different people - If they return.
Many of them choose to stay."
places whore one gets aid for re-
construction,and rebuilding a
country: from the Eastern bloc and
from the Waste= bloc. And if they
are denied access to the Western
bloc, if they become an enemy of
the U.S. by winning a military
victory, that they will have to
turn to the Eastern bloc - which
will then be used by the U.S. to
further justify subversion of
their political process. This
means that they would be faced
with the same sort of covert oper-
ations that are working to desta-
bilize the Nicaraguan revolution
today. There are great fears of
that. They do not necessarily wish
to end up as enemies of the United
States.
AMNESTY AND ELECTIONS?
The Anchbiehop o6 San Saevadon
ha6 aacd necenttty he 6avone an
namnea.ty" 6oh the gumi,t.Paa.
I don't think an amnesty can
have much meaning in a country
where there's no rule of law, no
due process, where the courts are
not functioning and where the se-
curity forces, such as the Treasu-
ry Police and the National Guard
seem to kill at will. I certainly,
for instance, as a Quaker and as a
physician who has maintained a
neutral role, would not dare to
set my foot in San Salvador. I
feel I would be targeted instant-
ly, even though my role has been
neutral. And I think any guerrilla
who stepped forward under the "am-
nesty" would be foolish.
What about the eUec.ti.one that
ate tepoA tedty planned Loh the end
o6 198'3?
I think elections have no mean-
ing either, for the reason that I
just mentioned. I was in El Salva-
dor during the last elections and
perhaps I could describe a fev
things from the viewpoint.of the
peasants. The peasants and workers
who go back and forth to the city
from the Guazapa Front explained
to me very apologetically that
they had voted. One reason, they
explained, was that not to have
the national voter stamp in their
I.D. card was a certain death sen-
tence, and that to be caught with-
out this I.D. card, or to be
caught with the I.D. card without
a vote stamp, was considered a
sign of guerrilla sympathies.
Secondly, they told me that the
ballots were numbered and that al-
though there had been a plan to
tear the numbers from the ballots,
that that in fact did not happen
in the places where these voters
participated in the elections.
Three days before the election,
they said, Roberto d'Abuisson's
ARENA Party had objected to the
mutilation of the ballots by
tearing off the numbers, Well,
each campesino or worker or citi-
zen that voted had to sign a piece
of paper that had the number on
the ballot that was issued to them
next to their name. So,.they,were
certain that people would know how
they voted.
Wa6 .then.e any voting booth in
the area were you were?
No, there was no participation
by any of the controlled zones.
THE U.S. SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT
What e66ect do you think the
U,S. aobidakity movement hob here
at home and in Et Satvadon?
Well, the solidarity movement
in the U.S. is trying to convince
people that perhaps the biggest
obstacle to aid in Central America
is U.S. foreign policy. I don't
think that the solidarity movement
here, which includes the church
and committees of solidarity, is a
38 -- Coutnte'Spy -- June-Auguat 1983
spokesperson for the FMLN or the
FDR. I think they're objecting to
U.S. foreign policy which has said
that, no, the government of El
Salvador does not have to negoti-
ate or carry on a dialogue with
anybody involved in this process.
Solidarity, in a concrete form,
means a great deal to the people
of El Salvador. You can imagine
that when they are receiving daily
"gifts" of bombs or rockets or ma-
chine gun bullets delivered by
aircraft from the United States,
and then they receive the gift of
medicine from people in the U.S.
or Europe, that carries a very
different message. It gives them
courage to continue their strug-
gle.
MAKE A TAX-DEDUCTIBLE CONTRIBUTION
TO BUY MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR EL
SALVADOR. MAKE CHECKS PAYABLE TO
SALVADOREAN MEDICAL RELIEF FUND
AND SEND TO CHRES, P.O. BOX 1194,
SALINAS, CA 93902.
A hilarious cartoon history
of the good old U.S.A.
By Estelle Carol,Rhoda Grossman
and Bob Simpson
$6.95
Ask for it at your local Bookstore
or order from-
Alyson Publications
PO Box 2783 Dept. B-1
Boston, Massachusetts 02208
$7.50 postpaid
(reduced rates for multiple copies)
Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130006-7
 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130006-7
Salvadoran Refugees Testify:
"It's a War Against the
People"
"Counter in6ungency," "mUitany op-
enati.ona" in "Zones ob constict" -
thoa e tenm6 at times tend to take
on a '.then technical and abe.tkact
aiit. What they mean in neatirty in
EL Salvador .ca des c&ib ed in the6 e
teeti.monLea by Salvadoran peaaa.n 4
who were sonced to slee into Hon-
dura.: The "human night6 centi-
bLed" government os EL Satvadon .ie
cav.ying out a wan again6t L.t.6 own
peopte.
These nebugeea gave the.iA te.-
,ti.mon.iea in the rebugee camp6 at
Cotomoncagua, 1ntibuca, Hondwraa
in JanuaAy 1983. The .intenv.iewene
are Jntennat. onat ne ieb wonkeh,6
a64igned to the campe. TheiA names
have been wit hetd bon the sake ob
theist pen.onal aabety.
1
snom?
Sociedad.
What Vepanbnent .i.6 that in?
Morazan.
Maybe you can tett me why you
test there?
We fled from the Air Force
which was dropping bombs. Just a
few days before I left they killed
an old women and tore out her in-
testines.
An otd woman?
She was about seventy
Haw did they k.itt hen?
A bomb fell on her. She was
running out but it hit her. It hit
other people too.
Did the.oldien. come in on was
that atom a ahett ng?
The shell came from a distance
- from a hill on this side of the
border.
Did you see the ptanea too?
No, not in the last few days.
The planes were around earlier.
What kind ob plane6 were theyt
First the explorers come and
then the A 37s.
And how do these plane,6 open-
a.te?
They drop big bombs and God
Can you tetl me when you
test Et Satvadon?
Around the 22nd of De-
cember, 1982.
Whene did you come
!doesn't prevent them from falling,
on the people.
Do they attach .the guelVl tLt"
oh .the civctian population?
They attack the civilians -
they're the ones who get it.
How do .these planes decide
where .to bomb?
The explorers come first and
give them a signal.
What doe4 .th.i.6 exptonen took
bon, peopte?
Who knows. They say they're
looking for enemies.
b dtyou toee membelt. ob your.
They're dead. My cousins and
nephews.
2
I'm fifty-six.
Whene did you come snom?
I came from San Vicente - from
an area called San Esteban Catari-
na, Department of San Vicente.
Can you tett me why you test?
Well, first of all we had to
leave the country because we knew
that the Armed Forces were coming
into our area. Everything they
found in their path they de-
stroyed - homes, houses, animals.
Everything. And they took money.
SLh, can you te. me when
you test Et Satvadon?
I left on the night of
December lstt 1982.
How otd are you?
"We had to leave the country
because we knew that the Armed
Forces were coming into our
area. Everything they found in
their path they destroyed -
homes, houses, animals.
Everything."
Recently?
Yes.
Have you seen any change in the
Ahmed Forces? I. there more ne-
.pect son human night6?
No, it's worse.
What do you mean, won. e?
Because before they didn't come
with all these forces - the planes
and the bombs.
And they're attacking atl the
people?
Right. They go wherever there
are people. The towns. They go af-
ter people who are shopping. They
grab children and kill them soon
afterwards.
What, did they burn the
houaea?
Yes, they burned them, and the
ones they couldn't burn they
chopped down to the ground.
Did that happen to you?
Yes. First of all, I'm aware
of what's going on and from what
I can see this is the most ter-
rible situation that's ever been.
Worse things are happening than
we've ever seen and we had to
leave there and go out into the
hills.
When did thL happen?
Last year, in March and April.
See REFUGEES, page 58
Coun te, Spy -- June-Augu6.t 19 83 .-- 39
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Intervention in Latin
America: Case Studies
Pinochet to
IMF Pushes'
Brink
by Walden Bello and John Kelly
As Chile approaches the 10th anniversary of the
bloody overthrow of the late President Salvador
Allende, it is in the throes of an economic crisis
which is far worse than anything ever experienced
under the brief three-year reign of the pro-
socialist Popular Unity Government. Recent
events, asserts a confidential memorandum from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), "have ad-
versely affected confidence at home, as well as
abroad, in the authorities' ability to manage the
economy.".
In 1982, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
plunged by close to 13 per cent and unemployment
skyrocketed from eight to 25 per cent. These
depression statistics were probably unmatched by
any other country in the world. But according to
the IMF, Chile's "most pressing immediate probe-
lem is the massive net reduction of foreign debt
by the Chilean private sector." Chile, a country
of 11 million, owes the international banks $17
'billion - at least $3.6 billion of which is due in
debt servicing and interest payments in 1983
alone.
The Fund has provided the government of
President Augusto Pinochet with a balance-of-
payments support loan of over $860 million in
return for the government's promise to tighten up
economic management. But the IMF ill fits the
role of benign savior in which it has been cast by
the business media. The IMF, in fact, is one of
the architects of the current economic mess.
This role is underlined in a recent confidential
memo from Chilean authorities to IMF managing
director Jacques de Larosiere, in which they re-
call with gratitude how the policies followed by
the Pinochet regime since the 1973 coup "were
supported by the use of Fund resources under two
successive standby arrangements and access to
the oil facility."
40 -- CounlenSpy -- June-Augua.t 1983
The current crisis of the Chilean economy is a
fundamental structural crisis of what has probably
been the most radical free market and anti-statist
(i.e., anti-central government control) program of
economic reform devised in the 20th century.
This experiment was inspired by Milton Friedman
of the University of Chicago, assisted and fi-
nanced to the tune of at least $300 million' in
loans by the IMF, executed by Friedman's Chilean
disciples, the so-called "Chicago Boys," and pro-
tected by one of the most repressive armies in the
world. Chile's experience from 1975 to 1983
provided a glimpse of the monetarist paradise into
which the Fund would like to turn its wards in-the
Third World - if it had its way.
Referred to by their authors, with perverse
pride, as "the shock treatment," these programs
had three strategic thrusts: completely integrat-
ing Chile into the capitalist world market by
destroying protectionism and debauching the cur-
!rency; fighting inflation by drastically reducing
government expenditures and government employ-
ment; and eliminating practically all checks on
the entry and operations of foreign capital.
This fundamentalist monetarist program,
which was conceived as a necessarily bitter anti-
dote to Allende's "Keynesian socialism," provoked
a depression in 1975, when the GDP fell by 13
percent, industrial production plunged by 27 per-
cent, and unemployment shot up to 20 percent.
Even the World Bank, the Fund's sister agency,
Walden Bello is the author of Development Debacle: The
World Bank in the Philippines co-,authored with David
Kinley, Elaine linson, Robin Broad, David O'Conner and
Vincent Bielski). The book has fast been released by the
Institute for Food and Development. Policy, 2588 Mission
Street, San Francisco, CA 94110. John Kelly is co-editor
of Counterspy and author of the forthcoming book The CIA
in America . ,
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was moved to comment: "The social costs of ing consumption by the upper classes or to specu-
enforced austerity were extremely high...." lative activities. Thus the geometrically expand-
The depression of 1975, argued the Chicago ing service costs of foreign debt could not be paid
Boys, was a necessary prelude to what they proud- out of newly generated wealth but only out of
ly pointed to as the halcyon years from 1977 to newly contracted debt. Chile's private bankers, in
1982. GDP growth averaged eight percent per other words, were borrowing from one set of
annum, prompting Ronald Reagan to proclaim international banks to pay off another.
