REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE TO ACCOMPANY S. RES. 400 RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200150007-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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94TH CONGRESS
2d Session
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
TO ACCOMPANY
S. Res. 400
RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A STANDING COMMITTEE OF
THE SENATE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
1 REPORT
No. 94-675
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-0080 WASHINGTON : 1976
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut, Chairman
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware
LEE METCALF, Montana BILL BROCK, Tennessee
JAMES B. ALLEN, Alabama LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., Connecticut
LAWTON CHILES, Florida
SAM NUNN, Georgia
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD A. WEGMAN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
PAUL HOFF, Counsel
PAUL L. LEVENTHAL, Counsel
ELI E. NOBLEMAN, Counsel
DAVID R. SCHAEFER, Counsel
MATTHEW SCHNEIDER, Counsel
PAUL ROSENTHAL, Assistant Counsel
JOHN B. CHILDERS, Chief Counsel to the Minority
BRAIN CONBOY, Special Counsel to the Minority
MARILYN A. HARRIS, Chief Clerk
ELIZABETH A. PREAST, Assistant Chief Clerk
HAROLD C. ANDERSON, Staff Editor
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CONTENTS
Page
I.
Summary of resolution ------------------------------------------
1
II.
History of legislation___________________________________________
2
III.
Background of legislation_______________________________________
3
IV.
Nature and purpose of Senate intelligence committee_____________
6
V.
Section-by-section analysis --------------------------------------
11
VI.
Changes in the Standing Rules of the Senate ---------------------
32
VII.
Rollcall votes in committee --------------------------------------
34
VIII.
Text of Senate Resolution 400, as reported -------------------------
35
0
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94TH CONGRESS SENATE
2d Session
j
REPORT
No. 94-675
SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Mr. MANSFIELD (for Mr. RIBICOFF), from the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, submitted the following
REPORT
The Committee on Government Operations, to which was referred
the resolution (S. Res. 400), having considered the same, reports fav-
orably thereon without amendment and recommends that the resolu-
tion be agreed to.
patea activities, Including any significant covert operations.
The resolution also establishes procedures controlling the disclosure
4 of information by the committee to the public and to other com-
I. SUMMARY OF RESOLUTION
The resolution reported by the Government Operations Committee
creates a permanent 11-member Senate Committee on Intelligence
Activities with legislative jurisdiction, including authorization au-
thority, over the intelligence activities of the Government.
The Senate's oversight of the intelligence community will be cen-
tered in this new committee.
The chief intelligence agencies it will have jurisdiction over are the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence activities of the De-
partment of State, Department of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, including its domestic intelligence activities.
The companies will have all necessary authority to exercise effective
oversight over the intelligence agencies. The executive branch will
be expected to keep the new committee fully and currently informed
about its activities. inclndlnv a.tlva.nnPd nnfir+n n+' einni{;nori+ ..,,+;..;
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mittees, or to other Members of the Senate in order to safeguard the
unauthorized disclosure of information that the committee, or the
Senate, has determined should not be publicly disclosed.
During the 93rd Congress four bills or resolutions were referred to
the Government Operations Committee creating a new intelligence
oversight committee. In December 1974, 2 days of subcommittee hear-
ings were held by Senator Muskie on the proposals but no further com-
mittee action was taken.
At the outset of the 94th Congress three bills or resolutions were re-
ferred to the committee establishing a permanent new unit of Congress
to oversee the government's intelligence activities. These proposals
were S. 189, S. 317, and S. Con. Res. 4. In 1976 three additional bills
to create a new intelligence committee were introduced and referred to
this committee. S. 2865 was referred to this committee on January 26;
S. 2893 on January 29; and S. 2983 on February 17. S. 2893, introduced
by Senator Church and seven other members of the Select Committee
on Intelligence Oversight, was referred to the Government Operations
Committee pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement with instruc-
tions that this committee report back to the full Senate on the legisla-
tion by March 1, 1976.
The committee held 9 days of hearings on proposals to create a new
intelligence oversight committee in January and February of this
year. The following is a list of the 26 witnesses who certified at the,,-
hearings. in order of their appearance :
Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana.
Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho.
Senator John G. Tower, Republican of Texas.
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., Republican of Tennessee.
Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State.
Nicholas Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United
States, and Under Secretary of State.
David Phillips, President, Association of Retired Intelligence
Officers.
William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
McGeorge Bundy, former Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
Clarence Kelley, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
John McCone, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Clark Clifford, former Secretary of Defense.
Ambassador Richard Helms, former Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
Robert F. Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Senator Gaylord Nelson, Democrat of Wisconsin.
Senator Alan Cranston, Democrat of California.
Morton H. Halperin, Director of the Project on National Security
and Civil Liberties.
Raymond S. Calamaro, Executive Director, Committee for Publi'
Justice.
Senator Barry M. Goldwater, Republican of Arizona.
Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina.
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Congressman Michael Harrington, Democrat of Massachusetts.
? Congressman Robin L. Beard, Republican of Tennessee.
Senator Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina.
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State.
Senator Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky.
Attorney General Edward H. Levi.
Following completion of these hearings, the committee met on
February 19, 20, and 24. The committee completed action on this legis-
lation on February 24 and voted unanimously to approve this
resolution.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION
BRIEF HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES
Since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, establish-
ing the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence
Agency, Congress has tried in a number of different ways to achieve
close congressional supervision of the intelligence activities of the
Government.
Congressional efforts to restructure congressional oversight of the
intelligence community, either through creation of a joint committee
or a special intelligence committee in each House, began as early as
1948. In that year Representative Devitt introduced legislation to
establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence. This effort was the first
of nearly 200 bills introduced in both Houses since 1948.
Soon after the creation of the CIA, an informal arrangement in the
Senate was worked out with Senators Vandenburg and Russell where-
by small subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees assumed responsibility for the oversight of the CIA. By
the early 1950's, congressional oversight was routinely conducted by
separate subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services and
ID'Appropriations Committees.
Subsequently, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign
Affairs Committees expressed growing interest in participating in con-
gressional oversight of the intelligence community because of the
possible effect on this country's foreign relations.
In January 1955, Senator Mansfield introduced S. Con. Res. 2,
which would have established a 12-member Joint Committee on Cen-
tral Intelligence. It gave the new committee legislative authority over
the agency and required that the CIA keep the new committee "fully
and currently informed with respect to its activities." The Mansfield
resolution, originally co-sponsored by 32 other Senators, was defeated
by the full Senate.
In July 1966, the Foreign Relations Committee reported out Sen-
ate Resolution 283, calling for the creation of a new Committee on
Intelligence Operations in the Senate. However, after floor debate, the
Senate failed to take final action on the proposal.
In 1967, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee
on Intelligence invited three members of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee to attend the CIA oversight sessions of his committee. This ad
hoc arrangement was discontinued in the early 1970's.
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The recurring need for reexamining the way Congress monitors the
activities of the intelligence agencies was again highlighted during the ?
investigations in 1973 of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities when questions were raised about the legality or
propriety of certain intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies.
In 1974 the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee
invited the majority and minority leaders to attend CIA oversight ses-
sions of the subcommittee as nonvoting members.
The House took action in 1974 (H. Res. 988) to g rive "special over-
sight (of) intelligence activities relating to foreign policy" to its
Foreign Affairs Committee. In 1975 the committee, renamed the In-
ternational Relations Committee, created a Subcommittee on Investi-
gations to handle its oversight responsibilities under H. Res. 988.
In December 1974 the New York Times charged that the Central In-
telligence Agency, in direct violation of its statutory charter, con-
ducted a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the
Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissi-
dent groups in the United States." The article also charged that "in-
telligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens" had been main-
tained by the CIA and that the agency had engaged in "dozens of other
illegal activities," starting in the 1950's "including break-ins, wiretap-
ping and the surreptitious inspection of mail."
On January 15, 1975, testifying before the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Mr. William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, stated that officers of the CIA had spied on American journal-
ists and political dissidents, placed informants within domestic protest
groups, opened the mail of U.S. citizens, and assembled secret files on
more than 10,000 American citizens.
In response to public allegations of abuses by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, in particular, both the Senate and the House moved
rapidly in 1975 to create temporary committees to investigate possible,
abuses by the intelligence agencies.
On January 28, 1975 the Senate agreed to S. Res. 21, as amended,
to establish a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities. On February 19, 1975 the
House established a Select Committee on Intelligence by agreeing to
H. Res. 138. On July 17, 1975 the House agreed to H. Res. 591, which
replaced that committee with another having the same name and func-
tions. Both Senate and House committees were temporary study com-
mittees, ordered to report finally by February 29, 1976, and January
31, 1976, respectively.
The committees of Congress, as well as the special executive com-
missions, that have examined the matter of congressional oversight
of the intelligence community have consistently concluded that a new
intelligence committee should be established.
As long ago as 1955 the Hoover Commission recommended creation
of a new congressional oversight committee.
The recommendation climaxed a period of 6 years during which
special executive commissions studied the Central Intelligence Agency
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.four
four times. The studies voiced criticisms of the agency and its failure
correct inadequacies and poor organization.
When recommending creation of a new congressional unit in 1956,
the Senate Rules Committee stated that creation of a new commit-
tee would :
Insure the existence of a trained, specialized, and dedicated
staff to gather information and make independent checks and
appraisals of CIA activities pursuant to the committee's dit' e-
tives and supervision. The effect should be to allay much of
the suspicion already expressed in Congress concerning the
activities and efficiency of CIA operations. (S. Rept. No. 1570.
84th Congress, 2d sess.)
When explaining the resolution reported by the Foreign Relations
Committee in 1966 to create a new congressional unit, Chairman Ful-
bright stated that a new committee would bring about "a more effi-
cient coordination of the various intelligence activities of the Govern-
ment." He added that creation of a new committee "would contribute
to the quieting of criticism, the allaying of public fears, and the re-
storing of confidence in the Agency." (Cong. Rec., July 14, 1966, at
p. 15673.)
In recent years, as the activities of the intelligence agencies have
become the subject of increased public scrutiny, recommendations for
a new congressional oversight committee have been renewed. In June
1975 the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission), after an ex-
tensive study lasting almost 2 years, recommended that Congress
create a new structure for overseeing the intelligence community.
In June 1975 the President's Commission on CIA Activities Within
the United States recommended in its final report that a new intelli-
gence committee be established in order to improve the operations of
*the intelligence agencies and help prevent abuses in the future. This
special commission, under the direction of Vice President Rockefeller,
was created by the President in January 1975 to investigate allega-
tions of abuses committed by the CIA within this country. .
The Commission noted "Congress has established special procedures
for review of the CIA and its secret budget within four small sub-
committees. Historically, these subcommittees have been composed of
Members of Congress with many other demands on their time. The
CIA has not as a general rule received detailed scrutiny by the Con-
gress." (Report of the President's Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States, p. 14.)
Although the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has not yet
4 completed its final report and recommendations, Chairman Church
and other members of the committee introduced.legislation to create
a permanent intelligence committee in the Senate. At the time Chair-
man Church introduced the legislation he commented, "The present
situation is clearly inadequate and even verging upon the chaotic.
Restructuring is clearly needed."
The House Select Committee on Intelligence recommended, upon
completion of its study creation of a separate House committee simi-
lar in scope and nature to the Senate Committee on Intelligence pro-
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posed by most of the Senate select committee. (H. Report No. 94-833, ?
94th Cong., 2d sess.).
