OUTLINE OF WORK LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200100001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2003
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OUTLINE OF WORK
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. Title Page
2. Table of Contents (Chapters and subheadings)
3. Foreword (done)
4. Chronology (done)
5. Body
6. Index (Proper names, elements of Government and organizations,
specialized terms and titles)
7. Reference Bibliography
8. Collection of Vital Papers
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOREWORD
1. This paper, a study of the legislative history of the Central
Intelligence Agency, including pertinent materials on World War II
foreign intelligence organizations, has been prepared by the Office of
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, as an aid to the better
understanding of the present structure and functions of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
2. The evolvement of the Agency under Congressional enactments
is deeply rooted in earlier Executive developments. For this reason it
is important to highlight those developments at least up until the passage
of the National Security Act of 1947. Theoretically, the authority to pre-
scribe functions for a foreign intelligence service lies within the power of
both the Congress and the President. Without attempting to set down
where these powers are mutually exclusive or where they are concurrent,
it may be safely stated that in addition to the power of the purse, Congress
has power, inter alia, "... to provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States... " and "... To declare War.... "~ This
War power includes preparation for war in times of peace, since " the
surest means of avoiding war is to be prepared for it in peace.... 12
Equally clear is the authority of the President to take executive actions to
protect the national interest as long as they are not barred by the Constitution
or other valid law of the land. "The very delicate, plenary, and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the Federal government in the
field of international relations... does not require as a basis for its exercise
an act of Congress. "3
3. This paper draws primarily on Executive correspondence and
orders, committee hearings and reports, and floor discussions and con-
ference reports on bills specifically relating to CIA. Secondary source
material and comment is used for the purpose of continuity and completeness.
4. To the extent this paper contributes to past and on-going efforts
to commit the Agency's history to writing, it would seem to fall into the
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areas of a chronology and bibliography of legislative actions affecting the
Agency, as well as a collection of: the issues put before Congress for
resolution; the alternatives considered by Congress in resolving them; and
the reasons or rationale supporting the choices or compromises Congress
ultimately approved.
5. It is recommended that the existing CIA publication of the
statutes specifically relating to CIA (in text and explanation form) be
reviewed in connection with this work.
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CHRONOLOGY
While the United States had engaged in foreign intelligence
activities since its founding, it took the events of the late 1930's to
provide the impetus for the conception and development of foreign
intelligence activities on a Government-wide basis. The results of
these efforts culminated in the formation of the Central Intelligence
Agency. 4 In this connection, it is felt that it would be helpful to
sketch out in chronological fashion some of the highlights of the evolve-
ment of CIA and its predecessor organizations.
I. EXECUTIVE
11 June 1941 Forerunner of national foreign intelligence service
established by Presidential Order (6 Fed. Reg. 3422).
Key Elements: Office of Coordinator of Information;
Government-wide collection of information bearing on
national security; direct reporting to the President;
inter-departmental committee system.
23 July 1941 Coordinator of Information authorized to expend funds
for certain limited purposes by Presidential letter.
13 June 1942 Coordinator of Information functions, exclusive of
certain foreign information activities transferred to Office of War
Information, transferred to established Office of Strategic Services
(16 Fed. Reg. 3422).
Key Elements: Joint Chiefs of Staff jurisdiction;
Director of Strategic Services appointed by the
President.
1 September 1942 Certain contracting latitude '... without regard to pro-
visions of law...'' granted to Director, Office of Strategic Services
(Executive Order 9241).
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22 January 1946 First Government-wide foreign intelligence service
established by Presidential directive.
Key Elements: National Intelligence Authority at
Secretary-of-Department level; participation by
personal representative of the President; the office
of the Director of Central Intelligence (appointed by
the President)' Central Intelligence Group; within
limits of appropriations available to Secretaries of
State, War, Navy; precursor of Central Intelligence
responsibilities and authorities later enacted into
law.
II. CONGRESS
28 June 1944 First independent appropriations for Office of Strategic
Services (National War Agency Appropriations Act of 1945).
Key Elements: Appropriations in Title I covering the
Executive office of the President; expenditures "for
objects of a confidential nature;" certain accounting
by certificate of Director of Strategic Services.
26 July 1947 Statutory basis for centralized foreign intelligence service
prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947.
Key Elements: National Security Council, Office of
the Director of Central Intelligence; the Central
Intelligence Agency; foreign intelligence service on a
Government-wide basis.
20 June 1949 Statutory basis for the administration of the CIA prescribed
by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Key Elements: Enabling authorities for the'administration
of the CIA on an independent basis.
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I. EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT
Between 1941 and 1946 the responsibility for developing a
coordinated foreign intelligence effort was assumed by the Executive
Branch. President Roosevelt and then President Truman established
in succession the Coordinator of Information, the Strategic Services,
and the Central Intelligence Group in response to the pre-war, war,
and post-war events which spanned this period. Quite understandably,
these precursory organizations reflected as of the time of their establish-
ment the Government's foreign intelligence needs as well as its foreign
intelligence experience.
A. Initiative
With the continuing deterioration of the international situation in
the late 1930's, President Franklin Roosevelt found himself facing an
increasing number of complex problems which transcended the responsi-
bilities of any one department. The President needed some staff facility
to channel coordinated information to him and to assist him in coordinating
the activities of the various departments in connection with these supra-
departmental problems.
The vehicle for implementing this central staff came in the form
of the Reorganization Act of 1939. Under it, the Executive Office of the
President was established. 6
In September of 1939 the President organized the Executive Office
into six principal divisions. One division was set aside for emergency
management "... in the event of a national emergency or threat of a
national emergency. "7 Eight months later and under a "threatened
national emergency, " the President established the Office of Emergency
Management (OEM) for the "clearance of information... " and to secure
maximum "utilization and coordination of agencies and facilities.... "8
In January of 1941 the functions of OEM were further refined in keeping
with its duties to "... advise and assist the President in the discharge of
extraordinary responsibilities imposed upon him by any emergency arising
out of war, the threat of war, (or) imminence of war.... 119
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Quite clearly the concept for organizing foreign intelligence
activities on a Government-wide basis was being born out of the events
which foretold the advent of the Second World War. The organizational
improvisations to meet the emergency would serve as the foundation for
foreign intelligence activity during the War and after it. .
The authorities and responsibilities of a Government-wide
informational channel to the President were more precisely defined on
11 July 1941, some six months after the Presidential finding of a "threatened
national emergency" in the case of OEM. The Office of Coordinator of
Information (OCI) was then added to the Executive Office, and Colonel
William J. Donovan was named to the position. Considering the early
period of development, the functions of this office and the functions
later enacted for the Central Intelligence Agency were quite similar:
"Collect and analyze all information and data, which may
bear upon national security; to correlate such information
and data, and to make such information and data available
to the President and to such departments and agencies as
the President may determine, and to carry out, when
requested by the President, such supplementary activities
as may facilitate the securing of information important for
national security not now available to the Government. "10
The Coordinator of Information was to have access to information and
data within the various departments and agencies but he was not to
interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the President's
regular military and naval advisers.11 To assist him, the Coordinator
could appoint committees of representatives of the various departments
and agencies. Colonel Donovan was to receive no compensation from
the Office but was entitled to transportation, subsistence, and other
incidental expenses. 12 Operating expenses for the Office were allocated
by the President out of his Emergency Fund. Under this broad mandate,
Colonel Donovan began building an intelligence service which would be
of significant value in the prosecution of the war effort.
SECE T
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C. Office of Strategic Services
Following closely on the heels of its Declarations of War against
the AXIS powers, Congress enacted the First War Powers Act, 1941
(P. L. 77-354) and thereby conferred upon the President the "... authority
which is urgently needed in order to put the Government of the United
States on an immediate war footing. "13 Title I of the Act gave the
President the authority to redistribute the functions of the various agencies
to facilitate the prosecution of the war effort.
With the nation now on a war footing, the desirability of linking
the tested and developing capabilities of COI more closely with the Armed
Forces received primary emphasis. On 13 June 1942, the President, as
Commander in Chief, issued a military order which re-designated the
COI as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and placed it under the
jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs. 14 (Foreign information activities of COI
were transferred to the newly created Office of War Information. 15)
OSS's mandate was to:
"a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may
be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
"b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff."
William J. Donovan was appointed by the President as Director of
Strategic Services "under the direction and supervision of the United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff.''
D. OSS Contracting and Appropriations
In carrying out its mission, OSS faced a number of administrative
problems which had not confronted COI. COI received necessary and
secure support in the form of funding, contracting, and other services
from the Executive Office. As a civilian agency under the JCS, OSS
could not rely indefinitely upon the Executive Office for such support.
The type of support needed sheds light on the support which would be
needed later by its successors.