Chile a model for Third World development, and The financial bubble finally burst in 1982,
provoking Friedman's memorable statement that confronting the Chicago Boys with an undoubtedly
the Chilean experiment was "comparable to the painful choice: to hew to long-cherished monetar-
economic miracle of post-war Germany." ist beliefs or to stave off financial collapse
The miracle, however, was a strange one: a through state intervention. In a classic statement
high GDP growth rate coexisted with a high, of the Chicago Boys' belief in the ideal of the
depression-level unemployment rate. Down to free, unregulated economy, Jose Pinera, the
three percent in 1973, Allende's last year, the young intellectual who has served as labor minis-
unemployment rate under Pinochet since 1975 has ter, once remarked: "To act against nature is
never gone below 10.4 percent. This indicated a counterproductive and self-deceiving." Mr.
development which was positive to the IMF and Pinera's colleagues chose to ignore his philosoph-
the Chicago Boys but disturbing to others: eco- ical counsel and proceeded to ack "against
nomic growth had become dependent principally nature."
on expanding external markets and was being This choice was not without irony, since the
steadily divorced from the domestic market. top officers of the big financial trusts were now
For a few years, growing markets for Chilean beseeching the aid of the state, such as Jorge
exports like copper, wood and fruits allowed the Cauas, Pablo Barahona and Alvaro Bardon, had
counterrevolutionary government to both achieve previously distinguished themselves as dogmatic
economic growth and reconcentrate income. But anti-statists when they served as chiefs of
when the international recession began to savage government economic ministries. To save the
these markets beginning in 1981, "export-oriented banks, the Chicago Boys adopted a number of
growth" became the Achilles heel of the monetar- measures, including a scheme whereby the
ist experiment. In a more balanced economy, Central Bank would "buy up" bad debts; a prefer-
declining export demand can be offset by expand- ential rate of exchange for debt service trans-
ing demand in the domestic market. But years of actions; and emergency lending from the Central
following an iron policy of. keeping down real Bank.
income - "demand restraint" - to combat inflation But while the Chicago Boys chose to depart
had so gutted the internal market that it could from the straight path of monetarism, the IMF
hardly sustain production. And by 1982, Chile was refused to go along, precipitating a conflict which
in the midst of its second depression in eight is captured in the confidential IMF accounts of
years - and its worst economic crisis since the the negotiations leading up to the granting of the
Great Depression of the 1930s. $860 million "standby" credit in early January
Under these circumstances of external reces- 1983. The Fund registered displeasure at the fact
sion and internal depression, the massive flow of that "the reduction of private foreign debt facili-
foreign capital to Chile became a time bomb. tated by a strong expansion of Central Bank
Most of this capital came in in the form of credit credit has resulted in a ... loss of international
to Chilean financial institutions from big inter- reserves." The government technocrats, on the
national banks; Citicorp, Wells Fargo, Bank of other hand, "strongly defended the introduction of
America, and Chase Manhattan. By the end of the preferential rate as a necessary measure to
1981, Chile's private banks had contracted a mas- forestall bankruptcy of a large segment of private
sive external debt of $10 billion. Forty-four industry, commerce, and the financial system."
percent of domestic credit extended by the pri- The Fund finally had to lay down the law: "The
vate sector in 1980 and 1981 was financed from staff ... would stress the importance of tight
these foreign borrowings. As the depression swal- credit management by the Central Bank and of
lowed up firms, however, many of these loans ensuring that Central Bank support of the private
came virtually uncollectable. sector and financial institutions be temporary and
But backed by an A-1 credit rating from the strictly circumscribed so as to protect the inter-
IMF, Chile continued on its foreign borrowing national reserves target of the financial pro-
inge. Bank of America, for instance, headed up gram."
massive syndicated loan of $70 million for Under the gun, the Chicago Boys decided that
ile's Banco BHC in late 1981, despite'signs that government. assistance could no longer hold up
nco BHC was seriously overextended. Most of Chile's three major financial institutions and de-
he new domestic credits, however, no longer clared their impending liquidation shortly after
went to productive ventures but rather to financ- See CHILE, page 47
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CIA, Coups and Cocaine
Klaus Barbie: Global Nazi
by Konrad Ege
Klaus Barbie is one of Hitler's Gestapo officers
who got away. At least until this year.
Barbie was a Nazi SS officer who was assigned
to combat French resistance to the German occu-
pation. Immediately after the Nazis' defeat, he
went to work in Germany for the U.S. intelligence
agencies. The U.S. government hid him from the
French authorities, and then the CIA and the
Vatican helped him to make his way to Bolivia
where he remained active as a CIA agent. In
Bolivia, he participated in a military coup, and
worked for the Security Police. Barbie also set up
his own paramilitary unit to provide protection
for Bolivia's cocaine traders. Italian authorities
now charge that one of the members of Barbie's
group was recruited by rightwing terrorists to
blow up a railway station in Bologna, Italy, in
1980. In 1983, Klaus Barbie was extradited to
France. When his ties to the CIA became known
in the United States, President Reagan's Attorney
General William French Smith, refused to investi-
gate, claiming that prosecution was unlikely.
After a public outcry, Smith changed his mind.
Klaus Barbie is now in a French prison, await-
ing trial for the "crimes against humanity" he
committed in Lyons in the early 1940s as a
Gestapo officer. This means that Barbie will face
charges relating to only a very small fraction of
his crimes. And the individuals who abetted his
life of crime by saving him from the French
courts after World War II - U.S. State Depart-
ment, U.S. Army and CIA officials - remain at
large.
Gottlieb Fuchs, Barbie personally tortured pris-
oners and killed French resistance leader Jean
Moulin: "I was there when Barbie beat Moulin on
his head and body with a stick and kicked him
with his feet... Then he dragged him by his feet
down the stairs to the basement and left him
there. Barbie told me: 'If that dog isn't dead by
tomorrow, I'll beat him to death."' Moulin died.
Barbie managed to leave France after the war
and entered the U.S. occupied zone where he
joined the U.S. authorities. He provided them
with information about the French Communist
Party in the Lyons area, and settled down com-
fortably in southern Germany, working for U.S.
intelligence and for the "Gehlen Organization."
Reinhard Gehlen, who had been Hitler's man in
charge of spying on the Eastern Front, had also
been recruited by the U.S. immediately after the
war. Only a few years after the Nazis were
defeated, he was put in charge of his own intelli-
gence apparatus, funded by the U.S. Gehlen later
became the chief of West Germany's CIA, the
Bundesnachrichtendienst.
The French government repeatedly demanded
that Barbie be extradited. The U.S. stalled, and
Le Monde reports that in 1950, the State Depart-
ment officially denied knowing Barbie's where-
abouts even though he was then on the U.S.
government payroll, receiving $1,700 a month. In
1951, the U.S. provided Barbie with a false pass-
port under the name Klaus Altmann; the Inter-
national Red Cross wrote him a letter of re-
commendation; and the Vatican assisted him in
traveling to South America. Commenting later on
From the Gestapo to the CIA the Vatican's support, Barbie said: "The Vatican
contact person told me, we have one thing in
Barbie joined the SS in 1935. He was first common, we are anti-Communists."
assigned to the Bureau of Jewish Affairs in The Barbie settled down in Bolivia, where, accord-
Hague and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. In ing to a secret 1963 French government docu-
Amsterdam, he arrested hundreds of Jews and ment, he continued to work as an agent for the
German refugees who had fled there before the CIA and the West German Bundesnachrich-
Nazi army occupied the Netherlands. Barbie rose tendienst. A former high-level official of the
through the SS ranks and was transferred to the Bolivian Interior Ministry under the dictatorship
Eastern Front to combat the Soviet resistance. of General Hugo Banzer (1971-78) confirmed to
Apparently, he did his work well. In November the Miami Herald that Barbie routinely gave the
1942, he was promoted to Gestapo Chief in Lyons, Ministry information about communist activities
France, the center of the French resistance. in Bolivia and other South American countries,
There, Klaus Barbie arrested more than 14,000 and that these reports were "regularly delivered...
resistance fighters, participated in some 4,300 to the U.S. Embassy."
murders and sent 7,591 Jews to the gas chambers Konrad Ege is co-editor of Counterspy magazine and a
in Auschwitz. According to his translator, freelance journalist.
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Coups and Cocaine in Bolivia
In 1951, the year Barbie arrived in Bolivia, a
progressive government was gaining power there
after a long struggle led by the Movement of the
National Revolution. The U.S. government im-
mediately put pressure on Bolivia, demanding that
the government disarm the workers and peasants
and create a "democratic army." That was Klaus
Barbie's chance: he became an advisor to this new
army. He was also put in charge of the Compania
Transmaritima Boliviana, a corporation which the
Bolivian military used to buy arms worldwide. As
a Transmaritima official, Barbie visited the
United States at least four times in 1969 and 1970
to buy arms. He also did business with West
Germany and Israel, and reportedly even went to
France, using a diplomatic passport.
Barbie's star rose even higher when General
Hugo Banzer staged a military coup in 1971. The
German colony in Bolivia, Barbie included, assist-
ed in the preparations for the coup, and Banzer
immediately appointed Barbie "special advisor" to
his intelligence service. Barbie's career had come
full circle: his job was to make Bolivia safe for its
dictator, just as he had once made Lyons safe for
Hitler.
In the mid-1970s, Klaus Barbie worked as the
Bolivian government's contact person with South
African whites who saw the writing on the wall
and wanted to immigrate to Bolivia. Bolivia
opened consulates in Pretoria and Namibia and
drafted plans for two new cities for the settlers
to inhabit. Barbie collaborated on this project
with two Bolivian officials, Frederico Nielsen
Reyes and Guido Strauss Ivanovic. Reyes is the
Spanish translator of Hitler's Mein Kampf, and
Strauss, then deputy secretary of immigration,
was one of Bolivia's top Nazi leaders. He stated
that white South African settlers would find living
conditions in Bolivia easy and "won't find our
Indians any more stupid or lazy than their Blacks."
The immigration plan was aborted when Banzer
was forced to resign in 1978.
Barbie wasn't devastated by his ally Banzer's
ouster. He had other close friends in the military,
and by 1978 was working for Roberto Suarez who,
according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency,
is one of the world's biggest cocaine traffickers.
Barbie, with the aid of his friend and former
Gestapo colleague, Hans Stellfeld, and Joachim
Fiebelkorn, set up a security squad for Suarez.
Fiebelkorn is a prominent West German neo-Nazi
who had come to Bolivia via Paraguay. He opened
a bar in Santa Cruz which turned into a regular
hangout for the German Nazis in Bolivia.