This resolution is thus preceded by years of debate and study con-
cerning congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies. It is
preceded by a substantial number of proposals that have been made
over the years for creation of a new committee.
The work during the last year of the Senate select committee and
the Rockefeller Commission, and the abuses that have been discovered
or alleged, have served to reemphasize the long-standing need for
Congress to act in the area of intelligence oversight. But proposals for
a new intelligence committee first began to be made only a few years
after the Central Intelligence Agency was created. Concern over the
activities of the intelligence agencies and congressional control over
them clearly predates the events of the last few years.
The need and advisability of a new intelligence committee rests on
a few basic facts.
A new intelligence committee can mark a new start. It can provide
a forum to begin restoring the trust and confidence the intelligence
agencies must have to operate effectively. It can formalize in an open
and definitive manner the Senate's intention to exercise close oversight
over a very important part of the Government's activities. Oversight
by Congress is essential under our constitutional system. By its actions
it can help assure the public that the abuses of the past will not be
repeated in the future. Until full trust and confidence in our intelli-
gence agencies is restored, the country will be unable to conduct a fully
effective intelligence program.
The intelligence functions of this Government are unique in their
importance to this Nation's security. At the same time, however, execu-
tive branch responsibility for intelligence is now spread among a
number of organizations whose primary responsibilities involve diplo-
matic, military, economic or other matters. No one agency or depart-
ment is solely responsible for our intelligence program. Direction and
evaluation comes from interagency committees, and ultimately the
National Security Council. and the President.
Jurisdiction in the Senate over intelligence matters is correspond-
ingly spread between a number of committees. No one committee is
able to bring together through its oversight or legislative functions
all the divergent portions of the intelligence community. For instance,
the Director of Central Intelligence, the intelligence arms of the three
military services, the Treasury Department, the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research in the Department of State, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Energy Re-
search and Development Administration all have representatives on
the U.S. Intelligence Board. In the Senate responsibility for the 11
agencies that sit on the board and for their intelligence activities is
shared by five legislative committees-the Armed Services Commit-
tee, the Foreign Relations Committee, the Finance Committee, the
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Judiciary, Committee, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Because responsibility for the intelligence community is distributed
among a number of different committees, it is not the prime focus
of any single committee. The committees with responsibilty in the
area cannot devote to time, or develop the staff, necessary to over-
see fully the Government's intelligence activities. Because the area
of intelligence is so important and complex, effective congressional
oversight requires that any oversight committee devote a large pro-
portion of its time and resources to the subject.
The Senate's present organization for oversight of intelligence also
means that when the executive branch wishes to brief the Congress,
on its own initiative, or in response to general congressional interest
in a matter, it must brief a number of committees. This may place
unnecessary burdens on the time of agency officials. Centralizing over-
sight responsibilities in a single Senate committee will provide a more
orderly working relationship between Congress and the executive
branch.
Centralizing oversight of the intelligence community will also help
to assure the preservation of necessary security of sensitive informa-
tion. Inevitably, the security of sensitive information is sacrificed
whenever a substantial number of people have access to it. A single
committee will help alleviate this problem by establishing a single
body to receive most of the information on intelligence provided by
the executive branch.
Congress itself can never run the intelligence agencies. Day-by-day
oversight and direction must come from within the executive branch.
Congress must exercise oversight, however, over the agencies and their
activities, including covert operations and make sure that before the
President initiates important new activities or programs he knows
the attitude Congress is likely to take towards them. Congress must
examine the economy and efficiencies of the intelligence programs
which cost billions of dollars each year, and eliminate any unneces-
sary duplication or fragmentation among the maze of agencies now
involved in intelligence.
As Senator Church, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, testified before this committee :
The work cannot be done on a piecemeal basis or by a sub-
committee of another standing committee which is primarily
engaged in a different preoccupation. It will require a well-
staffed committee directing all of its attention to the intelli-
gence community.
A wide range of other witnesses who testified during the nine days
of hearings held by the committee also supported the need for a new
committee. Present or former Government officials who supported
a new intelligence oversight committee included Dr. Kissinger, who
stated that creation of a new committee would be in the interests of
national security, and Mr. Colby. Additional officials who supported
creation of a new oversight committee included two other former
directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. John McCone and
Mr. Richard Helms; Mr. Clark Clifford, former Secretary of Defense;
and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, former National Security Adviser to the
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President. Mr. David Phillips, President of the Association of Retired
Intelligence Officers, stated that 98 percent of the members of the
association polled by him favored creation of a new oversight
committee.
SCOPE OF NEW COMMITTEE'S AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
It is the intent of this committee to create a committee with the
necessary power to exercise full and diligent oversight.
An essential part of the new committee's jurisdiction will be au-
thorization authority over the intelligence activities of the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Without this
authority the new committee would not be assured the practical ability
to monitor the activities of these agencies, to obtain full access to in-
formation which the committee must have, to exercise control over
the budgets of the agencies in order to reduce waste and inefficiency,
and to impose changes in agency practices.
. The resolution expressly provides that the Senate= does not expect
the intelligence community just to respond to inquiries or proposals
made by the new committee. To be effective the intelligence community
must take an active part in initiating the exchange of views and in-
formation between Congress and the executive branch. The resolution
accordingly provides that the intelligence agencies should on their
own take whatever steps necessary to keep the new committee fully
and currently informed of their activities. This includes informing
the new committee of significant anticipated activities, including co-
vert and clandestine activities, before they are initiated so that there
may be a meaningful exchange of views before any final decision is
reached. It is expected that the President will fully consider such
views and reassess the wisdom of any proposed programs which is
strongly oppose by the committee. By creating a new committee that
consults frequently with the executive branch, the committee hopes
that Congress, the President, and the public can be spared future in-
stances where covert activities initiated by the executive branch are
subsequently rejected by Congress.
The scope of the new committee's jurisdiction is intended to include
both foreign and domestic intelligence.
Without jurisdiction over both the domestic and foreign intelligence
activities of the government, the new committee could not act in the
comprehensive way it must. Many domestic and foreign intelligence
activities are now closely related. For example, responsibility for the
covert collection of intelligence from foreign sources residing within
the United States may be shared by the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These same agencies may-
both be involved as well in gathering information on whether domestic
groups in the United States are under foreign control.
The new committee must be able to review such relationship and
consider, where necessary, legislation readjusting the division of re-
sponsibility among -agencies for domestic and foreign intelligence. Past
abuses in the intelligence area have in part involved a confusion be-
tween the proper role and function of domestic and foreign intelli-
gence agencies.
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STRUCTURE OF NEW COMMITTEE
? The resolution establishes a permanent standing committee of the
Senate consisting of 11 members. The committee concluded that at
this time there were a number of advantages to a Senate committee,
rather than a joint committee, and that on balance, there were no
compelling reasons requiring Congress to depart from the normal prac-
tice of creating separate Senate and House legislative committees.
A Senate committee is more consistent with the bicameral nature
of the Nation's legislative system. The new committee will in all likeli-
hood be considering very important legislation concerning the nature
and effectiveness of the Government's entire intelligence community. A
single joint committee should not write legislation for both Houses.
A Seaate committee wil give better recognition of the unique role
the U.S. Senate plays under its constitutional advise and consent
powers in the area of foreign relations.
Separate Senate and House committees will better assure that each
House is able to conduct'its oversight of the intelligence community in
the manner that seems most appropriate to that House, its concerns,
its rules, and its existing committee structure.
Separate Senate and House committees will better promote coordi-
nation between the new committee and the other committees in each
House with interests in the intelligence area.
Separate Senate and House committees will help reduce the danger
that a, single joint committee, by overlooking certain practices or be-
coming too wedded to a particular point of view, will miss important
abuses or fail to consider important legislative reform proposals.
Because the very nature of the committee's work will require the
committee to act without informing the full Senate in many instances,
the resolution contains special provisions to assure that the committee
membership remain representative of the Senate as a whole. No mem-
ber will be able to serve on the new committee for longer than 6 years
at a time. This will assure a continual rotation of members, new view-
points, and new interests.
In creating a new Senate intelligence committee, the committee was
also very aware of the need to reduce the proliferation of committees.
The resolution has been drafted with this concern in mind. In order
to reduce the proliferation of committees now involved in overseeing
the Government's intelligence activities, the new committee is given
jurisdiction over the entire intelligence community. It will have author-
ization authority over all major expenditures for intelligence. The reso-
lution expressly provides that other committees in the Senate will no
longer have jurisdiction in these areas. The number of legislative or
select committees involved in this area in the Senate will be reduced
from four to one.
It is expected that after creation of the new committee, the Senate
may also want to review the effect of other relevant laws with the pos-
sible aim of further reordering Senate oversight of the intelligence
agencies. This could include, for example, the present law requiring the
President to brief all appropriate committees on covert operations con-
ducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, or the present division .of
responsibilities between the legislative committees and the appropria-
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tions: committee. The new committee is required by this resolution to
study some of these questions itself, and report its conclusions to the
full Senate no later than July, 1977.
PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING OONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
The committee devoted considerable discussion to how best to assure
that the new committee would protect the confidentiality of some of the
information that will be in its possession, while assuring that the Sen-
ate and the public have access to information on intelligence in a
manner consistent with the public interest. A very delicate balance
must be struck between the right of the people in a democracy to know
what their government is doing, and the need to protect some informa-
tion in the interests of national security.
Both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the standing
committees of the Senate that have been extensively involved in the in-
telligence area in the past have had an excellent record in protecting
the confidentiality of information. The past experience of these com-
mittees is evidence that the Senate can exercise effective congressional
oversight without the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information
occurring. In order to assure that this continues in the future, the new
committee will have all the authority it needs to establish necessary
security and clearance procedures. The new committee will be expected,
for example, to make special physical arrangements to safeguard
material.
Provisions in the resolution will assure the full Senate the opp'or-
tunity to determine whether in particular instances information should
be disclosed if the President objects. Other security procedures estab-
lished by the resolution will apply when the new committee provides
other Senators information which the committee, or the Senate, has
determined should not be made public. Finally, the resolution creates
a special procedure requiring the 'Select Committee on Standards and
Conduct to investigation allegations made by a certain number of
Senators that a Member, officer, or employee of the Senate has engaged
in the unauthorized disclosure of information.
The resolution requires the staff to receive appropriate security
clearances from the committee before they are hired and to agree in
'writing, before beginning to work for the committee, that they will
not divulge any information either during or after their employment,
unless authorized by the committee.
The ability of the new committee to obtain the information it needs
to do an effective job of oversight will depend in large part on its
'ability to protect information which should not be disclosed to the
public. The committee is confident that the new intelligence commit-
tee will strike the necessary balance between the necessity of protect-
ing the confidentiality of certain information, and the need to provide
the public the information it must have in a democracy to participate
in the basic policy discussions about the nature of this country's
intelligence program.
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V. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
? SECTION 1-STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This section states that it is the purpose of the resolution to create a
new standing committee of the Senate with legislative jurisdiction to
oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and
programs of the U.S. 'Government. The new committee, called the
Committee on Intelligence Activities, would have the duty to report to
the Senate appropriate proposals for legislation concerning intelli-
gence activities and programs. This section obliges the committee to
make every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and
agencies of the United States provide informed and timely intelligence
necessary for the executive and legislative branches to make sound
decisions affecting the security and vital interests of the nation. It is
further the purpose of the new committee to provide vigilant oversight
over the intelligence activities of the United States so as to assure that
the intelligence activities of the Government are in conformity with
the Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Nothing in the resolution is intended to inhibit the full access of
other committees and other Senators to the product of the intelli-
gence agencies.'As the wording of this section suggests, one of the goals
of the new committee should be to assure that other members and
committees of the Senate receive `directly from the agencies all the in-
telligence analysis they need to fulfill their responsibilities.
