HEARING HELD BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 164
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Thursday, December 4, 1975
Washington, D. C
WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, -D. C. 20003
[phone]
ILLEGIB
CRC, 9/25/2003
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C 0 N T E N T S
STATEMENT OF:
William G. Miller, Staff Director,
Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence
Activities
William Bader, Professional Staff
Member, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence
Rick Inderfurth, Professional Staff
Member, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence
Greg Treverton, Professional. Staff
Member, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence
Ralph Dungan, Former United States
Ambassador to Chile
Charles A. Meyer, Former Assistant
Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs
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Edward M. Korry, Former United
States Ambassador To Chile
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Thursday, December 4, 1975
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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:45 o'clock
p.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, the
Honorable Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,
Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower,
Goldwater and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director.; Frederic
A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.., Chief'Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority
Counsel; William Bader, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton,
Pat Shea,' Peter Fenn, Lock Johnson, Charles Kirbow, David
Aaron, Joe Dennin, Burt Wides, Joseph DiGenova, Charles Lombard
Rhett Dawson and Bob Kelley,.Professional Staff Members.
The Chairman. The hearing will please.come to order.
Today the Committee holds public hearings on the involveme t
of the United States in covert activities in Chile from 1963
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through 1973. It takes this unusual. step because the Committee
believes the American people must know and be able to judge
what was undertaken by their government in Chile. The nature
and extent of the American role in-the overthrow of a
democratically-elected Chilean government are matters for deep
and continuing public conern. While much of this sad story
has been revealed already, the public record remains a jumble
of allegations, distortions, and half-truths. This record
must be set straight.
President Ford has defended covert U.S. activities in
Chile during 1970-1973 as "in the best interest of the Chilean
people and certainly in our best interest." Why was that so?
What was there about the situation in Chile and the threat it
posed. to our national security which made covert intervention
into the political affairs of another-democratic country either
good for Chile or necessary for the United States? These
questions must be answered. The Committee's purpose is less
to pass judgment on what has been done than to understand, so
that it may frame appropriate legislation and recommendations
to govern what will be done in the future.
Given the President's statement, it is particularly
unfortunate in my opinion that the Administration has refused
to testify and has planned to boycott the Committee's hearings.
The American people deserve to know the reasons why the United
States firs,. undertook extensive, if not massive, covert
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operations within a democratic state in this hemisphere. They
deserve to know why their government sought, in 1970, to
overthrow a popularly elected government. The Administration's
prohibition on testifying in a public forum on this subject
has. extended to the point of preventing CIA employees, both
past and present, from coming before this Committee. I find
this particularly ironic since I spent the whole morning at
the Pacem in Terris conference at the Sheraton Hotel here in
Washington, publicly debating with Mr. Colby the covert
operations that occurred in.Chile during the period under
investigation. And so it is not denied to him to discuss
such matters publicly and before the assembled press at the
Sheraton-Park Hotel. It is denied him that.he should come and
testify here at the Capitol before this Committee.
I believe the position of the Administration is completely
unjusitifed. Secretary Kissinger has argued that.it would be
inappropriate to appear before Congress and the American people
to discuss covert action operations in which he was involved,
yet only last week-he gave a speech defending covert action.
the Secretary-can give speeches on covert action, I believe he
should be prepared to answer questions before Congress and the
people of the country.
The Committee has taken the utmost precautions, both durin
its investigations and in what it has written publicly, to
protect sensitive sources of intelligence, methods of
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intelligence operations, and the names of agents. With regard
to .Chile,' the Administration has joined in that effort. Thus,
there is no merit to the charge that holding a public hearing
on Chile will cause harm to the national security interests..
of the United States. .
What will damage the American interest is an Administration
that refuses to speak to the issue of why we intervened so
heavily in the internal affairs of Chile. The public-has every
legitimate right-to such an explanation.
This Committee and the American people can not wait foreve-
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until the Administration decides to honor the rights of the
citizens of this nation to know the policies of their Governmen
Today we make"public the results of our own Committee investi-
gation into the Chilean intervention. We will also take
testimony today from former State Department officials who haves
consented to appear and have shown a .sense of responsibility.
to ppeak to the issues raised by our Chilean policy.
This is the one covert action hearing the Committee will
hold in public session. We have taken this unusual step
because the Committee believed that revealing the truth about.
the Chile episode would serve two important purposes.. First, or
the basis of an accurate record, the public would be in a
position to decide for itself the wisdom and propriety of the
actions taken by its government'in Chile. And, second, the
Chile case provides a good example of the full range of
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covert action. It permits the Committee, the Senate, and the
country to debate and decide the merits of future use of covert
action as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
Our Committee report, which is being released in conjuncti
with these hearings this afternoon, is based on an extensive
review of documents obtained from the files of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State and Defense, and
the National Security Council, as. well as testimony by
present and former Government officials. Except when already
well-known, names of Chileans and of Chilean institutions have
been omitted in order to avoid revealing intelligence sources
and methods, and to limit needless harm to individual Chileans
who cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite
these deletions, the report conveys an accurate picture of
the purposes and magnitude of United States covert action in
Chile.
The. hearings will begin with a presentation by the staff,
laying out the bare facts about covert U.S. activities in
Chile in the decade.between 1963 and 1973. The Committee will
then hear three former State Department officials: Ralph
Dungan and Edward Korry,.American Ambassadors in Chile from
1964 through 1967, and 1967 through 1971, respectively; and
Charles Meyer, Assistant.Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs from 1969 through 1973.' Tomorrow, with the Chile case
but in the open,. a panel of distinguished Americans will
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discuss covert action in general, its value and costs, its
limits and effects. They will offer recommendations concerning
whether it should be employed in the future and, if so, in
what situation and under what restrictions and controls.
Senator Tower, do you have an opening statement?
Senator Tower. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have always clung to the view that information concernin
the details of United States covert operations should not be
made public because of the possible hazards created for
individuals and because the release of such information may
jeopardize necessary activities. Therefore, while I believe
it has been appropriate and useful for this Committee to
conduct an executive examination ofl.covert activities and
programs, I have been opposed to public sessions; I remain
opposed to public sessions. I believe,the national interest
would be better served if we had cancelled these particular
public sessions.
I yield, of course, to the majority of the Committee,
that voted to make these hearings public, but in recognizing
the right of the majority of the Committee to do so, I must
express my own very serious reservations.
Thank. you.
Senator Goldwater. Mr. Chairman, I would like.to be
recorded as being in favor of what Senator Tower has said. T
think it.is a mistake, not his statement, but a mistake that we
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are holding these hearings in public.
The Chairman. Very well, Senator Goldwater.
Any other comment from any other member of the Committee
at this time?
If-not, we will turn to our panel of staff e*cperts that
will examine the Chilean intervention, and I will call first on
the Chief of Staff of the Committee, Bill Miller.
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STATEMENT OF WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, th
two days of public hearings on covert action as an instrument
of United States policy, which begin today, are based upon an
in-depth inquiry done by the Committee and staff over the
past eight months. The Committee has been able to examine the
full scope of covert action techniques. that have been used by
the U.S. Government since the end of World War II, how they
relate to publicly declared foreign policy, and how they are
initiated, approved, and monitored.. These techniques range fro
relatively passive actions, such as passing money to shape the
outcome of elections, to the influencing of men's minds through
.prpaganda and misinformation placed in the media of other
nations, to the more aggressive and belligerent techniques of
organizing coup d'etats and engaging in paramilitary warfare.
Out of the thousands of covert action projects throughout the
world undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency since
1.947, the Committee chose to examine the programs in six countr
in detail. These six country programs, which the Committee has
already examined in Executive Session, span 30 years.of activit
since the end of World War II, and five Administrations.
From the.,outset of the Committee's inquiry, it has been
clear that a major question to be decided upon by the Committee
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is to what extent, if any, covert action should be authorized
by the Congress and the people of the United States.
A useful place to begin, therefore, in examining the past
activities and possible future scope of covert action is a
review of the present state of the law.
To begin first with definitions of what the law is suppose
to govern: According to the CIA's own present definition,
covert action means any clandestine or secret activities design d
to influence foreign governments, events., organizations, or
persons in support of U.S. foreign policy conducted in such
manner that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not
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apparent. .
The present law cited by the Executive Branch covering such
activities is ambiguous at best. The appropriate section of
the National Security Act of 1947 authorizes the CIA to "perform
such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting, the national security as the National Security Council
may, from time to time, direct."
The Committee, over the past eight.months, has examined th
legislative history of the 1947 Act, and has interviewed most
of the principal living participants who helped draft that
Act, and from the fruits of the investigation thus far, there
is little in the legislative history, in either Committee,
'Executive Session, or floor debate, that gives credence to
the notion that Congress intended to authorize what is now
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the full range of covert action. In particular, there is no
evidence that Congress ever addressed the question of whether
the U.S. Government should undertake assassination,:.support
a coup d'etat, or paramilitary warfare. The law that is now
on the books reflects the fact that neither the Executive
Branch nor the Congress was able to foretell what perils the
future. two or three decades would hold for the United States
or what activities the.Government would use to meet situations
that.emerged.
It has been argued that. the Congress voted appropriations
for covert actions and thereby tacitly approved these activitie
There has never been an annual authorization of the CIA budget.
The Congress has never as a body voted with knowledge on CIA
appropriations. But rather, it has voted.for appropriations
in which CIA funds were concealed. There are those who maintai
that because of that the Congress has never authorized through
the appropriations process covert actions by-the CIA, as a
result. Two years ago, Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act, an amendment, the Ryan-Hughes Amendment, was passed. It
requires the President to report to the appropriate Committees
in a timely fashion all covert action programs that he has
approved.
It.has been argued that the legislation provides congres-
sional authorization of covert action thereby. Informing
Committees of the Congress and subsequent Congressional
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awaremess of covert action is not the same thing as approval.
A strongly-held point of view is that the'a.im of that legis-
lation was to insure that sufficient knowledge of covert
action would be available before approval could be considered.
The Committee has been studying covert action in order to
decide whether to provide statutory authority for covert
action.
T 1ie"Exe'cutive' branch has defended' covert- factions' as "?hebessa
to' meet the situations 'ins the gray- area between"- declared ;aar -and
peace `,The.Committee.must decide whether it wishes to enact
specific limitations or to permit this area to remain vague
and circumlocqtious, as one witness has called it, and
subject to the failures and abuses, and the lack of fixed
responsibility and. accountability for actions taken. The
Committee's inquiry into assassinations and of large-scale
covert action program failures that have come before the
Committee's inquiry is proof of the problems.crea.ted by
this vague and inadequate law.
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The record examined thus far shows that covert action
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programs over the last 30 years have been generally successful
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enemies. In the view of many who have looked at the question,
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covert action has become.the national means, the "functional
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'equivalent" to-,use Secretary Katzenbach's phrase,,. for. acts of
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deception, subversion-, and violence, including instances of
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warfare The Chairman. Mr. Miller, I wonder if you could suspend
for a moment. There's a vote on by virtue of which the other
Committee members have absented themselves. I'm going to miss
the vote unless we take a very brief recess. You can renew
your testimony as soon as other members begin to reappear.
(A brief recess was taken.)
Senator Tower. Let's have order, please.
Mr. Miller, you will continue, please.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, although there has been a
considerable degree of Congressional acquiescence, many of
these aggressive covert activities havd.been undertaken without
the awareness of the Congress as a whole of the circumstances
and reasons for these actions; they have been taken without an
annual authorization, or without any explicit statutory
authority.
The costs of past covert action are considerable. Since
the end of World War II, the U.S. has expended many billions
of dollars in the carrying out of covert action programs.
As is evident in the Chile case,. the amounts spent.on
covert action programs are considerable;.however,.they.are
extremely small when compared.to.the amounts spent on various
forms.of aid. The secrecy required to carry out covert action
.,programs all too often has created confusion not only in the.
public mind, but has served to cause the Government to work at
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cross purposes. The positive effects of AID programs and the
good will created by programs such as the Peace Corps have been
negated by the covert action undertaken in Chile.
As pointed out by the former head of covert operations,
Mr. Richard. Bissell, there have been many short-term tactl.cal
victories but very few lasting successes.
in order to examine the broad questions of policy raised
by covert action, a detailed examination of Chile has been
undertaken. The staff study which members of the Committee have
before them is as factual as the Committee staff has been able
to make it. Its purpose is to clear up questions arising from
allegations of U.S. involvement in Chile, to arrive at an
understanding of the general nature of covert action in Chile,
to come to an understanding of the general nature of covert
action, and perhaps most important, how covert action in this
instance served to negate openly-avowed diplomatic policies
of the U.S. .
The Chile case presents great paradoxes. In 1964, the
U.S. through covert action assisted a candidate for the.
presidenty to achieve a majority. They gave assistance to
a moderate candidate. The reason given was ostensibly to
strengthen democratic purposes.
In the period 1970 through 1973, in order-to prevent a
,Marxist leader from coming to power by democratic means, the
U.S. worked through covert action to subvert democratic processy
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The means used went far beyond those used in 1964 in money,
propaganda, and political manipulation. The means used
were economic warfare, the encouragement of coup deetat and
military violence. .
The means were hardly democratic; this assistance, this
interference in the internal affairs. of another country, served
to weaken'the party we sought to assist and created internal
dissensions which, over time, led. to the weakening and, for
the present time at least, an end to constitutional government
in Chile.
The contrast between covert action in Chile during the
.1960s and 1970s with the responsibility of the_U.S. under the
Organization of American States, to which the U.S.. is party, an
the rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress could not be more
graphic. Let me quote from the OAS Charter to which the
United States is a signatory.
Article 18 states: "No State or group of States has the
right to intervene, directlyr or indirectly, for any reason'
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force
but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
.against the personality of the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements.
Article 19 states: "No State may use or encourage the use
of coercive measures.of..any economic or political character
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in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtai
from it advantages of any kind."
Article 21 of the OASiCharter, akin to Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter, provides for the use of force for purposes of
self-defense, but this could hardly be construed as a justi-
fication for the covert activities undertaken in Chile, since
the intelligence estimates of the U.S. Government concluded tha
the Allende government posed no threat to.vital U.'S. interests
or U.S. national security.
On October 31, 1969, President Nixon delivered an address
on his Action for Progress for the Americas Program. His first
principle was as follows: "A firm commitment to the inter-
American system, to the compacts which bind us in'that system,
as exemplified by the Organization of American States and by
.the principles so nobly set forth in its charter."
In his State of the World Address delivered on February
25, 1971 to the Congress, the President said: "The United
States has a strong political interest in maintaining cooperation
with our neighbors' regardless of their domestic viewpoints. We
have a clear preference for free and democratic processes. We
.hope that governments will evolve toward constitutional
procedures. But it' is not-our mission to try to provide --
except by example.-- the.answers.to such questions for other
0 2411 nations. We deal with governments as they are."
The new.Government in Chile is a clear case in point. The
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1970 election of. a Socialist President may have profound impli-
cations not only for its people but for the inter-American syst r
as well. .
