EXTRACTS FROM THE CIA PUBLICATION, 'THE VIETNAM SITUATION: AN ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200110016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Extracts from the CIA Publication,
"The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate"
dated 23 May 1967
ILLE
Army review(s) completed.
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Extracts from the publication "The. Vietnam
C
onclusions," dated 23 May 1967;
Section I. Paras. 6, 7, and 8 Pages 6 and 7:
~ he T1e'r
0. i orce: Estimating the size, structure and ^ ti? v_
Hess of the enemy fore e~f~ecJ,
e in South Vietnam is a difficult intelligence task
complicated by methodological pr
obla
ems, the difficulty of acquiring hard
data in a timely fashion, and the presentational issues involved in re-
fining our data base in the light of
new knowledge without giving data
the false impression that the ener,~ force has sucderiy ballooned or w ith-
outmaking new data difficult to relate to
example the inevitable tension between the need to apply stringent criteria
it or confirmation and acceptability, which tend to a
assessments" the real inherently low
(in estate taxation sense), with the need,
on the part of unit commanders for particularly
, appraisals (in the real estate sales
sense) which indicate what allied forces actually may be facing. Over the
past year our methodology and data base have both improved marke
Further refinement is still desirable, but o may`
aCGUlSltlOn problems 1nVOiVinv 'i S me problems, partic`.ilarly
meliness, are inherently insoluble y
(unless, for example, Communist infiltrators
start defecting sooner after
their arrival in South Vietnam).
7. Our review of all evidence available indicates increasingly effective operations and resultant
Vietnamese Co Communist casualties, the
mmunists have continued to expand the size of their main
force structure in South Vietnam born t1
by iriiltration and local recruit-
ment. Though part of this main force exp ,
a.-ision has been achieved at
the e:
l I
o unable
as yeL I,, to co
mpute th fll
eu St we
combat support, and political elements ;Ni`t,n The or.
the numbers of such personnel and any real precis:on. Tine ;
on their eden on
military operations, xact duties in relat=
Captured ? _ has been extremely scant until n to U:; ~t
remy documents and Y ``''' very receent period.
the strength prisoner in
, ~errog L n,
in all these categ -dons are now ~ L n ,
Drr aies i t at
appeared to be in the past. 5 almost certainly -much hi%'^er t:. -
tIn most cases, it had
sufficient to indicate , ti ._owever, the evidence is still
more than a
broad ranor In-
;.or strength in these categories
.
In the ca,e of the irregular forces, for e:{ample,
list their strength at 113 000, the Latest liS order of battle
indicate that irregular strength is more by CC+ IUO~fA~,`J, IlOz?Jev21
ndi g r; liti l in
the ,
i ~n a final judgment has not
althou yet Y neigi_bor,god of 190
000,
been made. The sL- 'z of
the so-called
"til ACV J-2 tilonthly Order of battle Summa-- as
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"administrative service" forces (staffs and non-combat support troops) are now
listed in the OB at 25, 000, but may be several times higher -- possibly in the
neighborhood of 75, 000-100, 000. The number of Viet Con, political personnel,
listed at 39, 000 in the OB, may be well over twice as high. Part of the difficulty
in estimating the strength of the above categories is that we
degree political cadre, for example, can be clearly delineated from irreg la sat
in counting for OB purposes.
In any event, it appears that strength of the insurgent apparatus in South
Vietnam, instead of totalling 292, 000 as listed in the 15 May 1?67 OB
actually be in the half-million range. if the may
Communists have an organized
manpower base of anytivhere near this size to draw upon for their combat units
it is hard to visualize how they can get into gnto serious trouble in the near future
in obtaining the necessary replacement
personnel, particularly when their ca-
city for recruitment in South Vietnam, outside their oro an-
sidered and when infiltration from the North is added. Curren estimates place
these latter inputs at a maximum of about 14, ~
may be mounting close to this figure, 000 per month' Current losses
but are probably not above it.
