THE TERRORIST UNDERGROUND IN THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200720001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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The
Terrorist
Underground
in the
United States
By Samuel T. Francis
The Nathan Hale Instid~te
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"I wish to be useful, and every kind
of service necessary to the public
good becomes honorable by being
necessary. If the exigencies of
my country demand a peculiar
service, its claims to perform that
service are imperious. "
-Capt. Nathan Hale
1755-1776
The Nathan Hale Institute is an independent organization devoted
to nonpartisan research in the area of domestic and foreign intelli-
gence with particular emphasis on the role of intelligence operations
in a free society. The Institute's principal purpose is to increase
public awareness and stimulate debate and scholarly pursuit of
important intelligence-related issues.
Classified by the Internal Revenue Service as a publicly-supported
Section 501 (c) (3) educational and research organization, the Insti-
tute welcomes grants and contributions from individuals, foundations
and corporations. All contributions to the Institute are tax-deductible
under the Internal Revenue Code and the Institute wilt provide docu-
mentation to substantiate tax-deductibility of a contribution or grant.
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The
Terrorist
Underground
in the
United States
By Samuel T. Francis
The Nathan Hale Instihllte
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Samuel T. Francis worked previously as a policy analyst with
the Heritage Foundation. He has written several other studies
on international and national terrorism. He currently works
as a legislative aide to Senator John P. East (R - NC) in
his capacity as a member of the Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
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A nationwide terrorist underground network is operating in
the United States. The remnants of the Weather Underground,
the Black Liberation Army, the Armed Forces of National
Liberation (FALN) and other terrorist groups of the 1960s and
1970s have linked up in a "movement of independent but
cooperating groups that believes in and practices the use of
violence for political purposes." This movement was involved
in the 1981 Brinks robbery, in which three murders were wm-
mitted, and is responsible for a series of bombings since 1982,
including the bombing of the U.S. Capitol in November 1983.
This terrorist underground may also be connected to foreign
terrorist organizations. "There is an increasing body of facts to
suggest at least a continuing liaison between the underground
ten orist movement...and various foreign based movements."
Although the United States has experienced the violence
of terrorist groups in the past, most Americans until recently
probably have perceived terrorism to be a problem for foreign
countries and their citizens rather than as a threat to
themselves. In late 1983, however, a series of events combined
to stimulate public interest in the possibility and likelihood
of major terrorism in the United States or directed at
American targets abroad. These events included the mass
murder of 241 American military personnel of the U.S. con-
tingent of the Multinational Force in Beirut on October 23,
1983 by local terrorists; the bombing of the U.S. Capitol
Building on November 7, 1983 by domestic terrorists; the
deployment of special security measures at the White House
and other federal buildings in December 1983 following a
report of a possible terrorist attack; and increased security
measures for the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the
World's Fair in New Orleans, and the National Conventions
of the Democratic and Republican Parties against terrorist
attacks.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the principal
agency for the investigation of terrorism in the United States,
reports a decline of domestic terrorist incidents in the last
year. According to the FBI count, there were 31 terrorist in-
cidents in the United States in 1983, compared to 51 in 1982.
In previous years, the FBI counted 52 incidents in 1979, 29
in 1980, and 42 in 1981. On December 18, 1983 Judge William
H. Webster, Director of the FBI, stated publicly that two-
thirds of the terrorist incidents in the United States were
related to Latin American or Caribbean political issues, and
in testimony before the Subcommittee on Security and Ter-
rorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March
14, 1984, Judge Webster stated that "it is important that the
public not come to the conclusion that we are being overrun
with people who support the overthrow of the United States.
This country is very infertile ground for terrorism to thrive
and succeed in its purpose."
Judge Webster's remarks and the recent FBI statistics may
be taken as a commendable effort to avoid alarmist exaggera-
tion of the terrorist threat in America. Nevertheless, some
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law enforcement authorities have questioned either the ac-
curacy or the significance of the FBI's statistics on terrorism.
Under the FBI definition of terrorism -- "the unlawful use
of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate
or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any seg-
ment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives"
-- some criminal acts that are terrorist in nature may not
be counted as such. In order to show "political or social ob-
jectives" as motivations, it is ordinarily necessary to have
a communique or statement from the terrorist group
acknowledging its responsibility and motivations for a violent
act. Although such statements are common, they are not
obligatory, and some terrorists do not acknowledge respon-
siblity for all of the violent acts for which they are responsible.
In many cases, moreover, terrorists will rely on comparatively
minor crimes, such as assaults or threats, to intimidate or
corece a group, and in some cases even to specify a particulaz
act as terrorist is difficult or impossible.
Nor does the appazent decline in terrorist incidents
necessarily mean that terrorism is declining in importance
in the United States. This decline may be due to recent disrup-
tions of terrorist groups by law enforcement or it may be due
to conscious decisions on the part of the terrorists to restrict
their violence or to use violence more selectively. In general,
terrorism becomes "important" in a society when the popula-
tion or government feels that terrorism is a threat -- when
they experience intimidation or terror. The subjective nature
of this feeling makes it very difficult to measure, and the
number of terrorist incidents by itself does not necessarily
reflect this subjective state. In the United States today, there
is increased concern about terrorism due to the Beirut and
U.S. Capitol bombings and similar incidents and perhaps a
growing sense that the United States is vulnerable to terrorist
attacks. This increased concern is due to the significance of
the targets and the results of the attacks on them and not to
the number of incidents or the size and skills of the terrorist
groups involved.
These events and concerns therefiore raise the problem of
the extent and nature of terrorism in the United States --
the degree to which there are terrorist groups extant in the
United States at the present time; their goals, methods, and
interconnections; and the likely targets and future prospects
of such groups or of new groups or coalitions of terrorists.
While there is no large tenrorist movement in the United States
today such as existed in Italy, 'Ihrkey or Uruguay in the recent
past or such as exists in El Salvador or Lebanon today, there
is a movement of independent but cooperating groups that
believes in and practices the use of violence for political ends.
This movement or its component groups has been responsible
for a series of violent incidents in the last several yeazs --
incidents that have cost several lives and resulted in con-
siderable property damage. The terrorist movement in the
United States expresses support for a number of foreign ter-
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rorist groups and may have received support from them. The
American terrorist movement appears to have undergone ex-
tensive reorganization in recent years and, although disrupted
by the arrest of some of its key members and the disruption
of some of its "safehouses" and organizations, may be
escalating its level of violence (both in terms of the frequency
of its attacks and of the nature of its targets), and it may
become a much more serious threat to the internal security
of the United States in the near future.
THE WEATHER UNDERGROUND NUCLEUS:
The Weather Underground Organization (WUO), formed
in 1969=10 from members of the "Weatherman faction" of
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), is the parent
group and probably the principal component of the most im-
portant underground terrorist network in the United States
today. This network consists of three main components: (1)
the WUO and its aboveground support apparatuses; (2) black
terrorist groups (the Black Liberation Army or BLA and the
Republic of New Afrika or RNA) to some extent descended
from the violent "Cleaver faction" of the Black Panther Par-
ty (BPP) and similar groups of the 1960s; and (3) the Puerto
Rican terrorist organization FALN and associated groups.
The most notable act of terrorism perpetrated by this net-
work to date has been the so-called "Brinks robbery" of
October 20, 1981 -- the armed robbery of a Brinks armored
car of $1,589,000 in Clarkstown, N.Y., and the murders of
two Nyack, N.Y., police officers and one Brinks Company
guard. This incident is significant not because it was a success
(in fact, it was a failure) but because the apprehension, trial,
and conviction of its perpetrators and the subsequent investiga-
tion revealed for the first time a highly organized, clandestine,
and nationwide terrorist network.
The Weatherman faction of SDS took its name from a line
of singer Bob Dylan's song "Subterranean Homesick Blues"
-- "You don't need a weatherman to know which way the
wind blows" -- which served as the motto fora 16,000 word
manifesto of the faction. The Weatherman took control of SDS
in the summer of 1969 and a number of its members traveled
to Cuba in August, where they met with Cuban and North
Vietnamese officials who encouraged them to make use of
violence to oppose U.S. participation in the Vietnam war.
Thereafter, the Weatherman planned and led its first violent
action, the "Days of Rage" rioting in Chicago on October
8-ll, 1969, and carried out its first bombing (of the Haymarket
police memorial statue in Chicago) on October 7, 1969. In
December 1969, the Weatherman held a "national war coun-
cil" in Flint, Michigan, at which an ideological line and tac-
tical plans for terrorism were formulated. Thereafter, in
February 1970, the Weatherman faction closed the national
office of SDS and went underground. At this time the WUO
was believed to consist of some 400 members.
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From October 1969 to September 1975, the WUO claimed
responsibility for approximately 40 bombings, including the
bombing of the U. S. Capitol Building on March 1, 1971, of
the Pentagon Building on May 19, 1972, and of the U.S.
Department of State on January 28, 1975. From the mid 1970s,
however, the WUO appeared to become less active as a ter-
rorist organization. In 1977 several members and associates
of the WUO were arrested in connection with a conspiracy
to bomb the offices of California State Senator John Briggs,
and this action was the last known terrorist effort of the WUO.