In 1980, Barbie's cocaine squad turned to poli-
tics: it aided the coup executed by General Luis
Garcia Meza because, said Barbie, "we have to
overthrow this government before it changes
Bolivia into a big Cuba." Barbie and General
Garcia were upset that the Bolivian
President Lidia Gueiler was preparing to appoint
Hernan Siles Zuazo, a leftist politician, to be
-me Minister.
Klaus Barbie played a key role in the coup and
in the brutal repression of the miners, unionists
and students who resisted the takeover. Accord-
ing to the Miami Herald, he worked closely with
Interior Minister Arce Gomez and the Servicio
Especial de Seguridad (SES), Bolivia's intelligence
agency. The Herald also reported that Barbie was
seen in an SES torture house, and that he interro-
gated prisoners in the Interior Ministry building.
As Fiebelkorn described it, it was his group's
"mission" during the coup "to open up leftist nests
and clean them out."
Several months after the July 1980 coup, the
mission of the group changed. It turned to
destroying the operations of small-time cocaine
dealers in Bolivia, so that General Garcia Meza
could dominate the cocaine business. The Barbie-
Fiebelkorn group disintegrated in 1981 as General
Garcia Meza faced international sanctions be-
cause of his cocaine trade, and domestic pressure
from unions and other political groups. The
country also suffered from a crippling financial
crisis brought on in part by the astounding corrup-
tion of Garcia Meza's government. General
Garcia Meza eventually was forced to step down.
His fall proved to be Barbie's undoing. The new
government of Siles Zuazo, after only a few
months in office, extradited him to France.
In Bolivia ... the two of
them recruited Klaus
Barbie's protege Joachim
Fiebelkorn for what was to
become the bloodiest
terrorist operation in
Europe since World War II:
the bombing of the train
station in the Italian city of
Bologna in August 1980.
Barbie, Fiebelkorn and the Bologna bombing
General Garcia Meza's 1980 coup had run smooth-
ly thanks to Barbie, but also thanks to the
Argentine military advisors who had come to
Bolivia to aid the takeover. They brought with
them two rightwing Italian terrorists who had
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been living in Argentina: Pierluigi Pagliai and
Stefano Delle Chiaie. In Bolivia, according to the
West German magazine Spiegel , the two of them
recruited Klaus Barbie's protege Joachim
Fiebelkorn for what was to become the bloodiest
terrorist operation in Europe since World War II:
the bombing of the train station in the Italian city
of Bologna in August 1980. 85 people were killed.
The Italian government is at present preparing
its case against three men who are charged with
the bombing: Fiebelkorn (who denies any involve-
ment); Maurizio Giorgi, a former agent of the
Chilean secret police DINA; and Olivier Danet, a
bodyguard of former French President Valery
Giscard d'Estaing. Stefano Delle Chiaie got away
and reportedly now lives in Argentina; Pierluigi
Pagliai was shot and killed when Bolivian police
tried to arrest him in October 1982 in Santa Cruz.
The order for the bombing reportedly came
from Licio Gelli, a banker and head of the secret
lodge P 2. This is according to testimony by Elio
Ciolini, a P 2 member who was present at the
decisive April 11, 1980 meeting of the lodge.
Licio Gelli, whose P 2 companions included many
of Italy's leading intelligence and military
officials, wanted to change the government and
install a "strongman." To achieve this goal,
writes Spiegel, the bombers of Bologna used a
"reliable tactic of the European neo-fascists":
applying the "'strategy of tension' - committing
seemingly senseless atrocities such as the one in
Bologna to destabilize the democratic government
and steer it into the desired direction."
Barbie's comrade, Joachim Fiebelkorn, is at
present being held in a West German jail. The
alleged bombing mastermind, Licio Gelli, was
arrested in Switzerland. Former. bodyguard
Olivier Danet is imprisoned in France, and the
Italian authorities are holding Maurizio Giorgi.
Their ally Klaus Barbie is awaiting trial in France.
Barbie's trial, as well as those of his friend
Joachim Fiebelkorn and eventually of Licio Gelli
constitute a great opportunity. They will reveal
more information about Barbie's war crimes in
France, and, equally important, about how Klaus
Barbie's criminal career continued under new
masters and with new allies: the CIA, the
Bundesnachrichtendienst, Bolivian dictators and
cocaine traders, and quite possibly even a right-
wing terror network in Europe determined to
reestablish a Hitler-style dictatorship.
Sources: "'Niemand wusste, wohin er ging': Die
neofaschistische Internationale der Bologna-Attentaeter,"
Spiegel (Hamburg), 1/31/83; George Stein, "The Nazi,"
Miami Herald, 1/2/83; James Brooke, "Nazi bought arms in
Dade for Bolivia, weapons dealers say," Miami Herald
3/13/83; "Die Karriere des K. Barbie," die tat, (Frankfurt),
2/18/83; Isabel Hilton and Tana de Zulueta, "Nazis who
bankroll terrorists," Sunday Times (London), 2/6/83; Serge
Klarsfeld, "Les protections de Klaus Barbie," Le Monde,
CIA Hires
Nazis
The CIA's protection and employment of war
criminal Klaus Barbie was not an isolated case.
After World War II, U.S. authorities in Germany
showed little interest in punishing high ' ranking
Nazi officials. The U.S. government had a new
enemy: the Soviet Union, and Hitler's Nazi
machine was experienced in fighting the Soviets.
Much of the recruiting of German Nazis and
their collaborators in Eastern Europe was done by
Frank Wisner while he headed the Office of Policy
Coordination. The OPC was set up in 1948 in the
State Department as the brainchild of George
Kennan, who hoped that it would engage "in a
back-alley struggle against the Soviet Union."
OPC's funds came from the CIA. Frank Wisner
seemed to be the ideal person to head the OPC:
He was obsessively anti-communist and was ex-
perienced in undercover work.
NEIL ?..
M.&e Petex,, Dayton Daly New-6
John Loftus, a former Justice Department
investigator of Nazis living in the United States,
writes in `The Belarus Secret (Knopf, New York,
1982) that Wisner closely collaborated with
General Lucius Clay, the military governor of the
American zone in Germany. Wisner told Clay
that he wanted to "re-create the SS underground
networks in Eastern Europe, Byelorussia and the
Ukraine." Loftus explains that "Wisner believed
the Soviet Union would begin to disintegrate from
internal rebellions, rebellions which he intended
to assist, and, if necessary, instigate."
The people Wisner recruited - and brought into
the United States for training in spite of a strict
congressional prohibition against Nazis entering
the country - included men who had committed
atrocious crimes in Hitler's service. They includ-
(Paris), 2/16/83; New York Times, 3/8/83; "Exorcising Old Soviet Union. When the Nazis invaded, he was
Ghosts," Time, 2F21183;
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ed, for example, Emanuel Jasiuk, a native of
Byelorussia, an area in the extreme West of the
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one of the first people to volunteer for the special
SS units, the Einsatzgruppen, which were to kill
all Jews and opponents of the Nazi regime.
Loftus describes Jasuik's activities after he had
been appointed mayor of the town of Kletsk by
the SS: "One of his main tasks was to draw up lists
of Polish intellectuals and Communist sym-
pathizers for the Germans. The Einsatzgruppen
swept through Kletsk, rounded up hundreds of
suspects at Jasiuk's direction and murdered
them." Jasiuk also arranged for the murder in a
single day of the entire Jewish population of his
county. Specially selected German and Byelo-
russian squads gunned down more than 5,000 Jews.
It was this man whom Wisner chose to become
a central figure in the recruitment of other
ed, underground cells were to seize the
government buildings and radio, and call for
the people to rise. Within hours, Wisner's
"liberation armies" would be dropped in to
attack the scattered Soviet garrisons.... After
the Soviets had been sufficently weakened,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
troops would be dispatched as a peacekeeping
force...
Wisner's grand plan, of course, failed dismally.
Many of the agents he parachuted into Eastern
Europe were captured or turned out to be double
agents: Soviet intelligence, writes Loftus, had
successfully penetrated the OPC. Obviously,
Nazis to join the U.S. OPC units. Jasiuk moved to
the United States and helped some 5,000
Byelorussian war criminals follow him. Many of
these Nazis worked in Wisner's units to facilitate
"uprisings" in Eastern Europe; others joined Radio
Liberty and Radio Free Europe which were then
largely funded and run by the CIA.
Until 1952, Wisner hid his operations even
from some agencies of the U.S. government. By
that year, writes Loftus, he was spending more
than half of the CIA's annual budget on his OPC.
On March 12,1955, the National Security Council
finally issued a directive (NSC 5412/1) retro-
actively sanctioning Wisner's effort:
In accordance with established policies, and to
the extent practicable in areas dominated or
threatened by international communism, de-
velop underground resistance and facilitate
co vert and guerrilla operations....
Specifically, such operations shall include any
covert activities related to: propaganda, polit-
ical action, economic warfare, preventive di-
rect action, including sabotage, antisabotage,
demolition, escape and evasion and evacuation
measures; subversion against hostile states or
groups including assistance to underground re-
sistance movements, guerrillas and refugee
liberation groups; support of indigenous and
anti-communist elements in threatened
countries of the free world, deception plans
and operations and all compatible activities
necessary to accomplish the foregoing.
In the early 1950s, the U.S. government also
had plans to invade the Soviet Union. President
Truman had ordered a study to prepare for the
invasion, and "invasion routes had been planned
and a timetable set for the early 1950s." Wisner's
plan was similar:
He authorized an operation designed to incite
simultaneous revolts against Soviet authority
in each of the major cities of Eastern Europe,
which were to be followed by a civil war
among ethnic and religious minorities within
the Soviet Union. Once the revolt had erupt-
Wisner authorized an
operation designed to
incite simultaneous
revolts against Soviet
authority in each of the
major cities of Eastern
Europe, which were to
be followed by a civil war
among ethnic and
religious minorities
within the Soviet Union.
Wisner also underestimated the strength of the
Eastern European governments. Unable to live
with his failure, Wisner committed suicide. But a
heinous legacy remains: Wisner and those Nazis
employed by the United States government con-
tributed to shaping the anti-Soviet cold war men-
tality which the Reagan administration is now
using as a premise for Its nuclear war plans. (A
number of Eastern European associations in the
United States which have Nazi connections are
now grouped together in the Coalition for Peace
through Strength.) And the Special Forces, or
Green Berets, infamous for their atrocities in
Indochina, are a direct outgrowth of Wisner's
special forces, for the remaining cadres of the
OPC became the first Special Forces units.
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Moonies Move on
Honduras
Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church believes
that "Communism is a cancer. You can't live with
it. You have to destroy it." And communism is
broadly defined in the Moonies' dictionary. The
Sandinista government in Nicaragua, of course, is
communist; former U.S. Representative Donald
Fraser is a communist because his subcommittee
investigated the Moon organization; and people
supporting the Central American liberation move-
ments are communists, too. It is this "concern"
for Central America that has prompted Moon's
top aide, Colonel Bo Hi Pak, to take his holy
crusade to Honduras.
