RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND AMERICAN ACADEMICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

roil
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2
ART!'? E r4 .r 1ED
ON PAGE
~RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CEN-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND AMERICAN ACADEMICS
? Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, one of the great tragedies of the
1960's and 1970's was the withdrawal,
by American academics, of cooperation
with the analytic arms of U.S. intelli-
gence. This country produces some of
the finest research and writing on for-
eign countries and foreign policy that
the world has ever seen. American aca-
demics, with their fine training and
years of experience. frequently devel-
op expertise on particular countries
that no intelligence organization car
match, despite its access to secret
sources.
U.S. intelligence agencies want and
need the help of academic experts.
They need the "reality check" that an
outside expert can provide by critiqu-
ing their analyses. They need the
fresh ideas that an outsider can inject
into the Intelligence process. Often,
because of personnel turnover, they
need the basic guidance that a sea-
soned expert can provide to get a new
analyst off to a good start .
Intelligence is a vital part of the
policy process. Academics should be
proud to help make the policy process
more rational by ensuring that it is
based upon the best possible informa-
tion and analysis.
American academics. In turn, need
some things from U.S. intelligence
agencies. They need the freedom to
state their views without censorship-
except as required to delete sensitive
intelligence sources and methods or
other classified information. They
need enough insulation from the oper-
ational side of U.S. intelligence that
their cooperation with analysts will
not lessen their ability to conduct re-
search in foreign countries. And they
need the right and encouragement to
be forthright with their employers
and the public regarding any financial
support received from U.S. agencies.
The recent case of Nadav Safran. a
truly distinguished professor at Har-
vard University who was faulted for
not disclosing CIA support for an sca.
demic conference, illustrates very well
both our need for academics to help
U.S. intelligence and the need to guard
against accidental harm to those aca-
demics and to free academic enquiry
everywhere. Professor Safran exempli-
fies the type of insightful scholar who
can really make a difference by apply-
ing his rigorous analytic approach to
problems of U.S. Intelligence. His res-
ignation as director of Harvard's
Center for Middle Eastern Studies is a
good example of the harm that can
come from keeping the service to his
country go secret that it offends schol-
arly canons or university rules:
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATI
13 March 1986
The CIA has learned from this case;
they are both changing their rules re-
garding contracts with academics and
reaching out to the academic commu-
nity to exchange views on this issue.
Recently, the CIA's Deputy Director
for Intelligence, Robert M. Gates, pre-
sented the CIA's latest position in a
thoughtful address at Harvard's John
F. Kennedy School of Government.
His discussion may not be the last
word, but it is well worth reading.
Both the CIA and the Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence would be most in-
terested in hearing the reactions of
American scholars, for we are serious
when we say that America needs their
contributions to the intelligence and
policy processes.
Mr. President. I ask that the text of
Mr. Gate's address on "CiA and the
University" be printed in the Rsconu.
The address follows
CIA AND THE UNrt-EP.StT?
1 welcome this opportunity to court to
Harvard and speak about the relationship
between the Central Intelligence Agency.
especially its analytical/research arm. and
the academic community. Recent events
here have again sparked broad discussion of
both the propriety and wisdom of university
scholars cooperating in any way with Amen-
can intelligence On December 3rd of last
year the Boston Globe stated "The scholar
who works for a government intelligence
agency ceases to be an Independent spirit. a
true scholar." These are strong word.. In
my view they are absolutely wrong. None-
theless. there are real concerns that should
be addressed.
My remarks tonight center on two simple
propositions:
First. preserving the liberty of this nation
is fundamental to and prerequisite for the
preservation of academic freedom: the uni-
versity community cannot prosper and pro-
tect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the for-
tunes of the nation.
Second. in defending the nation and our
liberties, the Federal Government needs to
have recourse to the best minds in the coun-
try. Including those in the academic commu-
nity. Tensions tnetitably accompany the re-
lationship between defense. intelligence and
academe, but mutual need and benefit re-
quire reconciliation or elimination of such
tensions.
TEE KISTOPY Or CIA-u,RVIItS!TY RELATIONS
In discussing the relationship between the
academic community and Amencan intelli-
gence. and specifically the research and
analysis side of intelligence. it Is important
u which coinciden?
-"-
n
ship. The tp
Liam L. Langer, was recruited as the Direc-
tor of Research and he in turn, recruited
some of the finest scholars in America for
the OSS, many of them from Harvard, Yale.
and Columbia Universities.
