LETTER TO EDWARD P. BOLAND FROM JOHN N. MCMAHON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200790016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 4, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

STAT
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Central Irneiligrn? Agc,cv
4 April 1983
The Honorable Edward P. Boland
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed Concurrent
Resolution to support the establishment of .a National Historical Intelli-
gence Museum.
The support and recognition of the role of intelligence reflected in
the Resolution is certainly.gratifying. The intrinsic nature of the
intelligence business,'however, precludes us from advertising our activities.
We would be hard pressed -to-come up with meaningful exhibit materials that
were unclassified. Moreover, any Intelligence Community association with
an exhibition of.intelligence materials would send the wrong signal to our
foreign friends, whose confidence in our ability to keep secrets we are
-trying to bolster. Finally, any Intelligence Community support of such a
venture would invariably be perceived as domestic propaganda.
While we therefore appreciate the good intentions behind the Resolution,
I am sure you will understand why we oppose establishing an intelligence
museum and believe it would be unwise for the Intelligence Community to be
associated in any way with such a project.
Sincerely,
Acting Dir&ctor of Central Intelligence
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
STAT FROM:
,ftczinq irector, Office of External Affairs
SUBJECT: C.oncuxrent Res
of a National Istor icaluInntelliigence 1Museum
1. Action Recuestea Sign the attached letter to
Concressman Boland.
2. Background: HPSCI Chairman Boland has requested your
comments on subject resolution
Th
.
e DCI last dealt with the
issue of ,,,~
S e a m i n h n.; 1 I n n
STA
Ir
museum promoter Martin C. Crame tol the trustees
o~ the William J. Donovan Foundation
the backorounder I for assistance. A copy of
the him then is attached. The important
point to note is that successive DCIs since to consider involving CIA in sucharob have found it
project.
STAT
Recommendation: Sign the attached letter.
Attachment
OEXA/PAD/C#W/scn/29 Mar 83,
Orig. - addressee
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1 - C/LLD/OEX
I - CAR/OEXA
1~- ER 83-1619
1 - OEXA 83-0685
1 -.PAD s u b j.
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STAT
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTEWGENCE
WASHINGTOI{, D.C. 20515
March-I+, 1983
Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Casey:
I would appreciate your comments concerning the attached resolution.
With every good wish, -I am
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98th CONGRESS
IL;. Session S. CON. BES -
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
To support the establishment of a National Historical
intelligence Museum.
whereas intelligence has played a crucial role in the history of
the United States;
Whereas intelligence activities were employed by George
Washington at the outset of the American Revolution;
it is important that the citizens of the United States
understand the role of intelligence in not only military
achievement in wartime, but in maintaining stability in
peacetime;
Whereas the sacrifices and contributions to intelligence by'
thousands of rren and women should be commemorated; and
Whereas the understanding of the importance that intelligence
activities have played in the history of the United States
and the acknowledgement cf the people who have contributed to
such activities can best be achieved by the collection,
preservation, and exhibition of-intelligence objects of
historical significance: Now, therefore, be it
1 Resol_veg by the Senate (the HoVse of Renresentat=_ves
2 concur ringj, That the Congress supports the establishment of
a rational Historical Intelligence Museum.
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ER 82-4873/2
OEXA 82-1129/1
24 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Office of External Affairs
Martin Cramer's Proposed Intelligence Museum
1. Action Requested: None; for information only.
STAT 2. Background: Martin Cramer
STAT
as promoted t e development
an in e igence museum or many years. He wrote you on 16 April 1982
asking for support for his long sought intelligence museum. He specifically
asked for help in procuring a Federal site or facility, identifying CIA
officers to assist him, support of requests for exhibit materials, and
advice on approaching people and foundations for assistance.
The notion of an intelligence museum has been considered by succes-
sive DCI's since 1969 (see chronology). Cramer's proposal first came to
CIA in 1977. After careful study it was determined that it would be in-
appropriate for CIA officially to sanction and support such a venture. Cramer
was encouraged to solicit the help of the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers and/or Georgetown University's (Ray Cline's) Center for Strategic
and International Studies. AFIO was unwilling or unable to support it then
and remains unwilling today. Cline's group, however, farmed the National
Intelligence Studies Center and named Cramer executive director, where he
continued to promote the museum project. I am informed he was recently
relieved of his duties and is no longer a member of the Board of NISC. His
interest in the museum obviously continues.
