CONGRESS CONSIDERS CIA OVERSIGHT PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200130005-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 7, 1976
• Content Type: OPEN

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Foreign Policy/National Security
CONGRESS CONSIDERS CIA OVERSIGHT PLANS
For better or for worse, the congressional in-
vestigations of the CIA and other intelligence agencies are
drawing to a close.
The year-long probes have been marked by dramatic
disclosures, confrontations between the executive and legis-
lative branches over the release of classified material and
friction within Congress itself on organizational issues.
Although publication of the House Intelligence Com-
mittee's final report was blocked by the House Jan. 29
because of the controversy that developed over release of
portions of the 338-page document containing classified in-
formation, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee is
scheduled to release its conclusions March 1 on illegal, im-
proper and unethical activities by the intelligence agencies.
With a mound of evidence on wrongdoing in govern-
ment already available, Congress is beginning to focus on
an agenda of legislative remedies that would: 1) alter ex-
isting laws governing intelligence and law enforcement
operations, 2) improve congressional oversight of the CIA
and the other agencies, 3) restructure the intelligence com-
munity and 4) restrict covert operations.
I Like the controversial House and Senate investigations
iemselves, the task is expected to be difficult and the
roposed legislation unacceptable to many. Already, the 11-
member Senate panel is divided over a bill (S 2893), spon-
sored by eight of the committee's members, to establish an
oversight committee that would monitor the intelligence
committee on a permanent basis. And in the House, some
members feel that because of the turmoil over the select
committee's investigation, intelligence reforms are en-
dangered. The House vote to block the panel's final report
"destroys any hope in the near future and perhaps in the
distant future of the House ever exercising any effective
oversight of the executive activities that involve secrecy,"
according to Richard Bolling (D Mo.).
Beginning a series of hearings Jan. 21 on S 2893 and
other related bills, the Senate Government Operations
Committee posed a number of questions about the
organization and responsibilities of the proposed in-
telligence committee that have drawn conflicting answers
from present and former government officials and
members of Congress:
? Should the committee be a joint committee of Congress
or a permanent committee of the Senate?
? Should senators and staff serve on a rotating basis?
? Should the panel have jurisdiction over both authoriz-
ing legislation and the bills that actually appropriate the
money for the intelligence community?
? Should the committee have jurisdiction over domestic
intelligence operations?
? Should it be notified before covert actions are initiated
by the executive branch?
? Should it have a veto
?ierations?
"The answers must be thoughtful and responsible,"
Abraham Ribicoff (D Conn.), chairman of Government
Operations, said at the outset of the hearings.
Although the ad hoc Senate and House committees es-
tablished in early 1.975 to investigate intelligence-related
abuses were authorized to make recommendations on ways
to better control the intelligence agencies, the permanent
Government Operations Committees of the House and the
Senate are responsible for drafting and reporting the
legislation that would require, by statute, any re-
organizations of government agencies and departments
or changes in existing law, such as amendments to the
CIA's charter. The committees also are responsible for con-
gressional reorganization.
The House panel has not yet scheduled hearings on
reform proposals.
Because of the sensitive role of the intelligence com-
munity as well as disagreements over how to institute con-
gressional oversight procedures, some members have
suggested that to avoid mistakes Congress should establish
an intelligence committee, but allow it to resolve the
procedural and jurisdictional issues.
Others contend that before anything is done, Congress
must have a firm grasp of the intelligence apparatus in the
executive branch so that an oversight panel will know how
and where the decisions are made.
Still others in Congress would leave the monitoring of
federal intelligence activities, at least for the present, to the
existing Senate and House panels having jurisdiction over
intelligence matters: Appropriations; Armed Services;
Foreign Relations and International Relations. They say all
the reform proposals submitted so far have serious draw-
backs.
Although it does not appear that Congress this year
will overhaul the National Security Act of 1947, which es-
tablished the CIA, it is likely that some new oversight
mechanism will emerge during the remainder of the 94th
Congress. Warning of the possibility of waning con-
gressional interest in reforming the intelligence structure,
Sen. Lowell P. Weicker (R Conn.) told the Senate Govern-
ment Operations Committee in January that if Congress
did not pass a bill "in 1976, you won't have a bill."
