INTELLIGENCE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: July 1, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STAT STANDING
COMMITTEE ON
LAW AND NATIONAL
SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Morris I. Leibman, Chairman July 1981
Intelligence Identities
Protection Act
In our previous issues we have reported extensively on
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act-S. 391 and
H. R. 4. The measure has resulted in a lively debate within
the legal community. In order to seek clarification on
some of the basic criticisms that have been raised,
Intelligence Report put some questions to Mr. John S.
Warner, for many years general counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency. The questions and his answers to
them are printed below.
0. Why is this type of legislation needed?
A. There are certain groups whose avowed purpose is
to destroy the U.S. intelligence effort and as a means to
this end they have published lists of names identifying
them as CIA agents. They place such people and their
families in physical jeopardy and certainly impair and
impede U.S. intelligence activities. Legislation presently
on the books is not specific enough to deal effectively
with this situation. The U.S. Congress has mandated the
carrying out of intelligence activities by authorizing and
appropriating the necessary funds. Thus, it has a
responsibility to take steps to protect the safety of the
people concerned and their activities. Passage of this
legislation is one such step.
0. As you are aware, the constitutionality of this
legislation has been challenged by the American Civil
Liberties Union and by a number of legal scholars. What
is your answer to these critics?
A. Three committees of Congress have said the
legislation is constitutional. Last year the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee approved and reported such a bill. Also
the House Judiciary Committee and the House Intelli-
gence Committee approved and reported such legisla-
tion. This happened after full debate and detailed
hearings where assertions of unconstitutionality were
fully aired.
0. Is there any precedent in Supreme Court opinions
to support the view that the First Amendment is absolute
and would prevail over this legislation?
A. Among the advocates of the absolutist view of the
First Amendment were those who asserted such views in
court and urged that Marchetti and Snepp could not be
held to their secrecy agreements-that the higher law was
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court clearly and
firmly stated the U.S. government can take steps to
protect its intelligence secrets, specifically stating that the
First Amendment privilege does not prevail in all
circumstances. In the Agee case, just decided (see
elsewhere in this Report), it seems to me the Supreme
Court has laid to rest such absolute views regarding a
First Amendment conflict with this legislation.
0. It has been said that legislation should not attempt
to penalize publication of agent identities which are
already in the public domain and have, in fact, been put
there by the U.S. government. There have been a number
of references, for example, to the fact that careful study of
the State Department Biographic Register will in most
cases reveal to informed persons the identity of CIA
agents using State Department cover. Is it accurate that
the government itself frequently puts the identity of
intelligence agents into the public domain?
A. No, it is not-such assertions are not true. Agent
identities are not routinely put in the public domain. It is
Continued on page 2
Case Note-Haig v. Agee
Germane to Intelligence Report's coverage of the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act now pending
before the House Intelligence Committee and the Senate
Judiciary Committee, is the recent (June 29, 1981)
Supreme Court case of Haig v. Agee. This decision held
that Agee's passport could be revoked because of the
serious damage he had caused or was likely to cause to
national security and/or foreign policy.
Reviewing the background, the majority finding noted
that in 1974 Agee, who had been employed by the CIA
from 1957 to 1968-
"Called a press conference in London to announce
his `campaign to fight the United States CIA where-
ever it is operating.' He declared his intent `to
expose CIA officers and agents and to take the
measures necessary to drive them out of the
countries where they are operating.' Since 1974,
Agee has, by his own assertion, devoted consistent
effort to that program, and he has traveled
Continued on page 2
STAT Editor: William C. Mott. Associate Editor: David Martin. Standing Comm ttee on Law and National Security, ABA,
1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Ill. 60637.
Copyright ? 1981 American Bar Assoc
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Case Note -Haig v. Agee
Continued from page 1
extensively in other countries in order to carry it
out. To identify CIA personnel in a particular
country, Agee goes to the target country and con-
sults sources in local diplomatic circles whom he
knows from his prior service in the United States
Government. He recruits collaborators and trains
them in clandestine techniques designed to expose
the `cover' of CIA employees and sources. Agee and
his collaborators have repeatedly and publicly
identified individuals and organizations located in
foreign countries as undercover CIA agents, em-
ployees, or sources."