The reasons CIA should not sponsor this venture have not changed.
Although Federally-sponsored museums exist, there is no known Government
agency subsidization of a private museum such as Cramer proposes. The Agency
also found--during the Bicentennial and the 1977-78 Outreach program--that it
had little to offer in the way of meaningful exhibit materials that were
unclassified. More importantly, exhibiting intelligence materials in a
museum would send the wrong signal to our foreign friends whom we are trying
to convince their secrets are safe with us. In addition, possible legal issues
notwithst1;nding, it remains that appropriated funds are not now available and,
if requested, would have to compete with other outyear priorities. Finally,
it is inevitable that CIA support would forever be perceived as domestic
propaganda.
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3. The following have participated in looking again at this issue and
concur in this position:
Chief, History Staff
Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection
Director, Center for Studies of Intelligence
Chief, Public Affairs Division
Deputy General Counsel
Special Assistant to the Director
4. Recommendation: None.
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T;, pfrrctor of Cenral lnlelligence
b% s}unglon.D C 2USOS
28 April 1982
Dear Mr. Cramer,
It is nice to hear from you and I am pleased to
learn you are retaining your interest in establishing
an intelligence museum. The trustees of the newly
formed William J. Donovan Foundation are interested
in this project, and I suggest you get-in touch with
Henry Hyde or - Geoffrey Jones. Mr. -Hyde'_s' tel eph'one"---
b
num
er is (212) 628-84$0_-and Mr.- Jones' number is
I have taken the liberty of sending a copy of
your letter along to Henry Hyde.
Mr. Martin G. Cramer
President, National Historical
Intelligence t''ucPUm
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CHRONOLOGY OF PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
1969 DCI Helms considered but finally dropped a suggestion to locate a
museum at the Smithsonian.
1972 DCI Colby established an Intelligence Museum Commission of Agency officers
to establish a program for conserving and exhibiting materials. Commission
met once but no program developed.
1976 DCI Bush considered a nonprofit, private museum and asked the Management
Committee to consider it. No record it ever did.
1977 DCI Bush turned aside a request from Martin Cramer to serve on an Advisory
Board to a museum Cramer was promoting.'
1979 Martin Cramer, representing the National Intelligence Study Center, came to
CIA Public Affairs to solicit help in obtaining U.S. Government funds and
other assistance for the purpose of establishing a museum. Public Affairs
determined funds could not be made available and CIA cooperation on displays
encountered security problems. DCI Turner determined CIA should not be
part of project.
1979 Martin Cramer sought AFIO assistance but was rebuffed.
1982 Cramer, cut loose from NISC attachment, has contacted DCI and DDCI for support,
using John Bross as entre. His position has not changed. He wants Government
funds, space, and people.
1982 AFIO reviewed again and has no interest.
27 April 1982
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The Director of Central Intelligence
28 April 1982
Dear Henry,
Coincidentally after our telephone
conversation about an intelligence museum a
few days ago, this came across m_y desk from
the chap I mentioned to you. I suggested that
r. Cramer get in touch with you or Geoffrey
M
Jones r both.
Henry 8. Hyde, Esquire
Wormser, Kiely, Allessendroni,
Hyde & McCann
33rd Floor
,100 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
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pri 16, 1YbZ
Admiral Bobby Inman
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence' Agency
W
ashington, DC 20505
Dear Admiral Inman:
John Bross has suggested that I send my revived
for a National Historical Intelligence Museum Proposal
Sey
and you . Having heard your recent presentationotootheMState
Department Open Forum Panel, I am especially encouraged to do
so.
I was impressed with you' r-stress on intelligence as a
government-wide matter,..and particularly --with the points you
made on the need for..sustained' popular sup p
telligence activities"and agencies. Moresecifically in
, hit a very responsive cord in this listener. through commentu
s
that. "intelligence has no constituency and. urgently needs
one" , and that we must. avoid the 'historical _
ing our intelligence capabilities for actual or pattern
threat enedl*
hostilities and then dismantling them when a specific combat
or threat of conflict ends
As you know
the Associ
ti
,
a
on. of former Intelligence Officers
(AFIO), our. National Intelligence Study. Center, -and- the Consortium
for the Study of.. Intelligence -have
all
.
worked to expand popular
understanding of intelligence and increase sustained public
support for it.
