VIET CONG RECRUITMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200110012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 23, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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22 Y ovexr ber 1964
M21I0RADMUM OR3 Mr. Robert W. Komar
Special . sister to the Peaident
SUBJECT s' Viat Cong Recruitment
SUMMARY
Hard t vidence on actual Viet Cong recruitment rate2
is scanty,. An analysis of theoretical recruitment capabilities
and estimated manpower requi:montx, however, permits ua
to frail e an estimate of current recruitment rates which We
have checked against such evidence as is available. We beU ya
the Viet Cong may have difficulty in meeting their overall
recruitment goals but believe that the essential Communist
requirement of replacing VC main and local force losses is
being met by recruitment within South Vietnam.. This recruitment
averaging 3, 000 to 4, 000 r,acruits per month -- igi not only
within VC capabilities but is almost certainly being met in.
actual practice,
1. In response to your request of 17 November, we have taken a resh
look at Viet Cong capabilities for recruiting manpower within South Vietnam
and endeavored to assess the current rate at which South Vietnamese axis
being recruited and trained by the Viet Conga.
25X1
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2. The judgments, methodology and argumentation offered below
reflect the views of all components of this Agency concerned with Vietnam.
Per your request, however, this paper has not been discussed with any
other compoye-lat of the intelligence commun.Ity. Thus it constitutes a CIA
rather than a community appraisal, though we belt a DIA and State would
probably be in substantial agreement with it.
3. As you are aware, hard evidence on actual Viet Cong recruitment
rates is scanty. Hance in responding to your request we have analyzed the
Viet Cong's theoretical recruitment capability, estimated their manpower
requirements and,, in light of these, framed an estimate of current recruit-
ment rates which we have then checked against such evidence as is available.
This procedure doea not yield very firm conclusions but, given the paucity of
hard evidence, we feel it is the beat available line of attack on this problern.
4. Viet Cong Recruitment Capabilities:: The number of South Vietnamese
living under some form of Viet Cong control is at least 3. 5 million and could
be as much as five to six million people, depending on the extent to which
the VC have access to contested areas. The population to which the VC have
effective access for recruitment purposes (lar;oly concentrated in the Delta
region) probably contains some 500, 000 physically tit young males. Within
this potential recruitment pool some 30, 000 to 35, 000 youths annually
become old enough for military service. In addition to this population pool,
/living in areas to which the VC have relatively unrestricted access/ the VC
can also draw on the population of military age in contested areal, on CYN
deserters and on recruits from urban areas. On the basis of what we conaide:
its available manpower resources, we estimate that in 1966 the Viet Cong
had a theoretical capability to recruit and train soma 7, 000 to 10, 000
personnel a month. Theta figures are based on a consideration of available
maleo and hence axe certainly on the low side, since we know the Viet Cong
make extensive use of females even In combat and combat support roles,
5. Recruitment at this rate would probably be close to the ma.Yin'um
capabilities of the VC. Several factors corn'bina to place this ceiling on VC
recruitn::--at and training capabilities. The deterioration of the VC political
control resulting from allied military operations shrinks the population. pool
to which YC recruiters have ready access. Increasing manpower losses
being sustained by VC forces and an apparent VC requirernent to meet at
least part of the North Vietnarnesi troop losses in South Vietnam daminishaas
t:-i" number of cadre available for training asst nments and hence ;mp4see an
effective wining lizxait ore `,?aeoretical r c:ultm nt pebili:y.
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6. VC anvower Requirements: There i littls hard intelligence
on the actu i manpower requirements which of CViet Long recruAtment
re s from
activity. An oxarzina~Ion of the mown buildup military
1961 through 1965 and the estimated losses auatained by the Viet Cong during
the same period. however, give Dome indication of recrui.tn?,o rt requi: a eaata
that obviously were met. As shown in the following table sari taemmower
-require= .eats during these rive ;gars -- to expand VC
forces and to replace losses --- was on ti-;.e order of 356, 000 .to 371, 000 men,
or an average monthly requirement during the period of about 6, 000 pa: a ono.
)During this period additional personnel were recruited to form the VC
Political /military cadre and combat support unite -which now probably luc1uta
from 60, 000 to 90, 000 persons,
*d3E'S CONG M'1.N'PQZ'7aeRRZCIJIR2ii NTS 10601s
Annual
I orce Increases
Estimated
Losaea b/
1961
23
24
1962
16
1963
13
35
1964
34
35-40
1965
54
80-90
Total
145
211-2Z6
7. This 356, 000 to 371, 000 man eat hate is based on current ord.e'r
of battle ho dings.. A reappraisal of the strength of Communist irregular
forces which is currently underway indicates that accepted (i. e., ,iACV)
estirr ates of the strength of Viet Con g irregular forces may have drastically
understated their growth, possibly by as much as 200, 000 persons. if thi3
should prove to be the case,. a buildup of Communist forces during the 1961,. 1965 period would have required xecruisent at a monthly rate of 9: 000 to
9, 500 persona. . Even these higher rtu, ramants are within the above estimat
of Viet Con g capabilities to recruit and train from 7, 000 to 10, 000 personnel
a month.