Section 2 of the resolution amends Rule XXIV of the Standing
Rules of the Senate to provide for the appointment of members to the
intelligence committees. It provides that six members of the Committee
? on Intelligence Activities will be members from the majority party
and five members of the committee will be from the minority party of
th
Members
Senat
ould b
l
t
d f
th
itt
th
i
e
e.
w
e se
ec
e
or
ese comm
ees
n
e
same way as for other standing committees.
This section also provides that, at the beginning of each Congress,
the majority members on the committee would select a chairman and
the minority members would select a vice chairman. The resolution
expressly provides that neither the chairman nor the vice chairman may
serve at the same time as a chairman or ranking minority member of
any other permanent committee. The vice chairman is to act in the
place of the chairman in the chairman's absence. This wording, which
is consistent with the bipartisan nature of the committee, will help
expedite the business of the committee by permitting the vice chairman
d to preside over hearings which the chairman cannot himself attend.
The provisions for a set majority-minority ratio and election of a.
minority vice chairman underline the importance that the new com-
mittee act in a fully bipartisan way. The unique importance and nature
of the matters the committee will consider make such bipartisanship
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12
essential. The existence of trust and confidence between the executive
branch and the committee will enable the committee to exercise more
effective oversight. This trust and confidence will only be achieved
if the committee does act in a fully bipartisan manner.
Subsection (b) prohibits a Senator from serving on the committee
for more than 6 consecutive years. After 6 years of continuous service,
a Senator must leave the intelligence committee. In an extraordinary
case it may be consistent with the general concept of rotating mem-
bership for a member who has served 6 years to serve again on the
committee after a period of years. This might be a member who did
not serve a full 6 years originally, or who did, but who subsequently
gains special expertise which makes additional service on the commit-
tee especially appropriate. It is expected that in each Congress approx-
imately one-third of the 11-member committee will be new members in
order to assure continuity, as well as the addition of new members on
a regular basis. Thus, to the extent practicable, between three and
four new members are to be chosen at the beginning of the 96th Con-
gress and each Congress thereafter. It is expected that in order to
initiate such a system of rotating membership, those Senators who are
appointed to serve on the new committee beginning with the 95th Con-
gress will be divided into three categories, with approximately one-
third serving 2 more years, one-third 4 more years, and one-third 6 more
years.
The resolution reserves no seats on the Committee on Intelligence
Activities for members of particular standing committees. Existing
committees such as Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary
will continue, of course, to have an interest in the work of the intel-
ligence committee. It is expected that some members of those commit-
tees will be chosen to serve on the new intelligence committee. By so
doing, the experience of these members might be shared, and co-
ordination between Senate committees facilitated.
The intelligence committee should reflect the membership of the
Senate-at-large. To give the committee a broad base it is expected that
many members of the intelligence committee will come from commit-
tees other than Armed Services, Judiciary, and Foreign Relations.
Whatever the exact ratio between members from these three commit-
tees and other committees, it should be consistent with the overall goal
to create a committee that truly reflects the divergent views and inter-
ests of the entire Senate.
SECTION 3-COMMITTEE JulusnICTION
Section 3 establishes the -Senate Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties by amending Rule XXV of the Senate Rules.
Subsection (a) defines the new committee's jurisdiction. The resolu-
tion gives the committee legislative jurisdiction over the Central In-
telligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as
over the intelligence activities of all other departments and agencies
of the Government. These other agencies and departments include, but
are not limited to, the intelligence activities of the Department of
Defense, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National
Security Agency, and the intelligence activities of the Departments of
State, Justice, and Treasury.
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?
Any activities of these agencies which are not intelligence activities
will fall outside the committee's jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the De-
partment of Defense's weapons development programs, for example,
would remain with the Armed Services Committee. "Intelligence ac-
tivities" is defined in section 13 to include (1) foreign intelligence; (2)
counterintelligence; (3) clandestine and covert activities; and (4) do-
mestic intelligence. The term specifically does not include tactical
foreign military intelligence, serving no national policymaking
function.
The following is a brief description of some of the major agencies or
departments that are publicly known to engage in foreign intelligence
activities. The new committee would have jurisdiction over the intelli-
gence activities of these agencies or departments. Since a complete list
of intelligence agencies, and their activities, is secret, this description
can not fully describe the total extent of the committee's jurisdiction.
?
The DCI is intended to be the President's principal adviser on na-
tional intelligence matters and to coordinate the allocation of resources
within the intelligence community. He is also charged by the National
Security Act of 1947 with the responsibility "for protecting intelli-
gence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures." He serves
in several functions, including the head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the U.S. Intelligence Board, and the U.S. Intelligence Re-
source Advisory Committee. Under the changes announced by the
President on February 17, 1976, the DCI is specifically charged with,
among other responsibilities, developing national intelligence require-
ments and priorities, directing covert operations, reviewing White
House requests for service from the intelligence community, and en-
suring the existence of a strong inspector general's office in the intelli-
gence agencies.
According to the 1947 Act which created it, it is the function of the
CIA to-
(a) Advise the National Security Council as to the intelligence
activities of the departments and agencies;
(b) Make recommendations to the National Security Council
on ways to coordinate these activities ;
(c) To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national
security ; It is specifically prohibited from exercising, in connec-
tion with this authority, police, subpoena, or law-enforcement
powers, or internal security functions;
(d) To perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies, such additional services of common concern as the Na-
tional Security Council determines can be more efficiently ac-
complished centrally; and
(e) To perform such other functions and duties related to in-
telligence affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct.
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14
The Defense Department accounts for approximately 85 percent of
the intelligence community's manpower and budget. The following
components of DOD are among those actively involved in national
intelligence:
Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director of DIA is the principal intelligence staff officer to the
Secretary of Defense, to whom he reports through the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The agency was established in 1961 by a DOD directive to
rationalize and unify the national intelligence activities of the entire
military.
National Security Agency
This agency is responsible for communications security, including
cryptographic work, and the development of techniques for the secret
transmission of information. The agency was established in 1952 by
Presidential directive.
Army Intelligence (G-f2)
Under the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army
Intelligence is responsible for the national intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities of the Army. The responsibilities of the Army
intelligence units are largely defined and authorized by internal DOD
directives.
Air Force Intelligence
'This unit is headed by the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. It collects information
relevant to military threats to the United States and its allies. It is
one of the chief consumers of, and contributors to, the national intelli-
gence product.
Naval Intelligence
National intelligence and counter-intelligence for the Navy is under
the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence. It collects, processes,
evaluates, and disseminates intelligence of naval interest.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
The Bureau provides the Secretary of State with research and
analyses. It is also charged with responsibility for ensuring that the
Government's overall intelligence effort is consistent with U.S. foreign
policy objectives. It does not engage in the covert collection of intel-
ligence information.
?
0
The Department's intelligence work is the direct responsibility of
the Office of National Security, its chief responsibility being in the
foreign economic area. The Department engages in no covert collection
of intelligence.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
The FBI is the agency chiefly responsible for intelligence activities
in this country. The work is the responsibility of the Bureau's In-
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15
telligence Division. Its primary national intelligence responsibility
involves investigation in this country of espionage, sabotage, treason,
? and other crimes affecting the country's internal security. In addition
to gathering intelligence, in this country, it has liaison posts in 16
foreign countries. Through its domestic and foreign operations, the
FBI provides the remainder of the intelligence community with infor-
mation it discovers as part of its other responsibilities.
?
The committee's legislative jurisdiction extends to domestic intelli-
gence agencies as well. This is in recognition of the fact that it is diffi-
cult, and probably unwise, to separate jurisdiction over domestic in-
telligence from foreign intelligence activities, for, as discussed above,
foreign and domestic intelligence activities have been inextricably
linked. Domestic intelligence is defined by section 13, clause (4), to
it is the politically sensitive kind which may give rise to political
abuses. The new committee's jurisdiction will not cover the normal
criminal or civil investigations of agencies, related to their regular law
enforcement functions, which do not focus on the political and related
activities of groups.
The Internal Security Branch of the FBI's Intelligence Division
is the primary domestic intelligence organization included within the
committee's jurisdiction. The fact that the FBI has already placed
these domestic intelligence activities within a special branch will facili-
tate the separation of the FBI's domestic intelligence activities from
the rest of the Bureau's operations. The Internal Security Branch is
responsible under FBI guidelines and procedures for domestic secu-
rity investigations conducted where there is a likelihood that domestic
groups or individuals will engage in acts of violence in connection
with activities designed (1) to overthrow the Government of the
United States or of a State, (2) to impair the functioning of Federal
or State Government, or interstate commerce, in order to influence
governmental policies, (3) to interfere within the United States with
the activities of a foreign government, (4) to deprive persons of their
civil rights, or (5) to create widespread domestic violence or rioting
necessitating the use of Federal militia or other armed forces.
The committee would also have jurisdiction should other agencies
in the future engage in domestic intelligence activities. If, for exam-
ple, the Postal Service again undertakes "mail covers," one form of
intelligence gathering, such activity would be within the purview of
the new committee.
Subsection 3 (a) also specifies that the intelligence committee will
have jurisdiction over authorizations of budget authority for the chief
intelligence agencies in the government : the Central Intelligence
Agency; the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense (in-
cluding the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Agency) ; the intelligence activities of the Department of State; and
the intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, spe-
cifically, all activities of the Bureau's Intelligence Division. The com-
mittee will continue to have jurisdiction over these parts of the intel-
ligence community even if they are transferred to successor agencies.
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These four agencies account for almost all the money spent by the
Government on intelligence. The new committee will not have. au-
thorization jurisdiction over the other agencies that engage in intel-
ligence ?
activities, such as the Energy Research and Development Ad-
ministration. The small size of the expenditure by these agencies on
intelligence does not justify giving the new committee authorization
authority over them.
This committee expects that to the extent that any practical
budgetary problems do arise out of the division of authorization of
an agency between two committees, the new committee will work with
the other existing committees to resolve these problems as soon as
possible.
The intelligence committee would also have jurisdiction over any
organization or reorganization of a department or agency of the Gov-
ernment to the extent that it relates to a function or activity involving
intelligence activities.
Subsection (b) of section 3 amends paragraph 3 of Rule XXV by
making the intelligence committee a "B" committee, and specifying
that the new committee will have 11 members. The committee felt that
an 11 member committee was large enough to permit it to be truly repre-
sentative, while small enough to facilitate the protection of informa-
tion that may not be disclosed publicly. The Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence also had 11 members.
As a "B" committee, described in paragraph 3 of Rule XXV, mem-
bership on the committee will be subject to paragraph 6 of Senate Rule
XXV. In general, no member of the intelligence committee will also
be able to serve on any of the other following committees : the Com-
mittee on the District of Columbia, the Post Office and Civil Service
Committee, the Committee on Rules and Administration, the Com-
mittee on Veterans' Affairs, or any select, special, or joint committee,
The committee felt no special exception should be made to paragraph
6 (a) of Rule XXV of the Senate, limiting Senators as general rule to
membership on only one of these committees. The work of the intelli -
gence committee will require considerable time and attention. A mem-
ber of the Senate should not be expected to take on the demands of the
new committee simply as an addition to all his other committee
responsibilities.