Checking Covert Activities
Disclosures by the intelligence committees in 1975
that the CIA secretly intervened in the internal
political affairs of Chile over a 10-year period, and
repeatedly attempted to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro,
haIe led some members of Congress to the conclusion that
the agency should be restricted to its original mandate: in-
telligence gathering. But it is unlikely the legislation that is
fin, lly recommended to the House and Senate will pro-
hibit all covert actions by the agency, despite widespread
abh )rrence in Congress of many of the CIA's previous
clan.lestine operations.
Testifying before the Senate intelligence panel Dec. 5,
former Deputy Secretary of Defense Morton H. Halperin
said the United States "is not in such dangerous peril that it
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Foreign Policy/National Security - 2
needs to continue to violate its own principles and ignore its
own constitutional system to perpetuate a capability which
? has led to assassination attempts...and to subversion of all
that we stand for at home and abroad."
Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D Mass.) expressed a
similar opinion before the House intelligence committee
Dec. 11. "The existence of a standing covert action capabili-
ty in the CIA," he said, "has had disastrous long-term con-
sequences, severely crippling this country as a leader in the
world and badly shaking the faith of our people in the in-
tegrity of their system."
House Prospects
In 1974, before the disclosures of intelligence abuses,
an effort in the House to restrain the CIA's foreign
operations was opposed overwhelmingly. By a 108-291 vote,
House members rejected an amendment offered by
Elizabeth Holtzman (D N.Y.) to bar the agency from using
appropriated funds to undermine or "destabilize" any other
government. Holtzman reintroduced the legislation in bill
form (HR 1531) last year, but Rep. Les Aspin (D Wis.), a
member of the House intelligence panel, sees little chance
of success for this type of measure. "It just would not be
possible to get an outright ban through Congress," he said,
"and there are some instances" where he thought covert
operations might be desirable, "for example, to act against
a terrorist group or a government led by a deranged dic-
tator that has gotten possession of nuclear weapons."
Special Cases
During hearings held by both intelligence panels in late
1975 on reorganizing the intelligence community, a parade
?f former government officials also opposed an outright ban
on covert activities.
Clark M. Clifford, a former secretary of defense and
long-time adviser to several Presidents, including Truman
at the time the 1947 National Security Act was drawn up,
acknowledged that covert "operations have gotten out of
hand," but he advised the Senate committee not to outlaw
the operations entirely. And Arthur Schlesinger Jr., an ad-
viser to President Kennedy, recommended that "we retain a
stand-by capability for clandestine operations" during
emergency situations. But for the present he said the CIA
should refrain from covert actions because the nation
"has lost all credibility in this field."
Other witnesses at the December hearings, including
McGeorge Bundy, who served in both the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations, suggested to the House panel that
covert operations be used only in the "most exceptional cir-
cumstances"-during a war; at times when there was a
"critically important need" for intelligence information and
when necessary to counter terrorism and threats to nuclear
facilities. But Bundy endorsed secret "aid to beleaguered
democrats in countries where the continuing right of
political choice is directly threatened by extremists."
Senate Select Intelligence Committee Chairman Frank
Church (D Idaho), shared that view. In Portugal, where "a
bitterly unwanted Marxist regime is being resisted
courageously by a people who earlier voted 84 per cent
against it, a forcible takeover by the Communist minority,
heavily subsidized by the Soviet Union, might be averted by
our discreet help to democratic political parties," Church
q i id Dec. 4. "Such operations", he added, "are consistent
h the imperative of national survival or with our tradi-
on of free government."
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/0-8*V ??T i 'K
Yet some members questioned the importance and the
ethics of secretly channeling funds to political parties and
candidates supported by the United States. After it was dis-
closed in January that the CIA was funding non-Communist
politicians in Italy, Rep. Wayne L. Hays (D Ohio) said that
he opposed the effort because it "will not work." Others, in-
cluding Rep. Harrington, agreed. "The whole area of sur-
reptitious support for political causes in other countries has
been discredited," he has said.
Although former CIA Director William E. Colby
repeatedly insisted that the agency be allowed to engage in
covert actions, albeit in a limited way, the agency's special
counsel, Mitchell Rogovin, told the House committee Dec. 9
in response to a question by Robert McClory (R Ill.) that the
agency would look favorably- upon Congress specifying
allowable forms of covert action.
A proposal to be formally recommended by the Church
committee would prohibit the CIA from engaging in plots to
assassinate foreign leaders in peacetime and would bar the
agency from attempting to overthrow democratically
elected foreign governments. The House intelligence unit is
also expected to propose bans on these and other discredited
covert actions.
