THE SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORICAL SERIES SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1941-68 VOLUME I AN OVERVIEW

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• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF
The Support Services
Historical Series
SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1941-68
VOLUME I AN OVERVIEW
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OS - 1
November 1971
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This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
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Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
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THE SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORICAL SERIES
OS - 1
SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1941-68
VOLUME I AN OVERVIEW
by
25X1A
November 1971
25X1A
HowardJpOsborn
Director o Security
-
HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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FOREWORD
This volume is the first in a series designed to present a
history of the CIA security program as it evolved from 11 July
1941 through 31 December 1968. This collection of volumes
was prepared by personnel of the Office of Security, under the
supervision of the Director of Security, with assistance and
guidance provided by the CIA Historical Staff.
The immediate volume presents an overview of the Agency's
security program, concentrating on the evolution of the organi-
zation which provides security support to CIA, and includes
discussion of those internal and external factors which affected
its development. Succeeding volumes explore the genesis and
development of a number of separate activities which comprise
the overall program. These are entitled:
II - Personnel Security
III - Physical Security
IV - Operational Support
25X1A
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VI - Technical Security
VII - Overseas Security Support
VIII - Compartmented Information Security
Practices
IX - Polygraph Program
Although all volumes are inter-related, each has been written
with a view toward individual integrity, in order that diverse
influences may be portrayed in context with the respective
subject matters.
???
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 1
The Genesis of the CIA Security Program (11
July 1941-26 September 1947). . . . . . 16
A. General 16
B. Security Under COI and OSS 18
1. Early Security Considerations . . . 18
2. Organization and Scope 21
3. Security Liaison 23
4. Investigative Assets 25
5. Counter-Espionage Branch (X-2) . . 31
6. Conclusion 36
C. Strategic Services Unit (SSU) War Depart-
ment 41
D. Security Under the Central Intelligence
Group (CIG) 44
1. The DCI and NIA 44
2. Origin of Government Personnel
Security Practices . . .... 45
3. Investigative Assets. . . . . 49
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PAGE
4. Other CIG Security Considerations . . 51
5. Security Organization Under CIG . . . 55
6. OSO Autonomy 58
7. Office of Security, CIG - The Concept 62
8. CIG General Order No. 3 66
Centralization of CIA Security Support (26 Sep-
tember 1947-6 December 1954) 70
A. Evolution of the Security Office 70
B. Security Policy 73
C. Security Division (Branch) 74
D. Employee Investigations Branch . 76
E. Special Security Division 81
F. Personnel Security 89
1. Personnel Selection 89
2. Loyalty Orders 93
3. Summary Dismissal Authority of the DCI 96
G. Interrogation Research Branch (Polygraph) 99
H. Physical Security 102
!. I
I. Counterintelligence 106
J. Alien Affairs 111
iv
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PAGE
K. Career and Area Security Officers . ?
?
115
L. Later Organizations
119
Expansion of Security Support and Growth of
the Executive Function (December 1954-
June 1963)
122
A. Reorganization of 4 December 1954. .
.
122
B. Subsequent Organizational Adjustments
. .
126
1. Within DD /IOS
126
2. Polygraph
128
4. Records
129
5. Staff Additions
131
6. 1960 IG Survey
133
C. Industrial Security .
.
136
D. Security Surveys
144
E. Special Security Support Activities . .
. .
148
F. Expansion of Overseas Security Support
. .
150
G. CIA Security Education and Counseling
of Employees
153
H. Contingency Planning
159
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PAGE
I. Career Management & Training 166
J. Participation in Interdepartmental Security
Activities 173
1. Early Involvement 173
2. State-Defense Military Information
Control Committee ... . 175
3. Intelligence Board Security Committee . 181
4. Other Interdepartmental Committee
Involvement 187
5. Interdepartmental Agreements . ? 189
IV. Changing Patterns of Security Support and
Protection of Intelligence as a Community
Concern (1 July 1963-31 December 1968). . 191
A. Management Personnel Changes ? ? ? ? 191
B. The Three-Directorate Organization. ? 193
C. Action Through the Intelligence Com-
munity 197
D. Vulnerability of Agency Overseas
Operations 208
E. The Domestic Threat . 215
F. Industrial Security-Later Considerations . 218
G. Technological Security Considerations . ? 230
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I. Other Organizational Adjustments .
. 238
J. In Conclusion
239
APPENDIX
Source References
251-278
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1 - Organizational Chart, Office of Security,
Dec. 1968 13
Figure 2 - Organizational Chart, OSO, Dec. 1946 59
Figure 3 - Organizational Chart, Security Office,
1 Dec. 1954 121
Figure 4 - Organizational Chart, Security Office,
5 Dec. 1954
Figure 5 Organizational Chart, Office of Security,
1 June 1963
Figure 6 Organizational Chart, Office of Security,
12 August 1965
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124
137
195
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SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1941-68
Volume I An Overview
INTRODUCTION
From World War II until 1960, there was a growing overall aware-
ness on the part of the US Government of the threat which the efforts of
foreign intelligence services posed to the national security. To continue
'to survive in an age where the threat of nuclear warfare was ever-pre-
sent, it was obvious that the US strategic national defense position ver-
sus that of its potential enemies would be prejudiced, were the latter
to be apprised of capabilities or intentions related to national defense
programs. To protect sensitive information, it was necessary to iden-
tify categories of information which, in the interest of national security,
would be declared secret. Dissemination of such materials was care-
fully controlled and limited to individuals who required access in per-
formance of official government business. This is not to say that the
nation had not previously practiced secrecy related to military matters,
but the emphasis had been sporadic, usually associated with a state of
war or the threat of war. Now the threat was ever-present.
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The primary preoccupation of security in government,
therefore, was insuring that classified information was ade-
quately safeguarded. In this sense security involved those
safeguards necessary to preserve secrecy. As this history
will demonstrate, people, places, and things also possess
utility in terms of national security; and they too require
protection.
The practice of security does not evolve easily under a
democratic form of government. Those safeguards neces-
sary to deny information to potential enemies will also deny
the information to a nation's citizenry, and both the rules and
the administrators will be viewed with distrust and suspicion.
In addition, there are many practical difficulties asso-
ciated with the security protection of information. Physical
security conditions which provide the greatest degree of pro-
tection will frequently detract from the overall utility of a
facility. The physical condition of information may be static,
but a great deal of the time it is in some process of communi-
cation: spoken, written, or transmitted over electrical com-
munications facilities.
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No standards exist for providing a condition of absolute
physical security protection to information. If such existed,
they would be prohibitive from the standpoint of cost if for no
other reason. In truth, there are few physical structures
that cannot be penetrated in some manner, if one possesses
the disposition to put forth the necessary effort to do so.
Since security protection, too, must be put on a cost effective
basis, some assessment of the threat is necessary to deter-
mine how much and where the major emphasis should be ap-
plied.
Much information does not lend itself to a condition of
secrecy. Secrecy, by its nature, implies a condition of mono-
poly. Scientific discoveries, for example, even those in
volving gross efforts of research and development, are not
good subjects for any permanent condition of secrecy because
the possibility exists for their rediscovery by someone else.
The best that can be hoped for, in such a situation, is that
a condition of temporary secrecy will provide some strategic
advantage over one's adversaries. Secrecy related to scien-
tific discoveries may in fact be prejudicial to the overall
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society, for the hypotheses supporting sophisticated military
weaponry will in most instances possess other, non-military,
utility.
Freedom of the press is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Information which is held by the government as secret is in
most instances newsworthy. Therefore, even the press can
be an adversary of security, since what is read in newspapers
and periodicals by the public can also be read by representa-
tives of foreign intelligence services. It is particularly dis-
turbing to government officialdom to discover that a national
secret has been unearthed and reported upon by some aggres-
sive, inquiring representative of the news media. One might
argue that if the level of security protection applied was not
adequate to protect the information from the inquiring news
reporter, then it was not adequate to protect the information
from foreign intelligence services. There is of course some
merit to this; however, few representatives of the foreign in-
telligence services are provided with the prestigious status,
and the degree of mobility and access, accorded some repre-
sentatives of the press.
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Then too, information is only a form of human expression
given to things that can be seen or otherwise sensed. A docu-
ment containing the overall blueprint of military reaction to
the contingency of a Soviet nuclear attack might be given very
tight security protection. But to be prepared to react in ac-
cordance with the plan, there must be a pre-positioning of per-
sonnel and materiel. Even without access to actual documents
in such situations, intentions may be forecast by actions.
In truth there is little information that can be kept secret.
For information to be useful, it must be disseminated to indi-
viduals who will make use of it. The greater the dissemination,
the greater the possibility that it will be acquired by an indi-
vidual who in some manner will break trust. Indeed, the pre-
cise formula for measuring the security reliability of the indi-
vidual is perhaps one of the most frustrating aspects of security.
Throughout the period of this historical report, there was
considerable codification, in the form of Executive Orders, re-
lated to the identification of information to be provided security
protection and procedures and practices to be used in the pro-
tection thereof. These Executive Orders also included proce-
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dures and standards for establishing the reliability of the indi-
vidual to be provided access -- recognition of the fact that the
security protection of information necessitates a considerable
reliance upon individuals. Inasmuch as the CIA is an agency
of the Executive Branch of the government, these Executive
Orders, to a considerable degree, determined the nature of
security practices within the Agency. CIA unquestionably in-
fluenced the content of some of these Orders, thereby raising
the level of the overall government security effort.
In many ways the CIA is similar to other Federal depart-
ments and agencies. It possesses a Headquarters Building and
other buildings in the Washington area which are publicly known
to be CIA facilities. These buildings contain classified informa-
tion, and classified activities are conducted therein by individuals
who are paid through the instrumentality of a US Treasury De-
partment check. But that is where the similarity stops. From
this center of CIA activity must flow the direction and super-
vision of clandestine espionage agents, saboteurs, and others,
whose relationship to the CIA, and in many instances to the US
Government, cannot be compromised without serious prejudice.
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Executive Orders which relate to the protection of classi-
fied information from unauthorized disclosure and to the selec-
tion criteria to be applied to those individuals authorized ac-
cess are appropriate to the hub of CIA activities, and partly
appropriate to many of the intervening locations -- they are
entirely inappropriate to the extremities of the activity, at
which are located the primary intelligence assets. One dare
?not hang a "Restricted Area" sign on the park bench in Buda-
pest used as a meeting place by the intelligence case officer
and the agent whose activities he supervises. Other protec-
tive measures appropriate to the individual circumstances must
be devised. Nor can the CIA be as selective in choosing its
agents as it is in selecting those who enjoy full employment
status. To collect all the necessary intelligence, opportunities
must be recognized and acted on. The security of the case of-
ficer/agent relationship is exercised through the measures
used to control the agent.
There are few activities conducted within CIA which do
not require the exercise of stringent security practices. The
intelligence source is vital to the production of national esti-
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mates to be used in guiding the government's policymakers.
Since the opposition is disposed to the severest form of in-
ternal security practice, intelligence sources are usually
difficult to acquire. Nevertheless, they are extremely vul-
nerable. The simple act of pulling down the bedroom shade
will frustrate the peeping torn; once a source has been com-
promised, there is little hope that it will continue to exist.
The practice of security in CIA is a serious business; it is an
important aspect to be considered in the planning of any mis-
sion.
Concepts of security unique to the mission of intelligence
have developed within CIA. Use of the polygraph as an aid in
the assessment of the individual in terms of his potential as
a security risk was developed to a high degree of profession-
alism.
Security compartmentation (which was pre-
dicated on the idea that many elements of a bureaucratic organi-
zation could devote their efforts to the accomplishment of a
particular mission without all being apprised of the objective
of their contributions) was developed to a fine art. The concept
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of sanitization was developed in recognition of the fact that
intelligence needed to be disseminated to be of value but that
the content of such reporting could identify and perhaps com-
promise the source. "Cut-outs" and cover, organizations were
used for a variety of purposes, including the cloaking of large-
scale logistics, staffing, and financing activities related to
covert action.
The Director of Security, CIA, shares with the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsibilities which relate to
both the internal management of this Agency and the functioning
of the overaif intelligence community. Within the CIA the
Director of Security, operating under the Deputy Director of
Support (DDS), is charged with the preparation and execution
of the Agency's security program and with the performance of
security inspection functions. Agency regulations prescribe
that security is a-command function. Nevertheless, a consid-
erable centralization of security responsibility has evolved
to the Director of Security, sometimes by edict and sometimes
by circumstance. Since the practice of security within an intel-
ligence organization involves the application of a defensive
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philosophy to an offensive mission, it is perhaps only natural
that the Director of Security has emerged as the principal
spokesman for his tradecraft, exercising considerable influ-
ence laterally across the several chains of command through-
out the Agency. Among other things, the responsibilities of
the Director of Security include the recommendation of Agency
security policy and procedures, the security screening of per-
sonnel for employment or other usage, the establishment of
safeguards to prevent physical penetration of Agency facilities,
the inspection of facilities and the recommendation of needed
improvements, the investigation of security violations and
compromises, the maintenance of a program of counter-intelli-
gence to detect evidence of penetration of Agency operations,
the carrying out of certain activities with respect to the Agency's
overall handling of aliens, the provision of security support
and a cadre of trained security officers to assist other compo-
nents of the Agency, and the institution of such technical re-
search and liaison with other government organizations and
local and federal law enforcement agencies as is necessary
to effect these responsibilities.
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Section 102 (c)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, provides that:
the Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
The DCI supervises deliberations of the overall US intelligence
Community related to the protection of intelligence sources
and methods in his capacity as Chairman of the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB), and the Direct or of Security of
the Agency is the Chairman of the Security Committee of
USIB. The Secretariat of the Committee is also provided by
the Office of Security. The Director of Security, on behalf
of the DCI, extends his influence to security considerations
affecting the entire intelligence community.
CIA's Director of Security acts as the executive agent
for the intelligence community in providing training in audio-
countermeasures for personnel of USIB member ?departments
and agencies. Additionally, through the SpecialSecurity
Center of the Office of Security, he exercises leadership in
the promulgation of. security policies affecting large intelli-
gence collection activities, wherein other departments and
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agencies share responsibilities with the CIA, in accordance
with defined agreements. His influence has further extended
to those foreign governments that have cooperated from time
to time with the intelligence effort or shared in its benefits in
varying degrees.
As shown in Figure 1,* the organization of the Office of
Security in 1968 consisted of three staffs: the Administration
and Training Staff, the Security Research Staff, and the Execu-
tive Staff, all responsible to a Deputy Director and the Director
of Security. In addition, there are three functional Deputy Di-
rectors: the Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security,
the Deputy Director of Security for Investigations and Opera-
tional Support, and the Deputy Director of Security for Physical,
Technical and Overseas Security, each heading a large organi-
zation responsible for effecting portions of the overall responsi-
bilities of the Director of Security.
The principal objective in this volume is to trace the genesis
and evolution of the organization providing security support ser-
P. 13, below.
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FIGURE 1
OFFICE OF SECURITY
December 1968
1
? Administration
Director of Security
Deputy Director of Security
Security
and Training Staff Research Staff
DD of Security
for Personnel Security
ADD of Security
for Personnel Security
ersonnel Security Interrogation
Division Research
1,
Security Records and
Communications Division
Division -
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1
MINI NM MO
Executive Staff
Special Security
Center
I
DD of Security for ,
Investigations Operational Support
I
Security for \
ADD of
Investigations & Operational Support
Investigations
Division
Operational
Support _
Division
pecial Activities
Diviiion
Executive & Planning
Division
DD of Security for
Physical, Technical
and Overseas Security
Alien
Affairs ADD of Se urity for
Staff Physical, Technical
and Overseas Security
?
Physical Security Overseas
Division Security
Support
Division
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Technical
Division
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vices to the CIA, and to describe the principal influences
which affected its development. Since, historically, security
had been a command function, many of the early considera-
tions were related to identifying those aspects of security
which would be best performed by a centralized security
authority. The early decision to include the functions of secu-
rity policy and inspection probably led to the decision to ini-
tially place the centralized security authority in a staff capa-
city, although security subsequently developed to be one of
the Agency's supporting services.
Of necessity, early considerations of the centralized
security authority were primarily concerned with the security
selection of personnel, and this function has remained the
principal activity of the Office of Security. The extensive in-
vestigative organization required to support this function,
however, provided a personnel base which could be channeled
into other areas of security support, resulting in the develop-
ment of a professional security corps, able to operate as an
important part of the Agency's overall mission. This merger
of the separate disciplines of the professional security officer
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and the intelligence operative undoubtedly contributed to a
better assessment of the threat, and correspondingly, more
appropriate countermeasures.
The record is clear. CIA did develop an extremely ef-
fective security program which allowed the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence to assume his full leadership responsibility
within the intelligence community for the protection of intel-
ligence sources and methods.
The first 20 years of the Agency's existence were marked
by many political and social changes. These have brought
about changes in the nature of the threat, thereby resulting in
changes to the overall pattern of security counteraction. The
CIA security program faces new and different challenges to-
day. If the important work of the Agency is to continue, its
activities must be cloaked in secrecy. This unquestionably
will require the development of new techniques, new skills,
new concepts of security protection.
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CHAPTER I
The Genesis of the CIA Security Program
(11 July 1941 - 26 September 1947)
A. General
The DCI's responsibility related to the protection of in-
telligence sources and methods, provided for in the Act which
created the CIA,* is a security responsibility which appears
to transcend that responsibility for the protection of all clas-
sified defense information, with which every department and
agency head is charged in accordance with his defined juris-
diction. The DCI does not, however, have the power to di-
rect the security activities of government departments and
agencies as they may relate to the intelligence mission.
Neither statute nor Executive Order ever provided him with
Section 102 (d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947.
Similar language appeared in the 22 January 1946 Presi-
dential Order, "Directive in Coordination of Foreign Intel-
ligence Activities," which created the National Intelligence
Authority, the DCI, and the Central Intelligence Group.
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such authority. As the DCI' s position as titular head of US
intelligence activities slowly emerged, however, he gradually
assumed a role of increased prominence related to the secu-
rity protection of intelligence information throughout the govern-
ment. This condition did not come about quickly. Early CIA
considerations related to security were, organizationally
speaking, largely introspective.
It was first necessary to establish a security program within
the Agency itself that was both appropriate and responsive to
its mission. To accomplish this it was necessary to draw on
the assets and concepts developed during World War II by the
predecessor organizations, COI and OSS,* which had had a
similar mission. It was necessary also to adapt and trans-
form these wartime assets and concepts to the peacetime intel-
ligence mission.
The history of the CIA security program, therefore, must
begin with a discussion of security as practiced under COI and
* COI (Coordinator of Information) 11 July 1941 - 13 June
1942; OSS (Office of Special Services) 13 June 1942 - 1 Octo-
ber 1945.
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OSS, and then proceed with a description of the transforma-
tion which began under SSU (Strategic Services Unit, War De-
partment) and the CIG (Central Intelligence Group).
B. Security Under COI and OSS*
1. Early Security Considerations
The practice of good security to protect its sensi-
tive mission was an early consideration under COI, but an
effective security program did not come about until well into
1943 under OSS. Security under COI was at first a responsi-
bility of the individual Branch Chiefs. Providing guards to
protect its buildings was the responsibility of the Public
Buildings Administration (PBA); identification badges were
issued by the Business Office of COI; visitor controls were
not uniformly applied. The reliability of its employees was
at first established by the individual being vouched for by
other COI staff personnel. Since most early employees were
Principal sources of information contained in this Sec-
tion were: War Report, Office of Strategic Services 1/ and
History of Security Office (OSS) 2/. (For serially numbered
source references, see the Appendix).
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hired under the Civil Service System and paid from vouchered
funds, they were required to be investigated and approved by
the Civil Service Commission for Federal employment. Rarely,
however, were the results of the Civil Service Commission
investigation available before the individual entered on duty.
As the size of the organization grew, this system for
establishing the individual's reliability became increasingly
less effective. Furthermore, an increasing number of em-
ployees who were to be paid from unvouchered funds did not
fall under the requirement for investigation by the Civil Ser-
vice Commission. As a result, Branch Chiefs suddenly be-
came aware that they were doing confidential business' with
many individuals of unknown character and loyalty.
Following the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Har-
bor, there was an initial flurry of concern related to security.
Personnel showing up for work found that the PBA guards had
been supplemented by armed military personnel; however,
these disappeared almost as suddenly, their services undoubtedly
more urgently required elsewhere. On 18 December 1941, Cdr.
F. C. Denebrink, USN, was assigned to COI in a liaison capacity
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as a security adviser, and the first formal COI Security Regu-
lations were published. With the outbreak of war, the establish-
ment of the reliability of COI personnel became imperative; and,
consequently, it was directed that a check of the files of the FBI
be completed on all incoming employees before they entered on
duty.
In March 1942, Lt. Colonel Ellery C. Huntington was
appointed as Security Officer in COI. A separate Security Of-
fice was formally established in May 1942 with Huntington placed
in charge. Huntington, a New York lawyer, former World War I
Army officer and member of the New York National Guard, im-
mediately set to work to develop an effective security program
in COI. The badging system was improved, additional physical
security measures were instituted, visitor controls were tightened,
and the maintenance of classified materials upgraded. Hunting-
ton's most pressing concern, however, was the establishment
of a system whereby the Agency could insure the character, in-
tegrity, and loyalty of its own personnel. This required the
development of investigative assets to investigate potential
employees, the'establishment of liaison with other US Govern-
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merit sources of personnel security information (FBI, ONI,
G-2, Civil Service Commission), and creation of a Head-
quarters office to assess the resulting investigative materials.
