WILL WARNS OF BUMPY FOUR YEARS FOR NATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: MISC

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Will Warns of "Bumpy"
Four Years for Nation
An overflow crowd, the largest attendance of any in
AFIO's history, greeted guest speaker George F. Will for
the winter luncheon, December 7th.
The noted political analyst and commentator, fresh
from a White House news conference, was primed with
facts and figures for the group assembled at the Bolling
AFB Officers Club, as he warned that "America, as a
society, is undertaxed... "Until we come to realize that,"
he continued, "we are going to find that something near
and dear to the hearts of everyone here, the national
security, particularly the defense budget, of the United
States is going to come increasingly under attack as the
target of opportunity of those bent on regressive
reductions."
Will explained that the Reagan Administration seeks
to reduce the deficit without new taxes and without
touching social security or defense. "And, you don't
touch interest," he added in explaining that the total of
those items constitutes 64% of the present budget.
Thus, he explained, the goal must be met in the remain-
ing 300 billion dollars, of which 110 billion is budgeted
for Medicare and Medicaid, also untouchable areas.
Cuts in defense spending aren't an easy solution
either, the speaker noted. "An aircraft carrier is not
made in one state, it's made in 30 states, and you have
sixty senators ready to do the right thing." That means,
he said, there is nothing left to cut but middle class
programs. "Given that the choice is to cut middle class
programs or cut the defense budget, you can see the
way we are going to go," Will said.
Will pointed out that the President currently is con-
sidering a nine-page, single-spaced list of programs "to
be cut, or in most cases, eliminated." The problem can't
be shunted to the Congress, he suggested, because
40% of the Republican senators are up for reelection in
1986, and can't afford to incur the wrath of middle class
voters. "When you cut a welfare mother's food stamps,
she doesn't turn to her secretary and say 'take a letter'."
If you move against the middle class, "you get very finely
written and typed letters on embossed stationery. That is
what the government is beginning to face," Will said.
"The easy part is over," the speaker stated, "Ronald
Reagan's message in the 1980 campaign was to ,"Be
brave and accept a tax cut." Will predicted that the
nation is in for a bumpy four years. "We'll see how good
George F. Will
a communicator he is telling them to cut their middle
class subsidies and pay more for Johnny's tuition at
Brown and Sally's at Stanford." He found comparison in
the situation in Britain, where the Thatcher government
moved against middle-class programs. There, he recalled,
he saw eight thousand middle class students rioting in
protest, with lawlessness that saw a hundred arrested.
He saw little hope in the Grace Commission report
intended to reduce waste, fraud and abuse. "The Grace
Commission was waste, fraud and abuse," he charged
in pointing out that the 47-volume, two million page
study contained such recommendations as cutting fed-
eral pensions. "Why didn't anyone think of that before,"
he joked.
"Put simply," said Will, "the sound in our ears
today is the sound of chickens coming home to roost."
The nation, he said, has been living beyond its means,
unwilling to pay for its standard of living, and the test is
to find out if the nation has the will and the means to do
something about it. "How do you pay for it, how do you
preserve it," he asked. "In the next four years we are
going to find out the extent we are a grown up people."
National Intelligence Symposium
Cancelled
Because of scheduling problems,
the National Intelligence Symposium
Announced for February 25, 1985
at Naples, Florida
Has Been Cancelled
STAT
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Former AFIO President
Robert Cushman Dies
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.
USMC-Ret
In Memorium
Mr. Obie Brown
Tavares, FL
Gen. Robert E. Cushman, USMC-Ret
Fort Washington, MD
Dr. Henry W. Forbes
Falls Church, VA
Mr. Donald C. Hays
New York, NY
Mr. Frederick L. Hetter
San Diego, CA
Maj. Clinton M. Hoose, USA-Ret
Falls Church, Va
Mary S. Moses
(Mrs. E. R. Moses, Jr.)
Prescott Valley, AZ
Lillian B. Noel
(Mrs. James A. Noel)
San Diego, CA
Mr. George A. Owens
Kalispell, MT
Mr. Ralph L. Seger
Alexandria, VA
Mr. Alfonso Spera
Bethesda, MD
Mr. Ross H. Taylor
San Antonio, TX
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. (USMC-Ret), Presi-
dent of AFIO 1978-79 and a member of the Board of
Directors until 1982, died January 2nd at his home in
Fort Washington, Maryland.
General Cushman, one of the most highly deco-
rated combat veterans of WWII, spent forty years on
active duty culminating from 1972 to 1975 as Com-
mandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Born December 24, 1914, in St. Paul, Cushman
graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1935. As a
second lieutenant he won his first campaign ribbon dur-
ing the Sino-Japanese hostilities while serving as a pla-
toon leader with the 4th Marines at Shanghai, China;
six years later he was commissioned a lieutenant
colonel. When Pearl Harbor was attacked, he was
commander of the Marine detachment aboard the bat-
tleship Pennsylvania. His ship out of action because of
the attack, Cushman returned for a tour of duty on the
mainland before embarking for the Pacific Theater as
commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, 3rd
Marine Division. During the next two years he led his
men through some of the toughest fighting in the
Pacific, including Bougainville and Iwo Jima.
Cushman was awarded the Navy Cross during the
recapture of Guam where, in the words of the citation,
he "directed the attacks of hisbattalion and the repulse of
numerous Japanese counterattacks, fearlessly exposing
himself to hostile rifle, machine gun and mortar fire in
order to remain in the front lines and obtain firsthand
knowledge of the enemy situation. Following three days
of bitter fighting culminating in a heavy Japanese coun-
terattack, which pushed back the flank of his battalion,
he personally led a platoon into the gap and, placing it
for defense, repelled the hostile force. He contributed to
the annihilation of one enemy battalion and the rout of
another."
Following the war, Cushman held a range of assign-
ments including service as an instructor at the Armed
Services Staff College and the Command and Staff
School. He also headed the amphibious warfare branch
of the Naval Research Office, and from 1949-51 served
a tour with the CIA. From 1957 to 1960, Cushman was
assistant for national security affairs to Vice President
Nixon. In 1962, he was appointed Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, a post in which he served until 1964
when appointed Base Commander and Commanding
General, 5th Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, Califor-
nia. In 1967, he embarked for Vietnam where he devel-
oped a reputation for independence, integrity and tactical
innovation, as Commanding General III Marine Amphib-
ious Force.
He returned to the United States in 1969 and
appointment as the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence.
In 1972, he was named Commandant of the U.S.
Marine Corps.
General Cushman is survived by his wife, Audrey,
of Fort Washington; a son, Robert E. III, of Arlington; and
a daughter, Roberta Lind Cauley of Charlottesville.
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May 1st Is Deadline
For Board Nominations
New election procedures, adopted at the 1984
Convention, will govern the election of members of
AFIO's Board of Directors, resulting in a deadline of May
1, 1985 for the submission of nominations to National.
Nominees must be full members in good standing and
are required to submit a written statement indicating
willingness to serve, if elected. In addition, the nominee
is asked to furnish a biographic statement and black and
white photograph to be published with the ballot.
Under the new rules, voting will be by mail only,
with results announced at the annual convention. No
nominations will be accepted from the floor of the con-
vention, nor may ballots be cast at that time. Ballots will
be mailed with the Summer issue of Periscope, and
must be returned with a postmark of no later than Sep-
tember 15th to be counted and verified.
Named by AFIO's president to serve as a nominat-
ing committee are Mr. Samuel Halpern, Chairman; Miss
Ann Caracristi; and Captain Robert A. Dowd, USN-Ret.
Mr. Halpern's telephone number is [phone],
should further information be desired. There can be no
extension of the May 1, 1985 deadline for nominations,
however.
Members of the Board whose term of office will
expire in October 1985 are: Captain Richard W. Bates,
USN-Ret; Mr. John F. Blake; Admiral Bobby R. Inman,
USN-Ret; Mr. George Scatterday; Major General Jack E.