,-a? Based on DIA/JCS Ol3 ilguraa, for
inclut? xiousiy unde~l..
b,. I IA/JCS figures 1961-1963, adjuatod to
1964-65 figures a s CIA es tee, I
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8. Viet Conti recruitment requirements have varied sharply during
th,e 1961 to 1965 period,. ranging from at least 40,000 a year during 1961-
1964 to over 120, 000 in 1965. the year of the V1 t Cong's greatest force
increase and the year during, which their estimated manpower Los sa mare
than doubled.
9. 1965 also saw a levzling off in the eatizmated buildup of VC
regular forcers. Although these forces will probably increase only by about
5, 000 personnel in 1966, the rising number of casual-ties being susitained by
the VC will keep the manger requirements at about 1965 levels. We
estimate that Viet Cong forces will suffer r a.npower losses of from 90-
100, 000 personnel during 1966. ** This Melds a total manpower replacarsien
rsquirtemant from 95, 000 to 105, 000 per sonm 1 for Viet Cong forces along.
In addition the Viet Cong may be tasked with providing repl.ace,ents for a
growing number of North Vietnamese losses. Depending on Lha extent of
North Vietnamese infiltration, she Viet Gong could be called upon to provide
as many as 15, 000 troops to compensate for northern Losses.
10. estimate of Actual Curren Recruitrr.ent Rates: The precise
ext--r4 to which these theoretical power requirements are actually aatisfiad
cannot be determined on the basis off available evidence. We are reasoaably
sure, however, the Viet Cong are baying d.i:#..lculty in meeting their recruit..
rm ent goals. This is reflected in the increased freguancy of reporting on.
Viet Gong recruitment difficulties and increasing Communist xacour se to
forced conscription despite the adverse political effects of such coercion,
11. It should also be borne in mind that .he i gvrea on ETC anaapower
losses do not directly traAs1ate to true mi1i ry rocruitrnznt .:equ.iremerta
since a large number of the estin:fated losseg are probably civilians ?- ei}.har
innocent vactiznz of military action or labor 'engaged for logistic support.
activities and recruited or impressed only bor short term periods.. Furtharmora,
o The recruitbnent figures expr .asod hero represent the personnel input
required a1tnr allowance has been =ado for the infsitration of pcrso .el
from North Vietnam. _
includgv
/Our (1. a., the CIA) estimate of manpower Insae:, l ralliars, deaer} r d
c
t
d
d
ap
ure
an
anxiously wounded per:a4},clitio:~ i
r*porfad as c ualtiee ,y ?- LACV. J
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the Viet Cong undoubtedly compensate for at least some of their military
manpower losses by upgrading personnel assigned to irregular units (is e.,
transferring them to main and lac-al force units) rather than by direct
levies on the civil Population.
12. We believe the Wet gong * ill consider it imperative to r eplac t
the manpower losses sustained by their main and local force unite. Our
estirr ate is that during 1966 such forces will loss some 35, 000 to 40, 000
troops as a result of casualties, disease, desertion, etc. if the VC are to
compensate for these losses and, at the same time, expand their main and
local forces by 5, 000 troops during 1966, their manpower requirements
for main and local forces alone mould be on the order of 3, 000 to 4, 000
troops a month or 36, 000 to 48, 000 now troops per year.
13. One of the few captured documents giving meaningful agareative
data on annual recruitment in a VC province indicates that total. recruitment
in 1965 amounted to 1.51 of the total population controlled by the VC.
Recruitment specifically for military purposes (inclucung militia, and defense
forces) was just over 17; of the population. On a nationwide hasia, recruit-
ment at this rate would be insufficient to meet total estimated Viet Gong
manpower requirements, but recruitme-at at this rate, projacted nationally,
would provide from 35, 000 to 50, 000 personnel annually -- or enough to
meet local andmain force requirements outlined above. Hence this document
tends to confirm our estimate of what the VC need to do and in fact are doing
in recruitment,
14. A few isolated reports on s ecrui.ncent programs indicate that
VC overall recruitment targets in 1965 were generally fulfilled by at least
50%. in Dinh Dinh province, for example, the percentage of population
joining guerrilla forces has reached only 3.3`,"o of the lowland population and
5. 1% of the highland population _- compared to t.argeto of 5% and 10%
respectively. Captured docurnentz indicate, nevertheless, that the Cori'nu-.
lusts in Dinh 10in`s1 considered 1963 recruitment auzficient to permit marked
i creases is the strength of guerri3 and militia forces.
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15. In