Several of its better known members surfaced in the late 1970s:
Mark Rudd in 1977, Bernardine Dohrn, William Ayers, and
Cathlyn P. Wilkerson in 1980. In 1979 the FBI closed its in-
vestigation of the WUO, and on December 29, 1981, Judge
Webster stated publicly that "The Weather Underground
Organization is not a viable organization. There is no evidence
that such an organization is functioning:'
In fact, since the early 1970s the WUO had undergone an
extensive internal schism over its organization, ideology, and
tactics. In 1974, a new tactical line emerged in a manifesto
of the WUO entitled Prairie Fire: 71ie Politics of Revolu-
tionary Anti-Imperialism. The new line consisted principally
of an effort to build a mass party using all means of revolu-
tionary struggle rather than to operate exclusively as a ter-
rorist group. This change, which was called the "weather in-
version" or "strategy of inversion," corresponded to a move
closer to orthodox Leninist tactics and away from the "New
Left" or "revisionist" tactic of Che Guevara and Regis Debray
of reliance on a revolutionary "foco" that engages exclusively
in "armed struggle" or terrorism. The latter tactic had
originally been the basis of WUO strategy.
To implement the new strategy an aboveground support
group, the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC), was
founded. Internal disputes over the new strategy continued,
however, and in 1978 the New York chapter of the PFOC
became the May 19th Communist Organization, while the
West Coast PFOC retained its old name. Despite the inter-
nal disagreements among the factions and personalities of the
WUO, public demonstrations in recent years suggest that all
elements of the organization continue to cooperate.
It is the May 19th Communist Organization that serves as
the principal support group and propaganda arm of the ter-
rorist network that was responsible for the Brinks robbery
and murders as well as for the bombing of the U.S. Capitol
Building on November 7, 1983 and for other bombings in the
New York City and Washington, D.C. , areas. The May 19th
Communist Organization (MCO) takes its name from the
common birthdates of Ho Chi Minh (May 19, 1890) and of
Malcom X (or Malcolm Little, May 19, 1925). Its principal
manifesto, written early in 197'9, is Principles of Uniry of the
May 19th Communist Organization. This manifesto defines
the MCO as essentially a support apparatus for "national
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liberation movements" engaged in "armed struggle" against
"imperialism: '
We have seen the collective strength of national
liberation forever alter the balance of forces
against imperialism. Revolution is the main trend
in the world, and revolution is being led,
ideologically and on the battlefield, by the na-
tional liberation struggles for proletarian power.
We have changed our name to the May 19th Com-
munist Organization out of a commitment to
follow that leadership.
While acknowledging that "the highest point of world
revolutionary struggle has shifted to Southern Africa," the
MCO declares itself to be "committed to the principle of
Third World leadership" and it expresses support for a wide
range of Marxist national liberation movements. In addition
to its support for foreign terrorism, the MCO specifically en-
dorses the use of terrorism within the United States:
Armed struggle is the fundamental tool of op-
pressed people to win their liberation. We fully
support, both politically and materially, the wag-
ing of national liberation war against imperialism.
Around the world and in the U.S., vanguard
forces will emerge and have done so through the
building of armed clandestine movements and the
waging of people's war. A central aspect of our
support is the active defense of all political
prisoners and prisoners of war captured by the
imperialist state.
The MCO manifesto also expresses support for a number of
far-left causes and groups within American society: womens'
liberation (defined principally as "the struggle against lesbian
oppression"), the "struggle against white supremacy," and
solidarity with Puerto Rican, black, Chicano, and American
Indian terrorists and violent activists in the United States. The
themes expressed in the manifesto are of central importance
in understanding recent American terrorist activity and its
likely direction in the future.
THE BRINKS ROBBERY AND ITS CONNECTIONS:
On October 20, 1981, a Brinks Company armored car was
robbed of $1,589,000 in cash that it was preparing to transfer
from the Nanuet National Bank in Clarkstown, N.Y. One of
the guards of the Brinks truck was killed in the robbery at-
tempt and two other guards were severely wounded when the
perpetrators opened fire with shotguns. In an attempted escape
from the scene of the robbery and murder, one of the vehicles
bearing the perpetrators was stopped in a collision, and a
second was stopped at a police roadblock. A third was suc-
cessful in escaping. The occupants of the first vehicle were
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arrested. The occupants of the second vehicle opened fire
on Nyack, N.Y. , police at the roadblock and killed two
policemen. The suspects then fled, although one occupant
was arrested. The stolen funds were recovered by police the
same day from the vehicles.
Those arrested on the day of the Brinks robbery were
(1) Katherine Boudin, a member of the WUO and a fugitive
since 1970;
(2) Samuel Brown, with no known political background
but a record of arrests in New York City dating to 1958;
(3) Judith Alice Clark, a former member of the WUO and
a current member of the MCO; and
(4) David Joseph Gilbert, also a member of the WUO and
a fugitive.
In addition to these arrests, a number of suspects were ap-
prehended in the following days. One of the vehicles used
in the escape attempt was found to be registered to Eve S.
Rosahn, a member of the MCO as well as of the "Springbok
Five", involved in violent demonstrations at Kennedy Airport
in September, 1981. Rosahn was charged with criminal
facilitation, but this charge was dropped on January 28, 1982
since her ownership of the vehicle by itself was not sufficient
to sustain an indictment. Upon her release Rosahn made a
public statement expressing "strongest greetings of solidarity
to the captured combatants."
Tracing the license plates and descriptions inwlved in rob-
bery, murders, and escape attempts led police to a series of
apartments evidently used as "safehouses" by the gang. Two
of these safehouses had been used by Marilyn Jean Buck,
described as "quartermaster" of the BLA. These apartments
were found to contain weapons, ammunition, communications
equipment, false documents and disguises, lists of police of-
ficers and floor plans of area police stations, and radical
political literature. The safehouses had been abandoned short-
ly before the police search, but evidence contained in them
contributed to subsequent arrests.
On October 27, 1981, Cynthia Boston (aka Fulani Sunni-
Ali), "minister of information" of the RNA, was arrested at
RNA headquarters in Gallman, Mississippi. Boston and her
common law husband, William Johnson (aka Bilal Sunni Ali)
had been identified from photographs by witnesses as having
visited the safehouses, and a vehicle found at the RNA head-
quarters had been identified as having been present at one
of the safehouses shortly after the Brinks robbery. Despite
this evidence, charges against Boston were dropped when a
witness in New Orleans, Louisiana, affirmed that she had
been in that city on the day after the robbery. Her husband,
William Johnson, was arrested in the Central American coun-
try of Belize in November, 1982; he was extradited to the
United States and indicted for his alleged role in the Brinks
crimes. Two former members of the WUO, Jeffrey C. Jones
and Eleanor Stein Raskin, were also arrested on suspicion
since their names had been found in one of the safehouses,
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but these charges were also later dropped. Jones pled guilty
to a charge of bomb construction and received a light sentence
on December 16, 1981.
In the course of 1982 and 1983 a total of eleven suspects
were arrested and indicted on federal or state charges growing
out of the Brinks robbery and triple murders. After lengthy
and expensive trials in the spring and summer of 1983, several
convictions were obtained.
On September 3, 1983, Sekou Odinga (t/n Nathaniel
Burns), a member of the Black Panther Party and the Black
Liberation Army, and Silvia Baraldini, "national treasurer"
of the MCO, were convicted on federal charges of conspiracy
and racketeering that included the Brinks robbery and
murders, a robbery and murder in the Bronx in 1981, and
the escape of BLA leader Joanne Chesimard from prison in
1979. 'Itivo other defendants, Cecil Ferguson and Edward L.
Joseph (a former member of the Black Panther Party and the
BLA), were convicted on the same day as accessories, and
defendants Iliana Robinson and Bilal Sunni-Ali (t/n William
R. Johnson), were acquitted. On February 15, 1984, Odinga
and Baraldini received sentences of 40 years imprisonment
and a fine of $50,000; Ferguson and Joseph were sentenced
to twelve and a half years.
On September 14, 1983, Judith A. Clark, David J. Gilbert,
and Kuwasi Balagoon (t/n Donald Weems, a former member
of the Black Panther Party and the BLA) were convicted on
state charges of two counts of first degree armed robbery and
three counts of second degree murder. On October 6, 1983,
the three convicted defendants were each sentenced to three
consecutive terms of 25 years imprisonment and concurrent
terms of twelve and a half to 25 years imprisonment for armed
robbery. 'Itivo other defendants, Katherine Boudin and Samuel
Brown, were scheduled to be tried separately on state charges
of murder and armed robbery. On April 26, 1984, Boudin
entered a plea of guilty to the charges and on May 3 was
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. On June 14, 1984, Brawn
was convicted of state charges of murder and armed robbery
and on June 26 was sentenced to three consecutive prison
terms of 25 years to life. Another suspect in the Brinks rob-
bery, Samuel Smith (aka Mtayari Shabaka Sundiata, a
member of the BLA) was killed by police in New York City
on October 23, 1981 after he had fired on police officers seek-
ing to arrest him. A .38 caliber bullet found in Smith's pocket
after his death was later shown to have come from the gun
of one of the police officers killed in the Brinks escape
attempt.
