OVERSIGHT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON S. 317 TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT S.

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• Publication Date: February 6, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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OVERSIGHT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
ON
S. 317
TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
S. 189
RELATING TO THE NECESSITY OF REORGANIZING CERTAIN DE-
PARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
S. Con. Res. 4
TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION AND
INTELLIGENCE
S. 2893
TO ESTABLISH A STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
S. 2865
TO ESTABLISH A STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ON
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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OVERSIGHT OF U.S. 'GOVERNMENT
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
S. 317
S. 189
RELATING TO THE NECESSITY OF REORGANIZING CERATIN DE-
PARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF TIIE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
S. Con. Res, 4
TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMITTEE? ON INFORMATION AND
INTELLIGENCE
S. 2893
TO ESTABLISH A STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
S'6 2865
TO ESTABLISH A STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ON
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
JANUARY 21, 22, 23, 26, 2T; FEBRUARY 2, 3, 5, AND 6, 1976
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 4976
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut, Chairman
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
LEE METCALF, Montana
JAMES B. ALLEN, Alabama
LAWTON CHILES, Florida
SAM NUNN, Georgia
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware
BILL BROCK, Tennessee
LOWELL P. W3ICKER, JR., Connecticut
RICHARD A. WEGDIAN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
PAUL 1I0FF, Counsel
I'11:L L. LEVENTHAL, Loun8Cl
":Ls E. NOBLEMAN. Counsel
DAVID R. SCHAEFER, Counsel
MATTHEW SCHNEIDER, Counsel
PATTY. ROSENTHAL, Assistant Counsel
JOHN B. CHILDERS, Chief Counsel to the Minority
BRIAN Coxfoy, Special Counsel to the Minority
MARILYN A. HARRIS, Chief Clerk'
ELIZABETH A. PREAS', Assistant Chief Clerk
HAROLD C. ANDERSON, Staff Editor
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CONTENTS
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Senator Ribicoff--------------------------------------------------- 1
Senator Percy___________
Senator Allen ----------------------------------------------------- 5
Senator ----------------------------- 7 8
Senator Nunn---------------------- - -----=---------
Senator Weickcr--------------------------
------------------------ 10
Senator Glenn---------------------------------------------------- 11
WITNESSFIS
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY '21, 1976
Hon. Mike Mansfield, a U.S. Senator from the State of Montana-------- 12
llon. Frank Church, a U.S. Senator from the ,State of Idaho ------------ 27
Hon. John G. Tower, a U.S. Senator from thQ State of Texts ------------ 45
Hon. Howard 11. Baker, a U.S. Senator from the State of.Tennessee--_-_ 48
THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 1976
Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State___73
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United ~3tates _ 92
David Atlce Phillips, president, the Association of Retired "Intelligence
Officers------------------------------------------------------- 105
FRIDAY, JANUARY 23; 1976
W. E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, accompanied by Mitchell
Rogovin, special counsel to the Director of Central Intelligence; George
L. Cory, legislative counsel, and Donald F. Massey, assistant legislative
counsel -------------------------------------------------------- 117
McGeorge Bundy, former special assistant to the President for national
security affairs------------------------------------------------- 144
MONDAY, JANUARY 20, 1976
Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau; of Investigation----------- 171
John McCone, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency------------ 187
Clark, M. Clifford, former Secretary of Defende _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 202
TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1976
Ambassador Richard IIelins, former Director of Central Intelligence ----- 221
Robert F. Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense--------------------- 236
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1976
Morton II. Halperin, director, project on jational security and civil
liberties-------------------------------------------------------- 275
Hon. Gaylord Nelson, a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin------- 278
IIon. Alan Cranston, a U.S. Senator from the State of California-------- 302
Raymond S. Calamaro, executive director, Coibmittee for Public Justice- 315
(III)
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TuESD Y, FEBRUARY 3, 1976
Page
Hon. Barry Goldwater, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona --------
333
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina-
348
Hon. Michael J. Harrington, a Representative in Congress from Massa-
chusetts --------------------------------------------------------
356
Hon. Robin L. Beard, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Tennessee----------------------------------------------------
362
Hon. Strom Thurmond, a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina__
368
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1976
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State___________________________ ---
415
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1976
Hon. Walter D. Huddleston, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kentucky_
449
Edward H. Levi, Attorney General of the United States -----------------
453
Baker, Hon. Howard, Jr.:
Testimony----------------------------------------------------
48
Prepared statement--------------------------------------------
52
Letter to Senator Percy from Senator Baker re Senator Baker's views
of intelligence oversight legislation, February 17, 1976----------
71
Beard, Hon. Robin L., Jr.:
36
Testimony----------------------------------------------------
2
Documents relating to complaint filed by Representative Beard
against Representative Harrington____________________________
372
Bundy, McGeorge:
Testimony----------------------------------------------------
144
Letter to Chairman Ribicoff from Mr. Bundy re Mr. Bundy's re-
sponsibilities while working in the intelligence community, Febru-
ary 4,1976-------------------------------------------------
157
_______ _____ __ __ ______ -- --- -
Prepared statement--------------------------------------------
Article from the New York Times, April 21, 1963, titled: "Kennedy
and His Critics on Cuba," by James Reston__________________
162
169
Calamaro, Raymond S.:
Testimony------------------------------------ ---------------
315
Prepared statement---------------------------- ---------------
325
Church, Hon. Frank:
Testimony -----------------------------------------------------
27
statement--------------------------------------------
Prepared
Letter to Senator Glenn from Senator Church re establishing a
Senate Committee to oversee the intelligence functions of the
Government, January 30,1976--------------------------------
40
44
Clifford, Clark M.: testimony---------------------------------------
202
Colby, W. E.: testimony
117
Cranston, lion. Alan:
Testimony-------- --- ---- ------ ------------------ ----
302
Letter to Chairman Ribicoff from Senator Cranston suggesting change
of language of two amendments, February 20, 1976 ------------
311
Prepared statement--------------------------------------------
312
Ellsworth, Robert F.:
Testimony----------------------------------------------------
236
Extract from a report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on
fiscal year 1977-81 budgets-----------------------------------
246
Goldwater, Hon. Barry:
Testimony
333
Prepared statement--------------------------------------------
346
Halperin, Morton H.:
Testimony----------------------------------------------------
275
Prepared statement-------------------------------------------
324
Harrington, Hon. Michael J.
Testimony----------------------------------------------------
356
Prepared statement--------------------------------------------
358
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Helms, Ambassador Richard: Page
Testimony---------------------------------------------------- 221
Letter to Chairman Ribicoff from Ambassador Helms giving his views
on the formation of a joint committee, February 2. 1976---------- 228
Hollings, Hon. Ernest F.
Testimony -------------------- ----- 348
Presidens Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - 355
Huddleston, Hon. Walter D.: testimony______________________________ 449
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB.:testimony ------------------------------- 92
Kelly, Clarence M.:
Testimony---------------------------------------------------- 171
Letter to Chairman Ribicoff from Mr. Kelley forwarding answers
to Senator Percy's two questions, February 4, 1976 -------------- 183
Kissinger, Henry A.: testimony____________________________________ 415
Levi, Edward H.:
Testimony---------------------------------------------------- 453
Prepared statement___________________________________________ 474
Responses to questions submitted in writing by Senator Javits---------- 481
McCone,John:testimony ----------------------------------------- 187
Mansfield, Hon. Mike: testimony____________________________________ 12
Nelson, Hon. Gaylord:
Testimony--------------------------------------------------- 278
Prepared statement____________________ __--------------------- 286
Prepared statement of Senator Nelson before the Subcommittee of
Intergovernmental Relations of the Cbmmittee on Government
Operations on December 9, 1974______________________________ 188
Statements on introduced bills and joint resolutions, from the Con-
gressional Record-Senate, Nov. 26, 1973---------------------- 292
Phillips, David Atlee:
Testimony----------------- -- ----- ----- --- ----- 105
Letter to Senator Percy from Mr. Phillips re British Official Secrets
Act, February 3,1976---------------------------------------- 112
Rusk, Dean:testimony-------------------------------------------- 73
Thurmond, Hon. Strom: testimony---------------------------------- Tower, Hon. John G.: testimony____________________________________ 45
MATERIAL SUPPLIED BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Prepared statement of Senator Javits________________________________ 104
Article submitted by Senator Percy entitled "CIA Probe Needs Goals,"
from the Chicago Daily News, January 18-19, 1975__________________ 4
Prepared statement of Representative Aspin__________________________ 360
APPENDIX
S. 189, text of----------------------------------------------------- 487
S. 317, text of------------------------ - 489
S. Con. Res. 4, text of------ -- 491
S. 2865, text of------------------- 492
S. 2893, text of---------------------------------------------------- 495
Letters to Senator Ribicoff from:
George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
February 13,1976------------------------------------------- 498
W. E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington,
D.C., January 23, 1976--------------- ----------------------- 498
James Keogh, Director, U.S. Information Agency, Washington, D.C.,
February 2,1976------------------- ----------------------- 500
Hon. Walter F. Mondale, a U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota,
Washington, D.C., February 17, 1976, with prepared statement
attached------------------------------------------------------ 502
Herbert Scoville, McLean, Va., December 18, 1975________________ 507
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., professor of political science, and university
professor, Brown University, Providence, ;R.I., January 8, 1976, with
prepared statement attached ----------- ;----------------------- 509
Robert Amory, Washington, D.C., January 13, 1976, with memoran-
dum attached ----------------------------------------------- 512
Robert Murphy, Corning International Corp., New York, N.Y.,
January 2, 1976---------------------------------------------- 515
William C. Sullivan, Sugar Hill, N.H., February 14, 1976, with
attachment------------------------------------------------- 516
Norman Dorsen, professor of law, New York University School of
Law, New York, N.Y., February 23, 197:6______________________ 523
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VI
Letters to Senator Percy from: Page
Herbert Scoville, McLean, Va., December 18, 1975 ------------------ 507
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, professor of political science, and university
professor, Brown University, Providence, R.I., January 8, 1976,
_________ __ ____ _________ 509
with prepared statement attached-----------------------------
Robert Amory, Washington, D.C., January 13, 1976, with memoran-
dum attached-----------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------ - -- 512
Robert Murphy, Corning International Corp., New York, N.Y.,
January 2, 1976--------------------------------------------- 515
William C. Sullivan, Sugar Hill, N.H., February 14, 1976, with
attachment------------------------------------------------- 516
Norman Dorsen, professor of law, New York University School of
Law, New York, N.Y., February 23, 1976______________________ 523
Prepared statements:
Senator Walter F. Mondale------------------------------------- 502
Senator John V. Tunney_------------------506
Richard J. Barnett, co-director, Institute for Policy Studies -------- 524
Mark Lockman, legislative aide, Liberty Lobby------------------- 527
Herbert Scoville, Jr., former CIA Assistant Director for Scientific
Intelligence and Deputy Director for Research, February 26, 1976_- 530
Charts:
Defense Intelligence------------------------------------------- 501
National Intelligence Community-------------------------------- 502
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OVERSIGHT OF U.S. GOVERNI1ENT INTELLIGENCE
FUNCTIONS
WEDNESDAY, JANUAA-Y 21, 1976
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNIIIENT OPERATIONS,
TVashington., D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice. at 10 a.m. in room 3302, the
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Abraham Ribicoff, chairman
Of the committee, presiding.
Present : Senators Ribicoff, Allen, Glynn, Nunn, Percy, WTeicker,
and Brock.
Staff members present: Richard A. Wegman, chief counsel and
staff director ; Paul Hoff, counsel ; Paul ]Rosenthal, assistant counsel ;
Marilyn A. Harris, chief clerk, and Elizabeth A. Preast, assistant
chief clerk.
Chairman RIBICOFF. The committee will be in order.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RIBICOFF
Today, the Government Operations Committee begins 8 days of
hearings on legislation before this committee to create a new intelli-
gence oversight committee.
It is my hope that these hearings cahi explore ways to improve
the policies of the future, rather than dwell on the mistakes of the past,.
As far as I am concerned, the Church; committee has done an out-
standing job. I personally do not intend to go over all the work that
the Church committee has been doing over this past year.
Of course, there is no restriction on other members of the committee.
I am interested in the future and not hi the past.
Disclosures during the past year of illegal or improper actions by
the intelligence agencies have deeply distilrbed the Nation. The Senate
select committee, under the very able leadership of Senators Church
and Tower, as well as other investigations, have performed an in-
valuable service by exploring some of these very serious allegations
of illegal or improper activities.
This country needs a strong and effective intelligence program. In-
telligence is essential to cope with threats to world peace abroad and
reduce the threat of crime and political terrorism at home.
But what kind of intelligence program, under what controls, and
under how much secrecy? We must consider what we as a Nation want
our intelligence agencies to do in today's ivorld.
To what extent should there be secrecy in an open democratic society?
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To what extent should there be covert operations in a society based
on law? To what extent in a democracy should agency action not be
subject to review by Congress and the public?
The intelligence agencies do not now have the full trust of the
American public. The general consensus and understanding which
prevailed when the National Security Act was passed in 1947 no
longer prevails.
IJnt.il full trust and confidence in our intelligence agencies is re-
stored, the country will be unable to conduct a fully effective intelli-
gence program. As long as there is basic disagreement about the goals
or policies of the Government's intelligence program, disclosures of
sensitive information will occur.
Creation of a new intelligence oversight committee can provide a
forum to begin restoring the trust and confidence the intelligence
agencies must have to operate effectively.
I strongly favor creation of a new intelligence committee with ade-
quate power to assure effective oversight of the intelligence agencies.
I am not committed, however, to any particular structure, or any
particular formula, to achieve this goal.
A separate committee with responsibilities in the area of intelligence
is not a new idea.. Special Government commissions have recommended
such a step as long ago as the Hoover Commission in 1955, and as re-
cently as the 1975 Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy headed by Mr. Robert Murphy.
Over 150 bills have been introduced in Congress since 1947.
The disclosures of the last year, however, have given great new
urgency to these proposals. The 1975 Rockefeller Commission on the
CIA recommended creation of a congressional oversight committee.
Today we will hear others recommend a similar step on behalf of
members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Oversight.
In July, the full Senate set itself a deadline of March 1 of this year
to consider and act upon proposals to change the way the Senate over-
sees the intelligence activities of the Government.
The public clearly wants Congress to act. A recent opinion poll in-
dicated that while 78 percent believe it is very important to have the
best foreign intelligence agency in the world, the public also believes
by a 66 percent to 18 percent margin that both Congress and the White
House should monitor the CIA more closely.
Congress can never run the. intelligence program itself. Day-to-day
oversight and direction must come from within the executive branch.
Congress should exercise oversight over covert operations and ask
hard questions about the need for such operations.
It must examine the economy and efficiencies of the intelligence pro-
grams which cost billions each year, and eliminate any unnecessary
duplication or fragmentation among the maze of agencies now in-
volved in intelligence. It must make sure that even good men, with
the. best of intentions, do not exceed the charters of the intelligence
agencies or violate the constitutional rights of Americans.
At the same time, it is essential that legislation creating a, new over-
sight committee recognize the need to protect the confidentiality of
some information. Some secrecy is vital if either the intelligence agen-
cies, or the new intelligence committee, are to do their work effectively.
The challenge is to find a way to reconcile the need for secrecy with
the right of the people in a democracy and the right of Congress under
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our system of checks and balances, to oversee the activities of our in-
telligence agencies.
The challenge is a large one that must; be approached with an open
mind. The answers must be thoughtful and responsible.
Among the. specific questions these hearings must consider are those
concerning the following :
First, should the committee be a joint committee of Congress or a
permanent committee of the Senate, should Senators serve on the
committee on a rotating basis, and should the legislation explicitly
reserve seats on the committee for members of other committees?
Second, should the new committee have jurisdiction over legislation,
including authorization legislation, involving the Government's na-
tional intelligence activities? Should the entire intelligence activities of the Government be sub-
ject to annual authorization legislation reviewed by the new
committee?
Third, should the committee have jurisdiction over domestic intelli-
gence activities and, if so, -what type of jurisdiction?
Fourth, to what extent should the legislation spell. out the extent and
nature of the duty of the executive'branth to keep the new committee
fully and currently informed of its activities and plans?
Fifth, should the bill amend the prod.edures now governing notice
to Congress of any covert actions undertaken by the executive branch?
When should such notice be provided ?
Sixth, what, if any thing, should the legislation say about the stand-
ards and safeguards that should govern; the committees disclosure of
sensitive information to other Senators? and to the general public?
There are no simple answers to these aild similar questions. No legis-
lation can resolve every problem, quiet every fear. What Congress must
do is agree on a basic framework and bade principles. These problems
can then be resolved in a sensible and'i responsible way in light of
changing circumstances.
In the next 8 days we will hear from! more than 25 witnesses with
significant experience in the intelligence area.
The Nation is indebted to Senator Church and Senator Tower and
the entire collective Senate committee aid their staff. We are honored
today to have as our first witness Senator Mansfield who has always
been perceptive and many years ahead of where the Congress and the
country goes.
Senator Percy, do you have any comments?
Senator PF.RCY. I would like to join, 1fr. Chairman, in welcoming
Senator Mansfield. I think his appearance this morning emphasizes
that these are among the most importatiit hearings that we will hold
in the Congress this year.
I certainly join in paying tribute to Senator Church, Senator Tower
and the members of the Select Cominitt4e on Intelligence for the dili-
gence with which they have pursued them tasks.
The one thing that we all would very much agree on is the need for
an outstanding intelligence service. It is; indispensable for us to carry
out our foreign policy. It is indispensable for us to preserve the
security and defense of the Nation.
As a Senator, I have benefited invaluably over 9 years through the
:services of the Central Intelligence Agency. The work that it did
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with some of us in presenting facts to us on the ABM is one instance.
They ended up helping save this Nation a $6 billion unnecessary
expenditure.
The assistance and help that I have had, and other Senators have
had when we prepared for trips to the Middle East, the Soviet Union,
and China and so forth have been absolutely invaluable. However, we
do have to put to ourselves today and this year in the Congress sev-
eral very basic questions.
Is the intelligence community best organized to provide the infor-
mation needed for our foreign policy decisionmiking and to protect
our national security?
Are the mandates and responsibilities of the various component
parts of the intelligence community sufficiently clear to define their
roles and to prevent illegal actions or abuse of individual rights?
Third : What we are concerned with here today,. the immediate task
at hand, what should the role of Congress be in evaluating and helping
to give guidance to the intelligence community of this country? The
organization and mandate of the intelligence community will be sub-
ject to debate and resolution later in this Congress.
Today, we focus on this third question and we try to better define,
as a result of the very careful hearings carried out by the Select In-
telligence Committee, how can we best organize ourselves in Congress?
As an individual member of this panel. I will certainly try to recog-
nize that the executive branch, and the President in particular, has a
clear constitutional responsibility in the foreign relations field and in
the field of national defense. There is a partnership that has been de-
veloped, and must continue to be developed, between the executive
branch and the Congress. The question is how -hall we redefine our
role so that we become better informed partners, more constructive
partners, so that we carry out our exercise of our oversight responsi-
bilities over the intelligence community in a more effective rnanner.
Senator Baker will point out in the testimony he gives today that
it is very difficult to achieve the balance between the requirements of
national security and insuring that the Congress fulfills its oversight
role and has access to necessary information to enable it to fulfill its
responsibilities.
These are the objectives and goals that we have.
Finally, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent that an article
that I wrote at the request of the Chicago Daily News 1 year ago
this week entitled "CTA Probe Needs Goals" be inserted in the record
at this point. I think the report that we will receive from the Select
Committee on Intelligence will have succeeded in fulfilling the goals
that I had hoped that it would have as outlined a year ago in the
article.
Chairman RIBICOFF. Without objection.
[The material referred to follows :1
[From the Chicago Daily News, Jan. 18-19. 19751
CIA PROBE NEEDS GOALS : PERCY
In the justifiable rush to investigate the transgressions of the Central In-
telligence Agency, all of us involved might well pause long enough to ask what
we want the end result to be.
In an ideal world, we would have no need for intelligence operations. But
the world is not ideal. The superpowers possess the capability to ravage the
I
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Earth. 011-producing nations, wielding their! new economic power, could bring
down the industrialized world. Other nations are capable of actions that could
trigger our security commitments and draw us', into war.
In such an environment, every nation needs the most accurate knowledge it
can get of the capabilities and intentions of other nations. For one nation
to eliminate its intelligence operations would be as naive and irresponsible as.
to eliminate its armed forces.
So, as we ponder the fate of the CIA, we; had better not apply the twisted
philosophy of that American officer in Vietn4m who justified the destruction of
a contested town by saying, "We must destroy it to save it."
Nor can we accept a return to doing business as usual. The charges are too
serious, the early evidence too compelling, the erosion of public confidence al-
ready too great. The need to uncover the details of what was actually done,
on what scale, for what motives and at wlicise direction is absolutely clear. If
illegal actions took place, they must be prosecpited.
But our investigations should go much farther than the narrow question of
whether the CIA has violated its charter b~ engaging in domestic operations.
They should encompass the entire American intelligence apparatus, including
such gay giants as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the intelligence arms of the
departments of Justice and State.
Congress should seek up-to-date answers to two fundamental questions : What
are the limits to intelligence operations that properly can be mounted by a
democratic society? How can these operations be most efficiently organized and
effectively supervised?
I suspect that ultimately the National Security Act of 1;}47 will be revised.
Such a legislative effort could establish these Forking goals :
To write a new over-all definition of the legitimate functions of the intelli-
gence agencies.
To redefine the jurisdiction of each a.genGy so that it does only what it is
chartered to do.
To create tighter oversight procedures from both Congress and the White
House.
To limit, rather than constantly expand, our intelligence activities. We should
do less, do only what is essential, and do it better.
To separate overt information-gathering elements from the agency conducting
clandestine operations abroad. The result would be a leaner, less distracted
clandestine service, and one more susceptible to careful oversight.
Another proposal worth considering is to change the name of the CIA..
Admittedly, that suggestion is cosmetic, ar~d cosmetics are not enough. But
given the rising suspicion with which the agency is regarded at home, not to
mention the sheer paranoia that it evokes abroad, it probably is time to lay the
old initials to rest.
We might consider rechristening the CIA as the Agency for Foreign Intelli-
gence. The name would be a visible reminder that the agency's mandate is
limited to plowing foreign, not domestic fields.)
And the change itself, backed up by substantive reform, would be evidence
that the United States intends to take a fresh approach to its intelligence
responsibilities.
Chairman RT ITCaFF. Senator Allen?
Senator ALlrN. Thank you, Mr. Chai>man.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALLEN
These hearings are important. They; deal with proposals relating
to the importance and effectiveness of legislative oversight of our
Federal intelligence agencies.
I would take it that the fact that zye are holding these hearings
rather than hearings to abolish outright our foreign and domestic
intelligence activities is recognition by the committee and by the
sponsors of the bills of both the legitirriacy and the necessity of these
functions for our country and our form df Government.
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Rightly or wrongly. sufficient questions have been identified in
thoughtful reports and in what I believe are unthoughtful reports
and in leaks out of the various investigations this past year to make
it clear that the principal point, of this hearing is accountability.
I believe the challenge to this committee is to examine what
accountability involves and whether it can be accomplished in a
manner which facilitates rather than stifles the legitimate activities
of our intelligence agencies.
In examining this question, we must face the central. and overriding
requisite of intelligence. It is secrecy.
Ivithout secrecy. certain legitimate intelligence activities simply
will not succeed. With it. suspicion arises in many minds that it aids
and abets the overstepping of bounds of legitimate intelligence
activities.
Therefore, as we examine. the various proposals to change some 28
years of oversight practice in the Congress and as we evaluate the over-
sight job that has been clone up to now, two considerations are
controlling.
First, do the proposals or the existing conditions contribute con-
structively and sufficiently to the task of assuring, as much as any
congressional committee in our form of government can assure, that
activities do not exceed laws and charters.
Second. that we not operate from a presumption that everything
secret is illegitimate or evil, and thus construct impediments under-
mining the probability of success of those secret intelligence, activities
which are both legitimate and vital to our national interest.
Normally, the responsibilities of Congress in the. area of legislative
oversight involve appropriations, performance, and legislation. Con-
gress has the duty to assure that moneys appropriated are used effec-
tively and efficiently and not squandered. Congress also has the duty
to assure compliance with the letter and spirit of statutes and the
responsibility to pass new laws and amendments as needed.
With respect to intelligence agencies. I think an argument can be
made that oversight committees must take on to themselves a greater
responsibility than most standing committees. This is clearly the ease
if for practical reasons of security the sensitive information available
to the oversight committees is not made available throughout the
entire Congress.
In this fashion, the oversight committees act as surrogates and I
would support, the concept of greater involvement in the workings of
intelligence agencies than is normally the case with other Federal
agencies in order to achieve the accountability that is the basis for our
hearings.
However, I do not think that the relationship between the commit-
tees and the intelligence agencies should be so adjusted from the
norm as to inject the committees fully into the decisionmaking process
in the executive branch. This would strain our. concept of separation
of powers.
Also, I do not believe that congressional committees as constituted
should or could effectively serve a Federal agency as a board of direc-
tors serves a private corporation. Thus, the oversight committees
should not take over and become, for all intents and purposes, the
agencies themselves.
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Whatever the degree of relationship and the resulting freer flow
of sensitive information from the executive to these committees, there
must be a compensating adjustment in the rules of the Congress itself
to stop the dangerous and irresponsible proliferation and leakage of
sensitive information within the Congress. In this respect, account-
ability is a, two-way street.
I think that is one of the most important issues that we are going
to have to face in these committee hearings, how these leaks can be
stopped, how we can stop this wrongful and improper dissemination
of information from the committees and from other sources.
I find it inconceivable that we have laws on the books which penal-
ize the simple willful disclosure of incori.e tax, commodity, or census
information but none which would penalize a similar disclosure of the
identity of a secret agent abroad.
The tragic death of Mr. Richard Wejich has brought home to all
Americans the danger of exposure of CIA operatives. For months,
we have been hearing warnings that di?'closures were harming CIA
effectiveness. These concerns should have tempered those responsible
for the unprecedented flood of allegations against our intelligence
agencies-allegations which in the free tiiiorld are witnessed with dis-
belief and in the Communist world with glee.
I hope that we do not witness other deaths, other grieved families,
or the failure of other brilliant technol~gieal plans before Congress
acts to protect intelligence officers from, international terrorists and
legitimate activities from defeat through disclosure.
In today's world, thousands of nuclear missiles can destroy this
nation and are only 20 minutes away. A wise and judicious use of our
national resources for defense, peace, and negotiations depends in
large measure on current and accurate information from our intel-
ligence agencies.
What we need to do is assure ourselv6s that conscientious and re-
sponsible members oversee the intelligence agencies. These members
must pursue the interests of a strong intelligence capability that per-
forms consistently with our national policy and does not exceed the
scope of its authority. To accomplish these objectives, we must assure
that the laws and charters governing the activities of the agencies
involved are consistent with these objectives.
We must also rectify present procedures and laws which unduly
spread sensitive operational intelligence information throughout Con-
gress and every type of media, and reject proposals, such as an annual
authorization requirement, which would r make it less likely that classi-
fied information can be kept secret.
What we must stop doing is tearing clown the finest intelligence
service which exists in the world and which we desperately need, to-
day, and for the future.
The fundamental principle that ours is a government of laws, not
men, is no mere vapid proverb. Congress' own honor is at stake in
the issue before us today. And so is an essential part of our national
security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RIBTCOFr. Senator Brock?
Senator Brtocx. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will sub-
mit my statement for the record and summkrize.
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Chairman RIBICOFF. Without objection.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROCK
Senator Bi;ocx. This relates to the scope of the hearings themselves,.
which I assume will be slanted toward the scope of the committee,
should it include just CIA activities, all intelligence activities, covert
and so forth. But I hope in that particular discussion the committee
will undertake a more fundamental responsibility, that is, to evaluate
what it is we are trying to do in the long term, whether the Congress
itself as presently structured is capable of engaging in proper over-
sight, whether that requires a more fundamental evaluation of the
Congress and its current committee structure.
Second, to keep very much in mind the fact that with access goes
responsibility, I think it is very easy to legislate ourselves knowledge
in these areas, but we must be prepared to accept the responsibility
that goes with such knowledge.
I have introduced legislation in this area, but I have no particular
pride of authorship except to say that the Congress has a remarkable
opportunity before it to serve this Nation well. It also has an awesome
task in assuring that the process that we create does, in fact, serve the
interests of the Nation, protect our national security, in a fashion to
afford our children an opportunity to live in a world of peace.
I think that is the reference that the Senator from Alabama was
making in regard to what I think are some unfortunate leaks that
have come from both bodies and I hope that will be very much on
our minds while we. undertake this particular task.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you for starting these
hearings on the formation of a new Intelligence Oversight Com-
mittee. I think that we have almost universal agreement that
some kind of new oversight committee is indeed needed in Congress
for us to properly exercise our proper constitutional role.
I anticipate that the thrust of the hearings and the testimony of
the witnesses will be slanted toward the scope of a new committee-
should it include just the CIA activities, all intelligence activities,
covert procedures, et cetera? This is a very important question and one
that I am eager to hear from the witnesses.
However, while scope is important, the events of late have shown
that there is an equally important part of this question of congressional
oversight and that has to do with congressional responsibility. It is
very easy for us to legislate ourselves the knowledge, but we must also
be prepared to accept the responsibility.
This is what I am concerned with today and I am introducing a
bill that will give the new committee the proper safeguards needed to
go along with knowledge it will gain.
Briefly, these safeguards are the following: This shall be a non-
partisan committee consisting of the majority and minority leaders,
plus the chairman and ranking members of appropriations commitee,
armed services, foreign relations, and Government operations com-
mittees. This indirectly solves the problem of the executive branch
having to inform too many committees.
My bill directs that if any member breaks his trust, he will be sus-
pended when charges are brought by at least one member from each
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party. The case will automatically be referred to the Senate standards
committee and disciplinary action shall not exclude expulsion from
the Senate itself.
For release of information, I have the following safeguards : (1)
any report, press release, et cetera, released to the public must be ap-
proved by at least a three-fifths majority! of the committee with at least
two from each party; (2) for material released over the objection of
the administration, a four-fifth vote tivil1 be required including at
least three from each party; in addition, this material must be ap-
proved by the Senate; and (3) for material received, under prior
notification procedures a unanimous vote of the committee will be
required plus a two-thirds vote of the Senate.
Staff safeguards:
(1) None shall be hired without the approval of both the chairman
and the vice chairman;
2) All staffers must have a background investigation ;
(3) Clearances will only be granted with recommendation of the
staff director and approval by both the chairman and vice chairman;
(4) All staffers shall sign a pledge never to divulge material;
.(5) There shall be immediate dismissal for leaks or other indiscre-
tions any time a charge is bought by one member or the staff director ;
(6) Violations of the pledge not to reveal information or for leak-
ing will be punishable by a sentence of up to 20 years and/or a
X100,000 fine.
While my bill does concentrate on safeguards, I am, naturally, con-
cerned about more substantive questions] Therefore, I am directing the
new committee to submit two reports. Oise shall be on the question and
advisability of an overall "intelligence b ldget" and the other is a study
on whether the whole American intelligence community should be
reorganized.
Finally, I have long felt that at lease once a year, the Directors of
the Central Intelligence Agency, Defe ise Intelligence Agency and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be allowed to tell their
story to the American people. Therefore, my bill directs that once a
year they shall submit a public report on communist activities within
their respective areas.
