NEXT AFIO CONVENTION OCTOBER 1-2; BOB BROWN IS NEW CHAIRMAN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2
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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
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Next AFIO Convention October 1-2;
Bob Brown Is New Chairman
AFIO's Board of Governors has decided that the
date of the next AFIO national convention will be
October 1-2, 1982 and will be held in the Washington,
D.C. area. The San Diego chapter, which had requested
that the convention be held in its area, has withdrawn
its offer because of a number of difficulties they would
encounter this year.
Robert Brown has been selected as the new chair-
man for the AFIO '82 Convention. Mr. Brown is a 30
year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (1950-
1980) where he held a variety of senior operational and
staff positions in the DDO. (He was awarded the distin-
guished Intelligence Medal for his work there.) Prior to
his CIA employment, he served in the U.S. Navy (1944-
1946). Mr. Brown is in the process of selecting his
committee and determining the best hotel sites in the
Washington area for the next convention. AFIO mem-
bers will be kept informed of his progress in the next
edition of Periscope.
Legislative Pots Bubbling
in the Congress
John S. Warner, AFIO's legal adviser, has written
the following roundup of current Congressional activity
concerning matters of intelligence concern:
What hath Congress wrought? As far as the intelli-
gence community is concerned, the answer is - not
very much. The Intelligence Identities Protection Act
(HR-4) was passed by the House by an overwhelming
vote of 354-56 late in 1981. (The details of the floor
debate are included in our AFIO News Commentary
sent out to members on January 1, 1982.)
(cont'd on page 5)
Welch Memorial Fund Drive
Opened To Clarify
U.S. Intelligence Aims
A drive has been opened by a number of former
intelligence officers to solicit contributions for the
Richard S. Welch Memorial Fund, at Harvard University's
School of Government and Center for International
Affairs.
The prime purpose of this Memorial Fund will be to
encourage the teaching and talking about intelligence at
Harvard and across the country. The sponsors state that
the topics to be addressed by the Fund will include the
(cont'd on page 3)
AFIO Spring Luncheon
The spring luncheon of AFIO is tentatively
scheduled for March 29 at the Fort Myer Officers'
Club, Arlington, Virginia. The speaker will be
Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Lawrence J.
Brady, who will discuss the technology flow from
the U.S. to the Soviet Union.
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KGB Disinformation: A Senior Defector Speaks
(Final Installment)
(We conclude the re-printing of the highly interesting
and revealing views of Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a 1980 KGB
defector whose last cover assignment was that of
Novosti editor. Mr. Dzhirkvelov was interviewed in En-
gland in mid-1981 by the editor of the American Bar
Association's Intelligence Report The first portion of the
interview appeared in our last (Vol. Vl, No. 4) issue of
Periscope.)
Dzhirkvelov: Here is a fresh example of "pure" dis-
information. On May 26, 1981, the Soviet newspaper
Izvestia under the heading CIA Sabotage informed its
readers that the paper Noticias de Beira of Mozambique
published a series of articles (a series, not just one arti-
cle) on the subversive activity of the CIA. The series
""revealed" that "from 1961 to 1976 the CIA organized
nearly 900 operations against politicians and govern-
ments in different countries." It is a remarkable analyti-
cal work-especially if we recall that in 1961 the
present Mozambique (and its apparently formidable
intelligence service) simply did not exist. The source,
therefore, is quite clearly distinguishable.
I must, however, make it absolutely clear that in
disinformation the KGB is only the arm, the tool, the
performing force. The aims for disinformation are set,
the targets are chosen and the plans made only by the
""apparatus" and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central
Committee.
Q. What can you tell us about the role of the
KGB in manipulating front organizations and orches-
trating internal campaigns like the recent campaigns
against the neutron warhead and the modernization
of theater nuclear weapons? What specifically does
the KGB do to assist these campaigns?
A. Every Soviet organization-be it a state office or
a "society" of any kind-is studded with KGB officers
and informers if this organization deals with foreigners.