E T
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Under the authority granted by the First War Powers Act of
1941, the President extended to OSS the same privilege to enter into
contracts "... without regard to the provisions of law relating to the
making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts... "
as had been earlier granted to the War Department, the Navy Department,
and the United States Maritime Commission. 16
In its first fiscal year, OSS received funds by allocation from the
President's Emergency Fund. To the extent determined by the President,
they could be expended ". . . without regard to the provisions of law
regulating the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of
persons in the Government service.... " Further, the President could
authorize certain expenditures "... for objects of a confidential nature
and in any such case the certificate of the expending agency as to the
amount of the expenditure and that it is determined inadvisable to specify
the nature thereof shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum therein
expressed to have been expended. "17
OSS's dependence upon the President's Emergency Fund was
removed by Act of Congress. In OSS's second fiscal year of operation
(1943-1944), the National War Agencies Appropriation Act of 194418 as
it pertained to OSS read as follows:
OFFICE OF STRATE6IC SERVICES
Salaries and expenses : For all expenses necessary to enable the
Office of Strategic Services to carry out its functions and activities,
including salaries of a Director at $10,000 per annum, one assistant
director, and one deputy director.at $9,000 per annum each; utilization
of voluntary and uncompensated services; procurement of necessary
services, supplies and equipment without regard to section 3709,
Revised Statutes.; travel expenses, including (1) expenses of attend-
ance at meetings of organizations concerned with the work of the
Office of Strategic Services, (2) actual transportation and other neces-
sary expenses and not to exceed $10 per diem in lieu of subsistence of
persons serving while away from their homes without other compen-
sation from tTie United States in an advisory capacity, and (3)
expenses outside the United States without regard to the Standardized
Government Travel Regulations and the Subsistence Expense Act of
'1926, as amended (5 U. S. C. 821-833), and section 901 of the Act of
June 29, 1936 (46 U. S. C. 1241) ; preparation and transportation of
the remains of officers and employees who die abroad or in transit,
while in the dispatch of their official duties, to their former homes in
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this country or to a ace not more distant for interment, and for the
ordinary expenses of such interment; purchase and exchange of.law-
books and books of reference; rental of news-reporting services; pur-
chase of or subscription to commercial and trade reports, newspapers,
and periodicals; the rendering of such gratuitous services and the free
distribution of such materials as the Director deems advisable; pur-
chase or rental and operation of photographic, reproduction, duplicat-
ing and printing machines, equipment, and devices and radio-receiving
and radio-sending equipment and devices; maintenance, operates,.,
repair, and hire of motor-propelled or horse-drawn p2snger-carry-
ing vehicles and vessels of all kinds; printing and binding; payment
of living and quarters allowances to employees with official head-
quarters located abroad in :? n;ordance with regulations approved by
the President on DecumSer 30, 1942; exchange of funds without regard
to section 3651. Revised Statutes (31 U. S. C. 543) ; purchase and free
distributicir of firearms, guard uniforms, special -clothing, and other
personal equipment; the use of and payment for compartments or other
superior accommodations considered necessary by the Director of
Strategic Services or his designated representatives for security rea-
sons or the protection of highly technical and valuable equipment;
$35,000,000, of which amount such sums as may be authorized by the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget may be transferred to other
departments or agencies of the Government, either as advance pay-
ment or reimbursement of appropriation, for the performance of any
of the functions or activities for which this appropriation is made:
Provided, That $23,000,000 of this appropriation may be expended
without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to
the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of persons
in the Government service, and $21,000,000 of such $23,000,000 may be
expended for objects of a confidential nature, such expenditures to be
accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director of the Office of
Strategic Services and every such certificate shall be deemed a'
sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.
It is to be noted that from its inception, OSS was authorized
to operate under two unusual rules relating to the expenditure of Govern-
ment monies. The first permitted latitude concerning the purpose for
which funds could be expended. The second assured that, whenever
necessary, the purpose and details of the expenditure could be securely
protected against unauthorized disclosure. Subsequent Congresses granted
OSS unvouchered fund authority similar to that granted by the 78th Congress
in the National War Agencies Appropriation Act of 1944; thus underlining
the confidence enjoyed by the Director of OSS in the disposition of confi-
dential funds. 19
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E. Central Intelligence Group
The efforts to build a comprehensive intelligence system by
Executive action was capstoned in the Presidential Directive of 22 January
1946 which established the National Intelligence Authority, the Central
Intelligence Group, and the position of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Nearly two years of study and discussion within the Executive Branch
preceded the issuance of the Directive. While a number of different pro-
posals relating to functions and structure were advocated during this period,
no one questioned the need for a coordinated intelligence system.
The Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946 was to have a marked
influence on the legislation which was to follow. Its background sheds light
on the issues which the Congress was soon to face.
F. Donovan "Principles"
Around 10 October 1944, General Donovan presented President
Roosevelt with a document entitled "The Basis for a Permanent United
States Foreign Intelligence Service. " In that document, General Donovan
wrote that an organization was needed "which will procure intelligence
both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide
intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and
correlate the intelligence material collected by all Government agencies.
General Donovan went on to prescribe ten governing principles:
"1. That there should be a central, overall Foreign
Intelligence Service which (except for specialized intelligence
pertinent to the operations of the armed services and certain
other Government agencies) could serve objectively and im-
partially the needs, of the diplomatic, military, economic and
propaganda service of the Government.
"2. That such a Service should not operate clandestine
intelligence within the United States.
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"3. That it should have no policy function and should
not be identified with any law-enforcing agency either at home
or abroad.
114. That the operations of such a Service should be
primarily the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence on the policy or strategy level.
"5. That such a Service should be under a highly qualified
Director, appointed by the President, and be administered under
Presidential direction.
"6. That, subject to the approval of the President, the
policy of such a Service should be determined by the Director,
with the advice and assistance of a board on which the Department
of State and the Armed Services should be represented.
"7. That such a Service, charged with collecting
intelligence affecting national interests and defense, should
have its own means of communication and should be responsible
for all secret activities, such as:
(a) Secret intelligence
(b) Counter-espionage
(c) Crypto-analysis
(d) Clandestine subversive operations.
"8. That such a Service be operated on both vouchered and
unvouchered funds.
"9. That such a Service have a staff of specialists, pro-
fessionally trained in analysis of intelligence and possessing a high
degree of linguistic, regional, or functional competence to evaluate
incoming intelligence, to make special reports, and to provide
guidance for the collecting branches of the Agency.
"10. It is not necessary to create a new agency. The
nucleus of such an organization already exists in the Office of
Strategic Services. "
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General Donovan's document was returned on 31 October with a comment
that an adviser had informed the President that a better and cheaper
intelligence system was possible and a request that General Donovan
continue his work on a post-war intelligence organization.
In keeping with the President's request to continue working on a
post-war intelligence organization, General Donovan drew up a more
detailed plan for the President. In the transmittal memorandum,
Donovan recommended that "intelligence control be returned to the
supervision of the President, " with a "central authority reporting
directly to you the President) , with responsibility to frame intelligence
objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required
by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and
strategy. " 20
The detailed plan in the form of a draft directive incorporated the
principles Donovan had earlier prescribed and added several functions
and duties for the proposed central authority including: "Coordination of
the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government... ;" collection,
either directly or through existing Government Departments and agencies,
of pertinent information. . . procurement, training, and supervision of its
intelligence personnel; subversive operations abroad, and determination
of policies for and coordination of facilities essential to the collection of
information. ,2l
The Donovan plan also proposed elements necessary to the successful
organization and operation of an intelligence organization including authority
to "employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary supplies,
facilities, and services" and "provide for the internal organization and
management... in such manner as its Director may determine." 22
H. Joint Chiefs' Consideration
The Donovan plan of 18 November 1944 was sent to various Cabinet
officials and the Joint Chiefs. On 24 January 1945, the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee submitted a report 23 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making
comments and recommendations on the Donovan plan and an alternate
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proposal submitted by the Joint Intelligence Committee. With one major
exception, the substance of this report was to be recommended by the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to the President on 7 January 1946
for the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority. The exception
concerned an independent budget for the National Intelligence Authority.
The Secretaries did not recommend an independent budget, a defect to be
corrected by the Congress.
The recommendations of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee
report were incorporated into a Joint Chiefs of Staff report24 dated over
a month after the war had ended. This report disagreed with Donovan's
concept that the centralized service should exist under the direct super-
vision of the President. It was thought that that type of structure would
"over-centralize the national intelligence service and place it at such a
level that it would control the operation of departmental intelligence
agencies without responsibility, either individually or collectively to
the heads of departments concerned.',25
The structure recommended by the Joint Chiefs included a National
Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Authority was
to be responsible for overall intelligence planning and development,
inspection and coordination of all Federal intelligence activities, and was
to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission
related to the national security. A Central Intelligence Agency with a
Director appointed by the President was to be responsible to the NIA and
assist it in its mission. An Intelligence Advisory Board made up of the
heads of the principal military and civilian agencies having functions related
to the national security was to advise the Director of Central Intelligence.
I. Secretaries of State, War, and Navy Consideration
As Donovan had earlier said, the need for foreign intelligence was
to assure that the formulation of national policy both in its political and
military aspects is influenced and determined by knowledge (or ignorance)
of the aims, capabilities, intentions, and policies of other nations.
Obviously, consideration by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the
determiners and customers of the proposed intelligence system, was needed
before further progress could be made.
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J. Secretary of the Navy
Following the release of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report,
Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, in a memorandum to the
Secretary of War, dated 13 October 1945, commented upon subjects
of mutual interest including: "Joint Intelligence. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, as you know, made a recommendation to the President for
a national intelligence organization, the general outline of which
provides for intelligence supervision by the War, State, and Navy
Departments, with a director charged with the working responsibility
functioning under these individuals as a group. I think this is a
subject which should have our close attention. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff paper seems to me soundly conceived and, if you agree, I think
we should push it vigorously at the White House. "
K. Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary Robert Lovett was placed in charge of a
committee in the War Department to study the matter. After considering
the opinions of a great many people experienced in wartime intelligence, 27
the Lovett Committee submitted a report 28 to the Secretary of War for
a centralized national intelligence organization similar to that recommended
in the Joint Chiefs of Staff report six weeks previously.
L. Secretary of State
In keeping with the Secretary of State's pre-eminence in the field
of foreign affairs, the President directed him to "take the lead in
developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program
for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity... through
the creation of an interdepartmental group, headed up under the State
Department, which would formulate plans for (the President's) approval. "?-9
The Secretary of State submitted his National Intelligence plan to the
Secretaries of War and Navy on 10 December 1945. 30
The plan recommended by the Secretary of State provided for a
National Intelligence Authority consisting of the Secretary of State (Chair-
man) and the Secretaries of War and Navy. Heads of other Departments
z
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and agencies could participate, on a call-in basis, on matters of
special interest to them.