Bo Hi Pak went there first in November 1982
to visit three major newspapers; the rightist La
Prensa and La Tribuna, and the slightly more
liberal El Tiempo. He told, the editors that he
wanted to help counter the "disinformation" being
'spread about Honduras. There is an anti-
l Honduran campaign, in the United States, Bo Hi
Pak let them know, which charges that the
Honduran government of President Roberto Suazo
Cordova is repressive, is aiding the Salvadoran
army in its counter-insurgency campaign along
the Honduran-Salvadoran border, and is allowing
former members of the Nicaraguan National
Guard to maintain CIA--supported training camps
close to the- Nicaraguan border.
Bo Hi Pak announced that he had a new
newspaper with which to counteract these "lies,"
and waved copies of the Washington Times to a
La Tribuna photographer. The Washington Times,
which began publishing in the U.S. capital in May
1982, is fully owned by Moon's News World
Communications, Inc. The President of News
World Communications is Bo Hi Pak. (The Times
practices virulent rightwing reporting, and
features a number of writers who are former CIA
officers or who have extensive intelligence ties.
Dozens of people on the Times staff are members
of the Unification Church, and Moon has paid two
visits to the Times, which Times editors have
tried to keep secret.
In January 1983, Bo Hi Pak's Honduran cam-
paign began in earnest. He met with General
Gustavo Alvarez, the chief of the Armed Forces;
President Suazo Cordova; Oswaldo Ramos Soto,
director of the National University in
Tegucigalpa; and the Honduran business elite.
During a January 13 meeting, these leaders in-
augurated the "Asociacion Pro Desarollo de
46 -- Counte)py -- June-Augue,t 1983
Honduras" (APRON, Association for the Develop-
ment of Honduras) to aid "democracy" and pro-
mote social progress. Bo Hi Pak also explained
Unification Church theology and told his audience
that it was a philosophy uniquely suited to counter
communism. The participants at the meeting
were also told to contribute $500 a month to
APRON. -
University director Ramos Soto urged the
business leaders to back the organization, and
especially to support General Alvarez because he
had proven to be an effective leader. Ramos
knew what he was talking about: Alvarez, with
the help of several others at the meeting, had
helped him to gain his university post by pressur-
Moon Organization Not
a Church
The Moon organization is not a church in the usual
sense of the word. A 19.78 Congressional report
called it a "tightly disciplined international political
party." It also found that it "resembles a multi-
national corporation, involving manufacturing, inter-
national trade, defense contracting, finance and
other business activities."
For Sun Myung Moon, there is no distinction
between religion and politics: "Separation between
religion and politics is what Satan likes most."
Deception, called "heavenly deception" is a central
doctrine of the Unification Church. Moon says Satan
uses trickery against God, so the Church must use
trickery to advance its work. This "heavenly de-
ception" theory provides a "religious" justification for
Moon to maintain his numerous front. organiza t ions.
Moon claims to be the true son of God. By pairing
off members of the Unification Church (his children)
at mass weddings, Moon says he is creating a divine
race. This divine race is destined to conquer the
world. Moon claims that as soon as he controls seven
nations, he will be able to dominate the world and
destroy Satan, i.e. all organizations and persons
opposed to Moon and his theocracy.
Moon's agenda is clearly political. 'To achieve his
goal of world domination - no less - he collaborates
with and uses numerous front organizations (whose
members at times do not know they are working for
Moon) as well as government agencies. Bo Hi Pak
admitted in a 1978 Congressional hearing that he has
received cash payments from the Korean CIA - not
for himself, though, but to channel it to organizations
involved in the anti-communist battle.
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ing the Supreme Court to oust the legally elected
university director. Getting Ramos into the
directorship, Alvarez had told the business lead-
ers, was part of his plan of "recuperating" the uni-
versity from the leftists. Alvarez also helped
rightwing students take over the traditionally
progressive student union - he simply had the pro-
gressive leaders arrested.
Several weeks after this kickoff meeting, Bo
Hi Pak arranged a five-day conference in San
Pedro Sula to take his cause to a broader segment
of the Honduran population: teachers, union lead-
ers, academics and small business people. All the
expenses of the conference were borne by
"CAUSA International," the front organization Bo
Hi Pak uses in Latin America. CAUSA, the
"Confederacion de Asociaciones para la Uni-
fication de las Sociedades Americanas"
(Confederation of Associations for the Unification
and collaboration with the Korean CIA is virtually
unknown there and the government is feverishly
looking for ideological tools in its `struggle to
discredit and destroy progressive movements in
Honduras. Moon's anti-communist "church" with
its vast financial resources apparently seems to
the Honduran government to be an ideal ally.
But there is some resistance to the govern-
ment's effort to give Bo Hi Pak such a prominent
role in strengthening the Honduran rightists. The
Catholic bishops are uneasy about the govern-
ment's collaboration with a cult organization.
The Vatican has sent a special warning to the
bishops, and Pope John Paul himself reportedly
expressed concern about "cults" during his recent
visit to Central America.
Sources: Information provided by the Honduran Infor-
mation Center (1151 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge MA
02138); Investigation of Korean-American Relations,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on International
It has been fairly easy for
Bo Hi Pak to establish a
Moonie organization in
Honduras. The Unification
Church's record of fraud,
deception and collaboration
with the Korean CIA is
virtually unknown there.
of the American Societies), is headquartered in
New York City, and also organized a "Conferencia
CAUSA" in Montevideo, Uruguay, in November
1982.
The San Pedro Sula conference was strictly a
one-way process - heavy doses of Unification
theory and anti-communist propaganda with no
questions allowed. Bo Hi Pak did most of the
talking at the conference; his topics ranged from
"The Unification Concept of God and Man" to the
"Unification Concept of History." Lynn Bouchey,
Vice President of the Washington-based Council
for Interamerican Security, lectured on "Com-
ments about the Marxist Concept of History." A
number of people wanted to leave the conference
early after they realized what they had gotten
themselves into, but were told that CAUSA would
be keeping track of those who didn't stay for the
whole affair.
It has been fairly easy for Bo Hi Pak to
establish a Moonie organization in Honduras. The
Unification Church's record of fraud, deception
Organizations of the Committee on International
Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Parts 1 to 4, 1978;
Colin Danby, "Moon Dupes Honduran Rightists," unpub-
lished manuscript; "Moon Shines on Apartheid, "Washington
Notes on Africa, Summer 1982 (Washington Office on
Africa, 110 Maryland Ave.,N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002);
"The Dark Side of Moon," Washington Tribune, June 4-17,
1982; Anne Nelson, "God, Man and the Rev. Moon," The
Nation, 3/31/79; Elizabeth Zanger, "Moonies: CARP,"
oo unterspy, vol.5, no.4, Aug.-Oct. 1981.
CHILE, 1nam page 41
the signing of the IMF-Government agreement in
early January. Government intervenors were to
take over five other banks and financial agencies.
When the question arose, however, of how the
gigantic $3.8 billion in foreign debt owed by the
private groups would be repaid, some of the
Chilean technocrats loudly reverted back to
Friedman's philosophy of "private gain, private
failure." This time, it was the IMF's turn to
depart from the tenents of pristine monetarism as
it pressured the Pinochet regime to guarantee
repayments to the big international banks.
State intervention to save free market cap-
italism from itself: this is an ironic but perhaps
fitting climax to the IMF-Friedman experiment in
Chile. Yet the conclusion of this tragedy still has
to be played out. The most appropriate outcome
would be one in which the people of Chile would
have a chance to choose a humane government
and a compassionate economic program.
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Features
Political Prisoner Michael O'Rourke:
The Longest Held
Immigration Detainee
Thursday, May 21, 1981: An unidentified man
attempts to deliver a package to the Philadelphia
office of Immigration Judge Ernest Hupp. Hupp's
secretary refuses the package; the man flees.
Friday, May 22, 1981: Judge Hupp is driving
home to northern Maryland from Philadelphia and
becomes aware that he is being followed by two
men in a black car. He fears that he is in mortal
danger. Frantic, he stops at the Millersville,
Maryland police station for protection. Millers-
ville police fail to intercept the black car.
Hupp tells his wife of the tailing incident, she
suffers a .heart seizure. Hupp believes that his
tormentors are members of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army. He connects this threat to the
IRA because of his position as a Judge in the
immigration case of Michael O'Rourke, a former
IRA member under deportation proceedings in the
United States.
The fear generated by the shadowing incident,
his wife's heart seizure, and his media-biased
opinion of the IRA as a "terrorist" organization
cause the elderly Hupp to write on May 29, 1981,
to Acting Chief Immigration Judge Monsanto: "I
feel that I must r. cuse [excuse] myself in the
above captioned [O'Rourke] matter. This decision
is based upon the fact that I have in my opinion
been unjustly intimidated and harassed and be-
lieve the hfrassment evolves from my presiding in
this case."
On the day he steps down from the case, Judge
Hupp learns that it is not the IRA that had been
harassing him, but rather agents of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS
officers supposedly were following up on a com-
plaint that Hupp had been leaving his office early
on Fridays and was charging the government for
the time. "It was just coincidental," claimed INS
spokesperson, Verne Jervis, "that they happened
48 -- CountehSpy -- June-Augua.t 1983
by Patricia Grace
to be looking into this matter at the same time
that he2 [Hupp] was holding the deportation
matter." Hupp later claimed that if he had
known that it was not the IRA who was tailing
him that May afternoon, he3 would not have ex-
cused himself from the case.
The damage, however, was done. The man
who had stated his intentions to give a favorable
ruling to O'Rourke was no longer in control of the
case. In his place was Judge Francis Lyons, a man
handpicked by the U.S. government to hand down
a decision in accordance with its own designs.
The results were predictable. In spite of a strong
defense, O'Rourke's appeal was denied for arbi-
trary reasons by Judge Lyons on July 12, 1982.
The case was then presented to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA, the highest administra-
tive body within the immigration system) in
October 1982, but neither O'Rourke nor his lawyer
James Orlow anticipate a favorable decision. Had
Judge Hupp remained on the case, Michael
O'Rourke would be a legal permanent resident in
the U.S. by now, based on his marriage to a U.S.
citizen. Today, as he awaits the decision of the
BIA, O'Rourke remains within the walls of the
Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York
City - a facility for convicted felons.
"Treated Like Garbage"
Michael O'Rourke is a native of Dublin, Ireland,
and a skilled mechanical fitter. In his early 20s,
he became interested in the "troubles" in northern
Ireland, and travelled to Derry to investigate.
Stopped on two occasions by British forces after
entering northern Ireland, O'Rourke says that he
was "treated like garbage": "I was asked a single
important question - what was my religion. I
replied 'Catholic.' As soon as I said this, I was
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seized and detained and asked to explain why I
was there, who I was going to see, what my
business was, where I had come from and how long
I was going to stay... I saw a world4torn apart,
presided over by occupational forces."