While it appears that the Communists can continue
to sustain their overall
strength during the coming year, it is unlikely i
at current moss rates that they
can add much to it, except in northern South Vietnam where the availability of
manpower from the North provides a seemingly Plentiful supply. If, on the other
hand, the Communists check the erosion of their manpower base and possibly
even make inroads into allied-controlled areas as a result of military develop-
ments this year they may succeed in significantly expanding their overall force.
Section II. Summary Paras. 1 2' 3
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 ,~~ 2
2a, and 23; Pages 3 thru 10.
Main and Local Forces'-
1. The Viet Cong - NV A Main and Local Forces have expanded considerably
since early last year. In January 1966, the MACV Order of Battle listed 85, 000
in these categories. As of mid-May this year the OB figures had increased 36
percent, to over 115, 000.
2. The VC/NVA who comprise the Main and Local Forces are, fr
or the most
Part, serving in 196 battalion formations, of which 102 battalions are clearly
North Vietnamese Army units. One hundred and eight of the total
196 battalions
are subordinate to 36 regimental formation; -
- 24 NVA and 12 Viet Cono -- which
`tiTain Force troops are those subordinate to the Central Office of
South Vietnam (COSVN) or to one of the Viet
Gongs military regions, or
to command elements in the North. Local Force troops are subordinate
to Viet Con Pro '
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in turn are subordinate to the seven accepted NVA divisions and two Viet
Cong divisions. The units above include those in the DMZ area w'
have been accepted into the Order of Battle. rich
operating in South Vietnam or in an adjacent area aollowing operLions liln th
South. In addition to the above units, there are 2 e
07
sparnd 69 platoons listed in the OB, all of which are V
iet Con ate companies
o units.
DISTRIBUTION OF VC/NVA COMBAT
FORCES
(SVN)
I CTZ
Stren th
31, 780
Division
a
Re?i rents
11
Bat_al
ion
61
Sep Co
(VC)
Sep Platoon.
(VC)
(21
340)
42
,
(4)
(43)
Ii CTZ
33, 045
2
1
0
(22, 650)
(2)
(
0
'4
56
31
)
(4-)
!II CTZ
31,652
3
13
(8, 590)
(1)
(5)
(15)
38
27
LV CTZ
19,240
2
22
71
11
3. It is likely that the < id-tilay 1967 OB figure Local Forces is somewhat lower than the actual Communist in t the Ivlain
field. This is due primarily to the inherent time lam in yhe
obtaini n~ current info: a, ofher. up to six months, in
'oration on newly arrived or recently created units.
secondary reason is the strict acceptance criteria which demand highly credible A
evidence before a unit is accepted into the order of battle.
4. Another factor influe,,
--cing our belief that OB
particular point in time is the is s? ne`,vhat love at this
status of North Vietnamese L:Lt41tratio n to South
Vietnam. During the first lour
months of this year we were observing >>
intelligence indicators which, from past of the
ast en-perience, suggested that a new round
of large scale infiltration into z
South Iietnam was taking place. Wit
two weeks tiIAC~i accepted ~ `_zir_ the past
another North Vietnamese dvision, the 325t: a, the figure from about 110, 000 to its current 0 alsino
level of 115, 00
significant amount of other info -
men. There is a
"oration -- from captured docu~ea
suggesting that still additional units had ts and prisoners
For eting that in South Vietnam before mid-May.
` j e, documents captured by MACV on I? and 13 May indicate at the
Stn N; I3 Regiment from. the 304th NVA ~.
March and n ~ Division 3rriJed in Scut'-: ~iietr_a;;Z in earl}.
participated in an. attack south o Qu an,-
date, ri City on 6
the 7 -~pri1. To
however, information available on this unit is not 51-'r.-`icient to 1.varr~Lt
its inclusion in the 03.
