ISSUES IN SENATE SELECT COMITTEE DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200120003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 2, 1976
• Content Type: REGULATION

-'Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200120003-9
2 January 1976
Issues in Senate Select Committee
Draft Proposal for Intelligence Oversight
1. The draft is in legislative format, but at the same time amends'
the standing rules of the Senate. Furthermore, it asserts the Constitutional
right of the Senate to change the amended Senate rules. This appears to
be technically objectionable in that a statute cannot delegate to the Senate
the authority to amend a Public Law.
2. The proposal states that service as a Senator on the committee
shall not be taken into account in other Senate committee assignments.
This is subject to the objection that if a Senator is to take on service
in this committee in addition to all existing committee assignments, how
much attention can he really give this important subject?
3. In discussing committee staffing there is no reference to
requirements for secrecy agreements. This point is sufficiently important
as to warrant providing for it in the charter of the committee, be it
legislation or by resolution.
4. Sec. 11 provides that even after Presidential certification that
information should not be disclosed, the Senate may disclose it. This
raises serious Constitutional problems and would undoubtedly call for
a veto of legislation containing such a provision.
5. Sec. 13 states that the committee shall be "fully and currently
informed with respect to all intelligence activities." This is very broad
wording and would raise questions as to the authority of agencies to
withhold names of informants, agents, and to identify cooperating corpora-
tions and other extremely sensitive details. This again raises grave
Constitutional questions.
6. Sec. 13(c) provides that the committee may specify types of
intelligence activities which in its judgment are especially sensitive and
may require that the committee be notified prior to the Executive branch
decision to carry out any such activity. This clearly raises most serious
Constitutional questions. The Senate is to legislate and the Executive
is to execute that legislation. A committee is not to manage intelligence
activities under the Constitution.
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 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200120003-9
7. There is a provision that the Comptroller General shall have
access to any books, accounts, records, and all of the papers or things
within the possession of the intelligence agency. This again is un-
acceptable on Constitutional grounds. Since the time of George Washington
there has been recognition that all intelligence accounts may not be
reviewed by the Congress or its representatives.
8. The jurisdiction of the committee is not made exclusive. It
is recognized that attempts to provide for exclusive jurisdiction will be
difficult.
9. No provision is made for repeal of Foreign Assistance Act
section 662 reports.
Approved For Release 2001/03/06: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200120003-9