O'Rourke's coworkers in Dublin asked him to
help fix a machine part after hours one evening
after his return from Derry. He was asked to do
more and more skilled work for his mates, and in
the summer of 1971, he and his colleagues joined
the Provisional IRA. He served as a mechanical
expert until his arrest on August 28, 1975. After
his seizure by C-3, a special intelligence branch
of the Irish Republic's Garda, O'Rourke was taken
to Bridewell Barracks detention center, only to
find that his father had also been taken into
custody as a means of forcing a "confession" from
his son. O'Rourke was told that his father would
be charged with possession of weapons materials
and that he would die if convicted by one of
Ireland's "Special Courts" which do not allow the
accused the right to a jury. Fearing for his
father's life, O'Rourke signed a statement of his
"confession" and was taken to Port Laoise Prison
near Dublin as a political prisoner. His father was
released.
Escape
In June 1976, the IRA ordered O'Rourke to par-
ticipate in an escape attempt which involved the
use of explosives. Planting "the only explosive
that I have ever planted as an IRA member,"
O'Rourke blew himself and5two others to freedom
with no injuries to anyone, and went underground.
On February 16, 1978, under the name of Patrick
Mannion, he entered the United States as a visitor
with a passport legally obtained from the Irish
government in Dublin, and the U.S. Consul in
Dublin. The Immigration inspector at John F.
Kennedy Airport in New York granted him six
months legal stay in the United States.
Originally, O'Rourke planned to lay low in the
U.S., but a few months after his arrival he fell in
love with and married Margaret Lieb of
Philadelphia. -By failing to return to Ireland,
O'Rourke resigned himself from the IRA.
O'Rourke's American dream was shattered on
October 30, 1979, when he was arrested by FBI
agents, who turned him over to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service on the following day.
The U.S. attorney in Philadelphia told the media
that O'Rourke was being held in connection with
the July 1979 killing of Britain's Lord
Mountbatten. Although this fallacious allegation
was later withdrawn, precious little mention of its
withdrawal was made in the same media that had
thrilled at the capture of one of Mountbatten's
killers.
Despite quick action by Margie O'Rourke and
James Orlow, O'Rourke was transferred to the
Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York
City, where he remains to this day. He holds the
dubious distinction of being the longest held de-
tainee in immigration history.
Why O'Rourke Should Remain in the U.S.
The INS wants Michael O'Rourke to be deported
because he overstayed his authorized visit of six
months. -'rye INS does not necessarily want
O'Rourke . return to Ireland. They do not care
where he goes as long as he does not stay here.
He has overstayed his visa (as have countless
other foreigners), and that is grounds for depor-
tation under the provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act unless there are strong factors in
the foreigner's favor which outweigh the overstay.
Michael O'Rourke has plenty of factors in his
favor, and Judge Hupp was going to base his
favorable decision on them:
? O'Rourke is a spouse of a U.S. citizen and
therefore eligible for permanent residence.
? Living outside of the U.S. would impose a
hardship on the U.S. citizen spouse of Michael
O'Rourke.
? O'Rourke has demonstrated a well-founded
fear of persecution should he return to Ireland.
He has already been designated a political prison-
er by the Republic of Ireland. There is no
question that he would be arrested immediately
upon his return. Yet in denying O'Rourke's appeal
in July 1982, Hupp's successor, Judge Lyons,
denied the hardship to be placed on a U.S.
citizen, and also denied the validity of O'Rourke's
application for political asylum. O'Rourke, stated
Lyons, was not part of "an organized, identifiable,
discrete force openly at war with the State. At
best he was a member of a clandestine secret
group, whose energies were directed against the
authorities of Northern Ireland, not the.Republic
whose laws he violated. As such I conclude that
the offenses for which he wash convicted were for
Acts of a criminal nature." In other words,
Judge Lyons redefined the laws of the Republic of
Ireland to suit the needs of the U.S. government.
Twisted Laws
Thus, Michael O'Rourke, who is charged with the
equivalent of a misdemeanor (overstay of autho-
rized time) has been held for three and a half
years in a criminal facility, virtually incom-
municado from his family and attorneys. On four
occasions the attorneys requested that O'Rourke
be released on bond to await the decision of his
deportation case. Four times the BIA denied such
release on bond (set at $500,000). The BIA argues
that O'Rourke would escape from the U.S. if he
were released.
This logic poses an interesting question: If the
U.S. government is doing everything in its power
to deport Michael O'Rourke, why is the govern-
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ment so afraid that he will leave the U.S.? "I
don't want to see the British, through the
American government, pervert the American sys-
tem of justice," said Attorney James Orlow re-
cently at a panel discussion in Philadelphia re-
garding the O'Rourke case. Yet, this seems to be
what is happening. Despite an extradition treaty
between the U.S. and Ireland (as well as the U.K.),
neither of those foreign countries is making any
move to have O'Rourke extradited.
Why should they? The U.S. - through the
Immigration and Naturalization Service - is doing
the punitive work for them. Instead of serving his
sentence at Port Laoise, O'Rourke is serving it in
New York. And he is imprisoned there in a
criminal prison with no distinction for political
status. The U.S. government is doing to Michael
O'Rourke what Ireland and Britain could not do to
him - de-politicize and criminalize his member-
ship in the IRA.
Legal scholars, jurists and attorneys who are
aware of the O'Rourke case expressed deep con-
cern. Orlow summarized this sentiment in his
May 4, 1982 appeal brief to Judge Lyons:
This is perhaps the most difficult brief I have
ever written. In major part it is because of a
commitment to law and to the constitutional
premises of the United States which we be-
lieve and submit, in the most earnest fashion,
have been violated by the U.S. government in
the prosecution of this case and in the manner
in which that prosecution took place. It is, we
submit, in and of itself a desecration of the
American ideal and without regard to the due
process of law, substituting the forms for that
process due. In this comment, I mean no
disrespect to you or your able predecessor in
the case, only that your offices are being
manipulated for certain unannounced advan-
tage which is in and of itself a perversion of
the system of justice."
The case of Michael O'Rourke demands our
attention and concern for if the U.S. system of
justice can be manipulated in a manner which
eliminates justice for political ends, then justice
within this country is weakened to a point where
it can be rendered impotent to protect anyone.
(For more information on this case, please write
to Michael O'Rourke in care of this magazine.)
Footnotes:
1) Recusation from Deportation Proceedings in the
Matter of Michael O'Rourke aka: Patrick Mannion
(A22 607 396).
2) Dr. Charles E. Rice; "Immigration Service Accused of
Harassing Federal Judge;" Irish ho; Dec. 25, 1982;
P.5.
3) Ibid.
4) Michael O'Rourke; Affidavit in Support of Motion For
Reopening and Reconsideration of Release on Bond;
6128/80;p.2.
5) Ibid., p.7.
6) Judge Francis Lyons; In the Matter of Michael
O'Rourke, (Respondent) In Deportation Proceedings:
Denial of Appeal; July 12, 1982; pp. 12-13.
The Bronfman Family
Whiskey Barons Smuggle
Arms to South Africa
by John Cavanagh
Perhaps it should come as little surprise that a
family that raked in millions bootlegging whiskey
from Canada to the United States during Prohib-
ition should become a central agent in munitions
smuggling to South Africa. Nor should it strike us
as odd that the smuggled arms were shipped from
a secretive compound straddling that same
Canadian-U.S. border.
The family at issue is the Bronf man dynasty,
sometimes referred to as the "Rothschilds of the
New World." Its empire, comprising over $15
billion in assets, represents one of the largest
50 -- Counte'Spy -- June-Augu6.t 1983
capital pools in the non-Arab world, and includes
the world's largest alcohol company - Seagram.
Until recently, it also owned one of the top
munitions smuggling operations in North America
- Space Research Corporation.
In 1968, Space Research Corporation-Quebec
was set up with little fanfare on 7,000 prime
acres in Highwater, Canada. On January 1, 1969,
Space Research Corporation-U.S. was incorpor-
John Cavanagh is a fellow of the Institute for Policy
Studies in Washington, D.C. He heads the IPS project on
transnational corporations.
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ated on 1,000 acres cif directly adjacent land in
North Troy, Vermont. While distinct legal enti-
ties, the two firms operated as one; not only
geographically, but in every aspect of their pro-
duction and sales. Presenting itself to the Inter-
national Boundary Commission as a non-profit
organization, Space Research obtained permission
to build a private road linking its Canadian labor-
atories with its Vermont test range site. Over
this road, military equipment could daily traverse
the border unencumbered by governmental super-
vision or customs duties.
Since the Canadian government considered the
operation to be entirely a U.S. concern, and the
U.S. considered the northern portion to be under
Canadian jurisdiction, exports from the Canadian
side were technically from neither nation. The
scope for illegal shipments was enormous.
With the injection of millions of dollars in U.S.
defense contracts, Space Research became a
world leader in ballistics technology. It developed
a new 155mm howitzer artillery system able to
fire 40 percent farther than conventional systems
and adaptable for firing nuclear warheads. NASA
files, in 1973, described Space Research's tech3
nical capabilities as including "nuclear weapons."
Over the 1970s, major Space Research clients
included Taiwan, South Korea and Israel.
In 1975, in defiance of a 1963 United Nations
arms embargo on South Africa, the CIA set up
contacts between Space Research and the manu-
facturing arm of the South African military
(ARMSCOR) too supply arms to South Africa for
use in Angola. Agreements were signed, and
between 1976 and 1978 at least $50 million in
Space Research howitzer shells, cannons, ballistic
testing equipment, demonstration projectiles and
other equipment were shipped to South Africa via
ports in Canada, Spain and Antigua. The ship-
ments flowed despite a second U.N. embargo on
arms to South Africa imposed in 1977, this one
"binding" on all U.N. members.
While many details of the South Africa ship-
ments were uncovered by the British Broadcasting
Corporation and published in the Vermont press,6
very little has been disclosed concerning the com-
plex ownership history of Space Research. Walls
of secrecy have shrouded this aspect of the mun-
itions compound: corporate complicity in the il-
legal shipment of arms.
From Booze to Guns
The story began in the 1960s, when a Canadian
engineer by the name of Gerald V. Bull, with
financing from the Canadian government, built up
a multimillion dollar project which pioneered
technology for hurling objects into space from
massive cannons. Bull's official rationale was
that he was developing satellite launchers, but the
military potential of his technology was obvious.
$cUPtttfl's
$even. Crown
AMERICAN WHISKEY
ABLEND
a tea a ,~errcwrd,
BLENDED & BOTTLED
UNDER U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION
BY JOSEPH E SEAGRAM & SONS
a$7735U LAINRENCEBURG, IND., RELAY, MD.,
SO. SAN FRANCISCO, CA. ? 200 ML ? BO PROOF
7 Chown, Seagnam'o tead/.ng bnand,
b oed aU oven the wontd, inctuding
South Ajtica?
When the Canadian government withdrew funding
in 1967, Bull began the search for corporate
sponsorship.
The circumstances surrounding Bull's intro-
duction to the Bronf mans have not been disclosed.
In 1968, Bull's land, buildings and assets were
purchased by Great West Saddlery, a subsidary of
Edper; one of the two main Bronfman holding
companies. Named for two of the Bronfman clan
(Edward and Peter), Edper also brought in Arthur
D. Little (a frequent U.S. defense contractor) to
provide management and technical assistance in
return for 50 percent ownership of the new Space
Research Corporation. Soon after the purchase,
Space Research-Quebec even moved its head-
quarters to 2055 Peel Street, Montreal, the loca-
tion o% Peter Bronfman's corporate operations
center.
