VERIFICATION & ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100130088-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 88
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

'STAT-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100130088-0
ARTICLE A,pPEARED
ON PAGE ? .,;
Letters from Readers
.Verification cf- Arms Control
-I.O THL EDtrot; OF CODI~It.\TAR1':
... I t is regrettable that Ede, and
~a}~ Epstein ["Disinformation: Or,
~~'!>>? the CIA Cannot Verify 2I2
.arms?Control Agreement," ~ulyj
does 'not mention the administra-
tion's proposal to the Soviet Union
that we agree on cooperative mea-
sures of ~?erification to supplement
~+?hat are called "national technical
means," i.e., satellite photography
and electronic sur~?eillance. The pro-
posal was based ore a full appreaa-.
Lion of the problem :14r.. Epstein;
anal}?zes and other aspects of the
verification issue. It ~+~as made iii '~
.~ugttst 1981, and the Soviet Union
accepted the principle in November
both in Brezhne~?'s intervierc in D.I?
Spiet?el and through diplomatic
channels. Tlie issue is now on the
agenda of all our arms-control ne?
gotiations with the So~?iet Union.
EL'GENL' V. Rosrow
Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.
TO THE EDITOR OF CO1fRIE1\TARY:
Ed~rarti ,~ay Epstein's crude on
disinformation is a welcome anti-
dote to thr glib assurances of uni-
I;~teral disarmers and freeze advo-
catts chat American intelligence
could easily detect Soviet cheating
on a freeze agTecmeiit. But tJlere
are more specific limiu to intelli-
gence-gathering than the Soviets'
expertise in feeding us what they
want us to hear... .
For example, it is simply not pos-
sible for a reconnaissance satellite
to determine llotr many reentry ve- ?
hides a Soviet ICBA4 is carrying;
the onl}? ~+?ay to discover this is to
~+?alk up co the missile, unzip iu
u?anc~?ad, and count. Similarly, satel-
lice pictures can tell its only that a
nets factory has lien built; the}?
cannot tell us what is being made
inside. Again, only on?site inspec-
tion, continuous on?site inspection,
can do the job.
Simple arithmetic shows the im-
pos~ibilit+' of e+?cn keepin>; track of
CONIN>EN'PARY
OCTOBE>~ 1982
}?sis of facttaal data-not neces
at falsifying facts (especialh? those
that might be exposed by encmv
intelligence). It: its most sophisci-
ne++? industrial facilities in the catecl f;lotakia depended on in.
timidatin~; ti:e ~t'c~tern alliuc into
appc:~scrncnt b}? misleading than
about the capabilities of tt:c Iatft-
traffe t~ bomb London. and P;tris.
Hitler's dercg~ion tcorkecJ not be-
cause \1?e~aern intelli;enc?e failed to
rather "fact," alx+ut tLc l,u!ttraffC,
but becaasc the suhccqueuc xnahsis
faiJe+l to rcl,uc tltc:n t~: l~itlcr', ara?
te~ic ~le~itrt.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27 :CIA-RDP90-008068000100130088-0