Thomas, USAF-Ret; and Colonel George R. Weinbrenner,
USAF-Ret.
Notes from the Boardroom
The Board of Directors met on December 7, 1984,
at the Bolling Air Force Base Officers Club, at 1410
hours, with Chairman, Major General Jack E. Thomas,
USA-Ret, presiding. There were fourteen members
present and four members absent, two of whom were
represented by proxy.
Col. Bruce Baumgardner, USAF-Ret, chairman of
the 1984 Convention Committee, gave a wrap-up report
on the Convention and was presented by the Chairman
with a letter of commendation. Mr. Greaney reported
that AFIO has received a 3/4 inch video tape of the film
The KGB Connection which will be made available to
the chapters for showing at meetings. Mr. Greaney also
reported on plans, approved by the Executive Commit-
tee, to visit chapters in Florida in February 1985 for
discussion of future chapter plans and any problems. He
will also discuss the possibility of the Florida chapters
hosting the 1986 Convention.
Mr. Sam Halpern was approved by the Board to be
a member of the Executive Committee, raising that body
to six members.
The meeting was adjourned at 1450 hours. Submit-
ted by Charlotta Engrav, Secretary.
From the
Executive Director
I am sure you will be pleased with the 1985 AFIO
Directory just off the press. Be reminded that some of
our members, at their request, have not been included.
These individuals are maintained in a restricted category
by National, and it is only on receipt of written notifica-
tion that we change the listing. As mentioned in the last
issue, the cut-off date for information in the new direc-
tory was December 31, 1984; any changes of address
received after that date were not included in it.
We are anxious to keep our mailing list current.
With the ten percent increase in Third Class mail up to
22 cents on February 17, 1985, it is essential that our
organization make full use of our Third Class mail privi-
leges. However, the Postal Service will not forward Third
Class, so we ask that you notify us of changes as early
as possible.
The response has been quite good to the new lapel
pins at $5.00 each, and we have not had any com-
plaints, as in years past, about the pins breaking in the
mail. We now ship them to you in a plastic box.
We are anxious to get more information from our
chapters in order to include this information in the Peri-
scope. To be included in the next issue we will need
information (preferably in press-release format) and
black and white photos by March 1 st. The deadlines for
the remainder of the year are June 1 st and October 1 st.
It has also been suggested that if chapters can schedule
their elections to permit the results to reach Headquar-
ters by the end of December, the new rosters can be
included in the annual Directory.
I again ask all AFIO members to get a friend to join
our organization. We feel that current members are the
best sales representatives for AFIO. We want to grow.
We would also like to suggest that our current members
consider converting to a Life Membership with a one-
time payment of $250.00 or, if they choose, the pay-
ment can be made in installments so long as the entire
amount is paid within twelve months.
1985 Convention Set
For October 4-5
Plans are already underway for the 1985 Annual
Convention, to be held during the first weekend in
October. The Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza in Rockville, Md.,
has been selected.
John H. Waller, who retired as CIA's Inspector
General in 1980, has agreed to serve as chairman of the
event, to be held October 4-5. Local members who
would like to assist him with arrangements are encour-
aged to notify National.
The hotel, scene of the successful 1984 Conven-
tion, will continue to offer AFIO the special room rate of
$55 per night. An added convenience will be the new
Twinbrook Metro Station (Red Line) located to the rear of
the hotel. Attendees arriving at National Airport, for
example, can take the Metro all the way to the conven-
tion with only one transfer enroute.
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On the Intelligence Bookshelf ...
Current books of interest to intelligence buffs and
watchers of the world scene. All reviews are by AFIO
members except when otherwise noted.
Secrets That Won't Stay Buried
Too Secret, Too Long, by Chapman Pincher, New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1984, $19.95.
The case of Cock Robin's wrongful death (said to have occurred
in the late 14th century) is still under active discussion in nurseries
throughout the world. Despite a full and direct confession by the
sparrow, reinforced by a display of the murder weapon, the corpus
delicti, eye-witness testimony from the fly and corroberative state-
ments by the beetle and others, the motive was never clearly estab-
lished and the sparrow, we are told, went unpunished.
Considering the impressive array of "evidence," a conspiracist
might speculate that the case was dropped because there was no
desire on the part of the "establishment" to bring the sparrow to the
bar.
The case of the late Roger Hollis, former director of Britain's
Security Service, is another anomaly, at least in the mind of Chap-
man Pincher who has detailed his very pertinent views in a 638 page
account of Hollis' alleged treachery.
It seems inappropriate to dismiss Pincher's considerable efforts
(as has been done by Robert Cecil in the London Times, 11 /22/84,
and Phillip Knightley in the Sunday Times, 11 /11 /84) by merely
suggesting that his version of the case contains little new informa-
tion, no new "evidence" and that it is inexcusably tendentious and
above all else, too long.
The critics make much of the point that if "Pincher and his
sources were to present their evidence in a British court of law they
would not get beyond their opening address before the judge
showed them the door" (Knightley). Robert Cecil assures the reader
that "Mr. Pincher's heart is in the right place; it is his head that I
worry about." Knightley seems to wonder if these events of forty
years ago have any relevance today.
Perhaps it is useful to suggest that what Pincher has attempted
is the construction of a counter-intelligence analysis and not an
indictment intended for the courts. On the presumption that officers
serving in sensitive intelligence positions have a special and peculiar
obligation to serve the public trust, any suggestion or even suspicion
of possible treachery must therefore form the basis for immediate
and direct action. All of the salient service personalities in Pincher's
account were under oath to discharge their respective duties in the
"defense of the realm" and by the execution of the oath, accepted
the special and peculiar obligations of public trust.
"Evidence" of the variety required to secure a conviction in a
court of law is seldom available to counter-intelligence officers. If,
indeed, proofs are in hand, a question relating to the government's
willingness to disclose sources and methods almost invariably
arises. The fact that counter-intelligence officers are paid and
trained to view the world (and each other) through a glass darkly
seems at odds with the Knightley thesis (attributed to Admiral Stans-
field Turner) that intelligence officers are victims of the "clandestine
mentality," an "illness (that) manifests itself most often in alcoho-
lism and divorce but as it progresses it develops paranoid symptoms:
a free-floating suspicion, the belief that outsiders are intent on pene-
trating the secret family to destroy it from within."
Too Secret, Too Long is based on Pincher's posit that the Secur-
ity Service suffered too many casualties, too many "case-deaths"
and too many failures than are supportable by the arithmetic of
chance. Thus, these adverse events, all of which are claimed to have
aided the Soviets, were allowed, caused or prompted by the inter-
vention of a penetration within the Service.
Pincher's position appears to have many supporters among ex-
Security Service officers who are not, as Knightley suggests, "dis-
gruntled former officers, whose spokesman is Peter Wright, once a
senior MI5 officer, now in retirement in Australia beyond the juris-
diction of the Official Secrets Act, (who) have worked consistently for
vindication and revenge." Vindication is indeed an objective of these
men who seek another extended examination of the Hollis case, this
time using data which was not previously considered and that which
has become available since the last review. Mr. Knightley depre-
ciates the former serving officers by ad hominum and ascribes
"revenge" as a collective motive. The men who were for the longest
time most directly involved in the internal investigation of Hollis,
who had years of experience in sensitive and responsible positions
within the Service are dismissed as "being behind the spy fever in
recent years, the apparently endless exposures of often old and
insignificant men for services performed for the Soviet Union
decades ago." As the Sunday Times' "expert" in these matters,
Knightley sees Pincher's work as a greater menace than the aggre-
gate effect of "old and insignificant men" like John Cairncross, Leo
Long, Alister Watson, Paddy Costello, E. Herbert Norman and a
number of others.