On another front, Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton (D Mo.) is
pressing for an amendment to the 1973 War Powers Act,
which clarified and defined the President's authority in
foreign policy-making, that would broaden the law's cover-
age to include civilian para-military operations in addition.
to combat actions by U.S. armed forces covered by the act.
The 1973 act, which requires the President to report to
Congress within 48 hours on any commitment of U.S. com-
bat forces abroad, "unintentionally encourages a President
to use covert civilian combatants in lieu of uniformed per-
sonnel," according to Eagleton. This "obvious loophole," he
added, could lead to "a new type of presidential war-a war
fought secretly with plainclothes soldiers and hired
mercenaries."
Oversight Committee
To improve congressional oversight of intelligence ac-
tivities, many in Congress are recommending that either a
joint committee or permanent Senate and House panels be
established to monitor the CIA and other intelligence and
law enforcement agencies.
The legislation (S 2893) introduced by most of the
members of the Senate intelligence committee would set up
a standing committee with the proviso that its membership
and staff be rotated periodically so as to deter the forma-
tion of an intelligence "establishment" in Congress. One of
the criticisms of the existing congressional oversight of the
CIA was that the selected members who were privy to the
agency's activities became defenders of its actions and
policies rather than watchdogs. (S 2893, box p. 288)
Alternative suggestions have also been introduced. The
Senate Government Operations Committee began a series
of 'learings on the various proposals Jan. 21. The lead-off
wit less, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.),
saic he favored an "independent" panel that was "respon-
sibli+ to the Senate and to the Senate alone." Sen. Charles H.
Per( y (R Ill.) and other members of Government
Opei ations supported this approach, but most executive
bran !h witnesses lined up in favor of a joint committee
becat se they said it would be easier to maintain security
and confidentiality.
i' sR?00200130005-6
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Foreign Policy/National Security - 3
Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
National Security
Council
National `` r
Intelligence
Gammunity
Intelligence
Committee
Director, Energy
Research &
Development
Administration
?
Intelligence
Division
Attorney
General
Federal
Bureau of
Investigation
Defense
Intelligence
SOURCE Senate Government Operations Committee ~
40
Committee
Verification
Panel
Director of
Central
Intelligence
U.S.
Intelligence
Board
Intelligence
L Resources
Advisory
Committee
National
Intelligence
Officers
Central
Intelligence
Agency
of receiving reports required of the executive branch
whenever covert actions were undertaken in foreign
countries. At issue here is the timing of congressional
notification.
In 1974 Congress adopted an amendment to the fiscal
1975 foreign aid bill (S 339-PL 93-559) prohibiting the
CIA's use of foreign assistance funds for overseas
operations other than in intelligence gathering unless the
President found such expenditures necessary for national
security and reported this to the "appropriate committees"
of Congress in a "timely fashion."
Although some members have insisted that the amend-
ment required the administration to submit a plan for
covert operations to Congress before its implementation,.
others concede that the language is ambiguous. CIA counsel
Rogovin told the House intelligence committee that the in-
formation did "not necessarily [have to be furnished]
beforehand."
The cosponsors of S 2893 recommended that the Presi-
dent give prior notification of a covert operation to an over-
sight panel, which would then offer its views on the
-)roposal. The President then might 1) modify the program,
call it off or 3) go ahead with it.
The executive branch, however, is opposed to this
procedure, fearing that leaks of new covert operations
would be likely and that it would restrict the President's
constitutional right to conduct foreign policy. Colby also ob-
j?cted to the procedure Jan. 23, maintaining that it would
be "impractical during a congressional recess or a time of
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Secretary
of
State
Bureau of
Intelligence
Research
Secretary
of
Treasury
- Rep. Aspin, citing what he called the "facts of con-
gressional life," has cautioned that new oversight proce-
dures should not become the keystone of the intelligence
reforms adopted by Congress. The members of any pro-
posed intelligence committee would be limited to a large
extent to what the agencies tell them, he said. They would
have to work behind closed doors "where critics would not
be able to point up foibles like they can with other com-
mittees." And the likelihood was that they would lose in-
terest in the subject after the CIA was no longer page one
news. The main task, as Aspin saw it, was for Congress and
the President to focus on reforming the intelligence com-
munity itself through reorganization and program restric-
tions.
One member who opposed setting up any kind of new
oversight apparatus was John G. Tower (R Texas), vice
chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee.