When his passport was lifted in December 1974, Agee,
instead of seeking an administrative review of the revoca-
tion as he had been advised was his right, went directly to
the courts. He filed suit attacking-
"The Secretary's action on three constitutional
grounds: first, that the revocation of his passport
impermissibly burdens his freedom to travel;
second, that the action was intended to penalize his
exercise of free speech and deter his criticism of
government policies and practices; and third, that
failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing vio-
lated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due
process."
With respect to the various constitutional defenses
raised by Agee, Chief Justice Burger's opinion of the
court states:
"Agee's disclosures, among other things, have the
declared purpose of obstructing intelligence opera-
tions and the recruiting of intelligence personnel.
They are clearly not protected by the constitution."
(Emphasis added.)
It would seem that the seven to two decision of the
court in Haig v. Agee would weaken the arguments of
those witnesses who opposed the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act on constitutional grounds and it should,
therefore, strengthen the chances of passage.
Intelligence Identities Protection Act
Continued.from page 1
true that certain government publications in the past
provided clues which, when put together with other
information, permitted deductions to be made by
knowledgeable persons which in some cases were
accurate. But this is a far cry from the charge that the
government has put in the public domain the very
information the publication of which this legislation
makes a criminal act.
0. Some of the critics have argued that instead of
seeking restrictive legislation the U.S. government would
be better to devise improved procedures for keeping the
identity of its agents secret. Do you consider such an
approach a viable alternative?
A. Continuing efforts are being made by the govern-
ment to protect such identities. In fact, the greater
number of agent identities are and have been adequately
held in secrecy. The provision in the legislation requiring
the president to establish procedures to ensure effective
cover is a welcome step to formalize and require uniform
executive branch adherence to an inherently complicated
matter. But, criminal prohibitions are needed to provide
additional protection and to reassure agents in all
capacities that the U.S. government will act against those
who willfully publish and expose their identities.
0. The critics have charged that this legislation would
have a chilling effect on the press. They assert the
identification of the single agent who may have been
involved in a criminal action would subject the press to
prosecution under the law. Would the press really be
chilled by the legislation in its present form?
A. This is strictly a red herring thrown out by those
who either don't believe we should have secret intelli-
gence or who have not taken the trouble to read the
protracted hearings and debates. These clearly demon-
strate that the careful drafting of this legislation in no way
will inhibit discussion, debate, and criticism of intelli-
gence activities. The Senate version requires a showing of
a "pattern of activities" and the House version requires a
specific intent to "impair or impede" foreign intelligence
activities.
It is indeed naive to think that our aggressive and well-
informed media will refrain from acting in their role of
informing the public. It indeed will chill those who have
published lists of names, some accurate and some
inaccurate, after extensive counterespionage-like opera-
tions in pursuit of their proclaimed objective of destroy-
ing American intelligence, with little or no concern if a
few of those identified are shot, maimed or killed.
Iranian Claims Case
The Supreme Court, on July 2,1981, eight days after
hearing arguments, unanimously upheld the actions
taken by Presidents Carter and Reagan to carry out the
claims agreement that ended the hostage crisis.
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the court, stressed that
this was a decision limited to the facts of this case, and
that the court was upholding the proposed settlement of
such claims because it was done incident to the resolution
by the president of a major foreign policy dispute and
"crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that
Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claims
settlement by executive agreement."
The court noted that future litigation from dissatisfied
claimants in the matter was not precluded by this
decision.
This is another in a series of Supreme Court decisions
(draft registration, Agee) in which the court states its
belief that it has a limited role in defense and foreign
affairs, giving wide discretion to the president and the
Congress.