This is true also for Soviet delegations at any interna-
tional congress or meeting, whether the host organiza-
tion is a front one or a genuine one. But the KGB itself
does not "supervise" front organizations; neither does it
launch or conduct any campaigns. This is the preroga-
tive of the Central Committee departments, acting on
the sanction of the Secretaries. The actions of various
kinds may indeed be performed by the KGB officers
using some cover in the international organizations-
but never on the decision of just the KGB. The KGB
capabilities abroad, especially in the West, are certainly
used to propagate the Central Committee line and
""mobilize" public opinion in campaigns against neutron
warheads, etc. But no more than "used."
Q. The author Claire Sterling in her recent book
charges that the KGB has been heavily involved in
supporting international terrorism. Is this a matter
about which you have personal knowledge, and if you
do, could you tell us what you know about the degree
of this involvement, the geographic target areas, the
principal surrogate organizations through which the
KGB has worked, and its mode, or modes, of
operation?
A. Let us speak separately of two kinds of terror-
ism. There are terrorist groups like the "Red Brigades"
in Italy or the former Baader-Meinhof group in Germany
and the like. I dare say that the KGB has nothing to do
with those-even if they use Soviet made weapons. The
KGB did "liquidate," or made attempts to "liquidate"
some leaders of anti-Soviet organizations, of emigres
like Bandera, Rebet, Konovalenko and others-among
them former Soviet citizens who remained, or intended
to remain, in the West. But that was done by the KGB
itself, without relying on usually unstable terrorist
groups, often hostile to the Soviet Union.
There is, however, the other kind of international
terrorism helped and sponsored by the KGB. I mean the
"'national liberation" movements in African, Asian, Latin
American and even European (Ireland) countries. Prom-
inent in this category is, no doubt, the Palestinian Liber-
ation Organization. It is certainly used as one of the
main tools in the fight against Israel and even against
the Western democracies. In the training of the "figh-
ters" for the Palestinian and other "movements", active
assistance is sought (and received) from Bulgarian, East
German and Cuban special services. The urban guerril-
las are trained on Soviet territory, in the three above
mentioned "brotherly" countries, and now also on the
territory of several African states-like Angola, Congo,
Mozambique and possibly Libya.
The supply routes for those "movements" may
vary. In my time a lot of weapons and ammunition was
sent through Tanzania. However, the goods-and espe-
cially arms-for the Soviet sponsored terrorists do not
always safely reach their destinations. I remember a
case when a consignment of 30,000 automatic rifles
and other military equipment was delivered from the
USSR to Tanzania under some disguise-and then dis-
appeared without a trace. Rumors persisted in Africa
that a group of smart Tanzanian "businessmen" had
sold the arms "on the side" for an astronomical amount
of money and the Soviet Union thought it wise not to
claim the loss.
Q. There have been reports in the West that it is
official Soviet policy to wage what has been called a
'"resource war" by progressively denying the West
access to vital raw materials. In your KGB experience,
did you hear talk about the "resource war," and could
you tell us what you know about the direct involve-
ment of the KGB in this war?
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Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. Barrow,
Addresses AFIO Pearl Harbor Day Throng
Speaking before a Pearl Harbor Day luncheon
crowd of more than 450 AFIO members and guests at
the Ft. Myer Officers' Club, Marine Corps Comman-
dant Robert Barrow paid high tribute to U.S. intelli-
gence and to the effectiveness of the intelligence
community. Identifying himself as "a great friend of the
intelligence community," he said,
"Intelligence production often exceeds the capa-
bility [by its customers] to use it."
He delivered a rousing speech on the efforts of the
U.S. Marine Corps to maintain and improve the quality
of its personnel, avowing that he would rather see the
size of the Corps shrink rather than see the quality of its
personnel lowered. He commented that the current crop
of junior Marine officers is the best in his memory.
General Barrow was introduced to the sell-out
throng by another old Marine, AFIO President John M.
Maury. Following Barrow's address, the Hon. Clare
Boothe Luce, member of AFIO's Board of Governors,
also spoke informally to the luncheon crowd on her
memories of World War I I as a member of the House of
Representatives from Connecticut. Mrs. Luce has been
recently re-nominated to membership on the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
and has moved from Hawaii to Washington D.C.