The Bronfmans' wizardry in generating profits
from the U.S.-Canada border was well tested long
before the takeover. When Prohibition clamped
down in the United States in 1920, the Bronfman's
empire was corfined to a small distilling com-
pany; by 1933, when the American experiment
with abstinence ended, the family controlled
Seagram, which was soon to be one of the largest
distilleries in the United States. The recipe for
success was simple: a mastery of both land and
ocean-based smuggling on small craft, ships, cars
and trucks, that generated millions of profits
annually.
In the years following World War II, when
Seagram was being built into the world's biggest
alcohol empire, then-head of the family Sam
Bronfman shuttled weekly between Montreal and
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New York, juggling his official residence in order
to minimize income tax payments. The family
that bought Space Research in 1968 knew how to
work that border to its fullest potential.
While the Bronf mans sold their shares of Space
Research-Quebec to a family trust controlled by
Bull in 1973, they retained control over Space
Research-U.S. The only ownership chart for the
corporation ever leaked was a confidential pro-
spectus (obtained by the Quebec Centre Inter-
national de Solidarite Ouvriere) for an attempted
Space Research takeover of a Canadian propel-
lants plant.
was at the forefront of almost all fund raising for
Israel in Canada. As a prominent Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation writer-broadcaster put it,
"The Canadian JewisI 0Congress almost became a
Seagram subsidiary." In keeping with family
tradition, Sam's son Edgar, current Chairman of
Seagram, now heads the World Jewish Congress.
This political and financial support of Israel
has been supplemented by heavy financial invest-
ment there, including full ownership (through the
other major Bronf man holding company, CEMP) of
Israel Supermarkets, Ltd. Acquisition of Space
Research only deepened Bronfman-Israeli collab-
oration: Bull's sophisticated long-range ammuni-
tion was sold in large quantities to the Israeli
military, enabling them to reach Egyptian instal-
lations from the Mitla Pass ip1 Sinai, and
Damascus from the Golan Heights. Since Israel
has long been one of the major arms and technol-
ogy suppliers to South Africa, it is entirely pos-
sible that Space Research products (including nu-
clear technology) have been shipped through Israel
to South Africa.
SPACE RESEARCH CORPORATION ORGANIZATIONAL
CHART 1977
Societe Giltaur MDP
Generale Corporation EDPER
(Belgium (Montreal) (U.S.)
I I
directors
and employees
PRB Space Spade
(Belgium) Research - - - - -Research
Spt a Shefford Space
Research Electronics Research
(Int'l, (Quebec) (Barbados)
Belgium)
This organizational chart indicates that in
January 1977, the Bronf man holding company
Edper controlled Space Research-U.S., which in
turn ran a subsidiary in the Caribbean island of
Barbados. Several of the 1977 and 1978 South
Africa shipments were partially run by the
Barbados subsidiary, which oversaw a highly se-
cretive "testing range" on nearby Antigua. Shells
from Canada and Florida were shipped by Space
Research to Antigua, where they were transferred
to vessels bound for South Africa. Space
Research "bought" the Antiguan government for
$500,000 a year, and received in return complete
customs clearance on all its shipments and the
right to set up a toting range protected by its
own security service.
The chart also disclosed a third operation,
Space Research International, located in Europe's
most important arms market - Brussels. This
branch was half owned by a major Belgian explo-
sives manufacturer (PRB), in turn owned by the
holding company Societe Generale. This holding
company, one of the largest and most secretive in
Europe, has extensive holdings in mining ventures
across Africa. In July 1977, after the chart was
completed, South Africa's ARMSCOR secretly
purchased 20 percent of Space Research's stock.
The Bronfman's interest in Space Research
clearly extended beyond swindling customs cof-
fers out of a few extra receipts. One primary
concern was to use the acquisition to further the
family's crusade for Israel. Sam Bronfman, undis-
puted leader of the family until his death in 1971,
52 -- CounteASpy -- June-Augue.t 1983
Government Complicity
Space Research's Mr. Bull, even with his powerful
Bronfman backers, would have faced considerable
difficulty shipping large amounts of munitions to
South Africa without substantial government
assistance. As meticulously documented by the
House Subcommittee on Africa, the CIA played
the key role in connecting buyer with seller. This
was further substantiated by John Stockwell, CIA
Angola Task Fore Director at the time of the
initial contacts. In 1972, Senator Barry
Goldwater facilitated Space Research's sub-'
sequent crimes by sponsering a rare private act of
Congress that conferred retroactive citizenship
on Bull in order to le itimize his access to highly
classified materials. l' Security clearances were
also granted to numerous other company per-
sonnel.
Further, as 1982 testimony by State Depart-
ment personnel demonstrated, the U.S. govern-
ment never set up procedures to implement the
arms embargo against South Africa. On the
contrary, in one case, the State Department's
Office of Munitions Control made it considerably
easier for Space Research to ship artillery shell
forgings to South Africa with a minimum of legal
risk.
Only after irrefutable evidence of illegal arms
shipments surfaced did the Justice Department
press charges. The sentence: Bull and a colleague
spent four months in a minimum security prison in
1980, and the case was shelved. Washington's
role in the affair was left virtually untouched, and
no mention was made of the central position
assumed by Bronf man capital in Space Research.
See BRONFMAN, page 59
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Interview with Polisario Front Representative
U.S. Backs Morocco's
Saharan War
In an arid corner of northwest Africa, the libera-
tion movement of the nomadic peoples of Western
Sahara is fighting U.S.-trained and equipped
Moroccan soldiers to determine the future of this
former Spanish colony. The war began seven
years ago when the Polisario Front launched its
campaign for an independent Western Sahara
against the forces of the King of Morocco, who
claims sovereignty over the territory.
Western Sahara is a poor and sparsely popu-
lated area with but one prize of interest to
outside powers: rich phosphate deposits and a port
from which to export them. (These deposits are
concentrated in a small enclave known as the
WESTERN SAHARA
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The 197&79 Moroccan-
Mauritanian partition line
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by Martha Wenger
"useful triangle.") Morocco's King Hassan covets
these mineral reserves which could be added to
his own country's deposits to enhance his position
as a major exporter of phosphate.
The U.S. stake in the region is the highly
useful role King Hassan has carved out for himself
supporting U.S. interests and toeing the anti-
communist, anti-Libya Reagan line among his
African neighbors and his fellow Arab nations. Of
great importance as well is King Hassan's per-
mission for U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces air-
craft to use Moroccan air bases in "emergency"
situations. U.S. 6th Fleet warships have, for
years, had unrestricted access to Moroccan ports.
U.S. military aid to Morocco is, simply, King
Hassan's pay-off for services rendered.
Most of that aid - with full U.S. knowledge and
consent - is poured directly into Morocco's war in
the Western Sahara. (U.S. funds are generously
supplemented by another friend, Saudi Arabia.)
Yet in seven years of war, the Polisario forces
have gained control over 90 percent of the terri-
tory in question. Fewer than 20,000 guerrillas
today keep 80,000 Moroccan troops dug in behind
a 280-mile defense line known as the "sand wall,"
guarding the useful triangle's towns and aban-
doned phosphate mines from Polisario incursions.
The war has divided the Saharawi people into
three populations: one-third live under Moroccan
military occupation in the triangle; about 150,000
live in refugee camps in Algeria; and the rest
remain on their land in the Polisario controlled
Western Sahara, which in 1976 was proclaimed the
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
Fifty-four nations have recognized the SADR, and
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) ad-
mitted it as a full member state last year.
Morocco, in turn, immediately launched a boycott
of the OAU and has sabotaged several subsequent
attempts at convening OAU summits.
A surprise meeting between the President of
Algeria, a longtime Polisario ally, and Morocco's
King Hassan on February 26, 1983, may be a
signal that the King wants to lessen his depen-
dence on the U.S. and move toward regional
detente. Algeria has affirmed that this thaw in
Source: Tony Hodges, H.i,a.toni.cat Dic ti-onary Martha Wenger is a member of Counterspy's advisory board
o Western Sahara, Scarecitcw reds, and assistant to the editor of MERIP Reports magazine.
Metuchen.. N. J., 1982. CounieASpy -- June-Augue.t 1983 -- 53
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relations does not affect its stance on the
Western Sahara issue. While Algeria is willing to
act as an intermediary with the King on Western
Sahara, it will not presume to speak on Polisario's
behalf. To date, King Hassan has refused even to
recognize Polisario representatives, let alone ne-
gotiate with them. Polisario Front leaders have
warned that the war will continue until the day
Hassan agrees to meet them at the negotiating
table.
Counterspy's Martha Wenger interviewed the
Polisario Front's representative at the United
Nations, Madjid Abdullah, in March 1983.
The New York Times and other U.S. papers have
reported recently that the war in Western Sahara
has died down. You were there in January 1983.
What did you see?
It's really not true at all that the war is over.
When the war started in 1975, the Moroccans sent
15,000 troops to Western Sahara thinking that
they could secure the whole territory of 285,000
square kilometers. Year after year they had to
pour in more troops. Seven years later, the
Moroccans are facing exactly the same number of
Polisario troops and the area they control has
shrunk to one-tenth of the territory. This is the
last stage of the war.
Every two years or so, the Moroccans have had
to change their strategy. One was columns of
troops going in search of guerrillas, like the plan
just announced for El Salvador. Those columns
were trained by the U.S., South Africa and
France. They renounced that strategy within six
months, in 1980. Then they tried large fortresses
- 5,000 to 8,000 troops in one big fortress in a
city. Before that they had the strategy of a
"thousand points": in each little outpost in
Western Sahara they put between 15 and 200
soldiers. That didn't work either. So the last
strategy is the wall, a military defense line to
preserve Moroccan control over the most im-
portant part of Western Sahara. Its objective is
to minimize troop losses and to raise morale.
The advice from the U.S. was to put all the
troops on the same line with their backs to
Morocco, only confronting the Polisario from one
direction. That also hasn't worked. The King
himself said four weeks ago that the morale of
the soldiers is very low. Even worse, the
Moroccans cannot leave their' defense sites
because that would leave part of the wall unde-
fended. A large part of the Moroccan soldiers
have not left their trenches for a very long time.
They are on permanent 24-hour alert.
The Polisario shelling and attacks on the wall
have a big impact because the Moroccans are in
large concentrations, all behind the wall. We
have information that there have been a lot of
casualties, particularly from attacks launched
54 -- CounteJSpy -- June-August 1983
during December, January and February of 1983.
What kind of military aid is the U.S. giving the
Moroccan government?
Last year, Morocco got $30 million in military
aid, this year they will get $100 million. For next
year the administration is requesting $90 million.
What about weapons sales?
Over the last three years, the new items which
have appeared in the Moroccan arsenal from the
U.S. are TOW and Chapparal missiles, more
sophisticated F-5 fighter jets, electronic counter-
measures to equip the F-5s, more helicopters and
the OV-10 counterinsurgency aircraft. All of this
is intended to be used against the Polisario Front.