Subsection (c) is a conforming amendment, amending the jurisdic-
tion of certain other committees to simply reflect the fact that the
other. committees that formely had jurisdiction over the intelligence
agencies would not continue to have jurisdiction. The four committees
whose jurisdictional wording is amended to account for the jurisdic-
tion of the new committee are the Armed Services Committee, the
Government Operations Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee,
and the Judiciary Committee. The amendment is necessary simply to
assure that the general wording for these other committees does not
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17
?
appear to include the specific jurisdiction given the new committee by
subsection (a).
As in the case of any other committee in the Senate, there will
unavoidably be instances where both the new committee and other
committees will have jurisdiction over some portions of the bill, but
not others. When an authorization bill is introduced for an agency
that engages in intelligence, as will as other activities, a separate bill
should be introduced covering only the authorization for the agency's
intelligence activities. The latter bill. would go exclusively to the in-
telligence committee, while the remainder of the agency's authoriza-
tion bill would go to another, appropriate committee. Or the same
bill may be referred to both committees under an agreement whereby
the new intelligence committee alone is responsible for the portion
of the legislation dealing with intelligence, and the other committee
is alone responsible for the remaining portions. In situations where
the intelligence matters are inextricably intertwined with other mat-
ters not under the new committee's jurisdiction, the legislation should
go primarily to the committee whose jurisdiction predominates.
For example, a bill that involved the Justice Department's general
investigative techniques,, such as the constitutionality of its surveil-
lance or investigative policies in general, would be referred to the Ju-
diciary Committee, even though it also affected the FBI's Intelligence
Division. The opposite would be the case with legislation whose pur-
pose was to reorganize the FBI's Intelligence Division.
The committee of course expects that, in fact, instances of over-
lapping jurisdiction will in practice be resolved, as in the past, on the
basis of comity and mutual accommodation.
SECTION 4-COMMITTEE. REPORTS
Subsection (a) requires the new committee to make regular and
periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the Govern-
ment's intelligence activities. This committee expects that at a mini-
mum this will require an annual report by the new committee to the
Senate. The committee must call to the attention of the Senate or any
other appropriate committee any matters which require the immediate
attention of the Senate or other committees. If, for example, the intelli-
gence committee possesses information on intelligence activities that
may have a significant affect on foreign policy, the intelligence com-
mittee should notify the Foreign Relations Committee. In addition to
these reports, the Committee on Intelligence Activities, as a standing
committee of the Senate, will also be required to make a report on
March 15 of each year in accordance with section 310(c) of the Con-
gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Any report
the intelligence committee makes will be subject to the provision in
section 7 governing the disclosure of information. The report should be
made in a manner necessary to protect national security.
Subsection (b) requires the intelligence committee to obtain an an-
nual report from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Each report should review the in-
telligence activities of the particular agency or department submit-
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ting the report. Included in this report should be a review of the in-
telligence activities directed against the United States or its interests
by other countries. The intent of these reports is to give Congress and
the public a greater understanding of the intelligence activities of
other countries, which may be inimical to the United States, as well
as a greater understanding of the intelligence activities of the United
States.
The reports by the four intelligence agencies and departments are
to be made to the intelligence committee in an unclassified form. The
Commmittee on Intelligence Activities shall then make them avail-
able to the public. In preparing these public reports, the agencies
should not disclose the names of individuals engaged in intelligence
activities for the United States, or the sources of information on which
the reports are based, where to do so would be contrary to the public
interest.
SECTION 5-COMMITTEE STAFF
Subsection 5(a) provides for the rotation of committee staff. The
maximum term for a professional staff member is a total of 6 years,
equal to the maximum term for committee members. Unlike a member
of the committee, however, no employee-who leaves the staff at the end
of 6 years may rejoin the staff later under any circumstances. The
6-year limitation applies to committee consultants and any others who
perform professional services for or at the request of such committee.
It does not apply, however, to nonprofessional staff members. In order
to maintain an experienced staff, approximately one-third of the staff
should be hired every 2 years.
Subsection 5(b) requires that intelligence committee staff members
with access to classified material have security clearances, the stand-
ards for which will be determined by the committee in consultation
with the Director of Central Intelligence. This provision prescribes
for the new committee the same procedure that was followed by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Under the select committee
procedure, the executive branch conducted background investigations,
but the decisions on clearances rested with the select committee. The
new intelligence committee should consult with the Director of Central
Intelligence concerning clearances. The Director of Central Intelli-
gence may offer advice, but will not have authority to grant or deny
clearance to any committee employee. The committee will have the
final say on such matters. The type of security clearance required
should be commensurate with the sensitivity of the information to
which an employee has access.
A second provision in subsection 5(b) requires staff members with
access to classified information to agree, in writing, to be bound by
the Rules of the Senate and the intelligence committee governing the
disclosure of information during and after their employment with
the committee. The purposes of such an agreement is to insure that
former staff members, no longer subject to the sanction of discharge,
will be bound in contract not to disclose information made available
to them in the course of committee employment which the committee,
or the Senate, has determined should not be made public. If any per-
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son engages in the unauthorized disclosure of information in viola-
tion of the agreement while still employed by the committee, the
? committee would be expected to terminate the person's employment.
SECTION 6-INDIVIDUAL. PRIVACY
Section 6 imposes upon the intelligence committee a responsibility to
establish rules and procedures to protect the privacy of individuals.
These rules and procedures should be designed to prevent the dis-
closure, without the consent of the person involved, of information
which unduly infringes on the person's privacy or violates his con-
stitutional rights.
The committee's duty to protect against disclosure of information
which infringes upon the privacy of an individual is not absolute. This
section limits its prohibition on disclosure to those which unduly in-
fringe on privacy. The section explicitly states that privacy considera-
tions shall not prevent the committee from publicly disclosing infor-
mation in any case in which the committee determines that the public
interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any infringement on any per-
son's privacy. This might occur, for example, when the conduct of
an employee of an intelligence agency raises serious questions about the
lawfulness of the agency's activities, or the adequacies of its procedures
to protect classified information. An individual may not cloak him-
self in the protection of this section simply to avoid the disclosure of
embarrassing or incriminating information if the committee finds that
the balance clearly weighs in favor of public disclosure. The final deter-
mination in each case is intended to remain within the committee's full
discretion.
SECTION 7-DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
Section 7 establishes formal procedures governing the disclosure of
certain information to the public and to other Members of the Senate,
? provides a special procedure to safeguard information made available
only to other Senators, and requires the Select Committee on Stand-
ards and Conduct to investigate violations of these procedures. This
section should provide for the necessary safeguarding of information
which the committee or the Senate has determined should not be dis-
closed to the public, while providing for as much public disclosure as
possible, consistent with the public interest.
Committee Authority to Disclose Information
Subsection (a) establishes the basic rule that the Committee on In-
telligence Activities may disclose publicly any information in its
possession after the committee determines that the public interest
would be- served by such disclosure. Subsection (a) also assures that
any member of the committee would have an opportunity to have the
committee vote on a disclosure question whenever he desires to bring
such a question before the committee.
The provision covers all information which the committee has
gained from any source. The new committee will have the greatest ex-
perience in such matters and in most cases it is appropriate that the
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20
committee, as an agent of the Senate, will play the primary. role, in
consultation with the executive branch, in controlling access to infor-
mation in its possession. At the same time, the ability of the committee
under this section to disclose information to the public is subject to the
procedures described in subsection (b). The provisions of subsection
(b) gives the full Senate the opportunity to vote on the matter of dis-
closure whenever the committee and the President are formally and
explicitly in disagreement about the wisdom of disclosing certain
information provided the committee by the executive branch, and three
members of the committee request full Senate consideration of the
matter. This committee expects that such a disagreement will occur
only rarely. Normally the committee and the executive branch should
be able to resolve any differences on such matters. However, subsection
(b) does provide an important check on the committee's powers, should
such a disagreement occur.
Full Senate Review of Committee Action
Subsection (b) preserves the right of the full Senate to decide
whether or not information should be disclosed over the objection of
the President. It also preserves the right of the full Senate to con-
sider the desirability of disclosing information when at least three
members dissent from a decision of the committee not to disclose cer-
tain information. Thus the procedures providing the opportunity for
full Senate involvement is an even-handed one, applicable whether
the committee is inclined toward disclosing, or toward not disclosing,
the information.
This subsection is intended to include all executive branch informa-
tion which the committee possesses, whether the information was sub-
mitted by the executive branch directly to the committee, or whether
it came from the executive branch to the committee indirectly, through
the full Senate. The request that information not be disclosed may
consist simply of a restrictive security classification attached to a docu-
ment at the time it was provided to the committee, or it may consist
of a specific request to the committee in response to an inquiry from
it. The word "information" is not necessarily synonymous with "docu-
ment." The committee is, of course, free to consider separately a por-
tion of an executive branch document which the executive branch has
requested not be disclosed, and to disclose any such portion of the en-
tire document which it deems appropriate. Similarly, if the executive
branch has requested that only a portion of the document not be dis-
closed, the committee will be free, of course, to disclose the remainder
of the material without following the procedures of this subsection.
.Paragraph (b) (1) requires the committee to notify the President of
any vote to disclose publicly any information submitted to it by the
executive branch which the executive branch has requested'be kept
secret.
Paragraph (b) (2) requires 'the committee to wait 5 calendar days
following the day on which notice of the vote is transmitted to the
President before the committee may disclose the information. If, prior
to the expiration of the 5-day period, the President notifies the com-
mittee that he objects to the disclosure of such information, provides
his reasons for his objections, and certifies that the threat to the na-
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21
tional interest of the United States posed by such disclosure is vital and
outweighs any public interest in disclosure, the committee may not
? then disclose without following the procedures described in the re-
mainder of subsection (b). If the President fails to object, the commit-
tee may publicly disclose the information at the end of the 5-day
period. The President's objections and reasons supporting those objec-
tions, as well as his certification concerning the threat to the national
interest, siiould be in writing. In light of the formal nature of this
procedure, and the fact that the full Senate will want to study the
President's position with care if it is required to review the matter,
it is expected that the President will set forth his reasons with suffi-
cient specificity and detail to aid the committee and the entire Senate
in making a final determination of the matter in a manner consistent
with the public interest.
If the President objects to the disclosure of the information, para-
graph (3) requires the committee to wait 3 calendar days following
the day on which it receives the President's objection before disclos-
ing. If, during this period of 3 days, three or more members of the
intelligence committee file a request in writing with the chairman
of the committee that the question of public disclosure of such infor-
mation be referred to the Senate for decision, the committee must
refer tl}e matter to the full Senate.
Paragraph-(4) applies to instances where the committee votes not
to disclose. The procedure the committee must follow in such instances
is reviewed below, following the discussion of the procedures appli-
cable to a committee decision in favor of disclosure.
Paragraph (5) specifies that when three or more members of the
committee file a request with the chairman of the committee to refer
the committee decision to disclose to the full Senate, the chairman
must report the matter to the Senate for its consideration. The Chair-
man. must make his report not later than the first day on which the
Senate is in session following the day on which the request of three
members of the committee is filed with the chairman.
Paragraph (6) provides that the matter of disclosure shall be taken
up by the Senate one hour after the Senate convenes on the first day
on which the Senate is in session following the day on. which the
chairman of the Committee on Intelligence Activities reported the
matter to the Senate. The matter must be heard in closed session
of the Senate.