AFIO Chapter Activities
(A sampling of recent Chapter activity is reported
below if you desire to have Periscope coverage of Chap-
ter events, please write to us promptly and with full
details.)
Western Montana Chapter held its Fall meeting 4
December 1981 at the Missoula Country Club and re-
elected Tom Nicholson, President; Terry Nobles, Vice-
President; Norman Larum, Secretary-Treasurer; and
Dick Grant, Chairman for Montana. Walt Sedoff, AFIO
member, lectured on life in Soviet Russia to the student
bodies of two western Montana high schools in January
1982. The Chapter has been expanding its membership
and now plans to hold quarterly meetings - a real
change when we consider the bitter winters around
Missoula.
Gulf Coast Chapter on November 6, 1981 held a
luncheon meeting in Houston, Texas, with a former Soviet
diplomat Dr. Vladimir Sakharov, and AFIO President
Jack M. Maury as guest speakers. More than 80 people
attended and the meeting was covered by the local ABC
and CBS TV affiliates as well as the press. At the close
of the meeting, Mr. Fred Rodell, Chapter President,
presented to Dr. Sakharov and Mr. Maury, on behalf of
the Governor of Texas, commissions of "Honorary Texas
Citizenship."
(cont'd on page 7)
Welch Memorial Fund
(cont'd from page 1)
rationale, historical importance, and contribution of
intelligence in creating an informed U.S. government
foreign and national policy; and a better national under-
standing and appreciation of the intelligence function.
As most AFIO members are aware, Dick Welch,
one of CIA's most promising officers, was assassinated
at the entrance to his home in Athens, Greece, on
December 23, 1975 by persons not yet apprehended by
the Greek government. At the time of his death, he was
serving as the CIA chief of station in Greece. The Memo-
rial Fund has been created as a means of commemorat-
ing Welch's love of his intelligence profession. Harvard
was chosen because Welch was a graduate (1951) of
that University.
The immediate goal of the fund-raisers is $50,000.
Among a long list of persons publicly supporting the
Fund are former Directors of Central Intelligence,
Richard M. Helms and William E. Colby; Ambassadors
(ret) Taylor Belcher and Delmar R. Carlson; Dr. Ray S.
Cline of Georgetown University; and a number of our
own AFIO luminaries including past President David
Atlee Phillips and our current President, Jack Maury.
AFIO members desiring to contribute to this worthy
cause, whose aims coincide with those listed in AFIO's
own charter, may make checks payable to the Richard S.
Welch Memorial Fund, and send them to Dean Bayley
Mason, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 79
Boylston Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. All contribu-
tions are tax-deductible and will be credited to the cur-
rent Harvard Campaign.
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KGB Disinformation: A Senior Defector Speaks
(cont'd from page 3)
A. The Soviet government has been paying much
attention to the "resource war" since the mid-forties. It
started with oil. As early as 1945 or 1946 a Soviet-
Iranian oil company called Kivirhurian was formed. The
Soviet director of the company was the KGB officer
Artavazd Mangasarov, a trained oil specialist. The aim
was to build a pipeline for getting cheap oil from both
Iran and Bahrein and gradually to make the Soviet
Union their only customer. These plans were thwarted
by Mossadegh who, on seizing power in Iran, imme-
diately nationalized all Soviet-Iranian companies.
Very significant from the point of view of the
resource war" was the turn in the long-range Soviet
policy towards Arab countries and Israel. I remember
how surprised we were in the KGB when it became
clear that the Soviet Union froze her relations with
Israel-initially very warm-and took the side of her
Arab foes. Our opinion was that Israel, a predomi-
nantly socialist country, well disposed to the Soviet
Union, was a much more useful ally in the Middle
East than any Arab country. Israel could have become
an excellent vehicle for intelligence and other penetra-
tion into the U.S.; indeed the saying was that whatever
would happen in the U.S. tomorrow was already known
in Israel today. Yet the Soviet leader-then Stalin-
decided to support the Arabs against Israel, and the rea-
son, we were told, was oil. The anti-Communist mood of
the late Egyptian president Nasser was ignored; it was
his pan-Arabic designs that tempted the USSR to gain
control of oil deposits in the Middle East. This long-term
policy has been carried on since. It is worth stressing
that at that time the USSR had virtually unlimited oil
resources and therefore the Soviet interest in Middle
East oil was clearly political: to deny use of oil to the
West.'