I think 90 percent of the U.S.-supplied ammuni-
tion and planes for the last seven years has been
going to use in Western Sahara.
The Moroccans also have tanks behind the
wall, armored cars and personnel carriers, howit-
zers, cannons, machine guns of all kinds, and of
course the Westinghouse radar equipment which
can sometimes detect our movements from 15-20
kilometers away. Since May 1982, they also have
U.S.-supplied cluster bombs which they are using
widely. [See Counterspy, Dec. 1982-Feb. 1983, p.
37.1
You saw and brought back photos of empty dis-
penser casings from those cluster bombs which
had been exploded in the Western Sahara.
It's a horrible weapon. The Moroccans were
dropping them from too high which maybe was
limiting the efficiency. But the little bomblets
they disperse could explode hours after they are
dropped. They have used them everywhere they
think there is a concentration of population, of
troops, or a base in Western Sahara, far away r
from the wall. On civilians too. There were
civilians hit. They are used for intimidation.
After the Moroccans had retreated behind the
wall, people had started to revive their nomadic
life, but with the cluster bombs, people have fled
south, even into Mauritania or Algeria, to get far
away from them. The kinds they are using are
CBU-58s and CBU-71s.
You said that the U.S. advisors are training
Moroccan troops. Are they out there in Western
Sahara, on the wall?
Very frequently. We know that they are super-
vising the war - the wall itself was an American
idea. At any given time there are at least 35 U.S.
advisors in Morocco. Their work is to deal with
the war, how the Moroccans can win; training new
commandos like the ones in El Salvador. They
visit Western Sahara from time to time and they
provide the Moroccans with sensitive information
about the movements and base locations of the
Polisario Front gathered from satellites. I don't
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know which planes or satellites they are using, but
the American technology and also the physical
presence of the advisors is a very important part
of the battle, and the gathering of information
about our side. Because the U.S. is supplying
information, the Moroccans have not needed to
use the OV-10 counterinsurgency and the C-130
transport aircraft to make reconnaissance flights
over the liberated territories in the last two
years.
Tell us about the living conditions of the Saharawi
people.
Life hasn't changed much in the refugee camps in
Algeria. The conditions are very harsh. There
has been a drought,for the last four or five years.
But the morale of the people is very high. The
people are well organized and we have started
many development projects, within Western
Sahara and from the camps. We are providing our
schools, our hospitals and even some of the aca-
demies - the women's military school - with
vegetables coming from Western Sahara and from
the camps. We also have a large herd of camels
and g ats to provide milk for the hospitals and
child care centers. Last winter there was a
shortage of blankets - the temperature reached
below freezing for the first time in years. We
provided heating wood to the people. Last winter
was a very hard winter, but we have met the basic
needs for everyone.
The people who are in Polisario-controlled
Western Sahara are Nomads?
U.S. C.E'u6tehbomb used in Weotetn Sahara
Yes. We have encouraged them to resume nomad-
ic life: this is an easy way to survive. We don't
want them to form communities which make them
easy targets for the Moroccan planes. So they
move from one place to another for security
reasons.
There are no towns of any size in that area?
Not at all. The populated towns are inside the
Moroccan-controlled area, the "triangle." The
other towns were bombarded so many times with
napalm and phosphorous that we encouraged
people to be self-reliant and to go back to nomad-
ic life. Of course, they are in contact with the
guerrillas who have their bases in Western Sahara
and who provide them with food and medicine.
What kind of society does the Polisario Front hope
to create in an independent Western Sahara?
I think we have already achieved a large part of
the Polisario Front's program, particularly in
health, education and agricultural production.
The people are organized, not only in the refugee
camps but also under the Moroccan occupation.
The Polisario Front, the Saharawi Republic, is
non-aligned. We have a nationalist-socialist
orientation.
The Organization of African Unity (OA U) has split
over the admission ' of the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR) as a full member
state in February 1982. Morocco has led a
boycott of the OAU which caused the November
1982 summit, set for Tripoli, Libya, to fail for the
See WESTERN SAHARA, page 59
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Book Reviews
South Africa's War on the
World Council of Churches
Derrick Knight, Beyond the Pale:
,
The Christian Political Fringe
Caraf Publications Ltd., London,
1982.
Derrick Knight's Beyond the Pale
has become highly relevant for U.S.
readers. In a richly detailed if
sometimes disorganized report,
Knight traces the origins and inter-
locking directorates of "Christian
political fringe" groups in Britain
and elsewhere -- groups that in the
1970s orchestrated a propaganda
campaign against the 40 million
strong international ecumenical
organization, the World Council of
Churches (WCC). The charges made
during that campaign are strikingly
similar to those recently repeated in
the controversial Reader's Digest
and 60 Minutes reports on the WCC
and its U.S. affiliate, the National
Council of Churches.
Knight's thesis is that between
1974 and 1978 a Christian underworld
- a "small, untypical, unrepresenta-
tive number of slightly dotty clergy
and their friends... whose bizarre
notions have hitherto found no wide
support" - was used as an (often
willing) tool in a ruthless propa-
ganda campaign funded by white
South African politicians.
The campaign was secret and the
objective was to manipulate pub-
lic opinion in Britain and else-
where . It attempted to buy
control of influential areas of
the international media and de-
veloped a strategy to try and
destroy the broad-based
Christian consensus against
apartheid. It took on the World
Council of Churches as a main
target, and called upon likely
and unlikely allies to help.
The money came from a secret slush
fund dispensed by the South African
Department of Information (later
exposed in a massive scandal tagged
"Muldergate"). It was laundered
through front corporations before
showing up in the coffers of such
rightwing groups as the Christian
League of Southern Africa, with
offices in Britain and contacts in
the U.S.
The propaganda themes were old
rightwing standards, with a partic-
ular South African twist: the Marx-
ist threat to white Western civiliza-
tion, the danger of multi-racialism,
the horror of the "terrorist" threat
to South Africa, and the takeover of
the churches by leftwing subversives
("the Archbishop of Canterbury be-
ing a Soviet agent and all bishops
communists, and behind them lay
the Marxist World Council of
Churches run by the KGB.")
The book which became the
"bible" for these groups is The
Fraudulent Gospel, by Bernard
Smith of the British Christian
Affirmation Campaign. Its original
cover is a gruesome photo with the
caption, "27 Black Rhodesians
massacred by WCC-financed terror-
ists in Eastern Rhodesia in
December 1976." Smith charges (as
did 60 Minutes and the Reader's
Digest) that "Christian churchgoers"
are "unwittingly giving financial
assistance to communist-backed
terrorist organizations in Africa"
via the WCC.
Knight examines the British
Christian fringe organizations at
length, tracing their many links with
such rightwing company as the
World Anti-Communist League, the
anti-Jewish British Israelites (who
believe that Anglo-Saxons are the
"chosen" people), the racist, fascist
British National Front, and other
pro-apartheid groups. (Knight's
revelations hit some sensitive
nerves: even before the book was
published, several rightwing groups
sued for libel. For lack of money to
pursue the defense, Knight had to
settle out of court. The censored
portions, noted in the text by blank
spaces, were printed in Counterspy's
Feb.-Apr. 1982 edition. lengthy
postscript treats the U.S. "moral
majority" groups and suggests that
under Reagan, South Africa no long-
er needs to conduct covert propa-
ganda campaigns in the U.S. After
all, John Sears, a longtime paid lob-
byist for South Africa, was one of
Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign
managers.
However, Knight's case that
South African money bolstered the
1970s anti-WCC campaign raises
serious questions about the similar
current debate in the U.S. Are we
perhaps witnessing a more subtle
Knight's case that South
African money bolstered
the 1970s anti-World
Council to Churches
campaign raises serious
questions about the
similar current debate in
the U.S. Are we perhaps
witnessing amore subtle
and sophisticated
version of the 1970s
model?
and sophisticated version of the
1970s model? The evidence is not
yet in, but some curious links bear
watching.
For example, according to Steve
Askin in the National Catholic Re-
porter , the Institute on Religion and
Democracy (IRD), a 'prominent
source of anti-WCC charges, got
$300,000 of its total $533,002 bud-
get from that notorious funder of
rightwing causes, the Scaife Found-
ation. Meanwhile, the Muldergate
scandal investigation has confirmed
56 -- Counte4Spy -- June-Augu4 t 1983
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that in 1975, the South African
government gave U.S. businessman
John McGoff millions of dollars with
which to try to buy the Washington
Star or the Sacramento Union to
serve as a pro-South Africa mouth-
piece in the U.S. McGoff's partner
in the deal? John Mellon Scaife,
says Knight. The same Scaife who
runs the foundation that funds IRD.
Another intriguing incident:
Leon Howell reports in Christianity
and Crisis that "two members of the
Republic of South Africa's Eloff
Commission paid a visit to the IRD
offices in August of 1982." The
Commission was appointed by the
government to investigate the anti-
apartheid South African Council of
Churches (a WCC affiliate). Six
months later, the head of South
Africa's security police was urging
the Eloff Commission to bar the
SACC from receiving any money
from foreign sources (such as the
WCC). He was quite confident that
this action, which might sound the
death knell for a courageous voice
Inflating the Assessment
of Soviet Strength
Robert P. Berman and John C.
Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces:
Requirements and Responses, The
Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C., 1982.
Soviet Strategic Forces might well
be one of the most important books
on military issues to be published by
an "establishment think tank" in
years. Robert Berman and John
Baker disprove much of the Reagan
administration's rhetoric about the
"offensive" nature of the Soviet
strategic buildup. They document
that the development of the Soviet
Union's missile and bomber arsenal
is primarily a response to threats
posed by U.S. nuclear weapons sys-
tems. This process began im-
mediately after World War II, the
authors write, when the Soviets hop-
ed to "offset" the "American mono-
poly on nuclear weapons" by main-
taining a large army. The U.S.
government, however, used an "in-
flated... assessment of Soviet
strength" to rapidly increase its nu-
clear weapons arsenal.
In the early 1950s, the Soviet
Union made its first serious effort
"to integrate strategic defense
forces into the Soviet strategic pos-
ture." At the same time, the U.S.
threat to the Soviet Union had mul-
tiplied: "The number of U.S. and
NATO forward-based systems cap-
able of nuclear strikes against the
Soviet homeland had increased by
1955 to more than 500," and the
Eisenhower administration had
begun "to emphasize American will-
ingness to rely on the U.S. nuclear
advantage to deter communist
threats around the world."
The first Soviet test of an Inter-
continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
took place in 1957, and a decision to
dramatically build up the Soviet
missile arsenal was made in 1959. It
came in response to the "serious
challenge posed by Western regional
nuclear forces and the prospect of
of opposition to racist policies,
would be taken. I
The IRD-South Africa link is not
proven. But to anyone who has read
Beyond the Pale, these curious con-
nections signal a need for careful
scrutiny.
