NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTELLIGENCE GAP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100490034-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

----- --- STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 513 C STREET, N.E. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002 [phone]
National Security and the Intelligence Gap
Throughout the post-World War II era, the United
States has relied upon foreign intelligence activities to sup-
port U.S. foreign policy objectives and protect U.S. in-
terests overseas. Clandestine collection, counterintel-
ligence and covert operations have all been essential
elements of the U.S. intelligence effort. Yet today, as at no
other time in the post-war era, serious questions have been
raised as to the adequacy of U.S. intelligence capabilities.
The recent crisis in Iran underscores the inadequacies of
U.S. intelligence. Thus, growing consensus is emerging
that U.S. intelligence capabilities have been degraded to
such an extent that the U.S. is increasingly incapable of
identifying and recruiting sources overseas, conducting ef-
fective counterespionage activities at home, and of using
covert actions to anticipate or alter the course of events
abroad to benefit the U.S. interests. It is therefore ap-
propriate that the record of recent U.S. intelligence
failures be recounted for public analysis, and that proper
attribution be given for the underlying causes of U.S. in-
telligence inadequacies, so that prompt remedial action
may be taken.
CUBA
Intelligence failures over the past two years with respect
to Cuba aze particulazly illustrative of the current U.S.
problem. Beginning in 1977, the Cazter Administration
brought about a major shift in U.S. policy towards Cuba
that included the suspension of all U.S. SR-71 recon-
naisance flights over Cuba and the categorization of Cuba
as a "low priority" target for U.S. human intelligence col-
lection efforts. The SR-71 over-flight suspensions and the
decline of the human espionage effort in Cuba led to a
failure to monitor the Soviet military build-up in Cuba and
Cuba's support of revolution and terrorism throughout
Latin America.
Since the 1977 SR-71 overflight cancellations, the Soviet
Union has:
1) deployed MIG-23 fighter-bombers in Cuba;
2) constructed a second pier at the naval port of Cien-
fuegos, which is capable of servicing two or more
Soviet submarines;
3) had two Foxtrot-class submarines visit Cuban
ports;
4) introduced the SA-3 Goa air-defense missile system
(with a low altitude detection capability of from
150-60,000 feet) into Cuba;
5) increased early warning radar sites in Cuba;
6) deployed a Soviet combat brigade, which took the
U.S. months to confirm after its actual deployment
date.
This series of events, and in particular the undetected
deploymcnt of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, has helped
the Soviets to build up Cuba as a military base, and poten-
tially provided the Soviets, as Rep. Kemp has stated, with
"a basing infrastructure that could enable them to support
a future division-sized deployment force in a matter of
days." The Soviet build-up in Cuba, and particularly the
development of naval facilities at Cienfuegos, has led the
Defense Planning Committee of the Atlantic Alliance to
conclude that the wartime potential of Cuba could pose a
significant threat to U.S. efforts to keep oil supply routes
and shipping lanes open in the event of a major conflict
with the Soviet Union. This Soviet build-up violates U.S.-
Soviet agreements made in 1962 and 1970 that no offensive
capabilities be introduced by the USSR into Cuba.
The decline of the human intelligence effort in Cuban
and Latin America has hampered U.S. capabilities to
monitor Cuba's support of revolution and terrorism in the
Western hemisphere as well. The U.S. is working at an ex-
treme intelligence disadvantage throughout Latin
America. The Cuban Direccion General de Intelligencia
(DGI) has provided training and support for numerous
Latin America terrorist movements, and substantial
evidence exists that it is controlled by the Soviet KGB. In
particulaz, the failure on the part of the Carter Ad-
ministration to order a revised National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) for Nicaragua, and its denial of Cuban-
Panamanian involvement in the revolution, in the face of
reports that Cuba was covertly aiding the Sandinistas (and
that Panama was serving as a conduit for Cuban arms to
the Sandinistas), led to a major intelligence breakdown on
Nicazagua. Combined with the psychological impact of the
Soviet militazy build-up in Cuba, the fall of Somoza could
lead to increased pressure upon El Salvador, Honduras
and Guatemala to succumb to Cuban-supported revolu-
tionary movements.