In 1971, when I was the TASS correspondent in
the Sudan, the Foreign Trade Minister of the USSR,
Patolichev, visited that country. He spoke to Soviet per-
sonnel in Khartoum on the aims and methods of Soviet
foreign trade. He mentioned as an achievement the new
treaty with Iran on supply of the natural gas which,
according to Patolichev, the Soviet Union could re-sell to
the West at a good profit. But he also stressed that, trade
advantages aside, oil and gas had, first of all, great stra-
tegic and political importance. "Stalin himself under-
stood it well," said the Soviet Minister.
As for the role of the KGB in the "resource war," it
is serious enough. Both the KGB and the GRU are gath-
ering intelligence world-wide on the availability of vari-
ous resources-to enable the Soviet leadership to act
precisely in the way which would hurt the Western
countries most. Then, the KGB is ordered to concentrate
its efforts on the countries important for their mineral
resources-both to obtain more information and to
'Translator's note. As a Soviet journalist in 1956, the translator
attended a briefing on the Middle East by the Central Committee lec-
turer German M. Sverdlov, who said: "Nasser is a Fascist but he has
his finger on the jugular vein of the West-and therefore we support
him."
influence the events in those countries. Stalin's goal of
depriving the West of the mineral resources of the
planet is still pursued.
Q. How much control does the KGB have over
intelligence operations conducted by Cuba and other
Communist bloc countries, how does the KGB exer-
cise that control, and how is the entire operation
coordinated?
A. It is a little misleading to speak of "control" by
the KGB over the intelligence services of other "social-
ist" countries. There is rather a very close partnership in
subversion against the West and in supporting various
anti-government organizations in the rest of the world.
Naturally, the KGB is an undisputed "senior partner"
but one should not diminish the initiative and activity of
others-notably of the Bulgarian, East German and
especially Cuban special services. A lot of support for
"national liberation" forces in Latin America and Africa
comes from those three countries.
The major actions, big concerted operations, are
discussed and agreed in advance with the Soviet side-
but then not just with the KGB, often at the higher level
(where the KGB is now, of course, represented by virtue
of its Chairman Yuri Andropov being a full Politbureau
member). Apart from that, in the intelligence services of
most "socialist" countries there are, as a rule, the KGB
"advisers" who coordinate (and possibly to a certain
extent control) all joint operations. They may be, of
course, just "keeping an eye" as well.
Q. As you are aware, there has been a good deal
of debate in the United States over the morality of
covert operations. Does the Soviet Politbureau
impose any restrictions on the kinds of covert opera-
tions from sabotage and assassination to support for
pro-Soviet parties and organizations in the West?
Could you give us a few examples of KGB covert
operations in each category?
A. All major operations conducted by the KGB
abroad are to be approved in advance by the top Central
Committee leaders-one of whom is, of course, the
KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov. But if such an "offer of
an operation" is made to the Central Committee Secret-
ariat, it very seldom is turned down, not only because
Andropov is in the Politbureau, but also because serious
operations are discussed by top KGB people beforehand
with the Central Committee "apparatchiks" who are
privy to such matters and who prepare the decisions
finally made by the Politbureau or Secretariat.
Here is an example from the past, but, to my best
knowledge, the decision-making process in this respect
has changed very little.
When we planned covert operations in Iran-like
abductions or "liquidations" of undesirable persons or
"'evacuation" of our valuable agents from there-we
had to obtain the go-ahead from Politbureau level (not
necessarily the whole Politbureau; there were members
(conci. on page 5)
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Notes From National
Decals and Pins
AFIO decals (circular, about 3 inches in diameter)
and AFIO pins are available for purchase. The cost of
each decal is $1.00 and that of each pin is $5.00. Cost of
postage is included in the price but please enclose your
check for the full amount with each order because AFIO
national headquarters does not have the facilities to bill
our members for such orders.