Breaking with the bipartisan consensus that had previously
existed on the investigating committee, Tower said Jan. 21
that he "too, initially leaned toward the creation of a
separate oversight committee," but "I am now of the view
that haste and simplicity may be the enemy of a solution."
Tower declared that oversight should be conducted by the
existing committees with responsibility for intelligence ac-
tivities.
Notification
One responsibility likely to be given to the new over-
sight arrangement ultimately approved by Congress is that
Feb. 7, 1976-PAGE 287
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% ryyi?
Foreign -c y -
S 2893: What It Would Do
Section 4: Establishes an intelligence oversight
committee in the Senate composed of five majority and
four minority members, each of whom would be
limited to a six-year term.
Section 5: Gives the panel general oversight
jurisdiction over the intelligence activities of all federal
departments. Defines "intelligence activities" as: 1)
functions related to information about foreign
governments, 2) counterintelligence, 3) clandestine and
covert activities and 4) domestic intelligence.
Provides the committee with authorization
jurisdiction over the specific agencies that make up the
"so-called national intelligence community"-the CIA,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency and parts of the Department of Defense,
Department of State and the FBI.
Reserves to other Senate committees prerogatives
on intelligence matters related to their jurisdictions.
Section 6: Requires the committee to keep other
committees and the Senate informed on intelligence
developments.
Section 7: Prohibits disclosure of intelligence in-
formation by the committee without authorization by
the panel or by a vote of the Senate.
Section 8: Provides for the rotation of the com-
mittee's staff and limits length of service to six years.
Requires the committee staff with access to
classified material to have security clearances and to
agree to be bound by secrecy rules of the Senate during
and after their employment with the committee.
Section 9: Allows the panel to establish rules and
procedures to protect the privacy of individuals.
Section 10: Outlines a procedure for the dis-
closure of classified information if the committee
decided that a matter ought to be brought first to the
full Senate for a decision, but allows the panel to make
disclosures if it chooses to without full Senate con-
sultation.
Section 11: Authorizes the committee to invite a
representative of the President to attend its closed
meetings.
Section 12: Provides for the transfer of the House
and Senate Select Intelligence Committees' records and
files to the new panel.
Section 13: Requires the executive branch to fur-
nish the committee information and documents re-
quired for fulfilling its responsibilities.
Imposes a legal obligation on the intelligence agen-
cies to keep the committee informed of all intelligence
activities in which they are involved.
Requires the executive branch to inform the com-
mittee of "significant" covert actions before they are
undertaken. Defines significant as "politically sensitive
or costly."
Section 14: Requires annual congressional
authorization and appropriations for intelligence ac-
tivities over which the panel has legislative jurisdic-
tion.
crisis" and that "committees now get information almost
immediately anyway, although hearings might be delayed.
Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R Tenn.), another member
of the Church committee, but not a cosponsor of S 2893,
predicted that "the Senate would be heading for conflict, if
not insurmountable difficulty" if prior notice were re-
quired.
Nevertheless 56 per cent of the 600 members of the
Retired Intelligence Officers Association, headed by David
Phillips, said in a recent poll that Congress should be ad-
vised in advance of any covert operation. They took the
position that Congress should share in the responsibility for
covert actions that later might prove unpopular with the
American public.
"No Veto"
The redeeming feature of the Church bill, according to
some of its critics, is that it does not give a new intelligence
unit veto power over covert operations planned by the ad-
ministration. But others in Congress have argued that
notification without the opportunity to veto is only half a
reform.
"We would usurp the role of the President as final ar-
biter of foreign policy," Church replied to such arguments
Jan. 13. But if a President consistently ignored the com-
mittee's advice, "then the committee would have the
remedy always available to Congress; it would control the
purse strings and could pull up on them if it saw fit.," he
added.
Sen. Mansfield, on the other hand, told the Govern-
ment Operations Committee that if the new intelligence
panel opposed a covert proposal, the Senate should have the
authority to reject the operation by majority vote within 30
days.
Among others in Congress committed or leaning
toward a veto procedure is Alan Cranston (D Calif.).
He suggested the following possibility to the Govern-
ment Operations Committee Feb. 2: A majority of the select
committee, voting in closed session, would he sufficient to
stop a proposed covert action unless the President appealed
to the Senate. In that case, a "no" vote by the majority of
the Senate, meeting behind closed doors, would be final,
and the President could not proceed with the operation. In
addition, if three or more members of the committee op-
posed a covert plan, they could appeal to the Senate for a
vote.