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How the KGB Operates:
Answers from a KGB Defector
This is another interview in our series of articles
describing the operations of the KGB, in the United
States and world-wide, in the words of men who until
recently served as part of this apparatus.
Ilva Dzhirkvelov, a .former KGB officer, defectedfrom
the Soviets early last year and is now living in England
under official British protection. His escapefrom Geneva
with his family bears many points of resemblance to the
hair-raising account of the escape of Victor Barisov, the
Soviet defector who plays a central role in the best selling
novel, "The Spike, "written by Robert Moss and Arnaud
de Borchgrave. The real life story of this escape is indeed
thrilling, and fraught with danger and excitement, but for
reasons of security it cannot be fully told.
Your editor recently was able to meet personally with
Dzhirkvelov, in a safe place in London, thanks to the
intervention of Leonid Finkelstein, an earlier Soviet
defector, now with the BBC, who had known
Dzhirkvelov in the Journalists Union in Moscow during
the 1960'x. Dzhirkvelov was then the KGBapparatchik in
the Union. Instead of attempting to ad lib an interview
with Mr. Dzhirkvelov, the editor presented him with a
series of prepared questions so that he could do a careful
Job of drafting his replies. (Finkelstein is an old friend of
the committee and its chairman, having lectured many
times before our Teacher Training Institutes.)
0. Will you introduce yourself, please?
A. I am Ilya Grigoryevich Dzhirkvelov, 54, a Georgian.
Until April 1980 a citizen of the USSR. Married, with one
daughter born in 1975.
0. For how many years did you work for the KGB, in
what capacities, and when did you leave their service?
A. In the organs of the KGB (then NKVD) I worked
since 1944. 1 was recruited in Tbilisi, Georgia, and sent to
the short training course for junior officers. Immediately
afterwards I was dispatched to the Crimea and joined the
so-called special detachments. For a while I was taking
part in the combat and intelligence operations against the
Germans but then our detachment was given the task to
supervise the deportation of Crimean Tartars from their
homeland. In February 1945 we guarded the Yalta
Conference. After the war I graduated from an advanced
KGB school in Moscow. On graduation I was sent to
Romania for intelligence work but in a short while got
recalled to Moscow and was given a job in the First Chief
Directorate (Foreign Intelligence)-first against Middle
East countries and then, for a short spell, against the
United States.
During 1953-54 1 worked for the Second Chief
Directorate (Counterintelligence) where I looked after
the embassies of the Middle East countries and foreign
journalists stationed in Moscow. Then I was again moved
to the First Directorate, into the position of Deputy
Head, Section 10. That Section conducted frontier area
intelligence and I was mainly responsible for Turkey and
Iran.
In March 1956 there was some unrest in my native
Georgia, where a peaceful demonstration was met by a
hail of bullets. Right after those events I was sent to
Georgia-against my will. Until the end of 1957 I was
Deputy Head, First Section, of the Georgian KGB, at
which time I applied for voluntary discharge, giving
personal reasons. My application was granted and I
joined my family in Moscow. My last KGB rank was
captain.
However, my unofficial connection with the KGB was
never severed. They were in touch with me both in
Moscow where I was appointed Deputy Secretary
General of the Union of Journalists and later abroad,
when I was TASS correspondent in Tanzania and the
Sudan from 1966 to 1972.
0. Do you have any direct knowledge of the KGB
disinformation operation, and if you do, could you
describe some concrete examples in which you were
involved or which came to your attention?
A. The KGB disinformation service took shape in 1947
when political intelligence of the KGB merged with the
military intelligence (GRU) for "the more active counter-
actions to the cold war." The above services merged into
the Committee of Information attached to the Council of
Ministers of the USSR. In charge of the new Committee
was Vyacheslav M. Molotov.
At that time the Fifth Directorate was formed. Its task
was to conduct disinformation "undertakings" in West-
ern and other independent countries. Initially, the
Directorate was not responsible for the organization of
sabotage, unrest or similar "extra-actions" as they were
known. "Extras" were the responsibility of a separate
section-the one headed by the notorious Colonel (then
General) Sudoplatov and later one B. Studnikov. Now,
however, both functions are entrusted to one and the
same department in the KGB First Directorate. I think it
is known as Department 13.