In. considering the matter in closed session, the Senate has three
options. First, it may approve the public disclosure of the information
in question, in which case the committee, must publicly disclose such
information. Second, the Senate may disapprove the public disclosure
of the information in question, in which case the committee must not
publicly disclose the information. Third, the Senate may decide to
refer the matter back to the committee, with instructions that the
committee make the final determination with respect to the public dis-
closure of the information in question. The Senate need not treat all
the information which it is considering the same way. For example,
it may decide to disclose a portion of the information and decide
against the disclosure of other portions.
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22
Paragraph (6) requires that the Senate act in one or more of these
three ways within 5 days after the matter is referred to it. The Senate ?
may vote, for example, to disclose a portion of the information and
vote not disclose another portion of the same material. The vote on the
matter must be in open session. If a dispositive vote has not already
been taken in open session prior to the fifth day, the closed session of
the Senate shall be automatically dissolved at the end of this period
and a vote must then be immediately taken in public session on the
matter.
Section 7 also provides a procedure for Senate review of a commit-
tee decision not to publicly disclose information. The procedure is
essentially the same as outlined above for review of a committee de-
cision to publicly disclose information. The only difference is that
where the committee initially votes not to disclose the information
the provisions requiring a Presidential certification are no longer
applicable.
If the intelligence committee votes not to disclose publicly any in-
formation submitted to it by the executive branch which the executive
branch has requested be kept secret, that information may not be dis-
closed unless three or more members file a written request with the
chairman that the question of public disclosure be referred to the Sen-
ate for decision. As in the case of the review of a committee decision
to disclose information, the written request to the chairman must be
made within 3 calendar days after the vote of the committee disap-
proving the. public disclosure of the information. Following this writ-
ten request the Senate must consider the matter according to the same
procedures applicable to Senate review of a committee decision to
disclose certain information.
Information that May Not Be Disclosed Publicly
Subsection (c) prohibits the public disclosure of certain informa-
tion by any member, officer, or employee of the Senate. It also regulates
access of other Members of the Senate, and other committees, to in-
formation which the intelligence committee, or the Senate, has deter-
mined should not be disclosed to the public.
Paragraph (c) (1) of section 7 prohibits the public disclosure by
any member of the intelligence committee of classified information in
the possession of the intelligence committee relating to this country's
lawful intelligence activities which the committee or the Senate has
determined should not be disclosed publicly. Paragraph (c) (1) also
applies to any other Member, officer or employee of the Senate to whom
the intelligence committee provides information relating to the lawful
intelligence activities of the government. Any Member, officer, or em-
ployee of the Senate who is provided such information by the intelli-
gence committee, whether in closed session or individually, is pro-
hibited as well from disclosing the information to the public as long
as the committee or the Senate has determined that the information
should not be disclosed. The subsection also requires the committee to
make the information available to other Senators, or other committees,
only in the manner provided in paragraph (c) (2).
The committee will receive a considerable amount of information
from the executive branch with a restrictive executive branch classi-
fication on it. It is this committee's intention that the new intelligence
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23
committee will adopt rules establishing a regular procedure for the
automatic review of the material as soon as it arrives so that an imme-
diate, initial determination will be made whether the material may be
disclosed to the public. If the inital determination of the committee
is against disclosure, the prohibition of subsection (c) would apply
until the committee or the Senate reconsiders the matter pursuant to
paragraph 7(b).
Paragraph (c) (2) regulates the access of other committees, or other
Senators, not members of the intelligence committee, to information
which may not be disclosed publicly. The intelligence committee, or
any member of the committee, may make such information available
to other State committees or other Members of the Senate. Whenever
the intelligence committee, or a member of the committe makes this
information available to another committee or another Member of
the Senate, the intelligence committee must keep a written record of
the communication. The written record must show the specific infor-
mation that was transmitted, and which committee or members of the
Senate received the information. This requirement of a written record
applies to oral as well as to written communications. The adoption
of other rules further governing access of other committees and Sen-
ators to information that may not be made public is left to the dis-
cretion of the new committee. The committee might decide it would
be appropriate, for example, that when a Senator reviews a written
document that may not be disclosed to the public, the Senator would
have to read that document in a secure room and without making any
copies of it.
No committee that in turn receives information pursuant to this pro-
cedure may disclose such information to any other person. A Member
who receives information under this subsection may make the infor-
mation available in a closed session of the Senate. He may also make
the information available to another Member of the Senate provided
that the Senator communicating the information promptly informs
the Committee on Intelligence Activities. The intelligence committee
will then record the substance of the information conveyed, the name
of the Senator or committee who transmitted the information, and the
name of the Senator that received the information. In this way, the
intelligence committee will have a record of each Senator and each
committee who has received the information.
Subsection (c) does not affect the right of any Senator under Rule
XXXV to request a closed session of the Senate at which to discuss
any matter he wishes. The requirement that a record be kept of the
names of any Member of the Senate, or any committee, that receives
information from the intelligence committee would not apply during
a closed session.
Subsection (d) permits the Select Committee on Standards and Con-
duct to investigate any alleged disclosure of intelligence information
by a Member, officer, or employee of the Senate in violation of sub-
section (c). The second sentence of subsection (d) places special re-
sponsibilities on the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct to
make an investigation and report its findings whenever five members
of the intelligence committee, or 16 members of the Senate, file a writ-
ten request with the committee that it investigate any alleged un-
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authorized disclosure of intelligence information by a member or
employee of the intelligence committee or by a member, officer or
employee of the Senate who obtained the information from the intel-
ligence committee. The request should refer, where known, to the
Senator, officer, or employee by name. Subsection (e) provides that
the select committee shall recommend appropriate action be taken
against the individual in the case of any significant breach of con-
fidentiality or significant unauthorized disclosure.
The substantial number of Senators required to file such a charge
should assure that the charge will not be lightly made. Only a viola-
tion of the provisions of this section which results in substantial
damage to the Nation's security should warrant the filing of the re-
quest with the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct.
It is anticipated that in the event of such a serious disclosure of
intelligence information in violation of subsection (c), the intelli-
gence committee will conduct its own investigation, or that the Select
Committee on Standards and Conduct will make an investigation
on its own initiative. But in the event that neither committee takes
action, subsection (d) provides that either a minority of the intel-
ligence committee or a minority of the Senate-but a fairly substan-
tial minority in either case-can mandate an investigation by the
Select Committee on Standards and Conduct.
In the event the required number of Senators do file a request for
an investigation, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct
must conduct an appropriate investigation and report its findings
and recommendations to the Senate. Such findings and recommenda-
tions may be submitted in confidence to the Senate whenever the com-
mittee deems it appropriate.
Subsection (e) provides that if the subject of the investigation so
requests, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, shall re-
lease to him at the conclusion of its investigation, a summary of its
investigation together with its findings. The person who is the subject
of the investigation may then determine whether he wishes to make-
this summary public.
The Select Committee on Standards and Conduct may recommend
appropriate sanctions only if it determines that there has been a
significant breach of confidentiality or a significant unauthorized dis-
closure of information relating to the lawful intelligence activities of
the government by a Member, officer, or employee of the Senate. A sit
nificant breach of confidentiality or a significant unauthorized dis-
closure of information is one which substantially harms the effective
conduct of foreign policy, reveals important confidential defense in-
formation, places in jeopardy the life of a named intelligence agent,
or otherewise causes substantial injury to the public interest.
Possible sanctions include, in the case of a Senator, censure, removal
from the committee membership, or expulsion from the Senate. In
the case of an officer or employee of the Senate, it may include loss of
employment. These sanctions. are meant to be illustrative only. The
Select Committee on Standards and Conduct will be free to consider
a wide range of sanctions according to the seriousness of the unau-
thorized disclosure. In deciding what sanction may be appropriate,
the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct should take into
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consideration the nature of the information disclosed, the intent of.
the person in acting as he did, whether or not the violation was -
deliberate, and the impact of the _ disclosure on the public interest,
including the conduct of foreign relations or national defense. If the
committee concludes that there was a public interest in disclosure
which outweighed any damage to the national defense or foreign
policy, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct will in all
likelihood, recommend no sanction.
The rules and procedures established by section 7 apply only to the-
control of information by the intelligence committee since the only
matter that was before this committee was the creation of a new intel-
ligence committee. It is the feeling of this committee, however, that it
would be desirable to apply the same provisions to all other Senate
committees. It is hoped that other, appropriate committees of the Sen-
ate will consider making these provisions applicable to the entire
Senate.
SECTION 8-PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AT COMMITTEE MEETING
Section 8 authorizes the Committee on Intelligence Activities to per-
mit, under rules established by the committee, a personal representa-
tive of the President to attend closed meetings of the committee. The
provision does not require the new committee to invite a representa-
tive of the executive branch to attend closed meetings or establish a
presumption that the committee will do so. It merely makes explicit
the power that any committee has to invite a Presidential representa-
tive to attend commitee deliberations if the committee finds such rep-
resentation helpful in conducting its duties. Because of the special.
nature of the new committee's work, however, it may find this proce-
dure especially useful.
0 SECTION 9-DISPOSITION OF THE MATERIAL OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
Section. 9 provides for the transfer of documents, records, files, and
other materials from the Select Committee on Governmental Opera-
tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities to the new Committee on
Intelligence Activities.
This committee has been informed that, since its inception, the select
committee has reached certain understandings with the CIA and other
in agencies concerning the ultimate disposition of written
material provided to the select committee. Under these agreements,
some material provided to the select committee was to be returned to
the appropriate agencies. Other materials were not to have been re-
turned. This section respects those agreements. Thus, the new intelli-
gence committee will receive all the material in the possession of the
select committee except in those cases where there is explicit agree-
ment that the material should be returned to the executive branch. It
is expected that before the Select Committee on Intelligence concludes
its work it will reduce its understanding with the executive branch on
these matters to writing. This will assist the new committee in under-
standing the nature of any material that is transferred to it pursuant
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26
to this section. It would also be helpful if the new intelligence com-
mittee receives an index from the select committee of the material the ?
latter returns to the intelligence agencies.
SECTION 10-COMMITTEE ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Section 10 concerns the access the committee will have to informa-
tion in the possession of the Executive Branch.
COMMITTEE FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED
Subsection (a) provides that it is the sense of the Senate that the
head of each department and agency of the United States should keep
the intelligence committee fully and currently informed with respect
to intelligence activities which are the responsibility of, or engaged in
by, such agency. The provision specifies that the information with re-
spect to intelligence activities that should be provided to the commit-
tee include information concerning any significant anticipated activi-
ties of each department or agency. Effective access to information is
the most important ingredient of effective oversight. Under this pro-
vision the departments and agencies of the government are under an
affirmative obligation to provide the committee all the information it
needs to do an effective job of oversight.
The reference in the section to agencies keeping the committee "fully
and currently informed" is similar to the requirement contained in sec-
tion 202 of the Atomic Energy Act. For over 30 years this requirement
has assured the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy complete and
timely notice of actions and policies of the Federal Government in the
field of atomic energy. The language in subsection 10(a) of the resolu-
tion means that the Committee on Intelligence Activities should sim-
ilarly receive full and complete information on matters within its
jurisdiction. The obligation imposed is not legally binding on the
agencies since it is in the form of a Senate resolution. Nevertheless, it
is fully expected that the departments and agencies of government
will recognize the Senate's intent concerning this matter and act
accordingly.