Col. Huntington, during his tenure as Security Officer, made
considerable progress in this direction. His efforts were
carried forward under succeeding OSS Security Officers, Wes-
ton Howland (August 1942-August 1944) and Archbold Van
Beuren (August ,1944-September 1945). 3/
2. Organization and Scope
During the entire period ot OSS, functions of secu-
rity support were largely centralized in a Security Office
which operated organizationally at a *staff level. The Secu-
rity Office was responsible for the establishment and main-
tenance of:
. such protective measures as shall be neces-
sary or advisable in order to safeguard and
make secure the OSS, its operations-, members,
property and records, and the areas, offices
and buildings which it occupies or uses.
Within the Security Office, the Internal Security Di-
vision was responsible for inspecting and approving OSS
buildings, offices and areas, both overt and undercover,
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providing adequate physical security protective measures,
providing a system of guards and badges, and the general
protection of classified material. In addition, there was a
Personnel Investigation Division and a Service Records Di-
vision. The former was responsible for initiating investi-
gations of prospective employees (both civilian and military),
assessing the results, and granting security approval or dis-
approval for OSS employment. It was also responsible for
the security indoctrination of new personnel. The Service
Records Division established procedures for the continued
security of OSS personnel, including reinvestigations, re-
indoctrinations, investigations of security violations, and
pre-termination or debriefing interviews. As a result of
British insistence that OSS personnel assigned to British
areas be certified as to security, the Service Records Divi-
sion was also made responsible for approving all OSS per-
sonnel for overseas assignment and for the security indoc-
trination Of such personnel prior to departure.
The personnel complement of the Security Office
ranged between 45 and 58 employees, both military and ci-
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vilian. The Security Officer of OSS, however, exercised
technical supervision over approximately 200 individuals, in-
cluding military guards for OSS training and warehouse fa-
cilities, receptionists, associate security officers assigned
to work within all OSS Branches, and overseas security of-
ficers* as well as domestic field security investigators. 4/
3. Security Liaison
The FBI, ONI, and the Army's intelligence organi-
zation maintained elaborate records generally referred to as
their "subversive" files. These files, used in conjunction
with those of the Civil Service Commission, the Treasury De-
partment, the Department of State, and British Security Co-
ordination, were an essential source of information perti-
nent to the security screening of OSS applicants, to insure
the absence of any disqualifying information already of record.
Prior to, or in conjunction with, the initiation of an investi-
Assignment of Security Office trained security officers
to overseas missions commenced in 1943 at the insistence of
Col. Bross of OSS/London. Subsequently, two were assigned
to the European Theater of Operations (ETO), one to Cairo,
and three to Algiers.
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gation, "flimsies"* were distributed by OSS to these other
organizations to obtain the benefit of any information they
might possess related to the individual under investigation.
This procedure, established early under COI, was the basis
of the National Agency Check (NAC) program which is an in-
tegral part of all Government personnel security investigative
programs today.**
As a result of careful referencing and cross-refer-
encing of individual and organizational names, the Security Of-
fice of OSS gradually built up its own indices. This made pos-
sible the pre-analysis of individual Personal History State-
ments, and often provided the basis for specific investigative
leads to be checked further by the field investigator assigned
to the case. Through this procedure, a group of German and
French "refugees" who were apparently attempting to infil-
trate the OSS organization for espionage purposes was dis-
covered. The indices disclosed a number of individuals who
Biographical data forms related to the individual under
investigation to be used as a basis for searching files.
** February 1971.
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provided the identical character references in New York, who
came from the same town in Vichy, France, or who had con-
nections with a business firm of known pro-Nazi interests. 5/
4. Investigative Assets
On 1 November 1942 the first contract was signed
25X1A with' to perform investigations of pro-
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
spective OSS personnel. 6/ Adapting the investigative methods
of this credit company to those required by a sensitive Govern-
ment organization such as OSS necessitated a major process of
indoctrination by the OSS Security Officer; however, I
was effectively used throughout the entire period
under OSS. Later the services of other credit organizations,
were also con-
tracted for and used extensively in the investigation of OSS can-
didates for employment. 7/ The services of
were also used
to a limited extent under OSS. Only in the case of
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was a major effort undertaken to indoctrinate
the investigators. As a result of this,
provided the best quality investigations of any of the contract
investigative services used by the OSS.
In March 1942 Col. Huntington, with the approval of
Colonel William J. Donovan, contracted with Mr.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A to organize a group of under-
cover investigators to operate on behalf of the OSS.
was a private investigator of considerable reputation. He had
111 25X1A
headed the
,
25X1A
25X1A
and reportedly had done other confidential investi-
gative work.* 8/
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gathered together a group of investigators
who had had prior experience with the FBI, ONI, G-2, and
private investigative and security organizations and estab-
lished an office
tions unit,
Following establishment of this investiga-
served primarily as consultant and over-
seer, with actual management of the office conducted byn
The
for the most part conducted
the security investigation of foreign-born personnel who were
to be used by the OSS in sensitive operations. A number of
investigators possessed extensive contacts among foreign
nationality groups in New York City, who were extremely val-
uable sources of information.
ersonnel also in- 25X1
vestigated complaints which were received from the FBI, ONI,
G-2, CSC, or other confidential sources regarding the loyalty
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of specific OSS employees.
25X1A
25X1A
The
was used through the entire
period under OSS and SSU, and as this report will demonstrate,
formed the original basis for the present-day Office of Security
investigative field organization. By 1943,
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panded the geographic coverage of his investigative unit to in-
clude a number of part-time investigators (compensated on a
set hourly rate, plus expenses) who were dispersed throughout
The choice as to which investigative asset to use in
individual cases was a judgment exercised by the Security Of-
fice of OSS. Th
4
sponsive for investigations of special importance, but it was
a limited asset that had to be used sparingly. The quality of
the 1 'investigative reports ranked second to
'called for payment on
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an investigator-hourly basis, whereas contracts with the other
investigative services called for payment on a case basis,
which was the more economical arrangement. The decision as
to which service to use was, therefore, made on the basis of
economics, the extent to which the individual being investigated
would be provided access to sensitive OSS information, and a
preliminary review as to whether the individual case might re-
quire special investigative talents.* 11/
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5. Counter-Espionage Branch (X-2) 13/
The function of counter-intelligence assists in the
security protection of an intelligence organization by identi-
fying those elements of foreign intelligence organizations
which could be inimical to its own interest. Counter-intelli-
gence carried one step further, counter-espionage, involves
the manipulation of foreign intelligence organization assets.
The key to the development of a counter-intelligence or counter-
espionage organization is the accumulation of a vast body of
records related to the identities of known or suspect foreign
intelligence operatives and organizations in addition to a de-
tailed study of their methods of operation. It is a process
which builds upon ifself, looking hopefully to the time when
the entire blueprint comprising the secret threat will be brought
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into focus. Once the threat has been identified, it can be ren-
dered ineffective, and thus a condition of security is created.
Counter-intelligence, therefore, is a positive form of security
protection.
It may be said that the United States, prior to World
War II, possessed a good domestic, counter-intelligence capa-
bility within the FBI. During World War II, the FBI expanded
its capabilities throughout the Western Hemisphere through
the assignment of its agents as legal attaches to the US Em-
bassies. In other areas of the world, however, the United
?
States had virtually no security protection. Essentially, there
was no counter-intelligence service for working in enemy terri-
tory at the outbreak of World War U.
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25X1C
it was decided that cen-
tralization within the OSS of the national counter-intelligence
and counter-espionage functions (excluding the Western Hem-
isphere) was the only logical solution.
A Counter-Intelligence Division was established within
the SI Branch of OSS by General Order No. 13, 1 March 1943,
and arrangements were made to detail personnel
No. 13 was revised on 15 June 1943, and a Counter-Espionage
Branch (X-2) of the Intelligence Service of OSS was established
to develop possibilities of counter-espionage both in the pro-
tection of American intelligence activities abroad and in the
protection of over-all national interests in foreign areas.
The rapid growth of its files made X-2 increasingly
useful in the assessment of the reliability of both agents and
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OSS pervmnel. In Washington, there was close collaboration
between the Security Office and X-2 Branch, and most names
investigated by the Security Office were submitted to X-2 for
further check. Correspondingly, X-2 frequently called upon
the Security Office for confirmation or supplementary investi-
gation of names or cases of possible counter-espionage in-
terest. Overseas, using the OSS
as an ex- 25X1
ample, the names of all agents used in the European Theatre
were checked by X-2 against
As the war
progressed, X-2' s own indices were added to from a great
variety of Allied sources.
But X-2's involvement in the matter of security of
overseas activities was even broader than?the identification
of suspect persons and organizations. For example, in
November 1942, X-2 arranged for the transfer to OSS of an
Army officer, who prior to the war had worked with the FBI,
where he had had extensive training in the detection of wire-
tapping and clandestine listening devices. This officer, was
25X1A assigned to the X-2 to inspect all European
legations and embassies for evidences of such devices.
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Conflict as to the relative responsibilities of the Se-
curity Office and X-2 led to a clarification in May 1944. 14/
Under this clarification, the Security Office's responsibility
for security of "all OSS personnel" was defined as:
(1) All Army, Navy, Marine Corps or civilian
personnel regularly employed by or attached to
the OSS, whether in the US or in the field, and
(2) Persons who are employed by such regular
OSS personnel in any capacity which permits
them to have knowledge of OSS operations or
intelligence plans as of personnel engaged or
being trained to engage therein.
X-2 was made responsible for the investigation and
approval of all individuals engaged in any OSS operations over-
seas, including agent, operative, and sub-agent personnel.
Requests for X-2 clearance were required to set forth all de- '
tails of the intended use of the individual.
Additional clarification was provided related to the
function of counter-intelligence. Although the X-2 Branch
was primarily concerned with the existence, identity, and
methods of enemy espionage, counter-espionage, and sabo-
teur agents and protection against them, it was required to
inform the Security Office of any evidence of enemy affilia-
tion or association of OSS personnel. Correspondingly, the
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Security Office was under obligation to consult with X-2 and
keep it fully informed regarding OSS personnel suspected of
enemy affiliation.
6. Conclusion
The basic security concepts employed under OSS
were those of the military departments. The practice of
official secrecy in the United States Government had histori-
cally been restricted to information of a military significance.
The OSS Security Office was required to operate under the
security policies of Joint Security .Control of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and OSS was periodically inspected by the JSC for
compliance. Communications security and cryptographic ex-
pertise were provided by personnel assigned from the War
Department, Signal Corps, and US Coast Guard. It can be
presumed, that whatever expertise the War Department had
developed related to security was imparted to OSS, to be passed
on in turn to successor organizations.
Sophistication may have been added by virtue of OSSIs
close working relationships
War Report, Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 15/ describes
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It is difficult in retrospect to assess the effective-
ness of the security program of OSS, but perhaps the 20 May
1946 words of the Adjutant, Strategic Service Unit, War De-
partment (Col. Knox P. Pruden) will serve to place this
matter in proper perspective:
During the war, events proceeded at a rapid
pace and the missions assigned to the OSS were
of such an urgent nature that in many instances
the basic requirements of good security had to
be sacrificed for what was felt to be the more
important consideration of producing results.
Due to the confusion that accompanies all wars
and to the fact that we were largely insulated
from the main forces of enemy intelligence,
loose security proved to be less costly than it
might have. The OSS was not the only Allied
agency which considered itself lax in its secu-
rity, but this in itself is no excuse for laxness
in our present and future operations. 16/
Col. Pruden's statement appears contradictory, however, par-
ticularly if one subscribes to the theory that the level of secu-
rity protection should be determined by an analysis of the de-
gree and nature of the threat.
Undoubtedly, early predisposition to employ person-
nel without adequate security check resulted in a number of
individuals of questionable political ideology being used by OSS.
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The case of Carl Marzani, who held a position of significant
responsibility in OSS and who subsequently as a State Depart-
ment employee was convicted of perjury for failing to acknowl-
edge past Communist Party affiliation, is one instance supporting
this conclusion; and it can be cited without breaching security
ethics. In all probability, the use of less qualified contract
investigative services contributed to other such cases. The
OSS Security Office by 1944 was averaging two re-investigative
cases a month, based upon information furnished from outside
sources related to OSS employees. Expediency, however, re-
quired the use of these investigative assets.* Furthermore,
the Soviets were our allies during World War II, and although
the record indicates that by 1943 the Security Branch was dis-
qualifying applicants for questionable leftist political philoso-
phies, such individuals were not considered as dangerous as
those with Axis affiliations.
The Chief Security Officers under OSS had had no prior
The average monthly investigative caseload under OSS
exceeded 1,000 cases.
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security or investigative experience. Mr. Howland had pre-
viously held a number of important corporate executive posi-
tions with manufacturing firms in Massachusetts. 17/ Mr. Van
Beuren had worked for a New York investment firm and had
been Treasurer of Cue magazine prior to coming to OSS. 18/
It might be argued that a better security program might
have resulted had the nation seen fit to employ the services of
someone with prior investigative and/or security experience to
hold this position, rather than individuals whose backgrounds
were rooted in Wall Street financial activities. This would be
shortsighted, however, for there is little evidence to substantiate
the conclusion that these men did not in fact provide a security
program in OSS that was well founded upon an analysis of the
degree and nature of the threat existing at that time. Their
overall managerial competence had been demonstrated before
coming to OSS. The war resulted in many citizens assuming
"for the duration" responsibilities completely foreign to their
prior experience and training. There is substantial evidence
supporting the conclusion that Howland and Van Beuren utilized
the services of many individuals who did possess si gnificant
prior investigative and security experience. There can be no
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question but that the degree and nature of the threat was changed
considerably following the conclusion of World War II. Many of
the security assets and concepts developed under OSS remained,
however, and were utilized where appropriate to the conduct of
the nation's peacetime intelligence activities.
C. Strategic Services Unit (SSU) War Department
The OSS was terminated by Executive Order on 1 October
1945. The Strategic Services Unit (SSU) of the War Department
undertook the reorientation of the nation's clandestine espionage
and counter-espionage activities to a peacetime status following
its creation by War Department Order. Following the Presi-
dent's Order of 22 January 1946,* SSU activities became es-
sentially those of a holding operation to permit the orderly trans-
fer of its functions to the CIG. The SSU ceased operations, ef-
fective 19 October 1946, although the last of its personnel were
not terminated until the spring of 1947. 19/
No civilian personnel were transferred from SSU to CIG.
"Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activ-
ities," which created the National Intelligence Authority, the
DCI, and the Central Intelligence Group.
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All were formally terminated from SSU, and then rehired by
CIG if it was deemed that they possessed utility to the new
organization. 20/ This permitted opportunity to conduct a
reassessment of SSU personnel against CIG personnel security
criteria. This procedure was an important element of secu-
rity control in light of an absence of summary dismissal
authority existing in the DCI at this time.*
Throughout the major portion of SSUIs existence, per-
sonnel and physical security support were provided by a Se-
curity Division under the Personnel Branch, responsible to
the Executive Officer. Mr.
the first Chief, Security Division.
was named
25X1
was succeeded by 25
Mr. Peer de Silva on 17 June 1946, at which time the Secu-
rity Division was placed directly under the Executive Officer
for Administration, no longer responding through the Per-
sonnel Branch. 21/
This absence of the authority of the DCI to summarily
dismiss employees for any reason in the interest of national
security was subsequently rectified by Section 102(c) of the
National Security Act of 1947. This matter is discussed in
further detail in D. 2. , below.
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By the time of its dissolution in October 1946, the SSU
Security Branch consisted of approximately 17 employees.
It controlled security investigative assets in
Upon dissolution of the SSU, all functions
of Security Division were transferred to the Executive for
Personnel and Administration, CIG. 22/
War Department SSU General Order No. 12 and supple-
mentary Staff Memorandum No. 5, dated 20 May 1946,
related to the subject of "Policy Concerning Nationality and
Security of Personnel." These documents defined the terms,
Staff Personnel, Housekeeping Personnel, Operational Per-
sonnel, and Consultants, and they prescribed personnel secu-
rity standards to be applied to each group. Recognizing that
the activities of SSU were to a large degree dependent upon the
services of foreign nationals for the acquisiton of intelligence
and general housekeeping tasks overseas, these documents
directed that the handling of these personnel be conducted in
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such a manner as to restrict their access and knowledge of
SSU activities as essential to their assigned tasks. 23/ This
basic philosophy relating to the security handling of agents
and housekeeping personnel who were foreign nationals was
carried forward under CIG and CIA.
D. Security Under the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)
1. The DCI and the NIA
The attention of the National Intelligence Authority
was quickly focused on the matter of security. To insure
the reliability of CIG personnel, CIG Directive No. 8, which
was issued on 9 May 1946, was entitled "Policy for Clearance
of Personnel for Duties with the Central Intelligence Group."
Since at that time the CIG consisted entirely of personnel de-
tailed from other departments, the directive charged each de-
partment detailing personnel to CIG with responsibility for
investigating and assessing personnel so detailed against the
personnel security standards defined in the directive. 24/
Because investigation of their own personnel assigned to the
CIG in accordance with strict standards prescribed by this?
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directive became a burden to the individual departments, 25/
Directive No. 8 was rescinded on 4 October 1946, and the In-
telligence Advisory Board concurred with a proposal by the
DCI that the CIG undertake the investigation and clearance of .
its own personnel, subject to previously established standards,
with exceptions authorized by the DCI. 26/
2. Origin of Government Personnel Security Practices 27/
Inquiry into the background of individuals proposed
for employment has long been a practice in the Federal govern-
ment. Prior to 1939, however, the authority of the govern-
ment to inquire into the individual's loyalty was not clearly
established by statute. Such inquiry appeared, in fact, to be
in violation of Civil Service Rule No. 1, dating to 1884, which
stated:
No question in any form or application in any
examination shall be so framed as to elicit in-j
formation concerning the political or religious
opinions or affiliations of any applicant, nor
shall any inquiry be made concerning such
opinions, or affiliations, and all disclosures
thereof shall be discountenanced.
The original Hatch Act (2 August 1939) was designed
to prevent any person employed in the Federal government
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from holding membership in any political party or organiza-
tion advocating the overthrow of the constitutional form of
government. On 1 July 1941, Congress added to all appropria-
tion acts a mandate providing.that no part of the appropriation
could be used to pay the salary or wages of any person who
advocated, or was a member of an organization that advocated,
overthrow of the Government by violence or force.
Public Law 671, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, ap-
proved 25 June 1940, granted specific powers to the War and
Navy Departments to summarily remove any employee in the
interest of national security, without regard to any provisions
of laws, rules, or regulations governing the removal of em-
ployees. This provided a much broader legal basis to these
departments for the termination of employees whose continued
employment constituted a security risk.
The situation at the close of World War II, therefore,
was that the heads of the War and Navy Departments possessed
legislative authority to summarily dismiss employees for any
interest of the national security, whereas the balance of the
Federal government was authorized to take such action only
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in cases where the individual personally advocated, or was
a member of an organization which advocated, overthrow of
the constitutional form of government by force. By early
summer of 1946 the Secretary of State was also given author-
ity to summarily dismiss employees for security reasons,*
and a year later the DCI was given similar authority in the
Act establishing the CIA.**
Prompted by a 20 July 1946 report of the Sub-com-
mittee of the Civil Service Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives, President Truman established (25 November 1946)
a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty to inquire
into policies and practices in the Federal government related
to employee loyalty. In its conclusions the commission gave
credence to the threat to the national security inherent in Com-
munist and Communist front organization activities; and it
stated that there was a demonstrated inadequacy in existing
loyalty procedures and a lack of uniform procedural means
* The so-called McCarran Rider, PL 495 (79th Congress),
5 July 1946.
** National Security Act, 1 July 1947.
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and methods either to bar or banish the subversive or disloyal
person from the Federal payroll.
As a result of the Commission's recommendations,
President Truman issued Executive Order 9835, on 22 March
1947, prescribing procedures for the administration of an Em-
ployees Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, and charging the head of each department and agency with
responsibility for instituting an effective program to insure that
disloyal employees were not retained. One or more Loyalty
Boards were to be created in each department or agency, and
the determinations of these departmental boards were subject
to review by a Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Com-
mission. Minimum investigative and loyalty standards were
also prescribed. The minimum investigative standards pre-
scribed under CIG Directive No. 8, on May 1946, were broader
and more specific than those provided under Executive Order
9835. The first Personnel Loyalty Board of CIG was estab-
lished on 16 April 1947, and Col. Sheffield Edwards was desig-
nated as Chairman of this Board. 28/
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3. Investigative Assets
Following the NIA's decision of 4 October 1946 to
permit the CIG to undertake all future security investiga-
tions required to clear its own personnel, an overture was
made to the FBI to service CIG's needs in this regard. The
FBI agreed to provide this service, but stipulated that they
would perform only standard, loyalty-type investigations. 29/
There remained, therefore, a need to develop a covert asset
that could investigate employees to be used undercover with-
out compromising their proposed use in the intelligence mis-
sion and that could perform domestically other inquiries of
a covert nature in support of clandestine activities, princi-
pally on behalf of the OSO. The available choices were (1)
to retain the investigative services of the
which had continued in existence from early 1942 pro-
viding investigative services to both the OSS and the SSU, or
(2) to establish a new investigative unit within CIG. 30/
In November 1946 an Investigations Unit was estab-
lished under the Executive for Personnel and Administration,
CIG, to fill this need.