During my work in Tanzania and the Sudan I several
times took part in the distribution of disinformation
material. One example, in Tanzania, was our "work" to
discredit the American Peace Corps. The line was that it
was a CIA front organization and its subversive activity
had to be "exposed." We tried, often successfully, to
place prepared articles into local papers-preferably
signed by the Tanzanians. The "authors" were always
paid well, and "their" articles worked: Tanzania, and
then Uganda, started refusing Peace Corps Services.
The other example was in the Sudan. When an
agreement was signed on the reopening of the American
Cultural Centre, we were immediately ordered to spread
rumors among politicians and other local dignitaries that
the new Centre was no more than a CIA branch which
had the task to destabilize the Jaafar Numeiry regime.
We quoted "reliable American sources." Later, I suc-
ceeded in placing an article in a local newspaper with a
Continued on page 4
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How the KGB Operates
Continued from page 3
strong indirect hint that the U.S. "special services"
wanted to change the regime in the Sudan.
Such articles invariably get reprinted by the Soviet
press and broadcast by the Soviet radio quoting the
"source" chapter and verse.
Similar means are used for defaming those politicians
and statesmen in the developing countries whom the
Soviets do not like. The easiest publications for such
defamation, as well as for placing articles extolling the
"achievements" in the USSR, are, naturally, Communist
and other left or "independent" papers and magazines.
Finally, here is a fresh example of "pure" disinforma-
tion. On May 26, 1981, the Soviet newspaper Izvestia
under the heading CIA Sabotage informed its readers
that the paper Noticiac de Beira of Mozambique
published a series of articles (a series, not just one article)
on the subversive activity of the CIA. The series
"revealed" that "from 1961 to 1976 the CIA organized
nearly 900 operations against politicians and govern-
ments in different countries." It is a remarkable
analytical work-especially if we recall that in 1961 the
present Mozambique (and its apparently formidable
intelligence service) simply did not exist. The source,
therefore, is quite clearly distinguishable.
I must, however, make it absolutely clear that in
disinformation the KGB is only the arm, the tool, the
performing force. The aims for disinformation are set,
the targets are chosen and the plans made only by the
"apparatus" and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central
Committee.
0. What can you tell us about the role of the KGB in
manipulating front organizations and orchestrating
international campaigns like the recent campaigns
against the neutron warhead and the modernization of
theater nuclear weapons? What specifically does the
KGB do to assist these campaigns?
A. Every Soviet organization-be it a state office or a
"society" of any kind-is studded with KGB officers and
informers if this organization deals with foreigners. This
is true also for Soviet delegations at any international
congress or meeting, whether the host organization is a
front one or a genuine one. But the KGB itself does not
"supervise" front organizations; neither does it launch or
conduct any campaigns. This is the prerogative of the
Central Committee departments, acting on the sanction
of the Secretaries. The actions of various kinds may
indeed be performed by the KGB officers using some
cover in the international organizations-but never on
the decision of just the KGB. The KGB capabilities
abroad, especially in the West, are certainly used to
propagate the Central Committee line and "mobilize"
public opinion in campaigns against neutron warheads,
etc. But no more than "used."
0. The author Claire Sterling in her recent book
charges that the KGB has been heavily involved in
supporting international terrorism. Is this a matter about
which you have personal knowledge, and if you do, could
you tell us what you know about the degree of this
involvement, the geographic target areas, the principal
surrogate organizations through which the KGB has
worked, and its mode, or modes, of operation?