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ni sT
5, It is currently recognized within the intelligence community that the number
of administrative service troops -- listed at about 2-
OB -- i
I
~V still, t ~ N bb substantially raised, but
side. due to the ?ac c of precise information b ?11 e w
em are present in each province.
7? There are, moreover other non-combat military Personnel personnel subordinate to national, regional pro
vinciel such as the
quarters, smaller signal units, and personnel ,_' al and district head-
who are not yet picked up in any OB Catec rT, 1 won Virg in Viet Corg base areas
forming ordnance and Such personnel include t;
quartermaster functions, those per'
ops engaged in running such facilities repair and maintenance perSe.- e1
ps
and as recruit depots, training ?n
camps, These individuals, as more information becomes ? ~ r
and troops be included under the administrative service available, :.sill
category.
8. MACVisno~.vreviewing its estimate of administrative
atte piing to include at least so ? ~ er ?
ahem me of the additional elemenu`s. It is service it s believed t-
a~ t.,
that ;~ ll this catego-
s probably substantially below their real stn n vh0 in MAC V's April 1967
50 - 75, 000 men, Information on such ? o perhaps by as much as
military operations be personnel was relatively scarce until US
began to result in large numbers of prisoners
documents, and captured
6, This ill allowed us to beg
Others Mill gin to fill in some of the gaps in this
tcro exist, however9 For example, o P tt a cage r
desig
than a nation encompasses all VC province and otr;.i the administrative service
dozen provincial ct staffs, he OB lists fewei
staffs and no district staffs, partly because precise infor-
mation is still unavailable on ?any such units. We know,
p
~
Cor_g
are have a total of 36 provinces broken down into .,owe=rer, that the Viet
almost certainly over ?00 districts.
Y administrative service staffs Sirce there
districts their inclusion w in the large :. ajority of these
ould raise this categor
winces we have no detailed i y substantially, In sixte
reformation at all on Co, en pro'
t
troops although it seems certain that some of th e . e
.
or full-time service and staFr _r. and 1--ocal Force strergt z T, .
0, 000, a figure roughly < ? ` t may oe in the neighborhood of
y equivalent ,
o Mai
on the conservative
9. An unofficial estimate
basis of made in the ti'~ashi ngton intelligence commu::=t
e ctrapolatior.s rem a limited n? y on the
strength in the mbar of documents suggests 'that service cateao' at total
1 Personnel to co ~- o ' . rely ratio
able for a milit -ary moat forces would not see? unre
apparatus of the present sophistication oft ason
one Viet Cong/NVa.
~drnir.istrative Se
rv'ce units are composed of mil'
mi litant .t? r= arson
r egion, military subregion ! P r_el in COSV.q
technical units Or all `fpeS directly subor inert to t district staffs and rear gerfiCe
f
Y dinate to these headquar`te?r
The ratio of US combatant to s,
at least si;' to one in US service and staff personnel i
favor of service and staff. n Sown Vietnam., is
That US for-es
should . ;
,ava
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Proportionally so many more service and staff troops than the Co
explained by the relativel high
y plane of living enjoyed b L sophistication of US
stanrd equipment and the higher the higher can be
y S troops,
Irregulars-
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10. On the basis of information received during
our previous estimates of Communist irr
e ulcer s r~he past year it is apparent tla
complete examination of this inform~ati 0 ength are also too low. 17
list some 113 000 on, the VIACV order of erclir,
irregulars. T' battle continues to
remained unchanged ? his figure was arrived at over
since that time. a Year ago and has
March 1967 tentatively Studies of the evidence by I ACV arrived at what was thought to be a slightly ACV er conservative
figure of 198, 000 irregulars.
d conserva
11. The basic problem in
estimating irregular strength is that the'i
force structure does not lend itself to the P".. ~~c:se measurements which
can force for conventionally organize rregule
rd military command vnti ary units based upon unit nomencab e,
and unit historical data. Many of the captured Viet Cong
records are available for som
e provinces are obviously estimates rather stabulations of strengths r irregular platoons and squads. statistical
more precise data, MACV'3 ^ than
ed pri
estimates of VC irregular strength In the
marily from the estimates provided by gular strength are de
consider the type of VC r rived aces
infrastructure, the densit of , These estimates
military activity, and the extent the scalp r
t of VC control ?i enem
12. The unofficial MACV estimate of about 198, 00
in part, of a new
Estim 0 irregular t..
countryside collection o s is he result,
ates and suPPor tin effort focussing on the sector level.