Despite these convictions, the failure of the Brinks rob-
bery, and the disruption of the network that the arrests and
investigations caused, the Brinks incident was not an isolated
crime, and some of its principal alleged perpetrators remain
at large. Law enforcement authorities pointed to at least five
earlier successful or attempted armed robberies in the same
area as the one in Clarkstown with a modus operandi similar
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to that of the Brinks robbery. These robberies included: (1)
an attempted robbery of an armored truck in Scarsdale, N.Y. ,
on February 20, 1980; (2) an armed robbery of $52,000 from
an armored car in the Bronx on February 25, 1980 and the
murder of a guard during the robbery; (3) the armed rob-
bery of $529,000 from an armored truck in Imvood, Long
Island, on April 22, 1980; (4) an attempted robbery of an
armored truck in Danbury, Connecticut, and the wounding
of its driver on March 23, 1981; and (5) the armed robbery
of $292,000 from a Brinks truck in the Bronx, the killing
of one guard, and the wounding of another on June 2, 1981.
In each of these robberies, as in the Clarkstown case, escape
vehicles had been rented by a white male or female using
the identification of a legitimate citizen. The actual robbery
or robbery attempt was perpetrated by black males using
shotguns, automatic rifles, and (in some cases) 9 mm. hand-
guns. Atotal of $873,000 was stolen in these robberies; to
date none of these funds has been recovered. At least three
major suspects in the Brinks-related cases remain at large:
Joanne Chesimard (aka Assata Shakur, a leader of the BLA);
Jeral Wayne Williams (aka Mutulu Shakur, also a member
of the BLA and RNA); and Marilyn Jean Buck of the BLA.
The terrorist, as opposed to the criminal or mercenary,
nature of the Brinks robbery and related crimes became ap-
parent from the political affiliations and associations of several
of the leading suspects as well as from the materials
discovered in the safehouses. Aside from linkages among the
WUO, the BLA, and the RNA, an additional connection to
West coast terrorist activity was also revealed. One of the
safehouses contained a picture of Betty Jean Abramson, a
member of a group in California known as "Tribal Thumb"
and its affiliate, the Wells Spring Communion (WSC); and
a radio transmitter found in one of the abandoned safehouses
in New Jersey was traced to this group through the Federal
Communications Commission. The WSC and Tribal Thumb
have been associated with the Symbionese Liberation Army
and with the Chazles Manson Family. Abramson and another
member of the WSC, Wendy Sue Heaton, were wanted in
the murder of Roseanne Goustin, a member of the Commu-
nion who tried to defect from it. Abramson was arrested in
New York on December 19, 1981, and Heaton was arrested
in New Orleans on June 4, 1982.
Tribal Thumb was founded by Eazl Satcher, a former con-
vict and member of the Black Panther Party who was killed
in a gunfight on the group's property in 1977. Another founder,
Benjamin Sargis, is the former husband of Heaton and worked
as an organizer for "People In Need," a food distribution pro-
gram organized by the Hearst family as a part of the ransom
demanded by the SLA for the release of Patricia Hearst in
1974. Another individual who worked in this program at that
time was Sara Jane Moore, who used the Tribal Thumb com-
mune in California for target practice in August 1975, one
month before she was arrested for an assassination attempt
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on President Gerald R. Ford. In the summer of 1982, the
FBI was investigating the possible connections between Tribal
Thumb and the Brinks robbery, including the possibility that
Marilyn Jean Buck and other accomplices were hidden by
the group after the robbery.
Despite these terrorist characteristics, the FBI was reluctant
to categorize the Brinks robbery as a terrorist incident. There
had been no communique from a group claiming the robbery
or similar crimes for a political cause and as late as March
1982 the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center of the FBI
included the Brinks robbery as only a "suspected terrorist
incident." By early 1983, hrnvever, the FBI acknowledged that
the Brinks robbery was indeed "a terrorist incident" "because
of the politically motivated statements made by the subjects
and because they have been linked to known terrorist groups
dedicated to the overthrow of the United States Government".
The organizational support for the Brinks robbery as well
as its political and terrorist character became clear on
November 2, 1981 when the MCO and the RNA held a press
conference "to extend our full solidarity to the captured com-
batants, the Black Liberation movement and in particular the
Provisional Grnernment of the Republic of New Afrika" (in
the words of the MCO statement). The RNA expressed its
solidarity with and support for the BLA and for "armed strug-
gle," although it denied any connection between the Brinks
robbery and the RNA. On November 5, 1981, the BLA itself
issued a communique that began:
On October 20th 1981, under the leadership of
the Black Liberation Army, Black Freedom
Fighters, and North American Anti-Imperialists,
all members of the Revolutionary Armed Task
Force, attempted an act of expropriation of 1.6
million dollars from an armored Brinks truck.
The John Brown Anti-Klan Committee (JBAKC), a WUO
aboveground support group founded in 1977, issued a special
edition of its newsletter, Death to the Klan!, in which it also
expressed support for the perpetrators of the Brinks robbery,
which it termed an "attempted expropriation" and noted that
"We made an enror...by referring to the attempted expropria-
tion as the Brinks `robbery'. We know that the use of this term
contributes to the state's strategy of criminalizing a revolu-
tionary act" (It may be noted that the term "expropriation"
was used by both Lenin and the Brazilian terrorist Carlos
Marighella to describe armed robberies committed to obtain
funds for the financing of terrorist and underground
activities).
Details of the background, organization, and purposes of
the "Revolutionary Armed Task Force" were revealed during
the trial of the Brinks defendants in the testimony of Tyrone
Rison, a 36 year old convict currently serving a 12 year prison
term for bank robbery in Georgia. Rison agreed to testify
after pleading guilty to the armed robbery of an armored car
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in the Bronx on June 2, 1981 and to cooperate with federal
authorities in the Brinks case.
Rison testified on May 2, 1983 that he had been recruited
into a group called "The Family" at meetings of the RNA
by Mutulu Shakur in 1976. Rison identified defendants
Nathaniel Burns, Silvia Baraldini, William R. Johnson, Cecil
Ferguson, and Edward L. Joseph as members of The Fami-
ly. In later statements Rison described the leadership of this
group as "The Action Five," consisting of himself, Shakur,
Burns, Donald Weems, and Samuel Smith. This group had
supervised or participated in armed robberies or attempted
robberies as early as 1976 in Pittsburgh as well as robberies
of a credit union in Arlington, Virginia, the Brinks robbery,
and others. Rison also provided a detailed account of the
escape of Joanne Chesimard from the Clinton, N.J., Cor-
rectional Facility on November 2, 1979. Rison, Burns, and
Shakur, as well as Baraldini, assisted Chesimard's escape
from prison, where she was serving a life tenor for the murder
of a state trooper in 1973. On November 2, 1979, Burns, us-
ing false identifcation, was able to smuggle a revolver to
Chesimard inside the prison. Following her escape, she was
taken to a safehouse in New Jersey that was raided by police
after the Brinks robbery two years later, given money from
earlier robberies, and provided a plane ticket to the Bahamas.
Rison also described in his testimony an organization
established in 1979 by Shakur as a front for the robberies and
for illegal narcotics traffic. This organization, known as the
Black Acupuncture Advisory Association of North America
(BAAANA) was located in Harlem, and according to the FBI
it served as a planning center for the robberies as well as
a distribution center for cocaine and other drugs. According
to Rison, the funds from the robberies were turned over to
Shakur. As much as $100,000 from stolen funds may have
been used for drugs and for living expenses by the group.
It was from BAAANA that the perpetrators of the Brinks rob-
bery itself allegedly left before carrying out the robbery and
murders. It was also Shakur who served as the principal link
between the blacks and the white radicals in the network,
according to Rison.
Rison also was specific on the political motivations of the
crimes. Shakur had originally recruited him, he testified, by
asking him, "will I be willing to commit robberies to give
money to the black people?" Although the Brinks robbery
itself was originally intended to benefit the members of the
group, according to Rison, Nathaniel Bums objected to this,
saying, "We're not just going out robbing to put money in
our pocket. Our purpose is to rob for black people, as a mass
of people, to channel the money back into the neighborhoods."
As a result of Burns's argument, it was decided by the goup
that the money from the Brinks robbery would "go to the
political struggle, just like any other robbery."
Additional evidence of a link between the series of armed
robberies in the New York area and the Weather Underground
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and its remnants was derived from false identifications used
to rent vehicles that were involved in these robberies. It was
discovered, for example, that the identifications of two
legitimate citizens were used to obtain driver's licenses by
persons who later rented vans used in two of these robberies
(an attempted robbery in Greenburgh, N Y. , on February 20,
1980, and a successful robbery of $500,000 in Inwood, Long
Island, on March 22, 1980). The legitimate citizens whose
identifications were used had, in December 1979, purchased
items at a boutique in Manhattan known as "Broadway Baby: '
Their identifications were used shortly after shopping at the
boutique by other unknown persons to obtain false driver's
licenses, and these licenses were used later to rent vehicles
involved in the robberies. From September 1979 until
February 1980 the manager of Broadway Baby was Bernardine
Dohrn, a founding member and leader of the Weather
Underground until her surfacing on December 3, 1980 in
Illinois.