While the State plan did not preclude "centralized intelligence
operations" its primary emphasis was on interdepartmental committees
and organization, rather than on an independent agency with a separate
budget. The accruing advantage was "(1) to avoid publicity and (2) to
reduce competition among the central agency and the intelligence
organizations of existing departments and agencies. "31
In the event a centralized intelligence operation under the
direction of the Authority was determined to be necessary by the
Authority an executive would be appointed and held responsible for the
effective conduct of the operation. In such case "... the personnel
(including the executive), funds and facilities required to conduct such
an operation shall be provided by the departments and agencies
participating in the operation, in amounts and proportions agreed by
them and approved by the Authority, based upon the relative responsi-
bilities and capabilities of the participating departments and agencies.
On 7 January 1946 the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
submitted a joint proposal to the President for the establishment of a
National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Agency. 33
This proposal, with one exception, was identical to the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee report which had been submitted almost a year
earlier to the Joint Chiefs.
The Secretaries did not recommend an independent budget for the
central authority. While an independent budget had been an integral part
of the proposals advocated by the Secretary of War and Navy, they seemed
to have been swung over to the Department of State's position since
"... it seemed to be the consensus at the meeting of the three Secretaries
that an independent budget should be avoided for security reasons. "34
Funds for the National Intelligence Authority were to be provided by the
participating departments in amounts and proportion agreed upon by the
members of the Authority. The Director of the Central Intelligence
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Group, under the Authority, would be able to "employ necessary personnel
and make provisions for necessary supplies, facilities and services" within
the limits of the funds made available. 35
The National Intelligence Authority, the office of the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group were established
by Presidential Directive on 22 January 1946. The Directive was sub-
stantially similar to the Secretaries' proposal although specific references
to collection of intelligence by the Director were omitted. A close observer
at that time suggests that at this was done to avoid mention of this function in
a published document.
COPY
3. Subject to the ex" Ling law, and to the direction and control
:anal intelli&ence Authority, the Director of Central Into
c~--,-% rr-r
be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Int
national security. I hereby designate you, together with another p
intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so a
the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission rel
The Secretary oft;
WA *UNGTON "?n ary 2Z,
The Secretary of War, and
The Secretary of the Navy.
1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal
Authority to accomplish this purpose.
telligence shall be designs by me, shall be responsible to the Natio
Intelligence Authority, a _ 1- sit as a non-voting member thereof.
assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central In
Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intellige
Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelli
2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall ea
from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective
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a. Accomplish the correlationand evaluation of
intelligence relating to the national security, and the
appropriate dissemination within the Government, of the
resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.
In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and
facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.
b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities
of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate
to the national security and recommend to the National
Intelligence` Authority the establishment of such over-all
policies and objectives as will assure the most effective
accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, such services of common concern as the National
Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally.
d. Perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the
President and the National Intelligence Authority may from
time to time direct.
4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions
shall be exercised under this directive.
5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of
your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence
Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence
for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by-the
National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said .intelligence agencies
shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in con-
nection with planning functions.
6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall
continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental
intelligence.
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P. Achievement through Executive Action
The publication of the Directive constituted a breakthrough for
the concept of a Government-wide foreign intelligence structure.
Responsibility for foreign intelligence matters had been clearly fixed in
the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI was under the
direction and control of the President's chief advisers in international
and military affairs. The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy would be
looking to the DCI for the correlation of foreign intelligence, its proper
coordination and dissemination, and for all other needs affecting central
intelligence matters. Clearly, central intelligence now existed as an
entity.
The Directive was a compromise of diverse views which had
been articulated for two years within the Executive Branch and more
recently by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. Even though
the fledgling organization was deprived of certain attributes of independence;
i. e. independent budget and authority to hire personnel, its charter was
written in broad terms so that it could "feel its evolutionary way and handle
obstacles only in such order as it deemed best. "37 This would permit the
details of the organization to be worked ou3t8 in the first instance by the
officials responsible for its performance.
C 1
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II. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS- -EXECUTIVE BRANCH
As early as 1944, the Director of OSS raised the question of
legislation in connection with a permanent post-war intelligence organi-
zation. 39 In 1946, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy saw the
preparation of organizational plans to "include drafts of all necessary
legislation"40 as the first order of business once central intelligence
had been established by Executive action.
A. CIG Consideration
By July 1946 a draft of enabling legislation for a proposed Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) was being reviewed by Clark M. Clifford,
Special Assistant to the President. In transmitting a revision of the
draft to Mr. Clifford in November, the DCI wrote that the "current
draft has been expanded in the light of the experiences of the last ten
months and the administrative facilities available. However, it does
not materially change interdepartmental relationships conceived in the
original Presidential letter of January 22, 1946.,,41
Two different types of consideration were involved in the proposed
legislation. One concerned structural relationships and functions of
central intelligence. The other concerned administrative authority to
complement the autonomy envisioned for central intelligence. 42 As
events transpired, CIA's functional responsibility and administrative
authorities were to be divided and enacted in separate legislation.
Nevertheless, comprehensive legislation was being pursued at this
juncture.
In connection with functions, the comprehensive legislation pro-
posed by CIG included a long declaration of policy ending with the state-
ment that "the foreign intelligence activities, functions, and services of
the Government be fully coordinated, and, when determined in accordance
with the provisions of this act, be operated centrally for the accomplish-
ment of the national intelligence mission of the United States. " The
proposal included programs for collecting ". . . foreign intelligence
information by any and all means deemed effective," disseminating
ET
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". . . to the President and the appropriate departments and agencies
of the Federal Government of the intelligence produced, " and for
planning and development ". . . of all foreign intelligence activities of
the Federal Government." (Underscoring supplied)
In connection with structural relationships, the National Intel-
ligence Authority was to be statutorily prescribed with the Director of
Central Intelligence sitting as a non-voting member and with the CIA
providing the Secretariat.
In connection with administrative authority, the appointment of
the Director from either civilian or military life was provided for at a
salary equivalent to that established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
for the Commissioners. A Deputy Director who "shall be authorized to
sign such letters,, papers, and documents, and to perform such other
duties as may be directed by the Director... and to act as Director"
in the Director's absence was also included. So was authority to hire
retired personnel of the Armed Forces. Provisions for employing
persons and authorizing the DCI "in his absolute discretion to, not-
withstanding the provisions of other law, terminate the employment of
personnel in the interest of the United States-.,_.. " were also included.
(The latter was in keeping with a similar provision found in the Department
of State--its Appropriation Act of 1947(P. L. 79-470) ). In connection with
control of information, it was thought that a provision similar to Section 10
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 would be included once the Department
of Justice had taken a position on a proposal to revise the espionage laws
as recommended by the War and Navy Departments and the FBI. Appro-
priations and other necessary authorities were also included. In all ways
the proposed draft was intended as a permanent authorization for a
Central Intelligence Agency.
B. White House Consideration (Armed Forces Unification)
The effort to obtain permanent enabling legislation for a Central
Intelligence Agency was subordinated to the objective of unifying the
military departments in 1947. Unification was accorded the highest
priority within the Executive Branch, with the result that enabling legis-
lation for CIA was to be deferred to 1949.
FRET
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The concept of central intelligence was not overlooked in the
unification proposals, however. President Truman's second plan for
military unification envisioned a single defense establishment served
by a number of coordinating agencies, some for inter-military
departmental coordination and others for military-civilian coordination. 43
NIA was seen as the mechanism for linking military and foreign policy.
It followed that CIG, its subordordinate agency, would serve as a coordinating
mechanism for civilian-military intelligence.
The individuals in the White House working on the proposed National
Security Act included Mr. Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to the President;
Mr. Charles S. Murphy, Administrative Assistant to the President; Vice
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Deputy Chief for Naval Operations; and Major
General .Laurin Norst..d, Director of Plans and Operations, War Department
General Staff. They felt that while the National Security Act should create
a Central Intelligence Agency, and provide for its structural relationship,
any administrative authorities needed by the Agency should be dealt with
in separate legislation.
The second White House draft of the proposed National Security
Act of 1947, dated 25 January 1947, covered the CIA as follows:
"SEC. 302, (a) There is hereby established under
the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency
with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall. be the
head thereof, to be appointed from civilian or military life
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The Director shall receive compensation at the
rate of $15, 000 per annum.
(b) Subject to existing law, and to the direction and
control of the National Security Council, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency shall perform foreign intelligence functions
related to the national security. 44
(c) Effective when the Director first appointed under
subsection (a) has taken office--
(1) The functions of the National Intelligence
Authority (established by directive of the President,
dated January 22, 1946) are transferred to the
National Security Council, and such Authority shall
cease to exist.