TERRORISM IN IRAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST
U.S. intelligence failures in Iran and the Middle East
have contributed to the isolation of Saudi Arabia and the
increase of Soviet influence throughout the Persian Gulf.
Two major reasons for U.S. ignorance of the impending
fall of the Shah of Iran last year were the refusal of the
Carter Administration to order the CIA to develop a com-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
petitive NIE on Iran, and its overreliance on pro-
government sources for domestic political intelligence.
Prior to major cuts in U.S. cladestine collection personnel
in the mid-1970s, contacts with opposition student groups
and religious factions were considered a supplementary
source of U.S. intelligence on Iran. Yet these personnel
cutbacks, and the deliberate decision on the part of the Ad-
ministration to restrict U.S. intelligence contacts with the
anti-Shah opposition in Iran led to very poor field in-
telligence reporting. Had the U.S. been able to accurately
assess the depth of opposition to the Shah and the role of
the PLO and the pro-Soviet Afghani Secret Service
(Estekbarat) in the revolt, U.S. policy-makers might have
been able to persuade the Shah to handle the rising opposi-
tion differently, and the U.S. might still have its Iranian
ICBM monitoring sites lost due to the revolution.
Furthermore, the counsel given to the Iranian military
during the final weeks of the revolution was based upon
misassessments of the political situation inside of Iran.
General Robert Huyser was sent to Iran on a mission to
warn the Iranian military that the U.S. would not support
a military coup because of its judgment that the Bakhtiar
government would maintain control over the situation.
That counsel was taken, and with the ensuing rise of Kho-
meini, Iranian revolutionary courts executed hundreds of
Iranian military officers.
These intelligence failures largely explain the U.S. in-
ability to determine who was responsible for the U.S. Em-
bassy takeover in Teheran and to undertake covert actions
to encourage ethnic separatists and other factions in Iran
to initiate acounter-revolt against the Ayatollah Kho-
meini. The lack of human intelligence in Iran among the
radical student factions in large measure explains why it
took weeks before U.S. intelligence could confirm that
pro-Marxist students, reportedly with international ter-
rorist connections, were behind the embassy takeover.
While recent reports have indicated that the possibility of
using covert action to topple Khomeini has been con-
sidered by the Administration, the lack of established con-
tacts inside Iran has made this option unusable.
Another area in which U.S. intelligence has been inade-
quate is in Afghanistan. U.S. intelligence consistently
misinterpreted the intent of the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan. The Administration only acknowledged in
late December that the Soviet military build-up represented
a threat to regional security. Yet over the past two years,
the Soviets took virtual command of Afghani military
operations against the Muslim rebels in central
Afghanistan. This conflict presented the U.S. with an ex-
cellent opportunity to initiate covert actions to exacerbate
the growing divisions between the rebels and the pro-
Marxist government in Kabul, but the decline of U.S. in-
telligence capabilities, in both Afghanistan and Iran,
limited that option. The U.S. failure to initiate covert ac-
tions or provide assistance to the rebels against the pro-
Marxist Amin government enabled Moscow to increase its
military presence in Afghanistan, and direct the unex-
pected coup against Amin with little concern over competi-
tion from outside sources.
The U.S. is increasingly unable to ascertain why U.S.
policy actions fail or lead to counter-actions. The
Muslim reaction to the U.S.-Iranian confrontation is an
example of how U.S. intelligence was taken by surprise.
Terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Libya and Pakistan
(where two Americans were killed), as well as the recent
takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca (which may have
been Palestinian-instigated and launched from South
Yemen, with Soviet backing) are three good examples of
this failure, Moreover, U.S. intelligence failed to ascertain
that the Saudis and other moderate Arab governments
would not support the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. This,
along with the Iranian situation, has led to a definite cool-
ing of U.S.-Saudi relations.
Meanwhile, the Soviets, through the introduction of
military advisors and technicians throughout Africa and
the Middle East, are taking the initiative in the area of in-
telligence operations in the Middle East and the Persian
Gulf. These U.S. failures have led the Administration to
belatedly order the CIA and the DIA to improve in-
telligence collection on "political currents" in these areas.