A fingerprint found on the application for a duplicate
driver's license used to rent a van involved in a June 2, 1981
armed robbery and murder in the Bronx was established as
being that of David Gilbert, and the handwriting on this ap-
plication is identical to that on another application for rental
of a van used in the escape of Joanne Chesimard. A copy
of a rental agreement in the false name of "Judith Schneider,"
an alias used to rent a vehicle involved in the Brinks robbery
of October 20, was found in the apartment of Katharine
Boudin after her arrest.
Washington-New York Bombing Campaign:
Between December 16, 1982 and April 20, 1984 a series
of 14 bomb explosions in the New York City and Washington,
D.C. , areas has been claimed by three previously unknown
terrorist groups. Analysis of the bombing techniques, rhetoric,
and modus operandi of these bombings indicates that they
were all committed by the same terrorist organization and
that those responsible for the bombings are closely connected
to groups inwlved in the Brinks and related "expropriations"
discussed above. The three groups that have acknowledged
responsibility for these bombings call themselves the Armed
Resistance Unit (ARU), which claims most of the bombings
in the Washington area; the United Freedom Front (UFF),
which claims most of the bombings in the New York area;
and a group that is probably part of the same terrorist com-
plex, the Revolutionary Fighting Group (RFG), which has
acknowledged responsibility for one bombing in the New
York area. To date, there have been no casualties or injuries
in these bombings, although considerable property damage
has been sustained by the governmental and corporate institu-
tions attacked. No one has to date been arrested or charged
in connection with these bombings; and there is no reason
to believe that this series of attacks has ceased or that it will
not continue in the future. The chronology, place, targets,
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and claimants of each of these bombings is given in the table
below:
Bombing Series, 1982-84
(Sources: FBI, Risks Interna-
tional, News Sources)
Date Place
'I~rget
Claimant
(1)
12/16/82 Elmont, NY
South African
UFF
Purchasing
Company
(2)
12/16/82 Harrison, NY
IBM Building
UFF
(3)
01/28/83 New York City
FBI Office, Staten
RFG
Island
(4)
04/26/83 Washington, D.C.
Fort McNair
ARU
(5)
05/12/83 Uniondale, NY
Army Reserve
UFF
Center
(6)
05/13/83 New York City
Naval Reserve
UFF
Center
(7)
08/18/83 Washington, D.C.
U.S. Nary Yard
ARU/
FMLN (a)
(8)
08/21/83 New York City
National Guard
UFF
Armory
(9)
ll/07/83 Washington, D.C.
U.S. Capitol
ARU
Building
*(10)
12/13/83 East Meadow, NY
Navy District
UFF
Recruiting Center
**(11)
01/29/84 New York City
Honeywell
UFF
Corporation
UFF
(12)
01/29/84 New York Ciry
Motorola
UFF
Corporation
(13)
03/19/84 Harrison, NY
IBM Office
UFF
***(14)
04/20/84 Washington, DC
Officers Club, Fort
ARU (?)
McNair
FMLN: Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front.
twv bombs were detonated.
atoempted bombing.
The Puerto Rican terrorist group FALN allegedly claimed the bomb-
ing, but it is probable that the same persons composing the ARU
were actually responsible.
The modus operandi of these bombings has tended to be
the same in almost all of them. The M.O. consists of timing
the explosive device to detonate at a late hour of the night
(often 11:00 P.M.-12:00 Midnight) and of placing a warning
call, usually to a news media outlet, shortly prior to the ex-
plosion. This call is often accompanied by atape-recorded
message that warns of the impending explosion, claims it for
the particular group, and gives a reason for the bombing
(usually on behalf of a South African, Central American, or
Puerto Rican terrorist group and in apposition to U.S. policy
in these countries). A typed communique is distributed by
the group or its above-ground support units after the bombing.
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The construction of the bombs in this series has also tend-
ed to be similar -- sticks of dynamite with similar caps
and often placed in attache cases. In the Washington area at
least, the bombs have had dual firing mechanisms to avert
a possible failure of a single mechanism. The bombing
material of the more recent UFF bombings in the New York
area has been dynamite stolen from the New England Ex-
plosives Company in New Hampshire in November 1983.
In an oversight hearing before the Subcommittee on Securi-
ty and Terrorism on March 14, 1984, Judge Webster testified,
We do know that the Armed Resistance Unit and
the United Freedom Front...tend to supply the
same rhetoric with respect to U.S. policies, the
same kind of words that we experienced among
some of the other dissident groups that became
dormant and which have, in a way, metamor-
phosized through other organizations that we have
been watching closely, particularly as a result of
the Nanuet robbery, the Brinks robbery which
I referred to earlier in my testimony....The in-
ferences we are drawing result not only from the
rhetoric of the claims, but also from the nature
of the explosives that were used in all of these
cases and the manner in which they were put
together.
Futher indications of a connection between the UFF/ARU
bombings and the Brinks case arise from a publication of the
MCO entitled Armed Propaganda Against the U.S. War
Machine: Communiques from the Armed Resistance Unit and
the United Freedom Front 1982-1983, Compiled with an in-
troduction lry the May 19th Communist Organization, publish-
ed in the spring of 1984. This compilation consists of ten com-
muniques from the UFF and ARU expressing their respon-
sibility for the various explosions in the bombing series, and
it also includes a communique from the Puerto Rican ter-
rorist group FALN expressing responsiblity for bombings in
New York City on December 31, 1982. The whole compila-
tion and especially the introduction by the MCO may be taken
as an expression of solidarity of the MCO with both FALN
and the UFF and ARU.
The terrorist strategy of the bombings is explained in the
"Introduction"; the bombings
expose the vulnerability of a system in extreme
contradiction with the people it rules -- it has
to beef up its security because it doesn't know
when it will be attacked. "Democratic rights" in
a "free and open" system clearly become expend-
able, and the real nature of the system as an em-
pire thriving on colonial oppression is exposed.
Thus, the purpose of the terrorist activity is to intensify the
security and counter-terrorist measures of the government and
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the established authorities so that its truly "repressive" nature
will become clear and resistance to it will be increased. This
concept is closely related to the idea of Carlos Marighella,
the Brazilian terrorist of the 1960s, who wrote in his
Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla (published in Havana in
19'70)
The government has no alternative except to in-
tensify repression. The police networks, house
searches, arrests of innocent people and of
suspects, closing off streets, make life in the city
unbearable. The military dictatorship embarks on
massive political persecution. Political assassina-
tions and police terror become routine.
In spite of all this, the police systematically
fai1....The people refuse to collaborate with the
authorities, and the general sentiment is that the
government is unjust, incapable of solving pro-
blems, and resorts purely and simply to the
physical liquidation of its opponents.
It is unlikely, however, that this strategy ever works very well.
It did not work in Brazil, nor in Uruguay, where the
'Ilipamaros followed a similar plan. 'Itivo reasons why it does
not work are that (a) governments do not necessarily meet
increased terrorism with genuine repression and (b) even if
they do resort to repression, this may be effective in suppress-
ing the terrorists (e.g., Uruguay).
The "Introduction"continues:
These actions [bombings] have begun to provide
revolutionary leadership for those American pea
ple also who are truly disturbed by the u.s. [sic]
invasion of Grenada, and for the growing solidari-
ty movements with the peoples of Central
America....For revolutionaries in the oppressor
nation, solidarity with national liberation strug-
gles provides the political basis upon which we
will polarize the white proletariat to organize
significant sectors of it to fight for socialist
revolution. Recognizing the leadership the op-
pressed nations struggling for independence and
socialism offer in the dismemberment of the im-
perialist system calls for a strategy in the op-
pressor nation that makes war on the wrarmakers.
Among the forces that the MCO recognizes as fighting im-
perialism and engaging in "revolutionary resistance inside
the u.s. -- to fight the world's enemy on its own turf' are
the Black Liberation Anmy, FALN, and "captured freedom
fighters inside u.s. prisons." The MCO therefore sees itself
and its terrorist allies in the United States as complementing
the terrorism and guerrilla warfare of the "national libera-
tions movements" in the "imperial system" (e.g., southern
Africa, Central America, and the Middle East) as well as
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leading terrorists and urban guerilla campaigns within the
United States.
FALN:
The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN or
"Armed Forces of National Liberation") is an underground
terrorist organization that has operated in the continental
United States (principally in the New York and Chicago areas)
since late 1973. Between 1973 and 1983 FALN has been
responsible for some 100 terrorist bombings and the deaths
of five persons (four of whom were killed January 24, 1975
in the FALN-claimed bombing of Fraunces 'Tavern in New
York City). FALN has also been involved in armed robberies
and has planned at least one kidnapping. The organization
collaborates with and often coordinates its terrorist activities
with terrorist groups that operate on the island of Puerto Rico.