Saigor. for review and
g information developed at the sector are forwarded to
comparison with infor-nation available there.
13. Despite the increased'ennphasis
monist' on colt
s irregular force, we are still not Co>Zcti?n of intelligerCe on the Corn-
accurate.
The number that the fiCe_- of irregulars is probably not 1 our of 193 0~0 is
it
could be considerably I hors. ess `ha t he 198, 000 fig~
o1re,
14. In any case, it is expected "
will rise consider that the Current OB figure of about 113, 000
y in the near future. This will
..'
regular strength has jumped, but only that we have refined o atp tLhat ac~al ir-
ur r;no.vledge of it,
Irregulars by MACV
's definition, are orga.-;ized_orc
self-defense, and secret self- es composed of
defense elements guerrilla,
level VC organizations. Ju DorduzatA to
arid harm, -t
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Political Order of Battler
15. The IACV Order of Battle lists 39, 000 VC political cadre in South V
but this estimate, like those for administrative service and irregular per ietna:
is probably also too low. The 39, 000 figure, P sonnel.$
j arrived at in early 1865, did not,
partly because of the scanty information available, include those political care
at the hamlet level where the lard dre
If hamlet cadres are included in the Political OBI,1 an unoff c j Y ' Je expected to serve
tion from the available data shows the number of of ti al ~?iACV ext
rapola-
80, 000 and 1 Z0, 000. Unofficial ARVN estimates put the number of political
personnel as high as 150, 000.
16. An Or,-going CIA study of one area of the political ? 'rastr
security apparatus - T~cture -- the
- also Suggests that the current figure of cadres is too low. This study concluded that there are p`O??-='o3l9, G0l political
VC security personnel alone in South Vietnarn. y at least 20 000
the Political OB include those assigned to the p Opaor person'- el which be Long in
Civilian Proselytiao, Militar pr?Se anda/Cti;t'=re and Indoctrinati<
Y 1 tin? Postal Transport, and Com:-riunication;
and Civil Health elements of the Viet Cong ~
b apparatus,
17. The basic problem in moving ahead to firm up the political OB is that not know host, mangy o at we
L the political personnel are already accounted _`or in some
N/fain/Local Force, Irregulars, or Adrnin'str ~=-.
personnel. Particularly at the lower echelons, it would seem likely that many the political personnel also fill in at military
there is unciuantifi evidence that or Paramilitary Posts. Y 1
that the Communists during ~' e ,
1967 cannibalized some of their political apparatus to get nb late 1960' and d early
units; the extent of this is unknown at present, militarz
18. Excluded from the Order of Battle altogether ouths whom have been the Viet Cong Assaul
m the Communists created in early 1965, after their decision to em-
phasize "rr1obile warfare. " v
Many Assault Youths from COSVN to district level
appear to be full-time personaset,.~
m
o
Ohe f ea Cor?-e fu l, expected to perform logistic _11-nccions in support
of Supplies. es. 1he-ir e,aS:\ include the transportati0.-.