Leaks and Disclosures
Because of the leaks of CIA activities and personnel
lists during the intelligence investigations, the executive
branch and a growing number in Congress have concluded
that statutes must be enacted that provide criminal
penalties against executive branch employees and con-
gressional aides who disclosed classified information.
Members of Congress themselves might be subject to
stricter internal disciplinary procedures.
"Our legal controls are not what they should be," ac-
cording to Colby, who said Jan. 23 that the Justice Depart-
ment and the CIA had drafted a secrecy law that would be
su:)mitted to Congress as soon as it was reviewed by the Of-
fic, of Management and Budget. The law would cover ex-
em tive branch and congressional staff members, who would
haN a to take secrecy oaths before gaining access to
classified information.
Both Church and Tower favor legal sanctions against
government employees who released official secrets; and
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this position is shared by members of the Government
Operations panel. Church also recommended Jan. 21 that in
situations when a senator or staff member disclosed sen-
sitive information, the case automatically would be
referred to the Committee on Standards and Conduct,
which then would investigate and recommend "appropriate
action including, but not limited to, censure or removal
from office."
In the House, the intelligence committee staff
recommended in its final report leaked to the press Jan. 26
that criminal penalties be levied against anyone who
released the names of intelligence agents or other secret in-
formation without authorization. The report also called for
censure and possible removal from their committee
assignments of members who disclosed such information.
It was the House investigation, particularly its Jan. 21
4-8 vote rejecting a motion offered by Dale Milford (D Tex-
as) to delete secret information on covert operations from
its final report, that has disturbed not only the White
House but also many in Congress. Referring to this action,
Sen. Bill Brock (R Tenn.) expressed "disgust over con-
gressional leaks" during the Jan. 23 Government
Operations hearing and then asked Colby, "How can we
guard against that? We can guard against leaks by the
staff."
Colby responded that a single oversight committee for
intelligence activities would help maintain control over of-
ficial secrets. One committee with responsibility for over-
sight and for the authorization and appropriation of funds
for intelligence activities would reduce the number of
members given intelligence data, he said. Under the ex-
isting congressional procedure, eight committees have
access to the CIA's and other intelligence agencies'
documents. "The fewer members on oversight the better,"
Colby declared "By limiting the number you increase a
sense of self-discipline... but in the end it is up to each
house to discipline its own membership either by formal or
informal procedures."
Brock has proposed that in the event any member of a
committee of Congress leaked national security infor-
mation, "he could be suspended when charges were brought
by a bipartisan mix of at least one-fifth of the members un-
til the charges were refuted; if they were proven, the person
would be expelled from Congress."
Among bills pending in Congress that deal with the
secrecy issue is S 1, the Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975
being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee. One
section of that bill would make it a criminal offense for
anyone to disclose the nation's military secrets to a foreign
power "knowing" that they could be used to prejudice the
safety or interests of the United States.
The use of the word "knowing" in that provision has
caused much controversy. Opponents charge that it is a
repressive departure from current law, which makes it a
crime for anyone to disclose information "with an intent"
that it be used to injure the United States.
Opponents also charge that this section of S 1 would in
effect create a National Secrets Act limiting what
Americans may learn about government policies and prac-
tices.
Another controversy has developed over situations in
which an oversight committee may want to disclose
classified information that the President wishes to keep
concealed. Sen. Church has proposed a procedure, which is
opposed by the executive branch, that would allow the
Senate to be the arbiter.
After the President objected to a disclosure, the
matter, under Church's proposal, would be referred to the
full Senate for a vote during a closed session. The Senate
could refer the matter back to the committee for recon-
sideration, but if the committee sent it back again to the
floor, the issue would have to be decided by an up or down
vote.
"There are some who say that once a matter is brought
before the full Senate, it will no longer be secret," Church
noted, but "in my view, once the Senate accepts...[this
process], it would respect the injunction of secrecy."
The House intelligence committee staff's recommen-
dations would allow a permanent oversight committee to
decide on its own whether or not to publicly disclose secret
documents.
Reorganization Plans
a
Throughout its 1.975 investigation of the intelligence
community, the House committee focused on the quality
and cost of secret data collected and analyzed by the CIA
and other agencies. One of the conclusion's reached by the
committee staff was that the U.S. intelligence product
could be improved by a number of reorganization steps
within the executive branch. It recommended: 1) separating
the National Security Agency, which gathers intelligence
by electronic methods, from the Defense Department; 2)
abolishing the Defense Intelligence Agency and dividing its
functions between the CIA and the office of the Secretary of
Defense, and 3) requiring that covert activities be approved
by the entire National Security Council.