Speakers' Kit
As reported in our previous issue, we now have
ample supplies of our Speakers' Kits for sale at AFIO
headquarters. Cost of each Kit, which runs to over 150
pages, is $5.00 and checks must be sent with each
order. Overseas members must pay $10.00 to cover
additional postage costs.
Soviet Disinformation
(cont'd from page 4)
of it who made decisions on behalf of that whole body).
When, after the debacle of the KGB-staged uprising in
Iranian Azerbaidjan, we made plans for rescuing the
Central Committee members of the Tudeh party which
was the driving force behind the uprising, those plans
had to be approved by Stalin himself. I was then the
participant in the planning and peforming of that opera-
tion and I remember that Stalin rejected the idea of
sending an aeroplane to Iran (incidentally, to the same
plateau where much later a helicopter rescue operation
by some other country proved to be not really success-
ful). In any event, the Tudeh leaders were evacuated
from Iran by various individual routes. I personally
organized the border crossing by the Central Committee
Secretary called Kombakhsha, dressed as a woman,
from Iran to the Turkmenistan desert.
Q. At the time you defected from the USSR, the
post-Watergate campaign against the CIA and other
U.S. intelligence agencies was still going on. What
can you tell us about the KGB reaction to our self-
mutilation of our intelligence capability? Do you have
any knowledge of KGB involvement in the campaign
against our intelligence communities?
Legislative Pot Bubbles
(cont'd from page 1)
HR-4, as passed, is in accord with the Administra-
tion's and the intelligence community's view. AFIO also
supports this bill. S-391, as introduced by Senator Cha-
fee, is substantially identical to HR-4. But the road was
rocky in the Senate when the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee reported S-391 but amended it to resemble HR-4
before it was amended on the House floor to conform to
S-391 as introduced. [Editor's note: This is sometimes
the way things are. Bear with us.]
Much of the support to amend S-391 in committee
was generated by elements who simply wish to kill any
legislation of this subject. In my opinion, supported by
many Constitutional scholars, the assertions that the
mere concept of this legislation is unconstitutional, is
pure sham. Some of those same elements were shout-
ing "unconstitutional - First Amendment Rights" in the
two Marchetti cases and the Snepp case. They lost in
the courts and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected their
arguments. What they lost in the courts, they are now
trying to win in the halls of Congress.
The issue was not brought to a floor vote in the
Senate in 1981 and it will be scheduled for action, we
hope, early in this year's session, with strong efforts on
the floor to amend S-391 as reported, to return it to form
as originally introduced. I urge all AFIO members to
write to your two Senators requesting them to support
such action. This battle can be won and we have cau-
tious optimism that it will be.
FOIA and Other Legislative Amendments
Other likely legislation will be amendments to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). AFIO is monitoring
this and, when the appropriate legislative vehicle is
determined, you will be informed. The chances of
serious consideration of statutory charters is most slim.
Another legislative item of interest is the amend-
ment to the Federal Tort Claims Act which would
require individuals alleging violations of their constitu-
tional rights, to sue the U.S. Government and not indi-
vidual government employees. As you know, there have
been hundreds of law suits of this nature, naming indi-
vidual employees as defendants. This legislation is in
good form and would be effective. Enactment appears
likely.
A. Denunciations and "exposure" of the CIA and
other special services of the Western countries is, of
course, one of the most favored lines of the Soviet pro-
paganda machine. In this activity the help from the KGB
is always sought; it advises on targets, names, etc.,
inside the USSR, for internal consumption, and con-
ducts some "mobilization" of public opinion abroad.
Naturally, the KGB was delighted that the U.S. Congress
and the U.S. media were doing such a good job for
them. Yet it must be emphasized that the KGB was not
really taken in by the campaign. The KGB bosses never
believed that the CIA was "demolished" or "utterly
incapacitated." The KGB still retains a great deal of
respect for the CIA as the most sophisticated service of
its kind in the world. The American "self-mutilation"
was, for many a KGB chief, simply some strange deca-
dent propaganda.