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4. Other CIG Security Considerations
A great variety of matters related to security were
considered or attended to during the period of transition under
CIG. To insure that employees understood their security re-
sponsibilities, a Secrecy Agreement, in use by June 1946,
was devised. The agreement was to be administered to all CIG
employees in conjunction with a reading of Federal statutes re-
lated to espionage and the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information, in addition to a pamphlet entitled, "Special In-
structions for Security of Central Intelligence." 36/
In the meantime, work proceeded apace toward the
preparation of the first published CIG Security Regulations,
37/ which were finally approved on 5 August 1947. Thereafter,
this publication was used in conjunction with the security in-
doctrination of personnel in addition to providing the guide
for day-to-day security activities.
The security role of the CIG with respect to the public
was also considered. A memorandum to all CIG personnel,
dated 21 November 1946, directed that the following response
be given to inquiries concerning the nature of the CIG
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organization:
The Central Intelligence Group is a recently
created inter-departmental organization, in
which the State, War, Navy, and sometimes
other departments participate. It coordinates
activities of the government involved in obtain-
ing and analyzing information about foreign
countries which this country needs for its
national security. It also furnishes inter-
departmental analyses of this type of security
for use by Government officials. 38/
Unlike the British, the US intelligence organization was not
to be a completely clandestine service. It became a publicly
identified agency, with its mission publicly stated in terse,
general terms, but with the great bulk of its activities conl,
ducted under conditions of secrecy.
Not only were limitations placed upon what CIG could
say publicly about its mission and activities, but it was fur-
ther necessary to control those public utterances of its per-
sonnel which would be misinterpreted as representing official
doctrine or policy. By April 1947, CIG was engaged in de-
vising policies related to its personnel who were writing for
publication or making public appearances. 39/
Other restrictions were placed on the private, out-
side activities of CIG personnel. CIG Memorandum No. 60,
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of 2 September 1947, concerned "Security Requirements for
CIG Personnel Engaged in Private Foreign Travel" and re-
quired prior security clearance and briefing before under-
taking such travel. 40/
CIG Operations Memorandum No. 11, 14 July 1947,
established "CIG Contract Security Policies for Non-IAB
Agencies" and charged the Executive for Inspection and Se-
curity with making surveys of each non-LAB agency nomin-
ated for CIG contact or dissemination to insure the adequacy
of security procedures within those agencies for the safe-
guarding of classified information. 41/
A variety of other security matters were under study,
although not finalized under CIG. These included preparation
of a CIG disaster plan (the first consideration given to emer-
gency contingency planning) and development of a policy to
govern relationships between CIG collection and dissemina-
tion activities and foreign agencies. 42/
Although National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective (NSCID) No. 6, of 12 December 1947, made the CIG
responsible for foreign wireless and radio monitoring, the
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Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which contained the
remnants of the nation's wartime organization used for this
purpose, had already been consolidated under the CIG by an
NIA Directive of 29 June 1946. This activity was to a great
extent dependent upon the services of foreign nationals for its
language capabilities. On the other hand, its mission was
not as sensitive as that of the clandestine service and its
product could be disseminated under low levels of security
classification. An appropriate accommodation to the strict
personnel security standards applicable to the balance of CIG
employees was under consideration during this period. 43/
The exploitation of domestic sources to obtain
foreign intelligence, begun by OSO under CIG, and later taken
over by the Contacts Division of the Office of Operations, was
assigned exclusively to the CIA by NSCID No. 7, 12 December
1947. Under CIG a beginning was made toward developing
appropriate security standards to be applied to US industria-
lists, scientists, educators, and others who might be consulted
for intelligence purposes.
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5. Security Organization Under CIG
Early deliberations in CIG related to security were
centered in the Central Planning Staff (CPS) and quite logi-
cally they related to security policy considerations. Colonel
headed the Security Branch of CPS and was
the principal early advocate of a strong centralized security
authority within CIG. 44/ On 20 July 1946, CPS was redesig-
nated as the Inter-departmental Coordination and Planning
Staff (ICAPS), and the Security Branch of CPS was dissolved.
Col. Sheffield Edwards, later to become the first Director of
Security, CIA, was originally assigned to work with ICAPS.
45/ This staff, which reported directly to the DCI, had as one
of its responsibilities to insure that the security facilities of
departments comprising the National Intelligence Authority were
adequate.
Following dissolution of the Security Branch of CPS,
became part of the Office of Collection (later the
Office of Collection and Dissemination--0CD)where, in addi-
tion to other duties, he functioned as Acting Chief of its. Secu-
rity Branch. This Branch was responsible for the formula-
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tion of security policy for the CIG, although this was to be
only an interim arrangement pending the establishment of an
Office of Security, CIG, 46/ the concept of which will be
discussed fully later in this history.
Considerations related to the physical safeguarding
of CIG facilities and the reliability of its personnel, were
responsibilities of the Administrative Office, later the Exe-
cutive for Personnel and Administration of CIG, subject to
the overall policy guidance provided by the OCD, Security
Branch. 47/ The first Security Officer of CIG, so desig-
nated, was Lt. Col. Claude D. Barton (May 1946 - July
1947). 48/ From 6 September 1946 to 1 July 1947, Barton
also functioned as Chief of the Security Division under the
Executive for Personnel and Administration (P&A). 49'
Initially, his principal duties consisted of providing physical
security guidance related to the CIG offices, located in the
then New War Department Building, fingerprinting employees,
and issuing identification badges. Until the recision of CIG
Directive No. 8 on 4 October 1946, Col. Barton's responsi-
bilities for personnel security were limited, inasmuch as
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this directive charged each department detailing personnel
to CIG with investigating and assessing personnel so detailed,
in accordance with the prescribed personnel security criteria.
Since the final decision as to acceptability was vested in the
DCI, however, Col. Barton's duties also included review of
the security investigative reports submitted bythe depart-
ments, and recommending to the DCI acceptance or non-accept-
ance. By September 1946 the CIG had obtained limited authority
to hire its own personnel. The CIG Security Division, under
the FBI in October 1946. The CIG Security Division also con-
ducted the security assessment of those SSU personnel who were
selected for hire by CIG. Its personnel complement rose from
three to ten employees during 1946. 50/
In December 1946 a Special Security Section was made
? a part of the Projects Support Division under P&A. This Divi-
sion also included a Secret Section, Personnel Procurement
Section, Communications Section, Special Funds Section, and
Transportation and Supply Section. 5y The purpose of this
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Division was to provide an almost complete range of support
services to the OSO on a compartmented basis.*
6. OSO Autonomy
The early security concept of the Office of Special
Operations, CIG (which was assuming functions previously ex-
ercised under SSU) envisioned an almost complete compart-
mentation of OSO from the balance of CIG activities in order
to limit knowledge of its sensitive operations. CIG Adminis-
trative Order No. 9, 5 August 1946, directed that contacts
between personnel of OSO and other offices of CIG be limited
to those essential to the transaction of necessary official
business, and that contacts by OSO personnel with other de-
partments of the government be carefully controlled by the
Director of Special Operations. 52/ By November 1946 a
three-pass identification system for access to CIG buildings
was adopted, providing one type of pass for access to OSO
See Figure 2, on p. 59, a December 1946 OSO Organiza-
tion Chart. The relationship between the Special Projects
Branch of P&A and OSO is shown as a dotted line arrange-
ment, indicating that the Branch was not a part of the formal
organizational structure of OSO at that time.
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FIGURE 2
December 1946
OFFICE OF
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
/...a...i.r......}9.7".0T1,..S.
Operations
4.,[3,21t WN. SY.
? ? -d
Speci;-,t
Control
Mom
Northern
Executive
Middle
Plans
tw.M.ComMia.....rna=1,e=1Canaa
Personnel -
Section
?????????
,JOntaiti
Admin
Section
MOMM?
South
Mid
?????lai
Central .
4101.41r..11 aisniure?
Arican
1
Western
Far
-
Latin
Training
Source
European
European?
European
Eastern Branch East
East
American
Branch
Control
Projec
Branch
:Branch
Branch
European Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Bran(
Branch
?????1. IMMOMM?11 IBM NOM. ???=all
OWE, Ilhomm ?????? 41?00
Projects Support Division
P&A t CIG
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offices, another for access to the balance of CIG, and a third,
to be limited in number, for access across-the-board. 53/
With the requirement to consolidate the Security Of-
fice of SSU under CIG, it was first proposed to combine it with
the Security Division of P&A. 54/ The Division was to include
security support to the OSO. Its activities would be strictly
compartmented from other activities of the Division, which pro-
vided security support services (both personnel and physical)
for the remainder of CIG.
The Assistant Director for Special Operations rejected
this plan in favor of making security support to OSO a part of
the activities of the Projects Support Division, which would
then consist of all of the elements of support services to be
provided on behalf of OSO, including Special Security Section
under
Although the functions of overt and
covert security support to CIG were both under the Executive
for Personnel and Administration during this period, they were
reporting through separate chains of command. 55/ By January
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and his Special Security Section were
physically located with OSO.
The concept of an autonomous Office of Special Oper-
ations is traceable in part to its origin under the SSU. With
the dissolution of the OSS in September 1945, the SSU under-
took the preliminary work for converting OSS's wartime assets
into the organization necessary to conduct the clandestine es-
pionage activities of the nation in peacetime. Most early OSO
personnel came from SSU, where they had formed the habit of
autonomous operation. It is understandable that they would
not be easily dissuaded. There were obvious disadvantages
from the standpoint of security to the complete integration of
the nation's clandestine espionage service with the organization
also responsible for the production and dissemination of national
intelligence. In all probability, they were strongly supported
25X1A by
the CIG Executive for Personnel and Admin-
istration who had been Chief of Services under SSU. In April
1947, Col. Donald H. Galloway, the Assistant Director of
Special Operations (ADSO), addressed the DCI expressing dis-
satisfaction with the existing support services arrangement
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for OSO (as provided by the Special Projects Branch of P&A)
and suggested that, in the interests of better security, these
activities should be transferred under his immediate juris-
diction. 56/
7. Office of Security, CIG - the Concept
The Security Advisory Board (SAB) of the State, War,
Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was created by the lat-
ter's membership on 5 April 1946 to assume residual functions
of the Security Advisory Board of the Office of War Information
(OWI), which had been abolished by Executive Order 9608 of
31 August 1945. Its deliberations related principally to policy
concerning the safeguarding of the classified defense informa-
tion in the possession of Federal government departments and
agencies, with intent to put this matter on a peacetime, rather
than a wartime, basis. Mr. Paul H. Appelby, Assistant Di-
rector of the Budget, in a letter dated 29 April 1946 advised
the Acting Chairman, SAB, that, whereas he agreed that "there
are still some security matters affecting the several agencies
of the government which require attention," he questioned
whether the SWNCC was duly constituted to undertake this re-
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sponsibility on behalf of the overall Federal government, and
suggested that the National Intelligence Authority, created by
directive of the President, possessed adequate authority for
this security activity. 57/
was designated the DCII s
liaison officer to the SAB, and he concurred with the preva-
lent view that the SAB's functions should eventually be placed
under the NIA and that its functions could best be performed
within the framework of the CIG organization. 58/ This, of
course, would have given CIG national, internal security re-
sponsibilities, which might have been in conflict with the
President's admonition of 22 January 1946 that "no police,
law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exer-
cised under this directive." Additionally, the matter of policy
related to the protection of all classified defense information
was much broader than the responsibility vested by the Presi-
dent in the NIA and the DCI related to the protection of intelli-
gence sources and methods.
On 24 August 1945, Byron Price, former Director
of the Office of Censorship during World War II, submitted a
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Confidential Memorandum to the President, entitled "A Basis
for Censorship Planning," which related to the matter of pre-
paring coordinated Federal censorship policies and procedures
for implementation in the event of future emergency or state
of war. This memorandum was subsequently referred to the
Director of the Budget for study and appropriate action. The
Director of the Budget held the matter in abeyance in belief
that the matter should eventually be acted upon by the NLA.
Following informal consultation with the Chief of the Central
Planning Staff of CIG in May 1946, the latter recommended
that the matter be undertaken by the CIG. 59/ Although this
recommendation was not acted upon, the matter of censorship
planning continued to attract the attention of planners through-
out almost the full era under CIG.
These external considerations, in addition to internal
security considerations affecting the activities of the CIG, led
to recommend the creation of an Office of Security
in the CIG in August 1946. 60/ This Office would be responsi-
ble for the formulation and dissemination of coordinated Fed-
eral security policies pertaining to the safeguarding of informa-
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tion, personnel, and equipment and installations of the depart-
ments and agencies of the United States Government in the in-
terest of national security, and, additionally, would formulate
coordinated Federal censorship policies. Internally, this Of-
fice would supervise the implementation of overall security
policies for the CIG and function as the sole agency for the DCI
for the coordination of matters related to CIG public relations.
Additionally, upon request by appropriate Offices of the CIG,
it would conduct investigations of specific sources of informa-
tion to determine the general validity, credibility, and relia-
bility of information furnished the CIG and it would be responsi-
ble for coordinating technical security activities of Federal
Government departments and agencies in the field of secret
communication, radio direction-finding equipment and techniques,
and sabotage.
Tentative provision for a CIG Office of Security, to
consist of a Policy Branch, Censorship Planning Branch, Se-
curity Branch, and a Technical Branch, appeared on an Organ-
izational Chart dated 22 November 1946. 61/ The Office of
Security was to report directly to the DCI, possessing status
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equal to the Office of Collection and Dissemination, the Office
of Reports and Estimates, the Office of Operations, and the
Office of Special Operations. It would be headed by an Assistant
Director for Security. The DCI deferred creation of this Office,
however, preferring to await legal, legislative clarification of
the functions of his new organization.
Prompted by a variety of considerations, including the
taking over by CIG of the FBIS and the
as well as renewed interest in the matter of national
censorship planning and the CIG's relationship to the SAB,
again recommended early activation of the Office
of Security in January 1947. 62/ His recommendation, how-
ever, was not acted upon.
oay1 A
On 10 June 1947, the Chief of
the OCD Security Branch submitted to the Adviser for Organi-
zational Management, ICAPS, two alternate plans for consoli-
dating CIG security policy and support as a staff element of the
DCI, using personnel of the OCD Security Branch as the nucleus
of the office's management. 63/ Both plans included the broad
national policy responsibilities contained in
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proposal. One plan proposed establishment of a Security
Policy and Planning Staff consisting of a small staff of selected
personnel to be directly concerned only with security policy mat-
ters. The other plan proposed establishment of a Security Staff
responsible for all of the policy and planning functions of the
first plan, but also included the exercise of direct control
and supervision of the CIG operational security functions then
performed by the Security Division of P&A (physical security
of domestic CIG facilities and the investigation and security
clearance of personnel).
8. CIG General Order No. 3
Advisor for Organizational
Management, ICAPS, was directed by the DCI on 6 May 1947
to prepare a CIG organizational plan to include provision for
a group at the Executive level to provide overall inspection,
audit, and security service to CIG. 64/ Consequently, CIG
General Order No. 3 was issued on 18 June 1947. 65/ This
Order abolished the position of the Executive for Personnel
and Administration and split the position of Assistant Execu-
tive Director of the CIG (held prior to this time by Colonel
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Sheffield Edwards*) into an Executive for Administration and
Management (A&M) and an Executive for Inspection and Security
25X1A (I&S) I lwas appointed to the former position;
Col. Edwards, to the latter. The mission prescribed for the
Executive for I&S was to provide overall inspection, audit,
and security (including security policy) service for CIG. Func-
tions previously exercised by the Executive for P&A were di-
vided, with the principal activities of the Projects Support
Division (including the Special Security Section) going to OSO
66/, the Security Division going to the Executive for I&S, and
the residual functions to the Executive for A&M. The Security
Branch of OCD was also abolished, with its functions trans-
ferred to the Executive for I&S.
CIG General Order No. 3, however, effected only a
partial consolidation of CIG security support services. Although
the overall security policy function was combined with forces
providing physical and personnel security support to the overt
* Col. Edwards had been relieved from duty with ICAPS
on 3 March 1947 and assigned to the Executive Staff as
Assistant Executive Director.
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activities of CIG, OSO had acquired an even greater degree of
autonomy with the direct supervision of its own support ser-
vices, including security.
The order also stated that the establishment of the
CIG Office of Security was postponed indefinitely. Actually,
the Office of Security, as envisioned under CIG, never did
come into existence. The matter of Federal government policy
considerations related to the overall protection of classified
defense information was subsequently made the province of
the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS)
under the National Security Council. As will be described in
the history, the responsibilities of the DCI related to the pro-
tection of intelligence sources and methods were eventually
effected through other means. On 9 September 1947 the DCI
decided to defer aggressive consideration of censorship plan-
ning due to the existing status of personnel and organization
and the danger of becoming involved in non-pressing activities.
67/ This matter received no further consideration under
either CIG or CIA, and the verification of the general
validity, credibility, and reliability of information furnished
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by outside sources to CIG was never thereafter considered
as an appropriate function for the centralized security authority.
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CHAPTER II
Centralization of CIA Security Support
(26 September 1947* - 6 December 1954)
A. Evolution of the Security Office
The Office of the Executive for Inspection and Security
(I&SO) at first consisted of an Inspection and Audit Branch,
a Security Branch, a Security Control Staff, and an Adminis-
trative Staff. 68/ The Audit Division of the Inspection and
Audit Branch conducted audits of the manner in which special
funds were used and accounted for and made reports of finan-
cial transactions involving special funds. and regular funds.
The audit function was removed from the Executive for I&S
in April 1951, and a separate Audit Branch created under the
Deputy Director for Administration (DDA). 69/
The original concept of the role of the Executive for I&S
* Effective date of the establishment of CIA.
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related to the inspection function was that of an "inspector
general" to perform inspections as directed by the DCI and
to make continuous inspections of CIA property, equipment,
supplies, and the procurement program. 70/ Prior to the
establishment of a CIA Inspector General in 1953, however,
functions of the Inspection Division (earlier the Inspection
and Audit Branch) had already evolved to that of an inspec-
tion staff to perform special inspections or investigations of
matters where special security problems existed, to support
operations with security guidance as required, to perform
continuing security inspections of selected activities and per-
form other services as directed, and to serve as the "in-
spector general" within I&SO. 71/ A transition occurred
during the 1947-55 period, therefore, whereby the Inspection
and Security Office, with its audit and overall inspection
functions removed, became the Security Office of CIA. In
addition, the Security Office was removed from the DCIls
Executive Staff, and placed first under the DDA* and later
1 December 1950.
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under the Deputy Director for Support (DDS).*
As of 1952, the Inspection Division had performed
major inspections
as well as numerous
regular and special inspections and services in the United
States. It participated in planning and conducting a program
during the period from July 1950 to December
1951. It planned and supervised a course of indoctrination
and training for investigator and security officer recruits in
1951, during which time six three-week courses were con-
ducted. It maintained continuing supervision of security as-
pects of classified contract procurement, including inspecting
contractor facilities and monitoring the security clearance of
personnel. It engaged in overseeing the training and sup-
plying of security officers who were requested by other com-
ponents of the Agency to perform duties of a security nature
in domestic and overseas missions or programs. It per-
formed security surveys of specific strategic industries in
16 February 1955. 72/
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National Security Council Directive No. 29. Following July
1950, the Agency's responsibilities under NSC Directive No.
nvere transferred from I&SO to another organizational
element of the CIA. 73/ In July 1954, the Inspection Divi-
sion was redesignated as the Inspection Staff. 74/ Its per-
sonnel complement, at one time consisting of
was eventually reduced to
B. Security Policy
The Security Control Staff (SCS) provided overall Agency
security policy and guidance on behalf of the Executive for
a number
I&S. By 1954, the SCS consisted of
of whom had previously worked in OCD. 75/
In addition to the promulgation of Agency security policies
related to the collection and dissemination of CIA's classified
information, SCS provided CIA representation to the State-De-
fense Military Information Control Committee,* and at inter-
See III, J2, below.
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national meetings convened intermittently to consider varied
security matters. From 1950 to 1952, a second CIA repre-
sentative to the US Communications Intelligence Board Security
Committee was provided from SCS.* This staff also provided
security guidance to Agency components, including that re-
lated to public affairs, and to .Agency employees, including
control, where appropriate, of outside activities, such as
public speaking, writing for publication, and private foreign
travel. 76/
C. Security Division (Branch)**
The Security Division of I&SO, which had its origin in
the Security Division of P&A, was the unit responsible for
providing personnel security support to the overt activities
,t6
See III, J1, below.
** Until 1949, principal organizational components were
called "Branches" and sub-components called "Divisions."
This was reversed in line with general overall government
practice, and principal components were thereafter called
"Divisions" and sub-components were called "Branches."
Since a number of the Branches discussed herein subse-
quently were raised to Division status, this report here-
after refers to all components only in the latter terms of
organizational reference, in order not to unduly confuse
the reader.
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of the Agency and with protecting its overt properties. Initially,
it consisted of two sub-components, the Investigations Branch
(later renamed the Personnel Security Branch) and the Physi-
cal Security Branch. On 29 October 1950 a third sub-compo-
nent, the Interrogations Research Branch,* was added to con-
duct the Agency's polygraph program. 77/ By 1954 the Secu-
rity Division had a total personnel complement of I
The Personnel Security Branch was responsible for the
initiation of investigations (either through the FBI, or later
through the I&SO's own investigative organization) of all Agency
applicants, including those who were to be used under cover of
as well as those
whose employment with the Agency would be acknowledged
(overt employees). The Personnel Security Branch also approved
security clearances for Agency overt consultants, contacts,
First called Unit P, later renamed IRB.