A. Let us speak separately of two kinds of terrorism.
There are terrorist groups like the "Red Brigades" in Italy
or the former Baader-Meinhof group in Germany and the
like. I dare say that the KGB has nothing to do with
those-even if they use Soviet made weapons. The KGB
did "liquidate," or made attempts to "liquidate" some
leaders of anti-Soviet organizations, of emigrees like
Bandera, Rebet, Konovalenko and others-among them
former Soviet citizens who remained, or intended to
remain, in the West. But that was done by the KGB itself,
without relying on usually unstable terrorist groups,
often hostile to the Soviet Union.
There is, however, the other kind of international
terrorism helped and sponsored by the KGB. I mean the
"national liberation" movements in African, Asian, Latin
American and even European (Ireland) countries. Prom-
inent in this category is, no doubt, the Palestinian
Liberation Organization. It is certainly used as one of the
main tools in the fight against Israel and even against the
Western democracies. In the training of the "fighters" for
the Palestinian and other "movements" active assistance
is sought (and received) from Bulgarian, East German
and Cuban special services. The urban guerrillas are
trained on Soviet territory, in the three above mentioned
"brotherly" countries and now also on the territory of
several African states-like Angola, Congo, Mozambi-
que and possibly Libya.
The supply routes for those "movements" may vary. In
my time a lot of weapons and ammunition was sent
through Tanzania. However, the goods-and especially
arms-for the Soviet sponsored terrorists do not always
safely reach their destinations. I remember a case when a
consignment of 30,000 automatic rifles and other military
equipment was delivered from the USSR to Tanzania
under some disguise-and then disappeared without a
trace. Rumors persisted in Africa that a group of smart
Tanzanian "businessmen" had sold the arms "on the side"
for an astronomical amount of money and the Soviet
Union thought it wise not to claim the loss.
0. There have been reports in the West that it is official
Soviet policy to wage what has been called a "resource
war" by progressively denying the West access to vital
raw materials. In your KGB experience, did you hear talk
about the "resource war," and could you tell us what you
know about the direct involvement of the KGB in this
war?
A. The Soviet government has been paying much
attention to the "resource war" since the mid-forties. It
started with oil. As early as 1945 or 1946 a Soviet-Iranian
oil company called Kivirhurian was formed. The Soviet
director of the company was the KGB officer Artavazd
Mangasarov, a trained oil specialist. The aim was to build
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a pipeline for getting cheap oil from both Iran and
Bahrein and gradually to make the Soviet Union their
only customer. These plans were thwarted by Mossadegh
who, on seizing power in Iran, immediately nationalized
all Soviet-Iranian companies.
Very significant from the point of view of the
"resource war" was the turn in the long-range Soviet
policy towards Arab countries and Israel. I remember
how surprised we were in the KGB when it became clear
that the Soviet Union froze her relations with Israel-
initially very warm-and took the side of her Arab foes.
Our opinion was that Israel, a predominantly socialist
country, well disposed to the Soviet Union, was a much
more useful ally in the Middle East than any Arab
country. Israel could have become an excellent vehicle
for intelligence and other penetration into the U.S.;
indeed the saying was that whatever would happen in the
U.S. tomorrow was already known in Israel today. Yet
the Soviet leader-then Stalin-decided to support the
Arabs against Israel, and the reason, we were told, was
oil. The anti-Communist mood of the late Egyptian
president Nasser was ignored; it was his pan-Arabic
designs that tempted the USSR to gain control of oil
deposits in the Middle East. This long-term policy has
been carried on since. It is worth stressing that at that
time the USSR had virtually unlimited oil resources and
therefore the Soviet interest in Middle East oil was clearly
political: to deny the use of oil to the West.'
In 1971, when I was the TASS correspondent in the
Sudan, the Foreign Trade Minister of the USSR,
Patolichev, visited that country. He spoke to Soviet
personnel in Khartoum on the aims and methods of
Soviet foreign trade. He mentioned as an achievement
the new treaty with Iran on supply of the natural gas
which, according to Patolichev, the Soviet Union could
re-sell to the West at a good profit. But he also stressed
that, trade advantages aside, oil and gas had, first of all,
great strategic and political importance. "Stalin himself
understood it well," said the Soviet Minister.