The President went on: "Our bilateral policy is to keep
open lines of communication. We will not be the ones to
upset traditional relations. We assume that international
rights and obligations will be observed. We also recognize that
.the Chilean Government's actions will be determined primarily
by its own purposes, and that these will not be deflected simpl
by the tone of our policy. In short, we are prepared to have
the'kind of relationship with the Chilean government. that
it is prepared to have with us."
At the very time this speech was delivered, the United
.States was already embarked on a Presidentially-approved
covert action program designed to control the outcome of the
At.this point, Mr..Chairman, I want to turn to Mr. Bader
who will describe the pattern of covert action as it was used
in Chile.
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Senator Tower. Mr. Bader is recognized.
Mr. Bader. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Sen. Sel.
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STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BADER
Mr. Bader. The staff study on Chile focuses on what
is labeled "covert action" by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Covert action, as defined by the Central. Intelligence Agency,
describes a policy tool for all seasons and purposes. To the
Agency the term "covert action" means, as Mr. Miller has
already stated, "any. clandestine operation or activity designed
to influence foreign governments,. organizations, persons or
events in support of the United States foreign policy objective
The definition of "covert action" was not always so
embracing, and indeed the term itself was only coined.i.n recent
years. This question of defining "covert action" is important
as the Committee addresses the central questions:
The.central questions are those, as an instrument of
foreign policy,.what can covert action do and under what
circumstances? What are the costs? We need to answer- these
questions in order to address the more fundamental issue of
iahether or not covert action should be permitted. If so,
under what rules and constraints?
Therefore, our interest in Chile, and in this report,
.is not only w-,,hat happened there but what the Chilean
experience tells us'about covert action as a foreign policy
operation of a democratic society.
It is important to note that the objectives, the.
techniques, and the political. control of covert operations. have
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changed rather fundamentally over the years.
It was only in late 1947 -- two and a half years after
the end of World War II -- that the United States formally
decided that clandestine intelligence, collection activities
had to be supplemented by what was described at the time as
covert psychological operations. These were described as
propaganda and manipulation of the press, and the like.
By the late spring of 1948, the Soviet threat was held
to be of such seriousness that "covert operations" were
expanded to include countering Soviet propaganda and Soviet
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support of labor unions, student groups, support of political
parties, economic warfare, sabotage, assistance of refugee
liberation groups, and support of anti-communist groups in
occupied or even in threatened areas..
Gradually, covert action was extended to include countrie
all around the world. Burgeoning from the experience of
countering the Soviet Union and its satellites in this early
period in 1947. and 1948, the CIA had major covert operations
underway in roughly 50 countries by 1953; this represented
a commitment of over 50 percent of the Agency's budget during
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the 1950s and 1960s. .
In broad terms -- and in the langauge of the trade'
--
covert activities since the so-called "coming of age" in 1948
have been grouped around three major categories: propaganda,
political action, and paramilitary activities. In the
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experience with Chile, the largest covert activities were those
in the. general. categories of propaganda and political
action such'as has been described in this chart, disseminating
propaganda; supporting media,:influencing instutitions, influenei
elections, supporting political parties, supporting.private
sector organizations and the like.
Now as far as paramilitary activities are concerned,
the last category,. that is covert''and military,operations,'they
were not employed to a significant degree in Chile with the
possible' exception of the Track II operation and the Schneider
kidnapping.
Propaganda. As revealed in the staff paper, the'
largest covert action activity in Chile in the decade 1963 -
1973 was propaganda. The CIA station in Santiago placed.
materials in the Chilean media, maintained a number of assets
or agents on major Chilean newspapers, radio and television
stations, and_manufactured "black propaganda.-- that-is, materi
falsely purporting to be the product of a particular group.
Let me give you an illustrative range of the kinds of
-propaganda projects that were undertaken in Chile during-the
years under discussion, 1963'to 1973:
Subsidization of two news services to influence Chilean
public opinion; .operation of a press placement service;
support of the establishment of a commercial television service
in Chile; support of anti-communist propaganda activitiy
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through wall posters, leaflets, and other street actions;
usd a CIA--controlled news agency to counter communist influence
in Chile and Latin America; placement of anti-Soviet
propaganda on eight radio news'stations and in five provincial
By far the largest -- and probably the most significant
in this area of propaganda was the money provided out to El
Mercurio, the major Santiago daily during the Allende regime.
The second category is that of political action.
In the intelligence trade, covert political action aims
to influence without attribution to the United States political
events in a foreign country. Political action can range from-
recruiting an agent from within a foreign government for the
purpose of influencing. that government to subsidizing political
parties friendly to U.S. interests. Starkly put, political
action is the covert manipulation of political power abroad.
In Chile the CIA undertook a wide range of projects aimed-
at influencing political events in Chile, and here are some
of them:
Wrestling control of Chilean university student organizati
from the communists; supporting a women's group active in
Chilean political and intellqctual life and hostile to the
Allende government; combatting the principal communist-dominate
labor union in'.Chile.
The most impressive political action in Chile was the
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massive efforts made over the decade from 1964 to 1974 to
influence the elections. The Central Intelligence Agency in
1964, for example, spent over $3 million in election programs,
financing in this process over half of the Christian Democratic
campaign.
The charts that I show you here give you some idea of
the.measure and extent of the support that I have been
talking about. Propaganda, $8 million, producing and disseminat'nc
propaganda and supporting mass media, roughly $4 million, and
These are the various techniques. of covert actions and
the expenditures from 1963 to 1973 to the.nearest $100,000
that we have been able to determine in the staff's work on
the techniques of covert action in Chile.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, in all the cases I have described,
the major objective of U.S. covert policy in Chile. was to
influence, control, contain, and manipulate political. power
in the country.
Mr. Chairman, against this background on the meaning and
varieties, and in certain respects, the funding of covert
action in Chile, I want to turn to Mr..Inderfu.rth, who will
'discuss the major covert activities taken in Chile in
specific detail.
Thank you, Mr. . Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr".. Basler. What is the
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population of Chile?
Hold that chart for a moment.
Mr. Bader. Roughly 2 million, Senator.
The Chairman. Roughly 2 million. And the total we
spent in attempting to influence the political process in
Chile came to what?
Mr. Bader. In the 1964 election it came to roughly
million, $2.6 million or $2.7 million.
The Chairman. The total on this chart comes to what?
Mr. Bader. $14 million, Senator.
The Chairman. '$14 million. Flaye you worked that out
on a per capita basis?
Mr. Bader. I believe Mr. Inderfurth has.
The Chairman. The $8 million represents just a little
less than $1 a person in direct contributions to the political
party.
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Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, to get it into perspective,
I might's'ay that I spent $2.7 million to run for election in
1972 in a state with a population of 11 million.
The Chairman. If we look at that in terms of all
population, national population of 200 million, that would be
comparable to $160 million of foreign.funds. If a foreign
government were given to interfere directly with the American
.political process in comparable terms, that $8 million would
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pumped into our process, wouldn't it?
Mr. Bader. That's right. That's correct, sir.
The Chairman. Based on comparable per capita' population.
Mr. Bader. In 1964, for example, it would be comparable
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in the American political scene of $50 million of outside
foreign funds coming to the American election, the Presidential
election of '64.
Mr. Inderfurth. As a comparison in the 164 election,
President Johnson and Senator Goldwater spent combined $25
million. So there would have been.a $35 million difference
there.
The Chairman. Would you please restate that?
Mr. Inderfurth. The $3 million spent by the CIA in Chili
1964 represents about 30 cents for every man, woman, and
child in Chile.
Now if a foreign government had spent an equivalent
amount per capita in our '64 election, that government would
have spent about $60 million, as Mr. Bader indicated.
Now President Johnson and Senator Goldwater spent $25
million combined, so this would have been about $35 million
.The Chairman. More than twice as much as the two America
Presidential candidates actually spent..
Mr. Inderfurth. That's-right.
The Chairman. ' All rigc~ht , Mr. Inderfu h would you
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STATEMENT OF RICK INDERFURTII
Mr: Inderfurth. This portion of the staff presentation
will outline the major programs of covert action undertaken by
the United States in Chile from the early 1960s through 1973'.
In every. instance, covert action was an instrument of U.S.
foreign policy, decided upon at the highest levels of the
government. We will begin with the first major U.S. covert
action -in Chile, which was the 1964 Presidential election.
The '64 Chilean election was viewed with great concern
.in Washington. The New York Times reported: "Officials said
they could recall no other foreign' election since the Italian
elections in 1948 that had caused as much anxiety in Washington
,as the one in Chile."
The United States was involved in the 1964 election on
a massive scale.. The Special Group, which was the predecessor
of today's 40 Committee, authorized over $3-million between
1962 and 1964 to prevent the election of a Socialist or
Communist candidate. In all, a total of'nearly.$4 million
was spent by the CIA on some 15 covert action projects. These
projects ranged from organizing slum dwellers to passing funds
to political parties,.
The groundwork for the election, or the plumbing, as
it is sometimes called, was laid early in 1961. The CIA
established, relationships with key political parties, as well
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sectors of the population. Projects that had been conducted
since the 1950s among peasants, slum dwellers, organized
labor, students, and the media provided a basis for much of
this pre-election covert action.
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Covert action during the 19G4 campaign was composed of
two major elements. The first was direct financial support
to the Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats
spent about $6 million to get their candidate, Eduardo Frei,
elected. The CIA's contribution was slightly'more than half
of this sum, or $3 million.
In addition to support for the Christian Democratic
party., the CIA mounted a massive anti-Communist propaganda
campaign. That campaign was enormous. Extensive use was
made of the press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters, direct
mailings, and wall paintings. To give some feel for this
campaign, a few statistics might be helpful. During the first
week of intensive activity, a CIA-funded propaganda group in
Chile produced 20 radio spots per day in Santiago and on-44
provencial stations: Twelve-minute news broadcasts were
produced five times daily on three Santiago stations and on
24 provencial outlets. By the end of June, the group was
producing 24 daily newscasts nationwide and 26 weekly commentary
programs. In addition,, 3.,000 posters were distributed daily.
The propaganda campaign was, in fact, a scare campaign.
It relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks.and Cuban firing
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squads and was pitched especially to women. Dis-information
ancT black propaganda were used as well. The CIA regards this
anti-Communist scare campaign-as-its most effective activity.
undertaken on behalf of Eduardo Frei.
In addition to support for the Christian Democratic
party and the propaganda campaign, the CIA ran a number of
political action operations aimed at important Chilean voter
blocs, including slum dwellers, peasants, organized labor,
and dissident Socialists. This effort made extensive use
of. public opinion polls and grass-roots organizing. In other
words, it was political campaigning American style.
Eduardo Frei won an impressive victory in the 1964
election. He received 56 percent of the vote. Now let's
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turn'to CIA activities in Chile between Presidential elections.
During the 1964 to 1970 period, the CIA spent almost
$2 million on 12 covert action projects in Chile.. One fourth
of this amount was authorized by the 40 Committee. Various
sectors of the Chilean society were affected. All of_these
activities were-intended to strengthen groups which supported
President Frei and opposed Marxist influences.
Tao of the projects during this period were directed
toward Congressional campaigns, one in 1965 and one in 1968.
The 1965 election project is representative. The 303 Committee
approved $175,.1000 for this effort. Twenty-two candidates were
selected by the.CIA station and the U.S. Ambassador to receive
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funds. Nine of these candidates were elected. Thirteen
candidates of the Socialist-Marxist coalition, known then as
FRAP, were defeated.
Election efforts were not.the only projects conducted
by the CIA during this period. Covert action efforts were
also undertaken to influence the political. development of
various sectors of the Chilean society. One project helped
train and organize anti-Communists among peasants and slum
dwellers. Two projects worked within organized labor. One
was designed to combat a Communist-dominated labor union;
another was conducted in the Catholic labor field.
.The media received particular attention during this
period. One project supported and operated wire services,
equivalent to our AP and. UPI. Another supported a right-wing
weekly newspaper. The CIA also developed assets within the
Chilean press. Assets are foreign nationals who are either
on the. CIA payroll or are subject to CIA guidance. One of
these assets produced radio political commentary shows
attacking the political parties on .the left and supporting
CIA-selected candidates. Other.assets placed CIA-inspired
editorials almost daily in. El't4ercurio and, after 1968., exerted
substantial control over the content of that paper's inter-
national news section.
Now let's turn to the period immediately preceding the
1970 Presidential election. The 303 Committee first discussed
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the upcoming election in April,.1969. According to a report
of that meeting, Director Helms commented that an election
effort or operation would not be effective unless an early
enough start was made. ITowever, a year passed before any
action was taken. In March, 1970, the, Committee decided
that the U.S.'would not support any one candidate, as it had
in the 1964 election, but that it would instead wage a
spoiling operation against Allende's Popular Unity coalition..
In all, the CIA spent about $1 million for this activity.
Half was approved by the 40 Committee..
The CIA's spoiling operation had two objectives: First,
to undermine Communist efforts to bring about a coalition of
leftist forces and second, to strengthen non-Marxist
political leaders and forces in Chile.
In working towards these objectives, the CIA made use
of a half-dozen covert action projects. An extensive propagand
campaign.was begun. It made use of virtually all the media
within Chile and placed and replayed items in the international
press as well...Propaganda placements were achieved through
subsidizing right--wing women's and civic action groups.
'Previously developed assets in the Chilean press were used
as well. As in 1964, propaganda was used in a care campaign.
An Allende victory was equated with violence and Stalinist
repression. Sign painting teams were instructed to paint
slogans on walls evoking images of Communist firing squads.
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Posters. warned that an Allende victory.in Chile would mean an
end of religion and family life.
Unlike 1964, however, the 1970 operation did not
involve extensive public opinion polling,, grass roots organizin
or, as previously mentioned, direct funding of any candidate.
The CIA funded only one political group during the 1970
campaign. This was an effort to reduce the number of Radical
Party votes for Allende.
The CIA's spoiling operation did not succeed. On Septemb r
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4, Allende won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election.
Ile received 36 percent of the vote; the runner-up, Jorge
Alessanclri., received 35 percent of the vote. Since no
candidate had received a majority, a joint session of the
Chilean Congress was required to decide between the first-.
and second-place finishers. The date set for the joint
session was October 24.
Now'we will turn to the period between Allende's plurality
victory and the Congressional election. Mr. Treverton will
go into this period.
to
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STATEMENT OF GREG TREVERTON
Mr Treverton. Thank you.
The reaction in Washington to Allende's victory was
immediate. The 40'Committee met on September 8 and 14 to
discuss'what action should be taken. On September 15,
President Nixon met with Richard Helms, Henry Kissinger, and
John Mitchell at the White House. U.S. Government actions
proceeded along two separated but related tracks., Track I,
as it came to be called, aimed to induce President Frei to
act to prevent Allende from being seated. Track I included
an anti-Allende propaganda campaign, economic pressures and
a $250,000 contingency fund to be used'at the Ambassador's
discretion in support of projects which Frei and his associates
deemed important in attempting to..influence the outcome of
the October'24.Congressional vote. However, the idea of
bribing Chilean Congressmen to vote for Alessandri, and against
Allende , the only idea for..use of this contingency
fund :which arose, was immediately seen' to b'e
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unworkable. The $250,000 fund was never spent.