The obligation is not limited simply to providing full and complete
information when requested by the committee. It also includes regular
briefings at the agency's initiative so that the committee is completely
apprised of all aspects of intelligence functions. Although the head
of each department or agency will remain responsible for keeping the
committee fully and currently informed, briefings may be undertaken
by persons delegated such authority by the head of the agency or
department. -Insuring that the committee is fully and currently in-
formed will not require an agency to provide the committee with
myriad details of day-to-day intelligence operations. The committee
should not and need not engage in the management of intelligence
operations. The committee should, however, have all the information
it needs to make informed judgments on policy questions.
The language in subsection 10(a) snecifically provides that the ex-
pectation that the committee will be "fully and currently informed" in-
cludes information concerning "any significant anticipated activities."
This language covers proposed covert and clandestine operations,
as well as any other significant proposed activities. An anticipated
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activity should be considered significant if it has policy implications.
his would include, for example, activities which are particularly
ostly financially, as well as those which are not necessarily costly, but
which have any potential for affecting this country's diplomatic, poli-
tical, or military relations with other countries or groups. For example,
government paramilitary operations and covert political actions des-
igned to influence political situations in foreign countries, including
providing aid to political parties, would be covered. It excludes day-
to-day implementation of previously adapted policies or programs.
The new committee could not be kept fully and currently informed
unless it receives notification of significant activities before they oc-
curred. It is the committee's understanding that the requirement that
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy be kept fully and currently
informed has also resulted in many cases in the committee receiving
briefings on significant actions before they are implemented. The same
broad interpretation should be given the phrase "fully and currently"
in this provision as well.
The committee will not be able formally to "veto" by a veto of its
members any proposed significant activity it learns about in advance.
As a number of present and former government officials pointed out,
however, including Secretary Kissinger, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Phillips, Mr.
Colby, Mr. McCone, Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Helms, it would be in the
interest of sound national policy for the President to be apprised in
advance if the committee is strongly opposed to any particular pro-
posed activity. In making his final decision, the President should have
the benefit of knowing the views of the committee on such important
matters.
Committee requests for information
Subsection (b) of section 10 expresses the sense of the Senate that the
head of any department or agency of the United States involved in
any intelligence activities should furnish upon request any document or
Wformation which the department or agency has in its possession,
custody, or control. An agency or department should also'make avail-
able any person in its employ the committee desires to have testify as a
witness. Independent of this provision, the committee will, of course,
have the usual subpena power possessed by any standing committee
of the Senate.
Reports of unlawful activities
Subsection (c) expresses the sense of the Senate that each depart-.,
ment and agency report any intelligence activity that violates the
constitutional rights of any person, or violates any law, Executive
order, Presidential directive, or departmental or agency rule or regu-
lation. Such reports should be made to the intelligence committee im-
mediately upon discovery of the wrongdoing. Each department or
agency should further report to the committee what action is taken or
expected to be taken by the department or agency with respect to such
violations.
SECTION 11-AUTHORIZATIONS
Section 11 requires periodic authorizations for appropriations for
those inteligence activities over which the intelligence committee has
authorization jurisdiction. It will be out of order for the Senate to
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consider any bill, resolution, amendment, or conference report which
appropriates funds for any activity listed in this section unless the
Congress has already authorized funds for the activity for that fiscale
year. Section 11 applies to authorizations for the Central Intelligence
Agency, the intelligence 'activities of the FBI, and the intelligence
activities of the Departments of State and Defense, including the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The
section will apply to all appropriations beginning with September 30,
1976.
This requirement will constitute a very important aspect of the com-
mittee's oversight over the agencies. It should assure a regular review
of each agency's intelligence activities, its efficiency, and its priorities
SECTION 12 -COMMITTEE STUDIES
In the course of its consideration of this legislation, this committee
identified a number of other issues which, though important, should
more appropriately be deferred until after the actual creation of a new
intelligence "committee. This. committee believes, however, that these
issues are. of such importance that the Committee on Intelligence Ac-
tivities should be required to give them specific study and to report
back to the Senate by July 1, 1977. By that time the new committee will
have had an opportunity to explore some of these issues, seek practical
answers to other questions on the basis of comity with the executive
branch, and to become familiar generally with its responsibilities. The
recommendations the intelligence committee reaches at the conclusion
of this period should be especially helpful to the Senate.
In addressing these specific issues, the Committee on Intelligence
Activities should give careful consideration wherever relevant to how
its. recommendations will help improve each aspect of the country's
intelligence activities. The separate aspects of intelligence, which
should be considered, wherever relevant, in connection with the review
of each of these issues. are the planning, gathering, use, security. and ?
dissemination of intelligence. An effective intelligence operation re-
quires careful planning to determine what information should be
gathered. How the intelligence collected is used, to whom it is dis-
seminated, and how it is kept secure are interrelated and essential
aspects of any intelligence function.
The specific issues to be addressed are the following :
(1) The quality of the analysis of foreign intelligence infor-
mation and the use of analysis in policymaking. In addressing
this question, the committee may wish to compare the analytical
capability and techniques of the personnel of U.S. intelligence
agencies, as well as the recruitment policies and methods of the
intelligence agencies in other countries.
(2) The extent and nature of the authority of each agency
and department to engage in intelligence activities and the desir-
ability of developing legislative charters to govern the intelli-
gence activities of intelligence agencies. Some agencies, such as
the FBI, do not now have charters that precisely and authori-
atively define the scope of each agency's legitimate intelligence
activities. Others are governed only by exceedingly broad statutes,
and Executive orders or Presidential directives implementing the
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(3) The effectiveness of the organization of the executive
branch in maximizing the conduct, oversight, and accountability
of intelligence activities, in maintaining a high level of morale
among intelligence personnel, and in minimizing duplication
and overlap.
(4) The legality and appropriateness of the conduct of covert
and clandestine, activities by intelligence agencies and the ade:
quacy and nature of procedures by which Congress is informed
of such activities. This should include a review of the effec
tiveness and desirability of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974,
under which the President must inform the appropriate com-
mittees in a timely fashion of any covert activities by the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(5) The desirability of making changes in laws, Senate rules
and procedures, or Executive orders, rules and regulations to
improve the protection of intelligence secrets and to facilitate
the disclosure of information where, on balance, the public
interest would be served by disclosure.
(6) The desirability of establishing a joint intelligence com-
mittee, and, in the event a joint committee is not established,
the desirability of establishing procedures whereby the separate
committees on intelligence in the two Houses would, at their
discretion, receive joint briefings and coordinate their policies
with respect to the safeguarding of information. Coordination
between House and Senate intelligence committees would help
assure that the creation of separate intelligence committees will
not place unreasonable demands on the time of intelligence
officials.
It will also assure that the policies of the two committees on the
disclosure of information will be consistent with each other and
with the interests of national security.
(7) The procedures under which funds for intelligence activities
are authorized, and whether disclosure of the amounts of funding
is in the public interest. This should include an ,examination of
whether or not the budget figures for the intelligence agencies
should be made public in some form. It should also determine what
procedures should be established to coordinate the ;authorization
functions of the new committee with the budgetary responsibilities
of the Armed Services Committee, the Appropriations Commit-
tees, and the other committees, as well as the House of Representa-
tives.
(8) In view of the vagueness and ambiguity of such terms as
"covert operations," the Committee on Intelligence Activities
should examine ways to develop, for use in policies and guidelines,
a common set of terms that both the executive branch and the Con-
gress will find helpful in governing, clarifying, and strengthening
the operation of intelligence activities.
It is not the intent of the committee that the study divert the Com-
mittee on Intelligence Activities from its other important legislative
and oversight functions. If necessary the committee should retain addi-
tional staff for a period in order to expedite completion of the study.
It is anticipated, however, that the Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties should be in a position to report its initial findings on each of these
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issues by July 1, 1977, together with any legislative recommendations
it finds desirable. Since the President has already submitted recom
mendations on some of these matters, and the final report of the Select
Committee on Intelligence should help the committee's study of these
matters, it is hoped that the Committee on Intelligence Activities may
be able to report its recommendations and legislation on some aspects
sooner than July 1, 1977.
SECTION 13-DEFINITIONS
Section 13 defines terms used throughout the resolution.
Subsection (a) defines the four aspects of the term "intelligence
activities." Clause (a) (1) concerns foreign or national intelligence.
This includes the collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use
of information which relates to any foreign country, or any govern-
ment, political group, party, military force, movement, or other associ-
ation in a foreign country. In order to fall within this provision, the
intelligence activity must also relate to the defense, foreign policy,
national security, or related policies of the United States. In other
words, there must be a relationship between the intelligence and this
country's defense, foreign policy, national security, or related policies.
If, for example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
were to analyze reports of drug treatment programs in Euope, so as
to compare them to this country's policy on drugs, such an activity
would not be considered a foreign intelligence activity. While such a
program may be important to this government's drug treatment pro-
gram, it does not relate to the defense, foreign policy, national security,
or similar policies of the United States. Activities may also be included
within the purview of clause (a) (1) if they are in support of the
activities mentioned above. For example, activities undertaken in order
to collect national intelligence information would be covered as well.
Clause (a) (2) covers counterintelligence. Under this provision,
activities taken to counter a foreign nation's intelligence operations.
directed against the United States are deemed to be "intelligence activi-
ties." The counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation's Intelligence Division are included within this definition.
Clause (a) (3) provides that covert or clandestine activities which
could affect the relations of the United States with any foreign govern-
ment, political group, party, military force, movement or other associ-
ation are also "intelligence activities." The phrase "covert and clandes-
tine activities" includes but is not limited to, covert political actions
designed to exercise influence on political situations in foreign coun-
tries, including support for political parties or economic action pro-
grams; covert propaganda or the covert use of foreign media to
disseminate information helpful to the United States; intelligence
deception operations involving the calculated feeding of information
to a foreign government for the purpose of influencing it to act in a
certain way; and covert paramilitary actions, including the provision
of covert military assistance and advice to foreign military forces or
organizations, and counterinsurgency programs. All these activities
are intended to affect the relations of this country with a foreign
government, political group, party, military force, movement or other
association and thus come within the meaning of the term. It is not, of
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31
course, necessary to come within this definition that the covert opera?
ion actually succeed, or that this country's relations with a foreign
NWountry are actually affected as a result of such operation.
Clause (a) (4) covers the Federal Government's domestic intelli-
gence activities. It includes the collection, analysis, production, dis-
semination, or use of information about activities of persons within
the United States whose political and related activities pose, or may
be considered by any government instrumentality to pose, a threat to
the internal security of the United States. This definition is not in-
tended to cover the investigatory work that all law enforcement agen-
cies engage in as part of their normal responsibilities to enforce the
criminal or civil laws. For example, if the Drug Enforcement Agency
kept dossiers on suspected smugglers, and engaged in surveillance of
suspected drug pushers, for the purpose of enforcing the drug laws,
those activities would not come within clause 5 of subsection 13(a). _
The only intelligence activities covered are those that center on the
political and related activities of Americans, including activities de-
signed to deprive people of their civil rights on racial or religious
grounds, because of the threat such activities pose, or are believed to
pose, to the fundamental interests of the United States.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation recognizes the distinction be-
tween its normal criminal investigatory and its domestic intelligence
activities. The latter are the responsibility of the Internal Security
Branch of the Bureau's Intelligence Division pursuant to specific
guidelines that the Bureau has developed on the basis of its experience.