When CIA was established by the Nation-
al Security Act of 1947, this pattern was re-
peated. Langer returned to establish the
Board of National incumates. Robert Amory
of the Harvard law School faculty was
named CIA's Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence in 2953, and served in that capacity
for nearly ten years. Other academicians
who Joined Included: Historians such as
Ludwell Montague. Sherman Kent, Joseph
Strayer and DeForrest Van Slyck; econo-
mist Max Millikan. who organised the eco-
nomic Intelligence effort: economist Rich-
ard Bissell, who later headed the clandes-
tine service; and even Willian Sloane Coffin
who left the Union Theological Seminary to
Join CIA for the duration of the Korean
War before becoming Chaplain at Yale. He
Is Quoted a reallint that he Joined th.-
Apenr% because "Stalin made Hitler loot
lu.r a Boy bbout - It was a common reasor.
for academiuan~t to Jour, the Agenc) in the
early years
kelatioi' between the scholarly eommu
nil'. ano CIA wart cordtr.! throughout tht
1950:, The cold war at Its height and faculty
or student, rarely questioned the nations
need for the Agency and Its activities. Some
of the most noted university professors of
the time served on a regular basis as unpaid
consultant-. helping CIA to form its esti-
mates of probable trends in world politics.
These halcyon days were soon to change
There was some criticism on campuses over
CIA's involvement in the Bay of Pegs expe-
dition in 1961. But the real deterioration in
relations between CIA and the academe par-
alleled the wrenching divisions in the coun
try over the Vietnam War. despite continu?
inf academic cooperation with the Director-
ate of Intelligence. The decline in CIA-acs
demia tier accelerated with the February
1907 disclosure in Ramparts magazine that
CIA had been funding the foreign activities
of the Nation:: Student Association for a
number of year
Sensational afiegations of wrongdoing by
CIA became more frequent in the media in
the early 1.970. culminating the establish
men:: of tht Rockefeller Commission and
subsequently boti- the Church Committee
lr. the Senate and the Pike Committee in
the House of Representatives
Lien the Cnurch Committee, however. so
critical of other intelligence activities. rec-
otrnued that CL4 -must have unlettered
access to the best advice and Judgment our
universities can produce.' The Committee
recommended that academic advice and
judgment of acadertucs he openly sought.
The Cornrtittet concluded that the pnnci-
e
to go back W an
pal resporLibih*.: for setting the terms of
tally, have important links to Harvard. In the relationship between CIA and academe
persuaded saded Presiden1941- t nt of Roosevelt i t J. the need Donovan should rest with college administrators and
to wadaenize d a coordinated iforeign the n other academic officials. "The Committee
gence org Tice to inform o infthe ov nmint believes that it is the responsibility
about fast moving world events. He pro- of ... the American. academic community
about the professions'. and ethical standards
posed fd that the service "draw on the upro- niver- to of its memr-rs '
shies for experts with long foreign expert- This, paralleled considerable debate within
crave and specialized knowledge of the Mato- academia ranlts and numerous articles about
ry. languages and general conditions of van relationship between the universities
btu countries.' President Roosevelt agreed the and CIA In response tea letter from the
and created the Office of the Coordinator of Preside.: of th< Amertcar. Association of
information, later renamed the he Office of
Special Services. under Donovan's leader- t nnerstty Professors. then CIA Director
Contr,ued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2
a
taeorgf Bust replied that the Agency
sought "only the voluntary and willing co-
operation of individuals who can help the
foreign policy processes of the United
States." The Director stated that where re-
lationships are confidential they are usually
so at the request of the scholars. rather
than the Agency. and he refused to isolate
the Agency from "the good counsel of the
best scholars in our cowuitry."
Adopting this approach. Director Stan-
field Turner engaged in a long and eventual-
ly unsuccessful effort to reach agreement
with President Bok of Harvard on relations
between this university and the Agency.
(Ironically, at this time, another Harvard
Professor. Robert Bow-it. was my predeces-
sor as head of the analytical element of the
Agency.) Some academic institutions adopt-
ed guidelines similar to the restrictive regu-
lations established at Harvard. in most cases
less severe guidelines were proposed. In a
great majority of school where the issue
arose, however, the faculty and administra-
tion rejected any guidelines, usually on the
grounds that existing regulations or prae-
tices were adequate to protect both the in-
stitution and individuals.