How successful these efforts will be, given the scarcity of
U.S. contacts, is highly debatable.
U.S. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
America's growing inability to detect changes in the
political/military balance also deser~si'+atidtly5t~:'"F~'S.
strategic intelligence, throughout the 1960s and into the
mid-1970s, consistently underestimated both the Soviet
strategic build-up and the steady increase of Soviet military
spending. In 1973 U.S. intelligence inaccurately predicted
that Israel would not be attacked by the Arabs. Recently
U.S. intelligence has continued these trends. Some ex-
amples include:
1) Underestimating North Korean troop strength by
25%, leading to a reversal in President Carter's
South Korean troop withdrawal policy;
2) Inability to confirm whether a nuclear explosion ac-
tually occurred over the Indian Ocean last
September, and if so, who did it;
3) Inability to anticipate the rapid shift of Soviet sup-
port from Somalia to Ethiopia;
4) A reported disagreement between U.S. and Israeli
intelligence as to the possibility of a major Soviet
airlift of military supplies and personnel to South
Yemen and Ethiopia during Soviet maneuvers in the
middle east last August;
5) In 1977 the CIA revised its intelligence estimates on
Soviet oil production, concluding that Moscow
..would be ?a net oil importeF in the 1980s. Yet the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and many Western
petroleum experts, disagree with these estimates.
The most recent major failure of U.S. intelligence has
been in the U.S. assessment of North Yemen's military and
political relationship with the Soviet Uriion. North Yemen
is now receiving large quantities of military arms (MIG-
21 s, T-55 and T-62 tanks) from the Soviet Union. Yet, ear-
ly last year, U.S. transfers of close to $400 million of
military equipment to North Yemen (via Saudi Arabia)
were based on the assessment that North Yemen was mov-
ing toward the Western camp. The Soviets have also sent
hundreds of military and intelligence personnel into North
Yemen to train its army, police and security services. This
is the same procedure that the Soviets used to consolidate
their influence over Angola, Mozambique and South
Yemen.
CAUSES OF THE FAILURES
The failures of American intelligence in the recent past
point to serious problems in the organization and purposes
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
of the U.S. intelligence community, and especially in the
CIA. These problems derive from two general causes: the
internal reforms of the CIA in the early 1970s and the ex-
ternal exposures and consequent limitations placed on it in
the late 1970s in the wake of Congressional investigations,
journalistic exposures and the defection of CIA officers.
Under the directorship of James R. Schlesinger and
William E. Colby efforts were made to modernize and
reform the whole purpose and structure of the CIA.
Previously, the CIA had been regarded (and appears to
have regarded itself) as the instrument responsible for
clandestine and covert operations essential to national
security. Under Schlesinger and Colby, however, there oc-
curred ashift away from clandestinity and covert action
toward a greater capacity for the analysis of information
and a greater reliance on technical (e.g., satellite) collec-
tion rather than human intelligence. As a result, some 2000
officers of the CIA were forcibly retired-many of them
the most experienced and most knowledgeable personnel
available to a profession that requires both experience and
human qualities that are by nature uncommon. Under
President Carter's DCI (Director of Central Intelligence),
Admiral Stansfield Turner, these cutbacks continued.
Another 820 officers-all of them from 4500-man Deputy
Directorate of Operations, which is responsible for covert
actions-were discharged, and this number amounted to
about 15% of the total personnel of DDO.
These cutbacks and the redirection of the mission of the
CIA occurred almost simultaneously with the congres-
sional investigations of the Church and Pike Committees,
with the passage of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, and with various media
exposures, suppositions, and conspiracy theories that
targeted the CIA as the villain in a number of recent
mysterious controversies. The effect of these events was
twofold. First, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, seeking to
make intelligence more responsible to elected authorities,
required the President to approve all covert actions before
they were actually undertaken (thus effectively preventing
the President from claiming deniability in the event that
the action was exposed). The Amendment also increased to
six the number of congressional committees involved in in-
telligence oversight, and in 1978 two more committees
were added for a total of eight. In the Senate alone, the
nuttib~r' of Senators who now have intelligence oversight
responsibilities by virtue of their membership on these
committees is 74-three-fourths of the total membership
of the chamber. Thus, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment vast-
ly increased the likelihood of leaks of classified informa-
tion and operations while diminishing the possibility of the
government's effectively denying an exposed covert action.