Educating and convincing opinion. leaders and -a public
made' skeptical in recent yea.rs-`is 'neither an ?easy nor a short-
term task, however.. It _requires institutionalization One-
way some-of us have been attempting this is through encourage-
ment of both more and.-more balanced scholarly and popular
writing, and more and better coverage in -.College courses. This
letter describes an'other.-,complementary approach, establishment
of a National Historical Intelligence Museum in a location
visited by Americans -in search of combination of recreation-
.and their nation's historical fieritage.
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Page Two
Admiral Inman
We have set up a non-profit, tax-exempt
established a working board. We are seeking membersafo~naand
blue-ribbon advisory board, a site, funds and help from within Covernment.
We believe the museum should take a heavily histori
approach, and have enclosed some preliminar cal
content for your consideration Y thoughts on
We are asking? 1r. Casey for his assistance with this
project and would be very pleased to have
as any preliminary comments - yours, as well
. .. you might have for us_
'Sincerely
Martin C. Cramer, President
National Historical
Intelligence Museum
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 STAT
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pri 16, 1982
The Honorable. William. j. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington., DC 20505,
Dear fir. Casey:
I hope you will agree with me that the time has come to
revive one of the_ projects_-.you an-d I discussed some years
back, the establishment of .a National Historical Intelligence
Museum. Some of the changes in the intervening y--ears are
obvious, such as a change in attitude in both the Executive
Branch and the Congress. Expanded educational efforts have
helped -- the establishment and nationwide activities of
AFIO, the projects of NISC, the Consortium for the Study of
Intelligence, the Welch Fund, along with expanded outreach
efforts of the Agency and some, at least, of the learned and
professional socities. Another, very important one is an
outpouring of printed and audiovisual materials on which the
exhibits of the museum can be based.
We have established the National Historical Intelligence
Museum as a non - profit, educational., tax-exempt organization.
We are reviewing possible sites in Washington, D.C., Virginia
and Pennsylvania. We have a good working boa-rd and are be-
ginning to approach people about serving on a general advisory
board or specialized advisory panels (ie. history and in-
telligence). Our fundraising'effort is beginning with app-
roaches to selected foundations and individuals. Hopefully,
approaches to corporations will follow before too long. IVe
have a proposed budget and reams of raw materials from which
museum content can be extracted.
The museum -will describe, within approporiate security
considerations, significant intelligence achievements, de-
velopments and personalities, using a wide variety of visual
displays and audio presentations. A summary note on possible
content is enclosed for your review.
Such a collection would go far to increase public under-
standing of the intelligence community and its efforts. The
museum would parallel and complement what other museums at-
tempt in related areas - air and s
Kenned pace, (Smithsonian and Cape
y) aviation development (Wright Patterson), nuclear
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Page Two
Hr . Casey
technology, the FBI, naval, army and marine history, and
specialized areas of military preparation and warfare (eg.
ordnance). Such existing museums, each in its own way, "beat
the drums" for a particular activity. Up to now, the activity
which in many ways needs it the most, U.S. intelligence, has
made no such attempt to attract an expanded national con-
stituency from a leadership and general public which now
visits museums by the millions.
John Bross has offered to get the project a hearing with
you and Admiral Inman, to whom I am also sending materials
on it.
For now, we-hope you`avill bc,- willing to-help us in five
critical areas:
(1) In advising us on people in and out of Government
with whom you suggest we be in early touch. (if
you are willing, I' 11 send you or whomever you
suggest the list of people suggested thus far
for the advisory board).
(2) In helping us to procure a site, preferably, of
- course, a building, perhaps a government build-
ing or a part of one - if possible in the District;
if not, in Virginia near historic, tourist - at-
tracting sites.
(3) In helping us to approach foundations which do
not accept proposals from general sources, notably
the Anneberg Fund and related foundations.
(4) Advising us with which Agency employees we might
work in developing this project, perhaps someone
on your staff, in the public affairs office, in
the Center for the Study of Intelligence and in
the History and Archives offices.
(5) Supporting our requests to individuals and organ-
izations for contributed or loaned photographic
materials, artifacts and other potential museum
content.
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IM1r. Casey
Our thanks for considering these proposals. I should
be pleased to forward any further information on proposed
content, or in response to any questions you might have.