Track II, as it was called by those inside the United
.States Government who knew of its existence, was touched off
.by the President's September 15th instruction to the CIA.
It is. the subject of the Schneider portion of the Committee's
recent Report on Alleged Assassinations. I will merely
summarize Track II here.
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Track II was to be run 'without the knowledge of the
Ambassador, or the Departments of State and Defense.. Richard
Helms' handwritten notes of the meeting with the President
convey the flavor of that meeting. I will quote from his
note:
'.'One-in-ten chance perhaps, but save Chile.
"Not concerned, risks involved.
"No involvement of Embassy.
"$10 million available,. more if necessary.
"Lull-time job -- best men we have.
"Make the economy scream."
Between October 5 and October 20,.the CIA made twenty-one
contacts with key military and police officials in Chile. Coup
.plotters were given assurances of strong support at the
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highest levels of the United States Government both before and
after a coup. The?CIA knew that the coup plans of all the
various conspirators included the removal., from the scene of:
Chilean General'Rene Schenider, the.Chief of Staff of the Army,
and aman who.--opposed any coup. CIA officials passed three
submachine guns to two Chilean officers on October 22. Later
that day, General Schneider was mortally wounded in an abortive
kidnap attempt. However, the group which received CIA weapons
was not the same group as'the one which carried off the abortive
kidnapping of Schneider. 0
Along the other line of covert action, Track I, the
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United States Government considered a variety of means
considered as constituting quasi-constitutional measures to
prevent Allende from taking office. One of these was to
induce the Christian Democrats to vote on October 24 for
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Alessandri instead of Allende, the first place finisher, with
Alessandri to promise to resign immediately, thereby paving
the way for new presidential elections in which. Frei would be
a legitimate candidate.
Another scheme considered by the government was to
persuade Frei to step down, permitting the military to take
Both the anti-Allende propaganda campaign and the
program of economic pressure were intended to support these.
efforts to prevent Allende's accession to power. The
propaganda campaign focused on the ills that would befall
Chile should Allende be elected, while, the economic offensives
were intended to preview those.ills-and demonstrate
the'-.foreign, economic reaction i to':an Allende
.presidency..
A'few examples: Journalist-agents traveled to Chile
for on-the-scene reporting; by September 28, the CIA had
journalists from ten different countries in, or in route to
Chile. The CIA placed individual propaganda items, financed
a small newspaper, and engaged in other propaganda activities.
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"We're prepared to have the kind of relationship with
U.S. journalists. For example, Time magazine requested. and
received a CIA briefing on the situation in Chile, and,
according to the CIA, the basic thrust and timing of the Time
story on Allende's victory were changed asa result of the
briefing.
In the end, of course, neither Track I nor Track 11
achieved its aim. On October 24, the Chilean Congress voted
153 to 35 to elect Allende. On November 4,..he was inaugurated.
U.S. efforts,. both overt and covert, to prevent his assumption
of office had failed.
Now let me turn to covert action between 1970 and 1973.
Mr. Miller mentioned a little while ago, in.his 1971 State
of the World Message, President Nixon announced, and I quote:
the Chilean government that it is prepared to have with us.."
This cool but correct public posture: was. articulated by other
senior officials. Yet, public pronouncements notwithstanding,
after Allende's inauguration, the 40 Committee approved a
total of $7 million in covert support to opposition groups
in Chile. That money also funded an extensive anti-Allende
propaganda campaign.
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The general goal of United States action toward Allende
Chile was to maximize pressures on his government to prevent it
internal consolidation and. limit its ability to implement
policies contrary to United States interests in the hemisphere.
That objective was stated'clearly in a Presidential decision
issued in early November 1970.
;U.:. S , policy was designed. to, frustrate Allende ` s experiment . in the 6,,les ei
.Hemisphere and thus limit its attractiveness as a model; and
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the determination to sustain the principle of compensation for
U.S. firms nationalized by the Allende government.
Throughout the Allende years, but especially after the
first year of his government, the American Government's best
intelligence, National Intelligence Estimates, prepared by
the entire intelligence community, made clear that the more ex-
treme fears about the effects of Allende's election were not
well founded. There was, for example, never.a significant
threat of a Soviet military presence in Chile,. and Allende
was little more hospitable to activist exiles from other Latin
American countries than had been his predecessor, Eduardo Frei.
'Nevertheless, those fears, sometimes. exaggerated, appeared.to.h
activated officials in Washington. .
Covert action formed one of a triad of official American
actions toward Chile. Covert action supported a vigorous oppo-
sition to Allende, while the "cool but correct" overt posture
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denied the Allende government a handy foreign enemy to use as al
rallying point. The third line of U.S. action was economic. Tie
United States did what it could to put economic pressure on
Chile and encouraged other.nations to adopt similar policies.
The subject of this report is covert action, but those
operations did not take place in a vacuum. It is worth spendin
a moment to describe the economic pressures, overt and covert,
which were applied simultaneously. The United States cut off
further new economic aid to Chile, denied credits, and made
efforts, partially successful, to enlist the cooperation of
international financial institutions and private firms in
tightening the economic squeeze on Chile.
Now to the effort of covert action itself.' More than
half of the 40 Committee-approved funds supported the oppositio
political parties in Chile: the Christian Democratic Party,
the National Party and several splinter groups. CIA funds
enabled the major opposition parties to purchase their own
radio stations and newspapers. All opposition parties were
passed money prior to the April 1971 municipal elections, the
March 1973 congressional elections, and periodic by-elections,
Covert:-'support also enabled the parties to maintain a vigorous
anti-propaganda campaign throughout the Allende years.
Besides funding political parties, the 40 Committee approv d
.large amounts .to sustain opposition media and thus to maintain
a large-scale prpaganda campaign.
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As mentioned, before, a million and a half dollars went to
one opposition publication alone, the major Santiago newspaper,
El Mercurio, Chile's ;oldest: newspaper. The Unitted'..
States Government calculated that El.Mercurio, under pressure
from the Allende government, would not survive without
covert U.S. support. At the same time, however, CIA documents
acknowledged that only El Mercurio, and to a lesser extent, the
papers belonging to the opposition parties were under severe
pressure from the Chilean government. The freedom of the press
continued in Chile until the military coup in 1973.
Let me say just a word about two specific topics which hav
been the subject of great public interest: The first of these
U.S. relations with private sector opposition groups during
the Allende years and United States actions vis-a-vis the
Chilean military. Covert support for private sector groups
was a sensitive issue for the U.S. Government during this
period because some of these groups were involved with anti-
government strikes and were known to agitate for a military-
intervention. In September 1972, the 40 Committee authorized
.$24,000 for "emergency support" of a powerful businessmen's
.organization at the same. time the 40 Committee decided against
financial support to other private sector organizations because
of their possible involvement in anti-government strikes..
In October 1972, the 40 Committee approved $100,000 for three
private sector groups, but according to the CIA, this m rney
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was earmarked only for activities in support of opposition cand~
dates-in' the March 1973 congressional elections. On August 20,
the 40 Committee approved further money for private sector
groups, but that money was dependent on the approval of the
U.S. Ambassador and Department of State, and none of these
funds were passed before the military coup.
American decisions during this period suggest a careful
distinction between supporting opposition groups and aiding
elements trying to bring about a military coup on the other. B
given the turbulent conditions in Chile, such a distinction
was difficult to sustain. There were many close links among
the opposition political parties, private sector groups,
militant trade associations, and the paramilitary groups
of the extreme right. In one instance, a CIA-supported private
sector group passed several thousand dollars to striking truck
owners. That support was contrary to Agency groundrules, and.th
CIA 'rebuked the 'group,-..but nevertheless passed it money the next Mn
With respect to the covert links with the Chilean military
during the Allende years, the basic U.S. purpose was monitoring
coup-plotting within the Chilean military. To that end, the CI.
.developed a number of information "assets" at various levels
within the-Chilean military.. Once this network was in place,
by September 1971, the CIA Station in Santiago and Headquarters
in Washington discussed how it should be used.
At one point, the Station in Santiago suggested that the
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ultimate goal of its military program was a military solution
to?the.Chilean problem. But CIA Headquarters cautioned that
there was no 40 Committee approval for the United States
become involved in coup plotting. There is no evidence:that.-
the United States did become so involved in coup plotting. Yet
several CIA efforts suggest a more active stance than merely
collecting information. One of these operations was a
deception operation involving the passage of information, some
of it fabricated by the CIA, which would alert Chilean officers
to real or purported Cuban involvement in the Chilean Army.
At another point, the CIA station in Santiago provided
short-lived financial support to one small magazine aimed at
military officers.
On September 11, 1973, of course, Salvador Allende was
toppled by a military coup. Let me just say several words
about Chile since the coup, and about U.S. covert action in
Chile since the coup.
After the coup the military junta moved quickly to
consolidate. its political power. Political parties were.banned
Congress was put in indefinite recess. Censorship was insti-
.tuted. Supporters of Allende and others deemed opponents
of the new regime were jailed, and the military leader, Agusto
Pinochet indicated. that the military might have to rule Chile
..for two generations.
The prospects for revival of democracy in Chile have not
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improved over the past two,years. Charges concerning the
violations of civil rights in Chile persist. Most recently,
the United Nations report on Chile charged that torture centers
are being operated in Santiago and other parts of the country.
The Pinochet government continues to prevent international
investigative groups from.free movement in Chile, and in
several instances, has not permitted these groups to enter
Chile at all.
After the coup, the United STates covert action program in
.Chile sank dramatically. No major new initiatives were under-
taken, and what projects were continued operated at'a low level
These consisted really of maintaining media assets and several
other small activities. .
During this period, the CIA also renewed its liaison asset
with Chilean government's security and intelligence forces.
However, in doing so, the CIA was sensitive to worries that
liaison with such organiza-cions would open the CIA to charges
of political repression, and the CIA sought to ensure that its
support for activities designed to control external subversives
were not used on internal subversives as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
That concludes thq panel presentation.
There is---another vote on the Senate floor. I think this
might be a good.time'for a brief recess to. give the members a
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chance to return.
2205
(A brief recess was taken.)
The Chairman. The staff members on the panel have finished
their presentation, and before we go to our next witnesses,
Senator Goldwater has indicated that he has some questions for
the panel, and so I recognize Senator Goldwater for that
purpose.4
Senator Goldwater. Mr. Miller, on page 6 of your presen-
tation, you say the record examined thus far shows that covert
action programs over the past 30 years have been successful
generally against weak nations and far less so against our
major potential enemies.
How many cases have you examined over the past 30 years?
Mr. Miller. How many cases has the Committee staff
reviewed? Well, in depth, Senator, we have done six. We have
reviewed in general terms the entire. scale of covert action,
both in budgetary terms, geographical coverage, and with some
attempt to measure success and quality.
The reason for this disparity of success against the
major potential enemies such as the Soviet Union and China I
-think are fairly clear. Those nations have very . strong.authori
tarian governments. It is very difficult to collect information
there. It is very difficult to mount operations. -It is not
the case in the nations which are not authoritarian in structure
or do not have such disciplined secret services, and have the
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police state that is not as effective as those of the Soviet
Union and China, but I do not think I should go into any
detail in open session.
Senator Goldwater. Well, has the Committee examined any
cases that involved Soviet Russia or Red China or any other
potential strong adversary?
Mr. Miller. We have in certain areas. We have had an
inquiry into particularly the areas of counterintelligence, and
also the area of'collection.
Senator Goldwater. Are you saying we've conducted
covert actions against major potential enemies?.
Mr. Miller. There have been attempts, particularly in
the period immediately following the end.of the Second World
War, the beginning of the Cold War.
Senator Goldwater. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a
rather important. statement. I know we cannot discuss it in
public, but: I would suggest that proper officials of the CIA
be recalled to testify as to what we have done in this general
field. If we are going to.pick on-Chile alone as an example
of covert action while we have heard testimony that there have
.been covert actions against major enemies, I think we have
to look into that also, and I would request that Mr. Bader or
Mr. -- or any representative of the CIA be called back to
testify as to what we're talking about when we hear this kind
of testimony.
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The Chairman. Senator, I have no objection to your request
of.thi.s Committee. As far as I am concerned, I would like to
examine all of.these covert actions in, the past, because I thi
so many of them have been wrong, and our problem. is that
we cannot get the Administration to agree to any kind of public
presentation to any of these operations. It has only been as
aresult of very extended. efforts that we have been able to
present the Chilean case, to obtain the cooperation of the
Administration in a very limited way, with respect to sanitizin
the presentation ' to protect legitimate security interests of
the United States.
We've had no such offer from the administration with
respect to any other covert operation.
Senator Goldwater. We've heard nothing about any other
covert action such as has been discussed by Mr. Miller. Had
we heard of it, I think the members on my side would certainly
have requested that a study be done, and I would suggest that
if this team can do as thorough job on Chile as they have done,
they certainly ought to be able to do an equally good job
on a much larger country such as the Soviet Union or Red China,
or any other large potential enemy. I don't think we can let
a statement like this stand.
Now, if Mr. Miller wants to change it, fine. But I don't
want to see this made a matter of public record that we, without
saying so, that we have conducted covert actions against
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potential enemies of a large scale. I think this is wrong.
However, before you start I might say that had we seen
Mr. Miller's statement before he read it, we might have. been ab.
to clear this up. We did not see any statements on this side
of the table. We listened to them, and I think this is the
first time in the whole history of this Committee that the
minority side had been sort of kept outside the tent.
And I just want to register my protest against that kind
of treatment.. If the press is going to be given statements
that we're not allowed to see, I've served on these committees
before and I can tell you, when the bell of end comes, that is
when it rings. We didn't see the report until we sat down
today. If we're going to have to put upwith that The Chairman. Senator Goldwater, may I simply say that
no member of the Committee on either side had the statement.
That was an oversight on the part of the Committee.. Each
member_;should have had these statements before every Senator.
That is the normal procedure. That is the procedure that we
have followed in the past and will-follow in the future. This
was purely an oversight and when it was called to my attentionn..
I immediately asked that'the'statements be placed before all
members.
Senator Goldwater. Well, I would like to have an answer
to my request :that we get a statement from the CIA -- if they
say they can't do it,' then we're going to have to go higher, to
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see what we've done against the Soviets and Red China, because
to my knowledge we have done nothing.
The Chairman. Well, the covert operations have been
reviewed in executive session, all of them,.and?it has been the
objection of the Administration itself that has largely
prevented the Committee from developing any more cases in
public session than this one, and so I have no objection to
your request, Senator Goldwater, but I would solicit your help
with the Administration in hopes that we could clear the way
for a public presentation of other covert actions-.