Another reform that has gained backers in Congress is
a proposal to establish a new Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Presently, the director of the CIA is expected to do
this, but, according to Rep. Aspin, it "has not worked well"
because administering the CIA is itself a full-time job.
Clark Clifford elaborated on this point Jan. 26 before
the Senate Government Operations Committee. "There are
now nine separate intelligence agencies in our country," he
said, and "it has turned out that the director of the CIA is
merely one individual among a number of equals." Clifford
suggested that Congress establish a "director general of in-
telligence" who would serve as the President's chief adviser
on intelligence matters, see that the agencies operated
effectively and complied with the law and function as the
main contact with new congressional oversight committees.
FBI Guidelines
To guard against the FBI again drifting into operations
aimed at disrupting domestic protest groups and dis-
crediting their leaders, the Senate committee's reform
recommendations call for tighter oversight of the bureau
and a new charter that would spell out for the first time the
types of investigations the FBI could and could not conduct.
Although Director Clarence M. Kelley has said that he
would "welcome any guidelines," the FBI chief strongly ob-
jects to proposals that would limit the bureau to in-
vestigations of committed crimes.
Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D Minn.), a member of the in-
telligence panel, maintains that giving the FBI in-
vestigative authority beyond criminal violations would be a
"step off a cliff. When you go beyond criminal law and get
into political ideas, you're in trouble."
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But both Kelley and Attorney General Edward H. Levi
have insisted that it is often necessary to gather intelligence
? on dissidents when there was a "likelihood" that their ac-
tivities would involve the use of force or violence in com-
mitting a federal crime.
"As a practical matter, the line between intelligence
work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult
to describe," Kelley told the committee. "What begins as an
prosecution of the subject." "
chief of the intelligence division's research section, has
investigations whenever available information indicated
methods against the federal government. But the new
ing a "highly indirect connection" with violent activities of
those not advocating violent means to achieve their ends.
Under draft guidelines being considered by the Justice
agreement," FBI domestic security investigations would be
limited to cases where an individual or group intended to
accomplish one of five purposes: overthrow of the
government; disrupting the activities of foreign
governments in the United States; influencing government
`.`The line between intelligence Foreign Relations Reaction
work and regular. criminal in- Clifford P. Case (R N.J.), ranking Republican'on the
vestigations is often' difficult , to Foreign Relations panel, commended Moynihan for having
describe. What begins as an in- made "a unique contribution to stimulative thinking about
telligence investigation may well aCLionS anU aLLILUUes VI LIIC unILeU INULIVilb.
Robert P. Griffin (R Mich.) called the ambassador's
end in arrest and prosecution of the decision to resign regrettable and his departure "a loss to
subject. " American interests in the United Nations. Like many
tablish order.
Although Levi said that the guidelines would enable
the FBI and the Justice Department to put their own house
-FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley and was saying many of the things that needed to be said."
in order, the Senate committee has felt that statutory
policies by interfering by force or violence with government of the world will be enhanced by treating them with the
functions or interstate commerce; depriving individuals of refreshing candor which Ambassador Moynihan voiced and
"their civil rights; and creating domestic violence or rioting which I feel represents the inner feelings of the American
when it would require the use of federal armed forces to es- people toward the United Nations."
Americans." Commented Mondale: "Guidelines written by
the executive branch can be re-written by the executive
branch.... They will mean nothing in the face of a willful
President or a willful Attorney General."
A second issue that has divided the FBI and members
of Congress is how oversight of the bureau should be ac-
complished by the legislative branch. Members of the
jority Leader Mansfield have suggested that any new in-
telligence oversight panel be given responsibility for
reviewing the FBI's intelligence operations in addition to
those of the CIA and other agencies.
Criminal matters, however, would remain under the
leurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee. I
Senate Views:
MOYNIHAN RESIGNATION
The assessment in Congress of Daniel P. Moynihan's
brief career as U.N. ambassador ranged from lavish praise
to sharp criticism. Moynihan, who resigned his post Feb. 2,
had received nationwide attention for his blunt, often
pugnacious and ideological speeches defending the U.S.
position in the United Nations. This was especially true
with his denunciation. of the U.N. resolution passed Nov. 10,
1975, defining Zionism as a form of racism.