Pincher, unlike most of his critics, has made a genuine effort to
distinguish GRU operations from those of the KGB and its predeces-
sor organizations. Further, instead of accepting the immaculate con-
ception notion favored by some, Pincher makes the point that
prospective Soviet agents, however identified, are recruited eventu-
ally by Soviet officers and do not occur as a consequence of being
chatted up by some unidentified don at Oxbridge. Where possible,
Pincher identifies the actors by name instead of the customary dis-
creet allusions. He also seems to believe that cases have beginnings,
middles and ends which conviction led him to develop his hypothesis
that Hollis was recruited to the GRU while employed in China by the
British-American Tobacco Company in the early thirties.
Whatever the reader's opinion of the case, Pincher's arguments
deserve careful consideration. There are a number of less than con-
sequential errors but, since many of the facts are unknowable and
the main characters mostly dead, defected, in foreign exile or under
punitive restraints, the case depends heavily on circumstantial evi-
dence. Pincher concludes that Hollis was either astonishingly
incompetent or a Soviet agent. His personal disposition strongly
favors the latter verdict.
A major point which requires restatement is that Roger Hollis
was the Director-General of the Security Service and not an ordinary
citizen-ratepayer who had come under suspicion. Robert Cecil who
concedes to having been deceived personally (and subsequentially)
by Burgess, MacLean and Philby, seems to find the possibility of a
fourth betrayal ("et to, Roger?") unacceptable.
The current Prime Minister has not been anxious to accede to
Mr. Pincher's demand for yet another examination of the case. The
Conservatives, since the "Zinoviev Letter" of 1924, have had mixed
results from "intelligence" related official enquiries.
Pincher is an advocate of oversight and seems to believe that
the U.S. process is effective and, perhaps, forms a useful model for
Britain. In the U.S., public awareness of the workings of the Con-
gressional committees has been focused on various covert action
programs and the estimative processes. The history of most over-
sight bodies confirms that they tend to be ill-equipped and usually
lack both the competence and continuity essential to deal effectively
with counter-intelligence matters.
The index of Too Secret, Too Long is comprehensive and a
number of interesting photographs put faces on some of the more
obscure players. Readers familiar with Pincher's earlier efforts in
this case (Their Trade is Treachery) will have another, engaging
opportunity to test their biases and, perhaps, flex a few fixed
opinions.
[Robert T. Crowley is the co-author of The New KGB. Engine of
Soviet Power, published by William Morrow and Company, New
York.]
An Overt Attack on Covert Action
Reagan's Secret Wars: CNSS Report No. 108 by Jay Peterzell,
Washington, D.C.. Center for National Security Studies, 1984
This study deals with known or purported covert actions which
by the author's claim were initiated or expanded by the Reagan
administration. The countries involved are Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Chad, Iran, Libya and Nicaragua. Let it be said at the very outset that
this reviewer will be guided in his comments now, as he has in the
past, by two general, self-imposed rules. The first concerns the
proper role in any general debate on covert operations of those cur-
rently or previously involved intimately in intelligence and national
security matters.
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Simply stated, it is the reviewer's belief that such individuals
should not be the theoretical advocates, the spokesmen if you will,
on the desirability of having the U.S. undertake such operations. Too
often intelligence veterans assume this role and become the point
men supporting covert action; in other instances, they do not take
sufficient care to avoid sounding like advocates when merely
explaining the concept to the public. The result, unhappily, is that the
intelligence profession frequently gives the impression of being just
another lobbying interest defending its turf, and its views are dis-
counted accordingly. Better advised are the professionals who con-
fine themselves to clarifying what the proper role of intelligence
should be: to advise the political leadership which makes the final
decision whether to have covert action as a weapon in the nation's
intelligence arsenal or to use it in specific instances, solely on the
technical, professional and feasibility aspects involved.
In line with this view, the reviewer will not comment on what he
discerns as Mr. Peterzell's underlying tone and attitude toward U.S.
covert operations in general beyond saying there is a visceral and
philosophical opposition to them. This comes through even when
disguised by him as being judged under the more practical consider-
ations of whether they are effective and serve our long-term inter-
ests. The second rule is that it is obviously not the role of anyone
who is or has been privy to privileged information to take it upon
himself or herself to use that knowledge to comment publicly on
what are alleged to be current operations. The fact that the reviewer
possesses limited information about on-going operations does not
alter his determination to stick to the rule.
This much said, what general comments can still be made
within these guidelines about Reagan's Secret Wars? First of all, let
it be noted that of the six cases he discusses, two that hardly fit the
description "secret" in his title comprise almost 40% of the work-
Afghanistan and Nicaragua. The author himself states that no covert
action has been more public than Nicaragua and believes the only
remaining secret is its purpose. Of Afghanistan, he concludes from
the lengthy list of past exposes that "It is remarkable that U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan was still a secret from most of the Amer-
ican public when ABC exposed the operation in a major story in June
1981." His treatment of Cambodia takes up another quarter of the
book and ends with the thoughtful and cautious remark that "a
conclusive judgment on the extent of covert U.S. involvement in
Cambodia cannot be made from the information currently available."
Thus two-thirds of his effort and presentation is devoted to covert
operations which in my view have either been acknowledged or the
existence of which he admits is uncertain.
Questions then naturally arise as to Mr. Peterzell's purpose in
producing this work, the validity of his supporting analyses and evi-
dence, and finally, the political and attitudinal approaches to the task
he set for himself. According to his charge, the Reagan Administra-
tion has expanded the use of covert operations while "severely limit-
ing the role in reviewing them of officials outside the intelligence
community." One takes this to mean that Congressional oversight
has been severely limited and consequentially, the duty of the author
and others of like mind is to see that public awareness and discus-
sion serve as the ultimate oversight and a spur to Congress to recap-
ture its abdicated obligations. He neglects, however, any investigation
into the oversight and appropriations role of Congress in the cases
discussed and one searches in vain for convincing proof of his con-
tention of Congress' "severely limited" role. One can imagine the
furor that would have been caused by the Congress if the author's
claims of U.S. covert activities in Chad, Iran, Libya and Cambodia
were true and undertaken without legislative knowledge! Any analy-
sis of post-1975 operations, such as that by Peterzell, that fails to
examine the role of Congress is incomplete. The author's neglect in
this regard when combined with the title gives the work a tone and a
motivating flavor of the pamphleteering writings of the 70s when
attacks against "unsupervised" covert actions and headbashing of
the intelligence community were in vogue.
Then there are certain themes that run like threads through the
essays which need to be commented on. One is that the conduct of
American adversaries may have been provoked by the actions of the
U.S. and its allies. This reviewer must confess that he found the
author's explanations and his concern for the sensitivities of the
Russians in Afghanistan, the Libyans in Chad or the Indochinese in
Cambodia as excessively solicitous. Indeed, one can identify a
danger that lurks in this type of exegesis when combined with
another common thread in his analysis, the undeviating doubt
regarding the wisdom and the efficacy of the American actions on
which he focuses his attention. By concentrating on what he regards
as the errors of American judgment and conduct, and their conse-
quences, he neglects to discuss the motives and the miserable con-
duct and records of such stalwarts of internal and international
conduct as, say, Qaddafi and the ayatollahs of Iran or the measures
and depredations of the Soviets in Afghanistan. This imbalance of
treatment results in making us, not them, the heavy. Works such as
this-that mute criticism of these worthies in an eagerness to prove
something against us and our allies-unintentionally become grist
for our adversaries' propaganda mills.
To these major, general observations and criticisms must be
added one more: the heavy use of media sources as evidence. This
reliance on and elevation of such sources to authoritative status on
the operations he discusses contradict his own caveat that "press
accounts are not necessarily evidence." True, and they result, oddly
enough, in a product that can be used for purposes the author never
intended. The long record of exposes of U.S. covert operations by the
media he has assembled makes this a handy reference for those
who wish to show how the U.S. has failed, despite a decade of
deliberation, to solve the question of the security of its covert opera-
tions. Note, too, that there are other more specific or minor short-
comings in his presentation. One good example is his chaste version
of the Sandanista treatment of the Miskito Indians. This is contrary
to the evidence and the conclusions of many other accounts available,
including those of Berkeley professor and Nicaraguan Indian expert
Bernard Nietschmann and Miguel Bolanos Hunter, a former Cl
officer in Sandanista State Security.