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and contractors as well as for guards and charforce personnel.
For a short time during 1948, it also made personnel security
determinations related tol
25X
The Branch con-
sisted of the Records Section (responsible for maintenance of
individual security dossiers and indices), the Research Sec-
tion (which did the initial analysis of the results of internal
indices searches conducted prior to all investigations), the
Requirements Section (which prescribed the scope of investi-
gative coverage), and the Appraisal Section. The Appraisal
Section analyzed the investigative results and recommended
either security approval or disapproval of the candidate. 79/
Activities of the Physical Security Branch and the Inter-
rogation Research Branch are discussed later in this chapter.
D. Employee Investigations Branch
On 30 September 1947, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
FBI, advised the DCI that, in view of Executive Directives
and actions of Congress, additional responsibilities had been
placed upon the FBI which made it impossible to continue to
conduct applicant investigations for the CIA. 801 In all proba-
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bility, Mr. Hoover's reference to Executive Directives and
actions of Congress related to the Executive Order 9835
loyalty directive and the Atomic Energy Act, both of which
had placed added burdens upon the investigative services of
the FBI. That the number of cases submitted by CIA to the
FBI had exceeded considerably the 100 cases per month
originally agreed to, undoubtedly contributed to his decision
to discontinue this support to the Agency. 81/
In response to the FBI's announcement, the DCI re-
quested the National Security Council to authorize the CIA
to establish an internal investigative unit to provide it with
essential facilities and authority to meet the standards of
investigation expected of and established by the FBI. He
additionally requested that the President instruct the FBI to
continue investigative support to the CIA for an additional
six months to permit the Agency adequate time to develop
its own organization. 82/ Through subsequent negotiation,
which involved at least one personal meeting between the DCI
and Mr. Hoover, the date of discontinuance was extended to
1 January 1948, 83/ and the NSC authorized the CIA to
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establish its own investigative unit.
The Executive for I&S requested the DCI to permit him
interim use of
to handle the backlog of applicant investigations that
had accumulated as a result of the FBI discontinuance. He
also requested approval of a Table of Organization (Tb) con-
operate under his supervision as an investigative unit. At
the same time, he requested clarification from the DCI re-
garding the responsibilities of the unit for investigations of
OSOls covert personnel, which up until this time had been
the responsibility of the OSO,
84/
The DCI directed a consolidation of the ;
of OSO under the Executive for I&S to be effective
25X1A
9 August 1948. 85/ Revised functional statements were to
be prepared, making the Executive of I&S responsible for all
domestic security functions (less communications security)
and including all overt and covert investigations of personnel
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for the CIA. An expanded overall TbO
was
approved for I&SO. 86/ The basic personnel assets for the
new investigations unit were drawn from
OSO, but considerable recruiting of new investi-
gators was also undertaken.
The investigative unit organized within I&SO was called
the Employee Investigations Branch (EIB), and the Investi-
gations Division of the Security Branch was renamed the Per-
sonnel Security Division to prevent confusion as to its func-
tions. 87/1
\was transferred to I&SO as a Special
Assistant. 90/ In this capacity he headed the Research Unit,
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Scarcely had EIB begun efficient operations, when in
December 1948 the FBI again agreed to provide security investi-
gative support to the CIA. 93/ Mr. Hoover's reasons for re-
suming this support to the Agency are not clear, but it is known
that the DCI, Admiral Hillenkoetter, preferred that the FBI
conduct investigations of CIA applicants and had so expressed
himself in official correspondence with Mr. Hoover. 94/ The
EIB was disbanded, and its personnel were assimilated into
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other parts of the rapidly expanding Agency.
E.
Although the investigative organization under the Employee
Investigations Branch was dissolved by April 1949, 95/ the con-
'with I&SO di-
solidation of the
rected by the DCI in August 1948 remained. The two offices
under the Research Unit (later called the Research Division)
to con-
were expanded
tinue investigations of OSO's covert personnel. 96/
The FBI continued to perform security investigations of
CIA applicants throughout 1949 and 1950. The number of
cases submitted for investigation rose from 100 to 200 a month,
and during April 1950,
were submitted to the FBI.
97/ On 21 November 1950, General Walter B. Smith, who
had been sworn in as DCI on 7 October, requested Mr. Hoover
to accept Mcases per month for the four months following,
in deference to CIA's rapidly expanding organization. 98/
Evidently, CIA's requirements were beyond the capabilities
of the already overburdened facilities of the FBI, and in De-
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cember 1950 it was mutually agreed that the FBI would again
discontinue investigations of CIA applicants and that the CIA
would reestablish its own investigative program. 99/
Rather than reactivate the EIB, Colonel Edwards chose
security support and to conduct internal Agency inquiries. 102/
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\a heavy incidence
of investigative caseload was experienced during peak work
periods. 103/
The rapid expansion of personnel which was occurring
throughout the Agency during these early years, coupled with
a desire of Colonel Edwards to not over-recruit with respect
to his own organization, necessitated the interim reuse of the
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A program known as the Confidential Correspondents
Program was also initiated providing for use, on a contract
set, per diem plus expenses rate, of retired investigators,
attorneys, and others, strategically placed throughout the
country to provide for a greater degree of flexibility in as-
signment of personnel investigations. 106/ Following a
recommendation of Mr. J. Patrick Coyne of the National
Security Council, contained in a July 1952 report of inspec-
tion of I&SO, the services
were gradually phased
out. 101 The Confidential Correspondents Program, how-
ever, continued as an important part of the Office of Secu-
rity's overall investigative facilities. The number of such
25X1A individuals under contract rose
25X1
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and 1952, and has since stabilized at approximately
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. . . considering the withdrawal of these FBI
services, and taking into account the substantial
personnel increase of the Agency during the past
year and a half, the investigative proficiency
achieved by SSD is particularly noteworthy. 109/
Investigators were recruited from a great variety of back-
grounds; most possessed college degrees; and many either
were attorneys or had had some prior federal, police, or
commercial investigative experience. I&SO conducted an
extensive training program to prepare them for the unique
requirements of CIA-related work.
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agencies to obtain investigative information already of record
was usually conducted by
credentials, although cut-outs were used to protect the fact
The Headquarters complement of SSD in 1954 numbered
It administered all work conducted by
The Chief, SSD was aided
by a Deputy, two assistants, and a Counter-Intelligence Desk.
The Division originally had three subcomponents: (1) the
Operations Branch, (2) the Special Referral Branch, and (3)
the Cover Branch. The Special Referral Branch was converted
A Di-
rective of 15 June 1954 shifted to DD/P the function of ac-
quiring official cover for the Agency.
The Operations Branch of SSD consisted of the Covert
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1
for a variety of security services and special investiga-
tions, not related to security clearance processing, per-
formed in support of operating components of the Agency.
IThese included the establishment and servicing of
\for various pur-
poses. Special inquiries were conducted for a variety of
purposes: for example, to ascertain the identity of the origi-
nator of an anonymous telephone call; the identity of the
owner of a particular vehicle; or a complete rundown on an
individual, company, or organization of operational interest
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F. Personnel Security*
1. Personnel Selection
The security screening of personnel for employment
or other use was a major preoccupation of I&SO from 1947 to
1954. The Agency was rapidly expanding its personnel and
activities both domestically and abroad. The Office of Policy
* A complete history of personnel security practices in
CIA is provided in Volume II of this series.
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Coordination (OPC) was established 27 August 1948, and OPC
and OSO operated independently as the Clandestine Services
of the CIA until 4 January 1951 when both offices were com-
bined under a Deputy Director for Plans (DDP). CIA's overt
collection, analysis, and dissemination functions under the
Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) also expanded. The
invasion of South Korea in June 1950 stirred much new activity
in the Agency. Applicant cases processed by I&SO rose from
Within I&SO the exercise of the security screening
function was divided between the Security Division and the
Special Security Division. The Security Division performed
I&SO security clearance responsibility for all overt and semi-
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covert applicants, and, in addition, for those individuals used
under overt contracts, overt intelligence sources,
Additionally, they performed
separate assessments related to the individual being provided
access to Special Intelligence information, and provided secu-
rity indoctrinations to personnel prior to overseas assignment.
The Special Security Division shared with the Clandestine Ser-
vices responsibility related to the clearance or approval of
individuals to be employed or used by the Agency under covert
* The division of responsibility and the influence and con-
siderations leading up to the issuance of (last Re-
vised 17 July 1958) are fully detailed in Volume II of this
series.
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The decision of the Executive for I&S related to the
security disapproval of an individual for employment could be
reversed only by the DCI. Annual security disapproval rates
ranged from 5.4 to 8.9 percent during the 1947-54 period. 117/
In July 1953 the MPS (Medical, Personnel, and Secu-
rity) Panel was created to assist in the selection of candidates
for Agency employment. This panel, which consisted of repre-
sentatives from the Medical Office, Personnel Office, and Se-
curity Office, provided an opportunity to assess the propriety
of employing any individual in cases where questionable inform-
ation existed but where such information was not of such nature
as to warrant denial of security clearance by I&SO. Individual
cases were referred to the panel for their consideration at the
discretion of any one of the three participating offices. This
panel made possible the discreet exchange of views and inform-
ation obtained from security and medical sources, resulting in
a better overall assessment of the individual in terms of his
suitability for engaging in the sensitive activities of the
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Agency.* 118/
2. Loyalty Orders
The CIG Personnel Loyalty Board, established
16 April 1947 pursuant to the provisions of EO 9835, was auto-
matically abolished upon creation of the CIA. Only one case
was referred to this board and the case was rejected due to
insufficient evidence of disloyalty, without notification to
the employee. 119/
Because CIA possessed a more expedient, legal
basis for dismissal of employees whose continued employ-
ment constituted a security risk,** a CIA loyalty board was
not established until 23 August 1948, and then only after con-
siderable prompting by the Civil Service Commission. 120/
A total of 62 cases were heard by Agency boards under E0 9835,
The distinction was that I&SO could reject applicants
solely on the grounds of security, whereas the MPS Panel
could recommend rejection on other grounds related to
overall suitability.
** Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947
(see F3, below).
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and all of the employees involved were retained. By way of
explanation, E0 9835 required that, in all cases where inform-
ation of possible questionable loyalty was developed (for ex-
ample, a case involving membership in an organization cited
by the Attorney General as being subversive), a full investi-
gation would be conducted by the FBI. Consequently, a large
number of cases were processed under EC) 9835 due to tech-
nical considerations. 121/
E0 10241 of 28 April 1951 amended EC) 9835 and
clarified the standard for refusal or denial of federal employ-
ment related to loyalty -- that there needed to be only a
"reasonable doubt" as to the individualts loyalty. The subse-
quent issuance of E0 10450* further strengthened the standard
by insisting that the employment of the individual must be
"clearly consistent with the interests of the national security."
Each change necessitated a review of the files of cases pre-
viously processed against the new standard.
27 April 1953.
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Although standards for acceptance for Federal em-
ployment became more stringent with each succeeding order,
so too did procedures providing for adequate, legal due pro-
cess to protect the rights of the individual. Provisions of
E0 10450 prescribing right of counsel, cross examination of
witnesses, right to receive a copy of the transcript, and calling
for security hearing boards consisting of impartial individuals
(non-Agency) selected in each instance from a roster main-
tained by the Civil Service Commission, threatened the secu-
rity of sensitive Agency activities, and militated against ex-
tensive use by the CIA of this loyalty order to purge itself of
possible security risks, particularly since a more satisfactory
legal alternative existed. In one instance, however, involving
an employee concerning whom the Agency was completely
satisfied as to loyalty, but who nevertheless had been the sub-
ject of some public controversy, the DCI chose to apply EO
10450 procedures in order that the case might receive a fully
impartial review. 122/
Provisions in both E0 9835 and 10450 required that
each Federal department and agency contribute information
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to a Civil Service Commission master index of the names of
all individuals investigated for Federal employment. The
Agency's compliance with these provisions would have pro-
vided the Civil Service Commission with a complete list of
all CIA employees, notwithstanding individual cover status.
Despite insistence on the part of Civil Service Commission,
the Agency successfully resisted contributing names to this
index until finally Section 7* of the Central Intelligence Act
of 1949 exempted the Agency-from requirements existing
under any law to publish or disclose the organization, func-
tions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of its
employees. The Agency thereafter interpreted this Section
as exempting it from any requirement to contribute to the
master index, and the Civil Service Commission eventually
acquiesced. 123/
3. Summary Dismissal Authority of the DCI
Effective with the establishment of CIA, the DCI was
Later Section 6, as amended.
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provided with the following authority:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6
of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555),
or the provisions of any other law, the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence may, in his dis-
cretion, terminate the employment of any
officer or employee of the Agency whenever
he shall deem such termination necessary or
advisable in the interest of the United States,
but such termination shall not affect the right
of such officer or employee to seek or ac-
cept employment in any other department or
agency of the Government if declared eligible
for such employment by the United States
Civil Service Commission.*
Consequently, the DCI was no longer limited to the rather
narrow guidelines provided in the Government's loyalty pro-
gram, to remove personnel whose continued employment
might be inimical to the sensitive operations of the Agency.
On 31 July 1947 an order was issued, effective with
the establishment of CIA, designating an Employee Review
Board, to be chaired by the Executive Director, to advise
the DCI on a just and equitable exercise of this authority in
individual cases brought to its attention. 124_I
* Subparagraph (c) of Section 102, National Security Act
of 1947 (Public Law 253 - 8th Congress).
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From 1947 through 1954, 26 cases were heard by the
Employment Review Board resulting in the separation of 15
employees. Eight cases previously approved under E0 9835
boards were rejected by the Employee Review Board as secu-
rity risks. Although a number of the cases resulting in separa-
tion involved security action related to loyalty questions, none
of these cases involved any individual who was engaged in es-
pionage, maintained active membership in the Communist
Party, or disclosed classified information to unauthorized per-
sons. In each case, information was developed of such nature
that the continued employment of the individual represented a
greater security risk than the Agency should assume on a con-
tinuing basis. In many more cases, however, employees (in-
cluding military assignees) left the Agency of their own voli-
tion prior to any Board action, ,based upon security information
related to a wide variety of indiscretions, including sexual per-
version, drug addition, psychotic behavior, arrest or criminal
record, excessive drinking, and security violations. 125/
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G. Interrogation Research Branch (Polygraph)*
25X1A In 1945,
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:1
carried out experimentation in
Rhode Island related to the practicality of a polygraph (lie
detector) program for government agencies. He used several
hundred prisoners of war as subjects in his experiments. 126/
On 4 June 1948, Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, wrote
and requested that he speak with
graph with
whom the DCI had authorized to discuss the poly-
127/ The polygraph was one of a number
of "Special Technique Applications (STA) of Subconscious Iso-
lation" then under consideration for security use, to facilitate
the personnel security screening processes in times of national
emergency. 128/
On 23 August 1948, Admiral Hillenkoetter advised all As-
sistant Directors that he had directed the Executive for I&S to
conduct research into the use of technical devices to aid the
personnel screening processes and accordingly had authorized
* A complete history of the CIA polygraph program is pro-
vided in Volume IX of this series.
** Security Control Staff, I&SO.
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I&SO to test the polygraph on any employees of CIA or appli-
cants who might volunteer to take the test. 129/
was used as a consultant for these tests.
On 18 March 1949, Chief, I&S advised the DCI that the
Atomic Energy Commission had made it obligatory for all
personnel having access to certain sensitive areas in their
plants to submit to polygraph examination. He further ad-
vised that results of his own tests showed definitely that the
polygraph could be of inestimable aid to security. 130/
The DCI, however, rejected a 21 December 1949 pro-
posal of the Assistant Director of Special Operations that
compulsory polygraph examination be instituted as an in-
tegral of the Agency's overall personnel security program.
131/ He did, however, authorize the Chief, I&S, to proceed
with such a program on a voluntary basis.* 132/ On 21 May
1953, Allen W. Dulles, as DCI, reaffirmed the authority of
the Chief, I&S'to continue the use of the polygraph as an aid
to the personnel screening process on a voluntary basis. 133/
AEC also subsequently put its polygraph program on a
voluntary basis.
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In October 1950 the Interrogations Research Branch (IRB) of
the Security Division of I&SO was organized to conduct the CIA
polygraph program, and IRB continued to increase its opera-
tions and enlarge its staff to meet the demands of the Agency.
Although the first use of the polygraph within CIA was
related to the security screening processes, its value to CIA
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examination. These individuals were still employed with the
Agency. Early examinations had been given to persons pro-
posed for clearance for Special Intelligence, to employees of
I&SO, and high-ranking officials of the Agency. In the spring
of 19511
\In the fall of 1951, procedures were ini-
tiated whereby all applicants were given polygraph examina-
tions as part of their entrance-on-duty processing. 135/
H. Physical Security* 136/
The Physical Security Branch of the Security Division of
I&SO was responsible for the development and maintenance
of security protective measures
The Branch had no responsi-
;1/4 A complete history of CIA physical security practices
is provided in Volume III of this series.
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bility for physical security of overseas installations and per-
formed services abroad only upon specific request.
The Physical Security Branch was divided into four sec-
tions -- Investigations, Technical, Building Security, and
Safety. By 1954, it had an authorized T/0 of
tors
The Branch's functions included: processing of all visi-
fingerprinting, photo-
graphing, and badging all employees, supervising the reading
of security regulations and signing of secrecy oaths and pro-
viding of security indoctrination to new employees, super-
vising the Agency's safety and overt firearms program, con-
investigating security violations, collecting and destroying
of classified trash, and maintaining the "Security Regulations
Manual!' on a current basis. In addition, the Branch pro-
vided the services of two night security officers, who served
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for all intents and purposes as the only non-duty hour point
of contact within the Agency for persons outside.
The primary physical weakness of the Agency's security
program resulted from a condition that could only be remedied
by Congress. Within the metropolitan area of Washington
alone, the Agency occupied
separate structures.
The movement of persons, documents, equipment, and clas-
sified waste from building to building exposed the Agency to
the daily danger of deliberate penetration. In 1950 the CIA
requested the Bureau of the Budget to find it secure quarters
under a single roof. The Bureau of the Budget reported that
no satisfactory structure could be found, and thereafter it
supported the Agency in a request for new construction. A
new, single building, however, was not to be provided
quickly. 137/
The principal outside influence on physical security prac-
tices within CIA during this period occurred in 1951 with the
issuance of Executive Order 10501, "Safeguarding Official In-
formation in the Interests of Defense of the United States."
? This Executive Order codified in great detail federal govern-
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ment procedures related to the classification of defense inform-
ation, according to various levels of sensitivity (for example,
Confidential, Secret, Top Secret); to the identification of such
information in accordance with prescribed markings; and to
appropriate standards for its storage and transmission to in-
sure against unauthorized disclosure.
Another aspect of physical security involved protection of
the DCI. In November 1953 the National Security Council is-
sued a Top Secret directive authorizing the CIA Director of
Security to establish and maintain adequate security measures
to insure the personal safety of the DCI and the D/DCI as well
as classified material in their custody. Prior to this, the Di-
rector of Security had been authorized to provide such pro-
25X1A tection under CIA Regulation
,n1 in emer?encies. As
a result of the NSC directive, coupled with an incident of 1
March 1954 which resulted in the wounding of several congress-
men on the floor of the House of Representatives by a Puerto
Rican, the Director of Security in April 1954 established a
small staff of
agents to provide protection to the DCI
and D/DCI. This staff provided 24-hour coverage seven days
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a week to the DCI, whether at home, in the office, or in
travel status. 138/
I. Counterintelligence
In June 1946,
had recommended that
the Security Branch of the Central Planning Staff, CIG, be
redesignated the "Counterintelligence Branch." 139/
believed that the word "counterintelligence" pertained
to all security measures, both active and passive, designed
to insure safeguarding of information, personnel, materiel,
and installations against espionage, sabotage, or other subver-
sive activities.
recommendation at that time
was only a manifestation of the philosophy that an effective se-
curity program must include some analysis of the extent and
nature of the threat. He carried the philosophy further in his
concept of the CIG Office of Security,* wherein he recommended
that the organization (CIG) having responsibility for coordination
of overall, national counterintelligence/counterespionage acti-
* See D7, above.
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vities (which includes an analysis of the threat to security)
should also be responsible for the overall coordination of the
Federal government's security countermeasures program.
He overlooked only that the new organization's charter limited
it to activities outside the United States, and that it was ex-
pressly forbidden from engaging in matters related to in-
ternal security affairs.
The Security Office, however, exercised functions of an
internal security nature in the protection of Agency classified
information, personnel, materiel, and installations located
within the confines of the United States. This incursion was
allowed under the several Executive Orders which made the
security of internal operations the responsibility of the head
of each department and agency of the Executive Branch of the
Government.
The Office of Special Operations of CIG was established
on 11 July 1946 to conduct all organized Federal espionage
and counter-espionage operations outside the United States,
pursuant to CIGis charter as defined by NIA Directive No. 5
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of 8 July 1946. Originally Staff D supervised all counter-
espionage/counterintelligence activities of CIG and CIA.* With
the establishment of OPC in 1948, this function remained the
exclusive province of OSO until the consolidation of the clan-
destine services under the Deputy Director for Plans on 4 Jan-
uary 1951, at which time a CI Staff was organized in the DDP.
The DDP continued to add to the Agency's data bank related to
known or suspected subversive persons and organizations
which had been commenced under OSS.
In setting forth OSO's overall responsibility for counter-
espionage protection and support, the DCI specifically pro-
vided that his instruction was in no way to abrogate the se-
curity responsibility of the Chief, Inspection and Security.