The Agency's relations with the academic
would have improved in recent years for a
variety of reasons. including developments
abroad and recognition In the academic
community that CIA. together with the De-
partments of State and Defense. has been
an Important and useful supporter of area
and regional studies and foreign language
studies In the United States. The agenue:m
of the American intelligence commune a
well as the Department of State have' long
been a primary source of employment for
specialists in these areas The scademt-
community also consulted closely with
senior officials of the Intelligence con.-nuni-
ty in their successful campaign to win sup
port for a Congressional-approved endow-
ment of Soviet studies. intelligence agencies
informally strongly supported this endess-
or.
In some areas of research, such as on the
Soviet Union. our cooperation for nearly 40
years has remained both close and constant
This also has been the case often in the
fields of economics and physical sciences.
On the other hand. there have been much
more pronounced ups and downs in our rela-
tionships with political scientists and allied
social sciences. particularly among those
with expertise in the Third World.
WHY CU NMS ACADi,Q
There Is. however. one constant in the his-
tory of this relationship and in its future as
well, our need for your help. and the oppor-
tunity you have to contribute to a better in-
formed policymaking process by cooperating
with us. Let me describe how and why.
In just the last dozen years. we have been
confronted with a large number of new
Issues and developments and also have had
to pay attention to problems too long ne-
glected. The oil embargo of 1973. the subse-
quent skyrocketing of oil prices and now
their plunge; the related dramatic changes
in the international economic system, the
growth of debt in Third World countries
and now repayment problems: revolutions in
Iran. Ethiopia, and Nicaragua: the final pas-
sage of European colonialism from Africa:
new Soviet beachheads and surrogates In
the Third World: changing patterns in
international trade: and the growth of tech-
nology transfer, international narcotics net-
works and terrorism all have demonstrated
vividly that our national security is greatly
affected by developments and events in ad-
dition to the number and capabilities of
Soviet strategic weapons.
Accordingly, the subjects we deal with
today are staggering In their diversity. They
include problems such as the implications of
the enormous Indebtedness of key Third
World countries: problems of political. eco-
nomic and social instability and how to fore-
cast them: human rights: narcotics: the illic-
it arms market: the Implications of Immigra-
tion flows in various regions of the world:
population trends and their political and se-
curity implications: the global food supply;
water resources. energy: technology trans-
fer. terrorism: proliferation of chemical/bio-
logical and nuclear weapons: changing com-
modity markets and their implications for
Third World countries: and others too nu-
merous to recount.
But nearly all of these problems have
something in common: while CIA has ex-
perts in virtually all subjects of concern.
there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experi-
ence, and Insight in the community of uni-
versity scholars that can help us, and
through us, the American government.
better understand these problems and their
Implications for ?a and for international sta-
bility.
With this diversity of issues and problems
in mind, the Directorate of intelligence sev-
eral years ago initiated an intensified effort
to reach out to the academic community,
think tanks of every stripe, and the business
community to, information. anal3?sL and
advicf
Senior manarers in charge of each of our
substantive areas were directed to under.
take a expand!?c program of sponsorship
of eor!~rcnces or substantive issue- of cot.
corr. tc us and tc encourage partic:patior: o.`
our ar.a:ysts ir. such conferences sponsored
by vhf private sector Since 1982. CIA ha
sponsored more than 30(' conference,
nearly all of them involving considerable
participation, by the academic cominunu"
and touching on many of the issues I noted
In addition. we have recorded more than.
1.500 instances of our analysts attending
conferences sponsored by the private
sector-and doing so as openly acknowl-
edged CIA employees.
We have increasingly turned to the aca-
deme community to test our assessments in
ways consistent with protecting intelligence
sources and methods. We have helped schoi
ass get security clearance` so that they
could examine the actual drafts of our stud
les. A growing percentage of our work is re
viewed by specialists outside the govern
ment-in the academic community and war,
ous think tanks and by retired senior mili-
tary officers, independent specialists. and
others
We have established panels of security
cleared specialists from business and the
academic community to meet with us regu-
larl. no: only to help improve specific re-
search papers but to het, develop new re-
search methods. review performance. and
help uts test new approaches and hypoth-
eses.
Our analysts are required to refresh their
own substantive credentials and expand
their horizons by obtaining outside training
at least every two years. This requirement
can be met through taking university
courses. Participating in business or other
outside sponsored seminars and conferences.
attending military training courses. and so
forth.