The question may fairly be asked whether this reviewer would
be happy with any work that treats in a more satisfying manner what
are said to be on-going U.S. operations. The answer is a frank and
emphatic "no." Quality works that claim to reveal classified, current
and properly-approved and implemented operations do not serve the
national interest any more than those of lesser standards. This view
is probably shared by most with similar background and experience
as those of the reviewer. Mr. Peterzell should bear in mind that
though there has never been any overwhelming consensus in this
group on all aspects of covert operations and their use, there is
definitely much greater agreement that they need protection against
unwarranted disclosure.
[George Constantinides is the author of the award-winning Intelli-
gence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography, published in
1983. Presently he is a consultant to the BDM Corporation. He is not
a member of AFIO.]
A Guide to the Intelligence Profession
Careers in Secret Operations: How to be a federal Intelligence
Officer, by David Atlee Phillips. Bethesda, MD: Stone Trail Press,
1984 (Paper, $9.00); Frederick, MD: University Publications, 1984
(Cloth, $15.00)
Dave Phillips has come up with an excellent solution to a problem
that has long plagued present and former intelligence officers-
what can one say when asked by young people about the profession.
We've all been through it. One stumbles and stammers, hesitating
on almost every word for fear of divulging what should be protected.
It usually sums up: "I can't tell you much about it, but I know you
would find it challenging profession." Then, the follow-on questions
get difficult. What does one answer when asked about security pro-
cessing and the polygraph, retirement program, salary, equal oppor-
tunity advantages, service abroad and the like? And, if the young
person's interest is still sparked despite the dissembling, where does
one say to write or phone for more information?
The author has produced a career counselor's friend covering
the full spectrum of the Intelligence Community, with detailed des-
criptions of what each agency or department does in the intelligence
arena and what they seek from candidates. The internal organiza-
tional descriptions of CIA, for example, are far more complete than I
have ever seen in any of that agency's public affairs and recruiting
materials, particularly when reference is made, if at all, to the clan-
destine services. After reading this guide, a potential applicant
should have little difficulty in understanding the intelligence maze
and where to find out more about entering it.
Unlike most counseling books of this type, it does not read like
the work of a committee. It is sprinkled throughout with Phillips'
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AFIO Chapter Activities
Arizona Chapter. The chapter met October 27th at
Monti's Restaurant for a luncheon, business meeting
and informative session. George Wiggins, chapter vice
president, presided over the thirteen persons present,
and was saluted for his election as national Vice
President.
An interesting video tape was presented by Ms.
Alice Smith, president of the local chapter of Arizonans
for National Security. The tape featured an interview
with Captain Willi Lollis, leader of the Blue Berets, a
paramilitary organization in Costa Rica that trains the
country's youth to defend their way of life against the
communist threat and aggression.
The chapter's December 8th luncheon at the Ra-
mada Inn in Tucson was deemed a large success, with
twenty-six persons in attendance.
Ed Barley was elected President, Bob Moy was
named Vice President and Bob Nugent was elected
Secretary-Treasurer.
Captain Oliver Lorenz, USAF, presented a film and
led a discussion on the attributes and capabilities of the
A-10 ground attack aircraft.
The chapter's next meeting was announced for
February 9th in Sierra Vista.
San Diego Chapter. Forty-seven members and
guests met at the Admiral Kidd Officers Club on
November 1 6th to hear Roger S. Young, a former
Assistant Director of the FBI and newly-appointed Exec-
utive Director of the San Diego Crime Commission, de-
scribe the Commission's efforts in carrying out a con-
tinuous and comprehensive program of public education
and information about the causes and prevention of
crimes. The speaker noted the program ranges from
border crime to investment and small business fraud,
and is particularly active with young people and the drug
problem. Mr. Young, who spent 23 years with the FBI,
ten of which were in the area of foreign counter-
intelligence, also gave his thoughts about recent FBI
internal problems concerning foreign counterintelligence.
The chapter's December meeting was held Decem-
ber 12th aboard the ferry boat Berkeley, with a full
Christmas dinner, music by Charlie Chancer at the
piano, and a fund-raising "white elephant" auction
gaveled by Don Perry (described as the ""32nd fastest
auctioneer west of Chula Vista."). Special guests at the
function were local members of the Air Force Association.
The chapter met at the Admiral Kidd Officer's Club
on January 25th to hear B.F. "Sandy" Coggen, a corpo-
rate executive, discuss "Some Technical Geo-Political
Fall-Out from the U.S. Space Programs."
San Francisco Bay Area Chapter. A very well
attended September 19th meeting opened at the Marine
Memorial Club with the Pledge of Allegiance and a
toast, in Russian, to the guest speaker, Consul General
Anatoly Myshkov and his wife, Natasha. The toast was
proposed by chapter Vice President Edward Rudka and
translated by chapter President McCarthy. Rudka intro-
duced the speaker as a 1950 graduate of the Institute
for International Affairs in Moscow and a diplomat with
twenty years of knowledge and observation of the Uni-
ted States. Myshkov, he said, has served in the Soviet
Embassy in Washington and the consulates in New
York and San Francisco.
Myshkov thanked the chapter for inviting him and
affording the opportunity to share his views on Soviet-
American relations. Never before, he said, had he seen
so many U.S. intelligence officers in one place.
He reviewed the fruitful diplomatic relations of the
past, dating from the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions in 1933, but noted that today relations between
the two nations are very tense. This, he said, is a result
of security considerations, nuclear disarmament and the
arms race.
The West's emplacement of weapons in Western
Europe, pointed toward the Soviet Union, has led the
Soviets to find further negotiations impossible, Myshkov
claimed. There can be no "business as usual" between
his country and this because those missiles are pointed
at Russian cities and the Warsaw Pact nations. Missiles,
he said, could be launched and land in Russian cities in
eight minutes. Eight minutes, he noted, that separate
peace from nuclear annihilation. What can be done in
eight minutes, he posed. Use the hot line? Hold con-
gressional hearings? The USSR is not going to attack the
United States, he declared, and he hopes the U.S. will
not attack his country. Yet, he said, we cannot overrule
an accident.
The Consul General blamed the United States for
the failure of his country's 1984 proposal of a morito-
rium on weapons in outer space. The meetings never
materialized, he said, because the U.S. refused to con-
sider the topic separate from general nuclear disarma-
ment. He urged the use of diplomacy recognizing equality
and equal opportunity. Both nations live on the same
planet, he said, noting that if they can't live together,
they will die together.
Myshkov called for understanding, stabilizing the
situation and opening a dialogue between the two
nations. He said he does not expect miracles, but hoped
the nations would work together, accepting compromise
and looking for openings.
He observed that security in a nuclear age is indivis-
able, and that both countries must realize it. His expe-
rience in the United States, he said, has taught him that
there are no issues that cannot be resolved with good
will, mutual understanding, and more trust between
nations. Nuclear power, he observed, is a common
enemy.
Myshkov concluded by suggesting the two nations
talk in the language of culture, trade and education,
including student exchange. In 1933, he recalled, the
founders of the USSR exchanged official notes with the
U.S. on the opening of diplomatic relations. Both sides
expressed hope that relations between the two peoples
would remain forever friendly. That, he said, is also his
hope.
The speaker answered questions, previously sub-
mitted in writing, for more than a half hour after con-
cluding his presentation.
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South Bay Chapter. The chapter will meet Febru-
ary 20th at the Proud Bird Restaurant, Los Angeles, to
hear LG Daniel 0. Graham (USA-Ret), former Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, speak of the "High
Frontier" program committed to defensive technology in
space. The chapter will host several other military ser-
vice support organizations, and the program will be
cablecast live. For more information call [phone]
or [phone].
Satellite Chapter. Sixty-eight members and guests
attended the chapter's October luncheon meeting at the
Suntree Country Club. The guest speaker was Thomas
Polgar, a veteran of over forty years in intelligence.