It is this special type of intelligence activities now conducted by the
Internal Security Branch that this definition is intended to cover. If
in the future other organizational units within the FBI, or other agen-
cies or departments, engage in this activity, their activities would also
be covered by this definition.
The entire definition of intelligence activities is subject to the gen-
ral statement that it does not include tactical foreign military intelli-
gence serving no national policymaking function. This is intended to
exclude the established budgetary and programatic categories in the
Department of Defense for tactical, rather than national intelli-
gence. The new committee will not have jurisdiction over tactical
intelligence.
Subsection (b) of section 13 defines the term "department or
agency". The term includes any organization, committee, council, es-
tablishment, or office within the Federal Government. Any ad hoc in-
teragency committee or government corporation is included within
this definition.
Subsection (c) states that any reference in the resolution to. any
particular department or agency of the government, or to depart-
ments and agencies generally, is also intended to include any other
department or agency that assumes the intelligence activities now con-
ducted by the department, agency, bureau, or subdivision referred to
in the resolution. If, for example, the CIA were to be reorganized and
renamed, this wording assures that the intelligence committee would
have jurisdiction over the new agency. The scope of the committee's
jurisdiction over a new agency would be the same as its jurisdiction
over the predecessor agency.
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SECTION 14-EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS
Section 14 states that nothing in the resolution is :intended to implo
approval by the Senate in any activity or practice not otherwise au-
thorized by law. This section is intended to make it clear that by as-
signing the new committee jurisdiction over a particular activity, such
as covert or clandestine activities, or the domestic intelligence activ-
ities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Senate does not there-
by intend to express any view as to the legality of such activity. Such
reference is also not meant to imply acquiescence in the legality of
any practices an agency now follows, as for example, the manner in
which the CIA briefs Congress on covert operations.
V'I. CHANGES IN THE STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE
Changes made by Senate Resolution 400, as reported by the Com-
mittee on Government Operations, are shown -as follows (existing por-
tions of the rules proposed to be omittted are enclosed in black brackets,
new proposals are printed in italic, and existing. portions in which
no change is proposed are shown in roman) :
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE
RULE XXIV
APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEES
1. * * *
3. (a) Six members of the Committee on Intelligence Activities shall
be from the majority party of the Senate and five members shall be
from the minority party of the Senate.
(b) No Senator may serve on the Committee on Intelligence Ac
tivities for more than six years of continuous service, exclusive Of servje
ice by any Senator on such committee during the Ninety-fourth Con-
gress. To the greatest extent practicable, at least three but not more
than four Members of the Senate appointed to the Committee on In-
telligence Activities at the beginning of the Ninety-sixth Congress and
each Congress thereafter shall be Members of the Senate who did not
serve on such committee during the preceding Congress.
(c) At the beginning of each Congress, the members of the Com-
mittee on Intelligence Activities, who are members of the majority
party of the Senate, shall select a chairman and the members of such
committee who are from the minority party of the Senate shall elect
a vice chairman. The vice chairman shall act in the place and stead of
the chairman in the absence of the chairman. Neither the chairman nor
the vice chairman of the Committee on Intelligence Activities shall at
the same time serve as chairman or ranking minority member of any
other committee referred to in paragraph 1(f) of rule XXV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate.
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RULE XXV
STANDING COMMITTEES
1. The following standing committees shall be appointed at the
commencement of each Congress, with leave to report by bill or other-
wise :
(a) * * * .
(d) Committee on Armed Services, to which committee shall be re-
ferred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and
other matters (except matters specified in subparagraph (s)) relating
to the following subjects :
(i) Committee on Foreign Relations, to which committee shall be re-
ferred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and
other matters (except matters specified in subparagraph '(s)) relating
to the following subjects :
(j) (1) Committee on Government Operations, to which committee
shall be referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, me-
morials, and other matters (except matters specified in subparagraph
(s)) relating to the following subjects :
* * * * * * *
(1) Committee on the Judiciary, to which committee shall be re-
ferred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and
other matters (except matters specified in subparagraph (s)) relating
to the following subjects:
* * * * *
(s) Committee on Intelligence Activities, to which committee shall
?be referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials,
and other matters relating to the following:
(A) The. Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
(B) Intelligence activities of all other departments and agen-
ties Of the Government, incluing, but not limited to, the intel-
ligence activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Na-
tional Security Agency, and other agencies of the Department
of Defense; the Department of State; the Department of Justice;
and the Department of the Treasury.
. (C) The organization or reorganization of any department or
agency of the Government to the extent that the organization or
reorganization relates to a function or activity involving intel-
ligence activities.
(D) Authorizations for appropriations for the, following:
(i) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(ii) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(iii) The National Security Agency.
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(iv) The intelligence activities of other agencies and sub-
w (v) The intelligence activities of the Department of State.
(vi) The intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, including all activities of the Intelligence
Division.
(vii) Any department, agency, or subdivision which is the
successor to any agency named in item (i), (ii), or (iii);
and the activities of any department, agency, or subdivision
which is the successor of any department or bureau named in
item. (iv), (v), or (vi) to the extent that the activities of such
successor department, agency, or subdivision are activities de-
scribed in item (iv), (v), or (vi).
3. Except as otherwise provided by paragraph 6 of this rule, each
.of the following standing committees shall consist of the. number of
Senators set forth in the following table on the line on which the
name of that committee appears :
'Committee Members
7
District of Columbia-------------------------------------------------
Intelligence Activities------------------------------------------------ 11
Post Office and Civil Service----------------------------------------- 9
Rules and Administration-------------------------------------------- 8
Veterans' Affairs -----------------------------------------------------
VII. ROLLCALL VOTES IN CoaiMrrrEE
In compliance with section 133 of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946, as amended, the rollcall votes taken during committee
consideration of this legislation are as follows :
Section 7, as amended :
Yeas: (7) Nays: (1)
Chiles Weicker
Nunn
Glenn
Ribicoff
1ercy
Javits
Roth
(Proxy)
McClellan
Muskie
Metcalf
Allen
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Roth amendment to require an investigation by the Select Commit-
tee on Standards and Conduct if so requested by 5. members of the
intelligence committee or 16 members of the Senate :
Yeas (6) Nays: (2)
Chiles Javits
Nunn Weicker
Glenn
Ribicoff
Percy
Roth
(Prosy)
McClellan
Muskie
Allen
Final passage : Ordered Reported : 8 yeas--0 nays.
Nays: (0)
VIII. TEXT OF SENATE RESOLUTION 400, AS REPORTED
[S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d.sess.]
REPORT NO. 94-675
Yeas (8)
Chiles
Nunn
Glenn
Ribicoff
Percy
Javits"
Roth
Weicker
(Pro
McClellan
Muskie
Metcalf
Allen
RESOLUTION
To establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and
for, other- purposes
Resolved, That is is the purpose of this resolution to establish a new
standing committee of the Senate, to be known as the Committee
on Intelligence Activities, to oversee and make continuing studies of
the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Govern-
ment, and to submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legisla-
tion concerning such intelligence activities and programs. In carrying
out this purpose, the Committee on Intelligence Activities shall make
every effort to assure that the appropriate departments. and agencies
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36
of the United States provide informed and timely intelligence neces-
sary for the executive and legislative branches to make sound deci-
sions affecting the security and vital interests of the Nation. It is
further the purpose of this resolution to provide vigilant legislative
oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure
that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws
of the United States.
SEC. 2. Rule XXIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended
by adding at the end thereof a new paragraph as follows:
"3. (a) Six members of the Committee on Intelligence Activities
shall be from the majority party of the Senate and five members shall
be from the minority party of the Senate.
"(b) No Senator may serve on the Committee on Intelligence Ac-
tivities for more than six years of continuous services, exclusive of
service by any Senator on such committee during the Ninety-fourth
Congress. To the greatest extent practicable, at least three but not
more than four Members of the Senate appointed to the Committee on
Intelligence Activities at the beginning of the Ninety-sixth Congress
and each Congress thereafter shall be Members of the Senate who did
not serve on such committee during the preceding Congress.
"(c) At the beginning of each Congress, the members of the Com-
mittee on Intelligence Activities who are members of the majority
party of the Senate shall select a chairman, and the members of such
committee who are from the minority party of the Senate shall elect
a vice chairman. The vice chairman shall act in the place and stead of
the chairman in the absence of the chairman. Neither the chairman
nor the vice chairman of the Committee on Intelligence Activities
shall at the same time serve as chairman or ranking minority member
of any other committee referred to in paragraph 6(f) of rule XXV
of the Standing Rules of the Senate.".
SEC. 3. (a) Paragraph 1 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the
Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subparagraph:
"(s) Committee on Intelligence Activities, to which committee shall
be referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials,
and other matters relating to the following :
"(A) The Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
"(B) Intelligence activities of all other departments and agen-
cies of the Government, including, but not limited to, the intelli-
gence activities of the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, and other agencies of the Department of De-
fense; the Department of State; the Department of Justice; and
the Department of the Treasury.
"(C) The organization or reorganization of any department or
agency of the Government to the extent that the organization or
reorganization relates to a function or activity involving intelli-
gence activities.
"(D) Authorizations for appropriations for the following:
"(i) The Central Intelligence Agency.
"(ii) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
"(iii) The National Security Agency.
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"(iv) The intelligence activities of other agencies and sub-,
divisions of the Department of Defense.
"(v) The intelligence activities of the Department of
State.
"(vi) The intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, including all activities of the Intelligence
Division.
"(vii) Any department, agency, or subdivision which is the
successor to any agency named in item (i), (ii), or (iii) ; and
the activities of any department, agency, or subdivision which
is the successor to any department or bureau named in item
(iv), (v), or (vi) to the extent that the activities of such
successor department, agency, or subdivision are activities de-
or (vi).".
(v)
cribed in item (iv)
,
,
s
(b) Paragraph 3 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate
is amended by inserting :
"Intelligence Activities----------------------------------------------- 11" .
ltnmediately below
---------- 7".
"District of Columbia------------ ---- ----------- -----
(c) (1) Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 of rule XXV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by inserting "(except mat-
ters specified in subparagraph (s) )"immediately after the word "mat-
ters" in the language preceding item 1.
(2) Subparagraph (i) of paragraph 1:of such rule is amended by
inserting "(except matters specified in subparagraph (s) )" immedi-
ately after the word "matters" in the language preceding item 1.
(3) Subparagraph (j) (1) of paragraph 1 of such rule is amended
by inserting " (except matters specified in subparagraph (s) )"immedi-
ately after the word "matters" in the language preceding item (A).
(4) Subparagraph (1) of paragraph 1 of such rule is amended by
? inserting "(except matters specified in subparagraphs (s) )" irnmedi-
ately after the word "matters" in the language preceding item 1.
SEC. 4. (a) The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate,
for the purposes of accountability to the Senate, shall make regular
and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the
intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies of the
United States. Such committee shall promptly call to the attention of
the Senate or to any other appropriate committee or committees of,the
Senate any matters deemed by the Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties to require the immediate attention of the Senate or such other
committee or committees. In making such reports, the committee shall
proceed in a manner consistent with paragraph 7(c) (2) to protect
national security.
(b) The Committee-on Intelligence Activities of the Senate shall
obtain an annual report from the -Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of :Investigation. Such report shall re-
view the intelligence activities of the agency or department concerned
and the intelligence activities of foreign countries directed at the.