But it has been the opposition of the Administration and
their refusal to make witnesses available that has handicapped
the Committee in this regard.
Senator Goldwater. It might have been done in some other
administration. I'd like to find out whether it happened under
Kennedy or Johnson or Nixon or just who was the one that though
they could perpetrate a covert action upon the Soviets. That's
a rather sneaky task. I'd like to know how they came out, not
that I'm opposed to..it. .
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Miller, do you have any further
response to the Senato'r's question?
Mr. Miller. No, I will endeavor to fulfill Senator
Goldwater's request. I think that is the best response.
The Chairman. Very well.
Well., while the-panel is.here, if anybody wants to questio
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members, please feel free.
Senator Mondale?
Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What do the records show to be-the threat that we thought
we had.to meet by frustrating and overthrowing Allende?'
(Pause)
What is this, a commercial break?
Mr. Treverton. Well, let me. say a word about that. The
question is, what -- you are interested in what the perception
of officials in Washington were about -.-
Senator Mondale. Why did we want to get rid of!Allende?
What did our specialists say was at stake?
Mr. Treverton. There is some difficulty with that questio
because as we pointed out in the report, there is some dif-
?ference between what the government's-intelligence specialists
were saying and the National Intelligence Estimates about
Chile.and the threat it posed to the United States.
Senator Mondale. In other words, this was the apparatus
that we have established to collect information and evaluate it
is that right?
Mr. Treverton. That's right.
Senator Mondale. And what did they say about the threat
that Mr. Allende posed to this country?
Mr.Inderfurth. I think the official threats that were
perceived had to do with the presence of the Soviets in Chile,
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the question of subversion of other Latin American Governments
using Chile as a base. There was a concern about a movement
by Allende, despite the fact that he had been elected consti-
tutionally, moving down the road toward a Marxist totalitarian
state.
There was a press conference given September 16th, 1970
in which -- it was a background press briefing, in which Dr.
Kissinger referred to the irreversibility of the Chilean
election, meaning that it was doubtful there would be another
free election in Chile.
So I think that these concerns, as well as the economic
concerns. The U.S. had quite a bit of private capital invested
in Chile. I think these were the motivating factors that had
raised our concern.
Now, in our examination of the NIE's, over a period of
time, the threat that Allende posed to Chile seemed to be less
shrill.
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221.2
Senator Mondale. On page 229 of the Assassination Report,
the CIA's Director of Intelligence circulated an intelligence
community assessment on the impact of the Allende government
on U.S. national interest.
Mr. Inderfurth. That's right.
Senator Mondale. September 7, 1970. It says, one, the u
has no vital ria.tiorial interest .in:Chi.lie.and there could be some
economic losses. Two, the world military balance would not
be significantly altered by the Allede government. Three, an
Allende victory would create. considerable political and
psychological cost and the hemisphere collision would be
threatened by the challenge of Allenge.
that right?
WARD :CSI I
Sen. Sel. CIA
12/4/075
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Mr. Inderfurth. Yes, sir.
Senator riondale. So that in terms of this nation's
interest, at least the 1970 estimate was that it did not
directly threaten America.
Mr. Inderfurth. That's correct.
Senator Mondale . I~Tow did Mr. Allende ever act in. a way'
which undermined the democratic procedures established by
the constitution of Chile?
Mr. Inderfurth. That has been. the subject of debate. Two
charges have been raised about his opposition to political
parties, as well as his oT-)positlon to the media. We have
looked into both of those areas and despite the fear that there
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fact national elections, municipal elections, there were
Congressional elections, trade union elections continued, the
political parties prospered. Of course today you see there
are no political parties functioning is Chile..
C.oncerning the press, the record there does indicate
that Allende was exerting some pressure on the opposition
press, especially El .-Mercurio. There were'instances in which
radio stations were closed. I think the number is three.
El Mercurio itself was closed down for a day, but the court
invalidated that and it was reopen the next day. There are
also charges that the government was attempting to take over
a paper company which was the.suppiying company for the
newsprint in Chile. The government backed off.
.The NIE is taking note of this growing government
domination of the press, indicated that El Mercurio had,
managed to retain its independence or had been able to continue
operating.
This was in 1971. . . .
'In '72 it.stated that the opposition news media in Chile
persisted in denouncing the Allende regime and continued to
resist government intimidation. At no point during Allende's
regime was there press censorship. Of course that is the
state today. .
So 'I think the record shows that in some ways he was
moving forcefully to stifle some of the opposition press, but
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certainly not all.
Senator Mondale. In the hearings, with Mr. David Phillips,
I Asked Mr. Phillips on page 59, and he had extensive background
15.
and experience in Chile, whether although -- is it your
judgement that although Allende was Marxist and espoused
Marxism, that he also wanted to achieve this through the
democratic process? And although there was some rough stuff
in the press, essentially that was the course he was pursuing.
Mr: Phillips said, I don't recall what he said but he
indeed acted that way. And-did he attempt to achieve his
Marxist philosophy with popular support under the Constitutions
system? Mr. Phillips said, yes, essentially that is, true.
the record-we have seen. In
Chile.they have a term for it, Via Pacifica, which is the
peaceful road, which is the road that Allende had followed.
He had run for the Presidency four times, each time going back
to try again, And the record is unclear, obviously,. where
he would have taken Chile. .
Senator Mondale. They were afraid that although he
had never made a move by force to take it over, that he might.
Mr. Inderfurth. That was the concern.
Senator 1,1ondale. Even though he'd never done it.
Mr. Inderfurth. That's right.
Senator _Mondale. And I believe Mr. Kissinger, when we
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asked him that, said what we are afraid of is that he would
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establish a Communist-dominated dictatorship very similar to
Portugal..
Mr. Inderfurth. He's used that example as well as
Cuba. The fear-of another Cuba in Latin America was very
strong.
Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hart.
Senator Hart of Colorado. -I don't know which member
of the'staff to direct the question,: but there have been
suggestions .that. a considerable amount'of money, which was
funne~]_ed into Chile from this country, went into assistance
of labor unions, trade unions, in Chile in support of strike
efforts against the Allende government.*.
Could you provide information to the Committee in this
regard as to amounts of money. and whether in fact substantial
amounts did in fact provide covert support to strikers,:
particularly between 1971 and 1973?
Mr. Inderfurth. I think the record here is clear, at
least from the approval stage. We have approved the.records
and there was never a 40 Committee authorization for funding
strikers in Chile.
Shortly before the coup there was a CIA recommendation
for funding. of the strikers. It is unclear whether or not that
proposal ever reached the 40 Committee, but it is clear that
the 40 Committee never approved any funds.
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The 40 Committee approval of funding private sector
organizations. is another matter:. These organizations were
sympathetic to and in support of the strikers, and on three
separate occasions the 40 Committee did approve funding for
these private sector organizations.
The total amount spent was something around $100,000.
Now these funds. were provided with the contingency that
'they would not filter down to the strikers, but at least in
one instance, and.the sum is rather small, $2,800. These
funds did go through a private sector organization to a strikin
group. These were against the Agency's ground rules for
funding strikers. In fact, Nathaniel Davis, who was there at
the time, and the State Department, had strenuously. objected
The total amount authorized was something over $1 million.
to any funding of the strikers.
So I think where.we come out on that is that the 40
Committee never really approved any funds. A small amount
we know of did filter down.
Whether or not other CIA money that went into private
sector operations or private parties ever made it to the
strikers, we have not been able to determine from the record.
Senator Hart of Colorado. C Ihy was there a . policy
against this assistance to strikers?
Mr. Inderfurth. There's no question that the strikers
were creating the climate in which military coup appeared to
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be inevitable. So any direct assistance to the strikers would
be directly heating up, building up tension,in*Chile, which
eventually did lead toward the'coup.
So whereas we would support El Mercurio, the political
parties, when you moved into the private sector area, you
got closer and closer to real tension within the society and
to the coup eventually.
So I think that was a concern.
Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Do any other Senators desire to ask
questions of the panel.
Senator Schweiker?
Senator.Schweiker.. Yes,.Mr. Chairman. What time frame
.did we start funding El Mercurio? Do you have any kind of
date as to when we started putting money into El Mercurio.
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as a CIA expenditure?
Mr.'Treverton. The first funds went to El Mercurio in
the late spring of 1970 -- I'm sorry, the late' fall of 19.70
or the early spring of 1971. ?
Senator Schweiker. Did we previously put money into
prior to that period in El Mercurio?
Mr. Treverton. Yes. Part of that period we financed
assets. That is people who worked for El Mercurio and who
received small amounts of money from the CIA to write stories
or run stories favorable to American interests.
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We had-not prior to that time provided substantial
support to the operation of the paper.
Senator Schwelker. And we are not certain when the
support for the operation began, or are we?
Mr. Treverton. We a.re.certain. I just don't have it
right here in front of me.
Senator Schweiker. Is it prior to our involvement 1,-with
going ahead with the 1970 program against Allendge? Or don't
we have that?',;,-.
Mr. Treverton. It would have been after Allende's
inauguration. That is after the Track I, Track II period.
After the election period. It came,in'the period after
Allende'sinauguration._.,'We decided'on this program-to
support opposition parties and.media.
Senator Schweiker. Would it have been before the Septemb
the. 15th meeting, 1970?
Mr. Treverton. It was after that. It was either
November,. 1970, or April, 1971.
Perhaps I can,give you the exact date.
(Pause) .
Mr. Treverton. Perhaps it was as late as September, 1971,
so it was surely after the '70 election period.
Senator Schweiker. That's all?I have, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator IIud(, leston?
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Senator IIuddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I've not heard all the questioning and I hope I'm not
repetitious, but in the original presentation, it was not.
clear in our relationship with the removal and subsequent
death of General Schneider that our policy clearly was it
was not that he should be clone away with. There was no
tension there, although we were attempting to forment a coup
d'etat to prevent the ascension of Allende to President.
Also, I think it is important to understand that the
reason that General Schneider had to he removed was that even
though he. was not a particular sympathizer with Allende,
he was a constitutionalist and he believed in his government's
constitution, which subordinated the military to the civilian
rule.. And. because of that, he was not interested in leading
a coup or participating in one.
Is that not accurate?
Mr. Treverton. Yes, those points are correct and well
Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Any further questions of this panel?
,If not,. thank you very much, gentlemen. We will call.-,the
next three witnesses, Mr. Ralph' Duncan, .-Ir. Charles Meyer,
.
and Mr. Edward I:or.ry.
(Pause)
The Chairman. gentlemen, in accordance with the practice
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of the Committee would you stand and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear that. all the testimony you will
give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you Cod?
t-Mr. r:orry. I do.,
Mr. . Dungan. I do.
Mr. Meyer. I do.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I understand each of you has an opening statement and
perhaps the logical way to proceed would be chronologically
starting with Mr. Dungan, please.
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TESTIMONY OF RALPH DUNGAN, FORMER UNITED STATES
AMB ISSADOR TO CHILE
I?Ir. . Dungan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate
your invitation'to testify in this public hearing on U.S.
intelligence activities in Chile. You are ultimately. interested,,
I-take .it, in the question of what changes in policies, laws,
and administrative procedures are.indicated as a result of
this Committee's inquiries and other information which. has
been made public recently.
I am prepared to answer questions'about any matter of
interest to the Committee about which I had knowledge and which
I can recollect but I shall refrain with your indulgence from
mentioning names of either.Chilean or U.S. nationals. As a
citzen who for many years in and out of government had
advocated stringent. curbs on covert action, I must candidly
state that I have very serious doubts that further public
disclosure of specific instances of excess, of illegal or
immoral. operations are necessary to enable the Congress to act
forthrightly, intelligently, and effectively'.in correcting what
has been for many years we. now see with the amazing clarity
of hindsight -- a national disgrace. But whatever the Committee:
decision is with respect to the revelation of.specific actions,
I intend to assist in any way that you think I can in your
difficult task. With. the cgreatest respect to the members of
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this Committee, to the Senate, to the House, it is well to
remember that to the extent that excessed have occurred in the
past in Chile, or elsewhere, they have transpired under imprecir,
Congressional mandates, haphazard Congressional oversight
and with moneys provided by.the Congress.
During the 1964-67 period, when.I was Ambassador to
Chile,.U.S. covert activities in Chile were.not extensive and
most, were irrelevant to and not directed at Chilean political
institutions. They were on the whole directed toward the
gathering and cross checking of intelligence about internal,
hemispheric and international affairs.. The Chief of Station
was an old hand in Latin America and had a strong bias toward
the intelligence function and.shared my personal skepticism
about-the desirability or utility of U.S. involvement in covert
activities not specifically oriented toward the collection of
intelligence. The naives of CIA agents or sources Were not
made known to me except on specific request. First-hand
sources tended to be on.the political right.
in addition to. covert intelligence gathering there were
three other types of covert activities-- my-classification.
Those involving international- targets or problems such as
surveillance of suspected agents from other countries, those
activities of the agency of a benign nature -- my term, benign
albeit interventionist, such as support for a private agency
engaged in social or economic development, and finally
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those directed toward the influencing of some Chilean insti-
tution, individual, or even for the purpose of producing a
result which ostensibly advanced U.S. interests.
None of these three types of actions were extensively
engaged in Chile during the 1964-67 period. To the extent that
they were especially as regards the latter category , that
is,'intervening political activity, they were reprehensible
in principle, I now believe. I might add that at the time
they were relatively harmless and ineffective.
To sum up, during the 1964-67 period in Chile relatively
little covert activity was undertaken and little of more than
marginal significance or effectiveness T,,as directed at Chilean
institutions or political processes.
It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we should: accept. the
fact that covert activity has . characterized. and will continue
to characterize statecraft. It would he foolish and hypocritic
for the Congress or the Executive Branch to pretent that we can
will, or should abstain from covert activity. Nor do I think-
that it is realistic to confine cevert.actions by law.solely
to intelligence gathering or counter-intelligence, much as
one might be tempted to follow this course.
.I noted with interest the staff report makes that point
very clear. You cannot distinguish intelligence from other
kinds of covert. activity.
On the other hand, the inquiries of this Committee seem
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to me to establish conclusively the urgent need to define with
greater clarity and precision than we have in the past, the
limits we impose on ourselves in utilizing covert action ir,.the
pursuit of our objectives. Of equal. importance is the
necessity to establish processes and procedures which establish
an effective system of checks and balances in accordance with
the fundamental constitutional principle to which we subscribe.
I submit that as regards our treatment of.covert?action we
have neglected to apply rigorously either this principle
or the principle of enumerated powers.
It is difficult to specify in detail covert actions
which may be utilized but I believe that Congress should examin
the basic.statutes under which the Agency operates with a view
to introducing general prohibitions against certain types'of
.actions except under extraordinary'circumstances and pursuant
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to specific approvals defined by regulation. For example, one
might wish to prdhibit generally any action to be taken
outside the U.S. which if committed in the continental limits
would be subject to criminal penalties. Murder would be one
of those. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only or
.necessarily the most important statutory guideline or restriction
I use it only as an example.