Since retirement from the CIA in 1981, Polgar has
served as a consultant to the DOD and as a writer for
the Miami Herald. The speaker offered his observations
on the present status of U.S. intelligence, with com-
ments on issues in Central and South America.
The chapter's meeting was dedicated to the memory
of its former President, James Griffin, who died in
September.
The chapter has announced that its speaker for the
February 8th meeting is Jerry Parr, Assistant Director,
Office of Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service, speak-
ing on terrorist activities. Parr was in charge of the
Secret Service detail during the assassination attempt
on the life of President Reagan. Parr pushed the Presi-
dent to the floor and instructed the driver to proceed
directly to the hospital, a decision believed to have saved
the President's life.
Suncoast Chapter. Forty-seven members and
guests met at the MacDill Air Force Base Officer's Club
for the chapter's October 10th meeting. Lieutenant
Colonel Wesley J. McMillen, USA, recently returned
from a tour of duty in Saudi Arabia, spoke on the
"Nation of Islam." He described life "in and out of the
compound," protocol, and the religion and culture of the
country.
The chapter's January 17th meeting, held at the
Breckenridge Resort Hotel at St. Petersburg Beach, fea-
tured the Air University national security briefing team
detailing the complexity of national security issues and
intelligence.
The chapter is pleased to announce that it enrolled
twenty-four new members during 1984.
Western Montana Chapter. The chapter's fall
meeting was held November 16th at the Missoula
Country Club. Eight AFIO members hosted the special
guests, members of the Western Montana Military
Officers Association.
Mrs. Ruth J. Patrick, Dean of Library Services of the
Mansfield Library, University of Montana, accepted eight
volumes from the chapter for deposit with the library. In
addition to the Constantinides Bibliography and a copy
of the late Charles Simpson's Inside the Green Berets,
the library was presented with a six volume antiquarian
set in French dealing with the life of George Washington.
The chapter invites potential speakers who will be
visiting or passing through the Big Sky Country to let
them know. "We can round-up AFIO members on short
notice," says Richard A. Grant, AFIO chairman for
Montana.
Greater New York Chapter. Director of Central
Intelligence William J. Casey was guest of honor and
featured speaker at the chapter's autumn meeting, held
November 2nd at the University Club in midtown Man-
hattan. Noting the size of the crowd, which included not
only AFIO members but also guests from the Veterans
of OSS, the DCI did not offer a briefing on current geopo-
litics. (Casey told the crowd at the outset, "You can't
have an off-the-record briefing with two hundred people
in the room.") Instead, he presented a progress report on
the rebuilding of American intelligence capabilities in
the first term of the Reagan Administration.
Saying the U.S. intelligence community has "never
been in better shape," the DCI recounted the goals set
forth by President Reagan four years ago: the reestab-
lishment of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, the enactment of legislation imposing criminal
penalties against those who disclose the identities of
U.S. intelligence agents, restrictions on the use of the
Freedom of Information Act to obtain CIA operational
files, and a general rehabilitation of the intelligence
community following the devastating cuts of the 1970s.
All those goals, Casey reminded the audience, have
been met. And, the DCI said, a substantial part of the
credit goes to the strong support and public education
efforts of AFIO.
Lee E. Echols with a group of servicemen who heard his presentation on AFIO, why it was established and its
accomplishments and goals. Echols gave a series of talks at the University of California and National University,
both at San Diego.
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Intelligence Issues . .
To many in intelligence, the collegial method of refining estimates
requires excessive compromise and concession; Frequently, individual
views, although noted, fail in the process. A CIA veteran, John Horton,
has taken serious issue with the system as he claims to have experi-
enced it during recent service with the Central Intelligence Agency. In
public speeches, articles and published letters, he has raised charges,
heard before in other Administrations, that intelligence estimates have
been corrupted to conform to the views of senior policy makers. In a
rare public comment, the DCI responded to the allegations in a letter to
the Washington Post, which also published Horton's rebuttal Since
both men are held in respect by many members of AFIO, Periscope
asked CIA's Office of Public Affairs for any additional information
which might be made available to shed light on the controversy. We
are indebted to the director of that office for the previously unpub-
lished text of a statement distributed to employees of the agency,
which is offered below along with the DCI's letter and Horton's
response.
"In a January 2 Op-Ed article, John Horton stated that he 'quit the
CIA' because pressure was put on him to come up with an estimate
that would satisfy the Director of Central Intelligence. It is not entirely
clear what Mr. Horton means by this. As National Intelligence Esti-
mates are issued by the Director and are traditionally regarded as his
estimates, it is hardly surprising that, after hearing the views of all
agencies representing the Intelligence Community, the Director should
want to be satisfied that the estimate is accurate and that it fully
conveys what the users should know.
"If Mr. Horton means that he was required to suppress or distort
evidence available to the Intelligence Community, it is a very serious
charge which needs to be addressed on the record. The first obligation
of the Director of Central Intelligence is to produce intelligence esti-
mates and reports that are as accurate, comprehensive and objective
as possible and which appropriately reflect the diverse and often con-
flicting views of the various components of the Intelligence Commu-
nity. Improving the estimating process was my primary concern when
I assumed office in 1981. Procedures were instituted to encourage a
broad range of views. The chiefs of every component of the American
Intelligence Community are responsible for putting forward at the
meetings of the National Foreign Intelligence Board the information
and judgments developed in his organization. These procedures were
carefully followed in the estimate addressed in Mr. Horton's article.
"Concern over developments had led to the initiation of a new
estimate of the prospects of serious instability in a particular country.
This issue was controversial within the Intelligence Community. There
were disagreements between the drafting analyst and Mr. Horton over
deletions made by the latter and I insisted that at least some of the
information and challenges to conventional wisdom present in the
analyst's original draft be restored to the estimate so that the range of
views existing in the Intelligence Community would be available to
policymakers. The full range of the judgments that came out of the
process were clearly and prominently stated on the first page of the
estimate.
"Finally, I would bring to your attention that the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Intelligence reviewed this matter and stated
in its annual report just issued this week that. 'The Committee exam-
ined the earlier drafts and the final version of that particular NIE and
found that dissenting views were printed at the very beginning of the
study, a practice the committee applauds.'
to be the official record a more complete account of what seems to be
the differences between Mr. Casey and me on that question.
"The question of general interest is not who was right or wrong
about that estimate, but how we are to ensure that the intelligence
that goes to the president is not diluted on the way by the passions of
the moment.
"The question may be put to one side; we must not pretend that it
is either irrelevant or unimportant.
[To employees of the CIA:]
"Our obligations too frequently require that we suffer in silence
when faced with allegations about our work. We do speak out to deny
violations of law. Similarly, any charge or implications that information
is suppressed or slanted goes to the heart of our work and cannot be
allowed to go unanswered. That is why I wrote the attached letter
which appeared in last Sunday's Washington Post and which I would
like to share with you.
"Inside the organization, I'd like also to have it known that the
estimate was drafted by an analyst with 20 years of experience who
made two trips to the country in question and visited areas which had
long been neglected. His original draft offered interesting new insights
and, in some areas, challenged conventional wisdom. The National
Intelligence Officer chairing the estimate deleted much of this mate-
rial, in my judgment excessively weakening a legitimate and important
view on the controversial issue. I had some of the data and judgments
which had been taken out the analyst's draft restored in order to
discharge my responsibility to provide policymakers with the full range
of substantiated information and judgments prevailing in the Intelli-
gence Community.
"As the House Intelligence Committee said in its report on this
matter:
'Several Directors of Central Intelligence, including the current
DCI, have taken the position that NIEs should represent their own
views and that any views that differ should be included so that the
policymaker can have the benefit of differing analysis. The Committee
examined the earlier drafts and the final version of that particular NIE
and found that dissenting views were printed at the very beginning of
the study, a practice the Committee applauds.'