Secondly, the wave of exposures and investigations by
the media and Congress contributed to the demoralization
of intelligence personnel. The intelligence profession is a
thankless one at best, with little visibility, public
acknowledgement, or financial reward and frequently with
considerable danger. The revelations of the 1970s con-
tributed to a myth that covert action was inherently a
brutal, deceptive, and usually criminal activity. However,
the demoralization of the intelligence community was not
due merely to apparent ingratitude from the public. In
1975 Richard Welch, CIA chief of station in Athens,
Greece, was assassinated by unknown gunmen shortly
after the revelation of his name and position in Philip
Agee's publication, Counterspy. Clearly, intelligence per-
sonnel would be reluctant to operate at their maximum ef-
ficiency if the chance of being exposed by journalists, un-
wary congressmen, or disgruntled colleagues persisted.
Furthermore, some intelligence services of foreign states
may be reluctant to share information or cooperate with
the U.S. services. The practical effect of these restrictions
became clear in 1978, when the CIA refused a request from
its sister Italian service to provide assistance in the terrorist
kidnapping of Aldo Moro. Admiral Turner apparently
feared that under the Hughes-Ryan restrictions, such
assistance could be considered "covert operations" and
that leakage of CIA help might result in further political
attacks on the agency. Nor were the sources, collaborators,
and foreign supporters of U.S. intelligence encouraged by
the leaks that could result in their own exposure, profes-
sional ruin, imprisonment, or death.
It is in this atmosphere, then, of scandal, ridicule,
demoralization, and reluctant cooperation that the recent
failures of U.S. intelligence must be assessed. The current
debate over the re-chartering of the CIA and reform and
redirection of U.S. intelligence has not yet fully ap-
preciated either the causes of these failures or the real
needs and purposes of the intelligence function. While the
U.S. concerns itself with the relationship of intelligence to
civil liberties, the Soviets and their surrogates have con-
tinued to use their own intelligence services as destabilizing
weapons of political warfare. The KGB and the GRU
dominate the intelligence services of Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and other satellite states.
They have provided special training for state security serv-
ices in Somalia, Libya, Mozambique, and other Third
World countries. They have given training, weapons,
funds, and moral support to terrorist movements in
Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They
maintain extensive facilities in Western states for the
clandestine and illegal collection of intelligence through es-
pionage (both human and technical and directed against
both governments and private industries), and often abuse
Soviet diplomatic privileges in the process. Finally, they
have been involved in "disinformation" operations
damaging to the U.S. through forgeries and hostile pro-
paganda, and have engaged in punitive actions against
anti-Soviet journalists that have resulted in their Murder
on foreign soil.
The need for an intelligence service that can meet the
challenge of the Soviets and their surrogates through
clandestine and covert operations is therefore clear, but the
debate thus far has concentrated on the need to respect
civil liberties and the "right to know." As important as
civil liberties are, it has always been axiomatic that they are
secondary in importance to national security and the sur-
vival of the society, without which there are no rights at all
or for anyone. It is therefore to be hoped that the debate
on U.S. intelligence in the future will start from the
premise that intelligence must be functional to national
security, and not that it should be restricted by the
obsessive concern with juridical abstractions. Only if the
intelligence community is given a mission that responds to
the threats of national security can it effectively deal with
these threats and in the process become one of the
strongest safeguards of freedom.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
Congress and U.S. Intelligence
The state of the U.S. intelligence community is, in a
word, alarming. The operations of the Central Intelligence
Agency have been severely curtailed, both by executive
order and by attrition, as well as through relentless media
and congressional exposure and exploitation of alleged
past abuses. Domestically, the nation's intelligence
capability is all but gone. Law enforcement intelligence has
been rendered impotent or nonexistent.