United States or its interests. Such report shall be unclassified and
shall be made available to the public by the Committee on Intelligence
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Activities. Nothing herein shall be construed as requiring the disclosure
in such reports of the names of individuals engaged in intelligence
activities for the United States,or the sources of information on which
such reports are based.
SEc. 5. (a) No person may be employed as a professional staff mem-
ber of the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate or be
engaged by contract or otherwise to perform professional services for
or at the request of such committee for a'period totaling more than six
years.
(b) No employee of such committee or any person engaged by con-
tract or otherwise to perform services for or at the request of such
committee shall be given access to any classified information by such
committee unless such employee or person has (1) agreed in writing
to be bound by the rules of the Senate and of such committee as to the
security of such information during and after the period of his em-
ployment or contractual agreement with such committee; and (2)
received an appropriate security clearance as determined by such com-
mittee in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence. The
type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such em-
ployee or. person shall, within the determination of such committee in
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, be commen-
surate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such
employee or person will be given access by such committee.
SEc. 6. The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate shall
formulate and carry out such rules and procedures as. it deems neces-
sary to prevent the disclosure, without the consent -of the person or
persons concerned, of information in the possession of such committee
which unduly infringes upon the privacy or which. violates the con-
stitutional rights of such person or persons. Nothing herein shall be
construed to prevent such committee from publicly disclosing any such
information in any case in which such committee determines the na-
tional interest in the disclosure of such information clearly outweighs
any infringement on the privacy of any person or persons.
SEC. 7. (a) The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate
may,. subject to the provisions of this section, disclose publicly any
information in the possession of such committee after a determination
by such committee that the public interest would be served by such
disclosure. Whenever committee action is required to disclose any in-
formation under this section, the committee shall meet to vote on the
matter within five days after any member of the committee requests
such R. vote.
(b) (1) In any case in which the Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties of the Senate votes to disclose publicly any information submitted
to it by the executive branch' which the executive branch requests be
kept secret, such committee shall notify the President of such vote.
(2) The committee may disclose publicly such information after the
expiraiton of a five-day period following the day on which notice
of such vote is transmitted to the President, unless, prior to the ex-
piration of such five-day period, the President notifies the committee
that he objects to the disclosure of such information, provides his
reasons therefor, and certifies that the threat to the national interest
of the United States posed by such disclosure is vital and outweighs
any public interest in the disclosure.
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(3) The Committee on Intelligence Activities may disclose publicly
uch information at any time after the expiration of three days follow-
ng the day on which iit receives an objection from the President pur-
suant to paragraph (2), unless, prior to the expiration of such three
days, three or more members of such committee file a request in writ-
ing with the chairman of the committee that the question of public dis-
closure of such information be referred to the Senate for decision.
(4) In any case in-which hte? Committee on Intelligence Activities
votes not to disclose publicly any information submitted to it by the
executive branch which the executive branch requests be kept secret,
such information shall not be publicly disclosed unless three or more
members of such committee file, within three days after the vote of such
committee disapproving the public disclosure of such information, a
request in writing with the chairman of such committee that the ques-
tion of public disclosure of such information be referred to the Senate
for decision, and public disclosure of such information is thereafter
authorized as provided in paragraph (5) or (6).
(5) Whenever three or' more members of the Committee on Intelli-
gence Activities file -a request with the chairman of such committee
pursuant to paragraph (3) or (4), the chairman shall, not later than
the first day on which the Senate is in session following the day on
which the request is filed, report the matter to the Senate for its
consideration.
(6) One hour after the Senate convenes on the first day on which the
Senate is in session following the day on which any such matter is
reported to the Senate, the Senate shall go into closed session and the
matter shall be the pending business. In considering the matter in
closed session the Senate.m-ay-
(A) approve the public disclosure of the information in ques-
tion, in which case the committee shall publicly disclose such
information.
(B) disapprove the public disclosure of the information in
question, in which' case the committee shall not publicly disclose
such information, or
(C) refer the matter back to the committee,: in which case the
committee shall make the final determination with respect to the
public disclosure of the information in question.
Upon conclusion of the consideration of such matter in closed session,
which may not extend'beyond the close of the fifth day following the
day on which such matter was reported to the Senate, the Senate shall
immediately vote on the disposition of such matter in open session,
without debate, and without divulging the information with respect to
which the vote is being taken. The Senate shall vote to dispose of such
matter by the means specified in clauses (A), (B), and (C) of the
second sentence of this paragraph.
(c) (1) No classified information in the possession of the Committee
on Intelligence Activities relating to the lawful intelligence activities
of any department or agency of the United States which the committee
or the Senate, pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of.. this section, has
determined should not be disclosed shall be made available to any per-
son by a Member, officer, or employee of the Senate except in a closed
session of the Senate or as provided in paragraph. (2).
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(2) The Committee on Intelligence Activities, or any member of
such committee, may, under such regulations as the committee shall.
prescribe to protect the confidentiality of such information, make any
information described in paragraph (1) available to any other commit-
tee or any other Member of the Senate. Whenever the Committee on
Intelligence Activities, or any member of such committee, makes such
information available, the committee shall keep a written record show-
ing, in the case of any particular information, which committee or
which Members of the Senate received such information. No Member
of the Senate who, and no committee, which, receives any information
under this subsection, shall make the information available to any other
person, except that a Senator may make such information available
either in a closed session of the Senate, or to another Member of the
Senate; however, a Senator who communicates such information to
another Senator not a member of the committee shall promptly inform
the Committee on Intelligence Activities.
(d) The Select Committee on Standards and Conduct may investi-
gate any alleged disclosure of intelligence information by a Member,
officer, or employee of the Senate in violation of subsection (c). At the
request of five of the members of the Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties or sixteen Members of the Senate, the Select Committee on Stand-
ards and Conduct shall investigate any such alleged disclosure of in-
telligence information and report its findings and recommendations to
the Senate.
(e) Upon the request of any person who is subject to any such in-
vestigation, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct shall
release to such individual at the conclusion of its investigation a sum-
mary of its investigation together with its findings. If, at the conclusion
of its investigation, the Select Committee .on Standards and Conduct
determines that there has been a significant breach of confidentiality or
unauthorized disclosure by a Member, officer, or employee of the Sen-
ate, it shall report its findings to the Senate and recommend appropri-
ate ?
action such as censure, removal from committee membership, or
explusion from the Senate, in the case of Member, or removal from
office or employment, in the case of an officer or employee.
SEC. 8. The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate is
authorized to permit any personal representative of the President,
designated by the President to serve as a liaison to such committee, to
attend any closed meeting of such committee.
SEC. 9. Upon expiration of the Select Committee on Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by
S. Res. 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, all records, files, documents and
other materials in the possession, custody, or control of such commit-
tee, under appropriate conditions established by it, shall be transferred
to the Committee on Intelligence Activities.
SEC. 10. (a) It is the sense of the Senate that the head of each de-
partment and agency of the United States should keep the Commit-
tee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate fully and currently in-
formed with respect to intelligence activities, including any significant
anticipated activities, which are the responsibility of or engaged in
by such department or agency.
(b) It is the sense of the Senate that the head of any department
or agency of the United States involved in any intelligence activities
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should furnish any information or document in the possession, custody,
control of the department or agency, or witness in its employ,
Wenever requested by the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the
Senate with respect to any matter within such committee's jurisdiction.
(c) It is the sense of the Senate that each department and agency
of the United States should report immediately upon discovery to the
Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate -any and all in-
telligence activities which constitute violations of the constitutional
rights of any person, violations of law, or violations of Executive
orders, Presidential directives, or departmental or agency rules or
regulations; each department and agency should further report to
such committee what actions have been taken or are expected to be
taken by the departments or agencies with respect to such violations.
SEC. 11. It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any bill or
resolution, or amendment thereto, or conference report thereon, which
appropriates funds for any fiscal year beginning after September 30,
1976, to, or for the use of, any department or agency of the United
States to carry out any of the following activities, unless such funds
have been previously authorized by law to carry out such activity for
such fiscal year-
(1) The activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(3) The activities of the National Security Agency.
(4) The intelligence activities of other agencies and subdivi-
sions of the Department of Defense.
(5) The intelligence activities of the Department of State.
(6) The intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, including all activities of the Intelligence Division.
SEC. 12. (a) The Committee on Intelligence Activities shall make a
study with respect to the following matters, taking into consideration
with respect to each such matter, all relevant aspects of the effective-
Mess of planning, gathering, use, security, and dissemination of
telligence-
(1) the quality of the analytical capabilities of United States '`
foreign intelligence agencies and means for integrating more
closely analytical intelligence and policy formulation;
(2) the extent and nature of the authority of the departments
and agencies of the executive branch to engage in intelligence ac-
tivities and the desirability of developing charters for each intelli-
gence agency or department ;
(3) the organization of intelligence activities in the executive
branch to maximize the effectiveness of the conduct, oversight,
and accountability of intelligence activities; to reduce duplication
or overlap; and to improve the morale of the personnel of the
foreign intelligence agencies ;
(4) the conduct of covert and clandestine activities and the
procedures by which Congress is informed of such activities;
(5) the desirability of changing any law, Senate rule or pro-
cedure, or any Executive order, rule, or regulation to improve the
protection of intelligence secrets and provide for disclosure of
information for which there is no compelling reason for secrecy;
(6) the desirability of establishing a joint committee of the
Senate and the House of Representatives on intelligence activities
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in lieu of having separate committees in each House of Congress,
or of establishing procedures under which separate committees on~
intelligence activities of the two Houses of Congress would receive
joint briefings from the intelligence agencies and coordinate their
policies with. respect to the safeguard of sensitive intelligence
information ;
(7) the authorization of funds for the intelligence activities of
the government and whether disclosure of any of the amounts of
such funds is in the public interest; and
(8) the development of a uniform set of definitions for terms to
be used in policies or guidelines which may be adopted by the
executive or legislative branches to govern, clarify, and strengthen
the operation of intelligence activities.
(b) The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate shall
report the results `of the study provided for under subsection (a) to
the Senate, together with any recommendations for legislative or other
actions it deems appropriate, no later than July 1, 1977, and from time
to time thereafter as it deems appropriate.
SEC. 13. (a) As used in this resolution, the term "intelligence ac-
tivities" includes (1) the collection, analysis, production, dissemina-
tion, or use of information which relates to any foreign country, or any
government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other
association in such foreign country, and which relates to the defense,
foreign policy, national security, or related policies of the United
States, and other activity which is in support of such activities; (2)
activities taken to counter similar activities directed against the United
States; (3) covert or clandestine activities affecting the relations of the
United States with any foreign government, political group, party,
military force, movement or other association; (4) the collection,
analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information about ac-
tivities of persons within the United States, its territories and pos-
sessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose political and ?
related activities pose, or may be considered by any department,
agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the
United States to pose, a threat to the internal security of the United
States, and covert or clandestine activities directed against such per-
sons. Such term does not include tactical foreign military intelligence
serving no national policymaking function.
(b) As used in this resolution, the term "department or agency" in-
cludes any organization, committee, council, establishment, or office
within the Federal Government.
(c) For purposes of this resolution, reference to any department,
agency, bureau, or subdivision shall include a reference to any suc-
cessor department, agency, bureau, or subdivision to the extent that
such successor engages in intelligence activities now conducted by the
department, agency, bureau, or subdivision referred to in this
resolution.
SEC. 14. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as constituting
acquiescence by the Senate in any practice, or in the conduct of any
activity, not otherwise authorized by law.
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