The ostensible goal of FALN and its sister terrorist organiza-
tions is national independence for Puerto Rico from the
United States.
In 1982 FALN claimed 11 bombings in which three persons
were injured. In 1981 and 1983 FALN claimed no bombings,
but a related group, the Puerto Rican Armed Resistance
(PRAR), claimed responsibility for five bombings in 1981
in which one person was killed. Most authorities believe that
the PRAR was either a faction of FALN or FALN itself
operating under another name.
FALN and the Puerto Rican terrorist groups with which
it collaborates are Marxist-Leninist in ideology, and FALN
is closely related to the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP),
which is in fact the Communist Farty of Puerto Rico and
maintains close links to Havana. FALN is also traditionally
close to the WUO and currently may be considered a branch
of the underground terrorist movement in the United States
responsible for the Brinks and other armed robberies and the
bombing series discussed above.
On February 28, 1982, FALN claimed responsibility in a
typed communique for the bombing of four American finan-
cial institutions in New York City. The communique express-
ed solidarity with
the three north-americans captured in the Brinks
exprpriation [sic] . By linking up with your Black
comrades and making their struggle your own you
have put into practice the Leninist principle which
states that the duty of the working class and the
advanced sectors in the imperialist countries is
to actively assist and fight for the liberation of
the colonies.
The May 19th Communist Organization distributed the FALN
communique for five bombings in New York City on
December 31, 1982 and stated that "Terms for this period
of armed activity were defined when the...FALN bombed"
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these targets in New York on that date. The above-ground
support groups of both FALN and the terrorists in the Brinks
case often express support for each other.
The communique for the bombing of the U. S. Capitol
Building on November 7, 1983, also distributed by the MCO,
stated in its last paragraph:
33 years ago almost to the day, Oscar Collazo
and Griselio Torresola, two Puerto Rican Na-
tionalists fighting for Independence for Puerto
Rico, attacked another part of imperialist power
-- the Commander-in-Chief, the President of
the U.S. Their action was one of the first in which
the oppressed brought the war back to the
doorsteps of the oppressor. We salute them and
all those Puerto Rican, Mexican, New Afrikan,
Native American and North American freedom
fighters who have been killed or captured in the
struggle. To them also, our action carries a
message -- our commitment to carry on the
struggle.
The action to which the ARU refers in this communique is
the assassination attempt against President Harry Truman on
November 1, 1950 by Collazo and Torresola, two members
of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party which in many respects
was a predecessor to the PSP. Although President Truman
was not harmed in the assassination attempt, Torresola and
a White House police officer were killed. Collazo was
sentenced to death; this sentence was commuted to life im-
prisonment by President Truman, and Collazo was released
from prison by a further commutation of his sentence by
President Jimmy Carter in September 1979.
One reason for the recent comparatively inactive state of
FALN terrorism is that since 1980 some of its principal
members have been apprehended. On April 4, 1980 police
arrested eleven members of FALN in a raid on a safehouse
in Evanston, Illinois. One of those arrested at that time was
Carlos Alberto Torres, at that time the top-ranking name on
the FBI's "most wanted" list. Tones and seven other FALN
members were subsequently sentenced to eight years in prison
for possession of a sawed-off shotgun and conspiracy to com-
mit armed robbery. Two others received 30 year sentences,
and Torres's wife, Maria Haydee Torres, was extradited to
New York, where she had earlier been sentenced to a life
term for a bombing on August 3, 1977 that took the life of
one person.
On May 26, 1983 Mexican federal police arrested another
FALN member, William Morales, in Puebla, Mexico.
Morales, reportedly the principal bombmaker for FALN,
escaped from a Bellevue Hospital prison ward in 1979 after
being sentenced to a ten year term for conviction of federal
weapons and explosive charges. Morales lost most of both
his hands in the explosion of a bomb he was constructing
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at the time of his arrest in 1978. Documents found in Morales's
possession at the time of his arrest in Mexico as well as his
own subsequent confession revealed that he was planning an
attack on a meeting of Mexican and United States Con-
gressmen scheduled for May 26.
A subsequent blow to FALN occurred on June 29, 1983
when four of its members were arrested and two of its
safehouses were raided in Chicago. According to the U.S.
Attorney in Chicago, FALN planned several bombings for
the July 4 holiday in the area as well as attacks on Illinois
jails where FALN members were being held.
Black Liberation Army and Republic of New Afrika:
The third component of the underground terrorist move-
ment in the United States consists of the remnants of revolu-
tionary or nationalist black groups that originated in the
1960s. The two groups that are most prominent in this con-
nection are the Black Liberation Army and the Republic of
New Afrika.
The BLA developed from the violent "Cleaver faction" of
the Black Panther Party in 1971. Supporters of Cleaver
organized an "urban guerrilla" organization that was called
the `Afro-American Liberation Army" (AALA) or the "Black
Liberation Army." The former name was used by Cleaver's
adherent, Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt, who had reportedly
written a pamphlet in 1972 that explained and justified the
AALA. Pratt stated in an interview in 1971 that he preferred
the name AALA over BLA "because it recognizes our con-
nectedness to Africa." At about that time the FBI reported
that the Cleaver faction numbered approximately 150
members.
The first act of terrorism carried out under the name BLA
occurred on May 19, 1971 when two New York City policemen
were wounded by machinegun fire from a car traveling the
wrong way on a one way street which they had attempted to
stop. On May 21, two other NYPD police officers were shot
in the back and killed after being called to a site in Harlem.
A communique from the BLA to the New York Times
delivered on May 21 claimed responsibility for the first at-
tack. The latent fingerprints of Richard "Dharuba" Moore,
a member of the "Panther 21" (a group of Black Panther Party
members indicted in 1969 for planning to bomb public
buildings) and an adherent of Eldridge Cleaver, were found
on the envelope. Moore and others linked to the Black Pan-
thers were later arrested during an attempted robbery on June
2, 1971 and a .45 caliber machinegun used in the robbery
attempt as well as in the attack of May 19 was found on them.
Moore was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1973.
The New York Times on February 19, 1972 reported that
members of the BLA were wanted in connection with the
murder of four NYPD policemen and for assaults on police-
men in Atlanta, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Raleigh. On
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August 1, 1972 a group of five persons with three young
children hijacked a Delta Airlines jet to Algiers, receiving
$1 million in ransom for the release of the 87 passengers. The
hijackers were met in Algiers by the Cleaver group (which
was then residing in Algiers) and identified as members of
the BLA. On February 15, 1973 an arms cache of the BLA
was seized in Brooklyn. Two .45 caliber machineguns, one
antitank 3.5 inch bazooka, six rifles, five shotguns, two .9
mm. pistols, and 200 rounds of ammunition were impounded.
On May 2, 1973 Joanne Chesimard, Clark Squire (aka Sun-
diata Acoli) and James Costan (aka Zayd Malik Shakur), a
former official of the New York Black Panther Party, were
involved in a gunfight with police on the New Jersey turn-
pike. Costan and a New Jersey state trooper were killed and
another trooper and Chesimard wounded. Chesimard and
Squire were later captured and sentenced to prison, from
which Chesimard escaped on November 2, 1979 with the aid
of the BLA and a member of the May 19th Communist
Organization. Squire attempted but failed to escape from
prison in 1976.
On November 14, 1973 BLA leader Twyman Meyers was
killed in New York, and the New York Police Commissioner
stated that his death "broke the back" of the BLA, noting
that five of its leaders had been killed and 18 were in custody.
However, the BLA robbed banks in Berkeley, California, and
New Haven, Connecticut, in the spring of 1974, critically
wounding a police officer in the latter city. In April 1974 and
in May 1975 the BLA was discovered to be involved in efforts
to free its leaders from New York City jails. On April 16,
1981, New York City policemen John G. Scarangella was kill-
ed and his partner Richard Rainey was wounded after they
had stopped a van for a routine check in Queens. Anthony
LaBorde and James Dixon York, both former members of
the Black Panther Party and the BLA were sought in this
shooting, and they were arrested in January 1982 in
Philadelphia and in August 1981 in South Carolina respec-
tively. On August 9, 1982 a New York jury convicted LaBorde
and York of attempted second degree murder in the shooting
of Officer Rainey but was unable to reach a verdict in the
death of Officer Scarangella. LaBorde and York were sentenc-
ed to terms of 8-25 and 12.5-25 years respectively. The in-
ability of the jury to reach a verdict on the murder charge
was due, according to some jurors, to racial feelings on the
part of the lazgely non-white jury. A second trial of LaBorde
and York on the murder charge also ended in a deadlock,
and a mistrial was declared in October 1983.
Although LaBorde had been identified by witnesses to the
Brinks robbery as having been involved in that crime, some
witnesses were unable to identify him in a line-up after his
arrest. Charges against LaBorde in the Brinks robbery were
dropped in September 1982.