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(2) The functions of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the functions, personnel, property,
and records of the Central Intelligence Group,
established under such directive are transferred to
the Director of Central Intelligence appointed under
this Act and to the Central Intelligence Agency, and
such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended
balances of appropriations, allocations, or other
funds available or authorized to be made available
for such Group shall be available and shall be
authorized to be made available in like manner for
expenditure by the Agency. "
In a memorandum to Mr. Clark M. Clifford, dated 28 January
1947, the DCI, General Vandenburg, summarized the outcome of earlier
exchanges of views on language pertaining to CIA for incorporation in
the National Security Act as "(a) setting forth a working basis for a
Central Intelligence Agency to the Merger; and (b) eliminating from the
proposed National Security Act any and all controversial material insofar
as it referred to central intelligence which might in any way hamper the
successful passage of the Act. "
While deferring to the higher priority of military unification over
CIG enabling legislation, General Vandenburg in the same memorandum
went on to urge the incorporation of several additional provisions in the
draft of the NSA to be submitted to the President. First, the DCI should
sit on the National Security Council as a non-voting member in keeping
with the decision of the 22 January 1946 Presidential directive. The
specific language suggested was that "the DCI shall serve as the adviser
to the Council on all matters pertaining to national intelligence and in
this capacity, will attend meetings of the Council at its discretion but
shall take no part in the decisions thereof. "
Second, rather than merely transferring the functions of the DCI
and CIG under the Presidential Directive to the DCI and CIA under the
proposed legislation through incorporation by reference, it was recommended
that some specific statement of CIA's function be made: "... the CIA shall
cr rT
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coordinate the Nation's foreign intelligence activities and shall operate
centrally those foreign intelligence functions which can be most efficiently
performed centrally. "
Third, a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should be pro-
vided for: to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The DCI concluded: "It
was felt desirable to include this in the legislation in order to provide
continuity of action in the absence of the Director or should there be a
vacancy in that office. The Deputy Director should be a man of such
caliber and stature as adequately to serve as operations deputy to the
Director. "
None of the DCI's three recommendations were included in the
draft of the "National Security Act of 1947, " which President Truman
submitted to the Eightieth Congress on 26 February 1947. However, a
memorandum45 covering the discussions between CIG and the White House
drafters illuminates the extent of agreement reached on certain points
within the Executive Branch. Excerpts follow:
DCI as Intelligence Adviser
In a CIG conference preceding the first meeting with the
White House drafters--
11... the Director also indicated his desire to have
included a provision that he would serve as the adviser
to the Council on National Defense (later changed to
National Security Council) on matters pertaining to
intelligence, and that in this capacity he would attend
all meetings of the Council. It was agreed that the
Director should take no part in the decisions of the
Council as this was a policy-making body, and it had
long been agreed that central intelligence should not
be involved in policy making. "
At the White House meeting with the drafters--
"... General Vandenberg stated that he was strongly opposed
to the Central Intelligence Agency or its director participating
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in policy decisions on any matter. However, he felt that
he should be present at meetings of the Council. To this
General Norstad voiced serious exceptions, as he felt that
the Council was already too big. He thought that the Director
should not even be present as an observer, as this had proven
to be cumbersome and unworkable at meetings of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Sherman suggested, however, that
the Director should normally be present at meetings of the
Council, in its discretion. General Vandenberg concurred
in this, as did General Norstad, and it was accepted with the
additional proviso that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also
attend meetings at the discretion of the Council. "
". . . the Army-Navy conferees felt that the position of the
Director as the Intelligence Adviser was inherent in the
position itself, and that it would not be proper to provide
by law that the head of an agency under the Council should
sit on the Council. "
Specific Statement of Functions of CIA
". . . General Vandenberg indicated the difficulties which he
had had in having to go to the N. I. A. on so many problems.
He felt that the difficulties of his position would be multiplied,
as he would have to ask policy guidance and direction from
the Council on National Defense, which consists of many more
members than the N. I. A. He was assured that the intent of
the act was that the CIA would operate independently and come
under the Council only on such specific measures as the
Council may, from time to time, desire to direct. It would
not be necessary for the Agency to ask continual approval from
the Council. "
"... It was the final sense of the meeting that the Director of
Central Intelligence should report to the Council on National
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Defense. As General Vandenberg indicated that it would be
necessary to report somewhere; that neither the President
around the Government. However, it was thought that the
agency should have sufficient power to perform its own
functions without it being necessary to have specific approval
from the Council on each action. "
C. Presidential Recommendation to Congress
On February 26, 1947 President Truman submitted to the Congress
a draft entitled "National Security Act of 1947. " As it pertained to CIA,
it read as follows:
"SEC. 202. (a) There is hereby established under the
National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency, with
a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof,
to be appointed by the President. The Director shall receive
compensation at the rate of $14, 00046 a year.
(b) Any commissioned officer of the United States Army,
the United States Navy, or the United States Air Force may be
appointed to the office of Director; and his appointment to,
acceptance of, and service in, such office shall in no way affect
any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the
United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States
Air Force, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or
benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank,
or grade. Any such commissioned officer on the active list shall,
while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay
and allowances payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and
length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to
defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate
equal to the amount by which $14, 000 exceeds the amount of his
annual military pay and allowances.
(c) Effective when the Director first appointed under
subsection (a) has taken office--
(1) The functions of the National Intelligence Authority
(11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) are transferred
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to the National Security Council, and such Authority
shall cease to exist.
(2) The functions of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the functions, personnel, property,
and records of the Central Intelligence Group are
transferred to the Director of Central Intelligence
appointed under this Act and to the Central Intelligence
Agency, respectively, and such Group shall cease to
exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations,
allocations, or other funds available or authorized
to be made available for such Group shall be available
and shall be authorized to be made available in like
manner for expenditure by the Agency. "
The White House drafting committee proposed these minimal pro-
visions for section 202 because they felt that the substantive portions of
the proposed CIG enabling legislation were too controversial and subject
to attack by other agencies and that the general authorities were contro-
versial from a congressional point of view. They felt that CIG might
justify these provisions in its own bill if it had time to present them
adequately; but that if they were included in the Merger Bill, CIG might
not have time to present their picture to the Congress in detail in the
course of the hearings. 47
However, as events transpired, Congress was to give a great
deal of attention to four areas affecting section 202:
1. The position of CIA in the Governmental structure.
2. The inclusion of detailed functions for CIA.
3. The position of CIA in connection with internal security.
4. The question of military control over the Director if a
military man were appointed to the position.
In fact, during the floor discussion of the bill in the House chamber,
Mr. Manasco, a member of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Department and a member of the Subcommittee which marked up the bill,
said: "This section on Central Intelligence was given more study by our
Subcommittee and the Full Committee than any other section of the bill."48
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4
?.
NATIONAL SECURITY-ACT OF 1947
A. Background
Even though the development of a Government-wide foreign
intelligence service was initiated by the Executive Branch, Congress,
in its role as prescriber of functions for the Executive Branch, had
considered the need for a Government-wide foreign intelligence service
prior to the Presidential transmittal of the draft National Security Act
of 1947.
In 1946 the House Committee on Military Affairs issued "A Report
on the System Currently Employed in the Collection, Evaluation and
Dissemination of Intelligence Affecting the War Potential of the United
States. "49 The report recognized the need for strong intelligence as the
"nation's final line of defense." The Committee made nine recommendations:
Recommendation 1: That the National Intelligence Authority,
established on January 22, 1946, by Presidential directive,
be authorized by act of Congress.
Recommendation 2: That the National Intelligence Authority
shall consist of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy,
or deputies for intelligence.
Recommendation 3: That the Central Intelligence Group receive
its appropriations direct from the Congress.
Recommendation 4: That the Central Intelligence Group has
complete control over its own personnel.
Recommendation 5: That the Director of the Central Intelligence
Group be a civilian appointed for a preliminary term of two
years and a permanent term of 10 years, at a salary of at least
$12, 000 a year.
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Recommendation 6: That the Director of the Central Intelligence
Group be appointed by the President, by and with the consent of
the Senate.
Recommendation 7: That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall (1) accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence
relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination
within the Government of the resulting strategic and national
policy intelligence, and in so doing making full use of the staff
and facilities of the intelligence agencies already existing in the
various Government departments; (2) plan for the coordination
of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the various
Government departments as relate to the national security and
recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment
of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most
effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission;
(3) perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such
services of common concern related directly to coordination,
correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as the National
Intelligence Authority shall determine can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally; (4) perform such other similar functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the Congress and the National Intelligence Authority may from
time to time direct. It is specifically understood that the Director
of Central Intelligence shall not undertake operations for the col-
lection of intelligence.
Recommendation 8: That Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10 of the Presidential directive of January 22, 1946, relating to
the establishment of a National Intelligence Authority be enacted
into law, with such revisions in wording as may seem necessary.
Recommendation 9: That the Army be requested sympathetically
to examine further the question of the establishment of an Intelligence
Corps for the training, development, and assignment of especially
qualified officers.
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Illustrative of Senate consideration of a Government-wide
foreign intelligence organization is the action of the Senate Committee
on Military Affairs during the second session of the 79th Congress,
1946. The first Truman plan for unification was submitted to Congress
on 19 December 1945 and embodied in S. 2044, which was introduced by
Senators Thomas, Hill, and Austin on 9 April 1946. The bill proposed
a National Security Council outside of the national defense establishment
and under it a Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of coordinating
military and civilian programs, policies, and plans in the foreign intel-
ligence field. 50 In hearings before the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs, General Marshall stated:
''Intelligence relates to purpose as well as to
military capacity to carry out that purpose. The point, I
think, is we should know as much as we possibly can of
the possible intent and the capability of any other country
in the world.... Prior to entering the war we had little
more than what a military attache could learn at a dinner,
more or less, over the coffee cups.... Today I think we
see clearly we must know what the other fellow is planning
to do, in our own defense.... The important point is that
the necessity applies equally outside of the armed forces.
It includes the State Department and other functions of the
Government, and it should therefore be correlated on that
level. , 51
While S. 2044 was favorably acted upon by the Senate Military
Affairs Committee, the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, which also
considered the bill, did not report the bill out; and it died in the 79th
Congress.
The first session of the 80th Congress was to be the testing
ground for the concept of centralized intelligence. On 26 February 1947
Congress received the Presidential draft of the National Security of
1947.
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Title I of the draft concerned the "National Defense Establish-
ment. " Title II, 52 "Coordination for National Security, " provided
for the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency53 and
the National Security Resources Board.