The remedy for this situation lies with several sources,
one of them the Congress of the United States. Congress is
currently considering adoption of basic legislative charters
for both the CIA and the FBI. The problem is, however,
compounded by the probable intent of Congress in this
area; it is wise to recall that any such Congressional action
will be grounded in the revelations of the Church Commit-
tee report of 1976, which provided the curious with a
catalogue of alleged past abuses by the intelligence com-
munity. Senator Church's pithy characterization of the
CIA as a "rogue elephant out of control" will not inspire
confidence among those who realize that it is essential to
the effective operation of the domestic and foreign in-
telligence agencies that there be sufficient leeway for them
to remain suitably flexible in discharging their functions
under the broad Constitutional authority of the executive
in this area.
Indeed, it is precisely this which has given rise to ap-
prehension with respect to the proposed legislative charters
(the charter for the CIA is still to come, although there are
indications that the Bureau charter now before Congress
can be taken as a "bellwether" for the community in
general). The problem, in the view of many seasoned pro-
fessional observers, lies in the fact that current usages will,
if the proposed charters come to fruition, be "set in con-
crete" and effectively hamstring these agencies almost
beyond hope of remedy; at present, these restrictions could
easily be altered by a President or Attorney General with a
desire to do so. Thus, one possible Congressional ac-
complishment in reforming the intelligence community
could well become a positive danger to the nation as we are
faced with the rising menace of organized terrorism at
home and intelligence failures abroad without a counter-
vailing intelligence capability which takes into account the
paramount need for flexibility in dealing with the "untidy
world" to which former CIA Director Richard Helms has
adverted.
One area in which Congress might well legislate con-
structively would be in amendment of the Freedom of In-
formation Act. At present, the hemorrhaging of secrets
under the provisions of the Act has caused a drastic decline
in the ability of the intelligence community to recruit and
maintain foreign and domestic informants and gather sen-
sitive intelligence data. An exceptionally comprehensive
report on the general erosion of intelligence, issued in 1978
by the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, has gone largely
unnoticed in the press and elsewhere, although Senator Or-
rin Hatch (R-Utah), a member of the Judiciary Commit-
tee, introduced two bills last month (S. 2086 and S. 2087)
to alleviate this and related problems by effecting needed
changes in both the Freedom of Information Act and the
Privacy Act. The U.S. may also need to enact legislation
making it a criminal offense to expose the identity of U.S.
intelligence agents overseas.
It is also possible that both the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act and the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amend-
mentmight be:amended to;good effect.;T?e fgrmEr has its-
posed another layer of judicial restriction in the use of elec-
tronic surveillance that increases the likelihood of potential
leaks of highly sensitive data. Former U.S. Solicitor
General Robert Bork has argued that such restriction may
well be an unconstitutional infringement on the power of
the executive to conduct such activity in the interests of na-
tional security. Moreover, as Bork has also noted, the act
brings the judiciary into an area (foreign intelligence) in
which it is not competent to judge the national security re-
quirements of the country. The latter requires that covert
action overseas be reported to as many as eight committees
of Congress, when it can be argued that the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees would probably be suffi-
cient (or a single joint committee), if only from the stand-
point of maintaining necessary security in this extremely
sensitive area.
Specialists believe that the Congress should reinstitute
continuing inquiry into the origins, nature, and activities
of groups which have as their aim the destruction of the
United States government and the subversion of its lawful
processes. At this juncture, the House and Senate do not
maintain oversight of those revolutionary groups and
foreign operatives which are the proper objects of the
community's concern. If agencies like- the CIA and FBI
were able to operate with reasonable flexibility in this area
with mandates which allowed them to do the job, there
might be at least some argument against such bodies on the
ground of duplication, although such argument would
overlook the need of Congress to inquire in the area in
order to legislate intelligently. The fact is that the House
Committee on Internal Security passed out of existence in
1975; and the House Judiciary Committee, which sup-
posedly now has jurisdiction, has done nothing to
discharge this function. Further, the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee, a part of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, has also been abolished. Thus, Congress
does not now have the professional staff and expertise to
study the operations of those who would destroy the coun-
try from within or from without. In the view of many long-
time professionals, reestablishment of such bodies would
be an invaluable first step in redressing the balance which
has, since the Watergate era, tipped disastrously against
the national security interests of the United States.