During the tour of the United States by the Springboks,
the South African rugby team, in the summer of 1981, the
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offices of the Eastern Rugby Union in Schenectady, N.Y. were
bombed on September 22, 1981. The BLA took responsibili-
ty for this bombing in a communique and telephone call .to
a local radio station. Although the FBI later stated that "in-
formation obtained through investigation suggests that
members of the CWP [Communist Workers Party] were pro-
bably responsible for this bombing," the John Brown Anti-
Klan Committee, a group close to the BLA and MCO in-
frastructure, praised the bombing and acknowledged BLA
responsibility. In the October-November 1981 issue of its
Newsletter, Death to the Klan!, the JBAKC noted:
This act of proletarian internationalism showed
the unity and leadership of Afrikan and New
Afrikan liberation struggles and set the terms for
white anti-imperialists in the fight against white
supremecy [sic]. In a separate action the "All
Whites" Rugby League of Indiana was bombed.
In a separate article in the same issue, the JBAKC noted:
On August 20, 1981, the BLA launched an of-
fensive against the police. They attacked a New
York City policeman, stealing his gun and walkie-
talkie, and leaving him in bad shape. The Red
Unit of the Black Liberation Army took credit
for the attack, which they said was in retaliation
for the capture of James York, who had been the
target of a vicious manhunt for months.
The Republic of New Afrika, a violent group advocating
the independence under black control of five southern states,
has been closely related to the Black Panthers and the BLA.
The RNA was founded in Detroit, Michigan, in 1968 by
Milton and Richard (aka Imari Abubakari Aobadele) Henry,
and its first president was Robert F. Williams, who, after flee-
ing akidnapping charge, lived in exile in Cuba, 'T'anzania,
and the Peoples Republic of China. Williams resigned the
presidency of the RNA after his return to the United States
in 1969, and Richard Henry assumed control of it.
RNA headquarters near Jackson, Mississippi was raided
on August 18, 1971; one police officer was killed and another
officer and an FBI agent were wounded in the raid by gun-
fire from RNA members. Richard Henry and six others were
convicted for their participation in a separate gun battle, and
four persons were convicted of murder for their involvement
in the fight at the Jackson headquarters.
In October 1971 a publication of the Cleaver faction of the
Black Panther Farty, Voice of the Lumpen, contained a com-
munique from the BLA expressing its support for the RNA
in its gun battle with the police in Mississippi. Another arti-
cle on the same page praised the BLA shooting of two NYPD
officers on May 19, 1971 and stated, "what could have been
more fitting than to kick it off on Malcolm's birthday
[May 19]:' Although Cynthia Boston and her husband,
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William Johnson, were not convicted for their alleged role
in the Brinks robbery, the RNA has expressed support for
terrorism, and several members of the RNA Vvere convicted
for their involvement in the Brinks robbery. In 1981 Chokwe
Lumumba, a member of the RNA and its "minister of
justice," claimed that as of 1977 the RNA had rebuilt its struc-
ture and was active in twenty states.
Prison Organizing:
One of the most likely sources for new recruits to the BLA
and other components of the terrorist underground in the
United States is the prison population, especially those of
black or Hispanic background. A number of BLA members
have been convicts, and some have been recruited while in
prison and have escaped from prison due to efforts by the
BLA. Since at least the early 1970s radical and extremist
groups have consciously sought to politicize and recruit con-
victs under the guise of "prisoners' aid" or "prison reform."
The National Lawyers Guild (NLG) is an organization of
leftist orientation that was described in 1950 by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities as "the foremost legal
bulwark of the Communist Party." 'Ibday, it remains the prin-
cipal U.S. affiliate of the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers (IADL), described by the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1978 as "one of the most useful Com-
munist front organizations at the service of the Soviet Com-
munist Farty." In 1971 components of the NLG began publica-
tion of a prisoners' newsletter entitled Midnight Special. The
editor of this newsletter was Russell Neufeld, indicted or
arrested several times for violent activities in association with
the Weathermen in 1969 70; another editor of the Midnight
Special was Judith A. Clark, later convicted of murder and
bank robbery for her role in the Brinks robbery. Susan
Tipograph, a member of the NLG and a lawyer who defend-
ed Silvia Baratdini of the May 19th Communist Organiza-
tion during her trial for complicity in the the Brinks robbery,
visited both Marilyn Jean Buck of the BLA and William
Morales (also her client) shortly before their escape from
prison. It will be recalled that Baraldini was convicted for
her alleged role in the escape of Joanne Chesimard from
prison. Baraldini had been legal assistant to Tipograph prior
to her arrest. In a number of cases, NLG members have been
indicted or subpoenaed for alleged roles in the escape or at-
tempted escape of terrorists from police custody or prison.
Prison gangs, increasingly considered a serious problem
by penal authorities, offer an organizational base by which
convicts can be politicized or ideologized. One of the four
largest such gangs is the Black Guerrilla Family, described
by Detective Arleigh McCree of the Los Angeles Police
Department in testimotry before the Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism on August 12, 1982 as "essentially the inprison
component of the Black Liberation Army," and he added,
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I know many of them and have known many of
them for years. They are a revolutionary group
inside the prison walls. Their philosophy is en-
tirely compatible, if not identical, as I say, to the
Black Liberation Army's. They seek revolution,
and they are a very violent group. Many of them
are very proficient with weapons and explosives,
and Mr. Pratt [Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt, a
founder of the BLA and leader of the Black Guer-
rilla Family, now in prison], of course, being
supreme in that category, I might add.
Arm the Spirit, a "revolutionary prisoners newspaper"
published in Berkeley, California, has published communi-
ques from the BLA and MCO in support of the Brinks rob-
bery aswell ascommuniques from the RNA and other violent
or extremist groups from prison chapters in Iawa, Washington
state, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and other states. It has also
published a statement of the "Coalition to Support Black
August," a group associated with the Black August Organiz-
ing Committee, which defines itself as
comprised of prisoners who define themselves as
Afrikan revolutionaries dedicated to the national
liberation of Afrikan people in this country and
to the ongoing struggle against racism, exploita-
tion and police brutality in prison and in the
Afrikan community.... It has...built significant
unity and solidarity between the prison movement
and the struggles in El Salvador, Iran, the Native
American struggle and other Third World and
progressive movement.
Given the similarities between this "anti-imperialist" theme
and the ideology of groups such as the MCO, RNA, BLA,
ARU, UFF, JBAKC, etc., it is not surprising that, as the In-
formation Digest noted, the Coalition to Support Black August
"has been seeking national support from organizations
associated with violence-oriented and terrorist groups in-
cluding the Weather Underground Organization and the Com-
munist Workers Party."
Foreign Connections of U.S. 'Ieerrorism:
The rise of transnational terrorism in the 1970s, with sup-
port from regimes such as those of Libya, Iraq, and Syria,
as well as the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East European satellite
countries, has led to speculation on the extent of foreign sup-
port for terrorist activity in the United States. The position
of the FBI on this question has varied somewhat over the past
few years. In a speech of July 6, 1978 Judge Webster expressed
doubt that Cuba supported American terrorists, although he
did suggest that "many of the propaganda manuals" of Puer-
to Rican terrorist groups had been printed in Cuba. On April
26, 1981, speaking on "Meet the Press," Judge Webster stated
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that "there is no real evidence of Soviet-sponsored terrorism
within the United States:' More recently, in the aftermath
of the bombing of the U.S. Capitol Building, Judge Webster
told reporters on November 10, 1983 that support from the
Soviet Union and Cuba to American terrorists "cannot be
ruled out," but reiterated that he did not have evidence of
direct involvement.
It must be noted, however, that there is an increasing body
of facts to suggest at least a continuing liaison between the
underground terrorist movement described above and various
foreign based movements -- especially the so-called "na-
tional liberation movements" of the Third World which are
themselves often closely connected to and supported by the
Soviet Union and its satellites. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, the WUO, the Venceremos Brigade, and similar "New
Left" groups in the United States had extensive contacts with
and support from the governments and intelligence services
of the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Vietnam, Communist
China, and some East European Soviet satellites. Much of
this support was documented in a 98-page summary of
evidence presented by the defense in the 1980 trial of FBI
officials Mark Felt and Edward Miller. To cite only one in-
stance from this document -- prepared with the assistance
of the FBI -- "the FBI learned from a reliable source that
Weatherman Howard Machtinger was in Canada being in-
structed by a Russian advisor on hove to make bombs." In
1973 the Annual Report of the FBI stated
A current tabulation shows that approximately
135 leaders of subversive Puerto Rican in-
dependence groups have traveled to communist
Cuba for indoctrination and/or training. Many of
them received extensive instructions in guerrilla
warfare tactics, preparation of explosive devices
and sophisticated sabotage methods.
A large majority of persons so trained have in-
structed others upon their return to Puerto Rico
and have carried out acts of sabotage there.
Dozens of these individuals are presently awaiting
trial for violations of Puerto Rico's Explosives
Law or are being sought as fugitives for such
violations. It is commonly thought that vigorous
police action against these terrorists is primarily
responsible for the decline in the number of bom-
bings during the past year.