B. Congressional Processing
Congress, conceiving its tasks as providing for the future
security of the United States, spent nearly five months in deliberating
the provisions to be included in the National Security Act of 1947. The
legislative processing relating to these deliberations is helpful in
keying into the substantive evolvement of the CIA section of the Act.54
Senate. Introduction of a bill incorporating the President's
draft was temporarily delayed in the Senate by a question concerning
which standing committee would have jurisdiction over the bill. The
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (now the
Committee on Government Operations) questioned the decision of the
President pro tem, Arthur Vandenburg (R. , Mich. ), to refer the
measure to the Armed Services Committee. 55 The Senate upheld the
President pro teen's ruling on 3 March, and Chairman Gurney (R. , S.D.)
then introduced the measure as S. 758. His Armed Services Committee
held hearings for ten weeks, went into executive session on 20 May, and
reported out an amended version of S. 758 on 5 June. 56 The bill was
discussed on the floor on the:7th and on the 9th of July, when it was also
approved by voice vote.
House. The measure was introduced in the House on 28 February
1947 as H. R. 4214 by the Chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in
the Executive Departments (now the Committee on Government Operations),
Clare Hoffman (R., Mich.). His Committee commenced hearings on
2 April 1947, concluding them on 1 July. A favorable report was issued
on 16 July. H. R. 4214 was discussed by the House on 19 July, amended,
ans passed by a voice vote. Immediately following passage of H.R. 4214,
the House passed S. 758 after substituting the provisions of its own measure.
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Conference. S. 758 emerged from Conference Committee on
24 July. The Senate accepted the Conference Report the same day by
a voice vote with the House following suit on the 25th of July.
C. Legislative Record of CIA
The legislative record on the CIA section of S. 758 and H. R. 4214
is found primarily in the reports of the committees and in the Congressional
Record. Testimony of witnesses before the committees is also helpful
in identifying the issues raised, the alternatives considered in resolving
them, and the reasons or explanations for the choices or compromises
ultimately approved.
In the legislative process, committees and particularly their
members bear the brunt of responsibility for creating the record on the
bills the committee reports out. In carrying out this responsibility, it
must be recognized that security and other considerations act, as a built in
brake on what is written and said. In illustration, during the floor debate
in the House on the CIA section of H. R. 4214, Mr. Manasco in opposing
an amendment said "Many witnesses appeared before our committee. We
were sworn to secrecy, and I hesitate to even discuss this section, because
I am afraid that I may say something, because the Congressional Record
is a public record, and divulge something here that we received in that
committee that would give aid and comfort to any potential enemy we
have. " 57
Considering this fact,a fairly extensive public record was made
on the CIA section. In a way, this proved the White House drafting team
correct in estimating that the CIA section had the potentiality for being
a controversial part of the draft National Security Act of 1947. However,
the drafting team was wrong in assuming that extensive deliberation
would be avoided by reducing the CIA section down to, and in the view of
CIG below, the minimum provisions needed, further, it underestimated
Congressional interest in providing for a CIA.
Probably the most striking aspect of the Congressional discussion
concerning CIA was the overwhelming support for institutionalizing the
Agency in statute as a positive step towards protecting the nations security.
An interesting turnabout was the insertion of two provisions by Congress
which had been earlier recommended by CIG, without success, to the
White House drafting team. The first authorized the Director to terminate
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the employment of an officer or employee in the interests of the United
States at the Director's discretion "nothwithstanding the provisions of
any other law. " The second involved spelling out functions for the Agency.
Actually, the CIA was but a part of a legislative proposal and,
with the section relating to the National Military Establishment being the
real center of controversy, CIA was bound to be caught in this controversy
as much or more so than the National Military Establishment was to be
caught in any controversy surrounding CIA.
The most extensively discussed provision relating to CIA concerned
whether the Director of Central Intelligence should be a civilian or not.
Undoubtedly, this was related to the strong sentiment in the Congress
for retaining the traditional civilian control over the armed forces and
against building up a strong General Staff. In line with ". . . a legitimate
fear in this country lest we develop too much military control of any
agency which has great'owers and operates in secret...", G-ei '&a.n
a/s`a ~we the Director of Central Intelligence
L -a-e passed the House. While the amendment was later eliminated
in conference eemtrritt-e.e, the House conferees were successful in obtaining
a compromise provision which ". . . seeks to divorce the head of the agency
from the armed services if a man in the service is appointed." 58,
For the most part, the reasons and rationale for Congressional
action on the CIA section are clearly brought out in the record. An
exception relates to the determination by Congress, in its wisd to
specify functions for CIA in the Act. A'~ be of reasons few-dozes-tz e
we-re--advanced.,. J..' c A tv c3 " ~ ~ . '.~ ~.cf . .
d.4.C"c.:l_ e?.'LOH
gijhe to-ems tyre separation of powers Congress
is obligated to prescribe functions for the Executive Branch;
The lessons of Pearl Harbor imposed upon Congress, for
the nation's future security, the responsibility for requiring one
clearly responsible focal point for coordinating and disseminating
national foreign intelligence;
Unless Congress expresses its intent in law, there is
no assurance that the Executive Branch will follow its intent;
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Unless CIA's functions are specified, it may
encroach upon the functions of other Agencies.
A further complicating factor is that CIG had strongly recommended to
the White House drafting team that the functions of CIA be spelled out.
This was to provide a stable charter for. its primary responsibilities
and to avoid the problem of constantly referring back to the National
Security Council. The drafting team had no disagreement with the merits
of CIA's position, it is recalled, but only felt that it should be done in
separate legislation. Undoubtedly, the desirability of such a charter for
the effective functioning of the Agency was also known to many knowledgeable
members of Congress.
With this as an introduction to the paucity of the record in some
cases and its obscurity in others, the legislative record on CIA will be
arranged according to the dominant themes which were to develop:
Need for Central Intelligence
Yhe-ache-r-ity-of CIA in connection with internal security.
the need for a Central Intelligence Agency;
the place of CIA in the Governmental structure;
the specification in statute of functions for CIA;
the feai--of-military control over the Director of
Central Intelligence.
The need for central intelligence was reflected in the findings of
committees during the 79th Congress, as previously. noted, and was to
be stressed again during the 89th Congress.
Four days before hearings were to commence on S. 758, Senator
Thomas59of Utah made a major address on the floor of the Senate concerning 60
the" Pres;ident'.s"bill and emphasized the need for a Central Intelligence Agency:
"Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department
had an intelligence service adquate to our needs when the war
broke out. The intelligence agencies in each Department operated
separately for the most part, except for the exchange of routine
military and naval attache reports. There was no real integration
of intelligence at the operating level, and no established liaison
with the State Department. Though funds were inadequate, there
was much duplication of effort by the services.
Ur'
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"The war brought substantial appropriations and
drastic reorganization. The Office of Strategic Services was
finally set up under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and acted as the central coordinating agency in intelligence matters.
Later, the Joint Intelligence Committee and its subcommittees made
further provision for the coordination of intelligence activities. In
spite of these and other changes, however, much unnecessary
duplication existed in the intelligence services of the State, War, and
Navy Departments. The significance of the collection, anaylsis,
and evaluation of information concerning foreign countries is no
less great now than it was during the war. The effective conduct
of both foreign policy and military policy is dependent on the possession
of full, accurate, and skillfully analyzed information concerning
foreign countries. With our present world-wide sphere of international
responsibility and our position among the world powers, we need
the most efficient intelligence system that can be devised. Organization,
of course, is not the whole story. We do know, however, that there is no
returning to the prewar system, where the War, Navy and State
Departments went their respective ways. We have now a central
intelligence agency established by executive action. Provision for such
an agency should be made in permanent legislation. It seems entirely
logical that such an agency should be placed in the framework of
any agency that might be set up to coordinate military and foreign
policies.
The theme stated so strongly by Senator Thomas was to be reiterated
and amplified when the Senate Armed Services Committee commenced its
hearings on S. 758:
Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, who was a member of the White House
drafting team and who was detailed by the Secretary of the Navy to work
with the Military Affairs Committee on the Common Defense Act of 1946,
said: "I consider the Central Intelligence Agency to be a vital necessity
under present world conditions. Its necessity will increase with our
greater international responsibilities and as the power of sudden attack is
amplified by further developments in long range weapons and weapons of
mass destruction. "61
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Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg62Director of Central Intelligence, made
the most comprehensive statement concerning the need for centra1 intelli-
nce: ' I sincerely urge adoption of the intelligence provisions of this bill.
Section 202 will enable us to (1o our share in maintaining the national
security. It will forma firm basis on which we can construct the finest
intelligence service in the world.
In my opinion, a strong; intelligence system is equally if not more
essential in peace than in war. Upon us has fallen leadership in world
affairs. The oceans have shrunk until today. both Europe and Asia
border the United?Sta.tes almost as Io Canada and Mexico. The in-
terests, intentions, and capabilities of the various nations on these land
masses must be fully known to our national policy makers. We must
have this intelligence if we are to be forewarned against possible acts
,,of aggression, and if we are to be armed against disaster in an era of
atomic warfare.
,-wit can be said without successful challenge that before Pearl
Harbor we did not have an intelligence service in this country com-.
parable to that of Great Britain or France or Russia or Germany
or Japan. We did not have one because t1ie people of the United
States would not accept it. It'-vas felt that there was something un-
"American about, espionage and even about intelligence generally.
,There was a feeling that all that was necessary to will a war-if there
ever were to be another war-was an abilit,jr to shoot straight. One
of the great prewar fallacies was the common misconception that, if
the Japanese should challenge us in the Pacific, our armed services
.would be able to handle the probleni in a h nlaaer offf a few months
at most.
All intelligence is not sinister, nor is it an invidious type of work.