Mr. Chairman, I am not wedded to every period and dotted "I" of
my bill, and I may well change my mind on sections after hearing the
distinguished witnesses. But, I will not change my mind on the fact
that we do need some safeguards and I feel that my bill will be use-
ful as a touchstone in that respect.
Chairman RiBZCOFF. Thank you, Senator Brock.
Senator Nunn?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN
Senator NUNN. I do not have a prepared statement.
Very briefly, I think Senator Allen has- pointed out many of the
problems I see and many of the opportunities we have in these hearings
and in the markup session on this particular legislation.
We have to play a vital role in Congress, as I see it. We also have to
learn to keep secrets.
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I know over and over again since I have been here I have heard about
how well Congress has kept secrets during the last 30 years. But I
would say in the last 3 years that. record leaves a lot to be desired.
I think that we can all point fingers at each other. Here certainly
has been an almost pervasive distrust between the executive branch
and the legislative branch in the last 2 or 3 years. We can talk a lot
about whether the Congress or the executive branch is at fault in
various aspects of our foreign policy.
I think any impartial observer. including the American people,
would have to conclude in the last 18 months that the combination of
what the Congress and the executive branch have done in the field of
intelligence and in the field of foreign policy has not been a good
combination. We can have two superb players on one team, while the
team itself can be a disaster. I think that we have to provide checks
and balances here.
Certainly Congress has a vital role to play. We also, as a committee,
have got to come up with a team approach. It is not enough to try to
point the blame for what is going wrong in foreign policy at the two
branches of government. The final result is whether or not. our foreign
policy in America is working for the benefit of our Nation. I think
that we are in serious difficulties today because of the many events
that have happened in the last 18 months.
Chairman R.IBIconr. Thank you, Senator Nunn.
Senator Weicker?
Senator TEICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The quick response to either threat, or neglect is a great national
trait. Nobody makes up lost ground faster than America. In so doing,
we sometimes go off the rocker with as much determination as we sat
in it.
When it comes to intelligence gathering and law enforcement, it
is time to stop the pendulum in midswing.
De facto immunity from accountability granted the FBI, CIA,
and so forth, by Presidents, Congressmen and the public is unconstitu-
tional.
Smearing everything CIA or FBI is nuts.
Congressional and Presidential failure to reform is hypocritical.
I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that the year is 1976. The year
was 1973 when the Congress and the President and the public knew
that these various agencies had overstepped their bounds. We have had
3 years of sound and fury, and no action.
The United States needs effective constitutional intelligence and
law enforcement. It is my suggestion that we clean up their act and
get on with it.
Chairman RmicoFF. Senator Glenn?
Senator GLENN. I have a statement that repeats some of the concerns
already expressed by other members of the committee today. I would
like to submit it for the record.
Chairman RIBICOFF. Without objection.
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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GLENN
Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, My statement will be brief. I concur
with the other members of the committee in the importance of our
effort to provide effective oversight of intelligence operations. The
issues we will be considering raise some basic but difficult questions of
which I hope we will be mindful during our deliberations and to which
I hope we might help find answers.
Public concern and debate in recent months relating to the U.S.
intelligence establishment has centered around such basic questions
as : what should we be doing or should we not be doing; who should
be doing it; and to whom should they be responsible?
An intelligence capability is necessary for the security of our Nation
and I would want the capability to be the best and most efficient
possible, but at the same time such capability must be consonant with.
the constitutional principles of our Government. The role of an intel-
ligence establishment and secrecy in a democratic society is not an easy
question to answer but nevertheless one of which we must be mindful.
In giving the powers necessary to have an effective intelligence ca-
pability, we in the leg islative branch must remember that such power
must have a check, which is why the oversight function of Congress
is a great responsibility.
The committee has the task of determining the most effective meth-
ods of congressional oversight of intelligence operations. We are for-
tunate to have the guidance of such a distinguished panel of witnesses
in considering the legislative proposals before us. We should give close
attention to the recommendations of the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence Activities, chaired by Senator Church, which has investigated
problems and abuses connected with intelligence activities. It is now
the responsibility of the Committee on Government Operations to go
forth with the recommendations and to try to solve problems brought
to our attention by the select committee.
I would only like to add to that statement that our purpose today
must be to strike, the balance that is necessary to maintain a strong
intelligence capability within our constitutional Government.
We need a strong intelligence gathering operation. Along with
many other people in this room, I am sitting here today alive because
of some of the intelligence gathering apparatus we have had in the
past in this country. In the future, that may well apply, not just to
some of those who represented their country in various efforts in the
past, but may apply to all of our Nation. It may apply to hundreds
of millions of people around the world. It is that important.
In fact, the survival of our whole Nation may well revolve around
what we do with regard to setting up the intelligence apparatus of
this country, or char es we make in it.
It is the balance between that necessity and the prevention of ex-
cesses of the sort that I think we would all agree are un-American and'
unconstitutional, that we are trying to set today.
Ours is a Government of checks and balances. We are trying to
determine the proper check as a part of that checks and balances today.
Congress represents the concerns of the people, and it is our responsi-
bility to strike that balance. That really concerns me.
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We do not want to destroy the intelligence apparatus. For that mat-
ter, it might be found necessary at some point even to expand it. The
security and the constitutional rights of everyone in this country are
our responsibility. It is the difficulties involved in striking that balance
that is essential today.
Chairman RIBICOFF. Senator Mansfield, 20 years ago you tried to
set up a separate committee to oversee the CIA and the Senate did not
heed you for 20 years. We are finally catching up with your thinking
20 years late.
We would be honored to have your views now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MIKE MANSFIELD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MONTANA
Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee.
What the chairman just said is true. When I introduced the resolu-
tion, I believe I had 53 sponsors. When the oligarchs got through with
me, we only had 28 votes to bring about the creation of a joint com-
mittee on intelligence.
I hope that lesson will be remembered, and I hope also what has
a-one on before will not be forgotten as we look to the future, because
I agree with the chairman that it is not so much the past that counts
now, because what has happened cannot be undone. It is the future
which is of importance.
These hearings coincide with the concluding days of the Select
Committee's investigation into illegal, improper, or unethical activities
conducted by the Nation's intelligence community.
May I say that I am very proud of the way the Senate Select Com-
mittee has conducted its hearings. They were given a most difficult job.
They were subject to all kinds of attack. innuendos, and allegations.
There have been no leaks out of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
and I want the record to show that, because I think that we ought to
give support and commendation to our colleagues who undertook this
arduous task and did so well under the most difficult of circumstances.
I have been much impressed with the unanimity of the Church-
Tower committee. with the conduct of the membership as a whole,
and I hope that such unanimity will continue and that this committee
and our colleagues in the Senate will give full and due consideration
to the recommendations which will be made from firsthand contact by
this committee in the immediate future.
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, as we learn about and begin to under-
stand some of these revelations regarding the way intelligence opera-
tions are conducted, it becomes apparent that what the American
people knew before were but dim shadows of our intelligence establish-
inent-shadows which were cast only from time to time. For most of
its, the community itself remains as it had before, cloaked in mystery.
Iiere.tofore, that was so because Congress largely chose to ignore it.
It will continue a mystery, however, unless and until Congress chooses
to change its policy and to exert some degree of scrutiny and viggil-
ance, to perform some measure of oversight, to extract a commitment
of ongoing accountability. The excesses of our intelligence community
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now so familiar to us all are a direct result of congressional neglect
and inattention.
What is to be remembered in the context of these hearings and any
forthcoming recommendations, however, is the essential necessity for
a strong, vital, and highly competent intelligence gathering facility
within the Nation. What is not to be forgotten for a moment is the
outstanding work to date performed by the CIA, the NSA, the FBI,
and all the rest of the elements that make up the intelligence
community.
That is not to say that there is no compelling need for vigilence and
accountability. Supervision and responsiveness are the only ways we
might avoid as much as possible the recurrence of past strains against
our constitutional system.
The initial question then is whether there is to be any oversight
facility concerning the intelligence community within the Senate.
That question for me personally does not need extensive comment.
Even without recent investigations it was clear that congressional
awareness of intelligence activities had been inadequate.
Either unable, unwilling, ill-equipped, or otherwise, the Senate
certainly has not performed this essential function. It could be said
that we as elected representatives under this form of government
simply have not performed as we should have performed. We have
been inexcusably lax.
Now is not the time, nor is this the place to assess blame, to cite
responsibility, or to lay bare these deficiencies of the past. Nor indeed
was it the Senate alone that failed. But the failure is there nonetheless,
cumulatively but unmistakedly.
It is there in terms of the abuse, in terms of the waste and ineffi-
ciency, in terms of outright assults against freedom and individual
liberty.
Intelligence is necessary. It is necessary, essential, right, and appro-
priate. But neither is that an issue before this committee.
In the past in America the intelligence function has been a corner-
stone to national survival, manned, in my judgment, by the most
competent, effective, and dedicated individuals ever assembled.
In the context of the world as it is and as it will no doubt continue,
intelligence gathering will remain a vital support to the Nation. No
one seriously questions that proposition.
What you are considering, Mr. Chairman and members of this
committee, is oversight, or awareness, or watchfulness, all reflecting
the appropriate role of the legislative body within the framework of
American. democracy.
To be sure, there will be cries of meddling, or wrongful intrusion,
of so-called politics.
Already they are heard in the corridors outside and even in the
press, and they have been made against the committee that has done
an outstanding job in pursuing this inquiry for the last several
months.
Be steadfast, I suggest, Mr. Chairman and members of this commit-
tee. Be steadfast in your efforts to recommend to the Senate a facility
that will provide regular, comprehensive, and systematic oversight
regarding the Nation's intelligence function.
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Those cries were heard before and they prevailed. They served to
obstruct the role of this institution only to misdirect it or mislead it
at times in pursuit of ill-advised and misguided policies both at home
and abroad.
As you know, my own efforts to create a more consistent and com-
prehensive approach to intelligence oversight by the Senate goes back
more than a decade.
The reasons for niy past concern, may I say, have been amply justi-
fied recently in terms of the task undertaken this past year by the
Church-Tower committee.
Those reasons are diverse-as diverse as intelligence operations
themselves; operations which are scattered among and between a
dozen or more agencies, bureaus, and departments.
CIA, as this committee knows, undertakes only a fragment of the
total intelligence activities of the U.S. Government.
There are NSA, DIA, the Bureau of Intelligence within the State
Department, Treasury's Office of National Security, ERDA, the Air
Force intelligence unit, G--2, in the Army, the Marine Corps, naval
intelligence and then the dozen or so agencies that cover domestic
intelligence including FBI, DEA. IRS, and so forth.
Within this intelligence thicket have arisen unneeded overlaps and
duplication of effort, goals, and achievements. To reshuffle and re-
structure them will take more than the immediate task this committee
assumes.
They do explain a small aspect of the problem. however. The history
of effective coordination is as uneven as the history of the growth
of the intelligence community itself and the changing cast of officials
within the differing lines of authority charged with administering it.
Then too, there is the question of Federal agencies directing actions
against individual U.S. citizens in clear violation of the spirit if not
the letter of the Constitution. This is only another aspect of the prob-
lem. But it should also be open to some form of Senate scrutiny.
And in connection with overlap and duplication, what about the
effective use of intelligence reports? Within the various components.
of the intelligence community there often have existed differing con-
clusions about a given set of facts or events.
In helping to formulate national policy should we in the Senate
not have the benefit of the various reactions within the intelligence
community to a problem facing the Nation? After all, we are charged
with the welfare of this nation' and we have to answer to our people,
unlike so many others in this Government who do not.
Admittedly, global conflict at times seems to pounce on us as a Na-
tion but the lesson of Vietnam stands also as a reminder of an infor-
mation and assessment hiatus that in my judgment assisted the mis-
direction, misapplication, and imprudent commitment of U.S. re-
sources and manpower.
By the same token, let us remember that Angola stands immediately
before us with the Middle East as always on the horizon.
Delicate indeed does this become when we speak of covert actions
employed to influence events. It is not that they should be abandoned.
It is rather that their purpose be measured with more care than
previously demanded against the vital interests of the United States.
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15
It means too that effective awareness of them be extended to this in.
stitution in advance of their execution.
Beyond these issues there is the question of fitting together the
Nation's intelligence components from the standpoint of external
threats vis-a-vis actions occurring within our national boundaries
which tend to serve them or to aid or assist them.
Such an oversight mandate must, therefore, include the capacity to
accommodate an integrated perception of national intelligence-
not foreign intelligence, not domestic intelligence-but national
intelligence.
Certainly, there are additional issues that would justify an intel-
ligence oversight function or mandate by the Senate. But, as I per-
ceive the task of your committee, Mr. Chairman, with the rationale
already there, the endeavor now is to design a Senate facility capable
of doing the job while at the same time safeguarding the most vital
secrets of the Nation. By that I mean matters the exposure of which
would threaten our very survival.
How do I see such a facility? Its shape? Its functions? Its form?
In part I have explained it already, but I would like to add some
further comments.
First of all, should it be a Senate facility. Yes. I have indicated
that.
What the House does is up to the, House. It has undertaken its own
special intelligence investigation this past year and may arrive at
differing conclusions on where to go from here in the context of its
own constitutional responsibility.
But, in my mind, it is clear from the Constitution, from the laws
and the history of this Nation that the Senate is assigned a unique
and special role in foreign affairs.
To more effectively perform that role in behalf of the American
people, the Senate must create every agency and facility needed to do
the job. Intelligence oversight is needed. To do that job, a facility
must be created.
As a body, the full Senate cannot do it and to date no existing com-
mittees have done it. As a result, in my own experience over the years,
I along with the Senate have suffered a significant deficiency both as
to the awareness of the intelligence apparatus and operation and the
information gathered and assessed therein.
What about the charter? I think it should be sufficiently broad to
encompass all major intelligence organizations. Directly under it,
therefore, should at least come the activities of CIA, NSA, DSA, cer-
tain endeavors of DOD and the counterintelligence undertakings of
the FBI.
While it thus should be broad enough to invite the most generous
scrutiny of the intelligence community in the Senate's behalf, it need
not limit or preclude the normal delegated jurisdictional bases of
other standing committees.
In some cases, in fact, there is a great deal to be said for a little
competition. But no committee, no agency of the Senate has exercised
complete vigilence over such obvious questions, for example, as intel-
ligence coordination.
No committee heretofore has analyzed on a continuing basis the on-
going activities of each of the intelligence components, related their
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activities to each other or fitted them together into an integrated
whole. Overlapping duplication, swollen and inefficient budgets and
so forth may or may not be in the interests of this Nation. Only by
vigilence and understanding, however, can such judgments be made.
And what about the issue of unconstitutional operations against
citizens of the United States by an intelligence apparatus?
For these, there have existed few, if any, remedies in the past. what
remedies there have been were inadequate at best. Oversight coupled
with a mechanism that assures accountability would go far in my
judgment to preserve notions of individual liberty that we cherish so
deeply, or at least we say we do.
Of particular sensitivity is the question of budget analysis with
respect to intelligence operations. But oversight per se would
seem to dictate that such a function be included within any man-
date established.
In the past we have been put off in this area with urgings that
there have been no hearings, no investigations and so forth.
The investigations have occurred, hearings have been held and it is
time I think that. we carve out a rational way to perform a simple
authorizing function on an annual basis.
Such a function is essential to the question of accountability. Per-
haps a line-item approach would not be in order granting the nature
of many of the activities involved but aggregate sums certainly reveal
little, if any, of our intelligence story that is not already known to the
world.
As I recall, atomic and nuclear expenditures are handled in similar
fashion.
Beyond an annual authorization, however, such a committee must
be kept informed on a continuing basis of all major activities and
plans.
Overall, it must be equipped with appropriate tools to assure such
responsiveness. But while subpenas, compliance and contempt pro-
cedures and the like should be made available, the emphasis in this
area must be on cooperation with the Executive and that too should
be spelled out in any charter along with appropriate measures to
require that cooperation be a two-way street.
It seems to me that a primary concern here is to assure that national
policy formulated largely by and within the legislative branch is not
to be overturned, undercut or frustrated in its execution and
implementation.
The initial burden of coming forward by necessity would fall on
the agency or agencies involved and in turn it would be the responsi-
bility of the committee as the Senate's agent to keep the Senate ad-
vised in an appropriate manner keeping in mind the relative impor-
tance and sensitivity of whatever issue happens to be at stake.
Standards and safeguards regarding disclosure may be in order but
it has always been my conviction that Senators are. equal, ever,- single
one of them, that there are. no super Senators, that no Member
elected to serve in this institution exceeds any other in terms of
patriotism, of loyalty or of dedication to the letter and spirit of the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.
It, is. in fact., for this reason that I believe that the membership
on the Intelligence. Committee should be rotated.
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A limitation of 6 or 8 years of consecutive service on the commit-
tee would guarantee the vigilant inquiry that a fresh mind brings to
any problem.
It would avoid the possible danger of establishing the client rela-
tionship that could otherwise and has so easily occurred. Also, it would
provide in time a significant foundation upon which the Senate as
a whole might confidently adjudge the recommendations of its agent,
the committee.
Otherwise, I would apply the same standards as are imposed upon
the other standing committees in terms of composition, selection, mem-
bership, staffing, the election of chairman, and whatnot save only
that the sensitive nature of its tasks requires that additional precau-
tions be taken just as they are by the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy and just as they have been this past year by the Select Intelli-
gence Committee of the Senate.
One final. comment, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
While these views reflect and expand upon my public critique of the
work and recommendations of the Commission on the Organization
of the Government, the so-called Murphy Commission, with respect to,
the establishment of an intelligence committee, I would caution you
and this committee concerning an aspect of this issue insofar as the-
involvement of Congress and the Senate is concerned.
I served on that Commission and my views on its performance are
rather well known. What I wish to say is that there is some risk in cre-
ating any committee in this area.
What I would not want to see happen; indeed, what would be coun-
terproductive would be a committee cloaked only with apparent im-
portance, manned by some elite few who gained admission outside the
normal selection process, centralized and aloof, and in the end so im-
potent that it would itself become a creature if not an active conspira-
tor within the community over which it must exert scrutiny.
Make it independent. Give it the tools and power to protect that.
independence.
. Above all, make certain that it responds to the Senate and to the
Senate alone,
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for the
opportunity to, appear.
Chairman RIBICOFr. Thank you for your most valuable statement,
Senator Mansfield.
Senator Mansfield, do you think that through a new committee it is
possible to reconcile the principles of democracy and openness with
the operation of a secret intelligence program ?
Senator MANSFIELD. Yes; although I believe it would be curbed to a
degree by the very nature of the responsibility.
Chairman Rzsicorr. With any new committee that is established, the
prime responsibility really in choosing the membership upon the part
of the majority will be yours. On what basis do you think the mem-
bership of the new committee should be selected?
Senator MANSFIELD. Certainly not on seniority alone, and I gave
a good deal of thought to the selection of the Democratic members of
the Church-Tower committee. For my par in that selection process,
what I tried to do was bring about a mix based on philosophy, geogra-
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phy, and the like, among the members of that committee, and I think
that they have lived up fully to all the expectations that I had antici-
pated of them, as did the members of the Watergate Committee, who
were likewise appointed after due consideration and thorough thought,
so that I would like to see, as I mentioned, a committee on which mem-
bers are rotated, where a member could serve no more than 6 or 8
years. It could just as easily be 4 to 6. I want to see younger members
placed on these committees; I do not want to see them hibernating in
the background. I want their fresh thoughts to be put to use so that
we can have the benefit of their thinking. They are closer to the people
than those of us who have been here for more years. They are more
aware of the needs of the people, and they have contributions to make
and they are just as competent, just as loyal, just as patriotic, just as
dedicated as those of us who have served in this body for a number of
years.
So I would like to get a, mix of all sections of the Senate. I would
like to do away with the doctrine of seniority as far as this committee
is concerned, really, as far as all committees are concerned, although
seniority is not as bad a procedure as some people think. But to put
it bluntly, I want to reiterate that I believe every Senator is equal,
every Senator, regardless of where he comes from, how he votes, what
his philosophy is, and I would operate on that basis to the end that a
mix would be made out of the whole Senate in the creation of a com-
mittee as far as the majority party would be concerned. I think these
matters could be handled through the usual channel with initial rec-
ommendations made by the Parties Steering Committees.
Chairman RinicoFF. Senator Mansfield, in your position as majority
leader, you are aware of committee jealousies and prerogatives. What
oversight function should be shared by a new oversight committee and
the committees now exercising oversight?
Which functions should be given exclusively to the new committee ?
How are we going to reconcile those jurisdictional difficulties?
Senator MANSFIELD. That is something that this committee which
I am addressing now will have to work out along with the full Senate.
Under the present charter, of course, the Armed Services Committee
in the Senate has primary jurisdiction. Under the present procedure,
I believe under the law, the CIA, for example-and let me digress a
moment. I hate to set the CIA by itself, because it is not the ogre, as
it has been painted; it is only a part of the intelligence community-
frankly, it has been right more often than it has been given credit for,
and I refer back to certain findings and statements made during the
course of the tragic war in Southeast Asia.
But at the present time, under the law, to reiterate, it reports to
six committees: Appropriations, which has a small subcommittee;
Armed Services, which has a small subcommittee; and Foreign Rela-
tions, which committee has delegated to the chairman and the ranking
minority Member the right to act for the full committee in its relations
with CIA specifically.
I think that a reasonable modus operandi could be worked out inso-
far as the Armed Services Committee is concerned because under its
original charter it has primary jurisdiction.
I think that there would have to be a subcommittee at least in the
Appropriations Committee because of the matter of funding. I do not
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think that it would be necessary for the Foreign Relations Committee
to be a third committee to be reported to if a standing committee is
created, because the membership of that committee would come from
other committees, and I daresay that there would possibly be one or
two on it from the Foreign Relations Committee-just guessing out
loud.
But the techniques, the details, are going to be up to the committee
now conducting these hearings after listening to the witnesses to exer-
cise its own best judgment as to what it would recommend in the way
of reshaping jurisdictions.
Chairman RIBicorr. The committee will run on the 10 minute ques-
tioning rule during the Senate hearings.
One final question. You state, Senator Mansfield, in your prepared
statement, that new committees should have budget authority over in-
telligence agencies. Which agencies do you have in mind? Do you be-
lieve such authority is essential if the new committee oversight efforts
are to really be effective?
Senator MANSFIELD. I think so.
As I have indicated, it is not necessarily by line item but certainly
overall it should have a picture of what is developing and an under-
standing of how these funds will be used by the major intelligence
agencies and a recognition that some matters cannot just be made
public.
Chairman Rinicorr. Thank you very much.
Senator Percy?
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, a procedural question.
I thought the Senators who are testifying were operating as a panel
and that each Senator would give his statement at the beginning. I
wonder if we could advise our colleagues when they should be pre-
pared to give their testimony so that they might perform other
functions?
Chairman Rinicorr. The problem that we have is that the majority
leader, who was supposed to testify last, and was taken before Senators
Church and Tower because of Senator Mansfield's other duties. Sena-
tors Church and Tower kindly agreed to have Senator Mansfield give
his testimony first so that he could return to his other duties.
Senator PERCY. I wonder if we could all limit ourselves to 5 minutes
now? Would that be acceptable, so that we can get to our other
witnesses?
Chairman RIBICOFT. Without objection, we will limit it to 5 minutes.
Senator PERCY. Senator Mansfield, I would like to say first on my
time that I think your statement is clairvoyant. It is a challenging
statement and a fine start for these hearings.
I originally felt a joint committee would be best, of the House and
the Senate, feeling that we should try to conserve the energy and time
of all the agencies to be overseen.
I since have changed my mind.
Senator Mansfield, you are for a separate committee of the Senate.
Could you amplify why you think that should be done, to reinforce
my own intuition that it should be that way?
Senator MANSFIELD. I would be glad to.
I originally thought that a joint committee would be the best way
to operate and the model would have been the Joint Committee on
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Atomic Energy. However, when the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence was created, I did establish contact with the House to see if
their committee would not work with ours so that we could have a
joint committee. The answer was in the negative, so I have come out
for a Senate committee. ,
If the House wants to, it of course can become a part of a joint com-
mittee, but the decision would have to be theirs and I do not think that
we ought to lolligag too long along the way.
Senator YEuoY. Senator Mansfield, do you feel that the Senate com-
mittee should have the right of veto over an intelligence operation to
be carried out by the CIA or any other intelligence agency'? Should we
become part and parcel of any action undertaken by them or should we
only look at it after it has been accomplished?
Senator MANSFIELD. I do not like to use the word "veto," but I think
a Senate committee should be in on the takeoff, to use an oldtime war
phrase, that it should work in cooperation with not only the agency
concerned, but with the administration. If it differs, it should make its
views known ahead of time to the agency and to the administration
so that if, despite the judgment of the Senate committee representing
the whole Senate an operation of that nature went ahead, it would at
least have made its position clear, and I think there should be a pro-
cedure to report to the Senate within a time period-- -say 30 days.
Senator PERCY. Finally, (1o you feel that covert operations should be
carried on by the U.S. Government, and, if so, should they be separated
front intelligence gathering in the Central Intelligence Agency how-
ever it is restructured ?
Senator MANSFIELD. To be carried on, they should be carried on by
the CIA.
I do think that they have been carried out to an extreme. They ought
to be limited. I do not think they should fall into patterns that are just
followed automatically.
For example, the $6 million that supposedly is being sent to anti-
Communist parties in Italy-and I use the word "automatically"
deliberately, because I recall the beginning of these payments. in 1948
and I am assuming that they have been used in all the intervening
years.
If so, it is a covert procedure that has outlived its usefulness and
at this time, it should be abolished, because it is counterproductive.
Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RrBico r. Thank you, Senator Percy.
Senator Allen?
Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mansfield, I certainly commend you on Your statement and
I commend you on your expertise in this area. I know of the strong
convictions that you entertain with respect to our foreign policy and
our various foreign aid programs.
I appreciate the counsel that you have given the committee today.
Carryin Senator Percv's line of ouestioning one step further.
would it be the function of the Oversight Committee to be established
in its oversight responsibility if it saw the need of a covert activity in
the
a. foreign country to direct the intelligence a.geney-in this ease,
CIA-to conduct that. operation, or would it merely review and pass
upon the suggested activities of the agency?
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In other words, would the committee initiate activity, or have that
power?
Senator MANSFIELD. 'Na, I do not think it should have that power,
because it does not have the expertise or the knowledge.
Senator ALLEN. All it would do is review from the start any
activity proposed by the agency?
Senator MANSFIELD. That is correct.
The agency, contrary to its present practice, should keep the com-
mittee fully informed rather than operate on a haphazard schedule
as it does at the present time, giving to the committees what they think
the committees want to hear.
I am referring to the three subcommittees in the Senate, and I
cannot fault the CIA for that, but I do fault the members of those
committees-and I happen to have served on those committees-be-
cause we have not raised the pertinent questions that we should have,
and we have not tried to delve into the matter of intelligence gathering,
coordination, or whatnot.
So I want to say, while the CIA-and undoubtedly other intelli-
gence agencies-have many faults, that the Congress has a good many
faults as well..
Senator ALLEN. Now, on the matter of revolving membership on any
new Oversight 'Committee because of the fact that they might become
more or less inbred on the committee, what about the staff which
directs the operations of many of our committees in practice? Would
you rotate them as well?
Senator MANSFIELD. O'h, yes. I had not thought of that question in
any great detail, but therein could lie, perhaps, the danger to -a com-
mittee, because in all too many senatorial committees, the staff becomes
all too dominant and they are the ones that lay down policy, and in
some instances the Senators are the ones who follow what they lay
down, so that they should be treated no better; they should not be
given permanent tenure.
That raises the most serious question. If you operate on that basis
and they cannot look forward to permanent tenure, how will they be
able to protect the national interests once they leave the committee?
Senator ALLEN. That would be something to consider and work out.
Now, on the matter of separate oversight committees in the House
and the Senate, if the House chooses to go that way, suppose the
Senate committee vetoes, you might say, an activity, and the House
said go ahead. Would you not then run into conflict with the House?
Senator MANSFIELD. That is correct. All a Senate committee can do
is speak for the Senate and not for the Congress.
Senator ALLEN. Could they veto it? Would each one have the power
of veto as we have on some of these changes of rules and so forth?
Senator MANSFIELD. Senator, that is why this committee is holding
hearings at this time.
Senator ALLEN. Thank you.
One further question. Will this be a major committee under the
Senate rules?
Senator MANSFIELD. Certainly.
Senator ALLEN. Which would forbid any Senator serving on that
committee from serving on another major committee ?
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Senator MANSFIELD. It would be a major committee and we would
have to, the joint leadership through their respective steering com-
mittees, would have to work out a schedule by means of which that
situation could be met, faced up to, and overcome.
Senator ALLEN. As Senator Church said, if he went on this com-
mittee, in all likelihood he would have to come oft' Foreign Relations;
it that correct?
Senator MANSFIELD. That I could not say.
Senator ALLEN. This would be a major committee.
Senator MANSFIELD. I do not think he can come off Foreign Rela-
tions because it will not be so long before he will be the chairman of
that committee.
Senator ALLEN. Speaking as a colleague of the distinguished chair-
man of the committee, Senator Sparkman, I hope it will be many
years.
Senator MANSFIELD. I hope it will be many years too. What I am
pointing out is that he is second in line.
Senator ALLEN. I thank you.
Chairman RISrcoFF. Senator Brock?
Senator BROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator, I particularly appreciate your statement and agree with it.
I would like to ask you to draw on your experience and your capacity
as majority leader to think with me out loud for a moment on the
complications that will arise with a separate standing committee, to
pose this question to you.
You are aware of our colleague's Senator Humphrey's, efforts to
create a permanent standing committee on national security. I wonder
if-I know this committee does not have that particular jurisdiction,
but it is going to be very difficult for us to consider this question with-
out considering the kind of question that Senator Allen was just ask-
ing, the complications that will arise in terms of service, jurisdictional
conflicts, and so forth.
I wonder if you might comment for me, at least, on the prospects or
possibility of some more fundamental Senate reorganization that
would allow perhaps a more focused look at intelligence as a part, not
a distinct component on its own, but as a part of our total national
security needs or policy?
Senator MANSFIELD. Well, I think that national security entails a
good deal more than national intelligence.
Senator BROCK. I understand that.
Senator MANSFIELD. I would prefer to confine my suggestion to a
committee on intelligence rather than a committee on security, because
there you get into another donneybrook and perhaps a worse one in
the relationship of a committee of that nature with the Committee on
Armed Services, for example, perhaps the Committee on Foreign
Relations, perhaps the Committee on Government Operations, which
has an all-encompassing mandate as far as their responsibilities are
concerned.
I could not answer that question, because I do not know what the
answer would be. If it ever came to a showdown, the decision would
have to be made first by the Rules Committee.
Senator BROCK. I understand that, and obviously, I agree. I think
my frustration comes from our inability to get the Senate even to
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study the question of Senate committees themselves and their jurisdic-
tion, That is not the point I am trying to raise.
I am trying to look down the road at the problems that will arise
with the budget question, for example, if armed services feel very
strongly that the budget approved by the Intelligence Committee is
inadequate because it does not adequately provide for national defense.
It seems as though we have at least the possibility of really significant
splintering of our effort in the Senate, not just conflict in jurisdiction,
but maybe a less-than-adequate oversight itself on the part of both
because of the competition between the two.
That does trouble me. I am very much bothered by it. I am not sure
I personally know yet how to resolve the matter.