J
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
+.. ~=.~ ? ,~- c ~ ror~... ,~~ -~~ mss # ,~ ~ ?~9:.-~
~~~r
x?:~4~ ?!.;f~S.S~i^ ... ..w, ,.. `~... E ,t?~` i=A~~a ``h,ms "~~. 'rij.~.~' ~a..T~ ~ ~:`;. ..
Armed Services Vote. The 10-0 vote (7 abstentions) by the
Senate Armed Services Committee approving a report con-
cludingthat the SALT I I treaty "is not in the national securi-
ty interests of the United States" is considered a "major vic-
tory" by anti-SALT forces on the Hill. The feeling persists
on the Hill that previously uncommitted senators will find it
increasingly difficult to justify support for renewed action
on the treaty on the basis of its strategic merits, given the
report's highly critical analysis of the treaty's strategic im-
plications. Moreover, the publicity and national exposure
given to the report's Critique is just beginning to be felt na-
tionwide. Observers feel that as these arguments become
more widely publicized, public support for the treaty will
erode even further:
Rhodesian Aid. With the arrival of British Governor Lord
Soames in Salisbury, congressional attention is now shifting
toward the financing of the Rhodesian peace settlement.
While the Administration has assured the British that the
U.S. will contribute to an international peace fund for
Rhodesia (the contribution could be as high as $1 billion),
both the Administration and the Congress are stressing that
U.S. aid must be made part of abroad-based reconstruction
effort. Members on both sides of the aisle appear to be oppos-
ingany funding proposal that will restrict the U.S. aid effort
to solely enable Rhodesian blacks to expropriate land owned
by white Rhodesian farmers and landowners.
Central American Security Assistance. A major issue to fac-
ing the Congress when it reconvenes after the Christmas
recess will be the disposition of the "Special Central
Assistance and Caribbean Security Assistance Act." This
act, introduced at the request of the Administration, would
authorize close to $100 million in flexible economic support
funding for countries in these regions. Approximately $75
million of that total will be earmarked to assist in the
"reconstruction of the Nicaraguan economy." While the
Administration believes that the assistance will help insure
the Nicaraguan junta from turning to Castro for advice and
assistance, many oil the-Hill are contending we will be sub-
sidizing another future Marxist state.
Defense Budget. Although the Administration hopes that
the preview of its FY 1981 defense budget and 5-year
defense program will ease the way for the ratification of
the SALT II treaty, many uncommitted senators are still
not convinced that the budget levels are adequate. Sources
on the Hill indicate that a group of fence-sitting senators
will pressure the Administration to ask for an FY 1980 sup-
plemental appropriation to have some of the money "up
front" as the FY 1981 budget is debated in Congress. A
major reason for congressional concern is that the Carter
FY 1981 budget used an inflation factor of only 7.67%,
and that decreasing inflation estimates were used for the
remaining "out-years" of the 5-year plan. Concern still ex-
ists, however, that even if a supplemental appropriation is
forthcoming, the extra funding will be insufficient in the
areas of a new strategic bomber, air defense, quick fix
strategic programs to reduce Minuteman vulnerability,
ABM research and development and civil defense.
Persian Gulf Basing. Sources on the Hill indicate that
Senator Richard Stone (D-Fla.) is ready to once again call
on the Administration to seriously considering a proposal
to base U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. The Administra-
tion's examination of possible longrange options for in-
creasing U.S. influence in the Gulf includes the option of
placing permanent military bases and a new military com-
mand in the Gulf area. Stone raised the basing proposal
with the Administration early last year, but Egyptian op-
position helped stymie the plan. Insiders report that Egyp-
tian opposition to the plan is softening, and that Stone is
prepared to bring up the basing proposal with Administra-
tion national security advisors.
NATO TNF Decision. The decision of NATO's Council of
Ministers to support theater nuclear force (TNF) modern-
ization has largely diffused congressional support for Ad-
ministration arguments contending that a defeat of SALT
II would jeopardize both TNF modernization and the
prospects for SALT III. Coming as it does in the midst of
substantial uncertainty as to the outcome of SALT II, the
NATO decision is seen on the Hill as an indication that the
European commitment to counter the Soviet theater
nuclear build-up transcended in importance any reserva-
tions Europe might have had over the implications of a
SALT II defeat in the Senate.