William J. Casey
Director of Central Inteligence"
In his favorable review of Espionage Techniques and Counter-
measures in the last issue of Periscope, Norman L. Smith differed with
the authors on the meaning of the term "disinformation. " The authors
viewed it as "a propaganda attack based on lies, false accusations and
doctored facts." Smith countered with an intelligence definition "of or
about or concerning information," with no inherent implication of false
or mis-information. He reminded readers.
"The technique is the reverse of propaganda, which proceeds
from a point source to a broad target. Disinformation operations pro-
ceed from a broad base against a single or small target, such as a
prime minister or his cabinet. The technique involves providing the
target with the same theme or 'facts' from as many and as varied
sources as possible using both witting and unwitting agents of influ-
ence. The idea is to convince the target to take some action favorable
to the operator by control or manipulation of his data base. There is not
requirement that the themes be false or deceptive per se. They can be,
but they also may be true. If we persist in limiting our concept of
disinformation to crude forgeries we risk failing to recognize and coun -
ter some of the truly sophisticated disinformation. "
Here are two additional comments, the first by AFIO member Leo
D. Carl, the second from a published interview of Roy Godson, co-
author of a recent book on the topic.
'The intent of my op-ed piece was to bring attention to the prob-
lem of policy makers' rejecting intelligence judgments that displease
them. The letter from William Casey did not address that point.
"Instead, he discussed the estimate on which we disagreed,
repeating in short form what the two of us discussed in correspon-
dence several months ago. In reply to two letters, I put in what I assume
"I find Mr. Smith's argument with respect to the disinformation
technique more persuasive, but here. again, I do not agree with him
entirely. While it is true that disinformation themes need not be false
or deceptive, per se, that they may be true, per se, they are always
used in a distorted manner to mislead or deceive. I do agree, however,
that disinformation operations are not limited to crude, or for that
matter sophisticated, forgeries.
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"From my knowledge of Soviet Government/Party/KGB usage, I
prefer to place disinformation into two separate categories
"(1) Any information fabricated or distorted by one government on
an non-attributable or falsely attributable basis for the purpose of
influencing the actions of one or more governments, international
organizations, officials, individuals, public or private entities in a
manner to further the political, economic or military objectives of the
former
"(2) In double-agent or wartime deception operations, all "fed"
information, whether true (to 'build up' the doubled agent in the eyes
of the opposition) or fabricated.
"I am aware that the first definition is more usually applied than
the second, given the nature of counterespionage operations, but a
moment's reflection should prove the validity of the second definition
within the parameters of its specialized usage.
Leo D. Carl
Lt. Colonel, USAF (Ret)
In a recent press interview, Roy Godson, director of the Wash-
ington office of the National Strategy Information Center, provided
two convenient definitions explaining the difference between the
terms "disinformation" and "propaganda" as practiced by the Soviet
Union.
"Propaganda," he said, "has many different meanings and peo-
ple use it in different ways, but the essense of propaganda is to tell
the truth as one sees it. It is to project one's views in a favorable way,
and to show how the other side or other point of view or other product
is not as good as yours."
"Disinformation," today called "active measures," says Godson,
"is the use of overt and covert techniques to influence, deceive and
mislead the target. The intention is to affect his behavior, to get him to
act in a way that is detrimental to his own interest and, at the same
time, to act in a way favorable to Soviet interests."
He explained that "Disinformation uses a combination of truth
and falsehood. Sometimes you use more truth, and other times more
false information. In addition, propaganda is used to affect people's
attitudes with the hope they will act a particular way. But disinforma-
tion is designed to lead to specific actions." Godson, co-author with
Richard Shultz of the book "Dezinformatsia," notes that there are
approxin dtely 2,200 Soviet and bloc officials now serving in the United
States, with about 30 to 40 percent being intelligence officers. He
estimates that approximately half of these Soviet intelligence legals
are engaged in political intelligence-collecting political information
and engaging in "active measures." He suggests that the largest
segment of Bloc intelligence agents here is engaged in political mat-
ters, active measures and disinformation.
Phillips' Guide is
Worthy Chapter Project
(continued from page 5)
personal experiences and comments about the intelligence profes-
sion, and includes a frank chapter on the issue of ethics, morality
and secret operations. A few pages are devoted to a narrative des-
cription, complete with tradecraft terminology, of the duties of a
typical case officer serving abroad. The only weakness of the work is
in the chapter on what one interested in the profession should read
to gain a fuller understanding. The books suggested are good ones,
but the list is far from complete for the young person who needs to
make that final crucial decision, whether to go with the intelligence
profession or Sears Roebuck. The military intelligence elements
should receive equal time in future editions.
Yes, I recommend the book be read by serving and former intel-
ligence professionals, henceforth there will be little need to stumble
and stammer. But I see a greater obligation for those who have left
the quiet service. This guide to our profession should be in every
university library and on the desk of every career counselor. Either
individually, or as a chapter project, donating copies where they are
most needed should become one of our priorities. (The paperback
edition may be ordered from Stone Trail Press, P.O. Box 17320,
Bethesda, MD 20817, the hardback may be ordered from University
Publications, 44 North Market Street, Frederick, MD 21701
Donations
The following members have generously contributed an
amount equal to or exceeding one year's annual dues.
Miss Mildred S. Brannan
Falls Church, VA
Mr. Hayden Channing
Tucson, AZ
Mr. Ralph A. deVore
Kingwood, TX
Mrs. Jeanne B. Griffith
Evanston, IL
Mr. Otto T. Hess
Brandenton, FL
Col. A.F.S. MacKenzie, USA-Ret
Holmes Beach, FL
Col. Benjamin B. Manchester, III, USMC-Ret
Hayes, VA
Ms. F. Catherine Rigsbee
Saluda, NC
Col. Herbert J. "Buck" Rogers, USAF-Ret
San Antonio, TX
New Life Members
Col. Sidney W. Hagerling, USMCR-Ret
P.O. Box 2131
Ft. Collins, CO 80522
Col. Thomas F. Lancer, USA-Ret
500 H Street S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024
AFIO SPRING LUNCHEON
Friday, April 12, 1985
Boiling AFB Officers Club
Speaker to be Announced
[Edward F Sayle, former Curator, Historical Intelligence, CIA, is the
editor of Periscope I
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OFF THE WIRE: News in Brief
OSS Officer Appears to Be
First Viet War Casualty
Col. Thomas F. Lancer (USA-Ret) reports that during his nostalgic
return to the Normandy beachhead to recall D-Day, 1944, he observed
a commemorative plaque on a side alter of the Cathedral of Bayeux
which read: "Lieutenant-Colonel A. Peter DEWEY, Chevalier de la
Legion d'Honneur, Croix de Guerre avec Palmes, Parachutist de I'In-
fanterie de I'Armee des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, ne a Chicago le 8
Octobre 1917, Mort a I'Ennemi le 26 Septembre 1945 a Saigon, Indo-
Chine, Priez Pour Lui."
Col. Lancer's research has determined that Col. Dewey com-
manded a unit called DETACHMENT that was dispatched by OSS
Detachment 404 in Ceylon to accompany British forces into Saigon.
The OSS unit's mission was to locate and assist Allied prisoners-of-
war, track down war criminals and confiscate or microfilm all Japa-
nese documents and code books. Among other assignments was
reporting postwar political trends, including actions by anti-Allied or
pro-Japanese groups. The POW evacuation team parachuted into Sai-
gon on September 1, 1944, Dewey and the rest of the unit arrived
three days later.
On the day after their arrival they saw a peaceful parade manipu-
lated by extremists into an attack on the French residents of the city;
dozens of French men and women were beaten, thrown in jail and
their homes looted. The EMBANKMENT team commandeered a hotel
as a refuge for the French civilians, using Japanese to guard it against
attacks by the Vietnamese. The team found the revolutionary govern-
ment naturally prone to violence and disorder, engaging in actions that
appeared crazy and unexplainable."