Senator MANSFIELD. All of the questions raised so far have been
difficult, if not impossible to answer, and that is an indication of the
complexity of the problem which confronts this committee and the
difficulty that you are going to have in trying to find answers, but if
it is a matter of budget, I can only say that I am thankful that we
have a Budget Committee now that may be able to act as an arbiter
or an umpire in a budget dispute between two committees if the other
one is created, if it should ever arise.
Senator BROCK. Again, I appreciate your testimony very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rmrco . Senator Glenn?
Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mansfield, in your statement, I agree with you com-
pletely on the need for a national intelligence oversight, which you
stress. When you mention some of the areas that might come under an
oversight committee-and on page 5 of your testimony, you indicated
a much broader scope than you did on page 10-when you cite the
authority that the committee would have.
Was this intentional, or did you mean that we would have all intelli-
gence oversight functions coming under this committee?
On page 5 you listed NSA, DIA, Bureau of Intelligence within the
State Department, Treasury, National Security Administration,
ERDA, Air Force Intelligence, G-2 in each of the services and a
dozen or so. agencies that cover domestic intelligence including the
FBI, DEA, IRS, and so forth. Later on, in the special mandate for the
committee, you narrow that down considerably.
It would seem to me that with a national intelligence approach to
this, we would have to encompass almost everything. Is that your
intent?
Senator MANSFIELD. That is correct.
On both pages 5 and 10 I left out a number of intelligence agencies,
bureaus, and offices, I think the intent was clear that it would be all-
inclusive.
For example, I did not mention, I believe the Atomic Energy Com-
mission has an intelligence set-up. There are various others.
Senator GLENN. Would it be your opinion that this would be a man-
ageable thing with a dozen or so different groups which an oversight
committee would be required to deal with.,. or do you think the execu-
tive branch would have to reorganize th one major intelligence-
gathering organization or a "Czar" under which all the rest of these
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agencies would come in order to make it a manageable situation for the
Congress?
Senator MANSFIELD. The latter.
I believe, for example, you have in the Department of Defense foul,
or maybe five, different intelligence operations. The Defense Intelli-
gence Agency was brought into operation, as I recall, to take the place
of the various service intelligence operations. The service operations
are still there, the DIA is still there. It has increased its activity.
What you have is a hodge-podge which I think can be cut down
considerably. You have to have some agency which will coordinate, as-
similate, assess information.. That I understand is the responsibility
of the CIA. I am not at all sure that CIA exercises that function. If it
does, I am not at all sure that this recommendation gives them the con-
sideration that it should.
Senator GLENN. In the area of authorization, which you indicate
you would provide for the committee, would you also propose that
the Senate take the additional, although unusual, step giving ap-
propriating authority to this committee, separate from the normal
Appropriations Committee?
Senator MANSFIELD. No.
I think that is a dangerous step to take. We did that in the legisla-
tion authorizing revenue sharing, and at the same time that we passed
the authorizing, legislation, the Finance Committee, as the dis-
tinguished chairman of this committee will recall, was also responsible
for the appropriation, and 5 years of appropriations were passed with
the authorizing legislation.
There was a struggle between the Appropriations and Finance Com-
mittees. The Senate upheld the Finance Committee, but I think it is a
very bad practice, even though I am a member of the Appropriations
Committee and took no part in the debate. I think that the authority,
the main responsibility of the Appropriations Committee, should be
maintained and not transferred to the legislative committee.
Senator Gr.ENN. What concerns me is that some of these things that
will be discussed in the oversight committee will be extremely sensitive
matters which might be the subject of much debate by the committee
in their consideration of an authorizing bill. They might deal with
covert activities, things like this.
Once we expand that same type of information into the Appropria-
tions Committee staff and into other staffs, Nye proliferate the danger
of this being public knowledge. That is the reason that I brought it
uWould you care to comment on how you think that could be handled?
Senator MANSFIELD. You have a good point there, but the Appropria-
tions Committee would be concerned primarily with funding. Where
the standing committee-if it is created-would be concerned with
policies and actions to be undertaken so I think there is a line of demar-
cation there that ought to be considered. Although you have raised a
fine point, again, I will pass the buck on this to this committee, because
you are the ones that will have to make the initial decisions.
Senator GLENN. It is very difficult for me to see how the Appropria-
tions Committee can really carry out their proper function, to pass a
judgment on what a proper level should be unless it is provided much
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of the same information. Otherwise it would be an automatic rubber-
stamp of the authorizing process of the oversight committee.
Senator MANSFILLD. They have not inquired too deeply into matters
that should have been their concern at the time. They meet with the
CIA and ask for the justification of their funds, so it would not bring
about a change of policy as far as the Appropriations Committee is
concerned, because it does' not go into it that deeply at the present time.
Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, I believe that my time is up. I re-
gret that it's necessary to have this 5 minute limit. I would hope that
we could have Senator Mansfield's expertise again before we conclude
these hearings, because lie is such a key witness, with his long
experience.
Chairman Rrisrcorr. Thank you, Senator Glenn.
Senator Weicker?
Senator WLrcIc n. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mansfield, I think that is a superb statement. I am in 100
percent agreement with every aspect of it.
I just have two questions.
I would like to, by referring to a passage in your testimony, dispose
of one of the scare tactics that is employed by those who are opposed to
the type of legislation that I have introduced, that being that any such
oversight would lessen national security and would diminish our
capabilities.
I notice in your statement that you state what is to be remembered
in the. context of these hearings is that any forthcoming recommenda-
tion is the essential necessity for a strong, vital and highly compe-
tent intelligence gathering facility within the Nation.
I am sure these same people that say that we would lessen our in-
telligence capability were probably opposed to the Armed Services
Committee when we first set it up. That national defense would be far
better run if it did not have congressional supervision.
I wonder if you might not comment on this point, that, in fact, we
could probably achieve better intelligence with oversight than with
the way the situation now stands and to try to dispose of those who
are entering the fear of the intrusion of national security.
Senator MANSFIErn. It is my feeling that we could achieve better
intelligence at less cost and with less manpower.
May I say, when I first advanced the idea of a joint committee to
oversee the activities of the CIA, I did so because I wanted to protect
the CIA in case it was unjustly accused. This was fought by the
CIA-Mr. Allen Dulles and others-because they did not want their
reservation infringed on, they wanted complete independence, they
wanted to do what they thought had to be done without hindrance
and certainly without any consultation with a congressional
committee.
They were able to win because they had the hierarchs in the Senate
in their pockets, so to speak, and they were just as loathe to change
as the CIA was to face up to change.
It appears to me that a committee, either single or either Senate or
joint, would be beneficial, would bring about a better degree of trust
between the representatives of the people, the elected representatives
of the people and the appointed officials of the intelligence agencies.
I think that it could function without much in the way of leaks.
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May I state, in about the same year or the year before that the
Joint Atomic Energy Committee was created in 1946 or 1947 that in
ears of its existence there has been only one leak, by
the almost 30 years-
the late Senator Ed Johnson of Colorado, and that was very, very
minor, and you have had all kinds of people on that committee. They
have conducted themselves well, and they established a good relation-
ship with the Commission itself.
The same thing could happen in relation to the CIA and other ele-
ments of the intelligence community.
Senator WEICKER. Thank ,you very much, Senator.
My last question is this. You indicated when you first introduced
your legislation 10 years ago that it was actually nibbled to death,
either by the bureaucracy or those opposed, and sort of died.
Senator Baker and I introduced ours 3 years ago. It has been nib-
bled to death. Nothing has happened on it.
I wonder if it is the intention of the Democratic leadership to try
to push for this legislation in this session of the Congress? Is that the
intention of the leadership?
I would hope it is. I would certainly join with you. I have the
same fear that you obviously experienced and I experienced and I ani
sure everybody in the CIA and the FBI hopes this eventually will
go away and blow away and we will be right back to square one.
Right now as a practical matter, is this a priority item for this
session of Congress to pass?
Senator MANSFIELD. It is and it has been, but the leadership can do
nothing until this committee acts and the Rules Committee acts, and
this committee cannot until it hears its witnesses and gets the recom-
mendations of the chairman and vice-chairman, Senators Church and
Tower, of the select committee.
Senator WEICTEP.. It is your hope that this would be passed?
Senator MANSFIELD. Yes; indeed.
Chairman RImcoFF. If the Senator would. yield, we have 8 days of
hearings with 23 witnesses running seriatum. When we come back
after the Lincoln Day recess, on the first two days, we will start a
mark-up session. If we can get a quorum of this committee, I would
hope to report this committee's work by March 1 for the Rules Coin-
mittee to look at.
If I have cooperation from the committee as a whole, I can assure
Senator Weicker and the majority leader that we will have a bill for
you by March 1 to be considered by the Rules Committee.
Senator WEICE F.R. I very much appreciate the commitment of the
chairman. I will make a prediction.
If we do not pass the bill in the year 1976. you are not going to have
a bill. passed. I think that is the seriousness of the situation.
Senator MANSFIELD. I would not disagree with the Senator from
Connecticut, and I want to assure him and the members of the com-
mittee that if the bill is reported out, as far as I am concerned per-
sonally, I intend to make every effort to get it up as expeditiously
as possible, so the Senate can render a judgment one way or the other.
Chairman RlnlcoFF. Senator Mansfield, thank you very much.
Many members have more questions, but in all fairness to you and
your three other distinguished colleagues, we are going to excuse you
at this time. Thank you.
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Senator PERCY. Senator Mansfield, I would like to say to Sena-
tor Glenn, I share his feeling, and it was only out of consideration
for your schedule and the schedules of your colleagues that I sug-
gested the limitation. But we would very much like to draw upon you
informally for further assistance and help in this regard.
We all have the objective to make this a stronger Nation, and a
stronger Senate as a result of these hearings. I think Nye are going
to, and you started us off in a magnificent way.
Senator MANSrIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rnsncorr. Thank you very much, for the members of the
committee.
In fairness to our three witnesses and members of this committee,
we will hear the testimony of Senator Church, Senator Tower, and
Senator Baker and after they have finished their testimony, we will
then question the three Senators.
Again, our appreciation to the three of you and the other members
of the committee for the outstanding work you have done on behalf
of the Senate and also on behalf of the Nation.
Senator Church?
Senator Ciruxczi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a prepared statement, but in the interests of saving the com-
mittee time, I would submit that statement.
Chairman Rmrcorr. Without objection, the statement will be in-
serted in the record following your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. FRANK CHURCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IDAHO
Senator GuuRcrr. I will make my remarks extemporaneously.
First of all, let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am very much pleased and
gratified by the testimony of the majority leader, who foresaw the
need for a permanent Senate oversight intelligence committee years
ago.
If ever his foresight was substantiated, it was in the course of the
investigations of the Senate Select Committee in recent months.
We have conducted the first serious investigation of the FBI since
its i tion more than a half century ago.
ti have conducted the first serious investigation of the CIA since
it was established more than 30 years ago.
The abuses that we found must be viewed in part as the, result of
the dereliction of congressional responsibility. I cannot believe that
if the Congress had been watching these agencies in which we en-
trust so much power and permit to operate in so much secrecy, that
these abuses would have or could have occurred.
It is not my purpose this morning to review in detail the findings
of our investigation. I think that most of you are aware that in the
case of the CIA we not only discovered 20 years of illegal mail open-
ings involving individual American citizens, the interceptions of 100,-
000 cables sent to or from individual citizens.
We found an extensive involvement.in conspiracies to murder cer-
tain foreign leaders extending over a period of years. We also found
that the Agency had engaged in spying activities directed against
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American citizens, although this was expressly contrary to the pro-
visions of the law of 1947 that created the CIA.
In the case of the FBI we found the beginnings of a. secret police
in this country, elaborate plans laid out for the purpose of harassing
thousands of citizens whose only offense was that of disagreeing with
the policies of the Government, which the Constitution and the laws
of this country guarantee them the right to do.
We found vendettas conducted against the leaders of the civil rights
movement carried to almost unbelievable extremes.
In the case of the Internal Revenue Service, we found tax investiga-
tions commenced against citizens concerning whore no tax delinquency
was even suspected, for ttie purpose of harassment.
We found, in that Agency which I would regard as having more
intelligence information on more American citizens than all the other
governmental agencies combined, which they get on the 15th of April
every year, a habit having formed by which that Agency transfers
these confidential tax returns to other agencies of the Govern-
ment, having nothing to do with tax matters, again, for purposes of
harassment.
These abuses, Mr. Chairman, have to be prevented in the future.
For that reason. the final 2 months of the committee's work will be
devoted to a series of recommendations having to do with the cor-
rection in the existing laws that. will give us some safeguard against
the, repetition of these abuses in future years.
The first recommendation that the committee will make has to do
with the subject before you today, that is, the establishmentof a
permanent oversight committee.
Why is it needed?
The obvious answer is that it is needed because the present arrange-
ments will not work, they have not worked. The intelligence activity
of the Federal Government is far-ranging. It involves agencies that
were mentioned by the majority leader, not only the CIA, but the
DIA, the NSA, certain other national intelligence components of the
Defense Department, and the counterintelligence and counterespionage
functions of the FBI.
,Jurisdiction is divided now between any number of committees of
the Congress, the Finance Committee, the Foreign Relations 4om-
mittee, the Armed Services Committee, and it is not possible ere-
fore-the judiciary committee- for an adequate. surveillance othat
entire intelligence community to be exercised under current conditions.
Furthermore, our experience over the past months enables me to
confidently tell you that the work cannot be done on a piecemeal basis
or by a subcommittee of another standing committee which is pri-
marily engaged in a different basic responsibility. It will require a
well-staffed committee directing all of its attention to the intelligence
comrrrunity.
Again, by experience, it will require a very large part of the time
of the Senators who serve.
So for these reasons, a permanent oversight, committee is neces-
sary, and I would like to make three observations having to do with
three principles that I think need to be embodied in any legislation
that your committee may recommend. Some of them have already
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been mentioned; I will not prolong the discussion of those that have.
The first principle relates to the power that will be given this
permanent oversight committee, and I believe that it cannot possibly
do its work unless it has the right to pass upon the authorization leg-
islation. In other words, it must be a legislative committee in that
respect.
It must have that power in the normal way over those agencies
that deal primarily with national intelligence, those would be the
CIA, DIA, NSA, the Defense programs which deal with sophisticated
technological collection systems and the counterintelligence functions
of the FBI. All of these are what are called national intelligence?
Now, the investigating power of the committee should extend be-
yond these particular agencies to look into other intelligence opera-
tions in other departments that may be subject to abuse concerning
which charge may be raised from time to time. So that the first princi-
ple, then, if this committee, is to have the tools to do its work, would.
be the jurisdiction to pass on annual authorizations for those agencies
that are primarily involved in strategic or national intelligence.
The second principle that I would endorse is the principle of rotat-
ing membership, both for the members of the committee and for the
staff. That rotating membership, I think, should be patterned after
the Senate itself : El years with one-third of the committee coming on,
fresh every 2 years in which manner two-thirds would remain ex-
perienced, but at the same time we would minimize the risk of having
the committee co-opted by the very agencies that it seeks to supervise.
If that is true of the members of the committee, it is equally ap-
plicable to the staff.
The third principle has to do with the question of how we are going
to resolve the problem of dealing with secrecy under the framework
of the Constitution.
Everybody recognizes that the existing condition is chaotic and we
would hope that with the creation of an oversight committee, proce-
dures could be regularized for dealing with le,gitimat.e secrets.
I might say, in that regard, that it was possible for the select com-
mittee to work out arrangements with the executive branch for obtain-
ing all of the information we required in conducting our investigation.
We were very careful to provide maximum security so that no item
of a sensitive national security character has leaked, to our knowledge,
from the committee, during the whole course of its investigation.
I think that such a permanent oversight committee could be made
relatively leakproof. I cite to you evidence of this record of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy through the years.
However, leaks, as we all know, are not confined to the congressional
branch. We have had the experience of many leaks from the executive
agencies, often planted and planned, for the purposes of the admin-
istration. That has been a practice that all administrations have en-
ga,zed in in the past, and we ought not to overlook the fact that the
principal problem faced by the CIA at the moment in connection with
leaks has to do with neither the executive or the legislative branches
but with former agents of the CIA itself. It has to do with the Philip
Agee syndrome which agents once having worked for the CIA and
having become familiar with the other personnel and their assign.-
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ments leave the Agency and turn against it, and then publish the
identification of these former employees and blow their cover.
That has been a principal source of difficulty. Senator Allen referred
to the tragic death by assassination by Mr. Welch in Athens. We in
the select committee took the precaution at the outset of our investiga-
tion to reach an understanding with the CIA whereby we asked for
no names currently assigned abroad, we asked for no sources abroad
of intelligence information because we did not think that the identifica-
tion of intelligence sources or the names of employees assigned abroad
were necessary for our work, and we did not even want to take the
risk of the possibility of inadvertent exposure.
I believe, despite the confusion on this question, that once the facts
are laid before you, it will be seen that there are ways of protecting
legitimate secrets that can be resolved by a permanent oversight com-
mittee. Gentlemen, the question of secrecy and the right of the Con-
gress to deal with classified information are basically questions that
must be resolved if we are to preserve our constitutional form of
government. That establishes the Congress as a separate but equal
and independent branch.
I would hope that we would never accept the. principle that. it is
exclusively the right of the executive branch to determine what a
national secret is, and exclusively the prerogative of the executive
branch to decide what may be revealed, and what they can conceal,
because once we do that, the ball game is over.
To grant the executive such prerogative would, in my judgment,
undermine any reasonable opportunity for a permanent oversight
committee to expose wrongdoing, to expose the abuse of power, to
correct inefficiencies, to expose illegal action contrary to the intent
of the Congress and contrary to the well-being of this Republic.
I close these remarks with a plea that whatever recommendations
,ire made by this committee following the hearings that you are com.-
niencing today that the prerogative of the Congress-the right of in-
quiring-be protected. There are ways that, this can be done that take
full account of the rights and responsibilities of both branches.
Our committee, the select committee, with your permission, would
like to present. for your consideration shortly, a bill which will con-
tain the provisions, that I have briefly outlined and others as well, a
bill which we think would form a sound basis for creating a perma-
nent oversight committee that can do its job, a bill that would conform
to the Constitution, that would preserve the prerogatives of the Con-
gress, and, at the same time, take into proper account protection of
legitimate national secrets.
Chairman RaxtcoFF. Thank you, Senator Church.
When could the cominitteee expect the presentation of such a bill?
Senator Chun n. Within the week, I would think. We just have
final revisions to make on the proposals, and final votes will be taken
into the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I have a problem of timing today. If it is possible for
me. to respond to questions now, it would greatly accommodate my
schedule.
Chairman rvimc(Fr. Again, subject to Senator Tower and Senator
Baker.
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Senate TOWER. I would certainly defer.
Senator BAKER. It is satisfactory.
Chairman RIBIcoFF. I think we will stay within the 5-minute rule
under the circumstances.
Senator Church, do we need intelligence agencies?
Senator CriuRCis. Yes, of course we do. We need efficient, effective
intelligence agencies.
I was an intelligence officer during the. war. I know the importance
of intelligence information during wartime; I have learned the im-
portance of it in peacetime. We could not conduct our foreign policy
without good intelligence.
Chairman RIBICOFF. Should intelligence agencies engage in covert
activity ?
Senator CuuRcri. This is a question on which a lively debate should
be held. I think that covert operations unconnected with the collection
of intelligence information presents an entirely different issue. It ought
not to be confused with intelligence, because it has nothing to do with
intelligence.
I do not think that there is any argument on the proposition that
the collection of intelligence must be drawn from various sources, in-
cluding clandestine or covert sources, but covert operations, as dis-
tinguished from the collection of intelligence, has to do with the
attempt to secretly manipulate events abroad in ways that are thought
to serve the interests of the United States, and here there has been
much bad judgment.
My own view is that most of the covert activity that we have en-
gaged in in the last 20 years has done this country far more harm than
it has done us good, and we must recognize in our kind of society,
no matter what kind of precautions are taken, in due. course covert
operations, whether they take place in Chile or in Laos or in Iran
or in Angola or in Italy, wherever they take place, are going to sur-
face, and when they do, they expose the United States to censure,
particularly when those operations are contrary to the professed prin-
ciples on which this country stands, as in the case in Chile, where we
undertook to overthrow by clandestine means a government that had
been freely elected by the people of Chile. This action was clearly
against the traditional principle by which we have stood through the
years of self-determination.
When these things happen, Mr. Chairman, they injure the good
name and reputation of the United States, and that should always be
weighed in the balance when a covert operation is contemplated.
Chairman Rinicorr. You mentioned the so-called Agee syndrome.
Should there be a restriction of any kind of former members of an
intelligence agency from going public with their information after
they leave the Agency ?
Senator Ciiuncii. Yes, I believe the Agency lacks adequate tools
to protect itself in this regard. Today the Agency enters into an agree-
ment with employees, but there is no way that they can enforce that
agreement unless they can anticipate that the agreement is about to be
breached and go into court for some kind of injunctive relief, and that
is a very rare case.
So I myself believe that a criminal sanction applicable to employees
who break their agreement with the Agency would be appropriate, if
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it were carefully limited to the identification of CIA agents on assig r-
inent or abroad, or to the identification of intelligence sources abroad.
I do not see any possible justification for disclosures of that kind.
We must be very careful when we frame criminal laws not to write
the sanction to broadly so it can become a shield to protect the Agency
from exposure of wrongdoing or abuse of power or illegal or illicit
action, but a carefully drawn provision of that kind added to the
rriurinal code, I think, would be appropriate and is probably necessary.
Chairman Prnicovr. I have time for one more question.
Do you think that the intelligence agencies under supervision by
this new oversight committee should brief the new committee before
undertaking any especially sensitive activity or inform it after it has
done that activity?
Senator CxITncii. Mr. Chairman, if we are going to set up this com-
mittee and not give it the right to obtain in advance of a significant
new covert involvement the information concerning it, we will give it
very little opportunity to do its job.
Yes. I think if we had had such a committee in place, it should have
had the power to require the administration to brief it in advance of
the Angola operation.
What good does it do the, Congress to be told after the fact that the
President has decided to involve this country deeply in a civil war in
Africa and has spent $50 million and then tells the Congress only
because he has run out of money and needs more?
If this committee is to perform its role, then constitutionally we
must remember that the Senate of the United States is to advise as
well as to consent in foreign policy matters, and if it is to ve its
advice. it must have advance notice of significant; operations of this
hind. Otherwise, it is simply told after the fact, after it has lost its
chance to advise the President at all.
This does not mean that the committee should interfere with the
President's constitutional right to ignore congressional advice. That
is quite another matter. But to deny the committee the opportunity to
give advice would seem to me to be putting blindfolds on the committee.
Chairman Rlmc ovF. Senator Percy?
Senator PERCY. Thank yon. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Church, you mentioned that there would be a proposed bill
within a week. j% ould that. bill, in your judgment, have unanimous
approval of the. committee or will there be a minority and a majority
suggest ion?
Senator Ciruncir. I had thought that there was a unanimous con-
sonsus on the committee. I am now told that, there, may be some dis-
sentinn votes, but I believe that depends on the final form of the bill.
We still have some questions to resolve, and I do anticipate that what-
ever we finally agree upon will have the strong support of the majority
of members.
Senator Prncv. Obviously, I think it would help our committee to
)nave as great a unity as on can on yours. but we certainly would want
the benefit of minority reports if they are strongly felt.
Senator Cnrrcrr. I can only say heretofore that, we have worked
very hard to reach a consensus on the committee. We were even able
to do that in connection with the assassination report. I would hope
that we would continue to work in that same spirit.
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Senator PERCY. Do you feel that covert activities must be carried
on by the U.S. Government in its national interests?
Senator Cnuaoir. I think that covert activities in the past 20 years
of the kind that we have engaged in have done this country much more
harm than good.
Twenty-five years ago, this country had a matchless moral position
from which it exercised immense leadership and influence in the world.
Anything the United States stood for was automatically endorsed by
three-quarters of the governments of the world.
Now we have had 25 years of manipulation by methods that were
plainly copied from the KGB : coercion, false propaganda, bribery,
:abduction, attempted assassination, and where are we at the end of
that 25 years ?
Senator PERCY. Some would say that these activities were not as
apparent until the creation of the Senate, select committee and the
publicity given in the last few months have far exceeded that of the
last 30 years.
Senator Cirurcir. That would not be true. There are those who
would say that, in fact, we are now the targets of what seems to me
to be an apparently orchestrated effort to undercut the committee's
recommendations.
Senator PERCY. Do you know of covert activities that were carried
,on in our national interest and served our national interest and should
have been carried on?
Senator CiiuEcIr. I think there have been some. I could envision
circumstances that might require others. But I would say on balance-
not because of the revelations of recent weeks, but because of the revela-
tions of 25 years, you cannot keep a free society restricted by keeping
secrets as is done in a police state.
Long before our committee was set up, the people of the United
States knew about the CIA involvement in Guatemala ; we knew about
the secret war in Laos ; we knew about the Bay of Pigs ; we knew a lot
about the Chilean affair and many, many other disclosures. We knew
about the CIA's work in Iran and other places.
So the world has been a witness, and will be a witness again, to
covert activities because in time they will surface.
I say today when we put our name on a resolution we have three-
quarters of the world automatically against us.
I think that wee, have eroded away our own strong moral position by
thinking that it is necessary to engage in this activity even when con-
trary to our professed principles. I think this was a serious mistake.
Senator PERCY. Should this committee established by the Senate
have the power of veto over covert activities?
Senator CHURCH. No. As I said, I do not think constitutionally that
such a committee could have the power of veto, but it should have the
opportunity to advise the President, and the President can then accept
the advice, he can modify his proposal in conjunction with the com-
mittee's recommendations, or he can ignore the committee's advice and
go ahead on his own. If he does that and a pattern of that kind were
to develop, then this committee would have the legislative tool that
always is reserved to the Congress-that is, holding up the purse-
,strings if this were necessary.
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Senator PERCY. If it were a criminal offense for a member of the
intelligence community to reveal classified information-should it be
a criminal offense if a Senator or a member of the Intelligence Com-
mittee's staff revealed such information ?
Senator Criunc n. We have, in our select committee, provided rules
that would require immediate dismissal in the case of anyone on the
staff.
Senator PERCY. That is quite different from criminal.
Senator CHURCH. That is right,. We were not in a position to pass a
criminal law. We had to deal with it as we could.
Our rules have been patterned after those of the Judiciary Commit-
tee of the House in the impeachment hearing, and I think similar rules
could be adopted by any permanent oversight committee. The secrecy
agreement that is entered into between employees of CIA and the
agency was also entered into in a somewhat different form between
the staff members of the select committee and the committee, and that
is a similar situation as the one I cited with the CIA and a similar
criminal penalty could attach if the Congress felt that this was
advisable.
I am speaking now
Senator PERCY. I think that members are subject to criminal penal-
ties on income tax evasion. I think we should consider whether we
should place ourselves above the law or put ourselves under the same
sort of penalty if we reveal secret information. Thank you.
My time is up, Senator Church.
'Senator CHURCH. I had reference in my answer to staff employees
of the committee, as I had to staff employees of the CIA.
Chairman RInicorr. Senator Allen?
'Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Church, would you agree that this committee, if estab-
lished, would have a more comprehensive, and far-reaching authority
in this particular field than any other standing committee of the
Senate?
Senator CxuRcir. No; I would not think so, because I think it would
exercise the same legislative authority over authorization bills as
normal legislative committees do.
You see, part of the problem, Senator, is that the FBI has no
statutory base, it has no authorization legislation. Its scope, its power
now depends entirely on Presidential directives.
Senator ALLEN. Your committee could not go further in its activ-
ities than a standing committee in the. Senate presently set up could
go in the area of its jurisdiction, is that correct?
Senator CHURCH. Yes; that is correct.
Let me make it clear that my own concept is that we would have
the regular authorizing, annual authorizing, authority for those
agencies that are. engaged in national intelligence, primarily in na-
tional or strategic intelligence. Beyond that we would have investi-
gative authority to look into improprieties in intelligence functions
of other agencies. We, would not have the right to pass upon their
authorizing legislation.
So its range of duties and powers would be comparable, Senator,
to other committees.
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Senator ALLEN. I sense that your support of covert activities,
clandestine operations, is lukewarm atbest.
'Senator Cumidri. Yes.
Senator ALLEN. I note the statement of Mr. John A. McCone,
former Director of the CIA, concerning whom no adverse comment
has been made as far as I know. Ile states :
The ethics of clandestine intelligence operations have long been debated. Some
would do away with it. The fact is, no international government forbids
clandestine operations and they go on as they have for centuries. At least
40 nations today support clandestine services. No great state can abandon it.
Would you agree or disagree with that?
Senator CHuitcir. It depends on the definition of clandestine activ-
ities. I have already said that the collection of vital intelligence infor-
mation may have to be obtained from time to time by clandestine
means, but we are under an old mystique because relatively little
comes now from clandestine means compared to what we get by
technical means.
I can see from time to time that we may have to use clandestine
means to secure vital information.. That is a different proposition,
however, than secretly undertaking to overthrow the Government of
Chile because the Chilean people did not choose a government that
was acceptable to the President of the United States.
Senator ALLEN. You have stated, I believe, that in no event would
the committee say that it disapproved of a covert activity and instruct
the Agency not to proceed with it. That would never be done?
'Senator C-auRou. That would be beyond the power of the Congress
in this particular field.
As I said, I think the committee should be able to give its advice.
It has been the lack of political advice that has led to some of the
most horrendous decisions, and many of these covert operations, in
the past. I think the Agency and the Government would benefit.
Senator ALLEN. How many times would the Agency have to go
against your advice before you would suggest that appropriations to
the Agency be cut off?
'Senator Criuu.czr. Senator, this is a matter of political judgment,
as it is in all cases.
The Agency takes its final direction from the President so that the
conflict, if it exists, would not be one between the Agency and the
committee, but rather one between the administration and the com-
mittee. We have had these conflicts in the past. They do not always
or often occur, but there came a time when the Congress used the
pursestrings to force an end to our involvement in a war that seemed
both futile and foolish, and proved to be so, in Southeast Asia, and
when the Congress feels sufficiently strong, it sometimes will resort
to pursestrings, and that is its right.
This committee ought to have the same prerogative.
'Senator ALLEN. At the time that this committee is set up, as I
anticipate it will be, the work of the investigation committee will be
completed?
Senator CFiuucx. Yes.
Senator ALLEN. Would it be your thought that this committee would
carry on the investigative work of the investigation committee and
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that it would make these disclosures from time to time to the American
public as to the operation of the intelligence agencies?
Senator CHURCH. Senator, I think any permanent committeee must
have full investigatory powers, and I would not pretend that within
the limited time that we have had to deal with a very big investigative
job that we have covered all of the bases, that we have looked into
every closet.
Obviously, we did not have time for that. But we have a sufficient
base upon which to make, I think, very valid recommendations. That
was our purpose.
The new committee, the oversight committee, if it is made permanent
would have the right to open up new investigations as it saw fit and it
would have, and I think should have, the authority to make disclosures,
to conduct public. hearings if it chooses, and to handle the question of
secrets in an orderly and regular manner. That is much preferable to
the present arrangement.
I suggest to you that the present arrangement is so chaotic that no
secrets can be kept..
I do not think that a committee of the kind that I would recom-
mend should be limited in its option when it comes to conducting in-
vestigations or determining what should be made public.
Senator Arr FN. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Chairman RiBico. Senator Weicker?
Senator WEICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just very briefly, I think you pointed out with great clarity the
necessity to distinguish between detail and policy.