Our involvement with the academic com-
munity takes several forms:
Consulting: This is the most prevalent It
can be formal. under a contractual arrange-
ment in which the individual is paid a se;
government rate. or it cats be informal and
unpaid-an exchange of views between in-
terested specialists. We are particularly in-
terested in ideas that challenge convention
al wisdom or orthodoxy. We know what we
think. but we need to know what others
think also.
Sponsorship of conferences We generally
organ_.e our owe.. but occasionally we con
tract with others to organize a conference
for us And, of course. our analysts attend
conferences sponsored by business. academ-
ic and professional organizations. this!:
tanks. and universities.
Research: In some areas scholars in uni
versities have the experience and expertise
to carry out basic research for us, for exam-
ple. on demographic and economic subjects.
The recent controversy at Harvard and the
media have focused on this area of coopera-
tion. In fact. it presently is a very minor ele-
ment in our overall retionship with the
academic community. It is hardly a pro-
gram. as recently alleged. of "covert fees
and fellowships" with which we can `buy
scholastic priorities."
Scholars in Residence: We have had a
scholars-in-residence program for a number
of years under which individuals from the
academic world can spend a year or two
working with us. with full security clear-
ances. on topics of interest to them and us.
Information: Finally, we are interested in
talking with scholars who are willing to
share with us their impressions after travel-
inc to places of interest or participating in
events of interest abroad
A principal factor in our pursuit of con-
tact with scholars is our perception that
quality analysis on the Incredible range of
Issues with which we must cop" requires not
only dogged research but also imagination.
creativity. and Insight large organizations.
and particularly government bureaucracies.
arc not famous for their encouragement of
these characteristics-although there Is sur-
prs:ngly more than you might think. Simi.
larl.. to re1% solely on information funneled
through government channels inevitably
would constrict the range of views and In-
formation needed. We are looking for
people to challenge our views. to argue with
us. to eritize our assessments constructively.
to make us think and defend and to go back
to the drawing board when we have missed
something Important. In short. we don't
want scholars to tell us what they think we
want to hear. That would make our entire
effort pointless.
FtnaI s. this relationship is not necessarily
a ono-way street. Just as we are conscious of
our need for the injection of ideas and infor-
mation from outside government channels. I
believe you should concede that there is at
least the possibility that you might learn
something from discussion: with us.
TOGA CONCtBTes
Let mf now address some of the major
concerns that have been raised by scholars.
deals and institutions about dealing with
iu I would note that certain of these con-
cerns reach well beyond just CIA and In-
volve the entire question of relations be-
Continued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2
tween outside sources of funds and the uni-
versity community.
1. Doesn't research or analysis under CIA
auspices of events abroad inevitably com-
Promise academic freedom and the honesty
of academic research?
First of all. when we contract for research.
we insist on honest work. We do not permit
our analysts to cook the books and we would
never consult or contract with a scholar a
second time who did that. Our research and
analysis must stand up to close scrutiny, not
only by other intelligence agencies, but by
other elements of the executive brunch. the
oversight committees of the Congress. the
Congress as a whole. the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory- Board. and a variety
of other panels and organizations that have
axes: to our information. While we ac-
knowledge we can be and have been wrong
in the past, our very existence depends on
our reputation for integrity and for reliable
and objective assessments. Any research we
use should have the same qualities.
Second. it seems to me that academic free-
dom depends on a scholar not being behold-
en to any outside influence or rigid ideologi.
cal conceptions but only to the pursuit of
truth. The scholar should be free to search
where he or she wishes and should not be
constrained by any improper influences, in-
cluding the preferences of colleagues or pre-
vailing cultural winds. Actually, improper
influence potentially can be exerted on a
icholar in a number of ways: funding from
contracts and consultantships with business.
foundations and foreign governments-or
ever, the threat of withholding tenure.
American academics have long consulted
with officials of foreign governments of all
stripes. In light of this. singling out a US
government agency as a particular threat to
honest inquiry represents a double standard
ii not outright hypocrisy. If a university re-
quires public exposure of any relationship
with CIA. then surely logic and equity re-
quire a similar practice for relationships
with foreign governments and. In fact, all
other outside relationships. And, indeed, if
our funding should be openly acknowledged.
should not all outside funding. of whatever
source. be openly acknowledged' You are
rightly proud of your ability to do objective
research. CIA does not threaten It
Third. I agree with the proposition that it
IF the responsibility of the university Itself
to establish and monitor the rules governing
all these relationships It Is both foolish and
irresponsible to do so by Isolating the schol-
ar from any outside contact under the guise
of protecting academic freedom
2. Won't publicly acknowledged contacts
with CIA hinder a schola's access and free-
dom of inquiry overseas? I acknowledge this
might be a problem for some Individuals.