140/ The Chief, I&S, was specifically charged with preventing
penetration of Agency activities. =.'t* Late in 1949 a small CI
Later redesignated Staff C to alleviate the problem of
omission of the prior Staff C's activities (related to Spe-
cial intelligence) during briefings of Congressional com-
mittees. The special intelligence function was redesignated
as Staff D.
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Staff was established in I&SO to maintain continuing vigilance
against possible penetration of CIA by agents inimical to the
interests of the United States, On 12 August 1952, the CI
Staff was redesignated the Security Research Staff (SRS), at
The CI Staff of I&SO and SRS, which consisted of no more
than 15 employees during the 1949-54 period, conducted a pro-
gram of continuing research to identify possible patterns of
penetration of CIA through its personnel and also maintained
vigilance related to potential or actual personnel security
risks within the Agency. To this end, fruitful liaison was
maintained with other intelligence and security segments of
the Federal government (including the FBI) and with the Metro-
politan Police Department in Washington. 142/ In November
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1952, the Chief, I&S, directed that one representative each
be designated within the Security Division and the Special Secu-
rity Division to review current personnel security investiga-
tive cases from the standpoint of possible penetration efforts
and to coordinate where appropriate with SRS. 143/ I&SO
continued to compile its own indices related to suspect per-
sons and organizations and thereby added to the Agency's over-
all counterintelligence knowledge. I&SO made searches of
DDP/RI indices in all cases where pertinent to the subjects
of its investigations.
In his July 1952 report of inspection of I&SO, Mr. J.
Patrick Coyne of the National Security Council reported that
the CI Staff of I&SO was not achieving complete implementa-
tion of its counterintelligence responsibilities of the Chief,
I&S, because it was not fully informed by the Clandestine Ser-
vices concerning the nature and extent of the latter's efforts
to prevent, or to detect and counter, possible attempts at
either penetration of the Agency or compromise of the per-
sonnel employed or used by the Agency overseas. With the
passage of time, however, SRS was to engage in a program
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of more fruitful dialogue and coordination with the DDP related
to counterintelligence and its operations assisted in negating
the threat of possible penetration of the Agency by foreign in-
telligence operatives.
J. Alien Affairs
The CIA early became involved in arranging entry into
the United States of aliens for reasons related to the intelli-
gence mission. Legislation* was enacted in 1949, authorizing
the entry into the United States for permanent residence of
aliens (not to exceed 100 in any one fiscal year) without regard
to their inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws
and regulations whenever the DCI, Attorney General, and Com-
missioner of Immigration determined that the entry was in the
interest of national security and essential to the intelligence
mission.
The sheer complexity of the Nation's laws and regulations
Section 8 (later Section 7 in the amended version) of
the Central Intelligence Act of 1949.
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related to aliens and immigration caused the overall intra-
Agency administration and coordination of such matters to
be initially handled by CIA's General Counsel. The Execu-
tive for MS was also involved because of FBI and Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service insistence upon assurances
from the DCI that aliens admitted under the Agency's spon-
sorship would not become a threat to the national security.
The Assistant Director for Policy Coordination objected to
the General Counsel's role as overall administrator and co-
ordinator on the grounds that it was an inappropriate involve-
ment of the Agency's legal staff in operational matters. 144/
It was at first proposed that the matter be handled by com-
mittee;* however in April 1950 because of MSG's status as
part of the DCI's Executive Staff and because it was already
intimately concerned with the alien affairs program of the
Agency, this responsibility was given to the Executive for
I&S. 146/ Evidently, action through committee did not pre-
sent an attractive alternative, and by this time all parties
* A proposed "Operations Unit" under the Coordination,
Operations and Policy Staff (COAPS) of CIA. 145/
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were convinced that the overall responsibility should not con-
tinue with the General Counsel. The Security Office's authority
related to alien affairs was more clearly fixed with the issu-
ance of
stated that:
of 26 January 1954, which
An Alien Affairs Staff was established in I&SO in May 1950
to assist the Executive for I&S with his responsibilities related
to the matter of aliens of interests to CIA. This Staff reviewed,
prior to implementation, from the standpoint of Ag ency com-
mitments, operational planning in any of the several opera-
tional segments of the Agency regarding use of aliens for intel-
ligence purposes. It conferred with operations offices con-
cerning security aspects of operational plans for the use of
aliens, and considered proposals of the operations offices of
the Agency for the entry of aliens under the new CIA legislation
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K. Career and Area Security Officers
With the centralization of security support and security
policy within the CIA, the implementation of security never-
theless remained a command function exercised through the
heads of the various Agency components. Some mechanism
was necessary to insure uniformity in the interpretation and
application of the Agency's security policies. In this regard
the function of security inspection played an important role;
however, this is discussed at length in other sections of this
history. Additionally, I&SO's responsibilities related to se-
curity clearance or approval of personnel employed or used
by the Agency also represented an important element of the
checks and balances necessary to effect a uniformly sound
security program.
On 20 July 1949 each Agency Assistant Director and Staff
Head was directed to appoint a security officer responsible
to him for insuring compliance with CIA security regulations
and policies. 148/ The duties of these security officers in-
cluded coordination and liaison with the Chief, Inspection
and Security. The Chief, Inspection and Security, held
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regular meetings with these security officers to discuss mat-
ters related to the security of Agency operations. On 24 Octo-
ber 1952 the DDP directed that the chief of each staff (FI, PP,
PM, TSS, Admin.) and area division designate a security of-
ficer for Headquarters activities of their organizational com-
ponents to be responsible to the chiefs for security of opera-
tions within their jurisdiction. 149/ These security officers
were to be briefed by the CIA Security Officer on the organi-
zational structure of the Security Office and were to establish
and maintain direct working relationships with appropriate
Security Office representatives.
With the passage of time, however, it became apparent
that the assignment of career security officers would produce
more desirable results, particularly in those areas where the
incidence of security problems was the greatest.* By 1954,
,,,,,,
Agency regulations distinguish between "Career Secu-
rity Officers" and "Area Security Officers"; the former are
Agency personnel whose Career Service is Security, who are
fully trained and experienced in security techniques, and who
are assigned by the Director of Security from the Security Of-
fice to other elements of the Agency for full-time security
i (Footnote continued on P. 117)
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career security officers assi-gned to work under
the supervision of the heads of the operating components. 150/
* (Continued from P. 116) duty; the latter are Agency per-
sonnel whose Career Service is other than Security, who are
designated by the official concerned with the concurrence of
the Director of Security, for security duties in addition to
regular duties.
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L. Later Organization
By December 1954, I&SO had become the CIA Security Of-
fice, responsible to the DCI through the DDA (later to be re-
designated the Deputy Director for Support). The Office had
an approved overall personnel strength of Supporting the
Director of the Security Office were an Executive Officer* and
five staffs: Administration and Training, Alien Affairs, Secu-
rity Control, Security Research, and Inspections (formerly
the Inspections Division).
The Administration and Training Staff, consisting of
employees, provided overall administration, personnel, and
training support to the Security Office; including the prepara-
tion of studies and budget estimates in addition to the mainten-
ance of property accountability. Activities of the Security
Control Staff, Alien Affairs Staff, Security Research Staff, and
Inspections Staff have been previously described in this Volume.
The balance of the organization was divided into two divisions:
* The position for .a single Executive Officer was estab-
lished in January 1952.
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the Security Division and the Special Security Division, whose
functions were also earlier described.*
* For an organizational chart of the Security Office just
prior to December 1954, see Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3
SECURITY OFFICE
1 December 1954
Director of Security
Deputy Direct r of Security
Executire Officer
INN MN INN
Admin. & Training Alien Affairs
Staff Staff
Securiti Division
Security Control Security Research
Staff Staff
Inspection Staff Special Security Division
Physical Personnel Interrogation Special Operations Cover
Branch
Security Security
Branch Branch
Re uire? .Appraisal Records Research
ments Section Section Section
Section
Research
Branch
Referral Branch
Branch
1?
Covert
Records
Section
.1 ?
Corres
Projects Covert
Section Section Security
Section
Operational Open Operational
Clearance Section Support/
Section SI Section
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CHAPTER III
Expansion of Security Support and
Growth of the Executive Function
(December 1954-June 1963*)
A. Reorganization of 4 December 1954
Following a survey conducted by the Agency's Management
Staff, 157/ the Security Office was reorganized in December
1954.** The survey recommended a reorganization of the Of-
fice to provide for two functional deputy directors in addition"
to the existing Director and Deputy Director. Each qf the new
deputy directors would exercise specific jurisdiction over a
, principal operating component of the Office -- namely, per-
sonnel and physical security support on the one hand, ?and in-
Effective date of retirement of Sheffield Edwards as
Director of Security/CIA.
44* The Security Office was formally redesignated the Of-
fice of Security on 16 February 1955 as an aftermath of this
reorganization; henceforth the latter title will be used.
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vestigations and operational security support on the other.*
In addition, a Tb O was recommended and approved raising the
office's personnel ceiling frorri
The principal effect of this reorganization, however, was
to raise the former Chiefs of the Security and Special Security
Divisions to a level where they could more appropriately exer-
cise responsibilities on behalf of the greatly overburdened Di-
rector of Security. Functional responsibilities of these two
major segments of the Security Office remained in general as
they had evolved prior to the reorganization.
The Deputy Director for Personnel and Physical Support-
(DD/PPS) supervised the activities of the Personnel Security
Division and the Physical Security Division. The raising of
, the Physical Security Branch to Division level resulted from
recommendations of both the management survey, and a 1954
inspection of the Security Office by the Inspector General. 158/
The Personnel Security Division consisted of the Clearance
For an organization chart of the Security Office as of
5 December 1954 see Figure 4.
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FIGURE 4
SECURITY OFFICE ORGANIZATION CHART
5 December 1954
DIRECTOR OF SECURITY
Policy Staff ------,? Deputy Direct r of Security-------'. Inspection
Staff
Executive1
Officer
r etarr t. -
Security Research Alien Affairs
Staff
Staff
Administration and Training
Staff
Deputy Director for Personnel Deputy Director for Investigations
and Physical Support
r spareors?soxswes.A.-ar..ename....4 ?
. -
Personnel Security Physical Security
Division
Taterrogation
search Branch
Clearance
Branch
Employee
,:tivity Branch _
Division
Technical
Branch
Building
Securi,ty
Branch
Physical
Survey Branch
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? and Operational Support
7.2%16a,,
Security Support
Division
Investigative
Branch
Correspondent
and
Records Branch
Ope rational
Support Branch
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Branch, Interrogation Research Branch (responsible for the
Agency's polygraph program), and the Employee Activities
Bran ch (EAB). The EAB was newly created to provide, among
other functions, personnel security advice and guidance to
Agency employees and components, thereby assuming tasks
previously assigned to the Security Control Staff. The Physi-
cal Security Division consisted of the Building Security Branch,
Security Survey Branch, and Technical Branch.
The Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational
Support (DD/IOS) supervised the activities of the Security Sup-
port Division
The Security
Support Division was divided into the Investigations Branch
and Operational Support Branch, with the former's activities
related to the security screening of personnel proposed for
covert use, and the latter involved in all other matters of sup-
port to covert activities of the Agency.* In addition, the Alien
Affairs, Inspection, Security Research, and Administration
Raising the OS/SI (Operation Support-Special Inquiry)
Desk to a branch level was also recommended in the 1954
Inspector General survey of the Security Office.
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and Training Staffs remained as previously constituted. The
Policy Staff replaced the Security Control Staff. Stripped of
its earlier functions related to providing personnel security
guidance to Agency employees and components (reassigned to
Employees Activity Branch of the Personnel Security Division),
this Staff now concentrated its efforts upon the recommenda-
tion of security policy as well as other areas of major security
concern throughout the Agency.
B. Subsequent Organizational Readjustments
The 4 December 1954 reorganization of the Office of Secu-
rity (OS) achieved a notable degree of overall organizational
stability which prevailed for ten years, although there were a
number of minor changes designed to accommodate Agency read-
justments.
1. Within DD/IOS
In October 1956, there was a reorganization of the In-
vestigations Branch of the Security Support Division along gen-
eral geographical rather than functional lines. 159/ The re-
sulting "desk" breakdown within the Branc
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to accommodate its organization to that of the operating com-
ponents of the Agency. This resulted in more fruitful dialogue
between the operating components and the Security Office re-
lating to covert security clearance matters. IB-5 (the "open"
desk) had no security clearance responsibilities, but instead
serviced the investigative requirements of the Personnel Secu-
rity Division, transmitting them
25
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In September 1962, the organizational composition of
the Investigations Division* of DD/IOS was again altered, pri-
marily to accommodate the increase of Agency activities re-
Raised to division status in 1961 (see B6., below).
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2. Polygraph
On 16 July 1955 the DCI made the Office of Security
solely responsible for the selection, training, and technical
supervision of all employees using the polygraph for the CIA,
161/ On 8 August 1957 a re-
25XIA
statement of this charter specifically charged the Office of
Security with responsibility for "conduct for the polygraph
program of the CIA." 162/ The Interrogations Research
Branch was raised to Division status under the Deputy Director
for PPS, effective 1 May 1957, 163/ and the Division continued
to expand its activities to meet the increasing needs of the
Agency.*
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* A complete history of the Agency's polygraph program
is set forth in Volume IX of this series.
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4. Records
Following the consolidation of the
Division of the OSO under the Executive for Inspection and
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Security in 1947, covert personnel security records had been
segregated from overt records. The maintenance of overt
personnel security records was the responsibility of the Records
Section of the Personnel Security Division under the DD/PPS.
The covert personnel security files were maintained by the
Covert Records Section of the Special Security Division under
the DD/IOS.
Although Col. Edwards was very early concerned with
this obvious duplication of effort and the possibility of serious
error, he was forced to operate fora number of years under
a strict injunction from the Clandestine Services. Finally,
early in 1958, the Director of Security directed the Chief of
his Inspection Staff to conduct a comprehensive survey of OS
records operations. The resultant report, submitted 19 Febru-
ary 1958, recommended consolidation of the two records sec-
tions under one Division. 167/ Consequently, on 13 October
1958, the Director of Security created the Security Records
Division (SRD) of the Office of Security (later known as the
Security Records and Communications Division - SR&CD) to
assume records functions of the two former OS records offices.
168/
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On 11 December 1958, the Director of Security delegated man-
agement responsibility for the SRD to the Deputy Director for
IOS.* 169/ SRD was divided into three Branches: the Opera-
tions Branch, consisting of a Processing Section, an Indices
Section, and a Communications Section; a Records Branch, con-
sisting of the Case Files Section and the Topical Files Section;
and the Research and Analyses Branch.
5. Staff Additions
A side effect of the consolidation of the OS records
function was the creation of the Coordination and Review Staff
under the Deputy Director for IOS. 170/ This Staff took over
functions of the SSD Covert Records Section not related to the
records function, such as the administration of the Confiden-
tial Correspondents Program, the Confidential Informants Pro-
gram, periodic review of the office's Resident Agent status,
and various statistical and administrative reportings related
In June 1961, the C&R Staff was abolished,
A complete history of the Office of Security Records pro-
gram is contained in Volume II of this series.
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its functions taken over by special assistants to the DD/IOS.
171/ In June 1957, a small Foreign Support Staff was created
under the DD/PPS, responsible for providing overall technical
support and direction to CIA overseas installations, and as-
sisting the Director of Security in his exercise of technical
supervision of overseas security personnel and activities. 172/
The Special Security Center (SSC) of the Office of Se-
curity was established in August 1962 to provide "security
policy guidance" and other security services of common con-
cern on behalf of the DCI to a large-scale, joint CIA/DOD in-
telligence activity, established pursuant to agreement con-
cluded between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
dated 25 April 1962. 173/ Until 1 September 1965 the SSC
also included a Special Clearance Center (SCC) charged with
the up-to-date maintenance of the names of all individuals (a
national responsibility) approved for access to information re-
lated to the various compartmented intelligence programs of
the US Government.*
For further details of the activities of the Special Security
Center, see Volume VIII of this series Compartmented Informa-
tion Security Practices (Top Secret - Codeword controlled).
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6. 1960 IG Survey
A great influence on Office of Security organizational
adjustments during this period were suggestions and recom-
mendations contained in the report of the Inspector General's
Survey of the Office of Security of December 1960, although
the full extent of the suggestions were not adopted. 174/ The
Inspector General described the two-deputy organizational
structure of the Office of Security as "semi-functional" in
that the basic allocation of duties was on a functional basis, but
that modification and exceptions existed attributable to the his
isolation of covert activities. Within the IOS Directorate,
a continuity of effort could be traced back through the Special
Security Division to SSU at the end of World War II. The IG
report also noted that in 1947 the SSD was brought theoreti-
cally into a unified Agency security component; but actually the
unification effort did not result in merger, but rather in two,
separate systems under a unified command. Internal proce-
dures which developed over the years gave effect to, and soli-
dified, this separation of interests.
The IG's report stated that experience had shown that
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it was not necessary to, have a complete separation of covert
and overt support functions. He went on to cite the polygraph
unit (IRD) and the recently accomplished consolidation of secu-
rity records under the SRD as evidences of this. The IG sug-
g ested a reorganization of the Office of Security along strictly
functional lines without regard for separation of covert and
overt support: for example, a Personnel Security Division, an
Investigations Division, a Technical Division (to include both the
polygraph and the technical countermeasures functions), and a
Security Operations Division. At the staff level, he would com-
bine the records function and the administrative functions under
the Executive Officer. In conclusion, the IG recommended that
the DDS assign a qualified representative to the Office of Secu-
rity to conduct a comprehensive and substantive survey and sub-
mit specific reorganization proposals to the Director of Security.
Accordingly, the Executive Assistant to the DDS con-
ducted a survey of the Office of Security, submitting his report
in April 1961. Contrary to the suggestion of the IG, this survey
upheld the validity of the office's two-directorate organizational
structure, but submitted eight suggestions related to consolida-
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tion of a number of "Secretariat" and administrative functions.
Included among the suggestions were: staff status to Interroga-
tion Research Division, raising the Technical Branch to Divi-
sion status, and splitting the Security Support Division into two
divisions,
responding organizationally 25
to the Director of Security. 175/ Not all of these suggestions
were adopted, but the following adjustments were made to the
Office of Security organizational structure 176/:
(a) The Inspection and Policy Staffs were abol-
ished; and in place of a single, Executive Officer, an Executive
and Policy Staff was designated to assume their functions.
(b) All purely administration functions such as
those being performed by the Coordination and Review Staff of
DD/IOS were given to A&TS. The Coordination and Review
Staff of DD/IOS was abolished.
(c) The Technical Branch was given full Division
status under the DD/PPS.
(d) The Security Support Division was abolished,
and two new Divisions -- Investigations and Operations Support
-- established in its place. What had previously been "desks"
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under the Investigations Branch and the Operations Support
Branch were themselves raised to branch status.*
C. Industrial Security.**
The CIA, as an Agency of the Federal government, may,
and does procure equipment and materials through the pur-
chasing services of the General Services Administration. In
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Executive
Staff
FIGURE 5
OFFICE OF SECURITY
June 1963
DIRECTOR
OF SECURITY
Deputy Director
of Security
Special Security
Center
Security Research Alien Affairs
Staff 1 Staff
v
Deputy Director Director for
. Personnel and Physical
Support
Personnel Security Physical Security
Division Division
Administration
and Training Staff
Deputy Director for
Investigations and Operational
Support
Operational Support
Division
Technical Security Interrogation Investigations
Division ?1---. Research Division
Division
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As stated in the previous chapter, during the early years
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of CIA, the Inspection Division of I&SO had been responsible
for continuing supervision of security aspects of classified con-
tract procurement, including the inspection of contractor facil-
ities and monitoring the security clearance of their personnel.
Contractor's personnel used under Agency classified contracts
were investigated by I&SO, with the personnel security assess-
ment of such individuals being the responsibility of the Security
Division of I&SO. A considerable expansion of CIA classified
contract procurement occurred during the 1954-63 period, and
following the establishment of the Office of Logistics (originally
called the Logistics Office) in the fall of 1953, and the initiation
of large-scale R&D programs such as the U-2 Project in 1955,
there was a delegation of responsibility for a large part of the
Agency's industrial security program to the several contracting
authorities.
On 7 May 1954, was rescinded by
'which de-emphasized the pri-
mary role of the Office of Security with respect to the implementa-
tion of the Agency's industrial security program. Under the
latter terms of reference, the CIA industrial security program
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was predicated upon the concept that the contracting authority
possessed command security responsibility, although the secu-
rity clearance of contractors' personnel remained the sole juris-
dictional responsibility of the Director of Security. The Director
of Security was also charged with the preparation of physical and
personnel policies and with providing guidance. Implementation
of the Agency's industrial security program, including inspections
of contractors' facilities and the continued monitoring of all phases
of security related to their activities was effected by security staffs
of the several contracting offices -- the staffs consisting of career
security officers, detailed by the Director of Security.
At the height of the Agency's industrial security activities
during the 1954-63 period, there were' areer security of-
ficers assigned to the Office of Logistics and another assigned
to the
In addition, the services of
career security officers assigned
to Technical Services Staff /DDP were related to a considerable
extent to the Agency's classified procurement program. Of
career security officers assigned to the Headquarters staff of
the Development Projects Division, the principal efforts of
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were devoted to the security of industrial activities. In addi-
Personnel security clearances for contractors' personnel
for DPD programs were provided by the DD/IOS. Personnel
security clearances for contractors' personnel involved in the
balance of the Agency's activities were provided through the
Personnel Security Division under the DD/PPS. The investi-
gative assets of the DD/IOS were used to support all industrial
The industrial security program related to activities of
the DPD will be discussed in further detail in Volumes IV
and VI in this series.