In other words, I gather from the rules of your own committee,
when you referred to not wanting the names, not wanting the sources
but trying to get to the policy, I think that this is important. Auto-
matically when you raise the concept of an oversight committee in an
intelligence area, everybody gets to the detailed area rather than focus-
ing on having policy in the hands of the Congress. Am I correct?
Senator CHURCH. That is correct. That was a distinction we wanted
to make.
We found, for example, it was unnecessary for its to obtain on the
record the latest devices by which the NSA obtains information, the
technical devices. We did not really feel that it was important for the
committee to have that information. We do not want that kind of in-
formation spread on the transcripts in a way that it might possibly
be disclosed.
But it was important for the committee to know just what kinds of
information the NSA was obtaining and just what the targets were
and the reasons and the scope of its activities. All of these were policy
matters.
It was important for us to discover that there was no basic statute
determining the extent or scope of its activity, or that it all depended
upon Presidential orders, Presidential edicts, really, and that has to
be corrected.
The answer to your question is yes.
Senator WFICKER. I think that the American people have the right
to know what the policy is on assassinating leaders around the world.
If you want to do it, fine. If you do not want to do it, fine-but this is
the judgment that should be left to the American people.
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Everyone has the right, I think, to know whether that is going to
be a policy of their government, and they never had that before.
Senator CrruRCrr. That is right.
I would hope that in that case, assassination never again becomes
an instrument of our foreign policy in times of peace. Our committee
has recommended enactment of appropriate provisions in the criminal
code to stop that. I think that is a question of public policy so serious
that it ought to be determined as a matter of law.
Senator WnrcKER. I do not want to switch focus. We are in agree-
ment that these major policy decisions definitely should be in the hands
of the Congress. The same holds true if we are going to actively in-
volve ourselves in the destruction of foreign governments abroad, is
that going to be an activity? I think everybody has the right to be
heard on that.
We hear so much about leaks. This is not our business. This is not
the President's business. This is not the head of the CIA's business.
It is the people's business, it is as simple as that.
The difficulty that this generation is running into is-fortunately
the country has become better educated, has become more aware, and
therefore they are asking questions and they want to have a say in
broad policy.
They do not want to know the names and addresses of agents, and
so on, but they want to know what they are investing in terms of money
and the reputation of this country.
Senator Crruncrr. I agree wholeheartedly.
I think it is foolish that anyone should assume that an activity so
broad that we are engaged in Angola could be kept secret. The best
experts in the CIA I know were of the same opinion.
Senator WnrcKEu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RIBrcor . Yes; we did:
L'et's assume the Arab: countries, further escalate the price situation
we have-on. energy now and it places the Western World' on the brink
of complete econotnie chaos and, collapse. Let's assume further that all
diplomatic efforts to resolve this impasse have failed. Then the only
alternative options apparently available to the President are simply to
acquiesce in the economic chaos or send in the Marines.
Mr. HARRINGTON. FraiikLy, if you. get to the point of your hypothet-
ical question letting me hanging on the edge of the cliff as "far as the
options, either/or,.and we are at the point where our national survival
in somewhat more subtle form- as shown as being the historical threat
that calls for war, let the President come to the Congress. for approval
and ask to go to war.
Mr. Si a.TIxsllrx. You are saying if he does call it covert or any
other word for it, secret action in the national interest, he would have
to come to Congress to get approval?
Mr. HARRINGT0 -. Only as it applies to what you gave me as an ex-
ample.
Mr. SIATINSHFx.. This is-ridiculous.
Mr. BOB. WILSON. I want to commend you for, bringing a new word
into our- vocabulary--destabilize. I have mad the total; testimony and
never once was that word used.. You invented it and:it is.beatutiful.
Mr. HARRINGTON. That is to the real'ere' dit of 'Bill Colby.
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i1Mr. SLATINSHEK. If I may interrupt at~ this point, Mr..Colby did
not use the word "destabilize" in his testimony.
Mr. BoB WILSON. That is what I said.,
Mr. SLATINSHEE. In fact he wrote a letter to the New York Times
to this effect.
Mr. IIARRINGTON. That is what I said.
Mr. SLATINSHEI#. I am sorry I missed that.
Mr. NEDZI. Let the,Chair return to the problem that 'really is vexing
as far as the subcommittee is concerned, the procedures with respect. to
the handling of sensitive , information
Mr., Hai i ingtoii, I have absolutely no' reason to ,challenge. your
Inotives in what has occurred. I similarly was interested in seeing that
.sonic of, this might be made~~ppublic. Do,you recall reading in the, trans-
script whenI inquired. of Mr. Colby whether this information could
be, made public or not? . .
Mr. I-IARRINGTON. Not enough to be able to respond right now with
anything more than what 'l have
Ir: Nsnzi. The point I am making is while the thoght occurred to
upon myself .to
me. I can'tt say the thought did occur to me. to take it'
,challenge the classification of thus information on. the ,ppart of. those
charged with responsibility of making this kind of classification. Don't
you feel uncomfortable when Colby testifies that if this information is
disclosed; lie expects that sonic individuals iii. the CIA will be-affected
adversely? . ' ;
Mr..IIARRTNGTON. Let me ask you-you have the benefit of something
I ' suppose isermanentl removed from me to have ae~cess to. My
memory of ,this, if Icou d say, is that Colby after. 16 or. 18 pages. of
specilieally "addressing himself to the question. of Chile gets into more
general discus's on of the, method of operation employed by the CIA.
If you are reading from that section, I would agree Colby has; made
,the observation at. some point that the, problem ,of disclosure could
create the situation you have described.. I didn't really want to have
that seein to:be inferred in.the instance of going back to Mr. Wilson's
question, of~motive and attitude earlier. In the .instance here Colby
testified to you"that if this information were made known that-the lives
of individuals or other problems would ensue in.Chile, I thought he
was addressing himself to the more general question of how the agency
dealt with problems of this kind on the broader. scale when he made
these observations here.
M . NED?I. I asked him, what do you see as 4problem?
'MI'. HARRINGTON. What page is that?
Mr. NEDZI. Page 42.
Mr. HARRINGTON. I assumed it is in the general discussion.
Mr. NEnzi. He answered: "There are a number of individuals who've
helped us who would be caught in the process, who were the inter-
mediaries, or the recipients, who would be revealed as having received
American money,'or passed American money, at the behest of the CIA.
I think some 'of them would go to jail maybe, maybe not, but some of
them would be very.. sharply discredited. Because you can't really say
that we are working in this area without saying sort of obviously whom
we were working with" and so forth;
Mr. HARRINOTON. Was the basis of the answer a question about in-
formation being made public?
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400
-Mr?. NEnzl. The basis of it was to determine if, in his judgment, we
could release the transcript and
Mr. HARRINGTON. I get the feeling when you get to that point in the
transcript Mr. Colby is engaging, because he dominates most of that
proceeding with almost it monolog, in the description in general'of the
agency function in this role, who is brought in as far as the other
executive branch agencies. how they in general function, and what the
change of command is as far as approval. But you are engaging in a
general as distinguished from it Chilean discussion focus.
Mr. NEDZI. That was not the intent of the question.
Mr. HARRiNGTO . 11'hat did he say before that prompted your ques-
tion? Probably page 41?
Mr. NEUZL. We do have independent inspections, the Inspector General, And
.things like that, and sometimes they do cone up to sharpen the question whether
this particular activity is worth it, or being run well. or whatever, It is the
usual thing of running any kind of an organization. You have to have some inde-
pendent appraisal of how well it is doing:
Apparently I had asked him about whether there was airy review of
these activities to determine whether' or not , the v were successful or
desirable. And following that it was certainly th< intent of airy ques-
tion to determine whether all. of the information ni the transcript could
be made public.
The i)oint is, however. you say that didn't trouble you?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Not at all, because lie didn't get into, as you well
know, anything by way of specific references to_names, to institutions,
to parties, beyond generalized descriptions that one might,have cog-
nizance about the area and fill ,' in' the.blanks.This was.`notsomething
he testified to you on.
Mr. ' nzi; Aren't`vou troubled by taking it upon yourself to deter-
mine whether a, rule should be followed or not ?Isn't that really what
Watergate was all about?
Mr. IJAmtI\G'ro .'Air. \edzi, I think
Mr. NEDzi. I certainly sympathize with your nxatiyes toafar greater
degree than I did the principals in Watergate. But aren't we really
talking about a similar problem-somebody taking it upon themselves
to make these determinations?
Mr. HARRINGTOv. I think Watergate is altogether about something
else. This is about the (Congress and deference or acquiescence with the
executive branch.
Mr. NEDZI. Don't you believe we are genuinely concerned about na-
tional security involves in that?
Mr. IIARRINGTO:v. In Watergate?
Mr. N Enzl. Yes.
lfr. HARRIxGTOx. It is so hard to find any remaining redeeming
facets to the term. After the President reduced it in the. tapes and
other things to a shambles of meaning,.. I don't think I' could really
. answer it.
Mr. NEnzr. My own feeling is there were some participants there
who felt they were doing the right thing and weren't concerned about
the law and the rights" of others. Lust because their own minds were
fixed that this was the right thing to do for the` good' of"the country,
they did it, and that tome is an undesirable way of operating. I think
we do have a Government of laws and of rules and you are really
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401
'treading on very thin ice when you choose on your own to violatV' laws
and rules.
Let me" put it another way: Let me ask you the question
Mr. HARRINGTON. I hesitate because I am looking for a rejoinder. I
think the Watergate runs more aptly toward a continuing coverup of
the, conduct on the part of the executive which is acquiesced in. collec-
tively by the Congress.' Mr. NEDzI.' I am talking about' the activities that the term "Water-
gate" encompasses. But that aside, do you have any suggestion as to
what kind of rules could be promulgated in order to assure that an
individual, because of whatever reason he might have, will not disclose
sensitive classified information that if disclosed could be contrary to
the public interest? Do youithink- our rules are unreasonable??
Mr. HARnhNGroN. I think totally, and I think the classification. system
is" oke
Jh. NEDZL Apartfrom the classification system. That. is-a separate
issue.
Mi HARiliNGTON That is`the root of it
A Nunzi Are you sa ing there' is no ,sensitive information" that. is
in: our . transcripts
M1'. I1A ith OTON. In general Or specific? The transcript before you ?
Mr. NEbzi: I am speaking in general.,
Mr. HARRINGTON. Sure.
Mr.'NEDzi What we "are Concerned about is having some extremely
seiisit;ive transcript available to a Member of Congress, given, to him
under the- same rules' and constraints that this transcript was given
to yOu, only-to have it disseminated to a member of the press.
Mr. HARRINGTON. If we talked about the broadest possible definition
.of sensitive information existing someplace that should not, be dis-
sermnated, without question f would agree with you. I didn't want to
he my answer attempt to be responsive to something that. appeared
to be directed to this particular transcript in front of you..
Air. NEDzi. But each individual should be entitled to make that same
'd'etermination then, shouldn't he ?
Mr. HARRINGTON. That I suppose is something we could quarrel
over forever, far more than this committee would say is the case if' I
could judge from the chairman.
M. NEDzi. Are you saying, there is no way to promulgate a rule or
.
we will just have to assume that risk?
Mr. HARRINGTON. e -will always,be in an area where- we- will never
arrive at a.point where' there will not be fundamental disagreements of
approach between people, who are otherwise reasonable. I think we
will never get to a point where you will satisfy all people'on this whole
question. +
Mr: NEDzi.-Have you any suggestions as to what we should do to our
procedures to improve them, if they need improving?
Mr. HARRINGTON. I think. I did this in my letter of mid-July which
I' addressed to' the chairman. of the Appropriations Committee,: in
which I: deal with the subject of the House. debate .Qn Monday on the,
whole guesti~oii. of oversight functions., and., with appreciation for the,
problems you-have had as far as. time ? . ;; "
Mr. TEDZI. But this problem is not going away.
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Mr. Nlnzi. Regardless of how you handle the oversight function,
whether you have a separate .committee or not, the problem of this
kind of information is not going to go away. Should it be handled in
a manner that is similar to the way in which we are handling it or
should the procedure be changed somehow?
Mr. HARRINGTON. I think there are any variety of methods that could
be available that .would go tasatisfying some of the more legitimate
concerns raised. For instaance, one of the reasons we have talked about
regularly here is much of what you have in that material has.a deliber-
ate and definite bearing on foreign policy, decisions of. this country.
Yet in theory Bill Colby can claim to the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee and the Foreign Affairs Committee that he has no mandate on the
part of Congress to be responsive.
Mr. Nxnzi. Let me tell the gentleman that problem is being addressed
very diligently, and we anticipate some kind of contribution toward
solving this in the very near future.
That isn't the point I was talking about. The point that troubles me
is the one which was brought to a focus by this particular instance. I
am trying to solicit from you some comment as to what might be done
to avoid having 435 members exercising their": own judgment as; to
whether the rules should be followed or not.
Mr. HARRINGTON. I thought I` had given you my usual curbstone
opinion about that-far less secrecy at the executive branch level; far
less acquiescence in it on the part of the Congress, which winds. up,
picking up the pieces of the kind of secretly arrived at policy of the
kind we find ourselves addressing here, and far more trust in general
on.the part of the Congress about itself. You can say I am example
"A" of why that shouldn't exist, but that is your opinion.
Mr. BOB WILSON. Do you feel by your violating the rule you might
have made it, impossible for other members to see sensitive material,
not this material but other sensitive material that might have great
use to individuals? Do you think in any way that is jeopardized?
Mr. HARRINGTON. I think by violating your Lisle--and I sad your rule
lierliaps pejoratively-or the rule, what I resulted in doing is forcing a
lot of people, not on this committee who have their own self-interest
at stake to a narrow degree and- philosophically at odds with my view,
but forcing a lot of benign members on my own committee with the in-
tent of perpetuating the fiction of oversight to get into the field for the
first time where they should have been a generation ago. I think that
has been done to a degree. That wasn't the intention.
Mr. BOB WILSON. Does your committee have oversight of the CIA?
Mr. HARRINGTON. No, it does not.
Mr. BOB WILSON. What do you mean?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Those who have acceded in this. You asked have
I precluded other Members of Congress from getting access to sensi-
tive material from what I have done in violating the rules. I have said
to the contrary, that out of the mouth of our own Chairman Morgan
the Foreign Affairs. Committee has to deal with what they have been in
for a long time, the knowledge there 'has been little oversight, ahd if it
has occurred, it has occurred informally. In looking at the statement of
27
Mr..IIARRINGTON. I tried to induce some thoughts about that. from
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Congressman Giaimo from Connecticut on the floor, gentlemen,, and
Senator Symington of a week or two ago in the Senate, those theoreti-
cally supposed to be on the committees of oversight haven't penetrated.
that balloon but may once full oversight exists.
I asked the chairman this morning-and you don't have to answer
it-did lie have information before April 22 that goes to the substance
of what we are doing. He may have to a degree..I don't know whether
he did or not.
Mr. BOB WILSON. This is a somewhat related question. Do you feel
that President Kennedy was ill advised in using CIA with regard to
the Bay of Pigs?
Mr. IARRINGTON. You bet I do.
Mr. BOB WILSON. With regard to our clandestine activities in Laos.
also?
Mr. HARRINGTON. To the disconcertion of people who happen to
sliare my same party label I very often hyphenate my criticism of
executive branch activity of the kind you have described more gener-
ally in foreign policy by alluding to both the Kennedy era and the
Johnson era, along with the Republican facets in the Nixon era over
the last dozen years. I think you can say one that the Secretary of State
clumsily tried to get at in testimony addressed to Mr. Church, who
tried` to keep interrupting Fulbright's efforts; to repress that line of
inquiry, I find the Secretary straining a bit with an exaggerated kind.
of claim of credit that he and the President were engaging In 1969 and
1970 on direction and departure. of American foreign policy, that we
ought to have more charity with decision's nlade,about Chile,, with ap-
preciation of foreign policy perceptions existing at that time. They
were once claiming a fundamental departure in our policy' affecting
our relationship with the Communists--aznd this. is what I find all the:
more ironic=at the time the secret trips were being planned to China,
a rapproachement with Russia being heralded as a great achievement
of the administration, and one Ihave publicly said I concur in, you get.
a systematic effort to gut the Marxist government that not anyone yet
in the most revisionist sentiment have suggested came to power .:did
not come to- power by a'process we endorse for the rest of the world..
Mr. BOB WILSON. You determined in your.own mind we gutted it.
Certainly the testimony, doesn't, indicate to me that the activities re
suited in gutting the Allende- government. In fact it was very inef-
fectual with the expenditure. of $11. million in my opinion. If there is
any inference in the testimony we have had that resulted in the mili-
tary coup,.that our actions resulted in the military coup, that is false,,
and yet the statements that were made on the floor yesterday indicated
that we instigated the co Lip by spending $11 million.
Mr. HARRINGTON. I never woul d.
Mr. BOB WILSON. Let inc ask this rhetorically.:. ITow would you like
to hate $11. million to run for. Governor of California with twice the
number of people? I use the example and analogy of a setting of 9
million ;people in a lcss sophisticated political niillieu and aptly it to
Chile against American dollars.
Mr, HAr,RING,ION. I..wouldn't run for Governor. of California if you
gave me $11 million.
Mr. NEDZI. We'have just a couple of more questions to complete the
record. Let me ask you this : How do you think the leak occurred?
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Mr. HARRINGTON. I really don't know. One of the things I said to
Seymour Hersh when he called, can you tell me where you got the one
thing? And an amusing thing, and it is maybe not entirely accurate
as it is secondhand-I heard it and had to some extent verified it-
the Fulbright office was frantically looking for copies of my letter
which was supposed to exist Senator Case's office called Over and asked
on Monday or Tuesday for the letter. I was told they were scrambling
around for a couple of days looking for the material I supposed got
to Fulbright back in July.
Mr. NEDZI. Was that the original letter a copy of Morgan's?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Both had the original letter. I think I alluded
to the fact the chairman of the other committee-if I had to guess, and
this is only a guess, and I said this to Martin Agronsky when he asked
me about it, I would basically see the letter to Fulbright or the Senate
side being the basis for what happened. I really don't know and would
be glad, as I told you, if I found out. I would be curious myself. But
I did not do it.
Mr. BoB WILsoN. You say you would assume it would fall, but it
may not look as if you pushed it?
Mr. HARRINGTON. I think really that has been the thrust of it all
this morning. I am more annoyed by what I consider to be vacillation
on my part in not having the courage to face it head on. I would not
engage in. that sort of thing. I would be more comfortable in taking
it to the floor of the House and letting you guys do what you want. I
never had any intention of going that way.
Mr. SLATINSHEK. I understood you to say you wrote a separate letter
to Mr. Fulbright. Is that correct?
Mr. HARRINGTON. I wrote identical letters to Fulbright and Morgan:
originally. Going to Mr. Nedzi's question, original copies.
Mr. SLATINSIIEK. Were they addressed specifically to Mr. Morgan,
and in the other instance to Senator ?Fulbright ?
Mr. HARRINGToN: Yes,
Mr. SLATINSIZEK. Could we have a copy for the record of both of
those letters?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Sure.
Mr. SL ATINSHEK. So we can insert them in the record.
Mr. IIARRINGTON. You can have it a]1.
Mr. SLATINSIIEK. What I am troubled by, you had indicated you
had personally handed them the letter's.
Mr. HARRINGTON. I had caused them to be personally -handed. I
thought I made that clear. Somebody asked did you mail them and I
said no, they were personally delivered.
Mr. BOB WILSON. I took you to mean you handexl the letters to them.
Mr. HARRINGTON. NO.
Mr. SLATINSHEK. In other words, you had a messenger hand deliver
this and they did hand deliver it to Chairman Morgan and to Chair-
man Fulbright?
Mr. HARRINGTON. That was the intent. I can go back, if you.would,
like, and see actually from the committees to'whom the delivery rwas.
made, if not to the chairman. I. frankly never inquired.
1Ir. SLATINSHEK. I think it would be important for the record we
know this.
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l%fr. HA.RRTN.GTON You,might check.
Mi. SLATINSSIInx, I would like .you to Provide that to us for the
.record
Mr, HARiIINGToN. Any way you want to do it,
Mr. SIr.lMNsIIEK. That is particularly important since the Seymour
Hersh - article repeatedly referred ,to' Thomas Morgan's letter, yet
Mr. Morgan I understand did not release the letter in any way. This.
is my informal understanding.
Mr. HARRINGTON. I am quite sure you have.a more: informal under-
standing .Of the situation than I do.
Mr.SLATINSHHEK.I am puzzled by the fact'tlie Seymour Hersh leak
uses the Morgan letter.
Mr.. HAuuNGTON. So am'I. That. was my theory to Mr. Nedzi in re-
spouse to his question..I thought frankly the Morgan title was only
used in effect to deflect attention from the Senate. ' .
Mr. NEDZI. Air. Morgan was referred to in the Senate letter.
Mr. HARRINGTON. The inference is clear I believe, in my writing to
both chairmen one could be substituted one for the other.
Mr. NEDZI. Have you supplied for-the, record now to.fhe''best of your
recollection . all. of the. individuals to whom: you imparted this info rma-
tioneither.by.letter .or by oral conversation?
Mr. HARRINGTON. That is correct.
Mr. NEDZI. Actually I don't see an. allusion. to the Fulbright letter
in the Morgan letter.
Mr. HARRINGTON. I will be.glad.to refresh my recollection. I assumed
it was or one could, infer. I haven't read. that in a 'while so I don't'know.
Mr. NEDZI. To pursue Frank's line. of questions, one would ?have, to
assume that the Fulbright letter was. available and some. additional
information to the effect that tliere,.was also a 1Vletgan letter.
Mr. HARRINGTON. Correct.
Mr. NEDzr. It was not clear. .from the,letter.
Mr. IIARRINGTON. I don't know. I don't have the .letter in front of
me. I assume I made a reference for the -chairman of the committee,
-so you would infer it was being sent both ways. Again, that is my guess
and. not anything beyond that at this point. Those are the letters, and
I can find out the method-ofdelivery. Mr..Slatinshek's intention is
very clear.
Mr..SLATIxsnEK. The question of the delivery, the individual who
delivered, whether personally delivered,. and give us-copies of the let-
ters. This woul&be helpful for the record.
Mr. HARRINGTON..
Mr. NEDzi. The subcommittee will ,stand in recess until further call.
,.of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m. the subcommittee recessed until ..call
~of-the Chair.]
[The,following information was received for. the record:]
DEAR NIB. HARRINGTON :As you will recall, on Wednesday, September 25, -..1974,
.you appeared as a witness before the Armed Services Special Subeammittee on
Intelligence.
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The Subcommittee is now endeavoring to complete the record in respect to your
testimony. However, certain materials that you had volunteered to provide for
the record have not as yet been received by the Subcommittee.
Specifically, I have reference to your offer to provide for the record :
(a) Your correspondence with Senator Fulbright on the Chilian matter; and
(b) Copies of the original letters sent to Chairman Morgan and Chairman
Fulbright; the manner of their delivery, the individuals who delivered the in-
dividual letters, as well as the names of the individuals who actually physically
received the letters.
I assume that your failure to provide this information for the record is due
to your exceedingly busy schedule or simple inadvertence. In any event, It would
be helpful to the Subcommittee to have this information made available so as to-,
permit it to complete its record of your testimony.
Sincerely,
FRANK M. SLATINSHEK, Chief Counsel.
Mr. FRANK M. SLATINSHE%, OCTOBER 8, 1974.
Chief Counsel, Committee on Armed Services, . U.S. House of Representatives,..
-Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SLATINSHEK: Thank you for your letter concerning the supplementary
materials mentioned in my September 25th testimony. My apologies for the delay
in responding.
Enclosed are copies of my correspondence with Senator Fulbright, as well as
copies of the original letters to Chairmen Morgan and Fulbright which you re
quested. It is my understanding that Lawrence Tell, who worked for me this
summer, hand delivered the July 18th letters to the personal secretaries of the
Chairmen and that the secretaries were admonished that the letters were per-
sonal, confidential and for the eyes of the respective Chairmen only.
If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours sincerely,
Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2183 Rayburn House Office Build-
ing, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : As you know, for sometime I have been actively inter-
ested in the development of United States foreign policy toward Chile, and par-
ticularly since the overthrow of the Allende government on September 11, 1973
and my visit to that country shortly thereafter. It is my purpose in writing to
discuss some of the fruits of my endeavors in that direction, which I feel pose
serious questions about the manner in which our current relations with Chile
evolved, how our policies there were implemented, and how Congress has exer-
cised its oversight function. I request that you bear with me on the length of
this letter, since I feel that the importance of its subject matter requires a
detailed and comprehensive presentation of the evolution of my present concern.
No doubt you are familiar with numerous reports, dating from the time of
Salvador Allende's election as President in 1970, alleging that the United States
government played an active role in trying to influence Chilean polities. Im-
mediately after the military coup last October, further reports appeared which
indicated that the United States was Involved, either directly or indirectly. At
that time, I made a very brief trip to Chile which enabled me to gain a sense of
the prevailing attitude there and, helped add some substance to my earlier im-
pression that the United States had engaged in political and economic destabil-
ization efforts that eventually led to President Allende's downfall.
Since that time, I have repeatedly tried to foeus attention, in Congress on the
origins of American policy toward the Allende government to determine its pos-
sible Influence in the eventual course of events in Chile. In particular, I was
concerned wIth the activities of the Treasury Departmept and the t{eiltral tn-
telligence Agency, the latter of which is the subject of quite limited tongrgss-
ional review that is perfunctory and comes after the fact. As you can readily
see from the exchange of correspondence which is attached to this letter, my
efforts have not been productive of any substantial inquiries into our policies
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toward the Allende government. Instead, the few hearings that have been held
focused largely on the internal situation in Chile and allegations of denials of
Civil and judicial rights. The following list of hearings and witnesses clearly
documents that fact :
Sept. 20, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs : Assistant Secretary of
State Jack Kubisch
Sept. 25, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs : Assistant Secretary of
State Jack Kubisch
October 11, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs : Central Intelli-
gence Agency witness
October 31, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: Defense Intelli-
gence Agency analysts
December 1, 1973 Subcommittees on Inter-American Affairs and International
Organizations and Movements: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE-Dr.' Frank
Newman
May 7, 1974 Subcommittee on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE-
Charles Porter, former Member of Congress ; Ira Lowe, attorney
May 23, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE--
Dr. Covey Oliver, former United States Ambassador
June 11, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE--
former Attorney General Ramsey Clark ; Judge William Booth
June 12, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE-
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman
June 18, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE-
Professors Richard Fagan,'John Planck, and Riordan Roett
Following the September 25, 1973 hearing, Chairman Fascell issued a state-
ment which read : ". . the Subcommittee will hold additional hearings on Chile
in the near future. We intend to conduct a full scale investigation of United States
policy toward Chile." The committed language of that statement has not been
pursued, despite a series of conversations between my office and the Subcommittee
both at the staff level and between Chairman Faseell and myself. Finally, a
request made in writing by me on March 7, 1974 to Chairman Fascell that he
hold hearings on U.S. activities in chile resulted in an inclusive exchange of
letters over three months with the end result that the Subcommittee has promised.
two days of hearings, possibly sometime this summer, with non-government
witnesses.
The one possible opportunity that was afforded to probe United States policies
toward Chile occurred during the Subcommittee executive session testimony in
-October, 1973 of CIA director. William Colby, who unfortunately refused to
respond fully to questions of CIA activities in Chile, citing the jurisdiction of the
Armed Services Committee. With little expectation that tangible results would
follow because of its past deference to the CIA in such matters. I turned to the
Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Armed Services Committee.
In my letter of April 2, 1974 to Chairman Nedzi, a copy of which is also attached,
I recounted the reluctance of CIA Director William Colby to fully testify before
the Foreign Affairs Committee and requested that Chairman Nedzi's Subcommit-
tee hold hearings to question Mr. Colby directly as to covert CIA operations in
.'Chile.
Mr. Colby testified on April 22, 1974 and after some delay, largely due to
Chairman Nedzi's desire to obtain clearance from Chairman Hebert, I was notified
on or about June 1, 1974 that I would be given access to the transcript. I read the
hearing transcript once on June 5 and again on June 12,- and the information
contained in the Colby testimony convinced me that it is of critical importance
for the Congress and the American people to learn the full truth of American
activities in Chile. I wish to share this information with you, in the hope that
.you will feel the same sense of conviction that I experienced upon learning the
full details of significant U.S. activities in the affairs of another country without
any prior consultation of even the committee charged with overseeing such
.operations. In fact, actual formal notification of that committee came seemingly
as an afterthought, and only after my request was made, many months after the
operations had been conducted.
While my memory must serve here as the only source for the substance of the
testimony,' I. submit the following summary of its contents as an indication of
what transpired in Chile.
The testimony was given on April 22, 1974 by Mr. Colby, who was accompanied
by a Mr. Phillips, who was apparently the Latin American specialist of the CIA.
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Also in attendance were Chairman Nedzi and Frank Slatinshek, Chief ; Counsel
of the House Armed Services Committee. Approximately one-third of the 48
pages of testimony is devoted to exposition by Mr. Colby of a continuous Central
Intelligence Agency involvement in the internal politics of Chile from 1962
through 1973. Most of the remainder of the testimony provides a description of
the methods employed by the CIA in conducting such operations, focusing on the
details of how activities in Chile were accomplished.
Over the 1962 to 1973 period, the Forty Committee (an interdepartmental body
that reviews and authorizes all covert. CIA activities and is chaired by the Presi-
dent's Advisor on National Security Affairs) authorized the expenditure of ap-
proximately $11 million to help prevent the election of Allende and, in Mr. Colby's
words. "destabilize" the Allende government so as to precipitate its downfall The
agency activities in Chile were viewed as a prototype, or laboratory experiment, to
test the techniques of heavy financial investment in efforts to discredit and bring
down a government.
Funding was provided to individuals, political parties, and media outlets in
Chile, through channels in other countries in both Latin America and Europe. Mr.
Colby's description of these operations was direct, though not to the point of
identifying actual contacts and conduits.
A total of $3 million was sent in 1964 to the Christian Democratic Party in
Chile that was opposing Allende in the national elections. Also in 19114, unidenti-
fied American corporations suggested that the CIA serve as a conduit for corpo-
rate funds that would finance anti-Allende activities, but that idea was rejected
as unworkable. Approximately $5(K),000 was authorized in 1969 to fund individ-
uals who could be nurtured to keep the anti-Allende forces active and intact.
During the 1970 election, in which Allende eventual was elected President,
$500,0(f) was given to opposition party personnel. An expenditure of $350,000 was
authorized to bribe the Chilean Congress, which at that time was faced with
deciding a run-off election betweeir Allende and the opposition candidate. The
bribe would have been part of a scheme to overturn the results of the election
in which Allende had gained a plurality, but that plan, although originally
approved by the Forty Committee, was later evaluated as unworkable.
The testimony indicates that the Agency role in 1970 was viewed as that of
the "spoiler," involving general attempts to politically destabilize the country
aad discredit Allende to improve the likelihood that an opposition candidate
would win.
Following the election of Allende, $5 million was authorized by the Forty
-Committee for more destabilization efforts during the period from 1971 to 1973.
An additional $1.5 million was spent for the 1973 municipal elections. Some of
these funds were used to support an unnamed but influential anti-Allende news-
paper.
Although a specific request in the summer of 1973 for $50,000 to assist the
trucker's strike was turned down, the Forty Committee did authorize in August,
1973 an expenditure of $1 million for further political destabilization activities.