Beyond the Pale is available from
Christians Against Racism and
Facism (CARAF), Publications
Officer, Vicarage Flat, Carr Street,
Leigh, Lancashire, England; &3.50
plus shipping.
forward deployment of its strategic
missiles in Cuba probably offered
the USSR its only means of quickly
improving its strategic position
relative to the United States."
In the 1960s and 1970s, the
Soviet ICBM force was improved
considerably with the objective "to
achieve nuclear parity with the
United States." The 1980s, claim
the authors, might bring about a
"reevaluation of Soviet strategic
force posture," in part because the
nuclear weapons the United States
and its allies will deploy over the
next few years "could significantly
upgrade the threat to the surviv-
Robert Berman and John
Baker disprove much of
the Reagan
administration's rhetoric
about the "offensive"
nature of the Soviet
strategic buildup.
growing
forces."
The Soviets were the first to
launch a satellite using an SS-6
rocket booster but this SS-6 failed
to fulfill its task as an ICBM. After
only a few years, the United States
had taken a decisive lead in the
production of ICBMs. By 1961,
write the authors, "the Soviet lead-
ership undoubtedly realized that its
planned strategic posture was in-
adequate to meet the evolving
American strategic threat." Soviet
leaders realized they were vulner-
able to a suprise attack, and, as
Berman and Baker explain it, they
responded by attempting to base
nuclear missiles on Cuba. The few
ICBMs based in the USSR were no
match for the U.S. force, and "this
ability of Soviet land-based missile
forces."
Ironically, when they discuss the
motivating force behind the Soviet
nuclear buildup, Berman's and
Baker's argument becomes contra-
dictory. First, they provide evi-
dence that the Soviet arms buildup
was usually geared toward catching
up with a U.S. lead in weapons de-
velopment, and state that gaining
parity with the United States has
been one of the most important ob-
jectives of the Soviet government.
But they go on to say that the
Soviet government believes it is
possible to prevail in a nuclear war.
Berman and Baker even claim that:
The Soviet approach to strategic
doctrine contrasts in many ways
with that of the United States
and other Western nuclear
powers.... Posing the threat of
unacceptable losses..., the West-
ern concept attempts to dissuade
the enemy from initiating nu-
clear war. If war should break
out, the Western powers would
continue to seek survival by
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means of deterrence by attempt-
ing to end the war through
threats to escalate the conflict
to increasingly higher levels of
destruction. The Soviet Union
has attempted to obtain ad-
ditional insurance by striving for
the capability not only to dev-
astate the enemy's homeland,
but also to prevail militarily in
the event of a world war.
Soviet government officials deny
that their objective is to prevail in
REFUGEES, 6Aom page 39
On the 25th of April the Armed
Forces came in and they said that
when we returned to the houses
that they'd be destroyed.
So where have you .Uved a..nce
April?
Different places in the same
area, when we were going to flee
we planned ahead and we went out
to find food to bring with us.
When we got there we found the
place destroyed, there were no
people there - the people came
back little by little to live
there because they even destroyed
all our clothes.
And tkie pna.ctice o4 banning
hone ee and dea.tno y ing th.i.nga, do
they a.ti.U do it?
Well sure, just this August
there was another repression. But
each time it gets worse because
the little that's left from the
earlier invasion gets destroyed
this time. So the people were
left completely without shelter,
on the run and starving.
3
Penhapa you can teU me
when you #ebt Et Sae.va-
dotc?
Sure. I left on the
20th of December, 1982.
What Department did you come
bum?
Morazan.
What pant o6 Morazan?
From Jocoaitique.
Why did you .leave .then.e?
Well, it was because of the
great repression which is being
done by the Army. First, I lived
in a little village and the planes
came and the Army wouldn't let us
stay there. They threatened us.
They said we were guerrilla colla-
borators and a whole lot of other
things. Even though you're not in-
volved, they still come at you
with this attitude. Then we fled
to the town of Jocoaitique trying
to get some protection from the
Army. They were there and they
started to repress us again. They
said we were collaborators; they
58 -- Counte'Spy -- June-Augua.t
(i.e. win) a nuclear war. If Berman
and Baker do not believe these
statements they must disprove
them. They do not. On the other
hand, they ignore the ample evi-
dence that it is the U.S. government
that is planning to "prevail" in a
nuclear war. Although the Reagan
administration's Defense Guidance
for Fiscal Years 1984-88 was pub-
lished before Soviet Strategic
Forces went into print, Berman and
Baker fail to report that this doc-
said the same things to us there
that they said in our village. So
they wouldn't let us leave town
for any reason. If we left to get
firewood or look for something we
needed for the family they said we
were going out to contact the
guerrilla. So they grabbed a lot
of people and they disappeared.
They probably killed them. The
people they caught outside of town
we never saw again. I realized
what was going on and I knew we
couldn't stay there where there
was no guarantee of safety. So we
decided to see how we could es-
cape.
They killed children there,
sometimes shooting them - the
children would appear dead. Since
I had one older kid with me, I
figured some day they would kill
him too. I left that town and I
came here looking for refuge.
Did you come alone ot w.L.th
your bamity?
I came alone.
Did the membene ob your 6am.-
Ly die?
My wife is dead. And they
killed my child in a shoot-up.
trine specifically calls on U.S.
forces to gain the capability to
"prevail" in a prolonged nuclear war.
This omission and the faulty con-
clusion drawn as a consequence
diminish the value of Soviet
Strategic Forces. It is still a book
to read, though, if only because it
thoroughly debunks many of the
Reagan administration's most
strident statements about the Soviet
"menace."
When they drink, they start
shooting and in one of these they
killed my son. I saw him. It's
really sad to lose your son. There
was nothing to do but come here.
When did .thAA happen?
December 10, 1982.
How otd was your son?
Ten years old.
Who hiUed him?
The Armed Forces.
Wae .thi.6 in the acme peace Jo-
coai ti que?
Yes.
How did they kilt him?
I never saw it. The boy was
probably out getting firewood and
they probably saw him and fired at
him, or maybe they were firing at
another man and hit him. The
point is they killed him. Some
neighbors of mine went there.
Did you aee av.peane attactzo
during .th.ie pae.t yeah?
Yes. When we were still living
in the village it was horrible.
They bombed and machine-gunned us
with the planes.
What kind o6 p&znea are .they?
I hear that they call them A
37s. There were helicopters too.
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How do they opexate with these
a 37s?
They operate mostly on the civ-
ilian population because that is
what they do. The people that suf-
fer the most from the machine-gun-
ning are the civilians. Those are
the ones who get it the worst. The
civilians. Children, old people.
Those are the ones who die.
How do they know where the peo-
pie axe?
I don't know how they do it -
some method that they have. But
they drop the bombs. I guess they
can see the people. I don't know;
but it's the people who suffer.
Have you seen any change ox
imp'tovement in the Armed Forces?
Vuxino .these attacks, do they show
moxe respect these days sox the
human tights 06 the people?
As far as I'm concerned, I can
see no change. I've just come from
Jocoaitique, and like I said in
the beginning, that's why I left
there; there's been no change. The
longer you're there the tougher
they get on you as a civilian. You
have got no right to leave or any-
thing.
So you say the xepxess.ion con-
tinues the same?
Everything is the same. There's
been no change.
Anything e?se?
I only want to say that this is
the reason I came here. I've heard
that there are humanitarian orga-
nizations here who help us, the
Salvadoran peasants. The civilian
population is suffering over
there. Somebody should talk to the
government of the United States
and tell them to stop intervening
here. Like I said, the children
are the ones who suffer. The only
thing I ask is that these institu-
tions should speak on behalf of
the Salvadoran people, because
just like we suffered, they're
still suffering over there out of
fear of the Armed Forces. That's
all.
Axe the peo pt e a bxa,id to moss
the boxdex into Honduras to seek
nebuge?
Yes, everyone is afraid. That's
why we came through the hills.
Why are the peopT abxaid to
Zook sox ne6uge?
If they catch you on the road,
they kill you.
? Who fzi-??s you?
The soldiers. If they find you
they kill you.
BRONFMAN, 6,nom page 52
This case only underscores the ease with which
multinational corporations can make a mockery of
government embargoes. This is particularly true
when the government where the corporation is
headquartered sees its interests as coinciding with
those of corporate capital. The Bronfmans found
willing parters in the governments of the United
States, Canada, Antigua, Israel and South Africa.
Further efforts to stem the flow of embargoed
goods must address the role of those governments
who have been partners in crime, as well as the
increasingly sophisticated techniques multi-
national corporations have devised to shift arms,
and other goods and capital around the globe.
Footnotes:
1) Jerome Robinson, "The Space Research Institute,"
Vermont Life, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Spring 1970, p. 12.
2) Comite Quebec-Afrique of the Centre International
de Solidarite Ouvriere, Space Research Corporation
(pamphlet), March 1980, p. 2.
3) Mark Abley, "Adventures in the Arms Trade: A
Canadian Saga," Canadian Forum, April 1979, p. 10.
4) United States, House, Subcommittee on Africa of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on
Enforcement of the United States Embargo Against
South Africa, March 30, 1982, pp. 55-66.
5) Michael T. Klare, "Evading the Embargo: Illicit U.S.
Arms Transfers to South Africa," Journal of Inter-
national Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring/Summer
1981, pp. 23-24.
6) See 1978-1980 articles in the Burlington Free Press
(by Sam Hemingway and William Scott Malone) and
the Herald (by Steve Snider, Louis Berney and Colin
Nickerson).
7) Cf supra, #3, p. 6.
8) Peter Newman, Bronfman Dynasty (Toronto, 1978).
9) Cf supra, #2, p.10.
10) Cf supra, #8, p.47.
11) Ibid., p.245.
12) Cf supra, #4, pp.62-63.
13) Jim Schley, "Gun Running: Vermont to South
Africa," River Valley Voice, Vol.1, No. 4, July/August
1981.
WESTERN SAHARA, yAom page 55
lack of a quorum. What role has the U.S. govern-
ment played in this dispute?
I know that the U.S. Charge d'Affairs in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia was very active during the OAU
ministerial conference there in February 1982,
trying to prevent the admission of the SADR or to
create a boycott. Some African governments
were not able to cable instructions to their repre-
sentatives in Addis Ababa because of the shortage
of time. But the U.S. government took charge:
they contacted the presidents or foreign ministers
of those countries in their capitals, took written
cables from them and sent them through their
very quick channels to the U.S. Embassy in Addis
Ababa. The Charge himself was handling
messages to their representatives at the OAU
ministerial council meeting, in view to getting
them to pull out. We also know about countries
that had a lot of economic pressure put on them
by the U.S. to boycott the summit in Tripoli.
Can you say which countries were pressured?
I can't really. It's very sensitive. A new summit
of the OAU is set to take place from June 7 to 11,
1983, in Addis Ababa. The same ministers and the
same presidents are still there. So they may
betray themselves and submit to the pressure, but
I think that they may change their minds and go
to the summit because they feel that the OAU
and Africa are closer to their hearts than the U.S.
The SADR will participate as a full member
state and contribute in any way possible so that
the summit can take place. It is the hope of all
Africans to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the
OAU in joy and unity.
CounteASpu -- June-August 7983 -- 59
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