To develop sources, Dewey-who spoke fluent French and had
served with OSS in France and North Africa-established close con-
tact with leaders of the independence movement. Officers of the
Anglo-French occupying forces accused by him of exceeding his
authority; They claimed his actions would be interpreted by the Viet-
namese revolutionary government as evidence of official American
support for the independence movement. The matter came to a head
on September 14th, when the occupying commander ordered EMBANK-
MENT to cease all intelligence activities until its mission could be
clarified."
Dewey complained bitterly to OSS headquarters, and continued
his intelligence activities pending U.S. instructions to the contrary. On
September 24th, a member of the unit, Capt. Joseph Coolidge was
ambushed and seriously wounded. Two days later, while Dewey and
his executive officer, Capt. Herbert J. Bluechel were riding in a jeep,
they were fired on without warning by a group of Vietnamese. Dewey
was killed instantly but Bluechel, though wounded, fought his way
back to the nearby villa that housed the OSS unit. There, he, Capt.
Frank White and Sgt. George Wickes held off the Vietnamese
attackers until help arrived from a nearby British post. Col. Dewey's
body was never recovered.
In 1981, a Vietnamese refugee in France told DoD officials that
the attack had been carried out by a Viet Minh front group. The jeep
was burned, he said, and after taking Dewey's pistol, the attackers
dumped the body in a well. According to the refugee source, the two
leaders of the attack were killed later fighting the French.
Scholar Questions Status
of Counterintelligence
Arnold Beichman, a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution, has
raised serious questions about the state of U.S. counterintelligence.
He concluded the study with these remarks:
"Richard Helms, CIA director from 1966-1972, has said, 'Counter-
intelligence is terribly important because without an effective counter-
intelligence program-both in the CIA and the FBI-the problem of
double agents and infiltrators is insurmountable.'
"Over the last decade, U.S. intelligence agencies have been weak-
ened, first, because of their own free-wheeling misbehavior and,
second, because of understandable congressional investigations into
this misbehavior. The late Sen. Frank Church, who chaired one of the
investigations, once said in a fit of exasperation, 'I wonder if we are
competent to manage an intelligence-gathering program on anything.'
In any case the congressional probes, particularly of the counter-
intelligence function, weakened U.S. intelligence to an alarming degree.
"The question today is whether or not the CIA or FBI have an
effective counterintelligence capability. In 1981, Newton S. Miler,
former chief of operations in the CIA counterintelligence staff under
the controversial James Angleton, told a conference of the Consor-
tium for the Study of Intelligence that such a Cl capability was then
lacking. Neither the CIA nor the FBI, he said, was neutralizing Soviet
and Soviet-bloc activity in the United States, the KGB's No. 1 target.
Whether there has been any improvement in the situation since the
Reagan administration took over is unknown to the writer.
"However, what is known is that for some years after these con-
gressional investigations and Justice Department actions restricting
intelligence activities, the training and recruiting of counterintelligence
personnel was inadequate, according to Kenneth deGraffenreid, now
on the National Security Council Staff and earlier on the Senate Select
Committee. Thus, the apprehension, however admirable, of an FBI
counterintelligence operative raises anew troubling questions about
U.S. counterespionage capability and therefore of U.S. intelligence in
toto.
"To put it simply, the crisis of U.S. intelligence is a crisis in
counterintelligence."
Quis Tells Rotarians
Of Terrorist Threat
Col. Francis R. Quis (AUS-Ret), a member of AFIO, made a
telling point in a recent talk before the Rotary Club of Statesville, NC.
After describing the impact of terrorism on the United States and
how small nations without large armies and nuclear weapons have
learned to grab the headlines through acts of violence, he had a
word for apologists who doubt the hand of the Soviet intelligence
services: "In the last ten years when the USA has been the focus of
terrible attacks, the Russians have not been attacked by the
terrorists."
New Laws Return to Stalinism
Says Department of State
ABC Settles Libel Action
Brought by U.S. Marshal
The ABC television network, while admitting no wrongdoing, has
agreed to settle a libel suit filed three years ago by the head of the
Justice Department's Federal Witness Protection Program.
The broadcast at issue, an investigative report entitled "Hostages
of Fear" on the program "20/20," alleged that Howard Safir, head of
the witness protection program for the U.S. Marshal's Service, had
been "badly misinformed or intentionally lying" about a number of
witnesses who might have been murdered while under the protection
of the Government.
In his complaint, Safir charged that correspondent Geraldo Rivera
and two ABC producers deliberately edited out a portion of his on-
camera response, intentionally distorting his answer. Sources at ABC
said the network settled for about $235,000 immediately prior to the
trial.
The Department of State has published a Foreign Affairs Note
indicating that "Recent changes in Soviet criminal law have further
restricted the rights of Soviet citizens, increased penalties for offenses
and tightened state controls." Some of the new legal provisions, states
the Note, "open the door to revival of Stalinist practices."
The new laws strengthen and broaden laws dealing with sabo-
tage, treason, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and transmitting
work-related secrets and economic data to foreigners. According to
the Department, one provision threatens those who receive funds or
goods from abroad, he it royalty payments to writers or gift parcels
from western organizations or individuals. Another could make it a
violation of the law to tell a foreigner where one worked and another
includes "acts threatening state security" as treason. For those
already in the KGB's camps, a new law makes it a criminal offense to
engage in "malicious disobedience" (infractions of labor camp
regulations).
The new laws are seen as an effort to disrupt contact between
activists/refusniks and foreigners.
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Former RCMP Security Chief
Assesses Canada's Vulnerability
"Successive [Canadian] governments have never learned the
knack of using effectively the information derived from various intel-
ligence and security services," says John Starnes, the first civilian
Director-General of the RCMP Security Service, who served from
1 970-73. According to Starnes, "In particular they have often failed
to take sufficient account of such information in the formulation of
foreign, defense, trade and security policies."
Speaking at York University earlier this year, the former security
services chief focused on the problem: "Many Canadians apparently
are unwilling to believe that anyone would wish to carry out such
unfriendly activities against them. This is partly because we tend to
think that we are universally liked and that others perceive us as we
see ourselves-peace-loving, honest brokers filled with goodwill
towards everyone. What secrets do we possess that could possibly
interest the Russians or anyone else? I recall a senior and influential
Cabinet minister arguing exactly in that vein, I believe with genuine
conviction."
To emphasize the vulnerability, Starnes noted that "Soviet bloc
intelligence activities rarely are taken into account at the official and
ministerial level when policies and strategies are being formulated
for the conduct of our overall relationships with the Soviet Union."
This is in conflict, he said, with "the never-ending attempt by
the KGB and others to compromise Canadians through blackmail,
entrapment and coercion." "To my personal knowledge," he added,
"'there have been literally scores of such attempts in the past 25
years and probably the numbers are greater, since it must be
assumed there are some such attempts which go unreported and
thus are unknown to the authorities. The victims have included offi-
cials, journalists, politicians, diplomats, cypher clerks, businessmen,
academics, tourists and sportsmen-the KGB's tastes are eclectic.
The unsavory methods are designed to take advantage of the human
frailties of individuals they consider some day may be of use to
them."
The Soviets have meddled in Canadian internal affairs as well.
According to the former security chief, the Soviets have harassed
ethnic groups for political and other purposes; have created agents of
influence who, consciously or unconsiously, serve some Soviet pur-
pose; have provided clandestine financial support for causes and polit-
ical groups serving Soviet interests; and have provided ideological and
military instruction for groups and individuals whose avowed aim is
the destruction of Canadian institutions and those of its allies.
The Russians and their satellites, including Cuba, says Starnes,
have stepped up their espionage and disinformation activities recently.
He suggests that this "more aggressive stance being displayed by the
KGB and the GRU ... raises some very serious questions in terms of
our future relations with the Soviet Union, how we manage those
relations and what it may reveal about Soviet intentions."
Challenge Elects New Officers
A significant number of AFIO members were among those
elected as officers of Challenge, Inc, a legal action fund for intelli-
gence officers.