But before the Second World War, our intelligence services had left
!,largely untapped the great ol-pen sources of information upon which
:such things as books, magazines, teclunicr i and scientific surveys,
,photographs, commercial analyses, newspapers, and radio broadcasts,
.and general information from people with. a knowledge of affairs
abroad. What; weakened our position furclner was that those of our
='. . '.intelligence services which did dabble in any of these sources failed to
coordinate their results with each other.
The Joint?Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor
Attack reached many pertinent conclusions regarding the shortcom-
ings of our intelligence system and made some very sound recom-
mendations for its improvement. We are incorporating many of these
into our present thinking.
7_i le, comni ttee showed that, some very significant information had '
not been correctly evaluated. It :found that some of the evaluated',
information was not passed on to the fielu_u commanders. But, over
and above these failures were others, perhaps more serious, which went
to the very structure of our intelligence orb*anizations. I am talking
now of the failure to exploit obvious sources; the failure to coordinate
the collection and dissemination of intel;ig~;ence; tine failure to cell-' tral' ence functions o;common concern to more than one
~epaI the Government; which could more efficiently be
1 perfo rally.
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t
All of these findings and recommendations have my hearty con-
currence. In the Central Intelligence Group, and in its successor
which this bill creates, must be found the answer to the prevention of
another Pearl Harbor.
As the United States found itself suddenly projected into a global
war, immense gaps in our know]edge b oc? ,
"
izationso that no future t't u ' '. >;1on;l i t't il,111 It t ? t`_1tr1 )y with some
the question asked by the 1)e;,ri ti :ebot' C.'?~u:.nuttcc: ,
of the finest intelligence ~~',~ilahle in our 1)aiory-why was it possible
for a Pearl Harbor to occur .
? In the testimony which h preceded mine in support of this bill'-
by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, General Eisenhower,
Admiral Nimitz, and General Spaatz, among others-there has been
shown an awareness of the need for cooi?d:elation between the State
Department and oui? fol'ci~rt) hand and our
Sim-
National Defense lstablial,iut , , , nd i t - u i i t l r On time other. central
ilarly with illtelligcnce, 11101", iJe 0 , 1 0 1 * ( i ir,nt it{'ecaoUlsp ss blv ask
The committee recomulonded that intellliigence work. have central-
had vital need of it. It stated that-
lzation of authority and clear-Ctn allocat.IOil of resliollslbility. It
found specific fault with the systeul of dissemination then in use-or,
more accuratel the lack of rlis~ciuination of intelligence to those who
the security of the Nation can be insured only through continuity of service and
centralization of responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence.
It found that there is no substiciite for imagination and resourceful-
ness on the part of intelligence personnel, and that part of the failure
in this respect was-
'the failure to accord to intelligence work the important and significant role which
it deserves.
The committee declared that-
efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war.
word
intelligence" quickly tools a fashionablei co notttioint Each
new wartime agency-as well as many of the older departments-=soon
blossomed out with intelligence staffs of their own, each producing
mass of lar
el
g
a
y uncoordinated. iln)formatioi1. The resultant competi-
tion for funds and specialized personnel was a monumental example of
waste.
1110 VV .1. U111A #1wry L\it tll lli. ?...
nomic intelligence staffs, as did the Research and Analysis Division
of the OSS. The Board of Economic Warfare and its successor, the
Foreign Economic Administration, also delved deeply into fields of
econorn.ic, intelligence. Not content with staffs in Washington, they
established subsidiary staffs in London and then followed these up-..-
with other units on the Continent.
When, during the war, for example, officials requested a report on
the steel industry in Japan or the economic conditions in the Nether-
lands East Indies, they had the reports of the Board of Economic
Warfare, Cx-2, ONI, and the OSS :from. which to choose. Because these
agencies had competed to secure the best personnel, it was necessal'y
for each of them to back up its expert , by asserting that its particular
reports, were the best available, and that the others might well be
disregarded.
- As General Marshall stated in tesS;ifying on the unification bill
before the Senate Military Affairs Con-,ill ttee last year-
* ? * Prior to entering the war, we had little more than what a military
attacbd could learn at a dinner, more or less over the coffee cups.
T
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From this sprillglnb lip every-
where. But nowhere collection, l;.rtxi.itction. or dissemination
fully coordinated-not ei en. in the u inc a forces. General Marshall.,
pointed this out.in his t,c tiulony when he m eillioned- . r' -
the difiiculty'we?bail in el c li de%elQping a Joint ~Int'lil c.`iice Committee. 'Th .
A.,. ... a-. a.-.~ e.. .c- ..
would seem to be n cerv_o. ?....t
-tl
e
n
in war. Witte our wartime e~pciieitcc behind us
we lcliow now where
,
to look for material, as well as for what to look.
The ti ansition fi om war to pek
d
n
'
e
oes
ot change th
e neyor
it f
oordination':o#;tli,a collection, product ioii, find 'clisseiniiia.t J the
incre siiigly? 8t=gqlYantlti6s" of"fo '@7 7i~1?itC[t e
`
i
i
n
ce
u
D
are becoming aYailable. This coordnlation the Central Intelligence
Agency will-supply.
idwit Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services for
't ho pl lfpose of gathering together inert of exceptional background and
?b nr.th t it. came late iit-n tlc field_ ?: It was n stonLtap.':..
,its known failures must be ~cifi rt 1?l gifl71St its success vroreovelf;
it marked a crucial turning poin ~'in the development of: 1j States l
intelligence. We are now attempting to profit.by -' lid Fll ieriences
and inistaiies.
ational position of inportai7ce
,.' Laving attained its prese.rl.t intern
te
State
ld
l
n
t
e
d
.. a.w.q.. ~;F-..-,~,
Vaaa
a
, 1
e YYV
FVYYe 111 an u
s
a
7L1l
opinion, find itself again confronted with the neces`ity of;.develo~ing
its plans and policies on the basis of iiitelligence?c01 ated, compiled,
For months we had to rely blindly and trustingly on the superior
~ntelligo>lce;system:of the Br.iti h. Our successes provethat.this trust
have ie respoiisibilities of a vo l ol~ve ;the j?sllted States should
r
nment
never-again have to go hat in hand, begging an ;foreign!gove
for the eyes-the foreign intelligence-with which to see. We should
be self.sufficient. The interests of others may not be our interests.
rcco i11Zed in -most quarters._. The-.Pearl -Harbor dicncfnr raram ti e
a close;,-; the.Yresident directed the Joint Chiefs of,Stafr.t sttidy the
the assigmnent of rimary fielclsl of intelligence espgnsibilities,
w
r
-i
th
fi
lds
c
e a
e
n
e
e
of
ollection productiosd diat
,n anssemmionpre-
c.r
ET
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we are--in the fields of collection, productior,, and dissemination-pre-
`By the assignment of primary fields of iute igence responsibilities,
Testimony before the House Committee on Expenditures in
the Executive Departments included the following comments on the
need for Central Intelligence:
General Carl Spaatz; Commanding General, Army Air Force, "The bill
provides the basic elements of security of which we may mention five.
... Fourth, correct intelligence. The bill provides for enlargment of
our capacity to know the capabilities of our possible enemies, how they
can attack us, and with what. Each service will retain its own technical
intelligence with its own trained attaches -abroad. The CIA will coordinate
information from all the services, as well as from other branches of the
Government." 63
Fleet Admiral Nimitz, "The bill will establish a Central Intelligence
Agency charged with the responsibility for collection of information from
all available sources evaluation of that information and dissemination
thereof. This Agency is intended to secure complete coverage of the
wide field of intelligence and should minimize duplication. The bill
recognizes that military intelligence is a composite of authenticated
and evaluated information covering not only the armed forces establishment
of a possible enemy but also his industrial capacity, racial traits,
religious beliefs, and other related aspects."64
Secretary James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy651isted the CIA
second among the essentials of the bill, after the National Security Council.
"The need for that (CIA) should be obvious to all of us.,, 66
Rep. W. J. Dorn (D., S.C.): "With regard to the Central Intelligence Agency--
I may be wrong, but have always felt that if Admiral Kimmel had had
proper intelligence from Washington the attack on Pearl Harbor would not
have occurred, or at least we, would have been able to meet it better. From
your experience, do you think that this Central Intelligence Agency alone
would warrant passage of this bill?"