If.anything is clear from the record you have compiled
and from the experience of many over the years, it is that
individuals at all level, have taken great liberties without
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the knowledge or authorization or any responsible person
or group. To be fair, responsible persons may have knowingly
or unwittingly given some signal or tacit approval or so
it may have been perceived by those with operational responsibiI i
Suffice it to say that it is high time we state at.least in
general what type of covert actions we as a nation believe
are. permissible and in accord with our values and traditions.
I think that with respect to our intelligence activities,
we have forgotten that we are a government of laws and not
of men. We have relied excessively on the best and the
brightest. We need to return to a system grounded in law,
regulation, and procedure. Therefore, I believe that, at a
minimum, we need to develop more explicit procedures which must
be.followed and approvals which must be obtained before
departing from the usual standards which should be set forth
generally in statute and, faith greater particularity,.in
regulation.
Mr. Chairman, as important as a.general statutory definit'o
of the rules of the game is, it is of paramount importance that
a structure of statutory and regulatory checks and balances
be created promptly. One should strive for simple mechanisms
so that the lines of responsiblity and accountability are
clear and unambiguous.
My experience and a reacting of the record suggests that
any future President -~zould be well-advised to appoint a deputy
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to the National Security Advisor whose sole responsibility
would be to monitor intelligence activities of all agencies,
especially covert actions. It is apparent to me now and
should have been in years past, that the special intricacies
of this field and the special responsibility of the President
strongly"suggests the need for more capability than we had
in the early '60s in the Office of the National Security
Advisor. Those who might argue that this arrangement unnecessa
concentrates in the President's.office super-operational
power ignore, I believe, the burden which the President bears
in this area and his need'-for capable, informed, and inclependeni{
judgment.
While I feel less secure in this suggestion because I
do not consider myself an expert in the internal' organization
.and structure of the CIA, I'th'ink it worth considering the
adverse results which oftentimes flow from the establishment'
of a permanent organization and cadre of bright, active
persons. Like any other, bureaucracy, private or public,
an established group tends, following the Parkinson principle,
to generate work to keep it occupied. Where, as I believe
has been the case with CIA, a unit is amply funded, prides
itself in being gung ho and capable of response to the'most
extravagant demands, you.have the ingredients of trouble. If
you add a degree of ideological bias within the limit and
lack. of restraint by political authority outside the unit,
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almost any excess is imaginable.
All- of this leads me to suggest that a drastic cutback
in the number of parsons involved both in.the field and
t'lashington should be examined. As regards what is now known
as DDO, I would venture to say that the elimination of
permanent personnel and units dedicated, to the perfection
of devices or techniques to meet esoteric contingencies would
go far to eliminate some of the excesses which have crept
into the system, and which you have documented very well.
I do not maintain that there are some capabilities
which should be maintained at the. ready, hut'I suspect that mos
could be energized as requirements arose and that any delays
which might be involved would be beneficial rather than
otherwise.
I am hopeful that these few remarks may be helpful to
the Committee, Mr. Chairman, and I stand ready to answer any
questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thanl_ you very much, Mr. Dungan.
Mr. Meyer?
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TESTIMONY OP CHARLES A. MEYER, FORMER ASSISTANT
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-N1ERICAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Meyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
Senators.
I am present by your invitation, Mr. Chairman, and as
I wrote this on December 3rd, I hadn't received for study
your Committee paper on Chile. I had received the published
document on,"alleged assassination." And quite obviously,
I hadn't a clue as to the staff statement.which I understood
would introduce this meeting.
My statement, therefore, does not respond to any of
the specifics of your Chilean examination except that I am
not, never have been, and never expect to be party to
assassination.
Instead, if I may, I'll simply say that my reason for
being here in the context of the long work of your Committee
is that I believe it is fundamentally of great importance
to our country. I know little or nothing of the domestic
aspect of your work.-.- I'm focused on the international
aspect.
I want to start with a bit from the past, an excerpt
from a fascinating article in Smithsonian Magazine of January,
1975. The article, by Robert Wallace, is called, in short,
"The Barbary Wars." 0
"In Washington., Eaton, the U.S. Consul in Tunis, laid
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before Jefferson a scheme that had been developing among
Americans in the Mediterranean for a couple of years. The
Dashaw of. Tripoli was a usurper, having stolen the throne from
an older brother who was now wandering forlornly somewhere
in Africa. Eaton proposed to find the. brother, give him
sympathy and support and install him as rightful head of state.
Jefferson approved the idea and thus was launched the first,
although not the last, American effort to overthrow an
-objectionable-foreign ruler and put a cooperative one in his
place. Jefferson also chose to.have that plot proceed quietly,
in twilight. He would send the would-be bashaw, through
Eaton, a few artillery pieces and 1000'small arms. Eaton
himself was to be given .a vague title --."Navy agent of the
United States for Barbary regencies" -- and placed under the
jurisdiction of the commodore of the Mediterranean squadron.
If he could accomplish something,, fine. If not, small loss."
This issue, resolved by the U.S. Navy in 1815, was
piracy against American merchantrien and tribute paid by the
USA. It was in in modern translation, expropriation with
negative compensation.
Interestingly, the Barbary t'7ars story, while unique in
its time and place, has in it many of the seeds which over 160
years have grown into the forest of U.S. interest versus
foreign policy versus practice which this Committee is tring,
or so it seems to me, to. cut its way through, not just
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intelligence.
Speaking to intelligence, I have to reminisce about
visiting President Kennedy at his request shortly after the
Bay of Pigs. He met me outside- the Oval Office door and
after hells from both families, he held his arm next to mine
and said, "Iley, look., we're wearing the same suit." I
answered, "Not exactly, Mr. President, because I bought mine
at X and you bought yours at Y He looked at rae, paused,
smiled wryly and said, "Charlie, your intelligence is a hell
of a lot better than mine."
In support of his implication, I.uncderstand -- and I
.hope accurately that this Committed has thoughtfully
recognized the essentiality of an intelligence capability
of the highest order as. indispensable to the national and
vital interests of our country and indeed the free world. ?
If that is correct, the next question:is what.do you do
with it.
And that question cannot be fully answered without
concurrent consideration of the evolution of:
The perceived national interests, and the perceived
vital interests of our country.
The actions taken in the defense of these interests.
,.The decision-making process, both in relation to defini
of national.and vital interests and in relation to actions
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All of us know that the Congress has played a large part
in,the overt decision-making process in relation to national
interest, and the laws of our land are heavy with overtly
interventionist intent.
All of us know that an overview linkage has long
existed between the Executive and the Legislative in the
pure intelligence area, designating those on the Bill, by
Congressional action, who had a "need to know."
Therefore, when asked, as I constantly have been, what
is the Church Committee trying to do, I've replied that I'
believed that this Committee under your Chairmanship, Senator
Church, was working apolitically towarck a responsible mechanism
for definition of and defense of the national interest --
further, that I thought I knew many of you well enough to be
able to discern a high level of concern for the future quality
of and maintenance of U.S. moral leadership in concert with the
responsibility of political and economic and military preeminent
and in a very tough world. _
Given the accuracy of that evaluation, and the excellence
of the staff work done to date, I have in honesty asked
myself the question continuously whether the committee really
needs further testimony in depth on any geographical or national
area. That is not a question motivated by SYA -- but rather
by the hope that the formation by new parameters for policy arid
practice at the dawn of our third century does not require
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that we throw the baby out with the bath water.
You all recognize that any action by the USA or
even.perhaps specifically the action of revelation can be
destabilizing where least expected. My point is not whitewash
but that the staff has information from which to proceed
constructively. We three here,. as Ralph has already said,
and countless others can he useful in consultation toward a
desired end -- we can countless others can be helpful in
.arriving at answers to the many parts of the great questions
your Committee' has raised, generic questions from the past,
but most imporantly, questions for the future and not
answered easily:
Who in our sovereign nation should define and periodicall
update our national and vital interests?
Who shall be the judge as to whether intelligence collect
indicated movements inimical to our interests?
What may our sovereign nation-do, if anything, when
intelligence is judged to indicate movements inimical to our
interests and, who makes that decision?'
And a cruestion of my own -- given the ideal solutions
to these questions, what should our nation do about kiss and
tell syndrome which confuses public confession and traitorous
action. I wonder if somebody wrote that with an expatriate,
entrepreneur-agent 'in mind.
The.. future credibility of the USA will be tough to-
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maintain no matter how high the level of international
judiciousness to which we aim if nobody trusts the USA to
keep a shared confidence in confidence or a shared secret
in secret. I know that all of you know from career experiences
that one of the agonizing processes in any aspect of public,
life is that of learning what not to disclose.
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it has taken me since
Thanksgiving day to compress a kaleidoscopic view of the
complex world out there and my four years in it into these
observations.. They are not.subjectively motivated, hut they
do reflect my objective conviction of the great responsibilities
you have shouldered
Thank you for your invitation;
'The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Meyer, for your statement.
We have a vote again. I think we,had better stretch so we will.
hold a brief-recess for the vote.
(A brief recess was taken)
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The Chairman. The members of the panel will please-return
? Mr. Korry, you have a statement you would like to make at
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STATEMENT OF MR. EDWARD M. KORRY, FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO CHILE
Mr. Korry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.
I requested the CIA program in Chile. I planned much of
the covert action in 1970. I drafted most of the policy that
the United States pursued with the Allende Government in 1971,
the year of my departure. I met with President Nixon in the
Oval Office two weeks before General Schneider was murdered.
Italked with Dr. Kissinger before and after'that grotesque
and inexcusable episode, and met with. several layers of
CIA official men. I was propositioned by key Chileans anxious
to involve the United States in hair-brained plots. I
even attended a 40 Committee meeting.
Yet this is the first time I appear before your Committee.
For the past year I assumed, and I requested and demanded,.
finally I implored to be interrogated by you gentlemen. I said?
as I said today, that every cable of mine, good and bad, and
there were plenty of bad ones, could be open to the public.
No Daniel has ever tried so`hard to get. inside the lion's den.
The Chairman. Well, you are here, Mr. Korry.
Mr. Korry. Yes.
The equivalent'of due process is what I was counting upon,
fair play, decency, justice, call it what you will, guaranteed,
-I thought, at least one occasion'to talk to you before you
2.5 wrote and published a. report which deals with serious public
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issues, grave questions of morality, and which invokes my name
often.
Again, and again, you, Senator Church, and your staff
promised a hearing. The fact, though, is that I was barred fro
speaking to this Committee, even in executive session before
your Assassination Report was published and propagated, even
delayed this public appearance until they had their second.
report on Chile written, reviewed and ready for the printing.
The Chairman. Mr. Korry, I don't mean to interrupt you
because if we're going to make charges.--
Mr. Korry. I will make many so, sir, so perhaps it would
be better to save it to the end.
The Chairman. I just want to say that you were interviewe
for about five hours by a member of the staff. At'that time
we were looking into the assassination question. We were
informed by the staff that you had no knowledge. Your transcri
showed that you had no knowledge of the .so-called-Track ]1,
which was the thing we were.looking at, and it was for that
reason that we didn't call you in executive session for further
testimony. It was not for the purpose of excluding you. We
were looking for witnesses at that time who could give us
testimony relating to the general subject of assassination,
which was then the subject of our executive. hearing. But it
was not for any purpose of excluding you.
25 The.staff member who'interviewed you concluded that you
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had no information to give on that subject. That was the only
reason why you were not called.
Mr. Korry. Mr. Chairman, if I may respond to just that
one point, if that were true, Mr. Treverton, the man who inter-
viewed me, would not have written subsequently to me asking
me to be prepared to address myself to questions on the
Assassination Report. I will submit his letter in the record.
So, to get back to the narrative. I wrote a 27 1/2 page
typewritten statement, 10,000 words, which you received
October 28th, according to the Postal Service. I asked that
each Senator be given a copy promptly so that each would have
one full week to consider it with care, but without publicity,
before I testified on the scheduled date; November 4th. I
thought it was only fair and honorable.to give you an opportu
to review the rather meaty disclosures I make, as well as the
charges I level against you, Senator. Church, and the staff
another Committee that you Chair.
I also wanted everyone to reflect on some rescuing truths;
that America deserves and needs, truths that will push some
air into the suffocating national guilt that you, Mr. Chairman
have done so much in the_past~ three years to propagate.
Your staff, though, blamed your peers, Senator Church,
for the decision that the public hearing be-delayed. I was
told that you, Senator, wanted the hearing, but minority
members, Republicans; were responding to White House pressure.
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The majority members, Democrats, were chary about what might
be-said ih public concerning the Kennedy years.
I now formally resubmit that written statement, together
with Mr. Treverton's letter to me, for the. record.
The Chairman. Well, for the record, then, it is incumbent,
upon me to say that your original statement, when it was
received, was distributed. to all members of the Committee.
Mr. Korry. I didn't say that it wasn't.
The Chairman. They did have an opportunity to read it,
and I received no special request, based upon the reading of
this document, that you be called at executive session from
any member of,-the Committee, Republican or Democrat.
Mr. Korry. The Assassination
Report was sent to me
after it was made public, out of courtesy, your'staff wrote,
with what I considered to be an exquisite irony. And I read
it, I comprehended why it was indispensable that we be kept
mart. Almost every page of the chapter dealing with Chile,
almost every page, that is, of which I have some knowledge of
the facts, contains .a. dishonesty, a distortion, or a doctrine...
Much is made in the Assassination report of the "II Tracks
that the U.S. policy followed in Chile 'in September and October
of 1970. The report stitches a new myth to suit some
consciences or some ambitions or some institutions. There are,
many who it might the public and history to believe that
no real difference existed between the diplomatic Track I that
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I followed, and the covert military Track II that the White?
House launched. It is hog wash. Track I followed Mr. Frei,
then the President of Chile and its constitutional leader. It
adopted certain minimal and cosmetic sug.gestions';put'forward
by one purportedly in President Frei's confidence. Track I
led nowhere because President Frei would not encourage or lead
any Chilean military action, and because I would neither have
the U.S. through the CIA or anyone else even in the private
community, assume a responsibility that had to be Chilean.
I never informed President Frei of the money which was
authorized for work for Track I, and not a penny, as. you also
say, was spent on it.
Track II, on the other hand, did not deal with Frei, did
not seek his concurrence, did not follow his lead, did not.
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pretend to be within any constitutional framework of Chile..
Track II is the track to which I've often alluded and to which
my embassy had alluded in cables since 1969. The Socialist
Party, Allende's party, had conspired with the same plotters
in 1969's abortive coup by General.Viaux and the extreme left
that is part of Allende's party, was very much involved as
.the embassy reported. Indeed, the Allende government was
remarkably lenient in its punishment of killers, of Schneiderls
killers, and of:those.in'crlminated. because. among -'other
.considerations, the military investigators who, tracked and
named the murderers and. their accomplices discovered the links
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to the extreme left activists who were intimates of and support
of Allende.