SALT and the MX. Congressional politicking over the MX
race-track missile system is expected to become more in-
tense when Congress reconvenes this month. SALT II
critics now feel that pro-SALT forces in Congress were
tentatively supporting the race-track system solely out of a
fear for the fate of the treaty. With SALT now delayed,
the support among pro-SALT senators for the race-track
system may significantly erode. More important, however,
are the concerns being raised by SALT II skeptics, in-
cluding Senator Henry Jackson, as to the cost and effec-
tiveness of the race-track as compared to a vertically-
deployed MX, and the strength of the Administration's
MX commitment itself.
Congressional Hearings of Interest.
Senate Banking Committee:
International Finance Subcommittee:
January 15: 10:00 a.m. 5302 DSOB
Hearings to be held on international technology trans-
fers in integrated circuits relating to the electronics
industry.
Senate Judiciary Committee:
Dates TBA: 9:30 a.m. 2228 DSOB
Hearings to be held on S. 1612, governing charter
for the FBI.
Senate Armed Services Committee:
Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee:
January 1980 Dates: Time and Place TBA
Hearings to Continue on Military Recruiting practices
in the armed services.
J
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
Adler, Emanuel. "Executive Command and Control in
Foreign Policy: The CIA's Covert Activities." Orbis,
Fall 1979, pp. 671-696.
Barron, John. KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents.
(New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974).
Bennett, Charles E. "Legislation to Protect Identities of
U.S. Intelligence Officers." Congressiona/ Record,
April 30, 1979, pp. E 1870-1871.
Brownfeld, Allen C. "The Intelligence Gap," reprinted in
Congressional Record, January 22, 1979, p. E 135.
Cline, Ray S. Secrets, Scholars and Spies. (Washington:
Acropolis, 1977).
Colby, William. Honorable Men: My Life With the CIA.
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).
Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. (New York: Har-
per and Row, 1963).
Francis, Samuel T. "Latin American Terrorism: The
Cuban Connection." Heritage Foundation,
Backgrounder No. 104, November 9, 1979.
Godson, Roy (ed). Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s:
Elements of Intelligence, Consortium for the Study of
Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy In-
formation Center, 1979).
Ignatius, David. "Should the U.S. Revive Its Covert-
Action Capability?" Wall Street Journal, November 30,
1979, p. 24; and "Experts Fear That U.S. Loses Es-
pionage Battle With Soviet Union." Wall Street Jour-
nal, October 4, 1979, pp. 1, 21.
r
Laird, Melvin. "Why We Need Spies." Reader's Digest,
March 1979.
Latimer, Thomas K. "U.S. Intelligence and the Congress."
Strategic Review, Summer 1979, pp. 47-56.
Lefever, Ernest W., and Roy Godson. The CIA and the
American Ethic: An Unfinished Debate. (Washington
D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, January 1980).
Meyer, Cord. "Pakistan's Sea of Troubles." Washington
Star, December 1, 1979, p. A-9; and, "Why Intelligence
on Cuba was Inadequate." Washington Star, October
1, 1979, p. A- 11.
Poole, William T. and Samuel T. Francis. "Terrorism in
America: The Developing Internal Security Crisis."
Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 59, June2, 1978.
Powers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard
Helms and the CIA. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1979).
Robinson, Clarence A. "USSR Cuba Force Clouds Debate
on SALT." Aviation Week and Space Technology,
September 10, 1979, pp. 16-19.
Rudd, Eldon. "A Policy That Will Destroy the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence
Agency." Congressional Record, March 20, 1979, pp. E
1232-1234.
Schemmer, Benjamin F. "The Slow Murder of the Ameri-
can Intelligence Community." Armed Forces Journal,
March 1979; and, "The Intelligence Community's Case
Against Turner." Washington Post, Apri18, 1979, p. D-1.
Szulc, Tad. "Shaking Up the C.I.A." New York Maga-
zine, July 2S, 1979.