Two New Executive Orders
In passing, I wish to mention two Executive Orders,
both issued on December 4, 1981. E.O. 12334 estab-
lishes the President's Intelligence Oversight Board to
inform the President of intelligence activities which are
believed to be in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States, executive orders, or Presidential
directives. The Chairman of this Board shall be desig-
nated by the President from among the appointed mem-
bership of the reconstituted President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
The other order, E.O. 12333, is a re-written direc-
tive governing "United States Intelligence Activities." It
replaces the over-restrictive executive order issued by
President Carter but does not "unleash CIA." It provides
a sensible and reasonable basis on which CIA and FBI
can go about their tasks in a more effective fashion.
5
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On the Intelligence Bookshelf ...
Current books of interest to intelligence buffs and watchers of
the world scene.
Blackford Oakes
Strikes Again
How It All Began ...
DONOVAN AND THE CIA, by Thomas F. Troy, University Publi-
cations of America (44 North Market St., Frederick, MD 21901),
1981, 589 pp., including illustration charts, bibliographic notes,
appendices and index. $29.95
It is a pleasure to be asked to write a commentary on this book,
not only because of the excellence of the product but also it is for me
an exercise in nostalgia. Of the latter, more later.
As to the book, it is meticulously researched. The author had
unusual access to almost all the pertinent record material. Tom Troy,
as I know, is an indefatigable pursuer of the facts both on paper and
through personal interviews. He also has perspective and the ability
to organize his material well. The result is a first rate historical
item-far and away the best on intelligence on the American scene
and well up with some of the recent excellent publications from the
British.
I happen to agree with Troy's argument in his preface to the
First Edition that there is definite historical connection between
Donovan and the creation of CIA, and later will support the argu-
ment from my own memory. But first, some comments on Troy's
unique contributions. One of the most useful is putting the role of
Sir William S. Stephenson into proper context; not to down-grade
him, as he played an important and useful part, but he was not quite
the eminence grise others would have him. Another is Troy's locat-
ing and describing all the documents which pertain to the growing
pains of OSS and the later debate on the concept for post-war intel-
ligence. The end product is pretty close to the definitive word on how
CIA came to be.
Having said that, I now come to the nostalgia and here Troy's
account does not accord in all respects with my memory. I have to
admit that whenever I took up a point with Troy on which we dif-
fered, he could almost always bring up some record that supported
his view, and I also am aware how treacherous one's memory can
be after nearly forty years. However, I have certain very clear pic-
tures in mind that vary somewhat from Troy's perception of some
events.
First, I would like to give credit for what I consider to be the
strong and important contribution of General John Magruder. He
was an unusual military man, coming from a distinguished military
family. Early in World War II, when he was, I believe, the senior
colonel on the Regular Army list, he was sent to the Far East by the
Army to assess the contribution that China's millions could make to
the land war against Japan. Contrary to the official assumption that
this would be massive, Magruder came to the conclusion that we
could expect no reliable or substantial military support from the Chi-
nese. I suspect but cannot prove that this was why Magruder was
assigned to OSS and remained there as a Brigadier General. He was
an intellectual and he thought deeply about intelligence, and had
become convinced that an independent and centralized intelligence
organization was essential for post-war needs. In the debate on this
subject, in the fall of 1945, Magruder was Acting Director of OSS
and then SSU. (Donovan was at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials
and played little part in this particular struggle.) As Acting Director,
Magruder, with valuable aid from his staff, was responsible for some
of the best papers arguing his and Donovan's points which I believe
were persuasive to such key prsonages on the scene, such as Ferdi-
nand Eberstadt (then a consultant to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal
on matters of unification, including intelligence) and Assistant
Secretary of War for Air, Robert Lovett, both of whom played major
roles in what emerged as CIG.
Troy does mention Magruder, and his importance is hard to
document, but I offer it as a personal impression.