As for the role of the KGB in the "resource war," it is
serious enough. Both the KGB and the GRU are
gathering intelligence world-wide on the availability of
various resources-to enable the Soviet leadership to act
precisely in the way which would hurt the Western
countries most. Then, the KGB is ordered to concentrate
its efforts on the countries important for their mineral
resources both to obtain more information and to
influence the events in those countries. Stalin's goal of
depriving the West of the mineral resources of the planet
is still pursued.
0. How much control does the KGB have over
intelligence operations conducted by Cuba and other
Communist bloc countries, how does the KGB exercise
'Translator's note. As a Soviet journalist in 1956, the translator
attended a briefing on the Middle East by the Central Committee
lecturer German M. Sverdlov, who said: "Nasser is a Fascist but he has
his finger on the jugular vein of the West-and therefore we support
him."
that control, and how is the entire operation coordi-
nated?
A. It is a little misleading to speak of "control" by the
KGB over the intelligence services of other "socialist"
countries. There is rather a very close partnership in
subversion against the West and in supporting various
anti-government organizations in the rest of the world.
Naturally, the KGB is an undisputed "senior partner" but
one should not diminish the initiative and activity of
others-notably of the Bulgarian, East German and
especially Cuban special services. A lot of support for
"national liberation" forces in Latin America and Africa
comes from those three countries.
The major actions, big concerted operations are
discussed and agreed in advance with the Soviet side-
but then not just with the KGB, often at the higher level
(where the KGB is now, of course, represented by virtue
of its Chairman Yuri Andropov being a full Politbureau
member). Apart from that, in the intelligence services of
most "socialist" countries there are, as a rule, the KGB
"advisers" who coordinate (and possibly to a certain
extent control) all joint operations. They may be, of
course, just "keeping an eye" as well.
0. As you are aware, there has been a good deal of
debate in the United States over the morality of covert
operations. Does the Soviet Politbureau impose any
restrictions on the kinds of covert operations conducted
by the KGB? For example, does the KGB engage in the
full range of covert operations from sabotage and
assassination to support for pro-Soviet parties and
organizations in the West? Could you give us a few
examples of KGB covert operations in each category?
A. All major operations conducted by the KGB abroad
are to be approved in advance by the top Central
Committee leaders-one of whom is, of course, the KGB
Chairman Yuri Andropov. But if such an "offer of an
operation" is made to the Central Committee Secretariat,
it very seldom is turned down, not only because
Andropov is in the Politbureau, but also because serious
operations are discussed by top KGB people beforehand
with the Central Committee "apparatchiks" who are
privy to such matters and who prepare the decisions
finally made by the Politbureau or Secretariat.
Here is an example from the past, but, to my best
knowledge, the decision-making process in this respect
has changed very little.
When we planned covert operations in Iran-like
abductions or "liquidations" of undesirable persons or
"evacuation" of our valuable agents from there-we had
to obtain the go-ahead from Politbureau level (not
necessarily the whole Politbureau; there were members of
it who made decisions on behalf of that whole body).
When, after the debacle of the KGB-staged uprising in
Iranian Azerbaidjan, we made plans for rescuing the
Central Committee members of the Tudeh party which
was the driving force behind the uprising, those plans had
to be approved by Stalin himself. I was then the
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How the KGB Operates
Continued from page 5
participant in the planning and performing of that
operation and I remember that Stalin rejected the idea of
sending an aeroplane to Iran (incidentally, to the same
plateau where much later a helicopter rescue operation
by some other country proved to be not really successful).
In any event, the Tudeh leaders were evacuated from Iran
by various individual routes. I personally organized the
border crossing by the Central Committee Secretary
called Kombakhsha, dressed as a woman, from Iran to
the Turkmenistan desert.
0. At the time you defected from the USSR, the post-
Watergate campaign against the CIA and other U.S.
intelligence agencies was still going on. What can you tell
us about the KGB reaction to our self-mutilation of our
intelligence capabilities? Do you have any knowledge of
KGB involvement in the campaign against our intelli-
gence agencies?
