EXTRACTS FROM THE CIA PUBLICATION, A SYNTHESIS OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION: AN ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00610R000200110015-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 24, 2003
Sequence Number: 
15
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 23, 1967
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00610R000200110015-8.pdf98.73 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP90-006108000200110015-8 Extracts from the CIA Publication, "A Synthesis of The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate'" dated 23 May 1967 ILLE Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR00020011001518 !ed b Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000200110015-8 Extracts from the CIA publication HAS n, 'The Analysis and Estimate"' dated 2.3 Ma 196 'sis of Viat*,~ Situation: 7; y Section II. Paras. B. 5, B. 6, B. 7, and B. 8I Pages 2 and 3: An 25X 5? EatltTiaeiri~ trld oi~o, St;ueeul-a anel in South Vietnam is a difficult intelligen e.feetivoaeas e~' ehe enet-;~y #aree y methodo- logical proble,~ s. It is difficult to acquc ethard da ali~ated b new ~ a timely fashion. Also, when kinds of data. information become availab~ to relate the new data to the previous figures based on a different break- down of data. There is, for example the inevitable o need to apply ~ tension between the stringent criteria of confir tend to produce ir.;nerentl low matiOn and acceptability (vr;2ich y ` "assessments," as do the assessments for real estate taxation) with the need for Praisals , salesman makes) which indicate what allied forces lactual'Se-,,-.a real facing Over tpast year, our -methodology / Y be facing. Over the hlz . y and data base have improved / Further refineme 25X is still particularly ac oee but some pr?bl i i sJ qu e;r_s, s tion roblem t in insoluble p g meliness are The Con ? munisL~s have continued to expand their -, despite the increasing effectiveness ._--_ain force units o of allied " ' goons, Viet Cong-~iort,i Vietnam main for s earch-and-destroy" oper- in the period since Januar 1906 _ ces have expanded by 36 percent level may be even higher y - from 85,'000 to L1-5, 000. The present since all the evidence on recent infiltrations and recruitment is not yet in. 7. Part of this expansion of main force units has been at the .lower level Viet Cong formations. expense of of l lea elements To accelerate the exp b i were up-graded, an ion, a number military g, causing a drain or. Viet Cong para- formations anc~ on the so-called "political i^= forces remaiP_ sizeable, -~rastructure." These however,-- Probably larger i fact Order of battle figures indicate. L n fact than current It is difficult to compute the full strength of the paramilitary, a support ' combat and political eler_-me precision. Latest order of Oj1 1 ntS Wi th any real 113, 000, holdings peg the irre;ula~ at but recent studies indicate ` forces 200, 000. The strength of the Support that to now cirri well be close to be several times greater. L y,? ed at 2S, 000, ma - In short, the overall strength of t t y apparatus in Southo Vietnam, currently listed as 292000, may y be e in the thent million range. e halr""- half- 8. This is not to suavest that the total increased dramatically in recent CO" maniac force structure has i r t months. Instead, ?..ents in rrethodologf ~ an accumulation o and data now indicates * L have long been facing a total that the t: ?^ L. nhave O a_ organized op p b ~~tion far larder * than accepted accepted Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP90-00 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000200110015-8 official figures have indicated. An appreciation of the probable true size of this organized opposition will make possible far more valid arid' nd useful interpretations of future input and loss statistics. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP90-00610ROff200110h15-5