This final authorization carne without any apparent deterrent being posed by the
recently completed hearings into ITT involvement in Chile and the Senate Water-
gate Committee's disclosure of CIA activities related to Watergate.
The full plan authorized in August was called off when the military coup
occurred less than one month later. In the aftermath of the coup, however, funds
that had been committed were spent. These included $25,000 to one Individual
to purchase a radio station and $9,000 to finance a trip to other Latin American
capitals to reassure then about the new military leaders.
Since learning this information, I have attempted once again to induce some
Members to pursue the facts of our involvement in the Chilean situation to deterr-
nrine how those policies evolved and how they can be justified as being in the
national interest. I have had a reasonably extended conversation with Congress-
man Fraser, and briefer ones with Congressmen Fascell and Hamilton, in which
I described what I learned from the Colby testimony. While they were indeed
distressed at the details of CIA operations, nothing was forthcoming as a result
of those conversations that leads me to believe that there would be further
investigations or hearings into the broader policy questions that such activities
pose.
I turn, to. you as a last resort, having despaired of the likelihood of anything
productive occurring as a result of the avenues I have already pursued. It is
indicative of my frustrations to note that in the five meetings this year of the
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, which focused on human rights in
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Chile, only one government witness with knowledge of U.S. activities in Chile
appeared. At that hearing, Congressman Fraser and I questioned Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman on possible CIA involvement in Chile while
he was stationed there as Deputy Chief of Mission from 19969 through mid-1973.
His answers, a transcript of which is attached, indicated to me some knowledge
on his part of CIA activities that lie was unwilling to discuss before a duly-
constituted Committee of the House. The inherent limitations facing Members
of Congress in uncovering the facts of covert activities such as those in Chile
requires, I believe, a commitment by those in a position to act beyond the existing,
illusory oversight machinery.
At his confirmation hearings on July 2, 1973, Director Colby said :
"We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries
run. We are going to run one in the American society and the American constitu-
tional structure, and I can see that there may be a requirement to expose to the
American people a great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow
intelligence point of view."
I feel it is time to hold Mr. Colby to his commitment, as the Congress and the
American people have a right to learn what was done in our name in Chile. Much
as I would prefer to see this accomplished within the channels of the Con-
gressional process, its importance convinces me that our very system of govern-
ment requires that knowledge of American activities in Chile not remain solely
with a handful. of officials and Members of Congress. Therefore, I urge you to
promptly turn this matter to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee for
A complete, public investigation of United States relations with Chile. I trust
that you will agree that the importance of this matter and its implications for
future foreign policies of the United States demands no less.
Yours sincerely, MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON.
lion. THOMAS MORGAN,
Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2188 Rayburn /louse Office
Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRRrAN : I am writing to reaffirm my request to you of July 18,
1974, that you initiate open hearings in connection with United States policy
with respect to Chile during the Allende period.
As you know, Mr. William Colby, Director of the CIA, in recent newspaper
reports, is reported as having stated that the CIA is an instrument of policy,
that it dogs not make policy, and that in connect ion with the Agency's clandestine
activities in Chile during the Allende period, the Agency was implementing the
.foreign policy of the United States. Hence, I believe that the issue rests squarely
within the jurisdiction of the House Foreign Affairs Committee : who made the
policy which led the. Central Intelligence Agency to undertake the extensive
clandestine activities designed to subvert the Allende government?
In my -opinion, an accounting to the American people and the Congress is in
order and we should demand that accounting from Secretary of State Kissinger
who, according to Mr. Colby, was the author of the policy toward Chile.
It, is no longer acceptable for the Congress to acquiesce in State Department
officials' coining before Congressional committees and making statements which,
if not outright lies, are at least evasions of the truth. I urge that your committee,
before which State Department officials have testified on this matter, reopen its
inquiry in light of what we now know, and determine whether or not transcripts
of their previous testimony should be transmitted to the Department of Justice
for perjury.
Yours sincerely,
MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON.
JULY 18, 1974.
Hon. J. WILLIAaz Fur.RRIOHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1215 Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CIIAIRMAN : As you may know, for sometime I have been actively
interested In the development of United States foreign policy toward Chile, and
particularly since the overthrow of the Allende government on September II.,
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410
1973 and my visit to that country shortly thereafter. It is my purpose in writing
to discuss some of the fruits of my endeavors in that direction, which I feel pose
serious questions about the manner in which our current relations with. Chile
evolved, how our policies there were implemented, and how Congress has exer-
cised its oversight function. I~ request that you bear with me on the length of
this letter, since I feel that the importance. of its subject matter. requires a de-
tailed and comprehensive presentation of the evolution of my present concern.
No, doubt you are familiar with numerous reports, dating from the time of
Salvador Allende's election as President in 1970,. alleging that the UnitedStates
government played an active role in trying to influence Chilean polities. Immedi-
ately after the military coup last October, further. reports appeared which indi-
cated that the United States was involved, either directly or indirectly. At that
time, I made a very brief trip to Chile which enabled inc to gain a sense of the
prevailing attitude there and helped add some substance to my earlier impres-
sion that the United States had engaged in political and economic destabilization
efforts that eventually led to President Allende's downfall.
Since that time, I have repeatedly tried to focus attention in Congress on the
origins of American policy toward the Allende government to determine its pos-
sible influence in the eventual course of events in Chile. In particular, I was con-
cerned with the activities of the Treasury Department and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the latter of which is the subject of quite limited Congressional
review that is perfunctory and comes after the fact. As you can. readily see from
the exchange of correspondence which is attached to this letter, my efforts have
not been productive of any substantial inquiries into our policies toward the
Allende government. Instead, the few hearings that have been held focused
largely on the internal situation in Chile and allegations of denials of civil and
judicial rights. The following list of hearings and witnesses clearly documents
tllat fact :
Sept. 20, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs : Assistant Secretary
of State Jack Kubiseh
Sept. 25, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs : Assistant Secretary of
State Jack Kubisch
October 11, 1M3 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: Central Intelligence
Agency witness:
October 31, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs : Defense Intelli-
gence Agency analysts
December 7, 1973 Subcommittees on Inter-American Affairs and International
Oxganiiations and Movements : HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE--Dr. Frank New-
man
May 7, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM : HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE
Charles Porter, former Member. of Congress, Ira Lowe, attorney
May 23, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IO:M : HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE
-Dr. Covey Oliver, former United States Ambassador
June 11, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IO.II : HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE
-former Attorney General Ramsey Clark : Judge William Booth
June 12, 1974 Subcommittees on. IAA and IOM : HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE
-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman
Jutfs 18, 1971, Subcommittees. on IAA and IOM : HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE
-Professors Richard Fagan. John Planck, and Riordan Roett
Following the September 25, 1973 hearing, Chairman Fascell issued a state-
ment which read : ". . . the Subcommittee will hold additional hearings on Chile
in the near future. We intend to conduct a full scale investigation of United
States policy toward- Chile." The committed language of that statement has not
been pursued, despite a series of conversations between my office and the Sub-
committee both at the staff level and between Chairman Fascell and myself.
Finally, a request made in. writing by me on March 7, 1974 to Chairman Fascell
that he hold hearings on U.S. activities in Chile resulted in. an inconclusive
exchange of letters over three months, with the end result that the Subcommittee
has promised two days of hearings, possibly sometimes this summer, with non-
government witnesses.
The one possible opportunity that-was afforded,to, probe United States policies
toward Chile, oc`ei1rr-,e4 during,the Subcommittee, executive session testimony in
vOefober, ''`Q73!,6D' 1At direetoi Wifiiam Colby, 'whoa unfortunately refused to
respond fully to questions of CIA activities in Chile, citing the jurisdiction of
the 'Armed Services Committee. With little expectation that tangible results
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would follow because of its past deference to'the CIA in such matters, I turned
to the: Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, .In my..letter of. April 2, 1974 to Chairman Nedzi, a copy of which is also
attached,, I recounted the reluctance of CIA Director William Colby to fully
testify before, the Foreign Affairs Committee and requested that Chairman Nedzi's
Subcommittee.hold hearings to questions Mr. Colby directly as to covert CIA
operations in Chile.
Mr. Colby testified on April 22, 1974 and after some delay, largely due to
Chairman Nedzi's desire to. obtain clearance -from Chairman Ilebert, I was
notified on or about June 1, 1974 that I would be given access to the transcript.
I. read the hearing transcript once on June 5 and .again on June 12, and the
information contained in the Colby testimony convinced inc that it is of critical
importance for the Congress and the American people to learn the full truth
of American activities in Chile. I wish to share this information with you, in
the hope that you will feel the same sense of conviction that I experienced upon
learning the full details of significant U.S. activities in the affairs of another
country without any prior consultation of even the committee charged with'
overseeing such operations. In fact, actual formal notification of that committee,
came seemingly as an afterthought, and only after my request was made, many'
months after the operations had been conducted.
While my memory must serve here as the only source for the substance of'
the testimony, I submit the following summary of its contents as an indication
of what transpired in Chile.
The testimony. was given on April 22, 1971 by Mr. Colby, who was accom-
Iianied by a Mr. Phillips, who was apparently the Latin American specialist of
the CIA. Also.in attendance were Chairman Nedzi and Frank Slatinshek, Chief'
Counsel of the Ilou'se Armed Services Committee. Approximately one third of'
the 48'pages of testimony is-devoted to exposition by Mr. Colby of a continuous
Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the internal politics of Chile #roan.
1962 .through 1973. Most of the remainder of the testimony provides a description
of the methods employed by the CIA in conducting such operations, focusing.
on the details of how activities in Chile were accomplished.
Over the 1962 to 1973 period, the Forty Committee (an interdepartmental
body that reviews and authorizes all covert ? CIA activities and is chaired by
the President's Advisor on National Security Affairs) authorized the expendi-
ture of approximately $11 million to help prevent the election of Allende and,
in Mr. Colby's words, "destabilize" the Allende government so as to precipitate;
its downfall. The agency activities in Chile were viewed as a prototype, or Tabora-?
tory.experiinent,'to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in efforts-.
to discredit and bring down a government.
Funding was provided to individuals, political parties, and media 'outlets in
Chile, through channels in other countries in both Latin America and Europe.
Mr. Colby's description of these operations was direct, though not 'to the point
of identifying actual contacts and conduits.
A total of $3 million 'was sent in 1964 to the -Christian Democratic Party in
Chile that was opposing Allende in the national elections. Also in 1964, uniden-
tified American corporations suggested that the ? CIA serve as a conduit for
corporate feuds that would finance anti-Allende activities, but that' ido' waa
rejected as unworkable. Approximately $500,000 -was authorized in 1969 to,
fund individuals who could be nurtured to keep the anti-Allende forces. active
and intact.
During the 1970 election; in which Allende eventually was elected President,
$500,000 was given to opposition party personnel.. An expenditure of $350,000
was authorized to bribe the Chilean Congress, which at that time' was faced
with deciding a run-off election between Allende and the opposition candidate.
The bribe would have been part of a scheme to overturn the results of the election
in which, Allende had gained a plurality, but that plan, although originally
approved by the' Forty Committee, was later evaluated as unworkable.
The testimony indicates that the Agency role in 1970. was viewed as that of
the "spoiler." involving general attempts to politically' destabilize the, country
and discredit Allende to improve the likelihood that an opposition candidate,
would. win.
Following the election of Allenue, s million vvas authorized by the Forty
Committee for more destabilization efforts during the period from 1971 to 1973,
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I feel it is time to hold Mr. Colby to his commitment. ns the Congress and the
American people have a right to learn what was done in our name in Chile. Much
as I would prefer to see this accomplished within the channels of the Congres-
sional process, its importance convinces me that our very system of government
requires that knowledge of American activities in Chile not remain solely with a
handful of officials and Members of Congress. Therefore, I urge you to promptly
turn this matter to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee for a complete,
public investigation of United States relations with Chile. I trust that you will
agree that the Importance of this matter and' its implications for future foreign:
policies of the United States demands no less.
Yours sincerely,
An additional $1.5 million was spent for the 1973 municipal elections. Some of
these funds were used to support an unnamed but influential anti-Allende
newspaper.
Although a specific request in the summer of 1973 for .$50,000 to assist the
trucker's strike was turned down, the Forty Committee did authorize in Au-
gust, 1973 an expenditure of $1 million for. further political destabilization ac-
tivities. This final authorization came without any apparent. deterrent being
posed by the recently completed hearings into ITT involvement in Chile and
the Senate Watergate Committee's disclosure.. of CIA activities related. to
Watergate.
The full plan authorized in .August was called off when the. military coup
occurred less than one month later. In the aftermath of the coup, however,
funds that had been committed were spent. These included $255,000 to one indi-
vidual to purchase a radio station and $9,000 to finance a trip to. other Latin
American capitals to reassure them about the new military leaders.
Since learning this information, I have attempted cake again to induce some
Members to pursue the facts of our involvement in the Chilean situation to deter-
mine how those policies evolved and how they can be justified as being in the
national interest. I have had a reasonably extended conversation with Congress-
man Fraser, and briefer ones with Congressman FasceIl and Hamilton, "in which
I described what I learned from the Colby testimony- While they were indeed
distressed at the details of CIA operations, nothing was forthcoming as a result
of those conversations that leads inc to believe that there would be further investi-
gations or hearings into the broader policy questions that such activities pose.
I turn to you as a last resort, having despaired of the likelihood of anything pro-
ductive occurring as a result of the avenues I have already pursued. It is indicative
of my frustrations to note that in the five meetings this year of the Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs, which focused on human rights in Chile, only one
government witness with knowledge of U.S. activities in Chile appeared. At that-
hearing, Congressman Fraser and I questioned Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State. Harry Shlaudeman on possible CIA involvement in' Chile while be was
stationed there as Deputy Chief of Mission from 1969 through mid-1973. His
answers, a transcript of which is attached, indicated to me some knowledge on
his part of CIA activities that he was unwilling to discuss 'before a -duly-
constituted Committee of the House. The inherent limitations facing Members of
Congress in uncovering the facts of covert activities such as those in Chile
requires, I believe, a commitment by those in a position to act beyond the existing,
illusory oversight machinery.
At his confirmation hearings on July 2, 1973, Director Colby said.:
"We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries
run. We are going to run one in the American society and the American constitu-
tional structure, and I can see that there may he a requirement to expose to the
American people a great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow
MICHAEL J. HABsXmc roN.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN : I apologize for the delay in responding to your. letter,
but have been.diverted by hearings in the Committee and other related'matteilB.
Hon. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON,
ri.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
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The question you pose in your letter is one of longstanding concern. The For-
eign Relations Committee has attempted from time to time to examine. CIA
representatives; when critical questions have been asked of these individuals,
we have consistently' received the answer that they are responsible to the Presi-
dent, the National Security Council, and the informal Committee of five in the
Senate; and they would not respond to specific, questions involving their methods
of influencing foreign elections,. such as Chile.
I share your frustration in this situation, but, as you know, .this has been. going
on in places other than Chile for many years: I have sponsored and suppox-ted
efforts to create a Committee similar to the. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
which would have specific and complete authority to examine the CIA. and
exercise some control over their activities. As you.will recall, the Congress di(I
not support these efforts. Furthermore, I do not believe that a thorough investi?
gxtion by the Foreign Relations Committee, would produce very much beyond that
which we already know, and if it did, unless there is a tremendous change in.the
attitude of the members of the Senate, nothing could be done about it. In short,
the Senate at least has been unwilling, to exercise serious control of the, CIA,
.and apparently approves of the activities to which you refer in Chile and which
I believe to be a procedure which] he CIA has followed in other countries.
The Committee on Foreign Relations is beginning, on the 8th of August,. an in-
depth study of the problem of our relations with the Communist world.. These
hearings will not bear directly upon the problem of the CIA, but will involve the
basic policy in which the CIA thinks tit is involved in their covert activities..
I believe, in spite of our frustration, that the creation of a Joint Committee,
with full authority to examine the CIA and control it, is the only practical
.answer to the problem. The Foreign Relations Committee, in a show down, never
has sufficient votes to overcome the opposition of the forces led by the Arnied.
Services Committee in the Senate, but. a Joint Committee, if it felt disposed to
.do so, I think would have sufficient prestige to exercise control. If you think well
of this idea, .1 will be glad to join with you in sponsoring a renewal of the effort
to create a -joint Committee on the Intelligence Community.
With all best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
J. W. FULBRIo1IT,
SEPTEMBER 11, 1974.
1101n. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGIIT,
,Chairrm.a.n, Scisate Foreign. Relations Cominittec, 1215 Dirlcsen Senate ?fflce
Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CIIAIIRMAN : I am writing to reaffirm may request to you of July 18,
1074, that,you initiate open hearings in connection with United States policy
with respect to Chile during the Allende period.
As you know, Mr. William Colby, Director of the CIA, in recent newspaper
reports, is reported as having stated= that the CIA is an instru anent, of policy,
that it does not make policy, and that in connection with the Agency's clandes-
tiue activities in Chile during the Allende period, the Agency was implementing
the foreign policy of the United States. Bence, I believe that the issue rests
squarely within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
who made the policy which led the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake the
extensive clandestine activities designed to subvert the Allende government.
In my opinion, an accounting to the American people and the Congress Is i4
order and we should demand, that accounting from Secretary of State Kissinger
who, according to Mr. Colby, was the author of the policy toward Chile.
It is no longer acceptable for the Congress to acquiesce in State Department
officials' coming before Congressional committees and making statements which,
if not outright lies, are at least evasions of the truth. I urge that your committee,
before which State Department officials have testified on this matter, reopen
its inquiry in light of what we now know, and determine whether or not .tran-
scripts of their previous testimony should, be transmitted to the Department of
.Justice for perjury.
Yours: sincerely,
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414
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE JOHN J. FLYNT, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON STAND-
ARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TO MEMBERS OF
THE COMMITTEE AT A MEETING CONVENED ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1975
Members of the Committee, it is my duty to state to you certain facts came to
my attention on yesterday relating to the complaint filed by Representative
Robin L. Beard against Representative Michael J. Harrington. The substance of
the Beard complaint is fully known to all on the Committee. However, because
the facts I am about to relate are directly relevant to the complaint, I will briefly
restate it.
In summary, Mr. Beard has charged Mr. Harrington with violation of Rule XI,
Clause 27 (o) of the Rules of the House in the 93rd Congress. It is Mr. Beard's
charge that, under Rule XT 27 (c) of the 93rd Congress, Mr. Harrington obtained
-access to executive session testimony taken by the Special Subcommittee on
Intelligence of the House Armed Services Committee on 22 April 1974 from CIA
Administrator William E. Colby concerning the CIA and the government of
Chile. lit is further Mr. Beard's charge that Mr. Harrington divulged the execu-
tive session testimony without the consent of the Armed Services Committee,
in violation of Rule XI 27 (o) and in violation of the Rules of the Armed Services
4Commtttee concerning access to executive session testimony.
At a hearing of the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Armed Services
Committee held on 25 September 1974 for the purpose of inquiring into the dis-
closure of the 22 April 1974 testimony. Mr. Harrington testified under oath and,
for all intents and purposes, admitted that he had disclosed testimony as sub-
sequently alleged by Mr. Beard.
The record of the 25 September 1974 hearing of the Special Subcommittee on
Intelligence includes copies of letters addressed by Mr. Harrington to Senator
Fulbright and Representative Morgan (Pages 31 through 37, H.A.S.C. 94-12).
In those letters Mr. Harrington stated that he had read the Colby testimony
and that it appeared in "testimony given on 22 April 1974 by Mr. Colby who was
accompanied by a Mr. Phillips. Also in attendance were Chairman Nedzi and
Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel of the House Armed Services Committee."
We have discovered, as of 5 November 1975, that, in fact, no public notice
was sent out to call the 22 April 1974 meeting. No quorum of the Special Sub-
committee on Intelligence appeared for the meeting. No vote to go into Executive
Session was taken and there was only one Committee Member, Chairman Nedzi,
present when Mr. Colby testified.
Since House Rules in the 93rd Congress required an affirmative vote of a ma-
jority of a quorum of a Committee to close a meeting for executive session and,
further, required the presence of at least two members for the purpose of taking
testimony, we are required to find that the "hearing" which was believed to have
been held was a nullity.
In other words, no executive session occurred and the Information divulged
was not taken in an executive session of a Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives.
Until this information was made known to your Chairman and other Members
of this Committee yesterday, all proceedings of this Committee on the Beard
complaint had been premised on the understanding and upon being informed,
that, in fact, an executive session had occurred and that the informatioh that
had been disclosed had been. given at such a session.
Since it has now been made known that the premises upon which the proceed-
ings of this Committee have been based are not valid, I believe we have no
recourse except that of dismissing the Beard complaint.
Accordingly, the investigative hearings which were scheduled to commence
next Tuesday, 11 November, should be dismissed if the Committee so directs.
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OVERSIGHT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE
FUNCTIONS
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 11:15 a.m. in room 3302,
the Dirkson Senate Office Building, Hon. Abraham Ribicoff (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Present : Senators Ribicoff, Allen, Chiles, Nunn, Glenn, Percy, Roth,
Javits, and Weicker..
Staff members present : Richard A. Wegman, chief counsel and staff
director; Paul Hoff, counsel; Paul Rosenthal, assistant counsel; Mari-
lyn A. Harris, chief clerk, and Elizabeth A. Preast, assistant chief
clerk.
Chairman RIBICOFF. The committee will be in order, 15 minutes late.
I noted, Mr. Secretary, in some of your comments, in Hollywood the
other day, when you stated, "I have been cited in contempt of Con-
gress. However, I want it known that I spent 7 years in Washington,
concealing my contempt of Congress."
I hope your being late is not to prove that you actually do have con-
tempt for Congress.
Secretary KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, first of all, that was a humor-
ous remark, and it was not exactly quoted correctly. I said some of my
friends make that allegation.
Second, my apologies for being late. I was delayed by the President
and the traffic jam.
Chairman RlBlcorr. You may proceed, sir.
TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary ICISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to
appear before this committee to give you my views on the relationship
I hope will develop between the Congress and the U.S. intelligence
community.
The executive-legislative relationship and foreign policy first.
It is essential that a sounder relationship between the executive and
the legislative evolve. The present relationship has reached a point
where the ability of the United States to conduct a coherent foreign
policy is being eroded.
This is certainly true in the intelligence field. One has only to look
at the recent leakage-indeed, official publication-of highly classified
material and the levying of unsubstantiated charges and personal
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416
attacks against the executive to see the point, the relationship has
reached and the harm we are doing to ourselves.
This situation must be unacceptable to us in both branches of the
Government, and it must be unacceptable to the American people.
Fundamental changes are taking place in the world at an unprece-
dented rate. New centers of power are emerging, altering relations
among older power centers. Growing economic interdependence makes
each of us vulnerable to financial and industrial troubles in countries
formerly quite remote from us. And, most important, we are working
hard to establish more rational and reliable relationships with powers
whose values and interests are alien and inimical to us and who, in
some cases, have the power to destroy us.
The conduct of foreign policy in this complex and fast-changing
situation requires that there be close coordination and mutual trust
between Congress and the executive branch and a large measure of
trust in both branches by the American people.
I am aware of the benefits of a certain amount of dynamic tension
between the branches of our Government. Indeed, the Founding
Fathers designed this into the Constitution with the principle of the
separation of powers. But there is an adverse impact on the public
mind in this country and on our national image abroad when this
beneficial tension deteriorates into confrontation. We have recently
seen this happen. This is why I hope this committee and the Congress
as a whole, with the help and suggestions from the Executive, can
construct an oversight mechanism for U.S. intelligence that can bring
an end to the strife, distrust, and confusion that have accompanied
the. investigations of the. past year.
I look to the development of means by which Congress can partic-
ipate more fully in the guidance and review of the intelligence activ-
ities of this Government and by which the Exe< itive, can direct. and
conduct those activities with the confidence of being in step with
Congress in this vital area of our foreign affairs.
Our foreign policy must cope with complex problems of nuclear and
conventional arms races, traditional and ideological disputes which
can trigger wider wars and sweeping economic dislocations ; emerging
new nations which can become. the arena for great-power contests;
environmental. pollution, food shortages, energy maldistributions
which affect the lives of hundreds of millions; and financial shifts
which can threaten the global economic order. In the, face of these great
challenges our goals are to foster the growth of a rationally ordered
world in which states of diverse views and objectives can cooperate for
the common benefit. W17'e seek a world based on justice and the promo-
tion of human dignity.
We cannot pursue these goals in this hazardous world unless we are
secure, and we cannot be secure unless we, are sirong and alert. Our
abii itv to be both strong and alert depends in part on good intelligence.
To be strong, we must know as precisely as possible how we are
threatened. In this age of highly sophisticated and expensive weapons
systems, we cannot afford to arm ourselves against all possible threats;
we must concentrate on those that are most likely in order to save our
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,resources for other purposes that make our country economically,
socially, and morally strong.
To be alert is not just a matter of knowing where the dangers of
war and change are increasing, basic as that knowledge is. We must
have the knowledge essential to our ability to try to help reduce the
dangers to peace. Intelligence is crucial to the future of this Nation.
To help construct a more cooperative world we must understand
trends and possibilities. Intelligence is an indispensable tool in this
effort.
The intelligence on which such judgments must be based can come
only from a highly professional intelligence service supported by Con-
gress and the people of this country. President Ford expressed it very
well in the State of the Union address when he said :
As conflict and rivalries persist in the world, our United States intelligence
capabilities must be the best in the world.
The crippling of our foreign intelligence services increases the danger of
American involvement in direct armed conflict. Our adversaries are encouraged to
attempt new adventures, while our own ability to monitor events, and to influence
events short of military action-is undermined.
Without effective intelligence capability, the United States stands blindfolded
and hobbled.
Let me give you just two examples :
Our policy to establish a more rational and reliable relationship
with the Soviet Union-commonly referred to as detente-would be
impossible without good intelligence. Indeed, our confidence in the
SALT agreements is based in large measure on the specific provisions
which permit each side to check on the compliance of the other through
national technical means of verification.
Similarly, without excellent intelligence the United States would
not have been able to play the leading role in seeking to bring about a
negotiated settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. All agree that
a new conflict there could bring the United States and the Soviet Union
to the brink of war.
Let me turn to the principles involved in the congressional over-
flight. As I have repeatedly said, this Nation's foreign policy must
reflect the values, aspirations, and perceptions of its people; it must
have broad public support. The American people must have confidence
not only in our policies but also in the institutions which formulate
and carry out those policies. This means that our foreign policy must
reflect consultation and accommodation between the executive and
legislative branches. But each branch has its special responsibilities
as well. The Executive must provide strong central direction of foreign
policy and must consult with the Congress. Congress must provide
mature counsel and must protect the confidentiality of its consultations
with the Executive.
That brings me to the question this committee is addressing : How
should a democracy provide for control of its intelligence activities
which, if they are to be effective, must operate in secret?
It is not my place as Secretary of State to recommend how the
Congress should organize its oversight effort, but for oversight to be
effective and constructive, conditions must be created which will pro-
mote mutual trust in dealing with the necessarily sensitive aspects of
intelligence information and operations. Both overseers and those
,overseen must be able to feel sure that information given in confidence
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will remain in confidence. No other single condition for success is as
important as this. The system cannot function in the atmosphere of
distrust that has prevailed in recent months.
Rather than make specific proposals for oversight, I would prefer
to set forth some general principles which I believe are important and
should be given serious consideration.
First : I believe that the goal of congressional oversight should be
to insure that the intelligence activities of the United States are
grounded in the basic values, perceptions and aspirations of the people
of this country as well as in a clear view of the national interest. Con-
gress has a particular responsibility in insuring that this is so because
intelligence does not :lend itself to extensive public or media debate.
This requires that the public have great confidence in the congressional
oversight mechanism. Americans must be assured that their constitu-
tional rights will not be abridged by intelligence operations.
I welcome congressional oversight because I believe it will build
public confidence in our intelligence system, and we in the executive
branch can benefit from the wise counsel oversight can provide. But
correction of the errors of the past must not take the form of controls
in the future that would stifle intelligence.
Second : I believe we must maintain the proper constitutional per-
spective. Under the Constitution, the conduct of foreign relations is
the responsibility of the President as the Nation's Chief Executive
officer. Congressional oversight must not infringe on the President's
responsibility for intelligence in a way which would violate the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers. The 'Constitution is written as it is
for practical as well as for political reasons. Congress is a deliberative
and lawmaking body, not an executive organ, and it is not organized
to provide day-to-day operational direction to ongoing intelligence
programs. Any proposal based on the idea of executive management by
Congress is, in my judgment, a mistake. Existing legislation requires
the President to determine that covert action operations are important
to national security and to give timely notice of those operations to
appropriate bodies of the. Congress. I believe this is adequate for over-
sight. I recommend that this or a similar arrangement be continued:
but that it be concentrated in the oversight committee.
Third : Is the crucial matter that the information provided to the
congressional oversight body must in many cases remain secret. Much
of this information is highly classified and is gathered from intelli-
gence sources and methods whose cooperation could be. lost by public
exposure. Some of it also bears on U.S. plans or policies whose effec-
tiveness depends on continued protection from disclosure. Unauthor-
ized release of such information could do great damage to national
security and our foreign policy. Protection of it is a responsibility
both the Congress and_the Executive must share. I strongly believe
that any legislation to establish an oversight committee must include
safeguards for the protection of this sensitive and important informa-
tion. Classified information given to the Congress should not be made
public without the concurrence of the President or his representative..
As a related point, I would like to state my agreement with Mr.
Colby that it is essential to establish procedures and sanctions to pre-
vent unauthorized disclosure of classified material. Legislation for this
purpose is currently under consideration in the executive branch. It
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would provide for the prosecution of Government employees who dis-
close such information without authority.
Fourth, and last : I believe the best oversight is concentrated over-
sight-ideally by a joint committee. The benefits of such an arrange-
ment are numerous : It would permit rapid responses both ways be-
tween the Congress and the intelligence community when time was
crucial; it would reduce the chance of leaks by limiting the number of
people with access to sensitive information; it would encourage maxi-
mum sharing of information; and it would permit a rapid development
of expertise to facilitate penetrating and effective oversight.
If a joint committee is not possible, I ask that you keep the principle
and benefits of concentration in mind and limit oversight to the mini-
mum number of committees required to conduct oversight effectively.
In concluding, I would like to express again my fervent hope that
we can rapidly end the divisive debate over the intelligence community
which has been so harmful over the past year. I hope this committee
will quickly complete its task of establishing effective oversight so that
we can all turn to the real challenges that face us in this dangerous
world.
I stand ready to help in any way I can, and I am ready to answer
any questions you may have.
Chairman Rrnicorr. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
If there is no objection, each member will confine himself to 10
minutes of questioning on the first round.
Mr. Secretary, does the administration support the creation this year
of a new congressional committee on intelligence oversight?
Secretary KISSINGrr,. Yes.
Chairman RIBrcorr. Chairman Church and several other members of
the Select Committee introduced a bill creating a new Senate Com-
mittee on Intelligence.
Does the administration have any position on the Church bill?
Secretary KISSINGER. Our preferred position is a joint committee.
The next best thing would be one committee in each House that con-
centrates the intelligence oversight, so we support this part of the
Church bill.
There are other provisions in the Church bill which we cannot sup-
port, such as the prior approval by the committee of covert operations.
Chairman RuBicoFr. We complete our hearings tomorrow. Congress
takes a recess until the 16th. On the 18th, this committee will start
marking up an intelligence oversight bill.