As late as 1976 a California based terrorist group, the Emiliano
Zapata Unit, had an adviser named Andres Gomez who was
identified by American intelligence sources as an officer of
the DGI, the Cuban intelligence service. Gomez disappeared
after the group was apprehended by police. Extensive infor-
mation on Cuban involvement in terrorist incidents in the
United States was presented in hearings before the Subeom-
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mittee on Security and Terrorism in February and March
1982.
In September 1981 Judith Clark, arrested one month later
for her role in the Brinks robbery, represented the May 19th
Communist Organization at a conference in Lebanon spon-
sored by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Lebanese National Movement. According to the newsletter
of the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee of October-
November 1981 "500 delegates attended, primarily from
Western and Eastern Europe, and the socialist countries and
National Liberation movements." According to Clark herself,
"The conference was an international conference in solidarity
with the Lebanese and Palestinian struggles."
As noted above, the MCO, UFF, and ARU have frequent-
ly expressed their solidarity with and support for the national
liberation movements of the Third World. Their solidarity
with such movements in southern Africa is especially signifi-
cant. Several of the bombing targets of the UFF have been
facilities associated with the Republic of South Africa or trade
with South Africa. The bombings by the UFF of the South
African Purchasing Office and an IBM office in Elmont and
Harrison, N.Y., on December 16, 1982 were carried out "in
the spirit of resistance with the African National Congress
and Nelson Mandela and all African peoples on the
motherland," according to the UFF communique. It is
perhaps significant that the date December 16 is a special
one for the African National Congress (ANC), a Communist
Party-dominated terrorist group in South Africa. As Sechaba,
the official organ of the ANC (printed in East Germany), ex-
pressed it in December 1981:
On December 16, 1961, organised acts of sabotage
against government installations took place,
marking the emergence of Umkhonto We Sizwe
(The Spear of the Nation) which was later to
become the armed wing of the ANC. The date,
December 16, which was chosen for the initial
sabotage acts, was of historical significance....
To the Africans this day symbolises resistance and
the indomitable quest for freedom....
The date December 16 is celebrated in South Africa as the
anniversary of the Battle of Blood River on December 16,
1838 in which the Afrikaners defeated the Zulu warriors; to
the ANC and its adherents, however, the date "is thus sym-
bolic for the ascendancy of white power over the Blacks: '
Two days after the UFF bombings in New York, the ANC
itself carried out a bombing of the Kceberg nuclear power
station under construction near Cape 1bwn. Four bombs were
exploded and claimed by the ANC on December 20. The
ANC stated that "the explosions served as a warning to
foreign investors in South Africa of what would become of
their investments." The Kceberg plant was being constructed
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with the aid of a French consortium. The UFF in its com-
munique on the bombing of IBM also emphasized that foreign
investors have been significant in developing South African
industry and (allegedly) apartheid and racism, quoting the
ANC to this effect, and rationalized its bombing as a warn-
ing to other foreign contractors and investors in South Africa.
The relationship between the Brinks robbery-murders and
the ANC and other southern African terrorist movements is
suggested by reports of visits to radical states in that region
and of guerilla training by these states or associated terrorist
movements. According to a report of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police,
...component elements of RATF [Revolutionary
Armed Task Force, the nom de guerre applied
to the Brinks gang] have raised funds and main-
tained political connections with the ZANU
Popular Front that is currently ruling the African
country [Zimbabwe] undergoing revolutionary
upheavals.
Silvia Baraldini of the MCO has visited Zimbabwe under its
present government and has stated
May 19th Communist Organization in 1977 began
actively to work with the Zimbabwe African Na-
tional Union (ZANU). We supported the party
in their struggle to lead the Zimbabwean people
to independence, to overthrow the white settler
regimes and to end the presence of British im-
perialism in their country.
Nathaniel Burns, also convicted for his role in the Brinks rob-
bery and murders, has been reported to have received guer-
rilla training in Angola from Cuban advisers to the Marxist
MPLA, which now rules Angola, and to have fought with
the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO). After
her escape from prison in 1979, Joanne Chesimard reported-
ly expressed interest in seeking refuge in Libya, Angola,
Cuba, or China according to witness Tyrone Rison. On
March 8, 1982, an FBI listening device recorded a conversa-
tion between Mutulu Shakur, one of the leaders of the RATF
and still at large, and Edward Joseph, later indicted and con-
victed as an accessory in the Brinks case, during a meeting
in Greenwich Village. Joseph is reported to have stated, "We
should be concentrating on lining up bankroll, making a flam-
boyant move, leave here for Zimbabwe."
Although no definite conclusions can be drawn at this time
regarding material assistance from foreign states or terrorist
groups to those involved in the Brinks crime and similar ter-
rorist incidents, it is clear that the American terrorists feel
and express strong sympathy for a number of Marxist ter-
rorist movements and states in the Middle East, southern
Africa, and Central America; that there is reliable informa-
tion of some cooperation between these American terrorists
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and their foreign counterparts; and that the possibility of more
extensive foreign support for American terrorist activities not
only cannot be excluded but also should be aggressively
investigated.
Conclusion:
The core of the underground terrorist movement in the
United States consists of elements that grew out of the Weather
Underground Organization of the 1910s operating in alliance
with violent organizations of black nationalists (the BLA and
RNA) and with FALN. It is unlikely that this core is
numerically large, although its periphery, the above-ground
support groups, is larger. The Brinks robbery and the subse-
quent investigations and trials appear to have disrupted its
organization and strategy. Nevertheless, this movement re-
mains the most dangerous terrorist group in the United States.
It has shown itself capable of operating clandestinely for some
years prior to its accidental failure and exposure in the Brinks
incident. It was able to accumulate at least several hundred
thousand dollars through "expropriations," to free in-
carcerated members and sympathizers from prisons and pro-
vide them security, to establish a network of safehouses, to
create virtually a nationwide (and perhaps an international)
network of supporters and sympathizers, and to maintain com-
munications with and discipline over this network. Most of
the $873,000 stolen in armed robberies prior to the Brinks
incident remains unaccounted for, and a number of the prin-
cipal suspects in these robberies remain at large -- in-
cluding the command nucleus of the Black Liberation Ar-
my, Joanne Chesimard, Mutulu Shakur, and Marilyn Jean
Buck. As long as these three remain at large and as long as
convict recruiting and organizing continues, it is likely that
the BLA or similar groups will continue their terrorism.
Since the Brinks robbery the terrorist underground has
shown itself capable of constructing, placing, and detonating
over a dozen bombs, and not one of these bombings has yet
been solved by law enforcement authorities. One of these
bombings (of the U.S. Capitol Building in 1983) attracted in-
ternational attention and has been a principal factor in in-
creasing public awareness of and governmental concern about
terrorism. Although most of these bombings were probably
not intended to kill, it is a fair assumption that those respon-
sible for them do not seriously object to killing. Certainly
this is suggested by both their public rhetoric as well as their
continuing defense of the murders in the Brinks robbery and
escape. Had the United States Senate been in session on the
evening of the Capitol bombing, a number of Senators and
staff members could easily have been killed or seriously in-
jured. The terrorist movement therefore has the capacity and
the will to take life and use violence for its ideological pur-
poses, and it may be merely a matter of time before it em-
barks on an intentionally murderous course to make its point.
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The terrorist underground, however, is only one of a series
of terrorist groups believed to be operating in the United
States, although there is little evidence as yet of firm linkages
among most of these other groups. In mid 1984, the FBI was
reported to be actively investigating 19 U. S.-based groups
suspected of terrorism and to be cooperating with foreign
authorities in the investigation of 15 to 20 other groups believ-
ed to be involved in international terrorism. Oliver B. Revell,
Assistant Director of the FBI, noted that 40% of all terrorist
activities (including international terrorism) target U.S. in-
dividuals or assets. The widespread nature of the terrorist
threat has led some authorities to warn of increased terrorism
in the United States, despite the apparent decline in terrorist
incidents as counted by the FBI. Brian Jenkins of the RAND
Corporation, for example, stated in late 1983 that that year
"is going to be probably the bloodiest year for which we have
any statistics" and "In looking at incidents with 10 or more
fatalities, we have had more already this year than in 1980-82
combined." The Department of State in November 1983
counted 300 deaths due to international terrorism in Beirut
alone, as compared to 150 deaths from all international ter-
rorism in 1982, and Jenkins estimated that the death toll from
all international terrorism in 1983 would be about 500 and
from "local terrorism" worldwide about 2000 to 5000. In
December 1983 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, Vice Chair-
man of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S.
Senate, stated, "I think the prospect of 1984 being the year
the [terrorists] bring the war to our shores is real. We should
assume it and not be surprised by it:' W. Raymond Wannall,
a former Assistant Director of the FBI and awell-known ex-
pert on terrorism and internal security matters, has also sug-
gested that 1984 could be the "Year of the Terrorist" in a recent
publication of the Nathan Hale Institute.
In preparation for anticipated terrorist attacks, several
government institutions established new security precautions
and procedures. Three days after the bombing of the U.S.