Vice Admiral Radford "Of course, I think it is most important. Actually
it is in existence now. It is already functioning. it 67
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The Senate Committee report on S. 758 succinctly stated that:
"To meet the future with confidence, we must make certain... that a
central intelligence agency collects and analyzes that mass of information
without which the Government cannot either maintain peace or wage war
successfully." 68
The House committee report on H. R. 4214 expressed the need with
equal clarity by stating, "The testimony received by your committee discloses
an urgent need for a continuous program of close coordination between our
domestic, foreign and military policies so that we may always be able to
appraise our commitments as a Nation in the light of our resources and
capabilities. This, you committee feels can be accomplished by the
provisions of the bill for the National Security Council supplemented by a
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board. "
Further that, "In order for the Council (National Security Council), in its
deliberations and advice to the President, may have available adequate
information, there is provided a permanent organization under the Council,
which will furnish that information. " 69
The need for central intelligence was also expressed on the floor of
the Senate when S. 758 came up for consideration on the 7th and 9th of July:
Sen. M. Gurney: "As an important adjunct to the National Security Council
there is a provision for a Central Intelligence Agency, which fills a long
recognized demand for accurate information upon which important decisions,
relating to foreign military policy can be based.,, 70
Sen. Baldwin: "Under the Council there is established a central intelligence
agency to provide coordinated, adequate intelligence for all Government
agencies concerned with national security. When one reads the record of
the past war in regard to that field it is found that there was much to be
desired in the way intelligence was covered, and there was great conflict
about it. I say nothing here in deprecation of the men who were engaged
in the intelligence service, because some remarkable and extremely
courageous things were done. Nevertheless, we demonstrated from our
experience the need of a central intelligence agency... , "71
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Sen. Hill: "It would (S. 758) provide adequate security measures at all
times, rather than only when hostilities threaten. It creates... a central
intelligence agency which is so essential for the Government to maintain
peace and without which the Government cannot wage war successfully.,, 72
The need for central intelligence was also stressed on the floor
of the House when H. R. 4214 was considered on 19 July:
Rep. Wadsworth: "This (H. R. 4214 and the instrumentalities it establishes)
links the military policy with foreign policy, all measured by our resources
and the potentialities of other people. " 73
Rep. Busbey (although troubled with certain features of the CIA section) said:
"I am not opposed to a central intelligence agency. ... You remember Pearl
Harbor. They had intelligence, but it was not correlated and evaluated
correctly. " 74
Rep. Andrews of New York: "On the next level above the National Military
Establishment there is provided the National Security Council with the
President as chairman, which will effectively coordinate our domestic
and foreign policies in the light of sound information furnished by the
Central Intelligence Agency." 75
Rep. Sikes of Fla.: "During the intervening years between wars we have
never had a proper balance between our foreign and military policies... We
have never been fully informed of the capabilities, potential or intent of
likely enemies.. This is another time when we can well say,'Remeber
Pearl Harbor. "'
Rep. Short of Mo.: "Mr. Chairman, on every score and by every count
we should vote adequate funds for... our Central Intelligence--which has been
lamentably weak--. . . These (including Central Intelligence) are the things
above all others which will guarantee our security." 77
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Rep. Holifield of Calif.: "Mr. Chairman, one of the most important
features of this bill is the Central Intelligence Agency. I would like for
you to turn back with me this afternoon to the most terrible period preceding
World War II. Why, you had most of the newspapers and people in this
country thinking that Adolf Hitler was a comic character, that a war in Europe
could not last through the winter---I remember those editorials quite well --
that Germany would not last through the winter of 1939. I remember officers
of the Navy coming back from observation posts in the Pacific and saying that
the Japanese could not last 3 weeks in a war with America. The Government
in Washington was stunned and shocked beyond belief when it suddenly
realized that Paris and France would fall. An important Member of the
other body, who is still serving in that body, said that a few bombs on Tokyo
would knock them out of the war. What a woeful lack of intelligence as
to the potential power of our enemies. People were saying that Mussolini
would not attack; that he was only bluffing. Around the world there was a
total lack of knowledge of those forces that were marshalling to destroy
American democracy. I tell you gentlemen of the committee that your
central intelligence agency is a very important part of this bill. " 78
Rep. Holifield: "I want to read to you some of the conclusions of the Pearl
Harbor Committee, as follows. Their conclusions were: 'That the Hawaiian
Command failed to discharge their responsibility in the light of the warnings
received from Washington, and other information possessed by them and
the principal command by mutual cooperations. (B) They failed to integrate
and coordinate their facilities for defense, to alert properly the Army and
Navy Establishments in Hawaii, particularly in the line of warning and
intelligence available to them during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941.
They failed to effect liaison on a basis adequately designed to acquaint each of
them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint
security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence, and they also
failed to appreciate and evaluate the significance of the intelligence and other
information available to them." 79
Rep. Harness: "Now a word about the Central Intelligence Agency. When
such an organization was first proposed I confess I had some fear and doubt
about it. Along with other members of the Committee, I insisted that the
scope and authority of this Agency be carefully defined and limited. Please
bear in mind that this is a bold departure from American tradition. This
country has never before officially resorted to the collection of secret and
strategic information in time of peace as an announced and fixed policy. Now,
howev r, I a convinced that such an A enc as we are now considering is
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Aappt
0 our na iona ecuri y.-
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Rep. Wadsworth: "... In addition, under the Council there would be another
element which is to advise the Council, subject to regulations made by the
Council, in the field of Intelligence, in the foreign field; and there is
established a central intelligence agency subject to the Council headed by a
director. The function of that agency is to constitute itself as a gathering
point for information coming from all over the world through all kinds
of channels concerning the potential strength of other nations and their
political intentions. There is nothing secret about that. Every nation in
the world is doing the same thing. But it must be remembered that the
Central Intelligence Agency is subject to the Council and does not act
independently. It is the agency for the collecting and dissemination of
information which will help the President and the Council to adopt wise and
effective policies. So with the information of that sort concerning other
nations and information coming in with respect to our own resources, both
of which are available to the Council and President, we will have for the first
time in our history a piece of machinery that should work and it is high
time that we have it. We have never had it before. During this last war
all sorts of devices were resorted to, obviously in great haste, to accomplish
a thing like this. You may remember the huge number of special committees,
organizations and agencies set up by Executive Order in an attempt to catch
up with the target. We have learned as a result of the war that we should
have some permanent organization, and that is the one proposed in this bill. "81
Rep. Manasco: "if we had had a strong central intelligence organization,
in all probability we would never had had the attack on Pearl Harbor; there
might not have been a World War II.. I hope the committee will support the
provision in the bill, because the future security of our country in a large
measure depends upon the intelligence we get. Most of it can be gathered
without clandestine intelligence, but some of it must be of necessity clandestine
intelligence. The things we say here today, the language we change, might
endanger the lives of some American citizens in the future." 82
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The preceeding excerpts emphasize the wide-spread support in
the Congress for the statutory ratification of the concept of central
intelligence. Opposition was forthcoming but it was to be related to
either specific provisions or lack:: of safeguards in the CIA section and
not to the general question of whether a Central Intelligence Agency was
needed.
Postion Within Executive Branch
One of the themes dominating the legislative record on the CIA
section concerned the position of the CIA in the Executive structure.
Discussion of this question helped to crystallize the supra-departmental
nature of the function and responsibilities of central intelligence and to
test the soundness of the relationship established under the National
Intelligence Authority within the "intelligence community. "
It is recalled that the 22 January 1946 Presidential Directive
creating the NIA placed the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Central Intelligence Group under the control of the President's chief
advisor in international and military affairs, the Secretaries of State,
War and Navy, and the personal representative of the President. The
DCI was a non-voting member of the NIA.
The Presidential draft of the National Security Act of 1947 simply
provided that "there is hereby established under the National Security
Council 83a Central Intelligence Agency, with a 'Director of Central Intelligence,
who shall be the head thereof.... " It also transferred "... the functions of
the National Intelligence Authority.. to the National Security Council. "84
The functions of the NIA, were to plan, develop and coordinate all Federal
foreign intelligence activities "... to assure the most effective accomplish-
ment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. " 85 It also
transferred the functions of the DCI and the CIG under the NIA to the DCI
or CIA under the proposed act.
Three concerns were raised in connection with this arrangement.
The first was whether the Agency could effectively operate by reporting
to a group, the National Security Council. The second was whether this
structural arrangement would support satisfactory relationships between
the CIA and departments and their intelligence agencies. The third was
the position of the DCI with respect to the NSC.
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During the hearings in the House committee, Representative
Walter Judd (R., Minn.) pursued the respective merits of the CIA
reporting to the NSC or to an individual:
Mr. Judd: "... I have concern as to whether the intelligence agency
provided in the bill is given anywhere near the importance it deserves...
it seems to be a joint and hydra-headed agency which will weaken our
intelligence rather than strengthen it. "
Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Emergency Management,
Scientific Research and Development: ". . . The Central Intelligence Agency
provided for (in the bill) links the military establishment and the State
Department, and hence cannot logically be placed under the Secretary of
National Defense. It is a joint matter. It might be reporting directly
to the President.... "
Mr. Judd: "I have never seen a hydra-headed organization which functions
as well as one headed by a single man. If we were caught flat-footed
without proper intelligence at the outbreak of another war, it might be
disastrous." 86
Mr. Judd: "Regarding the CIA, do you think that it ought to be under the
National Security Council, or directly under the Secretary of National
Defense, on a par with the National Security Resources Board, the
Joint Research and Development Board, the National Security Resources
Board, The CIA is put under the National Security Council so that it has
a dozen heads. It seems to me that this is so important that it ought to
be on a par with those other agencies. "
Vice Admiral Radford: "I feel that the CIA should be under the National
Security Council. "
Mr. Judd: "You don't think that its reports will make the rounds and never
get any action?"
Vice Admiral Radford "I hardly think so. I think its handling of reports can
be controlled by the Director. I am sure it would be. " 87
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Mr. Dulles, who made extraordinary contributions to the
success of the OSS and who was to later be appointed to the position
as the Director of Central Intelligence, registered his concern over the
Director reporting to the National Security Council in a statement to
the Senate Committee:
"Under the legislation as proposed, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is to operate under the National Security Council,
the stated purpose of which is 'to advise the President with
respect to the integration of foreign and military policies, and
to enable the military services and other agencies of the
Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
national security.' This Council will have at least six members,
and possibly more, subject to Presidential appointment. From
its composition it will be largely military, although the Secretary
of State will be a member. If precedent is any guide, it seems
unlikely, in view of the burden of work upon all the members of
this Council, that it will prove to be an effective working body
which will meet frequently, or which could give much supervisory
attention to a central intelligence agency. It would seem prefer-
able that the Chief of Central Intelligence should report, as at
present, to a smaller body, of which the Secretary of State would
be the chairman, and which would include the Secretary of National
Defense, and a representative of the President, with the right
reserved to the Secretaries of State and of National Defense
to be represented on this small board by deputies, who should
have at least the rank of Assistant Secretary. And this board
must really meet and assume the responsibility for advising and
counseling the Director of Intelligence, and assure the proper
liaison between the Agency and these two Departments and the
Executive.
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Senator Gurney, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee was also interested in the respective merits of whether the
CIA should report to the National Security Council or to an individual,
particularly the Secretary of National Defense and arranged for Mr. Charles S.