Indeed. in some places around the world, all
Americans are suspected of working for
CIA. However, many who have worked with
us for years have not had any difficulty.
3. Can't a colleague's contacts even with
CIA analysts compromise an entire depart-
ment? 1 have been asked before about the
danger of one scholar's association with us
involving his or her faculty colleagues
through some sort of guilt by association. I
would simply offer two observations. First.
the university community is a remarkably
diverse one and I am sure that In many de-
partments there are scholars who are In-
volved in some sort of activity with which
their colleagues disagree or which they do
not support. So again. this problem is not
limited just to CIA. Some form of reporting
to the university on such relationships that
could be kept confidential would seem to me
an appropriate way to minimize this prob-
lem- My second observation. however, is
that at some point some courage is called
for. The freedom of those who do wish to
consult with us can be infringed upon by
the fears of their colleagues. We do not be-
lieve that working with your government to
help bring about better informed policy is
shameful; indeed, it should be a source of
pride and satisfaction. Contributing to a
better understanding of some of the most
difficult and occasionally dangerous prob-
lems of the world. In my view, is responsive
to the scholar's highest calling.
4. Isn't prepublication review tantamount
to CIA censorship of independent Ideas.
opinions and judgments? No. Our review Is
only to ensure that no classified informa-
tion is included in a book or article and that
the text does not reveal intelligence sources
and methods. We have no interest in alter-
ing the substance or conclusions of writings
we review and take great care to avoid
asking for such changes. And the fact Is: we
don't. Where a consultant has no access to
classified information. there is no prepubli-
cation review.
5. What about the view that CIA engages
in covert action as well as collection and
analysis and a variety of "immoral" acts and
therefore association with any part of CIA
is unacceptable? Activities at CIA are car.
ried out within the law with the approval of
appropriate authorities. and with the over.
sight of the Congress. They are activities
mandated by the decisions of elected offi.
cials in both the Executive and Legislative
branches. As we have seen recently Con-
gress can and does deny funds for legal in-
telligence activities with which they dis-
agree. thereby terminating such activities.
The Central Intelligence Agency is a for.
eign policy instrument of the elected repre-
sentatives of the American people, just like
the military, USIA or the Department of
State. If you find some element of the gov-
ernment's foreign policy or activity incon-
sistent with your professional judgment. I
would encourage you first to do all you can
to test the validity of your position. You
also can decline to have any association
with us at all. But in the latter case, the de-
cision whether to sseociat.e with us should
be left to the individual One individual a
freedom of association should not be denied
because of another s persona! point of view
A university steps on precarious ground and
Itself endangers academic freedom If It
starts making arbitrary rules about which
organizations a scholar may participate in
or talk with-arid. I would add espeeia, ly if
one of those organizatiom It a branch of
our society's own democratically choser
government.
ODR stirs
Before I close, let me review the rules and
policies of the analytical arm of CIA for
dealing with the university community. We
continually review our regulations and poli-
cies In the light of new opportunities. new
problems and pea issues. For example. well
before the recent controversy here at Har-
vard, we revised our contract language with
respect to prepublication review, narrowing
that review-which again. is simply to avoid
the Compromise of classified Information-
to the specific subject area in which a schol-
ar had access to classified information. For
example. U a scholar consult- with us about
nuclear proliferation and has access to clas-
sified Information. writings on unrelated
subjects need not be submitted.
3
We have again looked at our rules and
policies as a result of the controversy some
modifications For example. the Directorate
of Intelligence now explicitly tells any orga.
nization or Individual organizing a confer-
ence on our behalf that the participants in
the conference should be informed in ad-
vance of our sponsoring role. Quite frankly.
because we organize the overwhelming ma-
jority of Our conferences ourselves, this
problem had not arisen before.