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work, however, to assist with the growing backlog of re-inspec-
tions; but this program did not achieve a notable degree of suc-
cess and was discontinued after a short period of time.
The first overall Federal government Executive Order re-
lated to "Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry"
was issued in 1960. This order resulted from efforts of the
Department of Justice and the Department of Defense to satisfy
requirements stated by the Supreme Court in Green vs. US,
32 L. Ed. 2d 340, 79 S. Ct. , handed down 30 June 1959. The
holding in that case was that the Navy Industrial and Security
Program was illegal, because it was not based upon an Exe-
cutive Order or statute. Following this decision, the Defense
Department's industrial security program was largely at a
standstill. The necessity for breaking this logjam and the de-
sire to head off legislative action prompted the Justice and De-
fense Departments and the Bureau of the Budget to move rapidly
to conclude their study of a draft Executive Order. 185/
The resulting E0.-10865 prescribed detailed procedures
for insuring the right of due process for the individual, with
respect to both the security review and subsequent appeal
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processes. Provisions of this Executive Order could not be
complied with by the Agency, inasmuch as the very fact of
the CIA as the contracting agency was itself the subject of secu-
rity classification. Informal consultation with the Department
of Justice, later made a matter of record with the Bureau of
the Budget, resulted in Agreement that the provisions of E0-
10865 did not apply to the CIA. 186/ The situation continued
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E. Special Security Support Activities
During the 1954-63 period there was considerable expan-
sion of security activities rendered in direct support to opera-
ting components of the Agency. Some of these, such as the
Guatemalan Revolution, the U-2 Project, the Bay of Pigs
Operation, and the defector program, involved extensive use
of Security Office manpower, in some instances through as-
signment of career security officers to the operating compo-
nents and in some instances through the temporary detail of
security personnel to accomplish specific missions. In most
instances this sort of activity was directed or guided through
the DD/IOS.
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G. CIA Security Education and Counseling of Employees*
The following quotations, the former attributed to Col.
Sheffield Edwards in November 1953 and the latter taken from
a November 1963 IG report related to "Personnel Security in
the Central Intelligence Agency," perhaps best illustrate the
objective and degree of accomplishment during this period in
the development of a sense of "security awareness" in all em-
ployees of the Agency:
Each employee of the Agency must consider him-
self at all times a "security officer" of the organi-
zation, and as such must adopt an ever present
and realistic security attitude toward every task
and every responsibility. The strength of all we
do in every compound of intelligence is only as
strong as our weakest security link. 206/
From his very first contact with the recruiter
and continuing throughout his entire Agency
career, the employee is never allowed to forget
his responsibility for maintaining intact the se-
curity of his organization. CIA makes it clear
to the employee that security is of paramount
importance and thus done in a fashion such that
the employee can have no doubts as to the
Agency's seriousness. 207/
* A principal source for this section, "Summary of A&TS,
Training Branch," 22 October 1965. 205/
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Many aspects of the Agency environment contribute to the
"security awareness" of its employees -- thoroughness of the
manner in which he is investigated, his encounter with the
polygraph, the rigid compartmentation of activities, the sys-
tem of badges and guards, and the punitive measures applicable
to security offenders. This section deals with two other as-
pects: the Office of Security's participation in the overall
Agency training program, and the Office of Security's program
for counseling of employees. These activities were largely
centered in the Training Branch of the Administration and
Training Staff and Employee Activities Branch of the Personnel
Security Division; however, component security officers (both
domestic and overseas) also played an important role.
Early efforts related to the security indoctrination of new
employees were conducted by the Physical Security Branch of
the Security Division, and consisted principally of the super-
vised reading of Agency Security Regulations at the time new
employees were requested to effect a signed Secrecy Oath.
The T/O of the Physical Security Branch in 1950 included an
Indoctrination, Training, and Special Investigations Officer.
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In December 1951 a progress report prepared by the Assistant
Deputy for I&S, giving the eight major functions of I&SO, listed
"Indoctrination of Personnel" as the second major function of
the office, preceded only by the screening and investigating of
personnel. As early as December 1948, I&SO was giving indoc-
trination courses for CIA employees, and by 1951 security talks
were scheduled as part of CIA orientation programs.
As a result of a classification survey, the Security Office
training function was established as a branch within A&T Staff
in 1953. In March 1955 this branch assumed responsibility for
the overall Agency security indoctrination program previously
administered by the Physical Security Division. By September
1956 the presentation of a three-hour security indoctrination
was instituted as a regular part of the EOD processing of all
new employees. /
Work began on a Security Indoctrination film, to be en-
titled, "Personal Security," in 1957. In September 1961 this
film, a four-part, two-hour presentation especially tailored
to the requirements of CIA, was introduced as an integral part
of the security indoctrination of new employees.
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Security Reindoctrination Program No. 1 was commenced
in January 1958. Over the next 20 months,
Agency em-
ployees attended this briefing, designed to reacquaint all em-
ployees of CIA with the importance of good security to the
Agency's mission. In June 1963 the CIA Executive Director
approved Security Reindoctrination. Program No. 2 which was
scheduled to begin in October of that year, thereby laying the
foundation for a subsequent, regular, four-year rein.doctri-
nation program.
In 1961 the Office of Security began a program involving
the one-hour security indoctrination of dependents of Agency
employees being assigned abroad, and a program of one-hour
indoctrination specifically tailored to the needs of summer
employees. In addition, the Office of Security participated
in the Agency's Intelligence Orientation Course administered
by OTR and a JOT (Junior Officer Trainees) dependents brief-
ing program. In 1957, the Office of Security commenced a
program involving the training of Office of Communications
personnel in order to augment the Agency's overall technical
countermeasures program.
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It was early recognized that in order to insure that the
security of CIA activities was adequately protected, certain
limitations on the personal outside activities of its employees
was necessary. Matters such as writing for publication or
making public speeches, engaging in private foreign travel,
taking outside courses of instruction, and having contact with
foreign nationals were the subject of CIA special Adminis-
trative Instructions and Notices from 1947 to May 1955. The
first composite Agency Regulation
was published 3 May 1955. This regu-
lation was revised on December 1956, and again in 1960. On
1 April 1961,
was approved for inclusion in the Headquarters Regulation
series. The cumulative effect of these instructions was to re-
quire employees to advise, and in some instances, seek the
approval of, the Office of Security in matters related to:
writing for publication, public speaking, contacts with for
nationals, private foreign travel, participation in loyalty and
security board hearing outside the Agency, court proceedings,
affidavits, appearing as witnesses, arrests, participation in
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outside courses of instruction, and joining clubs and organi-
zations.
The Employee Activities Branch (EAB) of the Personnel
Security Division, created as part of the reorganization of
4 December 1954, served as the office of action within the
Security Office for all such matters. Since many of the re-
strictions called for counseling of the employee by the Office
of Security, EAB evolved during this period as the point of
contact within the Office for employees seeking security con-
sultation related to private outside activities. Actions pro-
cessed by EAB related to outside activities of Agency person-
The EAB also performed another function related to the
Agency's overall security indoctrination program, involving
the security briefing ant' debriefings of all employees going
abroad or returning from overseas assignments, as well as
those separating from employment with the Agency. The
yearly number of such briefings and debriefing ranged between
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during the 1954-63 period. 209/ Security
Officers assigned to other Agency components provided indoc-
trinations related to special operating security requirements,
H. Contingency Planning.
The preparation of a "CIG Disaster Plan" was one of nine
outstanding security studies turned over to the Executive for
I&S following establishment of this position in July 1947. In
February 1948, the DCI approved a "CIG Disaster Plan (Local
Emergency)" prepared by the Executive for I&S which provided
for eventualities of fire or other local emergencies. 210/ In
June 1948, the Executive for I&S recommended that a study of
the requirements for duplication and storage (outside the Wash-
ington area) of vital documents -- those necessary to continue
Agency operations during times of national emergency -- be
undertaken. 211/ From 1948 to 1952 Agency "Standing" and
"Planning" committees considered the ways and means of im-
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plementing such a program. Initial consideration was given to
locating the vital documents storage site in
During the 1954-63 period, Agency contingency planning
took into consideration matters essential to the mobilization of
Agency assets under conditions of total warfare, as well as the
myriad of scenarios, such as fire, flood, civil disturbance,
insurrection, and enemy attack, which might bring about con-
ditions representing a threat to the continuation of Agency opera-
tions. This planning involved overseas as well as domestic per-
sonnel and facilities. Security, as an integral part of the
Agency's overall operation, naturally had to plan for the eventu-
ality of total war, to insure that such an eventuality would not
render the Security Office incapable of providing effective sup-
port to the organization. Security played an additional im-
portant role in all contingency planning, however, since each
contingency involved either an actual or potential threat to the
personnel, facilities, and operations which the Director of Secu-
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rity was charged to protect.
On 20 August 1953, responsibility for security under emer-
gency conditions was placed by regulation in the Security Office.
212/ In May 1955, the overall emergency planning function was
transferred from the Office of Security to the DDS. 213/ As a
result of subsequent deliberations, the following fundamental
responsibilities in contingency situations were vested in the Di-
rector of Security: (1) overall protection of classified materials,
installations, properties, and personnel in the event of a national
emergency; (2) security support for the relocation, evacuation,
or other transitory action occasioned by emergency conditions;
(3) maintenance of appropriate organizational facilities and
records capable of providing continuing, security support to the
Agency following its transition to an emergency mode of opera-
tion; and (4) guidance to other Agency components in the prepara-
tion of emergency plans. 214/
The CIA Emergency Security Patrol, which had been estab-
lished earlier by the Executive for I&S, was formalized by regu-
lations on 26 May 1954,. 215/ to protect classified material, in-
stallations, property, and personnel of the Agency in areas of
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the United States in the event of emergency including fire,
natural disaster, enemy attack, or other circumstances. This
regulation also appointed the Director of Security as the Com-
manding Officer of the CIA Emergency Security Patrol, and
authorized him to use employees of the Security Office for this
purpose, to be augmented at his own discretion with other
Agency employees on a temporary, interim basis, and on a con-
tinuing basis with the concurrence of the Operating Officials
having administrative responsibility for these respective em-
ployees. An Emergency Security Patrol Manual which outlined
the organization and duties of the Emergency Security Patrol;
and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency, was
published in November 1957, 216/ and revised manual was
published on 1 March 1962. 217/
The Office of Security's mission and related policy appli-
cable in the event of war was set forth in Appendix 5, Security
Annex E, of The CIA Global War Plan, approved by the DCI on
10 December 1957. On 1 April 1959, Office of Security War
and Contingency Plan was published, which was designed to
fully implement and proceduralize its responsibilities and
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functions stemming from Appendix 5. 218/ Among other
things, this plan provided for the maintenance of a team of
professional security officers who were fully documented and
prepared to augment the security capability of any station or
area as required, security assistance to be rendered to the
evacuation and/or relocation of Headquarters or other Agency
domestic or foreign installations, delegations of security author-
ity as appropriate to the particular circumstances, and security
organization, including personnel augmentation and training re-
quired to meet war contingency situations. This plan was revised
and updated in August 1962 by the Office of Security War and Con-
tingency Support Plan and Guide, published 1 August 1962.* 219/
Security plans were developed for Agency wartime reloca-
tion sites
The Office of Security participated in the Support Direc-
torate's annual "Operation(s) Alert" designed to test the Agency's
overall war plan. 220/
Basic guidance on physical protection of CIA personnel,
documents, and physical installations in the field was prepared.
* This guide was subsequently updated again in 1965,
and also in 1969.
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I. Career Management and Training
It will be recalled that the original personnel strength of
I&SO was
By December 1956 the number of
Security Office employees had risen to
223/ From that
point on, authorized personnel expansions were minimal. As
of February 1959, the overall T/0 for the Office of Security
25X9 stood ad Additional expansion occurred be-
tween June 1962 and August 1962, when the overall personnel
25X9 strength rose l This increase was the result
of new responsibilities, including the manning of a Special Se-
curity Center to provide certain services to the USIB Community.
224/
During the 1947-54 period, the emphasis had been on pro-
curing investigative personnel and training them as rapidly as
possible to perform investigative services for the CLA. Some
effort was also devoted to training personnel as component
security officers, to operate both domestically and abroad.
Although some individuals were engaged who possessed prior
government security officer experience, the principal reser-
voir of Security Office personnel continued to be its investi-
gative force.
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One disadvantage of drawing OS personnel leadership
almost exclusively from its investigative apparatus was that
1
tinual process of revitalization in terms of the overall mis-
sion of CIA was necessary if the function of security sup-
port was to remain in proper context with the balance of the
Agency's business, and if personnel were to be interchange-
able and capable of progression. Nevertheless, involvement
in the investigative process, which essentially relates to the
acquisition of facts appropriate to the reaching of conclusions,
proved to be excellent training for assuming government
managerial responsibilities.
Early consideration of the Agency's overall career man-
agement program began in 1952, but it was not until the issu-
25X1A ance of
dated 25 June 1954, that full-scale imple-
mentation was underway. The first I&SO Career Service Board
was established 13 August 1952. 225/ The major emphasis,
however, began on 10 December 1956 with the appointment of
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a Career Management Officer (CMO) and the initiation of a
projected, five-year individual career planning program,
with consideration to be first given to those at the GS-12
grade level. 226/ Improvements with respect to the prepara-
tion of individual fitness reports, effected 25 March 1957 and
4 November 1958, undoubtedly also aided the program to a
considerable extent. 227/
The Training Branch of the Administration and Training
Staff was not established until March 1954, although the posi-
tion of Security Office training officer had existed as early as
1951. The new branch assumed a number of functions pre-
viously housed in the Inspection Division related to training
special agent investigators and preparing career security of-
ficers for assignment in the field with other Agency compo-
nents. The Training Branch also possessed other responsi-
bilities related to the Agency's overall training program,
which are discussed in E?action G of this Chapter. On 20 Sep-
tember 1957, the Office of Security first established formal,
minimal training requirements for the various security spe-
cialties and positions related to security work. 228/ There-
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after, a serious program related to training was undertaken,
using facilities of the Security Office as well as those pro-
vided through the Agency's Office of Training. The program
was designed to increase the proficiency of OS employees in
the several security specialties, to better acquaint them
with overall Agency organization and activities in order to
support CIA requirements, and to prepare them for increased
managerial responsibilities. Undoubtedly, no small factor in
the OS training program was the frequent rotation of those of
its personnel showing particular promise, thereby providing
a measure of on-the-job training. This procedure provided
the Office of Security with a large number of qualified secu-
rity and managerial generalists.
Following are examples of in-house training courses which
were conducted by the Office of Security throughout the 1954-63
period to better prepare personnel for specific security assign-
ments 229/
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A
In addition, security careerists participated in more than
thirty different courses given by the Office of Training. By
1957, the Office of Security had achieved the Agency-wide goal
of allocating 5 percent of available man-hours to training. 230/
A 1962 report showed that most Security Office profes-
sional personnel were in the GS-12/13 grade level. A survey
covering the 1959-60 period, related to GS-12 level employees
in the DDS showed that the average age for OS was 28.3 years (the
Directorate's lowest) and the percentage of individuals possess-
ing at least a BA degree, 84 percent (by far the Directorate's
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highest). On the other hand, the annual attrition rate for the
Office of Security at this grade level, 1.8 percent, was the
Directorate's lowest -- the Directorate's highest annual attri-
tion rate was 42. 9 percent in the Office of Logistics.
Other statistics (in addition to the attrition factor pre-
viously mentioned) which reflect the overall degree of suc-
cess of the program, show that during 1959-60, the OS pro-
motion rate at the GS-12 level was 7.4 percent (again the
Directorate's highest); those in grade two years or less,
25.3 percent (the highest); those in grade four years or more,
37.6 percent (by far the lowest, compared with Office of
Personnel, 70 percent), and median time in-grade, three
years, five months (again the lowest for the Directorate).
The promotion rate, 7.4 percent, was the highest in the Di-
rectorate. Compared with the Clandestine Service, OS em-
ployees at the GS-12 rated as follows:
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Office of
Security
Clandestine
Services
Average Age (years)
28.3
37.3
In-grade 2 years or less (percent)
25.3
23.6
In-grade 4 years or more (percent)
37.6
26.8
1959-60 promotion rate (percent)
7.4
10.1
1959-60 attrition rate (percent)
1.8
3.3
These statistics seem to demonstrate that the Office of
Security achieved a notable degree of success during this
period in holding together a large organization of compara-
tively young, well-educated professional employees, while
at the same time providing a generous degree of opportunity
for personal advancement. Although admittedly faced with
a less serious problem than either the Office of Communi-
cations or the Clandestine Services (the Office of Security had
far fewer people overseas) the rotation of career security officers
into other Agency components, both domestic and overseas,
was effected with little prejudice to the individual and no loss
of jobs. In 1960 the Inspector General described the OS
career management program as one of the best in the Agency.
231/
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J. Participation in Interdepartmental Security Activities
1. Early Involvement
Participation of the Office of Security in interdepart-
mental security activities was limited during the earlier years
of CIA. The Security Control Staff exercised responsibilities
related to the safeguarding of CIA classified information main-
tained by non-IAC departments and agencies charged to the
Executive for I&S pursuant to CIG Operations Memorandum
14 July 1947 (see I. D4, above).
** NSCID No. 9, dated 1 July 1948, established USCIB as
an interdepartmental board to effect the authoritative coordina-
tion of the communications intelligence activities of the govern-
ment, and to include the responsibility for the protection of all
communications intelligence sources. USCIB, in its Directive
No. 1, set forth its organization which included a Security
Committee (SECCOM). 233/
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representation was provided from I&SO or the Office of Secu-
rity.
The Office of Security also worked closely with the
Bureau of Standards in developing security equipment, and it
had dealings with the General Service Administration regarding
the guard force for the many CIA buildings. In connection with
Dating back to 1950, the Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security (ICIS) and the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference (IIC) were the two principal federal executive com-
mittees concerned with internal security and Federal policy and
the procedures related thereto. Both functioned under the
National Security Council until President John F. Kennedy dele-
gated this responsibility to the Attorney General in 1962.* The
National Security Action Memorandum 161, 9 June 1962.
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provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 were inter-
preted as preventing the CIA from taking any active formal
role in the activities of these two Committees.* 234/ This
occasioned some prejudice to CIA security in that the Agency
possessed no formal voice in the drafting of executive orders
related to the protection of classified defense information, by
which it was nevertheless forced to abide. In September 1961,
it was necessary for the DCI to recommend that the President
amend EO-10501, "Safeguarding of Official Information in the
Interests of the Defense of the United States," in order to ex-
empt intelligence information from its requirements related
to automatic downgrading and declassification.
2. State-Defense Military Information Control Committee**
On 27 February 1945, President Truman approved a
statement by Secretary of State Byrnes on the "Basic Policy
Governing the Disclosure of Classified Military Information
Section 102(d)(3) provided that the Agency shall have no
police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal secu-
rity functions.
** For general sources of information contained in this
Section, See Source References 2351, 236/, and 237/.
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to Foreign Government," and directed the Secretaries of State,
War, and Navy to implement this policy. This was the origin
of what was called the MIC (Military Information Control) policy.
The statement of policy approved by the President specifically
included military intelligence as a category of military informa-
tion, which was to some degree in conflict with the DCI' s author-
ity for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
For approximately ten years, until 19 September 1959,
the CIA provided observer representation to the State, Army,
Navy, Air Force Coordinating Subcommittee for Military In-
formation Control, later identified as State-Defense Military
Information Control Committee (SDMICC), which was the body
responsible for policy related to the disclosure of classified
military information to foreign governments. This observer
representation was provided from the Security Control Staff
of I&SO. The CIA representative served as a focal point for
the Committee in its relationship with the Agency and serviced
its requirements, particularly those concerning the internal
security systems of foreign governments. The Executive of
I&S also furnished a member for the SDMICC survey teams
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Effective 11 June 1958, the Secretaries of State and
Defense, prompted in large measure by the CIA, agreed not
to exercise control of the release of classified military informa-
tion under the basic MIC Policy as applied to national intelli-
gence and interdepartmental intelligence produced within the
IAC.* The Agency's concern, of course, was that release of
such information might reveal military intelligence. Thereafter,
the authority for the release to foreign governments of that
national and interdepartmental intelligence produced within the
*
Intelligence Advisory Committee, the predecessor to USIB.
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IAC structure which contained military intelligence rested
with the DCI, acting with the concurrence of the IAC. Such
releases were contingent upon the application of criteria and
conditions established by the committee and set forth in LAC-
D-115/1 of 8 April 1958.
In a Survey of SDMICC prepared in 1959 for the
National Security Council, Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, the NSC
Representative on Internal Security, recommended that the
regular membership of 5.;DMICC be limited to State, Defense,
Army, Navy, Air Force, and the AEC, and that participation
of other agencies (e.g. , JCS, CIA) at the committee meetings
be limited to the relatively few instances when matters in-
volving their interest were considered by the committee. In
reviewing this recommendation for the NSC, the NSC Planning
Board commented that the AEC, CIA, and JCS should be repre-
sented by observers who could attend meetings at their discre-
tion, participating in and voting upon items of direct concern
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to them.