Could we expect from the administration its point of view on the
bills, including the Church bill, and suggestions from the administra-
tion before the 18th indicating what its position may be?
Secretary KISSINGER. I would hope so. I would like to make clear
that I do not have principal responsibility for developing the admin-
istration's position on these bills.
The President has before him various approaches to the organiza-
tion of intelligence which include also his final position on the attitude
to take toward congressional oversight.
I hope that they can be completed before the 18th.
Chairman RIBrcorr. According to Senator Church, you told his com-
mittee that an oversight committee should be briefed in advance before
any significant covert operation.
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Your statement this morning suggests a committee of Congress--
I read from page 8-.should have timely notice of covert operations.
Does your reference today to timely notice mean advance notice?
Secretary KISSINGER. Excuse me.
Chairman RIBzcoFF. Does your reference today to timely notice mean
advance notice, as you indicated to Senator Church when you briefed
his committee?
Secretary KiSSINGER. Let me separate two things, Mr. Chairman.
I would think that a wise administration would consult with an over-sight committee prior to conducting a covert operation. This is a dif-
ferent matter from writing in the law a requirement that would pre-
clude an administration under conditions of emergency or under con-
ditions that have some special now unforeseeable conditions that. would
preclude the administration from conducting such operations.
So I would think that on the whole., the notice should be timely,
which means literally-and which in fact would probably mean-
some consultation ahead of time.
Chairman RIBICOFr. What do you think should happen in the event
that a majority of an oversight committee disagrees with the pro-
posed operation?
Should the President go ahead with the operation in spite of con-
gressional opposition as conveyed to the President before the operation
starts, or while it is being contemplated?
Secretary KissINGFR. Again, I would separate the practice from what
the law should be.
I would think that as a practical matter the President would have
to weigh very seriously, take very serious account of an opposition
of a congressional oversight, just as we would take very seriously, say,
the opposition of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to a 'major
departure in policy.
If, however, the President believes that the overwhelming national
interest requires him to proceed even when the oversight committee
disagrees, then he should have the right to do so, recognizing that this
may lead to a constitutional confrontation, and that it cannot be either
in his interests or in the interests of the country to provoke that.
Chairman R imcoFF. I have been following your speeches in the last
few days, in your western trip, and you talked about the need for close
cooperation between the executive and Congress if we are going to have
an effective foreign policy.
I think all of us agree with you. Yet, if the President or,the Secre-
tary of State proceeds with an operation in spite of congressional
opposition, how can you have cooperation?
Let us take Angola. Here is a typical example o f where the President
and yourself are in serious trouble, because there is an overwhelming
sentiment in the Congress against our involvei=lent in the Angolan
situation-and this has been indicated by heavy votes against covert
aid to Angola, both by the Senate and the House.
Now, could not this have been obviated if you had told the over-
sight committee in advance of your intentions in a place like Angola
and immediately could have received the warning bells from a repre-
sentative group of Senators that this is just not going to fly in the
Congress and in the country ?
What would you have done under those circumstances?
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Secretary KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, first of all, the administration
followed the existing procedures with great care. There was no over-
sight committee. There were three oversight committees in each House-,
plus the two intelligence committees.
Each of these committees was briefed not once but several times,
Every time a new decision was made with respect to Angola, these
committees were briefed. Altogether, 8 congressional committees were
briefed 24 different times. Over 20 Senators, over 100 Congressmen
and over 150 staff members were briefed about what we were doing
in Angola.
We did not get the warning bells that you mentioned.
It does not mean that everybody agreed with it, but I think you will
agree, Mr. Chairman, there is a difference between some quibble or
with some disagreement about policy and a clear indication that the
Congress would absolutely or strongly oppose this.
Maybe there was a breakdown in communication, but the fact of
the matter is that we not only complied with the letter, we complied
with the spirit in the sense that every time something new was done in
Angola, we either briefed the committees just before or just after the
decision was made and well before it was -underway to full implemen-
tation.
We did not receive the warning bells.
The second question is whether something flies in the Congress or
in the public depends very importantly on how the issues are presented
and therefore the nature of the Angola debate, has taken a turn that
was not foreseeable on the basis of the congressional consultations that
we engaged in before that.
I would hope, however, that an oversight committee with a regular
procedure, with a clearer understanding of the mutual responsibilities
could avoid the problems that we have faced with respect to Angola.
But I would like to say one final thing about Angola, Mr. Chairman.
We know the congressional sentiment and we are going to abide by
it, but we also have an obligation to put before the country our con-
cerns as to the impact on future policy, even if it does not affect .the
immediate decision.
We have to prevent similar things from happening again, and there-
fore we have an obligation to state what we think the foreign policy
implications are. And that does not indicate a disrespect for the Con-
gress, it indicates a necessity of shaping the public debate if a similar
circumstance should arise again.
Chairman PAJBICorr. Secretary Kissinger, I owe you a personal
apology. I understand that Mrs. Kissinger went to the hospital this
morning for surgery and that, this was the reason you were late for
the committee. I want to state that I was not aware of that.
Secretary KTSSINGER. She is going tomorrow, but we had to wait for
the medical report.
Chairman Rlmcorr. One final question.
In view of what you have said, may I say that speaking for myself
and, I believe I have talked personally and privately with practically
every member of this committee, we in this committee are not com-
mitted to any specific oversight method, the Church bill or any other
bill. We approach this problem with a deep desire to come up with an
oversight committee so established as to do a responsible job to achieve
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what you seek, good cooperation and effective cooperation between the
Executive and Congress.
So the question of prior notice is going to be very important for us,
including the problem of what is done in the event that there is a basic
disagreement between the majority of the committee and the Execu-
tive? How do we make this known to the Congress as a whole?
That is why I am anxious to have the point of view of the executive
branch.
That view will be considered very carefully and respectfully, and I
would hope that you would make this known to the President and to
whoever is working on it that we are under direction by the Senate to
report a bill by March 1. As far as the chairman is concerned, we will
do everything possible in this conunittee to get the bill out by March 1,
and I would hope that we do not wait until February 28 to receive the
recommendations from the executive branch.
Secretary KIssiNGER. I will transmit this to the President. I know he
is working very hard on developing his own recommendations. I just
do not know what deadline he is working against, but we will certainly
communicate this, and hope that we can cooperate with this committee.
Chairman RisicoFF. Senator Percy?
Senator PERCY. Secretary Kissinger, is there any question in your
mind that Congress has failed in the past to exercise the proper, legiti-
mate oversight responsibility with respect to our intelligence
operations?
Secretary Kisser GER. It is difficult to know what the definition of
effective oversight is. I believe, in light of events, that a more coherent
oversight procedure, one in which the public can have a greater degree
of confidence, is in the national interest.
Senator PERCY. Is it essential that we carry on. an effective intelli-
gence operation, including possibly covert activities and is it essential
that we do organize ourselves so that we can work effectively, liar-
moniously, and cooperatively with the executive branch?
Secretary KissiNGER. I think that it is vital for the United States to
have an effective intelligence service that is independent of really both
the Executive and congressional direction but is subject to Executive
direction and congressional oversight.
Senator PERCY. Because of your recent comments about Congress, I
would just like to personally assure you that this committee, the mem-
bership that you see here, and others that are unable to be present, has
conducted, I think, the finest set of hearings that I have ever partici-
pated in, in 9 years.
The chairman has said that within his power he is going to report a
bill out, the best bill we possibly can on the deadline schedule of
March 1. I can assure the chairman, from the minority standpoint
there is no partisanship in this matter whatsoever. We will diligently
work toward that deadline. We have had a body of evidence to date
that has been extraordinarily helpful in enabling us to put together
something we think is essential and in the national interest.
Secretary KISSiNGER. Let me make clear what my concern is, Sena-
tor. It is not a question that individuals are behaving unpatriotically,
arbitrarily, or with anything but the best intentions.
My concern is not what will happen this year. My concern is that as
we look ahead, 2, 3, 4 years, how the United States can conduct an
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effective foreign policy, and it can do so only if it appears to other
nations as representing essentially one voice when it acts in the field
of foreign policy, and the tragedies that can occur in the conduct of
foreign policy are precisely those when men of good intentions, pur-
suing the best motives on each side, are producing paralysis with the
best of intentions.
And I am trying in my public speeches not to win an argument be=
tween the Executive and the Congress, because I recognize that the
Executive also has to change some of the procedures that have de-
veloped in recent decades, but to find a basis by which a coherent, long-
term national policy is possible, in which the Executive does those
things that really the Executive is designed to do, and the Congress
in turn exercises the oversight and the guidance over basic policies
which have been assigned to it.
It is not criticizing this or that decision which is always taken in the
best of ways.
Senator PrxcY. Again, I would like to assure you, there are two of
us here who sit on both the Foreign Relations Committee and Govern-
ment Operations Committee. The climate in which we are working is
extraordinarily difficult. We cannot overlook 10 years of Vietnam.
We have had a divisiveness between us.
We were misled. We were lied to. There was policy adopted that
later proved to be disastrous. It was out of control in-a sense, and that
is the climate in which we began to work. And then the Watergate
climate did not contribute to your work or our work as well. In respect
to the intelligence operations, we did not handle ourselves well. We
did not exercise and fulfill our responsibility.
But also, there is fairly solid evidence that the Congress was mis-
led, was lied to on occasion, so it is in that climate that we are now
trying to reconstruct 'a relationship.
I can assure you of that even though the statement you made on the
West Coast that our domestic divisions are more dangerous to this
country than our overseas adversaries is a pretty strong statement.
Secretary KISSINGER. I did not make that statement.
The statement I made is that the foreign policy design is in rela-
tively good shape and that our domestic divisions at this moment are
impeding the conduct of 'foreign policy. That is not the same thing as
re more dangerous to us than our
saying that our domestic divisions are'
foreign adversaries.
The basic problem that we face is that when the scope of national
action is the greatest, the knowledge to base such action on is inherently
ambiguous. Therefore, it is essential that there is a minimum of trust
and confidence, not only the relation between the executive and the
legislature, but also in the relations between the public and the whole
Government, and without a degree of faith in the future, without some
confidence that -responsible people are trying to do a, serious job, we will
paralyze ourselves, and if we turn the governmental process into one
gigantic permanent investigation into motives, than we may achieve
purity but we will also achieve paralysis.
Therefore, what I said-and I think if you read the text, I do not
know what newspaper account you refer to
Senator PrrcY. This is from the New York Times this morning.
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Secretary KissiNGER. If you read the text of what I said it did not
say foreign adversaries are less dangerous to us than our domestic
division. I said that our domestic divisions are inhibiting the conduct
of our foreign policy, and I grant you, that Vietnam, Watergate and
its aftermath, and many of the mistakes on the part of the Executive
have contributed to this situation, but the problem we face is when
are we going to turn to the future.
Senator PERCY. The subheadline on this story is, "He sees a greater
threat at home than abroad," and the first paragraph indicated, "He
said today the United States is more endangered by its domestic di-
visions than by overseas adversaries."
I know the point you are trying to make. I think it is a good point.
I think these talks around the country have been immensely valuable
and very important.
I think it would be helpful rather than just emphasizing our di-
visions to say in some areas that we are really working together. On
the Middle East, I think we have had marvelous cooperation between
Congress and the executive branch on the whole. T think our relation-
ships on China and the Soviet Union on SALT have been extraordi-
narily good.
I think you are going to get a lot of backup on the Concorde decision
now. It was a very important foreign policy decision as well as a
domestic one, I think, on Cuba.
You are getting support on the military assistance bill now on the
floor.
I would just hope that we would put balance into our relations. It
is not all bad. it is not all good. We are trying to reach out.
Secretary KISSINGER. When you give a 45-minute speech and three
paragraphs are reported, it is difficult for both the newspapers and the
readers to judge what the balance of the speech was.
Senator PERCY. In our session on this legislation we are dealing with
today, I understand from your testimony that you prefer a joint
committee.
Secretary KISSI:-m,ER. I prefer a joint committee.
Senator PrRCY. That can only be done if the IIouse concurs.
Secretary KISSINGER. Yes.
Senator PrRCY. If they do not concur, then we have to !?o ahead. If
we feel ahead of time that they are not going to, it would be futile for
us to send a bill over there and delay it a year if they are going to
hold it up. Then we have to go ahead.
I)o you see any possibility that we can combine in that same commit-
tee, if there is a House and a Senate committee, the authorization and
appropriation authority, so yon only have to really reveal everything
to one committee in the Senate and one in the House and not proliferate
it by four or eight, as it is now?
Secretary KISSrr(;ER. I cannot really tell the Senate how to organize
itself. As far as the executive is concerned, the more concentrated the
oversight procedure, the easier it will be to share the maximum of
information.
Senator PERCY. I personally feel it would be disastrous for the Con-
mress to be in a position to veto covert actions ahead of time. I do think,
however, that more control and oversight is needed.
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Attorney General Katzenbach recommended that such actions be
committed to writing before they are putt into effect, so that the record
would be there clearly and so that it could be subsequently examined.
Many times if an action were committed to writing it may not be
enacted, because it may not look as wise as if it were all done verbally.
Would you favor such an activity, committing such decisions to
writing, so at least, under the highest classification, we have a record
that subsequently can be looked at with all of the reasoning behind it?
Secretary KrssINGER. Within the executive branch, the major opera-
tions-I think nearly all of them-are, reduced to writing. I have not
considered the submission of them in writing to a congressional over-
sight committee, but speaking off the tap of my head, subject to later
reconsideration, right now it seems to me a feasible procedure; in many
respedts a desirable procedure.
Senator YEPCY. At the presen+t time, a cover is provided for CIA
agents and intelligence officials abroad through our embassies. Do you
think that this is any longer appropriate ?
Does it detract from the value of our embassies abroad and their
credibility?
Also, do you think that business people and journalists should be
used in the, future in the light of what we now know and the difficulty
of preventing them from being revealed?
Secretary KzssINGER. You cannot have a cover unless you use some-
body, and if every professional group takes the position that their
professional ethics are going to be impaired if they are used as a cover,
then we will not be able to have cover.
On the question of journalists, I would think Ghat it is undesirable
to use them professionally, because it is a profession that is so clearly
dependent on its public standing of independence that I think that the
allegations that have been made, the accuracy of which I have not had
a chance to go into, about journalists having been used by the CIA do
grave dama?e to a profession that depends on its impression-and cor-
rect impression-of integrity and independence.
With respect to business or the State Department, the problem is the
one tha I mentioned before. Obviously, any time you use something
as a cover, you hardly represent its real function, but unless you do
that, you do not have a real cover, and I would not want to make a flat
statement about which can and cannot be used. I cannot, in a public
hearing, even confirm that the State Department is so being used.
Senator PERCY. It could be a discussion with the new committee,
though.
Thank you very much.
Chairman RIBicarr. Senator Allen.
Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, did the administration decide to ;support, a separate
'oversight committee or committees as a result of its considered judg-
ment as to what is in the national interest and what is in the best
interest of our national security, or because apparently there is strong
sentiment in the Congress for such an oversight committee.
Secretary KissINGEr. Well, we are, of course, aware of the strong
sentiment in the Congress in favor of such an oversight committee and
I must say that I have found that the Armed Services Committee, in
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my limited contact with them on the subject, have attempted to exer-
cise a very responsible role.
The difficulty we have faced recently is, as Director Colby pointed
out, every covert operation that we have attempted in the past year has
leaked to the press within a matter of weeks or, at most, months, so
that we have brought about a situation where we, in effect, have de-
prived ourselves of the covert capability at a the when
Senator ALLEN. Did that come from the standing committees or the
investigating committees?
Secretary KISSINGEa. It comes in part from a situation in which it
is almost impossible to pinpoint the responsibility because we are now
briefing three regular committees. We are not briefing any more only
the Armed Services committees but three committees in each House
are being briefed as standing committees; on top of it, the two intelli-
gence committees.
From where we sit, it is impossible to tell where it comes from.
For us, the big problem has been with six committees to be briefed.
The responsibility has been so diffused, the procedures of each com-
mittee so different--some committees brief only 2 members, other com-
mittees brief 12 members-so that we would prefer to have one
regularized oversight committee with which we can work out agreed
procedures and which then can assume, on its part, responsibility for
the, security of information.
Senator ALLE . Do you think then that the creation of the over-
sight committee will be in the interests of national security?
Secretary Krssrxr,ER. I believe so; yes, sir.
Senator ALLEN. Should this oversight committee, or committees,
should they give the intelligence agencies a broad outline in that acts
or practices are permissible, or should they clear every action of the'
intelligence agencies?
Secretary KrssiN.c,FR. I think in the nature of things, no committee
can possibly supervise every act of an executive department.
If you look at the huge staffs that the executive departments have-
maybe bloated, but still, they have to have some relationship to the
problem and the amount of time they have to spend on these prob-
lems-then it is impossible for a congressional committee or for the
Congress to organize itself to supervise every aspect of their day-to-
day activities.
I think the strategy of oversight ought to be to determine those'
fundamental policy issues or those issues of the greatest sensitivity on
which the Congress will set down the guidelines and to leave some
margin for an executive discretion-always subject, of course, to the.
fact that the oversight committee having control of the budget can
seize itself of any problem it sees rising to a level of policy.
Senator ALT,-FN. Certainly one of the key words in a successful intel-
ligence operation is secrecy.
Do you think that the creation of a separate oversight committee
would result in more or less secrecy than we had prior to the time that
the investigating committees started their work?
Secretary KISSTNGER. In that period, on the whole-in fact, not only
on the whole, but fully until then-secrecy was being maintained
extremely well.
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The argument that is being made now is that secrecy was being
maintained at the price of control, so we are looking for :a method of
oversight by which those two objectives can be reconciled.
But we have no complaint whatever about the degree to which con-
fidential information was being safeguarded, prior to the beginning of
these investigations.
Senator ALLEN. Of course, we will not insist on an answer to this
question, but would you be willing to evaluate the work of the House,
and Senate investigating committees?
Secretary KzsszNGER. The Senate committee has done its job. I dis-
agree with some of the emphasis they placed and with some aspects of
the manner in which they put information together, but they had a.
mass of information to deal with, and I think they attempted to do--
within the limits of pressure did do-a responsible job. I have serious
question about the wisdom of publishing some of these reports, but I
do not have any major quarrels.
I disagree with some of their interpretation of facts, but that is
their privilege.
On the House committee, I have to say that they have used classified
information in a reckless way, and that the leaking of covert opera-
tions to the press created an impression that was totally untrue and
damaging to the national security.
Senator ALLEN. These proposed committees or a single oversight
committee, I gather you would like for the membership of the com-
mittee or committees to be limited in number. Would that be correct?
A smaller number?
Secretary KzssiNGER. Yes; 'I would prefer
Senator ALLEN. The smaller the number, the greater the hope or
chance of secrecy, is that correct?
Secretary KzsSINGER.That is right.
Of course, in relation to what is a meaningful degree of oversight,
which means there has got to be a minimum number that will make the
Senate feel that a responsible oversight is being exercised.
Senator ALLEN. Back during World War II, the German code was
broken and the Japanese code was broken. Do you think information
of that sort would be safe in the hands of a congressional oversight
committee?
Secretary KissINGER. I would think on the basis of the experience of
the past year, I would have to say no, but it is my understanding that
this committee is trying to develop procedures in which the congres-
sional committees would apply the same standards of secrecy and
confidentiality.
I would certainly be openminded on the possibility that this can be
achieved. I believe that if the proper penalties are developed, the,
proper security procedures are followed, the Congress can do that.
Senator ALLEN. I have been trying to decide, in my own mind what
would prompt a Member of the House or the Senate or a staff member
of any of these committees to leak sensitive information, and I have
listed here possible reasons why a man or woman would release or leak
sensitive information.
I would list first, lack of patriotism. Second, desire to feel important.
I think that is one of the major reasons; possibly malice toward the
agencies; possibly philosophical reasons. Then, desire for-and this
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would apply more to a Member of Congress than a staff member-
desire for favorable treatment from news media on other matters. Then
the possibility of a committee member or a staff under him being out-
voted in the committee as to whether a certain covert activity should
be carried out would then leak the information.
Do you feel that these are some of the factors that might cause
leaking of information, and would you care to stress any one or more
of those as motivating causes for the release of information?
Secretary KISSI\GFR. In my experience, the primary cause of leaks
seems to have been an attempt to influence decisions which were not
likely to go in the favor of those who were doing the leaking. I would
say this is true in the executive branch as well as in the legislative
branch.
Another reason could be an objection in principle to a type of opera-
tion. For example, there are those who believe with great fervor that
the United States should never conduct, covert operations, and there-
fore they believe that they are helping the country if they leak covert
operations or if they present them in such a way that, it looks as if
only knaves and fools would execute them.
These, in my experience, have been the principal. reasons for leaks.
Incidentally, both the executive and the legislative branch-I think
there have been leaks also out of the executive branch on certain of
these items.
The other motives I would not want to speculate upon.
Senator ALLEN. Mr. Secretary, I might say in my home State. of
Alabama, the people are distressed by the damage that has been done
about intelligence agencies as a result of leaks from the investigation
of the activities of the intelligence agencies.
Thank you.
Chairman RIBTcoFr. Senator Javits?
Senator.TAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am glad you said what you said a moment ago, Mr. Secretary, that
there have been leaks in the executive as well. We have concentrated
on leaks by the Congress and I noticed with great interest when you
read your statement, you omitted what I considered to be a key phrase,
and I would like to ask you about that.
Page 9: "It would provide for the prosecution of Government
employees in both the Congress and the executive. who disclose such
information without authority." You omitted the words "in both the
Congress and the executive."
Does that represent anything?
Secretary KrSSINGER. I sometimes cut these in reading. I stand
behind the whole statement.
Senator JAVITS. Is it not true that there have also been accusations
that the product of the intelligence agencies insofar as it was com-
municated to the Congress and the country was affected by political
considerations?
Secretary Kzssr_.TGFit. Could you repeat that?
Senator JAVITS. In other words, the administration would affect
what was reported by way of intelligence either to the Congress or the
country or both in order to slant a decision a certain way, because it
had a political view that it wished to serve.. There has been testimony
on that.
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Secretary KISSINGER. There may be testimony to that effect, but I
would reject it.
Senator JAVITS. You would reject it.
Secretary KISSINGER. Absolutely.
Senator JAVITS. Is there any caution taken in the executive depart-
ment to see that that is not done?
Secretary KISSINGrR. The way that a political decision could slant a
judgment of the intelligence agencies would be for either the President
,or his closest 'advisers to dictate to the intelligence community what
kind of estimates they wanted. That, to the best of my knowledge, has
not been done by any administration and it would be one of the most
foolish things for any administration to do, because the wisdom of
their decisions depends on having the most accurate information
possible.
In fact, I would say that is most likely to produce politically slanted
intelligence estimates is if these intelligence estimates have to be
defended against a large public on the basis of whether or not they are
temporarily popular or not.
I would think that a tightly organized oversight system could con-
tribute to the nonpolitical nature, but I do not believe that politically
that politically slanted intelligence estimates have been a problem
and have ever existed in any administration.
or his closest advisers to dictate to the intelligence community what
I know no example where this could be accurately stated.
Senator JAV1TS. We have certainly had testimony of the misuse of
intelligence agencies for political purposes, in the Watergate case, did
we not.
Secretary KISSINGrR. That is true, but that is not saying that any
directions have ever been affected by political considerations.
Senator JAVITS. You maintain that is true respecting the Vietnam
war as well?
Secretary KISSINGER. I can only talk about the period since I have
come to Washington.
Senator JAVrrs. The statements that you have made are limited to
the period?
Secretary KISSINGER. Limited to the period.
I do believe we should start with an assumption that those that are
in high executive positions may be misguided, but they are trying
to do the best thing for the country. This is the only thing that makes
it ultimately worthwhile, so they would not engage in a deliberately
fraudulent exercise within the Government.
Senator JAVITS. In the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I
am a member, we had a very, very queasy feeling about that in respect
to that Cambodian invasion. The facts that were presented to us,
and what was going on and represented to us. Be that as it may, the
point is, as I understand it, whatever legislation the 'administration
proposes will apply equally to the Congress and the Executive.
Secretary KISSINGER. You mean the standards of secrecy?
Senator JAVITS. Security of information.
Secretary KISSINGrr,. Absolutely.
Senator JAVITS. My colleague, Senator Case, mentioned the other
day that there was some suspicion that leaks were planted even by
the CIA in order to 'discredit the Congress.
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430
Is there any truth to that, as far as you are concerned?
Secretary KIssixcaR. Not to the best of my knowledge.
Senator JAVITS. Is not the key question, Mr. 'Secretary, who was
to tell who what and what is to be disclosed to the public, and is it,
not a fact that this is very deeply affected also by the Constitution.
of the United States? Whatever may be the role of the committee,
it is not the Congress, it is not the Senate, it is not the House, it is
not both. So that one of the nuts that we have to crack, and I certainly
appreciate your advice on it, is how do we handle that? How do we
prevent a situation which is very inimical to the American system
where a committee member would have to deny information to his.
fellow Members of the House or Senate simply because it was entrusted
to him in confidence, when every Senator and every Congressman
must treat every committee as his agent?
How are we to make wise decisions if we are not privy to basic
information?
Secretary KrSSINGF:R. I think it is largely a problem for the Congress
to answer, because it is obvious that if the Executive must get all of
its intelligence information to the oversight committee, or,all of its.
significant intelligence information to the oversight committee, and
every member of the oversight committee feels an obligation to share
it, at least with all other Senators, then the procedures as to secrecy
are going to be much more difficult to enforce than if there are some
limitations placed on what can be shared, but what these limitations
should be is a delicate matter that I think the Senate has to work out
for itself.
Senator JAVITS. Is it not also, Mr. Secretary, a function of discipline
in both the executive and the congressional branches? In short, is it
not a fact that under the Constitution, all of this information has to
be shared and that we cannot avoid it. Although you spoke of the fact
that what might take place in disclosures are "impeding the conduct
of our foreign policy," there is also the advice and consent function,
the right to investigate and inquire and get anything in the way of
information by the Congress. Is it not a fact, therefore, that it is the
enforcement of discipline-and by law in terms of criminal and other
sanctions with respect to these matters-that must be relied on, and
there both the Executive and the Congress have equally been derelict?
Secretary KrsSrNGER. The problem is, the question that has to be
answered is: What is it that the Congress wishes to oversee or must
oversee in pursuit of its constitutional functions with respect to the
advice and consent required by the Constitution or the court practice
that has developed since the writing of the Constitution?
Take, for example, the theoretical case that was mentioned by Sena-
tor Allen. Suppose we had broken the code of some country. Suppose
we had informed the committee of this and suppose that information
becomes public. We will have inflicted irreparable damage on our-
selves, because once that information has become public, the code will
be changed, and it is irretrievable. That has been the reason that
newspaper stories-which could have come from the executive branch, -
I am not saying they came from the Congress---have appeared in
which certain intelligence procedures that have not been challenged'
on grounds of impropriety have been described in enormous detail
and, having been described, have been irreparably compromised.
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This is a concern that any member of the executive branch must
'have, and it'is something that I'believe that the Senate will want to
address in constructing its oversight system.
'There are other operations-many of the covert operations are in a
different category-that involve questions of political judgment, for-
eign policy judgment, as to their wisdom and as to their relationship
to our overall foreign policy.
They lend themselves better to oversight, but there the damage that
can be done will not be as irretrievable as it is in the case of techni-
cal information, although it could be very egregious if proper proco
dures are not followed.
Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, my time is up.
With the Chair's permission, I would like to make one observation.
I believe the solution here is-perhaps you could comment on it for
the record in writing-the solution here is exactly as we resolved it
in the War Powers Xct. You cannot take away the constitutional au-
thority of a President or of the Congress or any Member, but you can
accomplish a great deal, in my judgement, by a methodology which
will cause people to stop and consider an act and by enforcing a very
strict order of responsibility by law.
I think, if you are going to try to deprive people of constitutional
powers or try to fight that out in this legislation, it is doomed in
advance. But if we can derive a methodology and a strict enforcement,
then I think we can get somewhere.
Thank you.
-Secretary KISSINGER. We would be sympathetic to that in principle.
Chairman RrBicorF. May I make one comment?
I personally cannot conceive that anything in this oversight legis-
lation would require the intelligence agency to disclose even to the
oversight committee that they had broken a code of a potential enemy.
That is not my concept of what the problem really is here today.
Senator ALLEN. May I comment on that?
I did not mean to suggest that this would be a matter within the
jurisdiction of the oversight committee. I am merely using this as an
example of sensitive information. I asked the Secretary if he thought
;sensitive information of this nature, or any other nature, would be safe
in the hands of an oversight committee.
Chairman RIBIOOFF. Senator Chiles?
Senator CHILES. Mr. Secretary, as we are trying to mark up this
bill, I think that most of us want to touch on two other things in addi-
tion to this bill. I certainly agree that we have to have an intelligence
capability. It needs to be second to none and it needs to be able to
operate in secrecy, and that we can have irreparable harm done if we
compromise any of those features.
I also agree with your statement that the President needs to be able
to conduct the foreign policy of the country and he needs to be able to
speak with n clear voice. I think there is a difference between a debate
over intelligence matters, especially if we are talking about the release
of any information, and a debate over foreign policy matters.
I think nothing could be healthier, perhaps, than some kind of
debate about foregn policy matters. That has been one of our problems
with Vietnam. Some of the problems that we had is that Congress
really failed in its constitutional role of advising and consenting and
failing to carry out that role.
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So I would hope that your feeling would not be that we could not
participate in that, debate about foreign policy matters or that we are
going to do irreparable harm because we are initiating or participating.
Secretary KISSINGER. I think you will find in every one of my public
statements, including the one that was so scantily reported, a strong
statement: One, that the balance between the executive and the legis-
lative has to move more towards a better proportion than existed in
the 1950's and 1960's and, second, that a meaningful debate in foreign
policy is absolutely imperative if we are going to have public support
and congressional support.
My concern is about the repeated public disavowal of executive
action, sometimes in midstream, and about the impression that it has
created abroad that the United States has lost the capacity for action.
Our problem is to reconcile debate with the capacity for action.
Senator Cnii.Fs. I certainly concur in that, and I concur that we
need to get this intelligence matter behind us today. It is doing harm,
and of course, that is one reason, in this committee, that we are going
to try to work as fast as we can to get this bill ma i ked up.
I would like to have your views on the question of the authority of
the committee, be it joint or be it individual. We know it is going
to be an oversight committee.
Do you have a view as to whether it should also be an authorizing
committee, as such, authorizing all the funds for the agencies?
Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, I was asked this question earlier, and
frankly, I have not thought it through.
As I indicated, in answer to that question, I would thick that the
more we concentrate oversight and financial control the easier it will
be to establish that close relationship between the executive and the
Congress which will be necessary to control the intelligence com-
munity.
So again, speaking off the top of my head, I would probably prefer
to have it in the same committee.
Senator CfiHLFS. Have you thought through the possible problem,
that if you give this committee authorizing authority, you perhaps are,
in effect, giving it a veto authority ?
Secretary KrssIN(,i~:x. That is a problem, but you also achieve with
it a greater degree of congressional support than has proved to be the
case with the present divided committee responsbility.
Senator Cn Fs. That, is all. Thank you very ni uch.
Chairman Rmarcorr. Senator Roth?
Senator ROTh . Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, Senator Javits discussed the importance of proce-
dures and methodology that I agree is extremely important. At the
same time, I think whatever we set up here, whether it works or not
will depend upon rebuilding trust and confidence between the two
equal branches of government.