Let we review three key policies of par-
ticular interest to the university communi-
ty:
First. while the Directorate of Intelligence
presently has no contracts for classified re-
search at any academic institution. we can
and will let contracts for classified research
where u zuversity rules permit, where appro-
priate facilities and circumstances allow
and when a genuine need exists
Second. when we contract for unclassified
research, we spell out explicitly for the
scholar the conditions governing use of tha:
research. In some cases, the research will be
done strictly for us, and we will be the only
recipient. In other cases once we have re-
ceived the research and assured ourselves
that the terms of the contract have been
carried out. we will acquiesce in a scholars
request to publish a book or article drawing
on that research. We do not communion or
contract for books or articles. We are realis-
tic about Pressures on scholars to publish.
however, and, in order to attract some of
the best people to work with us. we try to
accommodate their desire to draw on un-
classified research they have done for us for
publication for their own purposes. And fi-
nally, there are cases where we alloy re-
search done for us later to be published
under the scholar's name without any pre-
publication review on our part.
But In any of these circumstances, our
review Is simply to ensure that the work we
contracted to be done has been done. meets
appropriate standards of quality and does
not contain classified Information Taxpay-
ers justifiably would be displeased if we
were not to ensure that we had received
true value for their money.
Third. we also have looked again at the
question of whether our funding of research
that is subsequently used in a publication
by a scholar should be openly acknowl-
eared There are severs: good reason: that
ari?u, stains: such ar, cep proact.. Including
tt,f p(4 :busty of difficulty with a foralm
so'errrnent by virtue Of acknowledged CIA
kiteres: ir, its internal affairs, the possibility
tt.at acknowieat:ed CIA Interest In a specific
subirct-surd as the financial stability of a
parti~uii.r country.-could affect the situp
Lion iI elf, arc, finally, concern that reader,
might assume the scholars conclusions
wert. In tact- CIA a
As a result of the controversy here at Har-
vard and expressions of concern about this
policy. we reexamined this issue with con-
siderable care. In the firs: place, there are
certain circumstances under which disclo?
sure of our funding of research may be re-
quired. and we of course eompb Beyond
this. we have decided that our interest In
obtaining the cooperation of this country's
scholars and allaying the misunderstandings
and suspicions that have grown out of our
earlier approach warrants at least some
change In our policy. Accrdingly. CIA will
henceforth permit acknowledgement of our
funding of research that is later independ-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2
entry published by a scholar unless (1) the
scholar requests pnvacy or (2) we determine
that formal, public association of CIA with
It specific topic or subject would prove dam-
aging to the United States. Any acknOwl-
edgement of CIA funding would be $UOfli
parried by a statement to the effect that the
views expressed are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of CLA
or of the US government. I assume. of
Course. that universities also will press hard
for public disclosure of other sources of
funding for research.
Fourth. we expect any scholar or Individ-
ual who consults or works with us to abide
fully by the rules of his or her home institu-
tion in terms of reporting the relationship
with us. But, in our view, It Is. in the first In-
stance, the responsibility of the Institution
to set such rules and to enforce them, and
the responsibility of the scholar to comply.
CONCLUSIONS
The world is increasingly complex. The
challenges to the security and well being of
the American people are increasingly di-
verse and subtle. Director Casey and 1. and
others in the Executive Branch and our
Congressional oversight committees believe
that contacts with universities and others in
the pnvate sector are imperative if we are
properly and effectively to tam' out our
mission of informing. improving under-
standing, and warning the government
about developments around the world-the
same mission identified by General Dono
van and President Roosevelt. Our ability to
carry out our mission, as In the days of
Langer and Donovan. depends on voluntary
cooperation between those of us who carry
this responsibility in Intelligence, and those
in the university, business. retired military.
and others who can help us understand
these challenges better and forecast them
more accurately. Our country Is the ulti-
mate benefictary.
Consultation and cooperation with CIA on
the problems this nation faces abroad do
not threaten academic freedom. However. I
believe that freedom of inquiry is limited. a
desire to render public service sometimes
tragically thwarted, and our nation disad-
vantaged. by those who would deny a schol-
ar's willingness to work with the American
intelligence service in assessing the world
around us.
The government cannot coerce any schol-
ar to cooperate or work with the Depart-
ment of Defense. Department of State. or
CIA. By the same token, no scholar should
be prevented by acedemic institutions or col-
leagues from doing so. And none should
hale le worry that ht: or her reput.tior wil:
suffer because. of a public?speritec. patriotic
willinpnt' to help us better understand and
forecast developmentL, abroad affecting our
nations: atli-being an., the fore that
threaten our freedorr.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000100030005-2