ADMIRAL'S MEMOIRS HAIL CODE-BREAKERS IN WWII

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000201180122-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 122
• Publication Date: December 30, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00806R000201180122-4
i AE APPEARED
ON PA6
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 Decembcr 1985
AdIllierg9S nieM0 hafl "They set about manipulations to prove they had been
rights all the time," says Captain Pineau. "In the course
of that they ordered Rochefort back to Washington on
temporary duty." Rochefort ended up commanding a
code-briers WTV floating dry dock, while the officers in question - nota-
bly a pair of brothers named Joseph and John Redman
Author tries to set -record straighrt on solidified their bureaucratic hold on naval intelligence,
Pineau.
Hypo' officer in Battle of Midway This incident shows that while radio intelligence was
invaluable during World War II, it was also beset by ter-
rific intramural battles that reduced its effectiveness. Ad-
ey ve~a- ciAar mire! Laton, chief intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet
AA01M"` from 1940 until Japan's surrender: wanted to make this
waMrgt?s point clear in his memoirs, according to his co-author:
Forty years after the end of World War IL it is increasingly clear (Capt. Pinesu was himself a radio intelligence officer in
that theft of enemy messages was crucial to the United States vic- World War II, and a long-time friend of Layton.)
Such Navy turf wars may have inadvertently helped
''h~s "t dt was accomplished by men and women who and- Japanese forces in their Dec. 7, 1941. surprise raid on.
1 i n t e r c e p t e d r a d i o c r a c k e d codes. a n d P e e d Harbor: F o d d e r of s e c u r i t y leeks. Navy h e a d q u a r -
a n u e e m e d o u t secret information o n such things as ship movementr tan in W withhard crucial informaton from
and attack targets. Peed Harbor. forces in the months preceding the ttack.
Such radio i_AaW once gave the US invaluable advantage during Given access to this data, most of which came from
dtheeclassifiuse'ed d documents. . But t the to a man new who obookinks the drawing li llfidwswar4y se as- ? "M*? decodea of intercepted Japanese diplomatic
broke Pacific commanders would have smelled out
ot was promptly reassigned
his a post of We responsibility so Japanese intentions, argues "And I Was There."
others could take credit it for his work, charges the book. One message. from Tokyo to the Japanese consulate
Furthearmo:s, US bureaucratic tang may have earlier in Honolulu, asked spies to draw up .a grid map of Pearl
helped the Japanese achieve complete surprise in their raid on Harbor so that information on ship anchor locations
Pearl Harbor: according to ".And I Was There," the memoirs of the could be passed quickly and accurately.
Last late Rear Adm. month, the Edwin Layton.
Navy y belatedly .atedly recognized the contributions of "You u dask for information like that casually."
plot" message.
one of the most skilled radio intelligence officers of World War II, says Pineau don't o The officers of in this "chargebomb of plot" Pearl m ae. forces at the
Capt. Joseph Rochefort. by posthumously awarding him the Dis- time of the Japanese attack - Army U. Gen. Walter
tinguishem Berths Medal. Captain Rochefort had twice been Short and Adm. Husband Kimmel - were forced into re-
It down for the decoration in during his lifetime. " tirement shortly thereafter. Layton. who as fleet intelli-
gence was Rochefort. officer charge of Pearl Harbor's Hypo officer was there during the attack, believed all his
code-breaking station, who puzzled out the fact that the Japanese life that both Short and Kimmel had been made
intended to attack Midway Island in June 1942. With that fore- scapegoats
knowledge, Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, The fault instead was institutional, believed Layton, a
set a trap that crippled Japan a naval forces. commu
Unfortunately for Rochefort, high-ranking intelligence officers in matter of poor lines of nication and bad analysis.
the US had insisted the Ja would strike elsewhere. "Wash- But for the quickly-called panels of inquiry, to say so
ington concluded the targetpanese would be. variously, the Aleutians. Ha- " would not have been good for the war effort," points out
waii, the Whet Coast, or the Panama Canal." says Capt. Roger Pinesu. "So they let two men take the rap."
Pineau. co-author of "And I Was There".
Proved wrong, theme headquarters officers were unhappy.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00806R000201180122-4