It seems to me that one of the reasons we did not have problems
until Vietnam and subsequently is that we had a bipartisan foreign
policy in which people largely agreed in both political parties on gen-
eral objectives and goals.
The question I have is, what can we do to restore such a consensus,
or do you think that is desirable? Do you think we need a great debate?
What kind of forum would be needed to attempt to develop once more
in this country general agreement as to broad goals and objectives?
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Secretary KISSINGER. First of all, let me make one point which may
not be widely popular, which is that Congress was not all that ignorant
of what was going on in Vietnam as people now believe.
Senator ROThI. I would agree with that statement.
Secretary KISSINGER. We have to distinguish between mistakes in
judgment that may well have been made by both branches and defec-
tive oversight. It is quite possible-in fact, it is true-that some deci-
sions were not properly reported to the Congress. But the main lines
of the Vietnam policy-that is, the gradual increase in our forces, the
fact that increasingly larger expenditures were required-those facts
were known to the Congress and, in fact, the Congress voted on it year
after year.
So that, I think in trying to see what we can learn from the past, we
should not talk ourselves into the frame of mind as if Vietnam had
been entirely an Executive action.
Now with respect to your question. I believe that the coming together
of the Executive and the Congress and of the public in the conduct of
our foreign policy is our overwhelming foreign policy question.
I repeat, I do not think it is a problem for this year, because the
Government can operate on momentum for quite awhile, but I think
that in the long term, other governments are gearing their actions to
their belief in whether we can execute either our threats or our
promises, and a divided government, by definition, cannot do this.
They can only state individual preferences, after which everything
depends on how the political process will shape this up.
Therefore I believe that the restoration of what I would prefer to
call a nonpartisan foreign policy is imperative.
Now again, I was not asked to testify on this primarily. There are
a number of problems here.
You have this bipartisan policy in a period of strong congressional
leadership. Today, it may be a helpful thing, but it is a fact of life
that it is very difficult for the Executive to know who in the Congress
to consult and how you can build congressional support, because, due
to the reforms within the Congress, there is not any one group of
leaders that can reliably inform one about what the congressional senti-
ment is.
I believe that some mechanism must be found, some group of
people with whom the Executive can have a continuing dialog, and
I believe in a public debate, but of course, it is inevitable that there
will be differences, because these issues would not be difficult if every-
body came to the same conclusion about them.
-I think there should be some limit on the range of permissible
charges. It cannot help public understanding if accusations are made
that people deliberately mislead the President, people deliberately
fool the Congress, as if everything is put into variations of treason
or criminal activity.
I think we have to face the fact that we face a very difficult future
in which no one can know today exactly what its shape will be. Its
shape depends crucially on our vision and what ideas we develop.
If we can get a civilized, serious debate started, if we can identify
people who can then take the responsibility of helping within the
Congress and with pu'blic opinion, then I think we will be able to
solve our problems and shape a more peaceful future.
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434
I think that it is the most overwhelming national problem we have
now. I think the foreign policy questions in the traditional sense are
more easily solvable. This is what I meant to say yesterday.
Senator RoTII. One difference, of course, between our democracy
and others is that most of them are parliamentary forms. That, in
turn, means that members of the Parliament participate in-the mak-
ing of a foreign policy, the Secretary being a member of Parliament.
Would there be any merit, for example, in having Members of the
Congress, perhaps the leadership of this joint committee or the leader-
ship, participate in any way in National Security Council delibera-
tions, ex officio or otherwise?
Secretary IlrssrNGER. If you look at parliamentary democracy, it is
true that the Cabinet members-that the Cabinet members are mem-
bers of Parliament and therefore. you have an organic connection
between the Parliament and the Executive.
But I think it is also true that, except where the Parliament is
divided into many fragmented groups, the Parliament plays an infi-
nitely smaller role in policymaking and a much smaller role in foreign
policymaking in parliamentary democracies than in the United
States.
'There are no parliamentary hearings of any significant nature in
most parliamentary democracies. The average member of Parliament,
unless he is a minister, has almost no access to the sort of confidential
information that our Congress can get.
So, on the whole, I think that history will show that parliamentary
democracies are evolving in the direction of very strong Executive
power, except in those cases where the Parliament is so fragmented
that the fragmentation enables it to overthrow the Government
through the shifting coalitions of parties. This then presents major
problems of a different nature.
Now, concerning the participation of Congress in the actual de-
liberations of the executive branch, I would leave it to constitutional
lawyers to decide whether this is compatible with the separation of
powers. Looking aat it from the point of view of political prudence, one
has to weigh the greater understanding on the part of the legislative
branch against the dilemma created when a Member who disagrees
with the President on a decision he participated in must decide whether
he should begin agitating in the Congress or whether he has a moral
obligation, as do members of the executive branch, to support the de-
cisions once they are made.
But on an informal basis, when the system works well, a serious
offer is often made today to solicit the views of senior legislators be-
fore major decision are made.
But I would really like to put before the committee in all serious-
ness the question from where we sit of identifying who it is one ought
to consult, and when the number gets too large, with the best will in
the world, it becomes a problem of time.
Senator ROTH. In the 1940's there was some effort made on the part
of the executive branch and the President to have Members of Con-
gress, such as Mr. Vandenberg and others to be involved, go on foreign
missions with them.
Secretary KissINGFrz. I do not exclude it Senator, I really have not
thought through thoroughly how to do it. I can tell you the problem
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we are discussing here is one of the most preoccupying problems that.
I have right now, and I am not for a moment suggesting that it can
be solved by the Congress rubberstamping the executive. In fact, it
will help our democracy and it will help public confidence if we can
get a genuine partnership in Congress.
Senator ROTII. On the one point, I would say that in any such par-
ticipation, it would seem to me that it is the Members of Congress
responsibility necessarily, not to remain silent, if they disagree, any
more than the oversight committee would necessarily remain silent if
they disagreed.
If you have any further thoughts in this area, I would very much
appreciate receiving them.
Mr. Secretary,Senator Muskie and I have sponsored. a bill-as a
matter of fact, it was passed by the Senate in 1973-to resolve con-
flicts over information between the Congress and the executive branch
through an expeditious judicial process.
This is designed to help Congress get information for which there
is ,a genuine legislative need, and protect executive branch officials from
criminal contempt proceedings.
In view of your experience with the Pike committee, do you think
such an approach would be desirable to'avoid confrontations as a result
of those conflicts?
Secretary KissiNGnit. The experience with the Pike committee and
the general problem it raises calls attention to the need for mechanism
to resolve such disputes. I am a little bit leery about getting the judi-
cial branch involved, because very often when the case goes to court,
in order to explain our decision not to release a document, one has to,
give more information that would then, in the nature of the judicial
system, become part of the public record, and one may do more damage
in trying to block release of the information than may have been done
by the original disclosure to begin with.
Second : The judicial system is geared to deciding an individual
case and it cannot really judge the implications of the impact on for-
eign governments; for example, a court might find that publication
of certain documents-which it is not necessarily easy to prove-
would not damage American security ; but it might hurt other gov-
ernments' security, hurt their confidence and their ability to talk to us.
So again, it is not a matter that I have thought through. Quite .
candidly, I am not familiar with your bill. These are quick reactions
off the top of my head.
On the other hand, I have. a certain sympathy-unbelievable as it
may sound-with the Pike committee contention that if they get our
documents, and then the executive branch has a type of veto over their
use, then this makes their own role more. difficult. My major objection
to the Pike committee is the way they have distorted, falsified, docu-
ments that they have.
But some mechanism has to be developed-I do not have a good
answer to it-to resolve executive-legislative disputes as to the release
of information that is made available.
Senator ROTA. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
I would just like to observe that it does seem to me that this is a
logical mechanism to resolve this dispute, this question of secrecy.
Court proceedings can be secret.
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436
I would say, as a matter of fact, that procedures of the U.S. Su-
preme Court are probably the best-guarded secrets that I know in
the country. So I would urge you to consider this approach.
Secretary KISSINGER. Obviously I have not thought it through
completely.
Senator ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman RIBIcopr. Senator Nunn?
Senator NuNN. Thank You, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I share your frustration about knowing whom to
brief. I think that is one of the purposes of this committee hearing,
and one of the most serious things we have to consider.
Even if we decide on a joint oversight committee, there will con-
tinue to be a need for committees like Armed Services and Foreign
Relations to get the substance, of intelligence information.
Even a joint committee, in my opinion, is not going to limit to just
a few people the flow of this information.
Do you want to comment on this?
Secretary KISSINGER. Well, it depends on wh'i,t you mean. by "the
substance." The product of intelligence will obviously have to be put
before the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee to enable
them to do their job, but it is not possible for the Armed Services Com-
mittee, for example, to make a reasonable assessment about the ade-
quacy of our defense requests if it does not know the estimates of
Soviet or other strengths on which they are based.
As I understand it, the oversight committee that is being proposed
here is designed to oversee the operations of the agency, and not only
the final product. In that respect, perhaps concentrating it would ease
the problem somewhat.
Senator NUNN. One thing that comes to mind : We formerly got n
newsletter from CIA. Of course, no body used it as much as probably
would be advisable, but I found it very helpful. Now that has been
terminated.
Do you plan to interrupt the flow of intelligenco to the. Armed Serv-
ices Committee while we are struggling to get a solution to this legis-
lative responsibility?
Secretary KISSINGER. As I understand it, your receiving the. daily
newsletter was a relatively recent innovation. That was not something
that had existence since the origin of time.
Senator NuNN. Within the last couple of years.
Secretary KISSINGER. Certainly the flow of information that the
committees must have to do their job cannot be interrupted while the
Congress debates the appropriate oversight procedures, and certainly
the existing oversight procedures, I would believe, should stay in place
until alternative ones have been approved by the Congress.
Senator NuNN. Whose decision was it to interrupt that flow of
information? Was that a CIA decision, or did ii go higher?
Secretary KISSINGER. I do not know precisely who made the final
decision. I would suspect that the, White House certainly was involved.
Senator NuxN. Mr. Secretary, I am not, defensive about the situa-
tion in Angola at all. I do think, though, that many of your statements
indicate that the Congress is solely responsible for what was going on
there. I did not vote to terminate aid. It was a very close question, as
far as I was concerned.
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Nevertheless, the administration is not without other remedies, for
-instance, economic sanctions ; for instance, technology ; for instance,
food ; for instance, terminating negotiations with the Soviet Union for
a brief time. Yet, what we see was a congressional cutoff of aid fol-
lowed by Presidential announcement that the food would continue to
flow regardless of Angola, followed by the Secretary of State going
to Moscow with negotiations as usual.
The combination was congressional cutoff and announcement that
business would continue as usual, notwithstanding Angola.
It seems to me that Angola is a joint responsibility and the admin-
istration has not utilized fully the tools available to it short of mili-
tary aid.
'Secretary KTSSTNGER. Well, Senator, our concern with respect to
Angola now is not to win retroactively an argument that in the nature
of what was at issue was essentially settled by the Senate vote, but
it is to alert the American public to the long-term dangers that are
involved, to warn the Soviet Union and CiT'ba that this method, even
if it should work once in Angola, cannot, be a method that is compatible
with relaxation of tensions or is not fraught with great danger, and to
make clear to the American public what may happen in similar
circumstances.
Now with respect to your particular substantive point, our strategy
was designed to create a situation in December which would create
the best balance of forces at that time, to permit an OAU resolution
which hopefully we and the Soviet Union would then both support
which would get foreign forces, on all sides, out of Angola and to
permit an African solution to an African problem.
Such a strategy was obviously crucially dependent on not escalat-
ing it immediately into a massive confrontation and permitting each
side to back off it, and second, it was very crucially dependent on the
problem of time.
All of the measures that you have proposed would have taken a
long time to work and at the same time escalated things prematurely
into a massive confrontation. It was always clear to us that if these
other measures that we were pursuing in December would not work,
then some of the more blunt instruments would have to be used. I
foreshadowed this in a speech I made in Detroit at the- end of
November. With respect to grain, we face a much more complicated
:situation than simply turning off and on the sale of grain.
Senator NUNN. I agree with that.
Secretary IKTSSINGER. When I testified before the Senate Finance
,Committee and other bodies here, the criticism that was made of us
was that.through a program of voluntary restraints we discouraged
the sale of wheat for 4 months last year, and we cannot turn it off
and on every 2 or 3 months without having a massive domestic prob-
lem, which is not to say that if tensions go beyond a certain point
they will not affect all other relationships.
Senator NUNN. You do not want economic sanctions from now on,
do you?
Secretary KTSSTNGER. I do not. It is ,a rather blunt instrument that
has to be related to a rather massive situation, and it would not have
been relevant to the situation in Angola.
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With respect to strategic arms limitation talks, we believe those
are in our mutual interests, not exclusively in the interest of the Soviet
Union. If they get interrupted, asalso could happen in certain circum-
stances, or if they fail, then we are getting into a rather long-term
problem which we should not do easily.
It was, after all, this administration that first invented the theory
against rather strong opposition, and we are very conscious of it.
Senator NUNN. My time has expired. Thank you.
Chairman RmrcoFF. Senator Weicker?
Senator WEIci zn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I would like to concentrate on two areas, national.
secrets and second, who it is that we should oversee.
I have asked this question of previous witnesses. I wonder if you
could tell me in the last several months what national secrets have been
leaked from a congressional committee or a standing committee, inves-
tigating committee, or some individual?
I would like to know what national secrets have been released.
Secretary KISSINGER. If I would identify them precisely, I would,
of course, give them total validity, so I will have to speak in general
terms.
Over the course of the past year, a number of intelligence collection
methods of the most extraordinary sensitivity have been leaked. Almost
all of the significant covert operations that this country has engaged
in have been leaked, many of them in an extraordinarily distorted
fashion and in a fashion to which the Government cannot reply with-
out giving out more information and without claiming an overt right
to do things which, if it could have claimed such a right, it would
never have left to the covert operation to begin with.
On a classified basis, I would be prepared to submit-and the Na-
tional Security Council is even in a better position to submit-a list
of the most sensitive security leaks that have occurred during the last
year, but they have been massive.
Senator W'4'EICKER. Let me be specific. I do not sit on any of these
committees, either standing or investigative.
Let me go down the list of some of thematters that have come to
my 'attention through the newspapers, and let me see whether or not
these fall into the category of national secrets that should not have
been leaked.
The story of the U.S. military intervention in. the war between the
Kurds and the Iraqis in 1975 ?
Secretary KISSINGER. May I answer, before we get into this, if you
read a whole list of covert operations and I comment on each one of
them, I will, as Secretary of State, be in an impossible position, so if
you will read the whole list, I will make a general comment and not
comment on each one of them.
Senator WEicKER. Let us go through it very briefly.
The intervention in the war of the Kurds and Iraq. The intervention
in Angola. The paying of bribes to Italian politicians. The overthrow
of the government in Chile. The policy of assassinations.
These were all major stories in the last several months. Do you con-
sider any one of those, or as a group, that they fall into the category
of national secrets?
Secretary KISSINGER. I would say, Senator, that the way you put
them already indicates some of the problems.
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Intervention in the war in Angola-you use the word "intervention"
and that already, with all respect
Senator WEICKER. Participation.
Secretary KzssINGER. No. Even participation.
What did we do in Angola? We helped black African countries at
their request when substantial amounts of Soviet military equipment
and Cuban military forces appeared in an adjoining country, when
this military equipment was of a quantity that was larger than all
of the military equipment previously sent to black Africa. And we
did it in order to discourage similar actions in other parts of the
world.
But the Angola case has become public; has been confirmed
Senator WEIcKER. Is that a national secret?
Secretary KISSINGER. The Angola case I would put into a gray area,
because I had already spoken publicly about our concern for Angola.
But, I would say that the manner in which it became public compli-
cated its solution.
Some of the others that you mentioned, I would, of course, reject;
for example, the proposition that the overthrow of the Allende govern-
ment is an adequate way of describing what we were doing. But, I
would say that some of the things that have been described there-and
I do not want to go into the other matters; paying of bribes, for ex-
ample, I think is an inaccurate description-have been extremely dam-
aging to the national policy, yes.
Senator WEZCKER. I just wonder, in light of the activity involved,
this information would notbe better characterized as 'a national scheme
rather than a national secret.
I have to get back to a point that was alluded to by the chairman
earlier. I think that we all understand intelligence. I do not think that
there is a member of this committee who does not feel that we should'
have effective intelligence gathering.
No. 2, I do not think that there is any member of the committee
who does not understand sources of information when it comes to
names and locations of agents.
These are obviously national secrets.
Now we are talking about policies-and this will lead me into whom
we should oversee. We are talking about policies that are going to be
paid for in some way by the American people. I just wonder as to
whether or not the matters of which you complain and the members
of the administration complain are not national secrets. They do not
validly fall into that category at all. They are information that should
be there for judgments by the American people.
I think any one of the ones that have been discussed here, I would
have just characterized them in whole or in part as a shame, not a
Secret.
Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, that Just proves that you are in the
category of those that I just described earlier who are opposed on
principle to some of these actions that have been conducted in the
entire post-war 'period.
Senator WEIGKER. If you are talking about those as being against
covert operations, I am not in that category. I will tell you what I
insist on,
-I` insist 'on 'knowing the nature of those covert activities.
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Secretary KISSINGER. That is what the oversight committee is sup-
posed to do.
.Senator WFIcKEs. Can they do it if in fact --this leads me to my
second question-if in fact suggestions and conversations that have
taken place between the committee and the various agencies are
disregarded.
I say this because, again as I track the information coming.before
the American people in the last couple of months, it seems that unfor-
tunate decisions were made by CIA agents. They did not make the
unfortunate decisions. Sometimes we. get lost in the shuffle. The un-
fortunate decisions emanated at the policy level of the National
Security Council.
I wonder how effective oversight can be insofar as the CIA is con-
cerned if indeed the. decisions are being made at a totally different:
level and much higher.
Secretary KISSINGER. The important decisions of national policy
have generally been made by the National Security Council or by
one of its constituent bodies and have, to the best of my knowledge,.
been invariably approved by the President.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, they reflect the unanimous
decisions of all of the agencies, including the Cl A, but not necessarily
always. The oversight obviously would have to include decisions that
are taken in the National Security Council and that the intelligence
agencies are asked to execute.
I agree with von that it is unfair to blame the CIA for carrying
out national decisions, and I would agree with you further that the
sigiiificant decisions are taken usually at a policy level with the par-
ticipation of the CIA, but not necessarily with the dominant
participation.
Senator WEICKER. May I have 1 additional minute by way of ask-
ing a question?
This prompts this line of questioning. I believe it leads in the case
of giving money to Italian politicians, in the case of the Kurdish
operation, to some extent Angola, from what I have read, all of these
were opposed by the CIA.
What good will it do, inasfar as any committee we set up to oversee
the CIA, if, indeed, when they make recommendations they are over-
ruled by the National Security Council?
Am I correct in my evaluation of the CIA's attitude about these
three events?
Secretary KISSINGFR. I will only talk about Angola, because it has
been publicized.
In the case of Angola, it is emphatically untrue. The CIA recom-
mended the operation and supported it.
In the case of other operations, without applying it now to the
Kurdish or any other thing that may have been done, it is very im-
portant to distinguish what it is that has been opposed by that Agency.
For example, it is quite possible that the CIA will say in a certain
case, not applying it now to the specifies that you mentioned, the CIA
will say, we are in favor of this, but we do not believe it can be kept
secret.
In that case, it might be technically registered that they are op-
posed to the covert operation because they do not believe it can be
kept covert, even though they support the substance.
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Then the. President may well decide that if they think that this is
going to be a good thing to. do, he will take his chances on its becoming
public, 'and in one of the eases that I remember, the opposition was not
on substance. The opposition was on the grounds of whether it could
be kept secret, and that judgment, in fact, turned out to be wrong.
The other category of disputes that can arise is not over the sub-
stance, again, but over who should administer what is being agreed to
by the governmental process.
So I would say that in the cases that you gave, a more discriminating
examination of the bureaucratic records would show in general that the
overwhelming majority of covert operations have been supported and
recommended by the CIA; but again I would like to stress, it is per-
fectly clear to me that any activity that is approved in the National
Security Council in the intelligence field, even if in very rare cases the
CIA should have a different judgment, obviously it wouldbe subject to
congressional oversight, and the Congress then would have a right to
call appropriate members of the administration.
Senator WEICKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Just this word, as far as I ain concerned. I do not think the United
States has lost its capacity to act. I just think it demands that such
action be both logical and constitutional. To that, I say hallelujah.
Chairman Rniicorr. Senator Glenn?
Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in previous testimony before the committee, former
Secretary Rusk testified that at the time that he was Secretary of
State, he thought that he was aware of all the overt and covert activity
that was important to his department. He now realizes that such was
not the case.
What assurances do you have that you are being kept fully in-
formed?
Secretary KissINGER. Well, of course, it is always very hard to know
what you do not know.
Senator GLENN. Iasked what assurances?
Secretary KissiNGER. According to present procedure, all covert
operations must be approved by the 40 Committee, on which the De-
partment of State is represented, and therefore, I would find it incon-
ceivable that any money could be spent.for covert operations or any-
thing significance could be done which the Department of State,
that-1, as Secretary of State, would not be familiar with.
It would be a gross breach of procedures, which has never come to
my attention.
Secondly, the station chiefs of the CIA are theoretically under the
direction of the Ambassador. While this may not 'always work per-
fectly, I think that it works sufficiently well that I have considerable
assurances that no covert operations would be conducted without my
knowledge.
Now it is occasionally possible that with an existing authorization
somebody will do something that I would not have recommended.
But I know of no major case where that has occurred.
Senator GLENN. In prior questioning during these hearings the
assassination plan was used as an example of 'activities that had not
been approved. It appears from the testimony that the Security Coun-
cil did not know about that.
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Secretary KrssrNGER. Of course, no assassination planning has gone
on since I have come to Washington, and therefore, this is a category
of issues that has not come up.
I believe that this particular compartmentalization would not be
compatible with existing procedures.
Senator GLENN. When we tried to get to the bottom of this in ques-
tioning previous witnesses, it was very, very difficult, because the NSC
did not know. We asked if the President knew. That was described
as a "murky" area in which we could not get an answer. It would
indicate that perhaps no one knew it at the top level and no one can
tell us if the NSC knew or the President knew. It indicates that per-
haps these decisions were being made at a very low level in CIA or
some other activity that we have not yet brought under complete
control.
Would you have any comment on that?
Secretary KissINGER. I would not want to talk about particular
events, but from my personal experience with the CIA, from its socio-
logical composition and psychological makeup. I would be absolutely
astonished if they did anything major without checking it out with
the White House. I just do not believe that. That does not mean that
I could prove in every individual case what the facts are. It just does
not seem to me to be probable.
That does not mean that they had an explicit order in writing, but
they must have been led to believe that certain types of activities-
I would apply this also to the period that I was there-I would feel
that those of us in the White House or in senior positions at the State
Department have a responsibility for the basic policy guidelines.
In carrying them out, I could see in one or two cases that they
thought obviously they had authorization to carry out a policy which
in fact they may have gone a step or two beyond, but not the basic
policy itself.
Senator GLENN. What I am driving toward, of course, is whatever
oversight function we establish here has to be set up on the basis of
what level we are going to oversee. Can it be just the CIA, which we
can look to as one touchstone for all of our intelligence information,
or does it have to be at a much lower level?
Secretary KISSINGER. I think that the committee of Congress ought
to oversee the heads of the agencies and the heads of the agencies
have the responsibility for getting their departments under control.
What we are thinking about in these mechanisms that the President
has under consideration-and it was also recommended by the Rocke-
feller Commission-is to streng hen greatly the Inspectors General
in each of the agencies in the intelligence system, and perhaps give
them a body to which they can report directly, bypassing-or tooether
with-the heads of their agencies, so that there is an active effort to
make sure that the lower levels carry out the orders.
But I do not believe that an attempt by the Congress to deal with
the lower levels of agencies will have any other effect except to subvert
discipline, and it will be used by soreheads rather than be an effective
means of control.
Senator GLENN. That very well may be true, but it has been indi-
cated by the testimony I mentioned earlier that a lack of information,
a lack of certainty of where this information was at the Presidential
or NSC level that even the executive branch has not known exactly
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when these things were occurring and where decisions were being made,
so it seems to me that it is a combination legislative and executive
branch problem that we all have to face together.
Would you favor, to get to a specific question, a proposal made by a
previous witness that we have, an overall Inspector General for all
intelligence activities who could be responsible in both directions?
Secretary KISSINGER. My difficulty in answering this is that the
President is just now considering various proposals to deal with this
precise problem, but the strength and function of the, Inspector Gen-
eral, either through the method that you recommend or through com-
parable ones, is one of the important features that he has considered,
and something on that line will certainly emerge in his proposals.
I think that the procedures have been greatly tightened up since
the early sixties and we would certainly have no objection to regulariz-
ing their even more.
Senator GLENN. It has been most discance.rting-I will close this
because my time has expired-but the difficulty here was to find out
who was in charge in this area, just, trying to find out what level very
tremendous decisions are being made so we know what type of over-
sight functioning is necessary, what sort of committee or group, or
what sort of stave we are going to require, just how we are going to
set the whole thing up.
That is the reason I was pursuing this.
Secretary KIssINGER,. I have to tell you, 'Senator, as these 'bureauc-
racies get larger-leaving aside intelligence agencies-it is not always
easy for heads of departments to know who is in charge. One of the
big problems of management in these departments-State and Defense
and so forth, leaving aside CIA-become so large is to prevent the
individual bureaus from simply running themselves on momentum
and their perception of the instructions without bogging themselves
down in endless details. That is a big problem in modern government.
Senator -GLENN. It is a big problem,but the-obvious next step is not,
I think, to say that we just cut the intelligence community down to as
few people as we can oversee. I think we all want a strong intelligence-
gathering activity. I do.
We certainly want to set up the oversight function to correct the
injustices and improprieties of the recent past.
Secretary I ISSINGEr. Among the various inspectors general-type
proposals that are now being made -and considered by the President,
I just do not want in a public session to come down on one thing.
Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RtiIBICOrr. Senator Percy?
Senator PE,rcY. I just have two questions. One question that I would
like to -ask, if it would involve -a lengthy answer, can be provided for
the record. At no time in our hearings have we received a full under-
standing of the Bureau of Intelligence and research, which is one
element of the intelligence community that does fall directly under
the 'Secretary of State and his jurisdiction.
Could you tell its a bit about this Bureau, how useful it is, whether
or not its role- should somehow be changed or just left intact? It
would help this particular committee.
Is it possible to do it very briefly, or would you rather do it for
the record?
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Secretary Klssr-NGEI... The Bureau of Intelligence and Research in
the State Department is, in terms of resources, a very tiny fraction
of the intelligence community. It controls something like 2 or 3 per-
cent of the resources. It is very small. It has very few independent
resources of its own.
It has the additional problem that the Department of State, from
some points of view, can be considered an intelligence collection
agency, in this instance an information-collecting agency; political
officers are supposed to report about political developments, which is,
in a way, what the intelligence community is supposed to do.
So we have a problem : one, of using the very limited resources we
have, and second, to get those people in the Department who really
think they know everything already on the basis of their own infor-
mation to use intelligence effectively.
On the whole, I have tried to get, and I think successfully, an in-
creased status to the Intelligence and Research Bureau in the Depart-
ment by tying them more systematically into the decisionmaking
process so that the other bureaus know that the INR is going to be
consulted. Therefore, they have a. vested interest in working more
closely with them.
Second, in trying to define what it is that IN Ib could do more effec-
tively, I have tried to keep them out of the da y-to-day business and
focus them more on making projections of the mid-term future, and
of course, they have a very crucial role as liaison to the other intelli-
gence agencies.
There is no way that the INR could duplicate what the CIA is doing,
nor should it. What they should do is utilize the information that the
CIA is developing, and maybe some of the military services, and then
to make their projections based on the special competence of the
Department of State.
And I feel, in the last 2 years, that the position of the INR has in-
creased in terms of its influence. I do not think that we want any
larger resources than we have.
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to pledge on behalf of
the minority that you will have 100-percent cooperation in meeting
the schedule and trying to develop as thoughtful. and careful a philos-
ophy for oversight as possible, taking fully into account that it is our
objective., really, to reduce the amount of time required by members
of the executive branch before the Congress.
Mr. Colby testified that some 50 percent to 00 percent of his time
was spent testifying or preparing for or cleaning up after congres-
sional committees. It is an outrage. We ought to organize ourselves
better than that. I almost hate to put the question to you, Mr. Secretary,
how much of your time is involved on the Hill?
Secretary KISSINGER. While you are at it, would you do the same for
the Secretary of State?
Senator PERCY. We will try to do that, with the one exception of
the new committee.
But I would like to say, and certainly my objective on the Foreign
Relations Committee is to try to reach out and help in a small way to
develop what the Senator from Michigan did, Senator Vandenberg,
in trying to develop a foreign policy that really allows us to speak with
one voice.
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We are -a divided country on many things. Taking into account the
separation of powers, we ought to be able to come together though.
I think that this series of hearings has helped immeasurably in
working toward the reorganization of our efforts. They will help in
that regard.
One thing that I would urge. The daily briefing material that has,
been taken away from the Foreign Relations Committee by the CIA
is a disservice to us. We are going to have to ask
Secretary KissINGER. When did that happen? Did it happen
recently?
Senator PE Rey. Yes, just within a week or so.
We have had it for a long time. There has not been one single breach
of confidence that I know of. As a result of it, it saves u great deal
of time. It saves us from calling the Agency constantly and asking
for information. It is a concise way of getting information.
I hope you can use your influence at the White House to restore it.
Secretary KIssINGER. Frankly, I did not know that that had been
stopped.
'Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
consideration.
Chairman RIBICGFT. One final comment.
Toward the end, you talked about the problems that arise when a
bureaucracy gets large. You can have the best policy in the world
and if you cannot deliver it, it is meaningless.
As these hearings develop, what has become very apparent to me is
that most of our witnesses, including Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Colby, Mr.
Helms, Mr. Kelley, and Mr. Phillips-who represent former intelli-
gence agents=are not very far apart in their thinking from the com-
mittee's thinking. And yet, when you read in the press of how the
executive branch is thinking, it in no way tracks with the way the
witnesses from the administration are talking.
I know, having been in the executive branch, that what frequently
happens with the Secretary or with the President, is that when their
staff members come up with ideas and make statements that get frozen
in, that gets to be policy. There is very seldom difficulty if a President
or a Secretary sits down with Members of Congress who are trying to
work out a policy. They would find themselves pretty much in agree-
ment as to what had to be done.
I never have had any problem with you on various matters. WWTe
worked out the problems that we have had within a half hour or an
hour. And, this committee in the past few years has been able to work
with the executive branch and different secretaries to come to an
understanding. I would hope that when you sit down with the Presi-
dent and those working with the President, that no one will stand
on pride or a statement that someone might have made 2 or 3 weeks
ago on the question of separation of powers. There is really not a
problm with separation of powers here. The Congress is not trying-
to encroach upon the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive or
the Executive on Congress.
We think pretty much alike, as I listen to the testimony. We want
to achieve your objective to have fewer committees engaging in over
0
sight and to come to an understanding of how 'and what comes before
this oversight committee.
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WTe are dealing with the basic problems that will affect where this
country is going and eventually will hit a debate on the floor and
before all of the committees. There is an opportunity here from the
executive branch-I never felt any difficulty working with either a
Democrat or Republican President-to help the Congress to work out
a sound oversight committee and a sound oversight procedure.