A. Denunciations and "exposure" of the CIA and other
special services of the Western countries is, of course, one
of the most favored lines of the Soviet propaganda
machine. In this activity the help from the KGB is always
sought; it advises on targets, names, etc., inside the
USSR, for internal consumption, and conducts some
"mobilization" of public opinion abroad. Naturally, the
KGB was delighted that the U.S. Congress and the U.S.
media were doing such a good job for them. Yet it must be
emphasized that the KGB was not really taken in by the
campaign. The KGB bosses never believed that the CIA
was "demolished" or "utterly incapacitated." The KGB
still retains a great deal of respect for the CIA as the most
sophisticated service of its kind in the world. The
American "self-mutilation" was, for many a KGB chief,
simply some strange decadent propaganda.
Possible Use of Military
To Enforce Drug Laws
The House of Representatives (see House Report 97-
71, Part 2) is considering a "rider" to the Department of
Defense Authorization Act, 1982, which would authorize
the military to provide assistance to federal; state or local
law enforcement agencies to aid in the enforcement of
laws against illicit drug traffic. The proposed provisions
of the law would, among other things, authorize as
exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385)
the sharing of information, training of civilian officials,
and the use of military personnel and equipment. The
Senate is considering similar legislation (see Senate
Report 97-58).
The Department of Defense, speaking through its
general counsel, William H. Taft IV, generally recom-
mended enactment but noted that such use could, despite
the legislative language, involve the military in confron-
tational situations with American citizens, the possibility
of civil liability, and a derogation from the military
mission.
The House Committee on the Judiciary has recom-
mended enactment of its version. There were dissents
from other committee members (John F. Seiberling, Don
Edwards and John Conyers) who reiterated Mr. Taft's
views, discussed the Kent State case, and quoted Senator
Ervin: "The military forces should never be used for law
enforcement purposes, even for the purpose of suppress-
ing the drug traffic."
Final action by the Congress has not been taken.
Larry Williams
Law Professor Workshop
The Committee on Law and National Security and the
International Law Section, together with the newly
established Center for Law and National Security at the
University of Virginia School of Law, co-sponsored a
Law Professor Workshop, "U.S. Foreign Policy: A New
Beginning?" at Charlottesville, Virginia, June 5-6, 1981.
The program which included presentations and commen-
tary by the new Ambassador to the Organization of
American States and former Secretary of the Navy
J. William Middendorf, former Ambassadors Covey T.
Oliver (Colombia) and Herman Eilts (Saudi Arabia and
Egypt), and Congressman J. Kenneth Robinson (R.-
Va.), was well received by the more than ninety law
professors, members of the Bar and representatives of
other disciplines who participated in the workshop.
The program addressed the basic question whether "a
new beginning," the campaign slogan of the Reagan
candidacy, is achievable in the continuum of U.S. foreign
policy. That slogan provided an excellent vehicle to look
at the key issues which have already emerged for the new
administration: the attempt to redefine the U.S.-Soviet
relationship in the face of the threatened military
imbalance and Soviet resort to force in Afghanistan,
support for radicalization of the Caribbean, and threats
to the free labor movement in Poland; the search for
peace in the Middle East; international monetary policy
and the crisis in oil; the problem of access to strategic
minerals; and the law of the sea negotiations with special
emphasis on the regime for mining the seabed.
What clearly emerged is that new initiatives are being
taken, former policies are being reviewed and Congres-
sional attitudes concerning defense spending and foreign
policy have changed. The last point was brought home in
a most convincing way by Congressman Robinson, the
workshop's banquet speaker.
The emphasis on the activism of the Reagan adminis-
tration tended to overshadow the reality that certain
situations and relationships have a constancy which,
because of institutional, geopolitical or historical factors,
tend to resist change and, thereby, make difficult a
dramatic "new beginning."
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