Despite the recommendation of the NSC Representa-
tive on Internal Security, the National Security Council, in
its Action No. 2125, provided for
voting representation by the Atomic Engergy
Commission and Central Intelligence Agency on
items of direct concern to them under consider-
ation by State-Defense Military Information Con-
trol Committee or on unresolved issues of direct
concern to them referred by the SDMICC to
higher authority.
Following a survey of the Office of Security, the In-
spector General in December 1960 held that the extent of
participation of the Office of Security in SDMICC appeared to
be excessive to its value related to the protection of intelli-
gence and recommended that
The Director of Security, (1) determine the
extent to which the NSC contemplated that the
Agency should be involved in the SDMICC pro-
gram, and (2) establish frames of reference
for Agency participation.
The members of the Defense and JCS Planning Boards,
however, recommended to the NSC that the CIA participation
in SDMICC be limited to the "discussion" of items of concern
rather than the authority to vote upon them.
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This recommended review was conducted and concluded
that the CIA Representative or Alternate on the State-Defense
Military Information Control Committee should continue to at-
tend the SDMICC meetings and actively participate in items of
Agency concern. In addition, CIA should continue to furnish
representatives to the SDMICC security survey teams when re-
quested by the Chairman of SDMICC.
Whether in the role of observer or voting member,
the CIA representative actively participated by regular attend-
ance at the weekly SDMICC meetings. The Office of Security
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Later CIA representations to SDMICC
were provided from the Executive Staff of the Office of Security.*
3. Intelligence Board Security Committee**
On 26 September 1958, Mr. Gordon Gray, the Special
Assistant to the President, addressed a memorandum to the DCI
regarding procedures to be followed in reporting unauthorized intel-
ligence disclosures. Noting the President's concern regarding the
disclosure of intelligence, Mr. Gray's memorandum drew the Direc-
tor's attention to that part of NSCID No. 1*** which stated that:
The Director of Central Intelligence shall call
? upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate,
to investigate within their department or agency
any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
* SDMICC was renamed the US Military Information Control
Committee in 1964, and the National Military Information
Disclosure Policy Committee in 1966.
** Principal sources of information in this Section were
IBSEC First through Fourth Annual Reports and sources
referenced under 238/.
*** NSCID No. 1, Para. 5, if, 15 September 1958.
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sources or methods. A report of tbi?se in?,
gations, including corrective measures taken
or recommended within the department:: and
agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the
Director of Central Intelligence for revi.- iv and
such further action as may be appropriate, in-
cluding reports to the National Security Council
or the President.
As a result of Mr. Gray's Memorandum, Mr. Allen
Dulles expressed to the US Intelligence Board (USIB) his be-
lief that a committee should be established that would be
specifically ch:rged with the overall consideration of matters
dealing with security protection. 239/ This committee was
to be known as the Intelligence Board Security Committee
(IBSEC). At the direction of USIB, the Agency's Deputy Di-
rector of Security convened an ad-hoc working group o.. secu-
rity specialists from USIB member departments and agencies
to draft a proposed Director of Central Intelligence Directive
(DCID).
On 24 March 1959 the USIB approved DCID No. U,
establishing a Security Committee. The mission of the Com-
mittee as stated in this directive was
to promote means by which the intelligence
community may prevent the unauthorized dis-
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closure of intelligence, intelligence informa-
tion, and intelligence sources and methods.
The IBSEC was composed of security representatives
from the departments and agencies represented on the USIB,
with the chairman to be designated by the DCI in consultation
with and with the concurrence of the USIB.
25X1A
then Deputy Director of the Office of Security, was
appointed the first Chairman of IBSEC. The services of the
IBSEC Secretariat were also provided by the Office of Secu-
rity. The functions of IBSEC were to (1) include the recom-
mendation of standards, practices, and procedures related to
the security protection of intelligence, and intelligence sources,
and methods; (2) the recommendation of policy, such policy to
be in consonance with the responsibility of each department
and agency to establish its own internal procedures for the pro-
tection of intelligence, intelligence sources, and methods; (3)
the consideration of problems, including the degree of harm
to national security, occasioned by unauthorized disclosures
of intelligence information; (4) rendering assistance to the DCI
in his responsibilities arising out of Paragraph 5, NSCID No. 5;
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and (5) the making of such other reports and recommendations
as required by the USIB. Succeeding IBSEC chairmen have all
been appointed from CIA's Office of Security; consequently, the
burden of providing leadership and staff work for the committee
has fallen most heavily upon this office.
IBSEC also conducted inquiries into the possibility of
the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information asso-
ciated with published news articles. Identified below are six
news articles considered by IBSEC:*
"Why U.S. Planes Patrol Red Frontiers," U.S.
News and World Report, 20 February 1959
"Soviet Military Gains," Hanson Baldwin,
New York Times, 23 June 1959
"Russian A-Subs Estimated at 12," Norfolk
Virginian Pilot, 28 June 1959
"Missile with Wings is Tested by Russia,"
Richard Fryklund, Washington Sunday Star,
14 February 1960
"Two Soviet Rockets Failed, U.S. Says," John
W. Finney, New York Times, 11 February 1960
* The listing includes all news articles investigated through
IBSEC through 1963.
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"Facts About the Missile Balance," Joseph
Alsop, Washington Post, 25 September 1961
IBSEC also considered a rather broad range of policy
matters resulting in the promulgation of
DCI 1/7, "Controls for Dissemination and Use
of Intelligence and Intelligence Information,"
which established standards and uniform prac-
tices and procedures for the use of intelligence
and intelligence information.
"Procedures for Foreign Travel of Personnel
Possessing Special Security Clearances,"
USIB-9, 6/6, 1 April 1963.
"Policy Statement Concerning Counter-Intelli-
gence and Security Responsibilities," with at-
tached "USIB Guide, Practices and Procedures
for Counter-Intelligence and Security of Overseas
Personnel and Installations," USIB-D-1, 5/24,
approved 18 July 1962.
Prompted by the defection of two NSA employees,*
IBSEC surveyed personnel security policies, practices, and
procedures within the US Intelligence Community. The com-
mittee instigated the establishment of an ad-hoc committee
to promote legislation establishing federal injunctive powers
to prevent actions of unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
* Vernon F. Mitchell and William F. Martin defected to the
USSR in August 1960.
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information, an Official Secrets Act, and vesting other de-
partments and agencies with the DCI's discretionary authority
to dismiss employees. These considerations have not to this
date* resulted in legislation.
Executive Order 10501, "Safeguarding of Official
Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States,"
was considered by IBSEC, prompting an amendment (EO-10964)
approved by the President, 20 September 1961, exempting in-
telligence information from requirements related to automatic
downgrading declassification. A directive related to, "Dis-
closures of Classified Intelligence," was proposed and was ap-
proved by the President.
IBSEC was also given the task of considering a number
of recommendations of the Joint Study Group Report,**,"Foreign
Intelligence Activities of the United States Government," dated
15 December 1960. Specific recommendations considered by
the Committee were
**
October 1971.
A study group constituted by the President.
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No. 14 - The USIB should review existing corn-
partmentation of sensitive information with a view
to achieving more uniform practices and ensuring
that essential security safeguards do not result
in vital information being withheld from officials
and organizations with urgent national security
responsibilities.
No. 18 - The Director of Central Intelligence
should focus community attention on the impor-
tant area of counter-intelligence and security of
overseas personnel and installations, and the
agencies of concern should make periodic re-
ports to their agency heads.
No. 42 - The USIB should strongly support
the efforts initiated in the counter-audio sur-
veillance field by the NSC Special Committee
on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.
No. 10 - The USIB reappraise the security
standards for foreign-born translators to de-
termine whether the current shortage of trans-
lators can be alleviated by modified security
procedures and practices. (Coordination re-
sponsibility only - primary action responsi-
bility assigned to COMINT Committee)
The attention of the President had been sharply focused
upon the matter of the protection of intelligence information and
he insisted that the DCI assume his rightful leadership in the
US Intelligence Community with respect to this subject.
4. Other Interdepartmental Committee Involvement
Participation in the work of interdepartmental corn-
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mittees by the Office of Security expanded considerably during
the 1954-63 period and included, among other activities, work
with the following 240/:
Advisory Board - Federal Safety Council
National Safety Council
Federal Fire Council
GSA Inter-Agency Advisory Committee on
Security Equipment
Interdepartmental Committee on Physical
Security Equipment
Federal Committee on Physical Security
Equipment
Interdepartmental Committee on Security
Education
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Association
US Communications Security Board, Subcom-
mittee on Compromising Emanations
NSC Special Committee on Technical Sur-
veillance Countermeasures
CODIB - Task Team V, Biographics
USIB/Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
(COMOR) (Security Consultant status)
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5. Interdepartmental Agreements
In addition to its responsibilities related to foregoing
committees, the Office of Security also became involved in
interdepartmental security matters through agreements made
by the CIA with other departments of the Government involving
joint operation of specific programs.
One of these related to the U-2 Project, which was
conceived as a joint CIA /USAF operation. An agreement con-
cluded on 3 August 1955 defined the CIA security function as:
To maintain security control over all aspects
of the project, including the investigation of all
knowledgeable individuals, arranging for, or
monitoring, security arrangements at supplier's
plants, at a test base to be established and at
overseas bases. 2411*
Another activity which demanded a heavy investment
of effort by the Office of Security related to an agreement of
25 April 1962 between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense. This agreement concerned a large-scale, joint CIA/DOD
See Volume IV, Operational Support, and Volume VIII,
Compartmented Information Security Practices, for detailed
information related to the security of the U-2 Project.
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intelligence operation, and charged the DCI with providing
overall "security policy guidance." 4=
* See Volume VIII, Compartmented Information Security
Practices (subject to special security controls) for details
related to this program.
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CHAPTER IV
Changing Patterns of Security Support
and
Protection of Intelligence
as a
Community Concern
(1 July 1963 - 31 December 1968)
A. Management Personnel Changes
Sheffield Edwards, who had headed the Agency's security
support organization since the inception of CIA, retired from
Federal government service on 9 July 1963. Robert L. Ban-
nerman, the Deputy Director of Security under Edwards, suc-
25X1A ceeued him; and
was appointed to the Deputy Director position. Mr. Ban-
nerman served until 1 July 1964, at which time he was named
Assistant Deputy Director (Support) of CIA.* Effective that
On 5 July 1965, Mr. Bannerman succeeded Lawrence K.
White as the Deputy Director (Support).
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same date (1 July 1964), Mr. Osborn succeeded Mr. Banner-
man as Director of Security;
mho had
previously held a series of executive positions in the Office of
Security, became the Deputy Director. I I who
had also been with the Agency's security organization since its
inception, replaced
on 5 August 1968.* 242/
Changes in personnel serving as functional Deputy Directors
of Security were first influenced by the demise of
DD/IOS, on 11 September 1959.
who was named to Mr.
vacated post, 243/ served
as DD/IOS until 4 April 1960, at which time he was succeeded by
the Deputy Di-
rector for Physical and Personnel Security Support, continued
to occupy this position until 21 August 1965, when he was ap-
pointed to the newly created position of Deputy Director for
Physical, Technical, and Overseas Security (DD/PTOS), and
As this report was being written (October 1971), Messrs.
Osborn and were still in their respective positions as
Director and Deputy Director for Security. I 'accepted
** Mr. I-I retired in December 1970.
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B. The Three-Directorate Organization
Following the retirement of Sheffield Edwards, there were
no adjustments of the Office of Security organizational structure
until August 1965. On 2 July 1965, Howard J. Osborn, Director
of Security, advised the Executive Director-Comptroller that a
thorough analysis and review of the organizational structure,
mission, and functions of the Office of Security prompted him
to recommend a reorganization in order to place increased em-
phasis on the fields of personnel, industrial, and technical se-
curity and counterintelligence. 246/ Mr. Osborn's concern
related to these stated fields of security effort was a reaction
to the government's increasing reliance upon technical intelli-
gence acquisition programs necessitating large-scale industrial
For information related to the Office of Security reorgani-
zation of 12 August 1965, see B, below.
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and research and development efforts, to damage to the overall
US intelligence mission resulting from defections of US employ-
ees, and to the discovery of technical surveillance operations
by foreign intelligence services against US installations abroad.*
The Director of Security's proposed reorganization was
approved, and the functions of the Office of Security were
redivided among three Directorates, an Executive Staff, a
Security Research Staff, and an Administration and Training
Staff.** 247/ The Deputy Director, IOS continued supervision
of the Investigations Division, and of the
25X'
Operational Support Division; and he also acquired responsi-
bility for the activities of the Alien Affairs Staff. The position
of Deputy Director for Personnel Security (DD/PS) was created
to provide for the supervision of the activities of the Personnel Secur-
ity Division, Interrogations Research Division, and the Security
* For further details, see D, below.
** See Figure 6, Page 195, showing the Office of Security
structure resulting from the reorganization of 12 August
1965.
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FIGURE 6
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
OFFICE OF SECURITY
12 August 1965
Director of Security
Deputy Director of Security
r..131.,OrrJr .1-6.1rmm...amaanersort?ocsmamoz enia-rtsuAlo?---aensw,,,, /0.11111....1.1.1.11.1[4.7G.MI ???,,,:?*?????VOSA
Administration & Security Security
Training Staff Research Staff Policy & Exicutive Staff
Special Executive and
Security Center Planning Division
?fl.1...rt.,012....11,Mr ..7.?...4.?r_Cst......,WWa
DD of Security for DD of Security for Investigations DD of Security for Physical,
Personnel Security
and Operational Support Technical & Overseas Security
Personnel ,1 Interrogation Investigation Operational
1
Security Division Research Division Support
Division Division
Security Records &
Communications Division
25X
Alien
Affairs Physical Technical
Staff Security Security
Division Division
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Industrial
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Records and Communications Division. The position of Deputy
Director for Physical Technical and Overseas Security
(DD/PTOS) was established to supervise the activities of
Physical Security Division, Technical Division, and the
Industrial Security Division (still in the planning stages).
DD/PTOS's responsibilities also included responsibility
for supervision of a Foreign Support Staff.
By the same action, the Security Policy and Executive
Staff assumed supervisory responsibility for the activities of
the Special Security Center, in addition to the newly created
Executive and Planning Division. The latter was responsible
for staff work related to all executive officer and policy matters
which were not subject to special systems of security control.
The Special Clearance Center (previously a part of the SSC)
was redesignated the Compartmented Information Branch of
SR&CD, and it continued to administer the Agency's service
of common concern to the US intelligence community for
maintenance of overall compartmental clearance listings and
to conduct internal CIA security briefings related to the
various subjects prescribed for compartmented security controls.
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C. Action Through the Intelligence Community*
Security has traditionally been a departmental matter, ad-
ministered by each agency head in accordance with his defined
jurisdiction. The statutory responsibility of the DCI to pro-
tect intelligence sources and methods, as set forth in the National
Security Act of 1947, is not accompanied by an implementing
authority. Allen Dulles in The Craft of Intelligence expressed
the opinion that the legislative history showed an intent to limit
this responsibility to CIA intelligence assets.
The CIA is a producer of national intelligence, but the in-
formation does not remain in CIA. The CIA is not the only pro-
ducer of intelligence, and the production of national intelligence
involves the collation of information from many sources. The
intelligence collection activities of the CIA are, to a considerable
extent, logistically dependent upon the resources of other depart-
ments and agencies. The protection of intelligence sources and
Princinal overall sources of information used in this sec-
sources are either referred to in the text or by note, or
enced in the Appendix.
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methods, therefore, cannot be undertaken by the CIA alone; it
can only be accomplished through coordinated community action.
As the intelligence effort became continually more interwoven,
it was recognized that the level of security was that created by
the lowest standards maintained anywhere in the intelligence
flow.
During the early years of the USIB Security Committee
(IBSEC) its members remained jealous for the prerogatives
of their own agencies. Following three years of negotiation,
DCID 1/7, establishing uniform security control markings and
procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence, was
finally approved on 21 February 1962. The mutuality of all
agencies' interests gradually became more fully recognized,
and uninhibited interagency discussion and exchange of security
information resulted. Limitations on concerted Committee
action were reduced to matters which were beyond the authority
of the intelligence agencies. Since the chairmanship of IBSEC
continued to be vested in the CIA's Director of Security, the
Office of Security became increasingly more involved as a
leader in inter-departmental security matters related to the pro-
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tection of intelligence sources and methods.
Evidence mounted that US personnel entrusted with access
to sensitive information were subject to recruitment by foreign
intelligence services. Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., an NSA
employee with cryptographic experience dating back to 1941,
was apprehended in September 1954, and admitted supplying US
cryptographic information to the Dutch. In August 1960, Vernon
F. Mitchell and William F. Martin, employees of NSA, defected
to the Soviet Union, where they renounced their US citizenship.
SFC Jack E. Dunlop, following security rejection for assign-
ment to NSA, committed suicide, and subsequent findings es-
tablished his involvement in espionage activities on behalf of
the Soviets. Lt. Col. William Whalen, who served in the US
military service from 1940 until his medical retirement in Febru-
ary 1961, including service with ACSI/US Army and J-2 of JCS,
in September 1964 admitted selling classified information to the
USSR between 1959 and the time of his retirement. Sgt. Robert
L. Johnson and James Allen Mintkenbaugh were indicted and
convicted as Soviet agents in July 1965. Evidence showed that
their recruitment by the Soviets had taken place in Berlin in
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1953, when both were assigned to G-2 in that city. The damage
caused by Johnson's activities was inestimable, as he had from
1961 to 1963, while assigned to the Armed Forces Courier Ser-
vice (ARFOS) station at Orly Field, France, assisted the
Soviets in reproducing countless US documents of the highest
order of security classification and control.
IBSEC not only concerned itself with estimating the extent
of the damage to national security brought about by the actions
of these individuals but also examined the causes and attempted
to bring about corrective countermeasures. IBSEC's studies
showed that the causes ranged from misguided political ideol-
ogy to pecuniary benefit; perverted sexual activities, alcoholism,
disgruntlement, and serious psychopathic illness were also
present in some cases. 248/ In 1962, at the recommendation
of NSC, the Committee undertook a continuing study of per-
sonnel security policies and procedures in the Intelligence Com-
munity. A Policy Statement Concerning Counter-intelligence
and Security Responsibilities was approved 18 July 1962.* A
USIB-D-1.5/24.
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Study of Provocations and Harassments Against US Citizens
in Soviet/Satellite Countries was published in July 1967* to
alert the community to the techniques used by unfriendly foreign
intelligence services to recruit Americans abroad or other-
wise prejudice the interests of the US. A Review of Courier
and Pouching Procedures for Sensitive Intelligence Information,
prompted by the Johnson case, was published 17 October 1967.**
A Directive related to Uniform Personnel Security Standards
and Practices Governing Access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information*** was issued 23 June 1967 and revised 1 July 1968.
The preparation of an Inter-Agency personnel security film
was undertaken to be used in the security indoctrination of
personnel. 249/
Following the 1963 defection of another former NSA em-
ployee, Victor Norris Hamilton, to the USSR, the Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy) requested IBSEC
to consider the need for policy to control the abrupt dismissal of
* IBSEC -PR /12.
**
***
IBSEC -PR /16.
DCID 1/14.
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unbalanced employees who had been provided access to ex-
tremely sensitive and highly critical information without bene-
fit of adequate "defector deterrent" procedures. The facts
surrounding Hamilton's defection pointed unequivocally to the
existence of a psychopathic personality. 250/ Although no
USIB policy resulted frnm the Committee's consideration of
this matter, the incident did help to focus the attention of
Federal government security services on this potential hazard,
with the result that such dismissals were brought to the direct
attention of department heads for their consideration. The
CIA's Office of Security had historically considered the possi-
bility of serious security compromise resulting from the acts
of disgruntled employees.
Evidence that foreign intelligence organizations possessed
sophisticated capability to conduct technical surveillance of US
installations abroad also continued to mount.*
Principal sources of information contained in this section
related to technical surveillance threat were the 1st, 2nd, and
3rd Annual Report of the Technical Surveillance Counter-
measures Committee, TSCC AR-1 through 3.
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Also in 1967,
a Community Research and Development Center was established.
This Center was funded for the year of 1967 by .ARPA; the CIA
provided funds for 1968.**
As the effectiveness of the US intelligence program in-
creased and as its results became more interwoven into the
national decision-making processes, the problem of serious
compromises of intelligence information and intelligence sources
and methods through the US news media grew in direct propor-
tion. Intelligence was the "news behind the news," as so often
it provided the factor of causation. The US intelligence com-
munity was finding that it was extremely difficult to maintain
secrecy. A great deal of time and effort was expended in the
investigation of "leaks" through public information media with-
out appreciable effect. The problem impinged directly upon
the freedom of the press, one of the most jealously guarded of
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the constitutional guarantees. The criminal element inherent
in espionage, necessary to bring about prosecution, was mis-
sing in these cases. Extensive efforts by IBSEC to promote
more effective legislation were unsuccessful; and, moreover,
the prevailing legal consensus was that if the US had legislation
similar to the British Official Secrets Acts, such legislation
would be unconstitutional.* The effort, therefore, had to be
directed at the sources of the newsmens' information.
IBSEC did initiate a Presidential Directive of 23 May 1960
forbidding unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information,
and on 29 June 1960 published implementing instructions and
guidance. In May 1963, following an unauthorized disclosure
of COMINT information in Aviation Week, IBSEC, in conjunc-
tion with other USIB committees, undertook a study of procedures
and standards within the intelligence community for control of
sanitization and downgrading of sensitive intelligence. The re-
sult of this study was the issuance of a revised community
This continues to be the prevailing opinion in October 1971.
USIB-C -13.5/49.