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.
During his confirmation hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on June 4, considerable atten-
tion was given to a March 1975 magazine article written by
Moynihan in which he called for the United States to re=
spond forcefully to the Third World's ideological depreca-
tion of liberal democracies and advocacy of global economic
redistribution as a moral right.
Several committee members had endorsed Moynihan's
the nonaligned majority."
"make it more difficult for us to take a leadership role with
article outlined a posture, of confrontation that would
voy's tactics: "Our relationship with the developing nations
Moynihan, saying that he had "a decidedly negative impact
on our relations with the developing nations, particularly
the African nations. This has already hurt our diplomatic
nations generally for years to come."
rather than the substance of what he said. "Our diplomatic
cooperation, not confrontation," he added. "I hope Mr.
...Ilut we also need a man who emphasizes the end result
The U.N. post requires Senate confirmation.
PAGE COPVRIGNI 1976 CONGRESSIONAL OL'AFIrERLV INC
prWe~l' ~~ 'Release 2001/08'/0'4`,:?"Pl4=Rl'IP9"0~??@0?9' 8000200130005-6
 , HE- WASHINGTON PORT, 'UESD +' } 1
? p~3nr,%yPd For RPIPacP 20011MV01 IA-R P90-00 FORA
resident Ford is about to add his own plan .to a bzaad range of proposals for managing government
telligence operations, developed after- a year-long inquiry into.'American intelligence activities. TV. e
ffer today a representative sampling of such proposals dealing- With on a or another inspect of theovera
roblem of conducting secret intelligence activities in a democratic society. The fiat sele tton bs~'roin.
hicago Srari-Times editorial of Feb. 1. headed, "A plan o save democracy by dismemberingthe:C. A ti
he second, by columnist Tom Braden, formerly an"official of the CIA, assays the need for covert
perations. In the third, CI.A counsel i itchell Rogovin addresses the constitutional implieations~
ecrecy. In the fourth, :'Senate CIA investigator Frank Church responds' to :Roggvin Th efiftli .is a, f r
[uggestiort, his
own, by Army il!a jor F..Douglas . Mehle; a en agcn intelligence of f icer, s , i; t b
r s- ':Theme, inlelligence ,corniyttee :_ has s'
learned ? that the Operation of an.am-: T
z teIligence.;: service within ? the 'Coil
stittutio, is.a responsibility to be shared
sitb Congress.; But itstill remains for'
f,arties:to .]earn brow.? :to'c*;s
cammodate~6.each other's':legitimate'
needs - . , L s'
Oversight.. is,essence, the
congressional power to ia.i Ax
constantly..,--.'
'.that -the intelligence _
agencies are operating in accoi~iance 4:
-with the :. laws.",. Simply defined,
congressional- oversight':: means that
"there shall be no surprises."
:The watchdog function of'Congress'.'
will be effective only.: if the oversight
l~?committee?is privy to the CIA's secrets.
The committee,. however; will' only -
..become privy -to such secrets if the
agency is satisfied that the committee
Approved For Release 2001/08/01 : CIA-RDP90-00735
can keep secrets. But the committee
does not exist simply to act as a
receptacle for secrets. It has a dual,
and paradoxical, function: to disclose
information the committee deems_ to be
in the public interest:
Here is the rub: the contradiction
between the l committee's duty t.o .
receive secrets and retain the con-
fidence of the intelligence community,
and to report to Congress and the
people on the community's secret work.
Our constitution suggests an answer:
If the Congress is to overrule the
President, this should be done by a vote
of two thirds of both houses-the
number required to override a veto. It
must be recognized that the nation's
secrets are not the private-property of
any committee, the Congress, or the
executive branch:-;--..~'.'
Procedures should be established for
a member. to`"appeal an executive
branch decisfon that bars disclosure'tc
.an . oversight `-committee -2nd.-. -if
necessary;' to-1--the- whole house of
Congress 'concerned-in executive
session.
Serious thought must` be given to.
sanctions against those who are en-1
trusted with secrets and who then leak
-
them.-
We must face the fact that as'a-nation '
we do . liave-- legitimate 'secrets.
Unauthorized disclosure ? by either:.
branch, `ichicti amounts to a de facto
declassification',:. is an unacceptable
tOQQ B ~i~ for those secrets
worth keeping and a system for those
encrusted with secrets to measure their