Now, why suppress that. Because of the propensity for
rewriting history, I state here some of.the actions that I took to follow a policy totally different in direction than Trail,
II and to protect the United States from any complicity in
Chilean military inventions.
A. I barred, from 1969 on, any U.S. Embassy or U.S.
military contact with the circle around General Viaux, the man
who planned the murder of Schneider. I renewed this ban in the
strongest terms again and again in 1970 and thereafter.
B. I barred the CIA, in late 1968 or early 1969, from any
operational contact with the Chilean military without my
prior. knowledge and approval. I can recall no permissive
instance, from any contact with'President Frei or any Minister
or deputy minister, from any contact with any major political
figure without my prior approval, which was rarely gi.ven,.or
any contact with the head of, or a leading figure in a
government agency.
C. I informed the Frei government at great personal risk,1
.without daring to inform. the. white House in-the September 15- to'
October 15 period of 1970 of the most likely assassin of Allende
a military man-who was then involved in provocative axts,
bombings throughout Santiago. Major Arturo Marshal, General
Viaux"s right hand man, was arrested thereafter, a few days
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before the assassination of General Schneider. Why suppress
D. I dissuaded U.S. private citizens who were about to
be drawn into the machinations of Chilean military opponents of
Allende in the September-October 1970 period. Isteered
them clear, on pain of being reported to their home offices..
E. I informed the Frei government unequivocally in
September and in October 1970 on several occasions that the
United States had not supported, had not encouraged, would not
any action by the Chilean military taken outside the
constitution, independent of President Frei.
F. I consistently warned the Nixon Administration.,
starting in early '70, 1970, months before the election, that
the Chilean military was no policy alternative in Chile. I.
was pressed.in September-and October by-Washington to develop
possible scenarios for independent Chilean military interventio
in Chile.. Without exception, my responses excluded all
possibilities. Indeed, I warned gratuitously and very strongly
on two occasions that if anyone were considering such schemes,
it would be disastrous for U.S. interests. .
Let me read from two cables.sent to Undersecretary of
State, U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Henry Kissinger, so that the
public can judge for itself. .
One, on September 25, "Aside from the merits of a coup
and its implications-for the United States, .I am convinced we
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cannot provoke one and that we should not run any risks simply
to-have another Bay of Pigs. Hence I have instructed our
military and CAS" that is, the CIA, "not to engage in the
Again on October 9, the same two addresses, eyes: only,
".In sum, I think any attempt on our part actively to encourage
a coup, could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure. I am appalled
to discover that there is liaison for terrorists and coup
plotting," names deleted. "I have never been consulted or
informed of what, if any role, the U.S. may have in the
financing of" names deleted. "An abortive coup, and I and my
chief State colleagues, FSO's, are unalterably convinced that
this is what is here under discussion, not more beknownst to
me, would be an unbelieved disaster for the U.S. and for the
President. It's consequences would be to strongly reinforce
Allende now and in the future, and do the gravest harm to U. S.
interests throughout Latin America, if not beyond."
Letter G. I was so alarmed by a coup possibility that
I requested my deputy, now the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela,
in late September or early October to investigate my suspicion
.that the CIA was "up to something behind my back.".I.questione
him and others closely and repeatedly as to whether they had
discovered anything corroborative. ' No one could find any
basis for suspicion. So I asked on October 1 to fly to
Washington for consultations on how to deal with Allende in
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office. Permission was refused.for ten days. I requested in
that same cable that executive sessions be arranged with
Senators and Congressmen, Permission was denied. At no time
did I'suggest or did Washington instruct me to work for .the
overthrow of the Allende Government. Let that be very clear.
At no time, to my knowledge, did the U.S. engage in bribery of
any Chilean congressman, at no time did anyone give me "a
green light", in September 1970, or any instruction in that
period, not firmly predicated on prior constitutional action
and concurrence of the Frei government.
At no time until I read it four years later in the New
York Times, did I see or hear the word "destabilize" in
connection with the policy toward the Allende government.
At no time did .I recommend nor did I receive instructions
.from Washington to follow with the Allende government any
policy other than the one I launched, against Presidential
preference, the policy I launched and pursued to reach an
understanding with it, the sole policy to which I adhered
throughout my four full years in Chile was to protect and to
strengthen liberal and progressive democracy. in one of the
-shrinking circle of nations that practices that form of
government.
I told President Nixon in the Oval Office in mid-October
1970 that the U.S. had to.avoid'a self-fulfilling prophesy,
however correct my reporting and analysis might be, by seeking
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generally an understanding with Allende, starting even before
his inauguration. I said this effort need not prevent subsidie
by the CIA to non-conformist media and to non-conformist, non-
extremist political parties which we knew, we knew from
.superb-CIA penetrations and from excellent State Department
reporting were soon going to be squeezed to the wall.
Starting a fortnight. after Allende's inauguration in
mid-November 1970, the U.S. through me, with the support of. the
State Department, made-anunremitting,. strenuous, innovative effort to
reach a modus vivendi with Allende, the culmination of which
a copy and return its
The only deletions in it, sir, are 'those that refer to
the four western European countries who were briefed in detail
my.on'ly, copy so I would appreciate it if somebody would make
was the offer to have the United States Treasury guarantee.
long term bonds of the Chilean government.
And I would like to submit the unclassified, de-classified
I should say, cable summarizing that entire effort. It is
and who supported me in that.. effort. .
Incidentally,. that offer was far more generous than the
one made to the City of New York and New York State very
recently as you will see in that document..
Allende chose not to accept. The ultras in the leadership
of the Socialist Party vetoed compromizing in any way with
"imperialism," and let me add that President Allende in July
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of 1970, three. months before he was elected, said from a public
platform 'that the number one public enemy in the hemisphere
was the United States. They ruled out also any cooperation
with "the bourgeoise reformists" in the Christian Democratic
Party. They insisted on an all or nothing policy, even though
by 1973 the Soviet Union, China and others had refused to
encourage such a self-destructive, egocentrism.. I hone you.
compre'hdnd my view?.that: you 'report on Track I and Track II.
'does not accord with the facts. The authors do not seem to be
able to distinguish between a consultative process and an
action, nor do they comprehend that an ambassador, as the higher
ranking American in the country and the personal representative.
of a President, can ignore, can reject, can string out, can
string along, can do many things with a "authorization".
Hence the report unconsciously, unconsciously-falls in with
a monstrous black-white mythology foisted on this country durii
the past three years, a morality fable in which American
officials were all Nazi-like bully boys cuffing around decent
Social Democrats, although Dr. Allende had his left .Len-inist
Socialist Party, had nothing but contempt for Social
Democrats, and although Dr. Allende, as the embassy had reporte.
for many, many years, had personally .beeri.?finance'd from. foreign
Communist: enemies.
My time has run out. I had intended on November 4th, when
I thought I would come here to address the very complex and
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serious questions- rightly raised by an inquiry into the
intelligence community. You forced me today to try to expose
what is wrong with government by headline. What happens
when the public interest turns into a porno-flick,:'a sensate
experience into a cynical careening from one superficial
sensation, dart guns, poison, and all that, to another, to
divert the public from the complexity of reality, what happens
to the civil rights of an individual, me in.this case, but
it can happen to anybody, to the quality of political life,
to the national interest, to the truth, when moral fervor
runs over into the moral absolutism that has now led to the
desolation of Chile.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Yes, I agree it has led to the desolation
of Chile. I will have some questions.'
But we have another vote, I am sorry to say,.and we'll
have to take a short recess, and we'll come back for questions.
(A brief recess was taken.)
(The prepared. documents referred to by Mr. Korry follow:
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EDWARD M. KORRY
351 ELM ROAD
BRIARCLIFF MANOR, NEW YORK 10510
October 23, 1975
ti
The Honorable
Frank Church
United States Senate
,Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Church:
I have, as you know, confirmed my desire to testify before the Senate
Select Committee at its pleasure.,:Since I requested a CIA program and
since that program has been linked both to the tragedy that wracked Chile
and to the abuse of Executive power in this country, my appearance before
your Committee is a moral imperative and a civic necessity.
As Ambassador to Chile four full years (October 12, 1967 to October
12, 1971) I wrote more cables and dispatches than any of my rank in that
period, deliberately accounting, as best I could,.to current consumers
throughout the government, and to future political,*economic and social
historians, the motives, the atmospherics, the hopes and disappointments
that enveloped my decisions and actions. For reasons of ignorance, of self-
interest, of conflicting loyalties, of clashing principles and of percussive
pressures of various types, not everything salient or sentient could be
recorded even if comprehended then. Hence, new facts and fresh insights
still can be contributed to an illuminating case study of the dizzying inter-
action of national security actions abroad, partisan competition for votes
at home, covert ect1ivity, economic interests, espionage, Ideological rivalries.:
aucial i'actors and individual wills, of how, in sum, the United Stato:l--nut
juot thl:: White Houie, and/or the CIA, the Embassy, and other Executive
agencie!I, but the, nation as a dynamic entity--strode, stumbled or sneaked
to find its proper footing in the massive tides of history.
The Committee, as I understand it, has judicial powers. In effect,it
sits as.a court, a court of the people, one might say. As such,'then, its
function is to expose and to explore, without prejudice, the relevant facts,
to sift their implications. and to reach conclusions on past performance which
will, in turn, permit judgments on future lines of conduct. Your direction
as presiding officer of the proceedings have demonstrated that the Committee
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is not interpreting its mandate narrowly; it is examining an Executive
branch decision-making-and-action process as it was affected by the in-
telligence agencies. It is, I submit, investigating one manifestation of
Authority at a time whan all forms of it are in,or near,crisis.
The US-in-Chile case is a thicket of ironies. Good and bead lie so
clone together, as Acton said, that to seek artistic unity of chnra3cter,
or purpose, or performance, is, in this instance, an anile absurdity.
Your own role,. no lass than CIAlp,illustrates the point. You would be
judge and Jury when justice and decency suggest that 'it would be more
appropriate for you to be witness and defendant.
An outrageous proposition, you will doubtless retort, one that might,
as I recognize from past experience with anuther of your investigative
committees, provoke a prodigiously hostile and costly reaction. No matter.
"My heart has followed all my days," the poet writes, "Something I cannot
name." Mine cannot and will not live or die quiescently while you and others
fashion abedlam of humbug and.a blaze of unwarranted national guilt. If
we have entered the new era of ultra-brite, klieg-lighted honesty 'and
openness, of "letting it all hang out" as you and your admirers advertise,
then your wash must be pinned on the same sunlit line with mine. By that,
I mean this appalling, disqualifying record:
1. You were Chairman of the Subcommittee responsible for Inter-
American affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1969 and 1970
when.I inquired of its staffman on three separate occasions, in Washington
and in Santiago, if a Subcommittee meeting could be arranged. Each time,
Mr. Pat Holt repliers, with some embarassment, that the Chairman did not wish
hearings. He gave me to understand that Latin American affairs did not
arouse sufficient interest or promise ennutjh headlines to merit even one
executive rump sess'on. Your successor as subcommittee Chairman was sub-
sequently briefed on CIA operations in.Chib.;, I am reliably informed, long
before the leaks to the media by Congressman Harrington (and your staff) In
.1974 of Mr. Colby's secret testimony earlier that year to a House Committee.
Is It unfair to compare your looking-the-ether-way in 1969-70 to a
sentry asleep on duty on the eve of battle? Is it not right to inquire
how such a negligent guard turns up as presiding judge in the resultant
court-martial? Is it not logical. to speculate that you did not wish to
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know too much, did not cant to be saddled with any responsibility for the
agonizing decisions or recommendations that the best of puhlic servants
willingly confront, must confront, if our system is to avoid a demoralizing
paralysis? Or was it disinterest iri a taxpayer investment, authorized
step by step by the Congress, of approximately $2,000,000,000 (billions)--
dollars of 1964-69 vintages and values?
2. You were, next, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations of the Senate Foreign Rol.aticuns Committee, having transferred
to that limelightad role in mid-1972 when Jack Anderson published the.
sensational and grotesque ITT memos. Because my name appeared in several-
of those papers, I was, quite rightly, soon contacted (the summer of 1972)
by Mr. Jack Blum, Subcommittee deputy Counsel. In his second utterance on
the telephone, he said "ITT is trying to make you the fall guy, you know"
(I didn't) and added that if I did not cooperate with the Subcommittee to
"get" ITT and the White House people behind the corporation, the Subcommittee
would "let" me be a scapegoat. My employers' attorney contacted Mr. Olum
straightaway and in November, 1972,accompanied me as a silent inhibitor to
my one pre-hearing interrogation with Blum and his superior, Mr. Jerry
Levir;nso.n, the Counsel; we insisted they tape the multi-hour session. Events
have justified your staff's zeal to expose and to. rid the country of the'
then abusers of Executive authority although, I might add parenthetically,
their lack of pursuit in certain areas is intriguing.
I ask, in this connection, however, if the Senate empowers its Sub-
committees to abuse its authority with the same "enemies list" tactic!] of
its targets? Would you say that the ends justify the means?
3.? Your Counsel, Mr. Levinson, and I participated soon after in a
Dusseldorf, Germany, Conference on Multinational Corporations, January 5-7,
1973 (two months before your Subcommittee began hearings). Levr4isnn re-
counted to several participants one evening, in my presence, that the US
government in 1963-64 had spent "$12,000,000--even more" to defeat Allende.
He elaborated' briefly on the effort and purpose. When I asked him, in
privacy later, how he could Justify such past intervention and yet be so
.outraged by a very muted US hostility-in 1970 against the same man and the
same-forces-La CIA program, in fact, whose reach and cost were tiny fraction,,
of the earlier one---he replied that "we had a democratic alternative worth
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backing in 1964". Not for a second did he, your representative, argue that
the United States had no moral right to intervene or that the CIA had no
legal basis to engage in covert political action overseas or that inter-
national treaties forbade such intervention or that Allende and his forces
had changed stripes. Quite the contrary. His was a partisan, an ideologic-
al, distinction. He contended, entirely erroneously, that the US in 1970
had supported a conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri, when, in truth,
my position, and therefore the Embassy's, was strongly biased (much to the
annoyance of all of the CIA) in favor of President Eduardo Frei and his
Christian Democratic party---.the "Democrati,c.Left" force that Mr. Levinson
extols in his book.The Alliance That Lost Its Way (Quadrangle, 1970); I
had even argued in writing to the Nixon Administration that if the Democratic
Christian candidate in 1970, Tomic, were,by the most unlikely miracle, to
fashion and to lead a coalition with the Communists, as. he proclaimed he
would, it should not trigger US hostility. Even more relevant to the US
Committee's inquiry, one powerful incentive for.the structure I recommended
of anti-Allende covert propaganda action in the 1970 campaign---no funds to
any candidate or party---was my determination to-guard against an indirect
commitment by the US to a discredited Right that was so clearly in a minor-
ity'and with whose tactics and objectives I was in profound disagreement.