I know from your historical writing', your continuing
interest in NISC and our talks of some years ago, you will
give this project a very interested hearin
together, %re can develop a national intelligencehmuseum~rking
combining private and public efforts, more interesting than
the traditional war museums and much more comprehensive than
any existing museums in the U.S. with' content relating to
intelligence.
Sincerely,
!Martin C. .Cramer , President
National Historical
Intelligence Museum
cc: Admiral Inman DDCI
John A. Bross
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NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEU,
A NOTE ON CONTENT
Making the museum
,advantages. a heavily historical one has many
It allows us:
1. To provoke thought while interestin
taining) the viewers on some ver g (even enter-
not well understood b
y many Americans. 1ms. Dr points
treatments of history ricans Drama tic
dramas, historical - phistorical novels, docu-
o
audiences, as do espionage novels; andanostalgia
underlies the appeal of much in continuin g
entertainment aA..d hobbies. All this g education
potentially very wide appeal for exhibits which
but focus Pnodinstuschondintelligence g subjeCtslestion,
and colorful secret agents in . tbe-Americaas e n Revoonage
lution, the Civil War and since; cryptographic
successes, such as the Black Chamber and the Naval
Treaty and ENIGMA and ULTRA, Russia in World -Yar I and failures (eg,
e-
connaissance, such as in atheaU-2nstorveandtthe
Cuba Missile Crisis; electronic listenin the
the Great Seal in the Moscow Embass d as with
in
ped-
cepts, as with tapping the recently ' and o e
d
= telegraph in the Civil War, the Berlin dTunneland
the Zimmerman Telegram; types and variety of agents
(eg. Philby, Wennerstrom Col. Abel, Sorge ,rRado,
"Cicero") counterintelligence (eg. FBI's more famous older cases, annd'more recent
ones involving both military and civilian agencies
and KGB activities more generally).
2. To address such important matters as war and eac
changes in non-democratic-governments
p e'
(sucesi
questions), the impact of some revolutionsconsUSn
interests, and thus to address general points about
early warning analysis, estimates, dissemination
and briefings of top leaders, misconceptions and
misjudgements, or failures to disseminate adequately
and use available intelligence. Exhibits covering
such subjects might center on Pearl Harbor; the
beginnings of the Civil War; Arab-Israeli wars;
the extravagant expectation of all initial part-
icipants in World War' I ; the wishfulness of
Japanese in World War II ? the
listen to evidence of Stalin ewith lregardeto Hitler'
preparations for a massive attack on the Soviet s
Union, to cite a few arbitrarily chosen examples.
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Page- Two
3. To make some very basic
which the knowledgeable taketforbout intelligence
not as well understood granted, but are
generally These include: rally as they should
-That espionage is an ancient and virtually
universal activity.
-That we Americans owe much to intelli enc
activities since the time of "Ge g e
Washington., S pyma ster" . orge
-That although virtually universal, inte
is also a very "national" t Iligence
, solutist,
dictatorships (and before that of
monarchies) approachingt dif-ferently than
and tth even- differences among
approaches to intelligence among the
a democrleg .- the- longtime acceptance ..of .British aci
es
Official Secrets Act).
4. To address sometimes complex factors under
the challenge posed by lying
which depend the need to make decisions
Pend on an understanding of the
intentions and likely actions of Probable
potential adversaries and allies.dThesercould
a
include stereotypical thin kin
oti on
imrrortant analogies - or failureatopadopt?them -
or even naivite and overconfidence.
5. To make sometimes controversial matters (eg.
civil liberties vs. requirements of national
security; the role of the courts relative to
intelligence, the limits of Congressional over-
sight; media coverage of intelligence;
"political" use of intelligence data) clear ile
a relatively noncontroversial way. clear in
6. To avoid-the truly sensitive
technology and weaponry in terms.ofnintelligenceh
or with cryptography) 9
Finally, in planning for relativel
the museum we will have to y - recent content of
highly - informed people sometimes tend toe deci that even
telligence differently. The museum' "define in-
even discussion and definition, s content, will require
foreign intelligence and counterintelligencerandyrshouldn~l.ou
view, include such historical and interesting related activities
as deception and forgeries, and escape and.evasion. In our
might not, however in dealing with relativel It might or
to any extent a number of other subjects y recent events
and
la tirarfare -, such as counter-insurgency
eg gtuerrilll al are, Psychological warfare and propaganda and
quire good intelligence: except insofar as such activities re-
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