USING SOVIET LEND-LEASE PAYMENTS TO FUND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100390032-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/09: CIA-RDP90-0
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CHRISTI.kN SCIENCE :'ONITOR
3 July 1985
[91;i ik"11111
Using Soviet lenil-eae payments to fund
cultural exchange
Ely Holt
THERE are so many issues in US-Soviet relations
that the lend-lease debt stemming from World War
II tends to be overlooked. But this is one issue
with a relatively simple solution.
First some background: Under the Lend-Lease Act of
1941, the United States sent billions of dollars of war
materiel to its allies while postponing the question of pay-
ment until after the war. In the euphoria of victory, the
United States forgave all except materiel which would be
useful to the postwar civilian economy (trucks, for exam-
ple). In the case of the Soviet Union, this residual civil-
ian-type lend-lease was valued by the United States at
$2.6 billion (out of total lend-lease to the Soviet Union of
$10.8 billion). The Soviet government at first offered to
pay $170 million.
Negotiations dragged on intermittently for 25 years.
Then in 1972 agreement was reached on $722 million to
be paid in installments running through 2001. The catch
was that the lend-lease settlement_was dependent on im-
plementation of a trade agreement under which the US
would extend most-favored-nation treatment to the So-
viet Union. -The trade agreement was scuttled by the
Jackson-Variik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974,
which made most-favored-nation treatment contingent
on Soviet liberalization of Jewish emigration. When the
Soviets balked on emigration, the trade and lend-lease
agreements came crashing down. By that point, the Sovi-
ets had actually paid $48 million, leaving a balance of
The suggestion here is that the United States propose From the Soviet point of view, the objection will be
to the Soviet Union that payments be resumed and that that the visiting Americans will subvert the Soviet eo-
they be earmarked for educational and cultural exchange pie with the alien ideas of Thomas Jefferson and that the
- for the support of Americans studying or teaching in pr__gram will most likely provide cover for hordes o_ f CIA
the Soviet Union and of Soviet citizens studying or teach- agents. (Congress_has insisted that the CIA stay hit of
ing in the United States. This would represent a major theFulbnghttro am, and the CIAs ys it has done so.)
expansion of one of the most successful American for- Some' Americans w' voice mi ror images oTthese Soviet
eign policies - the program under which Fulbright objections. T - `-~
scholars have covered the world. (The Fulbright program None of these anxieties in either Washington or Mos-
was also originally financed with surplus property left cow is substantial. If one takes them seriously, one is led
over at the end of World War II.) In no country do we inexorably to the conclusion that the gulf between the
need such a program more than in the Soviet Union. United States and the Soviet Union is permanent and
Such a disposition of the lend-lease debt should be unbridgeable. Such a conclusion points to disaster.
attractive to the Soviets. Since the exchanges would be An exchange program by itself will not avoid disaster.
mutual and since the expenses of Americans in the So But it will at least light a small, flickering candle in the
viet Union would be paid in rubles, the dollar cost of the darkness that now surrounds us.
settlement to the USSR would be cut in half. An ex.
change agreement would also fill the need Soviet leaden
Gorbachev apparently feels to take an initial step for.
ward in improving his relations with the US.
It would fill the same need for President Reagan, and
it would have the further advantage of not affecting the
budget. The program would be paid for with money
which otherwise we would not get.
From the point of view of both countries, the pro-
gram's most important advantages are broader and
longer lasting. It would begin to nibble away at the vast
culture gap between the two countries and at the moun-
tains of ignorance and stereotypes which affect the way
the two peoples perceive each other. A small example of
the kind of cultural exchange that could be fostered was
provided a few weeks ago when a group of people from
the American state of Georgia got together with a group
from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. The im-
provement in US-Chinese relations began with a touring
American ping-pong team.
The program envisaged here, of course, would go far
beyond feeding visitors Southern barbecue or playing
ping-pong with them. It would give significant numbers
of American and Soviet citizens the opportunity to study
or to teach in the other country. On the basis of our ex-
perience with the Fulbright program, we can assume that
a substantial percentage of these participants would turn
out to be influential leaders over the next generation.
Two objections - one American, one Soviet - may
be anticipated. In the US, some people will worry that
Russians coming to the United States will not be content
to study American history or government or literature
but will want to study physics or computer science and
learn our technological secrets. (It is not possible to keep
technology secret, but some people think it is.) Or the So-
viets might want to go to the Harvard Business School or
Iowa State University and learn how to run their econo-
my and agriculture better. (In the process they might also
decide that there is something to be said for the life styles
Pat M. Holt, former chief of staff of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, writes on foreign af-
fairs from Washington.
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