My question; to you here, Sir, is whether you were no less aware than
Levinson in January 1973, and before, of the pervasive US intervention in
the Chilean electoral campaign of 1963-64? Is it not a fact that you de-
liberately suppressed this chapter of US activities in Chile in your' 1973
hearings and later, because of its partisan embarrassment, becuuse it i.nvolvcac
a 'President we both cherished? Is it not true,. therefore, that you expanded
public funds to convert a public investigation into a private internecine
vendetta? Did .you not gra~;p, by the way, that the 1963-64 covert operations
involved the de facto overthrow of an existing government---that the program
conceived by the Kennedy Administration and executed by the Johnson team
to elect Christian Democracy depended on the prior repudiation by the
Chilean electorate of the conservative political coalition in pokier, and tha'
the US government, in many ways, worked to this end? Is it note thEnrefore.
correct to assert that your energetic campaign the past three years to
persuade the media and the world of the CIA's alleged "overthrow of' a
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democratic government" in 1973 was, among other things, an effort to draw
a false distinction between a past you labored to cover up and a present
you willfully distorted for partisan and personal advantage?
4. Twice during our European stay in January, 1973, Mr. Levinuon
pleaded with me to help "get" President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger and others
involved in the 1910 decisions affecting Chile. He asked how I,. a lifelong
"liberal" and a Kennedy admirer and appointee, could "defend" Nixon and
Kissinger and company. I told Levinson, as I had others over the years, I
had never voted for Nixon and had never contributed a penny or anything
else to any of his campaigns; nor was Kissinger a friend, as I, no less
than Levenson, was painfully aware. The issues for me, .I told Levinson,
were of another order:
'A::.'I.had been so opposed to the Marxist-Leninist forces re-
presented by Dr. Allende, it would be craven dishonesty to seek d.ispen-
sation by accusing others of actions based on shared perceptions;
B. It would entail the dredging of.secret decisions and acti-
vilties in a country where the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations had placed
their highest hopes and the greatest per capita American investments,
morel and material, in the hemisphere; such muck-rakj.,ng, I said, might bury
living Chilean politicians, and would muddy two dead'US Presidents. The.
costs, I held, would he very high to this country's standing and to Chile's
stability.
C. The Allende government had entered its third critical year
and the US taxpayer still had in the balance hundreds of millions of dollars
of US-Trea99ury-backed guarantees of American corporate investors plus morn
than one and a quarter billion dollars of other public monies; although I
had no doubt that the Allende government wus determinud to levy this charge
on the US taxpayer, I.did not wish to give any further pretext.
D. The sum of these constraint., subjective and objective, and
of the unending complexities flowing from them, were too overwhelming. for
me to play the dummy for him and for you.
My que3tion here, Senator, is who authorized your Subcommittee to
concentrate on "getting", to usU' the recurrent parlance of your staff, Dr.
Kissinger, and to rewrite history, IF necessary, to achieve that end? Why
did you and Mr. Levinson, for example, manipulate the subsequent hearings
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and the background briefings to selected journalists---before, during and
after those sessions---to propagate the dernogogic, specious suspicion that
US actions in'Chile, in my time, were motivated importantly because of
fealty to, or concern ford the monetary interests of, the multinational
corporations there? (What was true is that I had argued that the "Allt,nde
doctrine", of non-negotiable, unilateral grubs of US property, if unoppuaod,
would be emulated by many others, in one fashion or u.nother; I had said that
the consequences of Allende's uncompromising behaviour would also reduce aid
had gratuitously. declared, in Levinson's presence, to the Dusseldorf Con-
ference, as the published record (Ins.tute for International and Foreign
Trade Law, Georgetown University, and Praeger, 1974) states:
"Ambassador Iorry has given only part of the information
and investment, bilateral and multilateral, by a more isolationist US in
those areas of the world that needed it most; T had avowed my fiduciary
responsibility for the heavy texpayer exposure through guaranties and the
tied risks of other US government funds.) Did you not believe what Senor
Raul.Prebisch, the first Secretary General of UNCTAD (the third world
grouping) and an Argentine economist and socialist of International repute
on this matter (the evolution of relationships between
.multinational corporation's and less developed countries)
and I will complete it. The truth is that he was one
of the first---perhaps the first---to develop this idea
(of foreign corporate fade-out from absolute to shared
or minority ownership in LDCs) but only within a narrow
circle of friends. Indeed I had the privilege in 1967
to listen to his idea:; about this matter presented with
hic customary lucidity. I have ample proof Ambassador
Korry,,while Ambassador to Chile, was instrumental in
shaping new ideas in this matter of investment."
-00
(He was, as,youwill see below, speaking of both the Allende and the Frei
years.) Did Mr. Levinson not tell you, as he had written in his book, that
my defiance of the Anaconda Company in 1969 enabled the Chilean government
to gain immediate majority interest and control of that giant corporation's
mines in what was the largest-ever peaceful transfer of resources in an LDC?
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Had you not been briefed on my, persistent maneuverings in 1971 to prevent
ITT from exploiting its Chilean difficulties at the US taxpayers' expense?
Did you and-Levinson not manage events to avoid any public airing of this
.or of additional reasons for ITT's hostility to me because it would not
fit the single-minded partisan script you had drafted? Where was the moral
compulsion to "get" at the truth as the public expected and indeed paid
for?
by Congressman Harrington (and Mr. Levinson) that led to the formation of
the. Select Committee. I denied than, as I do now,. that we had ever attempted
to bribe Chilean Congressman. I asserted then, as I do again now, that I
had imposed the most extraordinary precautions to prevent any U. S. complicity
in a.Chilean military insurrection against the Chilean government, either
5. Mr. Levinson Is interrogation of me in public Subcommittee hearing
brought out, intur!Alia, my confirmation of a CIA electoral program in
Chile In.1970 as the New York-Times reported prominently in a two column story
.March 28, 1973,---a full year and a half, no less, before the disrloHures
policy: diplomatically doing its utmost to negotiate a solution acceptable
to the majority of. Congress and to most Americans as fair and just by the
most liberal measure; publicly adhering to a cool but correct posture;
covertly providing funds that did, in fact, permit newspapers (and their
labor unions), other media outlets and two major political parties to ful-
fill their democratic functions.
Is it not true that you and your staff were aware-in 1972-3 of the
hundreds of cables sent from Embassy Santiago between November 1970 and
October 1971 reporting to Washington in swamping detail the genuine, the
strenuous and the innovative efforts. to reach an accomodation with the
Allende regime? Is it not true that you decided to muffle this aspect
eventuality. I maintained then, as I do now, that the United States had
dealt with the Allende government, from the moment of his inauguration to
the day of my departure eleven months and one week later more generously
than anyone could have imagined or anticipated.
The United States was following, In fact, a sophisticated three:-tier
unusual---some today might sayhigh-risk --measures to guard against such an
Frei's or Allende's, and that between 1969
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and 1971, I had personally taken
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of the US-in-CHILE case? Is it not true that you and yourcounsel con-
scientiously stifled any public ventilation of an offer that Mayor 8eame,
Governor Carey and the people of New York, might have been intrigued by--
my offer to the Allende government, Marxist-Leninist in composition and
thrust, to have the US guaranty its almost worthless, bonds as part of a
fair, non-dogmatic and inexpensive settlement of its conflicts with the
US? Had I not provided on tape in 1972 the precise details to Levinson
and Diem? Had I not informed four major Western powers of them'in.timely
fashion? Was not.Levcnson also cognizant that oven within the Allende
government,not to mention several Santiago residents of international
kad w,)n support For
standing, such as PrebiOc this unusual proposition?
Why,shouldn't the public conclude that your deliberate coverup of a
major initiative was indispensable to your concoction of a simplistic and
monstrous black-white mythology---a legend in which the American bullyboys
kicked and cuffed small and innocent social democrats because they only
wanted control of their resources,' and because they only wished to implement
some progressive socio-economic programs,,and besides, weren't they demo-
cratically elected? Why would a Senator of your moral repute. and standing
lend himself to, let alone lead and orchestrate, a campaign of such half-
truths,. outright lies or distortions to discredit not merely the Nixon
Administration but an American society which had., in so many varied ways,
participated in the government's covert operation
Why was suppression so unavoidable or so essential when the truth,
damning in some of its other implications, would have permitted a salutary
and. intelligent debate and appraisal of the perplexing issues involved in
Chile? If Dr. Allende could, to my surprise, write a letter to the US
President after my departure to praise my efforts,' if his ultra-Soc1ilist
Foreign Minister Mr. Almeyda, could extol my endeavors to negotiate,.
aettlementn before a multi-party farewell gathering for. me in Santiago-----
even though both men were aware of almost all CIA activit legj ~at~n 1963
and 1970-----why should a US :.Dunator seek to erase so much of the tapo of
history? ?.
Why, to take another example, did you and your staff let stand the
.impression in your final report that the US had nbt, in fact, ceased all
further. economic loaning to Chile in October 1968-----two years before the
election of Allende and that in 1969, I had protested explosively this Nixon
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b
.Administration decision? Dir.l Mr. Levenson,(himself 0"ow a high A.I.D.
official in Guatemala and Brazil, both repressive military regimes by
the way, before his bureaucratic career was ended by Nixon's electia,)
not demystify the misleading AID'statistical tables included in your;.
Subcommittee's record? Why, too, did you bar from the final report and
economic aid to Chile because of Allende's "socialism" or uMarxisrn"?
Haven't your selective-outrages-and excisions the past three years
been akin to a conductor performing Beethoven only with kettles?and trumpets,
reducing incredible complexity to the drum-and-bugle thumping of a political
convention? ,
.6. The State Department's Foreign Service observer et'.the.', ,.
1973 hearings of your Subcommittee reported on the. extraordinary
daily working relationships between your staff and a Chilean Embassy
diplomat. I'witnessedit during my one day there. D'oubtless, the State
Department had not shared the coincidental intelligence that this Chilean
had been nicknamed by fellow Embassy officials, also loyal to Allende,
as the"Commissar: Nor would I suggest here that you perceived the thread
of logic that led from Mr. LevQnson's endorsement of this Chilean to
from the public the no less crucial information concerning the US offers,
through me, of loans and credits to the Allende government, again and
again in 1971, if it would only cease reneging an President Allondu's
explicit promises to U.S. officials, reiterated often in Washington by
its Ambassador? Did you and he not wish these ruscuing facto, ploi.rn
.and provable, to kill your morality fable of the U.S. cutting off further
the'Chilean Embassy's reinforced influence with several very well-
placed journalists in Washington, and how that success,in turn, amplified
Allende', authority in Chile, in this country and in the world, at the
price of moderation in Chile and of U. S. standing everywhere.
It is pertinent, though, to ask you why you should prefer such source,,
of information, guidance and judgments to the affirmation of not just one
inriapondent-minded Ambassador but the documented reports and analysis
over many years of many, highly-regarded f=oreign Service Officers? Why
would you not even explore the ontocoricnts of the Socialist Party of Chile
o' of its best known member, Dr. Allende? Was it-because'the immutable imprin
rt
/the official Party histories would strike at the heart of so many of your
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of Marxist - Leninist dogma who ruled out any oAm Q HM-iur with the U.S.?
Why hide the fact that.the majority of this party's ruling Committee (by a
in every meeting of its Central Committee for decades as extreme interpreters
in those of the British, Swedish;i, or German Socialist parties? Why.. turn
the blame uniquely on the U.S. when Dr. Allende's party had unwaveringly,
for decades, espoused violent revolution for Chile and throughout Latin
America---when it had gone on record in every national party conclave an:i
had unremittingly and vehemently opposed social democracy for a quarter
of a century, that it was pledged against reform, and everything rational.
contained not only in the founding proclamations of Chile (arid the US) but
postulations, preconceptions, and prejudices? Surely it wasn't necessary
to agree with my recommendations or actions for you, to lot some light
shine on the primordial phenomenon: --- that the Socialist Party of Chile
vote of 11 for, 13 encT six absent) had refused to endorse Allende as
-the party's candidate for Presidrant in 1970 because of his 18 years of close
collaboration with the less violrnnt,but stronger and totally subservient-to-
Moscow Communist Party of Chile? Why shouldn't there be a sober study of the
implications of Allende having bu:en the compromised. recipient of large amounts
of funds over many years from various Communist capitals and organizations?
Or that his first foreign political act on the very day of his inauguration
was to promise covert support to the Puerto Rican Independence movement?
Why not explore the reasons for the US Embassy, in advance of his election,
reporting the step by step process by which US influence--cultural, economic,
commercial, political, and military---was to be extirpated? Or why we
concluded before the elections tha Communist and Socialist parties planned
to use the default of their debts to the American taxpayer as a means to
impose their political will on Chile and the U.S.
Most important query, can you grasp that your refusal tn'Iaermit any
serious consideration by the Congress, and therefore, the public, allowed you
and thereby the Senate to be exploited within and without Chile in a dis-
astvrouo, in b catastrophic, mannur---that you unwittingly became a powerful
agent, as an Allende apologist, for. the polarization within Chile, and for the
reign of terror that ensued? No American, not even Mr. Nixon, had more
devastating effect in Chile, as I have good reason to assort, than you, Sir.
No one proved the adage that "what is earnust is not always true; on the
contrary-erro.r is often more earnest than truth".
7. Your man, Levdnson, next acted as one of the two channels for
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-The.Hersh stories of the week disseminated the impression that I was Ambassador
to Chile for the two Allende years following my departure in 1971, that the
in September, 1974, Mr. Colby's secret testimony on Chile. (Congressman
Harrington's other channel wag Mr. Laurence Stern of the Washington Post,
a confidante of Luvl:nson and of the aforementioned 'Commissar", who
published
during the March, 1973, hearings of your Subcommittee a front-page story
stating that the United States government had funnelled up to $20,000,000
through official agencies in 1964 to elect Eduardo Frei. By design or
occident, that story was timed to obliterate Frei, the strongest single
democratic, moral and Intellectual obstacle to the Marxist-Leninist re-
volution then entering its runaway phase.) Mr. Levinson, still your-ongoing
Subcommittee Counsel, was the anonymous source for the publication of the
Harrington leak in the New York Times by Seymour Hersh on September 8, 1974.
of the Times on September 13, 1974, He did so in the context of "now we are
going to nail Kissinger" and "this time we have Kissinger" and appeals to me
to help "get" Kissinger (as I informed the Times in my letter). Then, on
September 17, 1974, Harsh reported in the Times to the effect that Levenson
had presented you with t3 staff report urging strong action against Secretary
Kissinger along with recommendations for perjury and contempt charges against
five other former and active LIS ufficials including mu.