Nationa/ Security Record, Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., Publisher; Wayne A. Schroeder, Editor. The Heritage Foundation, 513 C
Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002; [phone]. CABLE: HERITAGE WASHDC: TELEX: 440235. Subscription
rate-$25/year. Nothing herein is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an at-
tempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. Reproduction is granted provided that proper attribution is
given. ISSN /i0162-3206.
e
`Helitag~ `FoundatiorL
J
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
 ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
~ iii
i .~ -~i~
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: Herb Berkowitz
CIA REFORMS SAID TO LEAVE AGENCY "DEGRADED," U.S. HELPLESS
WASHINGTON, January 9, 1980 -- Despite assurances from the
Administration that U.S. "intelligence" operations are adequate,
the crisis in Iran and a string of other U.S. foreign policy
setbacks indicate that "U.S, intelligence capabilities have been
degraded to such an extent" that they are no longer an effective
arm of U.S. foreign policy.
That's the assessment of security analysts at The Heritage
Foundation, writing on the "Intelligence Gap" in the current issue
of the National Security Record newsletter.
They blame the breakdown on the internal reforms within t:1e
CIA in the early 1970s and the external exposures and resulting
limitations placed on the agency in the late 1970s in the wake of
Congressional investigations. These reforms resulted in the forcible
retirement of some 2,,OOOmostly senior officers, and the discharge
of another 820 officers from the super-secret Deputy Directorate
of Operations, which is responsible for covert actions.
"Throughout the post-World War II era, the United States has
relied upon foreign intelligence activities to support U.S. interests
overseas. Clandestine collection, counterintelligence and covert
operations have all been essential elements of the U.S. intelligence
(more)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
effort. Yet today, as at no other time in the post-war era
... (a) growing consensus is emerging that U.S. intelligence
capabilities have been degraded to such an extent that the U.S.
is increasingly incapable of identifying and recruiting sources
overseas, conducting effective counterespionage activities at
home, and of using covert actions to anticipate or alter the
course of events abroad to benefit the U.S. interests."
In addition to Iran, which caught the U.S. totally off-guard,
several other examples of intelligence community failures are
cited:
1) "U.S. intelligence consistently misinterpreted the intent
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan." In fact, the Heritage
analysts say, it was only in late December (1979) that the Admini-
stration finally acknowledged "that the Soviet military build-up
represented a threat to regional security. Yet, over the past two
years, the Soviets took virtual command of Afghani military operations..."
2) Cancellation of SR-71 reconnaissance flights in 1977 and
the "decline in the human espionage effort in Cuba led to a failure
to monitor the Soviet military build-up in Cuba and Cuba's support
of revolution and terrorism throughout Latin America."
3) In 1973 L1.S. intelligence inaccurately predicted that Israel
would not be attacked by the Arabs.
4) More recently, underestimating North Korean troop strength
by 25 percent led to President Carter having to reverse his previously
announced troop withdrawal policy.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0
-3-
5) The U.S. has been unable to confirm whether a nuclear
explosion actually occurred over the Indian Ocean last September,
and if so, who was responsible.
6) The U.S. was not able to anticipate the rapid shift of
Soviet support from Somalia to Ethiopia.
7) In 1977 the CIA revised its intelligence estimates on
Soviet oil production, concluding that Moscow would be a net oil
importer through the 1980s. "Yet the Defense Intelligence Agency,
and many Western petroleum
experts, disagree with these estimates."
"While the U.S. concerns itself with the relationship of inter.--
ligence to civil liberties, the Soviets or their surrogates have
continued to use their own intelligence services as destabilizing
weapons of political warfare," the Heritage analysts write.
They conclude that as important as civil liberties and the
public's right to know may be, "it has always been axiomatic that
they are secondary in importance to national security and the sur-
vival of the society, without which there are no rights at all or
for anyone. It is therefore to be hoped that the debate on U.S.
intelligence must be functional to national security, and not that
it should be restricted by the obsessive concern with juridical
abstractions. Only if the intelligence community is given a mission
that responds to the threats of national security can it effectively
deal with these threats and in the process become one of the strong-
est safeguards of freedom."
The Heritage Foundation is a non-partisan public policy institute
dedicated to individual and economic freedom, limited government, and
a strong national defense.
1-79
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100490034-0