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policy.* The problem of compromising sensitive intelligence
information through the press, however, continued to frustrate
the concerted efforts of the US intelligence community.
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The frequency of incidents involving civil unrest overseas
caused the Office of Security to review and analyze the capa-
bility of each of the Agency's overseas facilities both to protect
its classified material in case of forced entry by mob action
and, also, to destroy its classified materials under emergency
conditions. 262/ Guidance and equipment was provided as
appropriate to the circumstances. An Office of Security Task
Force, composed of nprofessional Security Officers of vari-
ous specialties, was readied and documented to travel abroad
to assist in emergencies affecting any of the Agency's over-
seas installations. 263/*
See Volume III, Physical Security, for further details
related to this program, including instances of task force
usage.
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The critical shortage of approved overseas career Security
Officer positions led to the creation of a Headquarters-based
Overseas Security Support Division (OSSD) in the PTOS Direc-
torate in October 1968, 264/ to insure the continuance of high-
quality security support to the Agency's activities abroad. This
E. The Domestic Threat
The advent of the "new generation" during the 19601s also
had its effect on the Agency's security program. Elements of the
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"new generation" were at war with almost every facet of "the
establishment" -- its moral and ethical code; its evidence of
authority and allegiance;?its manner of conducting the nation's
business. Domestically, CIA could not avoid identification
with "the establishment" -- indeed, of becoming one of the
principal hate targets. Agency facilities, personnel, and ac-
tivities were repeatedly threatened.
Increasing incidents involving domestic civil disorder
necessitated the Office or. Security to devise procedures to pro-
tect Agency personnel arid facilities within the United States.
Harassment of Agency personnel recruiters on campuses by
various demonstrating groups led to the rendering of direct sup-
port to the recruiters by Office of Security
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Through
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interviewees were checked in advance through Office of Secu-
Following the civil disturbances in Washington, D.C. in
the spring of 1968, a Contingency Planning Officer position
was established within OS during the fall' of 1968. In addition,
construction of a Headquarters Security Command Center was
initiated. When actual emergency situations existed, the Secu-
rity Command Center was operated by a six-man staff on a 24-
hour basis, and additional security manpower was brought in
as necessary to insure protection of Agency facilities. During
periods of relative normalcy, the Contingency Planning Officer,
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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in addition to maintaining the Command Center in an operational
condition, reviewed intelligence reports, conducted liaison with
law enforcement and other governmental organizations, and kept
the area commanders in the CIA buildings advised of pending
emergency situations. 268/
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that all considerations related to these programs be compart-
mented from the balance of the Agency's procurement effort.
The Office of Special Activities and the Office of Special Pro-
jects, under the DD/S&T, were given contracting authority
direct from the DCI,? quite distinct from the contracting autho-
rity possessed by the Director of Logistics.
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The Inspector General's Survey of Industrial Security,
September 1965, was one of five surveys of functions, rather
than components, conducted at the request of the DDS. The IG
The IG recommended that the Director of Security, though
his newly-established Industrial Security Support Division, ex-
ercise more direct control over the Agency's industrial secu-
rity program. The IG noted that the 1959 Management Staff
survey* had recommended that the Director of Security assume
total responsibility for the industrial security program, and
See III, C, above.
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the IG acknowledged that this would probably have been too
drastic, primarily because it would have relieved contracting
authorities of any responsibility for security of its contract
operations. A compromise solution whereby the Office of
Security provided central guidance and monitorship might have
produced the needed results. What was needed according to
the IG survey was: (1) a central inventory of all contractors,
consultants, and grantees maintained on a current basis; (2)
more realistic categorization of contractual relationships by
degree of importance and sensitivity, including objectives
and security classifications; (3) development and dissemina-
tion of uniform industrial security doctrine and standards;
(4) continuing overall analysis to reduce costs; (5) a coordi-
nated program of study of the security vulnerability of Agency
industrial programs; and (6) regularization of inspections of
contractors facilities as required by the degree of sensitivity
of the work performed, and an efficient, equitable allocation
of the inspection function. The IG's 1965 report also took issue
with the fundamental policy bases for the special security con-
trols governing those Agency programs subject to DOD/CIA
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agreement, and noted that the USIB was currently considering
matters related to this subject. The USIB and higher author-
ities, however, subsequently sustained these policy bases.
ISSD was formally established under OS's PTOS Director-
ate, effective 13 April 1966. 270/ A great deal of effort was
put forth in attempting to define its specific charter to the
agreement of Agency contracting authorities and in promoting
corresponding changes to Agency regulations. It prepared,
"Uniform CIA Industrial Personnel Security Policy and No-
menclature - A Study," May 1967, 271/ which was extremely
useful in defining the total scope of this subject. It worked
in close coordination with the Special Security Center and DOD
representatives in the preparation of an industrial security
regulation and a manual governing the joint DOD/CIA activities,
and it prepared a draft, "Industrial Security Manual for Safe-
guarding Classified Information," to be applicable to the
balance of?the Agency's industrial security effort. 272/ The
former was issued over DCI signature; however, the latter was
not implemented because its drafting presupposed the adoption
of regulations changes which did not come about. Nevertheless,
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the latter served as a useful tool in terms of necessary study
of the problems involved in the Agency's industrial security
program, and through ISSD's close coordination with the writing
of the DOD/CIA policies, more compatible procedures de-
veloped.
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DDS&T, but under the general surveillance of the DDS and the
Agency Contract Review Board.
In a counter-proposal submitted on 23 December 1966,
the DDS took exception to the proposal to make all R&D con-
tracting the responsibility of the DDS&T as representing a
major transfer of responsibilities and manpower to achieve
the "team" concept," the latter of which he nevertheless ac-
knowledged as an appropriate managerial device. He also ac-
knowledged the desirability of establishing a CIA Contract Re-
view Board but took exception to a DDS special assistant per-
forming a management surveillance function which was more
appropriate to the Agency's Director of Logistics. The posi-
tion of the DDS prevailed; responsibility for R&D procurement
in CIA remained divided between the DDS&T and OL; a Con-
tract Review Board was established 4 April 1968** with the
Director of Logistics presiding as its chairman; but the team
Heretofore there had been a division of this responsibility
between DDS&T and OL; with the former responsible for those
procurements the subject of joint DOD/CIA agreements, and the
latter responsible for all others.
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concept was adopted in principle.
Under the latter concept, the Director of Logistics fur-
ther delegated his contracting authority to other contracting
officers assigned to individual Agency components. Complete
procurement "teams," consisting of technical, contract, audit,
and security specialists, were assigned to the several CIA of-
fices engaged in large-scale R&D activities. By the close of
1968, the system had been implemented in NPIC, TSD, ORD,
OSSI, OCS, FMSAC, and OEL. The Director of Logistics pro-
vided overall supervision of management, policies, practices,
and procedures related to the Agency's procurement program,
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The decentralized nature of the Agency's overall research
and development procurement system, coupled with the unique
management and security structure applicable to such a large
portion of the effort, led to the abolishment of the Industrial
Security Support Division, and many of the concepts involved
in its formation. The ISSD never succeeded in its efforts to
promote changes to regulations which would have provided it
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with the necessary charter to operate effectively. Its profes-
Director of Security retained the industrial personnel security
clearance authority, as well as responsibility for developing
overall security policy and standards related to the Agency's
industrial contracting arrangements. A new factor, however,
had been introduced. Because of the Director of Logistics'
new role under the decentralized procurement program --
providing overall procurement policy to Agency contracting
authorities -- the principal initiative for industrial security
policy now stemmed from the Office of Logistics (albeit in co-
ordination with Director of Security, and albeit formulated by
Author's own analysis.
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Career Security Officers assigned to the OL Security Staff)
as an integral of the Agency's total procurement policies.
The Chief, Security Staff, Office of Logistics, was made
responsible for the security of the contracts executed by the
Office of Logistics, as well as for giving technical advice
and guidance to the Industrial Security Officers assigned to
the operating directorates, who under the decentralized pro-
curement system would be working members of the cont ract-
ing* teams. In this latter role, the Chief, Security Staff, OL,
was also responsible for:
a. Effecting such coordination as necessary
among the Industrial Security Officers assigned to
the directorates to ensure that inspections and re-
inspections of contractors' facilities are accom-
plished in an orderly and timely fashion.
b. In collaboration with the Support Services
Staff, DDS, developing automated record systems
All Security Officers were Career Security Officers as-
signed by the Director of Security with the concurrences of
the D/L and heads of contracting offices.
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to reflect appropriate industrial security information.
c. Developing procedures leading to the iden-
tification of responsibility among the Industrial Se-
curity Officers assigned to the several directorates
for prime cognizance of a contractor facility which
is used by more than one directorate; and ensuring
the development of the necessary coordination so
that all Industrial Security Officers were aware of
the security status of any contracting facility in
which they had interest.
Following abolishment of the ISSD, a Special Assistant for
industrial security policy was added to the staff of the Special
Security Center, to provide a working-level point of coordina-
tion within the Office of Security for the Chief, OL/Security
Staff, to coordinate matters of policy. The Chief, OL/Secu-
rity Staff, initiated a program involving the assignment of
overall security cognizance for contractors' facilities to Indus-
trial Security Officers assigned to other Offices possessing con-
tracting delegations, to insure that dual security inspection re-
sponsibilities did not exist in those cases where more than one
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office possessed contract relationships with the same con-
tractor. Work was also commenced toward preparation of a
standard industrial security guide, and Chief, OL/Security
Staff, held regular meetings with Industrial Security Officers
assigned to other Offices.
G. Technological Security Considerations
The government's, and the Agency's, incursion into the
field of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) occurred much too
swiftly for realization of the security problems involved in
such a system.* Security policy and procedures were based
on traditional concepts of personnel and physical security
which were born in an environment with little or no automa-
tion of the information-handling processes. Classified informa-
tion was thought of in terms of a single piece of paper, a
spoken word.
With the advent of the computer, the security hazard in-
creased dramatically, if for no other reason than that so much
The principal source for information related to ADP
security is reference 274/.
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information could be compromised so quickly. The computer's
ability to collate information from all sources threatened to
undermine the "need-to-know" principle, which had been a
fundamental concept of security applied to the intelligence
mission. One unreliable individual with access to the computer
could now do more damage.
Storage in the ADP environment is either internal or ex-
ternal to the computer processing unit and is in digital form;
it can thus be in "main memory" (or core) or on one of a
variety of tape, disc, drum, or other devices. As examples
of computer storage capability, 13 million characters may be
stored on a single magnetic tape; 7 to 24 million characters
in a disc pack; 3,200,000 characters in a drum; and the capa-
city of a data cell is 400 million characters per disc and 40
million characters per unit. The small size of the storage
unit created a vulnerability to theft. The computer itself pro-
vided the means to copy information. Electromagnetic radia-
tion occurs in almost all parts of a computer system, and it
is subject to direct electronic eavesdropping. The digital
transmission of data provides no more privacy than Morse Code.
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Since 1965 there has been an increasing awareness of
the security hazards inherent in ADP systems. In July 1967,
Mr. Clark Clifford, as Chairman of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, submitted a report to the Presi-
dent on the intelligence information-handling problem which
contained, among other recommendations, the following:
The development by the Director of Central
Intelligence of new physical security regula-
tions, procedures, and guidelines to be imple-
mented by US intelligence agencies on a commun-
ity-wide basis, with a view to providing adequate
security protection for sensitive intelligence data
within information-handling systems utilizing
automatic data processing techniques.
Mr. Clifford's report was subsequently (in February 1968)
forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence under cover
of National Securi ty Action Memorandum No. 368. This
memorandum requested the DCI to consider the recommenda-
tions and to prepare a proposal for implementing a community
information-handling system which would ensure the secure
and efficient dissemination, processing, storage, and retrieval
of intelligence information. In April 1968, USIB approved the
establishment of the Intelligence Information Handling Com-
mittee (to replace the former Committee on Documentation);
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one objective of this new Committee was to ensure that the
security aspects of information-handling systems were given
appropriate consideration. In addition, USIB indicated an ob-
jective in the intelligence information-handling field to develop
standards to assure the protection of information incorporated
in ADP systems, particularly multiprogramming and on-line
systems.
In CIA on 23 October 1967, recognizing the special secu-
rity problems of computer operation, the Director of Security
established the position of Special Assistant for ADP in the
Executive Staff of the Office of Security to coordinate Office of
Security applications for ADP, in addition to representing the
Office in all matters related to the security aspects of ADP
utilization. 275/ Two additional professional personnel were
subsequently added.
But other aspects of technology affected the Agency's secu-
rity program. Large-scale research and development efforts to
produce equipments of potential intelligence application resulted
in break-throughs in the overall technological state-of-the-art.
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A
I. Other Organizational Adjustments
Other minor adjustments to the Office of Security occurred
subsequent to the 1965 reorganization. The Special Activities
Division of the IOS Directorate was created in March 1966 to
supervise and manage the Office's proprietary investigative
organization. 282/ In 1968, due to the drastic curtailment of
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J. In Conclusion
The profession of Government security officer was born
during World War II. The nation was engaged in a total war,
and all elements of the Government's bureaucracy, as well as
much of its industrial organization, became involved in the
military effort. Since the activities of the greater portion of
the bureaucracy had previously been open to full public scru-
tiny, World War II security efforts were much concerned with
censoring the information which was to be released to the
public. Sabotage was also a concern, as was the possibility
that the opposition's intelligence services would somehow
See Figure 1, Page 13, for Office of Security organiza-
tional structure existing as of 31 December 1968.
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effect a secret penetration of the US war-planning machinery.
Fortunately, the FBI had for several years been engaged in
identifying suspect individuals, and grants of emergency war-
time authority permitted their incarceration. The lines of
battle thereafter provided a formidable barrier to subsequent
efforts on the part of the opposition. With relatively limited
experience, the nation entered the postwar period with little
or no sense that foreign intelligence services represented a
threat to US national security.
The activities of the Government security officers include
a conglomeration of many specialties, common to one another
only in that they are all intended to negate the threat of un-
authorized exposure, either accidental or purposeful, of clas-
sified information. It might be concluded that the Government
security officer need not have been at all. The investigation
and appraisal functions attendant on the personnel selection
processes might have been made the responsibility of the per-
sonnel officer; the physical protection of installations and clas-
sified materials the province of the logistics officer; and the
day-to-day application of security concepts peculiar to the
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nature of any given activity, the sole prerogative of the com-
mand authority. The opposition, however, as represented by
foreign intelligence services, organized itself in a manner
designed to best exploit the overall weaknesses in the security
system. Therefore, a counter-effort (security) structured to
consider the total threat was necessary.
When the Central Intelligence Agency came into being in
1947, Federal government concepts of security were still
undergoing a process of refinement. Proposals entertained
under CIG, which would have given the Agency the paramount
role in the coordination of policies related to the protection of
all classified defense information, were discarded during the
preparation of CIA enabling legislation, probably due as much
to insistence by the military departments that such matters
were more rightly within their province as to prevalent national
fears related to the creation of a secret Federal security organ-
ization. Thereafter, the Agency's considerations of security
turned inward to the business of providing protection for its
own operations. Given responsibility to pursue activities of
extreme sensitivity, wherein the exercise of good security was
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essential, the Agency's security program not only kept pace
with that of the balance of the Government, but surpassed it
in effectiveness.
The Agency possessed certain advantages over other de-
partments and agencies. Its early introspective considerations
of security led to the development of policy and procedure in
more intimate surroundings, where conceptual thinking was
always subjected to the rigorous critique of those who were
sfaced with the practicalities of getting the overall job accom-
plished. This unquestionably resulted in a more responsive
security program. Furthermore, able to operate under con-
siderable exception to the Federal policies controlling other
departments, it made use of the good aspects contained in
these policies, often improved upon them, and further inno-
vated as appropriate to the nature of its own mission. What
resulted was a combination of orthodox procedure -- related
to security of personnel, physical assets, information controls,
and the principle of "need-to-know" in the dissemination of
classified information -- with concepts of clandestine opera-
tion (operational security), wherein security relies heavily
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upon anonymity. The latter also provides a basis for "plau-
sible denial" or disclaimer by the Government of direct in-
volvement in actions, the acknowledgement of which might
seriously prejudice international relations.
The orthodox aspects of security provided considerable
early challenge to the CIA. The Agency began with many per-
sonnel inherited from the wartime OSS organization, a number
of whom possessed political philosophies inimical to the ob-
jective of the new, peacetime intelligence organization. In
addition, the Agency expanded its personnel very rapidly.
The personnel security screening process was delivered a
severe blow by the FBI's withdrawal of applicant investigative
services. The Agency quickly developed its own security in-
vestigative organization, which investigated not only its appli-
cants but also those proposed for operational use in its clan-
destine activities.
The Office of Security also was able to render a wide range
of other support to Agency operations, thereby developing into
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to a truly clandestine pcnetration attempt were quickly recog-
nized, and the polygraph was introduced as an integral part of
the Agency's personnel security screening procedures. It was
early presumed that even the most rigid personnel screening
program might not b e completely successful in preventing
penetration of the Agency through its personnel by foreign in-
telligence services, and programs providing for continuing
security research and re-investigation to detect possible pat-
terns of penetration, in addition to the security counseling of
employees related to personal problems, were undertaken.
The physical protection of the Agency's classified informa-
tion and facilities also involved unusual problems. Working
daily with information involving the highest classifications of
sensitivity was the general rule, rather than the exception,
in CIA. Personnel needed to be constantly reminded of their
obligations to security. The many dispersed buildings consti-
tuting the early CIA Headquarters establishment necessitated
a constant traffic of personnel and classified materials from
building to building, thereby subjecting the Agency's activities
to an unusual degree of security hazard. Too often CIA physical
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Operational security concepts were also put to severe test.
The introduction of the ideas of covert political action and psy-
chological warfare in 1950 qualified and diluted the traditional
concept of a case officer controlling an agent because of the
size and scale of the operations involved. Efforts at compart-
mentation of activities always failed to achieve complete suc-
cess, because, sooner or later, common assets and resources
would need to be called into play. The geographical area di-
vision organizational concept prevailed, and the day-to-day
activities of espionage and covert action programs came to be
thoroughly integrated. As covert action activities grew in size
and complexity, the resources, of other departments and agencies
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were called upon with increased frequency and there was fur-
ther deterioration of the "need-to-know" principle. Finally,
the abortive covert invasion of Cuba demonstrated that there
were practical limits to the size of any such effort that the
nation could hope to undertake on a truly covert basis.
With the advent of the U-2 program in 1955, the principal
source of intelligence collection began to move away from the
traditional DDP methods into the technical and scientific field.
Entire fleets of aircraft and other equally significant items of
intelligence hardware were developed under conditions of secu-
rity rivaling those involved in World War II's Manhattan Pro-
ject. Dollar expenditures were so large that the defense of
these programs required interdepartmental coordination to
justify them. Special formal security systems were devised
to provide security compartmentation to these programs which
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It was about 1957 that studies of the nation's overall foreign
intelligence activities were begun by President Eisenhower.
These studies, continued through 1961, resulted in the DCI be-
coming more firmly recognized as the titular head of all US
foreign intelligence activities, and consequently as the individual
most prominent in the coordination of policies affecting the safe-
guarding of intelligence information, and intelligence sources
and methods. Previously the statutory responsibility of the DCI,
related to the protection of intelligence sources and methods,
had been applied only to matters concerning the security of the
Agency's own internal operations, in addition to overseeing the
protection of its published reports disseminated to non-USIB
(United States Intelligence Board) departments and agencies.
Among other results, these studies led to the creation of
the Security Committee (IBSEC) Of the US Intelligence Board
in 1958 and to greatly increased interdepartmental investiga-
tion and coordination of matters related to security intelligence.
- Events occurring both during and subsequent to this period in-
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provided ample evidence of the extent and nature of threat to
security of the nation's intelligence mission. There followed
an overall effort toward uniformity and upgrading of security
standards. The 1964 creation of the Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures Committee (TSCC) under USIB further re-
sulted in closer coordination in the fields of security training
and research and development and in a pooling of ideas and
resources.
Thus the DCI, early discouraged from a formal role
in the promulgation of overall Government policies related
. to the protection of classified information,* nevertheless
attained considerable Government-wide prominence in
matters related to security, in his protection of intelligence
sources and methods role. One might postulate that the time
is long overdue for the nation to recognize that internal security
* A function of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal
Security (ICIS) (see III, J. 1, above).
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is affected by occurrences outside the territorial limits of
the United States, and that the CIA has much to offer to this
subject. As a minimum, some effort should be made to
bridge the activities of ICIS with those of USIB, IBSEC, and
TSCC at some point short of the Executive level.
An examination of the history of the CIA security pro-
gram against these overall trends which have been summar-
ized here must conclude that the Agency's security support-
ing organization demonstrated a remarkable degree of ver-
satility and adaptability. The versatility and adaptability
are reflected to a minor degree in the progression of organ-
izational charts which are included in this volume, but it is
those sections which describe the activities of the various
components of the Agency's security organization which
most reveal its unusual responsiveness. These sections re-
flect the development of one of the most outstanding personnel
security screening programs in Government, a realistic
assessment of the physical threat to Agency facilities, per-
sonnel, and classified materials, a security education program
which has made every employee a security officer, the develop-
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ment of a professional security corps to render assistance
as required to the varied and ever changing nature of the
Agency's operations, and last but not least, leadership to
the entire Government in its coordinated efforts to protect
intelligence sources and methods.
As an overview, this volume has only touched upon
many of the details of these accomplishments. It must be
left to subsequent volumes in this series to describe them
in further detail.
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