Do you not find these accusations by your staff, leaked in sneaky
anonymity without any prior notification, without any communication to me,
-sourco for the comments concerning me, as I stated in a letter to the Editor
with the Johnson Administration in 1964, rather
Stern's above-mentioned story had), toat
bribe, through me, Chilean' Congressmen at
that I had denied to you and your Subcommittee
campaign In Chile,.that_.I had invoked
executive privilege to evade responses., that I had lied under oath and would
be subject to immediate investigation for perjury. In his telephone calls
.to me some days later ~r~et~st~sttlfesttrnr Hersh Identified Levinson as his
CIA programs in Chile began nrzt
than with Kennedy, (just as Mr.
the US government had sought to
the time of Allende's election,
any CIA involvement in the 1970
of any kind, without any opportunity to this date to examine the charges or
to rebut them, a callous, even criminal, abuse of US judicial process? Wtiare
is fairness? Where is decency? Where is morality? Whore is the essential
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and 1tiine? Or Mr. Nixon's dirty tricks. department? How does it come about
that a Senate employee paid by public funds Can impose'on the country, by
trading secrets for space in the media on your behalf, his ";idualriOY, his
politics, his double-standards of justice, murall ty, perception and action?
Is it stretching the evidence to ask you why anyone in public life 'should
not emulate this performance---to exploit the protection offered by a
powerful Find approving patron,to insist on his criteria, to convert evfury
public interest matter into savage poll ti co3 of F3mbi tian, to abuse his
F3uthority? Is this riot the essence of the Watergate case? Is the lesson
you would have the public draw that such abuse is tolerable as long as you
agree with the abuser?
mental ussues on which the Congress must still. decide.
You stated on national television this past summer (and on many other
occasions in 1975) that you do not in any way criticize the efforts by. the.
I recite these details to prove the existence from 1972 to the present
of a t,iab of connected events in the new era of openness you proclaim so often
that nuithor the public or the Congress :;er:mud to bu privvy to. Also, I
wit3hod to lay a foundation of fact to support the observations contained in
this document, not the least of which 1:.3 my initial questioning as t'o whether
you have not disqualified yourself as Judge and jury in anything relating
to the US-in-CHILE case. They also provide an.introduction to the funda-
Social Democratic parties in Europe to aid their sister party and to save
liberty and democratic process in Portugal. You added that if the US were
to be involved in that effort, it would only embarasr.s and. weaken the Europouna'
endeavors and damage the Socialist Party of Portugal. You explained that
your insistence on the CIA being tethered was based on the risk of exposure
in Portugal. And then you omphusized with rightrouon.e:3s -quivering from every;
pore that Portugal teas quite the oppositu of Chile because in the former
a military dictatorshitpt had been overthrown while in Chile the US engaged
in overthrowing a democratically elected government.
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What unredeeming rubbish! Morally shameless, intellectually insulting,
factually incredible and politically asinine.
Either the United States condones or does not covert political action.
Either it does or does not condemn the interference by one government in
another's internal political affairs and processes. (Oe.cause Olaf Palma or
Harold Wilson or Holmut Schmidt can wear tho hat of party leader for such
exercises, it does not dilute his-role as the leader of the government
responsible for them.) Either the United States can display the Aristo.talaL
capacity to discern that is the source of political wisdom be it should
renounce its claims to thought, to rippreciatlon, to mural leadership. To
contemplate with equanimity covert political Fiction by others --- presumably
Soviet as well as Swedish or German or British--.-and to worry aloud that
the most powerful democracy might be nabbed if it defended principles in wh''
it believed)is, to my mind, an incitement to every American to abjure his
religious faith, his political beliefs, his hurnpnistic,yearnings, his plura
istic attachments. Yours is a prescription for isolation.' Not just the -
isolation of a Fortress American byt the more devastating entombment of rninc
and.of spirit. No wonder Americans despise all politicians!
It..is'also a reckless invitation. Why should militant, terroristic,
willful, or dedicated groups not read such a declaration from you---as indeE
they did in Chile ---as.a signal to advance their stratagems, their interest!
their passions, their absolutisms? After all,.if they have the.courage of
their convictions, why not? Wasn't the lack of an inhibiting signal from
the Nixon Administration---if not worse---an encouragement to the Chilean
military in September, 1973, and, more horrifying, later?
As for the consequences of US covert action, you prove how much easier
it is to predict the future than the past. Before the disclosure of the
US covert efforts to block the imposition of Marxism-Leninism on Chile, you
and your supporters maintained uninterruptedly that such defense of US
interest, as perceived by me and others, would worsen the cold war-
tensions-that thFiy would, for example, delay, Impede, hinder, block meaningful nagot!
tibno with the Soviet Union, or, say, i,ii th Cuba. The cold writ' would go on,
you forecast. Of course, thii exact contrary occured. Not to my uurpri rie. -
I had predicated my Chilean r?ucommenrlutionu on the assumption that if the 0!
rudently defended Its declared policies---the Congrsss'?s-declared policies.
? a
the USSR and China would respect us find that they would becom' moderating
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influence in Chile. Even after your rigged III hearings, Allende sent
in mid-1973 to me (a private citizen in New Yorlg:, a high official of his
yovernmen.t to inquire; if my 1971 offers could sumehuw be updated and revived.
(I immediately apprised the State Department. As with all Allender dualinge,
Ernd as he often boasted in privo tf3, eppearunce were much more important than
reality; he could not, would nut, oppose the voto of the Socialist Party
leadership which insisted on the same oil-or-nothing terms, according to
that same official, now living in exile.) In Portugal itself, the :-jnmrs
point applies. No souner dirt the Now York limes publish last month the
reports of large-scale CIA invoivernunt than the Lisbon government concluded
its first major negotiation with Washington.
What might well be hypothi,ized, on the other hand,. is that your declara-
tions emboldened the anti-democratic forces within Portugal to emulate their
ideological cousins in Chile, to ignore the majority will and to hurl the
country into civil war if necessary to have their way. If one accepts the
unarguable evidence that the Socialist Party of Chile was, in fact, n `Left
Communist party (since: it had scorned and spurned .this Third tnturnut.ionel
for decades) and that the Christian Democratic party' was, ins fact, the
democratic socialist party of Chile, by western European political standards,
then you will comprehend why every event inPortugal since the overthrow of
the Salazar dictatorship has repeated a Chilean experience---even the
manner in which the non-democratic Left deals with the military.
You tnikrsd of the dumoerr.rtic electiens by which Allende became Pruoident_
1f we e,u_rru to contildel' the must rrxegrle;rutud iristnncrr, the dennucrrrtic ttuluctiura
in preswur Girrmuny of Hl tier, am t to unlur:storud that you would havfr pro('orr(_reL
the hulucoiu:3t first ruthur than launch a covert: e.rctl.on rirogrum to pruvunt
excesses you knew were being plonneord by o"durnocruuticul ty-elected government"?
Obviously nut. We are, in Allesrrdu'o case, not spooking of diabolical per-
versities of the Hitlerian dimension, nor are we talking)P8 than a modest,
covert-US effort to dissuade immoderation and to prevent it from running wild.,
as it did. The point is only that a human judgment based on the real world
.cannot be evaded by recourse to hollow slogrrns. In Chile, throe successive
US Ambeosadors---each originally appointed to government by the Iennedy
Adrniniotrotion---plug the Foreign Survicrs, not to mention the CIA or John
F. and Hobert Kennedy, or an army of 11 berel Am?ruricart ucodemictoons, chr.irchmursl,,
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labor observers had over a period of eight or nine years stated that'a
government led by Allende and dominated by the Communist and Socialist
parties intended to constrict very markedly, at the least, the two freedoms
on which our form of democracy is based---of press and of association,
particularly labor unions. In 1970, as in 1963, we knew beyond a shadow of
reasonable doubt that an Allende government intended to use the processes
and laws of what it called "formal democracy" to eliminate rim and replace it
with what it called "popular democracy"---ran accurate description whose
.meaning is known to every member of the Congress. From 1961 to 1970, the
Embassy like the majority of Congress agreed that such a development would
do serious harm to US interests and influence-for-good in the world.
As far as interference in internal political affairs is concerned,
the US Congress has been knowingly engaged in it for years. At very high
cost. Not always with candor either. The voting or withholding of funds
for food, for arms, for loans, had political aim,as often as not although
.cloaked in the pretext of "development". Is it riot fair to say that when
the Nixon Administration ignored my explosive protests and denied further
economic aid to the Frei Government in early 1969, it was casting massive
and deliberate political vote---with CIA connivance---for the Right, and
ironically, for Allende? It could do so with. impunity,incidentally, because
groups such as your subcommittee on Latin American affairs had no interest.
Who, then, had to deal with the consequences?
Or consider the same problem from another angle. The majority of
-Congress and of the American electorate have expressed,pne way or another,
the suspicion, or the finding, that the events surrounding the Watergate
affair threatened democratic process in the US. Yet nothing Richard Nixon
and his associates did, or even contemplated, hogan to approximate the
actions of a Chilean President you persist to this day in labeling "democratic'
Rock-hard information shows that Allende:
A. Arranged for the covert importation and distribution of .
illegal arms int7 his country.
Sought by bribery, coercion and covert political action to
gain ownership or control of all media not conforming to
government',s desires.
C. Blackmailed, literally, the two major opposition parties
(the Christian Democrats and the Nationals) and many of
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 .under-Frei, Chile was one of the most politically free places on earth,
freer, in fact, than the US. I assort, too, that had the United States
?a diluted definition for Chile? If so, I state here categorically that
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their individual Senators and Congressem,,by threoteneng
to expose incriminating, albeit generalized and customary,
misuse of the loaning mechanism of the private banking
system.
D. Approved and shared very large bribes from foreign corpo-
retions.
L. Flouted the will of an. independent Congress by invoking
dozens of times the rarely-used, ultimate constitutional
device of "a degree of insistence" to iynnru vetoes and/or
lrigiulation.
F. Ignored major judicial decisions and denied the authority
of the courts.
G. Approved and exploited the altering of union ballots to
win determinant control of the centralized labor union
confederation and to become the first government in the
hemisphere whose Minister of Labor was al:io head of the
labor confederation (as was once the case in the Soviet-
Union).
Much more could. be said. I would only inquire here by what elastic
yardstick do you gauge "democratic". Is it the double standard that some
apply .to race? Is it that Latin America is somehow inferior, as your lack
of interest in the late 1960s. might indicate, and that "democracy" has,
not pursued my suggestion to provide covert aid to the media and to key
politicians committed, I helin vcd,to democratic and pq~ constitutional
irrevc.., r~,tihl.c t~~
procuocers, All ndo would hove un(IuFJt3tionobIV won/control pfd nl'Jn-conforming
media that mattered, of the labor tile rnrchius, and of a Congress truns-
formed Into a "Peopluu- 11HHCmbly". How long, by the wuy, do you think thu
indepcendence of some newspapers .:arm some radio ntations whose vigor so
impressed you in 1972 and '73 would have endured if I had furnished the
Y
details Mr. Levson was so anxious.to pressure out of me?
I don't know whether the disappearance of democracy in Chile merited
a $2,000,000 insurance policy in covert action, as I proposed in 1970,
on the two billion dollars.voted by Congress in the previous decade to
safeguarApowvu FnayRbleaCsbi2M3MZl&oOiA# F 9to-oo7mBRooo'2Mowo0t.6st of Latin
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America. know only that I had said at the beginning of 1968 and in
the 1969 annual Embassy Policy Statements that the only vital interest
the US had in Chile was that it remain a democracy and that if' we were to
become indifferent to the fate of democracy in a country of Chile's caliber,,
we would inevitably become indifferent to how we practiced democracy at
home, a forecast that T beleive was borne out.
By mid-1970, a number of other motivations---strategic and tactical,
international and regional, weighed so heavily that Iofened my previous
Iron determination, often expressed, to have the US stay on the sidelines,
to follow a strictly non-interventions}., policy I suggested a
and then, qqne t or pu .i ca a71T6 n
modest electoral propaganda erogram% Yau may.not wish to have all my
reasons discussed in public but I em prepared to do so. I offer
here the full catalogue for public :perusal:
1. The avowed aims of the Marxist-Leninist Socialist and Communist
parties, and of their governmental leader Salvador Allende, tb eliminate
'"formalistic" democracy---the kind that the United States, Canada, Sweeden
and Britain have---and to replace it with "popular dumocracy"---the kind
that Cuba, East Germany and Czechoslovakia have.
2.. The declared aims of the two parties to extirpate US influence
the US,
in Chile and in Latin America---to treat./ in Allende's pre-election words,
as "public enemy number one" in the hemisphere.
.3. The.Allende Government's intention, as reported painstakingly
forri'in reams.of Foreign Service Officer cables and dispatches, in
thousands of CIA messages from clandestine sources, in the assessments of
the three successive Ambassadors in Santiago, from 1961 to 1970, each
appointed to government originally by John F. hunnedy, to align itself
with the Castro government in Cuba in a hemispheric effort to wipe out
US influences, and to become, in the words of John F. Kennedy "a second
bridgehead" for the Soviet Union in the humi;-3phuura.
4. The knowledge that an Allende government would seek to maneuver
the United States into a scapegoat role so as to avoid repayment of/Mount
approaching one billion dollars in loans originating with the US taxpayer
and to justify the unpaid--the uncompensated--nationalization of US citizens
property guarantees by the.US taxpayer under Congressional legislation in
the amount of hundreds of millions of dollars.
5. The certain knowledge that the Soviet Union and other Communist
governments and organizations had provided for man_~/ years and were providing
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very substantial sums for covert political action to the Communist
party, to the Socialist Party and to Allende himself. Therefore we
anticipated (as quickly proved to be the case in 1971) that the USSR and
Cuba would exploit fully these relationships and that the USSR might (as
promptly occurred in 1971) exert strong pressures on the Chilean armed
forces with the active support of Allende, to accept it as the main
military supplier and military advisory group.
years.
6. The certain knowledge that the Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
the largest single political grouping in Chile and the representative of
the Democratic Left, would be the main internal target of the Marxist-
Leninist government. I had very, very, good reasons to anticipate that
the party would not have the material means or the moral or Organizational
impetus to sustain itself as a vital party in Chile for very long without
outside help in advance of its certain crisis. 'The PDC owed large amounts
of money to banks the Allende government would quickly nationalize;, we
reckoned that the Allende government would exploit bank nationalization to
blackmail, to coerce and to starve financially (as proved to be the case
starting quickly in 1971') numerous and influential,members of the party.
SSG The Allende bjectives were to silence political opposition, to compel the
Congress..to.accept its bills, and most important,. to destroy the PDC by sowinc
internal dissension at every level. The PDC owned no national newspaper,
had no TV outlet and influenced few of Santiago's many radio stations at
the time of Allende's election although it had been the governnent for six
to undertake such risky and costly non-conformity on their own---without
some material manifestation of a shared US concern for a free press.
that the effluent proprietors could not alone sustain for long the huge
deficits the Allende Government would..(and did) rig or would be willing
. 7.. The. certain knowledge that the Allende government planned to
gain quick control by coercion, bribery and monopoly authority (over all
credit, imports and prices) of the major independent media outlets. The
CIA persuaded me---and I beleive today their assessment was probably correct--
8. The certain knowledge that the Allende government planned to
use bribery, coercion and its monopoly powers to achieve monopoly control
of organized labor. (The Allende government did, in fact, resort to large
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 _~ .r''iyri;..