Capitol Building, the Congress established special identifica-
tion badges for staff members and mandatory use of metal
detectors and searches for visitors to Congressional buildings,
and access to certain parts of the Capitol Building was
restricted for tourists and visitors. Other special precautions
were implemented by the White House, the Pentagon, and
other government buildings in November and December 1983,
after reports or threats of bombing attacks were received.
Further plans for offensive as well as defensive measures
against terrorism were drafted or implemented in early 1984.
The most impressive (in theory and actuality) were those for
the Summer Olympics, although there were jurisdictional
disputes between the FBI and the LAPD. Security prrnisions
for the Summer Olympics cost more than $100 million (about
1/5 of the total budget for the Games), and the Congress ap-
propriated anadditional $50 million in the event of a major
incident requiring military intervention. Military helicopters
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and special communications and surveillance equipment were
also purchased with federal funds. Because of the diversity
of jurisdictions involved in the Olympics, no single agency
had comprehensive control of security procedures, although
interagency agreements for cooperation were evolved. Over
16,000 personnel were employed for security purposes at the
Games, and according to Edgar Best, in charge of security
for the Olympics, "This Olympics will be the first in which
we take full advantage of high technology in security." In ad-
dition, the FBI developed and sent to the Olympics a hostage
rescue team of 50 FBI agents that was specially trained in
sharpshooting and offered an alternative to the use of military
force.
In addition to precautionary measures, the Department of
Defense also developed anti-terrorist plans, training, and pro-
cedures in the aftermath of the Beirut bombing, and in early
1984 the White House issued a National Security Council
Directive (NSDD-138) reportedly implementing more ag-
gressive measures for combatting terrorism. This new policy
toward terrorism was reflected in Secretary Shultz's public
comments on the concept of regarding terrorism as a form
of warfare, although it is still not clear if the full dimensions
of this concept have been grasped. Finally, the Administra-
tion as well as members of Congress introduced new legisla-
tion intended to address international terrorist threats.
The most effective means of combatting terrorism does not
consist in more legislation, executive orders, inter-
departmental conferences, additional concrete barriers, or
pamphlets such as this one. The most effective means of com-
batting terrorism consists of a domestic security and in-
telligence capacity adequate to investigate groups and in-
dividuals who are ideologically prone to violence and to an-
ticipate and prevent their violence. Since at least the early
or mid 1970s, the United States at the federal level (and in-
creasingly at the state and local levels) has not possessed such
a capacity, a defect examined in detail in W. Raymond Wan-
nall's Who is Tracking th Terrorists, published by the Nathan
Hale Institute. The imposition of the Attorney General's
Guidelines for domestic security investigations (the "Levi
Guidelines") in 1976 and the resultant erosion of domestic
security investigations played an important role in allowing
the formation of the underground terrorist movement in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Although groups such as the John
Brown Anti-Klan Committee and the May 19th Communist
Organization were formed in 1977 and 1978, due to the Levi
Guidelines they could not be investigated by the FBI. The
lack of investigation coupled with the evolution of a new iden-
tity and strategy of the Weather Underground Organization
led the FBI to the erroneous conclusion that the WUO had
ceased to function and to the termination of its investigation
of the WUO and Prairie Fire Organizing Committee in 1979.
Only in the wake of the Brinks robbery and its ramifications
were similaz or derivative groups placed under FBI investiga-
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lion. The apprehension of FALN members in April, 1980 in
Illinois and the subsequent apprehension and prosecution of
other members of this terrorist group were due purely to an
accident (the fortuitous suspicion by a neighbor of activities
near what was a safehouse for the FALN) and not in the least
to law enforcement intelligence efforts.
That intelligence investigation of extremist groups can be
effective in preventing terrorism is shown by the example (to
take one of many) of informants in the Prairie Fire Organiz-
ing Committe (emplaced prior to the Levi Guidelines) who
in 1977 alerted police to the planned bombing of the office
of a California state senator. Because of this information, the
bombing was prevented and several key members of the PFOC
and WUO were arrested. The value of anticipative (or "pro-
active") intelligence in preventing terrorism and the lack of
such intelligence in the U.S. intelligence community in re-
cent years has been acknowledged by several authorities. In
the wake of the attempted assassination of President Reagan
on March 30, 1981, the General Counsel of the Department
of the Treasury, in a review of the performance of the Depart-
ment in connection with the attempt, noted,
From the protection-oriented perspective of the
[Secret] Service, therefore, the decline in FBI
domestic intelligence activities has caused a
critical overall decline in the useful information
the Service receives from the FBI. In November
1979, Secret Service Director Stuart Knight
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the Service was, at that time, receiving only
about 40 percent of what it had previously receiv-
ed from the FBI, and that this reduced in-
telligence product had deteriorated in quality. Ex-
plaining what he meant by quality, he referred
to the loss of information concerning motives and
plans.
Knight repeated these statement in the aftermath
of the March 30 assassination attempt, in
testimony before other committees of the House
and Senate, specifically attributing this loss of
useful intelligence to the Attorney General's
Domestic Security Guidelines.
More recently, a similar conclusion on the role of intelligence
(albeit foreign, not domestic security, intelligence) was noted
by the Department of Defense Commission (the "Long Com-
mission") on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act:
The Commission concludes that although the
USMNF commander received a large volume of
intelligence warnings concerning potential ter-
rorist threats prior to 23 October 1983, he was
not provided with the timely intelligence, tailored
to his specific operational needs, that was
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necessary to defend against the broad spectrum
of threats he faced.
The Commission further concludes that the HU-
MINT [human intelligence] support to the
USMNF commander was ineffective, being
neither precise nor tailored to his needs. The
Commission believes that the paucity of U.S. con-
trolled HUMINT provided to the USMNF com-
mander is in large part due to policy decisions
which have resulted in a U.S. HUMINT capabili-
ty commensurate with the resources and time that
have been spent to acquire it.
In March 1983 the Department of Justice issued new
guidelines for domestic security investigations to replace those
issued by Attorney General Levi. These "Smith Guidelines"
have been in effect for a little more than a year, and to date
it is too early to make an informed judgment on their effec-
tiveness. There is some reason to believe, however, that many
of the same problems persist.
The underground terrorist network in the United States of-
fers several opportunities for effective intelligence that, until
recently, have been missed and may still be missed. The ter-
rorist groups in this network have generated anation-wide
series of above-ground support groups that regularly publicize
their activites, ideology, membership, strategy, and intercon-
nections as well as their self-proclaimed enemies and poten-
tial targets. Under the Levi Guidelines, the FBI was not per-
mitted to read such publications (let alone to emplace infor-
mants in or utilize more intrusive techniques on such groups),
and not until after the Brinks robbery was the FBI able to
investigate these support groups or analyze their publicly
available documents. The importance of investigating terrorist
support groups has been emphasized by General Shlomo
Gazit, former Director of Israeli Military Intelligence, and
Michael Handel at a symposium in 1980:
Very few organizations can operate in complete
or full compartmentalization and do not depend
on networks of local supporters. Such supporters
help the terrorist organization, either because of
ideological motivation or through fear and
blackmail, without being directly involved in ter-
rorist operations. The importance of penetrating
the sympathizers' or supporters' system lies in the
fact that it is easier to penetrate it than the more
highly closed terrorist organization. By
penetrating this supportive system it may be
possible to penetrate the organization itself or ob-
tain indirect information about it. Also, it is much
easier to deter such supporters from continuing
their assistance than to deter the members of the
organization itself. By reducing or eliminating
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this supportive system, we can undermine the
capacity for action of the terrorist organization.
The very need of terrorist organizations to propagandize, gain
legitimacy, and support themselves logistically therefore
represents a vulnerability of terrorist activity that can be (but
has not yet been) exploited by law enforcement to anticipate
and prevent terrorist violence.
The occurrence of several nationally or internationally con-
spicuous events in the summer of 1984 suggested the possibili-
ty of terrorist attacks on them, and attempts by terrorists on
future mass public events should not be ruled out. Both the
indigenous terrorist movement described in this report as well
as other, largely foreign terrorist groups (consisting of Libyan,
Iranian, Palestinian, Armenian, Cuban, or Central American
terrorists or their American adherents) have reason to
embarrass, disrupt, or destroy what national or international
events represent and to gain the publicity that such attacks
generate. Nevertheless, the Olympics and similaz highly visi-
ble public events are not the main issue in thinking about and
dealing with terrorism, and protective, organizational, and
legislative measures are not the principal means by which
terrorism can be prevented or deterred. After these events
pass, the terrorist underground in the United States will per-
sist, and it is this network that at the present time represents
the most serious threat of terrorist violence in the United
States for the future.
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Other Studies in the Nathan Hale
Institute's Terrorist Series:
1984 -Year of the Terrorist?
By W. Raymond Wannall
Who fa Tracking the Terrorists?
By W. Raymond Wannall
Additional copies of this report may be obtained from:
THE NATHAN HALE INSTITUTE
422 First Street, S.E., Suite 208A
Washington, D.C. 20003
[phone]
Permission to quote from this publication is granted
provided due acknowledgment is made.
PRICE $5.00
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