Partially armed and often uniformed
of acting as a m they have the second y pool for Communist e ular , aril function
Youths in Viet Cong-controlled villas g unit''. There are al ..
es and ': so a -
time personnel. b . amlets, but these are clearly Part-
19. As yet no attempt has been
e ctrapolation_s fro.. made to estimate their over-all numbers,
from available documents suggest suggest their total Strength 4.s in the low
'The Political OB
iS defined as the str engtn, and disposition of ' e
ad;i zi str alive orgar:ization of the Viet Con- ;;,,_ t"- com. -and, and
Com_:u _st control rastructur e, which ern bodies
~
front oroanicati0;1 ~ str al and the leadership and ad,-ninistratio -I , f the
o a Parcel' el
which which e cterid f national tiirFront ?llgn for :e Liberation of S0uti. -Vietnam.). of
rorn na`' , both O~
o the ham-le, l
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Input Capabilities
20. There are two basic input factors to Communist strength in South Vietnam
recruitment of indigenous manpower and i
fil
-
n
tr
precise in our estimate of Communist capabilitie
ation s and-present lthe ~rates for We cann
these factors. of
e therot be
21. MACV has developed what is believed to be a better estimate than in the past
te
of the rate per maYimum p month at which the Communists can obtain and train
power in South Vietnam for their armed fo
' mal-i-
rces -- currently 7,0the 00
This estimate is based on an assessment of the Percentage of the r.er. per month.
available to the Communists and on male population
n a limited number of documents discussing in-
digenous recruitment from which an extrapolated tfor all of Sout h Vie
developed. rate It represents input both to the regular tnam was
or not the Cornmunis regular and irregular forces. jY'nether
ts are actually attaining this rate, or perhaps u' nown? No numerical documentation, it should be noted, was exceeding it, is
delta in making the estimate. The delta, of course, has long serve av d able for the
reservoir of manpower for the enemy. o d as a main
22. The average monthly rate of infiltration into South Vietnam cannot be
determined with any real deg.
Y tree of confidence for the period
~
1966 due to the overall lag in obtaining information. after about September
the rate dropped substantially It does appear, however, that
in the last months of 1966 and in early 1967, although
the exact extent of this and the reasons for it ar
dence ~ `e not clear at present. The eve-
, as indicated earlier in 'he paper, strongl/ y
again increased in '- suggests that infiltration has
he last few months and is now probably at or above
average rates. If the time fro? October of 1965 -- when a heavy the prior
1tration began - heavy round of i r1i-
- to the present is taken as a base period, the maximum infil-
tration reported (including confirmed, probable and possible) works out to a rate
in excess of 6, 800 per month.
23. Applying this rate of infiltration, together with esti-
mated internal recruitment rate would g:-r J~ the 7, 000 per month est:-
of around l4 000
e the Communists a total input capacity
men per month. When this is measured against estimates of t
Communist overall loss rate it appears that ~ ? ~n e
pear,.s that the Communists are still able
substantially to their overall strength in the South. T to add
that our estimates of enemy losses are in It s.hoL.ci be noted, 1-;owevz~
estimate many respects ,just as tenuous as our
s of enemy input. Moreover, much of the --, r
in the last year has been into from- northern South Vietnam
creased the threat in that area, and, while it has greatly in.-
`has not added directl to n ,
II Corps southward. Y t e enemy strength from.
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Section III Paras. 3 and 4 Page 4:
3. No systematic study of the size of the Communist infrastructure has yet
been published. Research indicates, however, that it has far more than the
39, 000 members carried in current political order of battle estimates. Un-
official estimates of its actual strength range from 80, 000, regarded as a rock
bottom minimum, up to 150, 000. These estimates are based on extrapolations frog
captured documents, as applied to allied population control statistics. The ex
those who are only casually connected to the Viet Cong Y clu;
associations. such as members of non;
4. Although the infrastructure is far larger than listed in the OB, it is probably
not as big as it once was. There has been, according to captured Viet
ments, a significant erosion of the Co Cong docu-
mmunist-controlled population base since
mid-1965. Many me,, bers of the infrastructure have fled, been or faded away. In some areas, such as in parts of Dinh Dinh and killed, ca
Phu Yea ptured
provinces and certain parts of the Delta, the infrastructure has partially dis-
integrated because of allied military pressure,
however,
particularly in I Corps, it appears to be as resilient and as strong asvever.
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