Elected were: President, J.E. "Ned" Dolan, Vice President, Wil-
liam Tyng, Treasurer, Charles Claxon. Alfonso Spera, reelected as
Secretary, subsequently passed away. Newly elected to the group's
Board are Col John V. Lanterman (USA-Ret) and Col. Mary Thomp-
son (USA-Ret). W. Raymond Wannall has joined Challenge's Board
of Advisors.
Report Suggests Goals
For Next Four Years
intelligence community, and respect for and confidence in the capa-
bilities of the intelligence agencies at home and abroad arQiastly
improved. Yet American intelligence continues to fall short of the
extensive improvements envisioned by the Reagan Administration in
1981. At least part of the reason for this is that the administration
made only a handful of political appointments to the CIA, not nearly
enough to re-invigorate or re-orient the agency. Problems persist."
Initiatives for 1985: "Educate the public, improve Intelligence
Community leadership; grant the Defense Intelligence Agency direc-
tor hiring direction; tighten the focus of technical intelligence,
improve human collection techniques; allow the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board presidential access, and establish com-
petitive analysis."
The Next Four Years: "Long range objectives should focus on
five major areas: Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection; technical
collection; counterintelligence (Cl), covert action; and analysis and
intelligence estimates."
Senator John Chafee
on the "Quiet Service"
The nature of intelligence activities requires that success be
secret. On the other hand, the nature of our society is such that
controversy in intelligence activities will often lead to public debate
based on speculation. I suppose President Eisenhower summed it up
best when he said of intelligence:
"Success cannot be advertised, failure cannot be explained.
In the work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung,
often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is
rooted in patriotism-their reward can be little except the con-
viction that they are performing a unique and indispensable
service for their country, and the knowledge that America
needs and appreciates their efforts."
As one who served on the Intelligence Committee, I want to
emphasize that there is much to be proud of in our Nation's intelli-
gence effort. There are many "quiet successes." One of the things that
has struck me in my service on the committee is the sacrifice we
demand of the men and women in the intelligence profession who are
responsible for these "quiet successess." They constitute the Nation's
first line of defense, and their contributions are critically important to
our national security. Yet, there can be no public acclaim or recogni-
tion of their accomplishments, dedication, professionalism, or bravery.
On the wall in the entrance foyer to the CIA headquarters building
in Virginia, you will find a star for each of those officers who have
given their lives while in "quiet" service to their country. The names of
some of these individuals are noted, but the names of others, given the
nature of their work, cannot be revealed to the public. The number of
those stars has, unfortunately, been increasing in recent years. I can
think of no more poignant symbol of quiet service to the Nation than
those stars associated with names that must remain secret.
I think we would all do well to reflect on this aspect of the intelli-
gence profession whenever we debate or consider a matter of con-
troversy in U.S. intelligence. We as a nation owe a debt of gratitude to
people in the Intelligence Community that we cannot name, for
accomplishments that cannot be trumpeted. I salute the men and
women of our Intelligence Community-those who have served, those
who are presently serving, and those yet to come-and thank them for
their unique sacrifice.
PERISCOPE is published quarterly by the Association of
Former Intelligence Officers, McLean Office Building,
6723 Whittier Ave., Suite 303A, McLean, VA 22101.
Phone[phone].
In 1980, the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based study
group, proposed an agenda for the Reagan Administration; Much of
what was proposed was implemented. Recently the Foundation
presented a model agenda for the next four years. Among its sugges-
tions is a section on national intelligence, the key elements of which
are.
"While the Reagan Administration has sought to improve intel-
ligence capabilities, the results have been mixed. Morale within the
Officers of AFIO are:
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick ..................... President
Lloyd George Wiggins ............... Vice President
Robert J. Novak ......................... Treasurer
Charlotta P. Engrav ...................... Secretary
John K. Greaney ................. Executive Director
Edward F. Sayle ............... Editor of PERISCOPE
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From the President 's Desk
1985 promises to bring many challenges to the
U.S. Intelligence Community, and every member of
AFIO has an important role to play in assisting the
nation in fulfilling its responsibilities.
We are in a position to comment with knowledge
and objectivity on matters relating to intelligence which
face the nation. Obviously the most important issue that
will be before us for the foreseeable future is reaching
an understanding with the Soviet Union that will insure
peaceful solutions of the many vital issues that separate
these two great nations.
Make no mistake about it: this is a very serious
problem. It is not a case of our being the good guys and
the Russians being the force of evil. Each nation has
determined attitudes toward the requirements for
national security. Aside from a small group of scholars
and public officials in each nation, there is very limited
understanding in each of the motives and guiding forces
in the other.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States are
newcomers as great powers, even though both consi-
dered themselves as such long before emerging as the
most powerful: the United States during World War II;
the Russians more recently.
Historical factors have been important in the rise to
great power by each. The Americans shocked the Euro-
pean powers in the eighteenth century when they
fought and defeated what was then one of the most
powerful powers on this planet: Great Britain. Not many
Europeans, including the Russian Imperial Court, thought
that the fragile new republic in the Western Hemisphere
would survive. Likewise, the Russian Revolution of
1917 brought forth a new regime which had to struggle
many years before its survival was insured. Many of us
consider the Russians paranoid,which may well be true,
but the Bolsheviks' fight for survival may well have
added a considerable sense of insecurity. Their attitude
toward us may well be affected by U.S. hostility during
the post-revolutionary period and our non-recognition of
the Soviet Union until 1933.
We are so blessed by our geography that it is not
surprising we tend to forget that other nations may not
be so fortunate. Although we have fought in more than
our share of wars, one every quarter of a century if we
incude the war for independence and the Civil War, we
consider ourselves peace-loving and not warriors. Regard-
less of how we consider ourselves, we maintain military
forces on a permanent basis to meet every contingency
and think of such futures as "Star Wars."
It seems unnecessary to say to AFIO members and
friends that our national experience dictates the neces-
sity of maintaining the most effective intelligence ser-
vice in the world, not solely because of the possibility
that we may have to fight another war-which all of us
fervently want to avoid-but to graphically indicate to
the world the high price of aggression. While we never
asked to be keeper of the peace, we are the only power
on earth that can do so.
This awesome responsibility requires not only that
we maintain our place as the most powerful nation mil-
itarily, that we are in the forefront in science and tech-
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
President of AFIO
nology, that we constantly strive to make ours a better
society for all who live here, but that we have genuine
concern for all others. We are alumni of intelligence
services which must be the best in their specialties in
the world. These services provide the government with
the information it needs to be effective in the world
arena. As an organization devoted to supporting the
intelligence services in the public arena, we must exert
constant and effective efforts to shed the "cloaks" and
get rid of the "daggers" that so many word-merchants
use as nameplates for activities about which they know
little or nothing. If the truth shall make us free, then we
should be freedom fighters in spreading the truth about
our former profession.
I want to stress that I am not suggesting that AFIO
become a strident, raucous voice in the political arena.
There are a number of these, and while their impact
may be noisy, their long-range influence is limited. AFIO
has acquired a reputation as a responsible organization
which sponsors carefully prepared proposals formulated
with the nation's needs in mind.
AFIO must continue to build its strength and mem-
bership as representative of a// the departments and
agencies in the intelligence community. We should also
intensify our efforts to become truly national in scope.
Perhaps it is too much to look forward to the day when a
couple of wranglers meet on the range in Wyoming and
part with the comment: "See you at the next AFIO meet-
ing!" But surely it should be our objective to be nation-
wide in our membership so that every community in the
United States will be within reach of an AFIO chapter on
which they can call for speakers and reference material.
And now is the time to put on your calendar the
next AFIO convention: Friday and Saturday, October 4th
and 5th, at the Crowne Plaza in Rockville, Md. This con-
vention site is within about 30 minutes of downtown
Washington, D.C. via Metro's rapid transit, and a reason-
able commute by private automobile. This year we plan
to make an intensive effort to have as many members of
Congress as possible at the convention. Plan to come
and bring one (or both) of your Senators and your repre-
sentatives in the House. It will give them something of
unusual interest to report to their constituents.
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