NATO GIVES HIGH PRIORITY TO WAR IN AIR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200710010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05: CIA-RDP90-00806R000200710010-0 ---_,,_
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NEW YORK TIMES
1 October 1984
T.'0 Gives
High Priority
To War in Air
By DREW MIDDLETON,
Special to The New York Times
STUTTGART, West Germany -
With NATO holding major exercises in
this country, alliance commanders
seem reasonably confident that their.
forces have the capacity to engage and
halt an initial conventional attack on
Western Europe. The im-
mediate problem, they
suggest, would be holding
Analysis off the subsequent waves
of attackers.
The commanders, who
spoke in separate interviews in mid.
September, said that if there should be
a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the
second wave of attacking divisions
would be supported by surface-to-sur-
face missiles and would have ample air
support from bases in East Germany
and Poland.
New surveillance systems, the offi-
cers said, would enable the Western al-
liance's air forces to strike the mis-
siles, air bases and the second attack-
ing wave, referred to as "follow-on"
forces. The problem, as it is seen by
,ground commanders, is the availabil-
ity of air resources.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion's military priority in the event of
aggression will be air superiority over
the Soviet Air Force. Although the air
forces work closely with ground units,
commanders said they would be insist.
ent that before anything else, such as
bombing enemy missile sites, they
must attain superiority in the air.
Reinforcements Are Key Factor
The key factor is the arrival in time
and in strength of reinforcing squad-
rons from the United States and their
deployment on NATO airfields. Once
there, with air superiority won, they
can start to deal with the follow-up
forces and their missile and ai, sup-
port.
. Both airmen and soldiers concede
that the first three or four days after
Soviet, aggression would be the period
of maximum risk.
The major tactical problem facing
alliance commanders arises from a
natural emphasis on a forward defense
for West Germany. At its most ex-
treme, this means that the Federal Re-
public would be-defended on or near its
frontiers, a formula that gives little
room for tactical maneuvering.
Officers say the problem has been
emasFN--intei igeports
that the Soviet Union is developing spe-
cial units trained to break through the
NATO front and attack depots, fines of
c'oinmunication and- reseive forces.
Few military leaders doubt that e
Russians have the information on
allied dispositions they would need to.
carry out such tactics if they should
break through.
On the other hand there are many
who believe that basic Soviet strategy
has not altered and that the emphasis
will be on mass. These sources believe
that if the Russians should break
through anywhere along the long allied
line they would feed the follow-on divi-
sions through it without paying much
attention to units on the flanks.
Stress on Flexible Defense
In either event, NATO commanders
increasingly ask for a flexible defense
that will enable them to concentrate
strong armored and infantry forces be-
hind the forward areas to deliver coun-
terattacks.
Gen. Leopold Chalupa, the West Ger-
man who commands the Central Army
Group, pointed out that any defense in
depth, that is, one that would permit
the enemy's overrunning of forward
areas, would be unacceptable to the
Germans living in those areas.
He expects that a solid allied base
would enable NATO to meet the attack-
ing divisions and, at the same time,
deal with the follow-on units in local
counterattacks. General Chalupa also
observed that the flow of modern tanks
into the American, West German and
British armies would provide NATO
with a flexibility of response it has
lacked up to now.
Allied tactics in the event of war ob-
viously are secret, but interviews with
commanders left the impression that
despite the enhanced flexibilty and
mobility of the three main forces in
Germany, withdrawals to positions
well behind the frontier from which
counterattacks could be mounted
would be limited in number.
There is a geographical reason for
this. As one American general put it,
"This isn't the Soviet Union or North-
Africa; one tactical withdrawal could
give the enemy half of Germany with
all that means in airfields, highways
and railroads.'
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05: CIA-RDP90-00806R000200710010-0