Based on your testimony, 14Ir. Secretary, and the others in the ad-
ministration, I feel there has been very little philosophical difference
between myself, personally, and the witnesses. I ut the testimony was
altogether different from what I have read in the papers as to what
the Executive is thinking about. I would hope that von would bear
this in mind, and that the President would bear this in mind as he
conies up with his recommendation.
Again I remind you---as this committee tries to work rapidly and
thoroughly-we start on the 18th. I would like to deliver a piece of
legislation to the Rules Committee by March 1.
I would certainly respect the point of view of the executive branch
of this Government, but we cannot fold in those thoughts and ideas
if we do not get them until February 28.
Secretary KISSINGER. First of all, I want to thank you for the man-
ner in which this hearing was conducted. I agree with you, from the
questions and from the discussions you and I have had before., that the
objectives of the Executive and this committee are very compatible,
that we have a problem of how to work out tough problems in a co--
operative way.
On the specific decision of when the President can submit his views,
I will certainly carry back to him your views and my impressions of
the tone and attitude of this committee and maybe I can call you
after I know what the schedule is.
Chairman Rn3FCOFF. Please keep in mind that we break on Friday.
I think this committee has conducted these hearings almost exclu-
sively future oriented. I am not interested in going over what the
Pike committee did or what the Church committee did. Reference to
the findings of those other committees was made only when it was
used as an example of what we are trying to prevent in the future.
Personally, I realize that there has to be a great reorganization in.
the executive branch. In 10 days, it would be foolhardy for me to
think that we in the Senate can reorganize i Ate entire intelligence
community. We really should not even try.
We should try to do the oversight. Much has to be done. Those
other tasks will be for another day.
I think this oversight, committee, once it is established, can be given
a directive by the Senate that it come up with elements of reorganiza-
tion of the intelligence. community by.Iuly 1, 1977.
Personally I do not agree with the house that within 10 days, we are.
going to reorganize or eliminate any element in the intelligence com-
munmty. That is not our job today.
Our job is to try to put an oversight commitree in place as soon as
possible. It has become very apparent to me that the reputation of the.
intelligence. community of our Nation has been so undermined and so
damaged that it becomes very essential that We completely restore
congressional and public confidence in our intelligence community,
because we need them to operate in the type of world we are in at the
present time.
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447
The oversight committee, in my opinion, is what is needed to regain
congressional confidence and public confidence in the intelligence com-
munity. That happens to be my thinking, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary KrssINGER. I agree with these objectives, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I appreciate the way in which this hearing was conducted.
Chairman RIBICOFr. Thank you.
Senator Nunn and Senator Glenn?
Senator NuNN. I do not have any questions. I just have a brief
comment.
I agree with everything the chairman has said. I think that he con-
ducted the hearings in a very, very fair manner, and I believe this
committee is going to be able to improve rather dramatically the status
quo. I am comforted by the fact that it cannot get much worse. We
only have one way to go.
And I do, Mr. Secretary, very sincerely share your expressed frus-
tration with the tremendous amount of leaks that have gone on in
Congress and in the executive branch. I hope we will be able to deal
with that subject, too.
I also share your frustration with the lack of coordination now. I
think, for the sake of the American people, both branches of govern-
ment must make every effort to try to coordinate our foreign policy
and I pledge my support towards that end.
Secretary KrsSINGER. I appreciate that. We will make every effort
on our side.
Chairman RzBrcorr. Senator Glenn?
Senator GLENN. I have no comments.
Chairman RIBICOFF. Thank you very much. We all wish for Mrs.
Kissinger that the operation tomorrow will be most successful.
The committee will stand adjourned until 9:15 tomorrow morning.
[Whereupon, at 1:20 'p.m. the committee recessed to reconvene Fri-
day, February 6, 1976, at 9:15 -a.m.]
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OVERSIGHT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE
FUNCTIONS
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:1115) a.m., in room 1318,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Abraham A. Ribicoff, chairman
of the committee, presiding.
Present : Senators Ribicoff, Chiles, Percy, Javits, and Brock.
Staff members present : Richard A. Wegman, chief counsel and staff
director; Paul Hoff, counsel; Paul Rosenthal, assistant counsel;
Marilyn A. Harris, chief clerk; and Elizabeth A. Preast, assistant
chief clerk.
Chairman RIBicorF. The committee will be in order.
We are privileged to have as our first witness today Senator Hud-
dleston, who is a member of the Church committee. We welcome your
comments, Senator.
TESTIMONY OF HON. WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY
Senator IIUDDLESTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the, committee to
testify on proposed legislation to establish a new standing committee
of the Senate on intelligence activities.
My service on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities
has served only to reinforce my commitment to a strong and effective
intelligence community, responsive to the needs of both national secu-
rity and the Constitution.
That service has, however, convinced me that the Congress must
take upon its shoulders a larger responsibility for overseeing the activi-
ties of the various intelligence agencies.
This, in turn, requires that the Senate be advised of the general
nature and extent of intelligence matters. And, that in turn, requires
that the Senate keep secrets and control itself internally.
Section 6 of the legislation introduced by certain members of the
Select Committee provides that :
The 'Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate, for the purposes of
accountability to the Senate, shall make regular and periodic reports to the
Senate on the nature and extent of the intelligence activities of the various
departments and agencies of the United States. Such committee shall promptly
call to the attention of the Senate or to any other appropriate committee or com-
mittees of the Senate any matters deemed by the Committee on Intelligence to
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450
require the immediate attention of the Senate or such other committee or com-
mittees. In making such reports, the committee shall proceed in such manner as
will protect the national security.
Within the select committee, this section, Mr. Chairman, has some-
times been referred to as the Huddleston amendment. As a result, I
would like to make a few comments concerning it.
First, it is important, I believe, to note that the section is modeled
on similar language pertaining to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, which deals with the very sensitive matter of development,
use, and control of atomic energy. Section 2252 of title 42 of the U.S.
Code established a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. That section
provides in pertinent part :
The [Atomic Energy] Commission shall keep the Joint Committee fully and
currently informed with respect to all of the commission's activities. The Depart-
ment of Defense shall keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed
with respect to all matters within the Department of Defense relating to the
development, utilization, or application of atomic energy, Any Government agency
shall furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee with respect to
the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy.
The part of the Atomic Energy Act funnels the information to the
committee. Perhaps more important for our purposes, however, is a
latter portion of that same section which provides that:
The .Members of the Joint Committee who are 'Members of the Senate shall
from time to time report to the Senate * * *
Second : I think it is important to note that my amendment does not
envision a wholesale release of classified or sensitive information. The
section itself directs that national security be protected. It does not
contemplate the naming of agents, the revealing of specific details of
ongoing operations, which can only lead to undesirable results. In-
stead, it refers to reports on the "nature and extent" of intelligence
activities. Thus, it does contemplate the provision of general_informa-
tion on the total range of activities to all Senators. For those instances
where classified materials might be involved, section 6 should read in
conjunction with section 10.
Perhaps the Angolan situation best illustrates the need for section
6. Some time ago, the select committee learned of the U.S. interest in
Angola. We, of course, as we did throughout our investigation, kept
this information in the strictest of confidence, even to the point of not
informing our fellow Senators. As the situation developed and in-
formation came from other sources, I saw conclusions being drawn on
the basis of partial information and became increasingly aware of the
real need of the Senate to know what was transpiring in Angola.
Certainly, the U.S. Senate could have been provided more complete
information on the situation-without naming contacts, sources of
information. et cetera.
't'hird: I think it is important to note that the. reporting provision
should not be read in a vacuum. Instead, section 6 must be read in
conjunction with sections 7. 9, and 10, which involve the disclosure
of information. Section 10. for example, seeks to create a process for
the release of information, which the President and other specified
members of the executive; branch have objected to having disclosed.
I believe, your committee will want, to examine this proposed process
closely and perhaps strengthen it. And, for my own part, I would like
to see section 6 operate in conjunction with some type of sanctions for
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those who fail to honor and respect the responsibility which knowledge
of sensitive matters of national security carries with it.
Certainly, it is reasonable to ask, "How will Congress act once it
has received sensitive information?" I am deeply concerned about this
issue. Indeed, it shares equally in importance with my desire to see the
Senate fully informed so that it may intelligently decide questions of
grave national importance. As one commentator so aptly put it re-
cently, if Congress is to be taken seriously in exercising its oversight
function, then it will have to devise ways of securing information and
for the orderly declassification and disclosure of information.
I firmly believe that the task of dignifying and solemnizing this
process falls squarely upon the shoulders of the Senate and that it
must not flinch from this responsibility.
Recently, I have at times had the feeling that we were all riding a
"runaway horse"-with information galloping forth and no one able
to pull in the reins. That must be eliminated and replaced with under-
standing and acceptance of the fact that some secrets have to be just
that-secrets.
That is why I urge that the Senate consider the section fi reporting
provision in conjunction with its consideration of provisions dealing
with disclosure. Such provisions are designed not only to accord more
sanctity to the process of disclosure but also to delineate a method for
dealing with this complex issue. I personally believe that once individ-
ual Senators become exposed to the problems of intelligence that the
full burden of responsibility will be felt and appreciated. But, that
cannot be left to chance or hope or to wishful thinking.
Consequently, I believe it is incumbent upon the Senate to develop
the internal sanctions it deems appropriate for unauthorized disclosure
by its Members.
Whether these should be fines, denial of access to classified materials,
automatic expulsion from an intelligence committee should the person
be a member, censure or even expulsion are matters of such grave
import that they should receive the most studied and thoughtful con-
sideration by the Senate. But, whatever the specifics decied upon, I
believe it is imperative that the Senate adopt some standard which it
believes in and will enforce with wisdom.
During most of the select committee's deliberations on proposed
legislation, the draft contained the following provision regarding
sanctions for Members who fail to comply with secrecy requirements :
,No Member of the Senate and no member of the :staff of the Senate shall dis-
close outside fire 'Senate any information conveyed to the Senate in closed session
or otherwise made available to Members of the Senate in confidence by the Com-
mittee an Intelligence Activities, unless authorized by the !Senate.
The Committee on intelligence Activities of the Senate shall refer 'to the Select
Committee on Standards and Conduct Hof the Senate for investigation and other
action (1) any disclosure outside the Committee pan Intelligence Activities of the
Senate, not authorized by such committee, of :ally information in the possession
of or obtained by such committee relating to the activities of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency or any other department or agency of the United States engaged in
intelligence activities, or otherwise held in confidence by such committee ; and
(2) any disclosure outside the Senate, not authorized by the :Senate, of any
information conveyed to the Senate in closed session or otherwise made available
to OlUeinhers -of the Senate in confidence by the Comzmittee on Intelligence Activi-
ties. The Select Committee on 'Standards and Conduct shall investigate any
breach of confidentiality referred to it pursuant to this subsection and shall
recommend appropriate action, such as censure, or removal from office.
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I regret that this language was dropped from S. 2893 as introduced,
and I am recommending comparable language be included in any bill
reported to the full Senate. With the committee's permission, I will in
the next few days offer some specific suggestions regarding the original
language as well as some recommendations on my own, which will
include a broader range of sanctions. If comparable language is not
added within committee., it is my intention at this time to offer such
language as an amendment when the bill reaches the floor. If we are
serious about being responsible, we will impose on ourselves sanctions
sufficient to guarantee that responsibility.
In addition, it is my intention to offer separate legislation which will
provide criminal penalties for ex-employees of the intelligence agen-
cies and the proposed intelligence committee who reveal classified
information subsequent to their employment by the agency or
committee.
As you know, exemployees of intelligence agencies are now sworn
to secrecy through an employment contract. I do not believe this con-
tractual. arrangement is sufficient, as evidenced by the unhappy epi-
sodes of late in which exemployees have revealed the names of the
present CIA undercover agents. I would like to strengthen the bond of
secrecy by providing criminal penalties for such unauthorized revela-
tions of national security information.
The experiences of recent years, Mr. Chairman, have taught us that
our institutions are strong and worthy of the confidence of the people.
During this period, conflicts on policy issues have often taken the form
of attacks on individual institutions. Many have been unmercifully
buffeted. Yet, they have borne well the brunt of each sally. What is
desperately needed now is a method of conciliation and mediation
which could turn the focus away from these entities themselves and on
to the issues involved. If we in the Senate wish to enter a new era of
sharing the burden in the foreign policy arena, tart of our task is to
show the American people by both word and deed that we understand
the role we wish to fulfill and that we take our responsibility with the
profound seriousness it demands. That will require knowledge, and it
will require an appreciation for the manner in which that knowledge
must be used.
Chairman RmrcoFF. Thank you very much, Senator Huddleston, for
your valuable contribution.
As chairman, I would be most appreciative if your suggestion legis-
lation or amendments would be submitted to the committee for our
examination.
It is our intention to start marking up this bill on the 18th, 2 days
after we return, and I am very sympathetic with some of your
suggestions.
Senator HI`DDLESTON. Itre will have it by that date, Mr. Chairman,
and make it available to the committee.
Chairman Rmi(l.oFF. Thank you very much.
The committee will stand in recess until 9 :30.
(Whereupon, the committee took a. brief recess.)
Chairman Rinrcon-. The committee will be in order.
Thank you very much, Mr. Attorney General, for being with us.
I would like your indulgence to change our order somewhat. I am
required, as chairman of the Government Operations Committee, to
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appear at 10 o'clock before the Rules Committee for the approval of
this committee's operating budget for the next year.
,So, I would like the privilege of asking a few questions first.
I understand that you have to leave at 11 or a few minutes after 11
o'clock for another important engagement. We understand that.
I am hopeful that while I am at the rules Committee Senator Brock
or other Senators can be here
Senator BRocK. I am supposed to be elsewhere, too.
Chairman RIBICOFF. Well, Senator Percy or Senator Weicker will be
here, so let's get started.
Before you read-your statement, could I ask a few questions?
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD H. LEVI, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES
Chairman, RIBICOFF. Yesterday, Senator Church urged the appoint-
ment of a new special prosecutor to investigate past activities of the
CIA and FBI and to prosecute officials who broke the law.
Do you have any comment on Senator Church's proposal?
Attorney General Lrvi. Well, I suppose the covering comment is, as
I think Senator Church indicated in the newspaper this morning, that
I don't agree with him.
I would be glad to say why I don't.
,Chairman RIBICOFF. Yes; I would like that because the first I knew
about the proposal was reading it in the newspaper this morning. I'
thnk it is important because it is a vital role.
Do you think that the Justice Department can act impartially on
these matters? I would like to have, your comment because it is im-
portant, it is on the front page of all the papers.
Attorney General LEVI. I don't have the slightest doubt that the
Department of Justice can act and is acting impartially on these mat-
ters and, as 'a matter of fact, Senator Church's statement went some-
what beyond that point into a different point.
It was really to the effect that, I think, whether the Department of
Justice could or could not act impartially and effectively, it might not
appear that way to the public.
Now, that means, then, that whenever one raises suspicions con-
cerning activities of Government employees-and Senator Church's
statement was not just about the Department of Justice employees but
employees in other parts of the Government-then the ordinary law-
enforcement mechanism cannot be trusted to take care of that.
I think that is a most debilitating and destructive view of the De-
partment of Justice and of Government.
I understand that when an emergency situation arises, as it did in
Watergate, and as it may from. time to time, a special prosecutor may
be necessary. To take the position that really it is an ongoing matter,
that a Department is so biased and so incapable of enforcement of the
law within the Government that one must have u special prosecutor run-
ning along side, strikes me as an attack on the integrity of the De-
partment, and if I believed that, frankly, I would just quit because
there really would be no purpose in my being here.
Chairman RIBICOFP. In other words, you reject Senator Church's
suggestion completely?
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Attorney General LEVI. I reject it for the events about which he is
talking.
Now, if there is some kind of emergency problem which arises-
and I don't know what would it be-I recognize that one can have a
special prosecutor.
Furthermore, at any time that I thought, it was required under the
present. setup, we could bring in a special prosecutor. In fact, we have
a special prosecutor in place right now who is operating on matters
assigned to him, and lawyers can be brought in from outside to handle
particular cases if that's necessary.
That has not been the problem. I might say that one problem which
Senator Church I know is aware of, is that we have not been able to get
from the Church committee materials which they gathered and which
we really must have with respect to these investigations.
{Chairman RmrrorF. In other words, Senator Church has never
turned over to you the material that you
Attorney General LE VI. Some material has been turned over, a great
deal as yet has not been, and as anyone would understand, this is
extremely important, both for fairness to putative defendants as well
as in preparation of the case.
Chairman RIBICOFF. In other words, you look at Senator Church's
suggestions as a reflection on your own integrity?
Attorney General LEVI. I don't think it is intended that way.
Chairman RIEICOrr. But the result would be?
Attorney General LEVI. I don't know about that. I would say if I
believed that, I would ask myself, "Why am I here?" Since there are
other places to be, that would be a good question.
Chairman Rim7COFF. Do you support the creation of a new intelli-
gence oversight committee this year?
Attorney General LEVT. Well, I would support it. There are prob-
lems which I have tried to discuss in my statement.
There are problems about the giving of information to it. There are
problems about the disclosure of information by it. There are particu-
lar problems with respect to the Department of Justice or the FBI.
I am sorry that there are those problems, particularly with the
latter, but I think they exist and how that should be handled, I am
not sure.
T don't think that the FBI's activities should be split as it is sug-
gested. So, if they are not split and if they are kept together, then the
question is which committee should have oversight over the FBI.
I think it is very important not to segment the FBI.
Chairman Ru3ICOrF. Even though you have counterintelligence ac-
tivities in the, FBI, it would be your feeling that they should not be
within the oversight committee's jurisdiction with the other intelli-
gence activities of the other agencies?
Attorney General LEI. I think counterintelligence, domestic secu-
rity investigations, are law enforcement directed and that it is a peril
to our country to think of them in any different-Fight.
it is very important to see the relationship between these investiga-
tions and law enforcement and very important for the Bureau to see
it that way and to always be reminded of it.
That's why I think it. is dangerous to coin part ni ntalize and split off
the activity.
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455
Now, that doesn~t mean, assuming an oversight committee on intelli-
gence, that it couldn't look at various parts of the FBI's activities, but
I don't think it should be -a primary oversight committee on the FBI
unless it has the whole thing.
If it has the whole thing, then it is dealing with law enforcement
activity or it never should be in the Department of Justice. I don't
think that's possible. So, that is a problem.
I don't know how it gets settled.
Chairman RIBICOFF. Mr. Attorney General, the committee starts
marking up this legislation on the 18th. Could we expect the position
of the Justice Department on the Church bill before we start marking
this legislation up?
Attorney General LEVI. Well, we will get you our position. I just
hope the position will be helpful.
I think there is a problem.
Chairman RIBICOrF. Yes, we know there are problems and we are
very anxious to get every point of view and we want the point of
view of the CIA and the State Department and the, Attorney General
and your analysis and your feelings.
Obviously, you feel very strongly on it and I think we would respect
your thinking.
Attorney General LEVI. We will get it to you.
Chairman RIBICOFF. Let me ask you : Do you think, under present
law, the CIA's present authority to conduct covert operations abroad
is clear?
Attorney General LEVI. I think the authority is probably clear
enough. That doesn't mean it couldn't be made clearer. I think past
actions of the Congress and the constitutional powers of the Presi-
dent together proba%ly are sufficient-I don't know if the word should
be "clear."
Chairman Rimco T. Would you again want to make suggestions by
the 18th to clarify this? Or, will you not be ready for it by than?
I would rather have a candid answer on this because I recognize
that there will be features of the intelligence problem that I don't
believe that we can really address ourselves to in the period between
now and March 1.
Yet they require study and they require amplification. I would rather
have your frank opinion, Mr. Attorney General, and not make any
commitment that you can't keep.
Attorney General LEVI. Well, perhaps the commitment should be
that we will do our best. There are, of course, problems in giving that
kind of an opinion, anyway, so we will have to see if we can do that.
Chairman RIBZCOFF. Now, the Atomic Energy Act requires certain
Government agencies to keep the Joint Atomic Energy Committee
fully and currently informed on atomic energy matters.
Do you sea any constitutional problems with the way such a provi-
sion has been generally interpreted by agencies and the committee?
Senator Baker, who is a member of the, Joint Atomic Energy Com-
mittee, said the other day that under the fully and currently informed
language the committee has been consulted in advance regarding some
of the most sensitive of undertakings by the agencies.
Do you object, as a constitutional matter, with this particular inter-
pretation of the term "fully'and currently informed"?
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Attorney General LEVI. I think the problem is perhaps less with the
language than with the way it is interpreted and what it is thought
to require.
I think there is a constitutional problem if to keep fully informed
means that every act taken has to be passed on ahead of time by a
congressional committee.
Nov, it isn't inevitable that that be the kind of interpretation, and
it isn't inevitable that that be a requirement. It could be more of an
accommodation and mutual working.
There is a constitutional problem if the congressional committee
regards itself as being the manager of the operation. If the purpose of
the disclosure of the information ahead of time is really part of the
management process.
Then the congressional committee has really become an executive.
Chairman RmrcoFF. Under our constitutional system, Congress has
the responsibility for exercising oversight of the activities of the exec-
utive branch.
Now, the ability of Congress to meet this responsibility would be
undermined if the executive branch has a final say over what informa-
tion the committee can disclose.
On the other hand, the executive branch asserts a constitutional role
of its own in classifying and declassifying information.
Do you feel that there are important constitutional interests involved
on both sides of the issue wherever Congress seels to release informa-
tion labeled "confidential" by the executive branch?
Attorney General LEVI. Well, there are important constitutional
issues involved. It is perhaps more complicated than just to say wher-
ever there is a label of confidentiality on a document.
I don't think that whether Congress can declassify-which I think
Congress cannot do-is the same thing as whether Congress can dis-
close, which in fact ait.,tinies it has done.
So, it is a, complicated constitutional matter.
I would like to go back to a point to make what you might find a
more alarming statement.
I don't find in the Constitution any provision which says that Con-
gress has oversight functions over the operations of the executive.
Theme is no such provision.
't'here is a provision that it has the necessary powers to carry out its
functions and, therefore, one has to ask what are the congressional
functions.
The congressional functions are to appropriate and to pass laws and
certainly for that purpose it needs to know a great dea.1 about how the
laws are being administered and their effect.
But I do not find in the Constitution, whether it should be there or
not, the power of Congress to supervise the executive branch.
I do not believe that one would find it either ia the writings of the
Founding Fathers.
So, there are constitutional problems when one has a separation of
powers which one does have here, and a necessity for confidentiality.
Chairman RIBICOFF. In chatting with Secretary Kissinger yesterday,
I suggested to him-and I suggest to you, too-we are going to have to
enter into a trial marriage here between the President and Congress.
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Now, we are really in a thorny thicket here. There is a problem,
as Secretary Kissinger states, which is uppermost in his mind, and
that is : How do Congress and the Executive work together in the
field of foreign policy? I agree with him on that. We are at an impasse
and it isn't good for the country to have the quarrels and deep di-
visions on important matters between the President and the Secretary
of State on one hand and the Congress on the other hand.
Again, I am only speaking for myself and I can't commit the other
members of the committee, but it would seem to me that it is going to
behoove us to try to set this committee up and maybe deliberately
keep certain elements fuzzy.
'There ought to be this trial period over the next 9 months or so in
which the Congress and the President are going to have to accommo-
date themselves to one another.
My thinking is that on many of these issues, with a proper directive
to the Oversight Committee, they could come back to the Senate on
July 1, 1977 with suggestions on problems that we now see only
dimly developed. To make this really work without having a con-
frontation with one another, it is going to be absolutely essential that
there be mutual trust, mutual understanding, and mutual accom-
modation.
I am going to leave now to go to the rules Committee, but I will
come back.
Senator Percy has some questions. I know he has to go to the Rules
Committee, too, and Senator Brock, also.
I hope Senator Weicker will come, but I hope we can accommodate
ourselves for the Attorney General.
Your point of view is very important and I regret that we find
ourselves in this situation because there are important questions that
I would like to ask.
So, Senator Percy, would you chair, and would you excuse me. I
will return later.
Senator PERCY [presiding]. I thank the Attorney General. I think
you are fortunate in that both of us are going to have to leave.
I will not be able to come back, but in 10 minutes I hope I can
finish up my questions.
Attorney General LEvr. I am not sure in which part of that my good
fortune lies.
Senator Pzncy. Well, I do apologize, though, because in looking
quickly over your paper this morning I think you have really done
a great service to this committee and the Congress in thoroughly
researching what you describe as very delicate lines of questions. Ever
since our previous conversation on the oversight duties and responsi-
bilities and authority of Congress, I have done a little research on it to
be absolutely certain that as we proceed we are proceeding in accord-
ance with the clearest provisions of the Constitution.
I certainly will be most concerned, as you evidence on the bottom of
page 3-on the question of how far a committee can go in monitoring
intelligence operations for legitimate legislative purpose before the
tendency develops to attempt to manage them.
I hsd previously come to the conclusions in these hearings and put
questions to virtually all witnesses to corroborate my feelings that we
should not become the executive branch of Government.
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If we became part and parcel of every major decision made in the
intelligence field involving covert operations, we would have no right
to exercise oversight. We wouldn't be able to do it because we are part
of that decision.
First of all, do you concur with that, that there should not be prior
approval as long as the operation is within general guidelines of policy
and as long as it is certainly not contrary to la :v. Do you think that
there should not necessarily be prior approval by Congress of every
activity undertaken by an intelligence agency?
Attorney General LEVI. I don't think that should be a requirement.
Senator PERCY. Former Attorney General Katzenbach has suggested
that it might be a good procedure to require the CIA and other intel-
ligence agencies to commit to writing, in classified form, plans for a
major covert operation, to write it down and make it a matter of record
so that it could be reviewed subsequently if therm was a need for that.
There might be a tendency, once an operation is committed to writ-
ing and its purpose put down, along with the various range of alterna-
tives and options, to not engage in some of the things that we might
loosely go ahead with if it were all done verbal ly and informally.
Is this a suggestion worthy of our consideration and the considera-
tion of the executive branch ?
Attorney General Lrwz. I think so. I don't want: to dissemble; I have
no particular experience in or insight into that kind of covert activity,.
but Mr. Katzenbach, I assume, as Under Secretary of State, perhaps
knew more about them.
I would assume that a requirement of that kind has to be carefully
looked at because my guess would be that the. writing down could not
always be as detailed as one might wish and as one might think it
could have been after the fact.
I have not seen such a plan in operation, so I just don't know.
Senator PEUCY. I would like to send you his testimony on that par-
ticular point. If you could give us your analysis of that suggestion, we
would appreciate it, because it is a very concrete suggestion and seems
to be, on the surface at least, a worthy effort to try to find a way to
minimize the excesses in this field.
I intend to send copies of your testimony to members of the Foreign
Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee because on
the floor today we have a military assistance bill that I think comes
dangerously close to the area of assuming the responsibilities and
duties and functions of the executive branch of Government.
The Senate yesterday accepted four amendments I put in to remove
the legislative branch from executive branch operations.
There is a terrible tendency to overreact in Congress with things
that will take us away from legislative objectives and get its into man-
aging things, which would be a horrendous result.
Mr. Katzenhanh testified that he did not really know a lot of things
being carried on by the FBI that he feels now he should have blown,
that there was a lack of communication there.
I believe. the best oversight possible of any of these operations should
really begin with the executive branch itself, in sensitive security mat-
ters. The National Security Council we know has not exercised the
oversight it should.
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Certainly, when Dean Ilusk said he was unaware and shocked to,
find out certain things had been carried on involving foreign policy
when he was Secretary of State that he did not know about, there has
not been sufficient oversight there.
I am interested in your relationships now with the FBI. Could you
describe your relationship with the FBI and with the Director, Mr.
Kelley? He said in testimony that he welcomed your guidance, coun-
sel, cooperation, and availability.
For the record, could you tell us whether you have found a way that
the Attorney General and Director of the FBI can have satisfactory
relationships so that there is oversight over the FBI within the execu-
tive branch of government as we assumed all along there has been but
suspected there probably wasn't?
Attorney General LEVI. Well, I would describe the last year's rela-
tionship as a learning process, one in which the Department and my
office have become much more acquainted with the operations of the
Bureau and the Bureau has, I am sure, come to realize much more that
the concerns we have are the kinds of procedures that ought to be, fol-
lowed and that really is a search for the kind of thing which you were
talking about before, namely, where we should have prior notification;
where the Director ought to have notification on what is done in the
field ; where our authorization is required.
So, for the last 10 months at least the Department., through a com-
mittee on which the FBI is represented, has been drawing tip detailed
guidelines for the Bureau.
That is why I called it a learning process because in the course of
doing that a variety of activities has surfaced and has been examined
and then an attempt made to determine whether these activities are
the kinds of things that the Department should be notified about
should give specific approval on and what is the standard, and so on.
While these guidelines are taking much longer than I ever thought
they would-and I regret that-I think they have formed the basis
for a much better understanding.
My view is that the relationship-I think this must be right-
between the Director of the Bureau and the Attorney General and the
Department on the other side, the relationship between those two seg-
ments is now closer than it has even been since probably the Stone
period.
That doesn't mean that I know everything that is going on in the.
Bureau, and I hope he won't mind my saying so, but I wouldn't assume
that Director Kelley knew everything, either. Ho knows a lot more
than I do, and he should.
So, it is, as you have put it, a kind of oversight function which
means you don't know everything. One has to know and have con-
fidence that one knows the important things.
As time goes on, one perhaps gets greater confidence that that, con-
fidence might turn out to be misplaced, but I hope not.
Senator.PERCY. When will the new guidelines that have taken longer
than you thought they would, be ready?, What is the target date for
them?
Attorney General LEVI. Well, the target date is many months ago.
Senator PEE.CY. What is the new target date?
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Attorney General LEvr. Senator Percy, I wish I knew. I refused to
accept the target date that was given to me by the committee the last
time I met with them, which was the first of next year.
I find that much too long a time to wait, and I hope that within the
next few months that we. will be ready.
Senator PERCY. Could we try to aim for a June 30 target date?
Is that too short a period, in your judgment, or does that give you
sufficient time?
Attorney General LEVI. I would shoot for a._ shorter date, knowing
that one never hits these. shorter dates anyway. But, I think one has to
shoot for the shorter date.
For one thing, these guidelines are tentative. We have tried to make
them available in various ways to chairmen of congressional commit-
tees and to other committees.
They require discussion, consultation, there is a question as to
whether some parts shouldn't be, as I would hope, enacted into legisla-
tion; other parts into Executive orders and rules.
The sooner the better, and I don't even want to wait until June.
Senator PERCY. I believe it would have been very helpful to us in
working on this legislation. We are going to report this bill out on
March 1. We are doing so at the urgent request of the executive branch.
It would help us immensely if we could have known how much over-
sight we could have expected inside the executive branch.
If we could have gone over those guidelines it might have made un-
necessary some of the things we might have to do. So, there is a sense
of urgency about it.
We are not assuming that this bill is going to sail through. There
are going to be a lot of toes stepped on if we are ,doing to cut down the
number of oversight committees to one or two. There are going to be a
lot of bodies around here and that's not going to be done early, but
the sooner we can get those guidelines, the sooner we can really know
intelligently how much we should be doing at the congressional end.
It would help a great deal.
I would like to ask another question on the dissemination of sensitive
information. In quickly going through your testimony, and I am sorry
it was not available last night for me to study, have you suggested a
joint committee, for congressional intelligence oversight?
Do you support particularly a joint committee of the House and
Sell-ate?
Attorney General Lr