I would also like to emphasize the contribution of (then) Major
General Lauris Norstad to the CIA legislation. One of the main bones
of contention was the relation of the Director to the President. Dono-
van had insisted that the DCI report directly to the President, while
most of the other participants wanted him to report to an interde-
partmental board similar to the National Intelligence Authority for
CIG. John Warner and I had drafted a bill in SSU starting in early
MARCO POLO, IF YOU CAN, By William F. Buckley, Jr., 233 pp.,
New York, Doubleday, $13.95
Having spent some 40 years in various aspects of the second
oldest profession, I find most spy books too contrived to be credi-
ble or too involuted to be readable. Bill Buckley's accounts of the
adventures of Blackford Oakes, though, are a shining exception.
Buckley has done his homework. Thus, in the case of MARCO
POLO, IF YOU CAN, it is difficult to comply with the unwritten law
that book reviewers must find nits to pick. The best I can do in this
regard is to note that Allen Dulles' official title was Director of
Central Intelligence, not "of the Central Intelligence Agency;" that
at no time within memory was his desk "immaculate" (it was invari-
ably cluttered with papers, pipes and pipe ashes); and the camera
compartment in the U-2 was in the center, not the tail section, of
the aircraft. (Beyond this trivia, by the way, Buckley's description of
the design and operation of the U-2 is authentic and, to the
technically-minded, fascinating. As one of the masterpieces
created by "Kelly" Johnson, the legendary design genius of Lock-
heed's famed "Skunk Works," the U-2 is even to this day a marvel of
ingenuity.)
Buckley is equally authoritative in his portrayals of Allen
Dulles, J. Edgar Hoover (and the strained relations between them),
Dean Acheson, Eisenhower and Khrushchev. Inevitably the reader
will identify Oakes with Gary Powers of the fateful U-2 mission of
May 1, 1960, which has been blamed for wrecking the U.S.-Soviet
summit meeting of that year. But the only similarity between Powers,
the shoemaker's son from a Virginia coal mining village (who was
later killed in a helicopter accident), and Oakes, an authentic Ivy
Leaguer, is that one actually, and the other fictionally, did a hell of
a job for his country (although a job which Powers, to our shame,
never received the recognition he deserved).
Beyond this, Buckley takes us on a wide-ranging tour of the
spy business. He covers the intricate process of sorting out num-
berless leads in a counter-intelligence case. He lets us in on FBI
surveillance techniques. He describes a beautiful and privileged
Vassar girl who turns out to be a sort of Kim Philby mole. He tells
us what it's like in the pilot's seat of a U-2 flying over the Soviet
Union at 70,000 feet. He suggests how a sophisticated and auda-
cious deception operation might alter international relations on a
massive scale. He treats us to a ringside seat at a shootout in an
East Berlin loft, at occasional sexual encounters and at a tempes-
tuous summit meeting, and provides profiles of assorted KGB
operatives, including an "illegal" of the Rudolf Abel variety.
In fact, Mr. Buckley conveys in 230 pages more of the flavor of
the real world of espionage than can be gleaned from a dozen
books by renegade former intelligence officers or investigative
journalists. He does so with style and wit, and his narrative moves
along at the exhilarating pace of a Porsche on the autobahn. Those
who can pick up MARCO POLO, IF YOU CAN and put it down
short of the last line are the people who'll turn off the TV tube
during "sudden-death" overtime in the Superbowl.
- John M. Maury
1946 which followed Donovan's concept. It was a long complicated
bill containing both the functional role of CIA and the administrative
authorities we thought would be needed. As Troy states, Norstad
represented the War Department (Army and Air Corps) in the devel-
opment of the National Security Act of 1947.
I remember the White House meeting on 23 January 1947
which I (as General Counsel, CIG) and Walter Pforzheimer (as CIG's
Legislative Counsel) attended with General Vandenburg, then DCI,
at which Norstad suggested that we split our bill in two and put the
functional part in the National Security Act, leaving the administra-
tive aspects until later. This made good sense to us as it put the
creation of CIA as an integral part of a major administration bill, and
it had the DCI reporting to the National Security Council, chaired by
the President. Since the Council was advisory only to the President,
we felt that a proper relationship to the top was established. This is
an oversimplification of a process that Troy describes at some
length, but is is an example of what memory retains as important in
contrast to the record as it now appears.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2
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