Cheston, a former Assistant Director of the Office of Strategic Services,
to discuss this and other matters relating to the CIA section of the
proposed bill with Admiral Hillenkoetter. In a memorandum inserted in
the Senate Hearings,88 Mr. Cheston concluded: "It has been amply
demonstrated that problems of peace and war in modern times require
total intelligence. Each of the principal departments and agencies
of Government requires information for the determination of basic questions
of policy, the collection and analysis of which are entirely outside the scope of
its own operations. It does not solve the problem to create a kind of clearing
house for information gathered in the ordinary operations of the several
departments. What is needed is an effective, integrated, single agency with
clearly defined duties and authority to analyze and correlate information
from all sources and, wherever necessary, to supplement existing methods
of collection of information. Such an agency must serve all principal
departments of the Government and also bring together the full and com-
prehensive information upon which national policy must be based. It
should not supplant existing intelligence units within the several department s.
Every effort should be made to improve and strengthen these units wherever
possible. The problem is national and not departmental. And it will not be
solved by having the policies and operation of such an agency determined
by a committee of Cabinet members, whose primary duty is to discharge
the full-time responsibilities of their own offices."
Admiral Hillenkoetter met with Mr. Cheston in Philadelphia on
Memorial Day and, on 3 June 1947, wrote Senator Gurney as follows:
"The third point (advocated by Mr. Cheston) is that
the Director should report to an individual rather than a committee.
As j previously stated before the Senate Appropriations Committee,
I feel that this is a matter to be determined by the Congress rather
than by me. On purely theoretical grounds, it would, of course,
be best to report to one individual rather than a group. However,
I can work with a Council equally well, and see no great difference
in either solution that Congress may determine. There may be
some question as to the wisdom of having the Director of Central
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Intelligence report to the Secretary of National Defense. This,
in effect, might be considered as placing the Agency within the
military establishment, which would not, in all probability,
be satisfactory to the State Department. They have a great
interest in the operations of the Agency, and their contributions
in the intelligence field are particularly important in time of
peace, when the Foreign Service can operate throughout the world.'
"As General Donovan stated in his memorandum to you
of 7 May 1947, intelligence 'must serve the diplomatic as well as
the military and naval arms. ' This can be best done outside
the military establishment. As General Donovan stated further
".. Since the nature of its work requires it to have status, it
should be independent of any Department of the Government (since
it is obliged to serve all and must be free of the natural bias on
operating Departments)"'
An incisive comment on the supra-departmental nature of the functions
and responsibilities of central intelligence and the reasons why it should
not be organized under an individual olicymaker, was given the Senate
Committee by Mr. Allen W. Dulles-.8_9
"The State Department, irrespective of the form in which
the Central Intelligence Agency is cast, will collect and process its
own information as a basis for the day-by-day conduct of its work.
The armed services intelligence agencies will do likewise. But
for the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is
important that information should be processed by an agency whose
duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts,
without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the
inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to
determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too
likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy
to be faulty. The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to
do with policy. It should try to get at the hard facts on which others
must determine policy. The warnings which might well have pointed
to the attack on Pearl Harbor were largely discounted by those who
had already concluded that the Japanese must inevitably strike else-
where. The warnings which reportedly came to Hitler of our invasion
of North Africa were laughed aside. Hitler thought he knew we didn't
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have the ships to do it. It is impossible to provide any system
which will be proof against the human frailty of intellectual
stubbornness. Every individual suffers from that. All we can
do is to see that we have created the best possible mechanism to
get the unvarnished facts before the policy makers, and to get it
there in time. "
Senator Robertson of the Senate Armed Services Committee proposed
on the floor of the Senate an amendment to elevate the Secretary of National
Security (Secretary of Defense) to a position: "where he will be over the
National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
National Security Resources Board, and over the entire military establish-
ment as well. "90 However the real thrust of Senator Robertson's amendment
was that the Secretary of Defense should be the coordinator of national
security and immediately under the President, and was only collaterally
related to central intelligence. Senator Gurney in opposing the amendment
said "We do not believe that the (Secretary of Defense) should in any way
control, by means of a superior position, the conclusions which emanate
from the Security Council.... " 1 The amendment was defeated.
The second concern relating to the establishment of the CIA under
the National Security Council was whether this arrangement would support
intelligence agencies. This concern was clearly brought out in the following
i - -" - o
th
i
a
au
or
t
t
ATOlr ` DI GAS: . . . when you ;et down to the
Central Intelligence Agency, which certainly i, one of the most
important of all the functions set forth in the bill, I notice that
it reports directly to the -resident and does not seem to have
any line running to the War Department, or the Navy Department,
or to the Secretary for Air. And I was wondering if that rather
excluded position, you might say, was a wholesome thing. It
seems to me that Central Intelligence Agency ought to have more
direct contact with the Army and the Navy and the Air Force;
and as I see it on the chart here, it is pretty well set aside and
goes only to the z- resident. What is the reason for that ?
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~Kk- `112&: % . '?eU, sir, this diagram Shows
the primary control of tie Central Intelligence Agency through
the National Security Council which, of course, is responsible
to the President. But, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency,
by its detailed directive, takes information in from the military
services and also supplies them with information.
In other words, it is a staff agency and controlled througk
the National Security Council, which is supported by the military
services, and in turn, supports them.
SENATOR TYDINNGS: It seems to me that of course they
would diffuse such information as a matter of orderly procedure
to the Army, Navy and Air Force, as they collected the information
and as they deemed it pertinent. fut I would feel a little more
secure about it if there were a line running from that agency to
the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Air Force,
rather than have it go up through the _" resident and back again.
Because. the President is a rather busy man, and while he has
control over it, one of its functions, it seeaxs to me, ought to be
to have a closer tie-in with the three services than the chart indicates.
AD .IRAL SHE AN: 1. ell, air, that is the trouble with
the diagram. Actually, the Security Council, placed directly under
it, has members of the three departments, the p3ecretary of
National Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, who collaborates
very closely with Military and Naval Intelligence, and there are a
good many other cross-relationships.
Sl NATOR TYDINGS: I realize that, but even so. I think
--_itltelliaence in about as important a part of running A war as there
W, as I Cep}W you ,v ill agree, And it is rather set off there by
itself, and is only under the President= which is all right for
general direction pur?pase, but I do not feel satisfied in
having it over there without so : e hues running to the War
Department, the Navy Department, and the Air :Force, even
though that might follow and they might do it anyhow.
ADLWAL `A tIv : - Well, in a further development
of this chart, we might show a line of collaboration and service
and so on, extending from the Central Intelligence Agency to the
three departzulents, and to those others.
ATV, T To the Joint Chiefs of staff, anyway,
a -matter of fact. We have a Central Intelligence (-nan
J?olicy Council of the Research and. Development Board at the
present time.
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'Q
T TYMNGS: U you ever do another chart, will
you do me the U *or QO nec stg that up with those thstih dmpartels
and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Because it looks like It is set
up in that way to advise the xresident, more than to advise the
services and the Joint Chiefs of itaffl which, of course, is not
the intention of it at all, in n:ay opinion.
A )M ?'SHE M, ,: ' e tried, in this particular chart,
to show only the primary line of control, with the exception of the
dotted Tine from the :"resident to the Joint Chiefs of v>taff, which is
there for constitutional reasons.
a. NATGI TY]DINC 5: "Well, I hope that ray comments will
cause us to find some way that we can make sure that someone will
offer an amendment from the `. ar Department or the wavy Department
that the Intelligence Agency is to have direct tie-in with the Joint
Chiefs and the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Otherwise. we may
have another Pearl arbor controversy, with, the question arising.
", 'ho got the information ? ' And the reply, 'It was not transx:nltted.
That is one thing that should not happen again. And as this is set
up, it would lend the layman the opinion that it was more or less
detached, rather than an integral part of the three services.
: .t t4niral, that is azi awfully short
bit of explanation, un.d.er the caption '`Central Intelligence Agency.
the way it is set up ; .eere. separately, to be appointed by the
President, and superseding the services now run by the Army and
the Navy. I respectfully submit to you and to General Norstad
that it might be wise to put an amendment in there, in orde
make certain that the thing is understood; that this Central
Intelligence Agency shall service the three departments and the
joint Chiefs of 'itaff, and have some tie-in with the three
departments, rather than to leave it hanging up there on a limb
all off by itself. I do not think that would change anything
materially. but it would clarify it, and make it plain that we are
setting up something for the purposes for which we conceive it to
be set up.
H RMAN: Kell, air, I would like to make a
comment nn the language as to the Central Intelligence Agency.
At one time in the drafting we considered completely covering
the Central Intelligence Agency in the manner that it should be
covered by law.
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SENATOR TYDINC,S: Admiral, my point is xi.rplyr this:
that under the wording as to the Central Intelligence Agency which
begins on page 20 and ends at the top of page 22, it deals more or
less with consolidation and not with the duties that devolve upon
that office. It seen is to me there is a void in the bill that ought to
be eliminated.
AI)M AL ~iI :RMAN: Well, we considered the matter of
trying to cover the Central Intelligence Agency adequately, and
we found that that matter, is itself, was going to be a matter of
legislation of considerable scope and importance.
SENATOR TYDINGS: A separate bill?
ADMIRAL SHERMAN: A separate bill. And after consultation
with General Vandenberg, we felt it was better in this legislation
only to show the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency to
the National Security Council, and then leave to separate legislation
the task of a full and thorough development of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
SENATOR TYDINGS: Well, now, for the record, is it safe
for this Committee to assume that during this session it is likely
that a bill will come along dealing with the Central Intelligence
Agency in the particulars we have under discussion?
ADMIRAL SHERMAN: It is my understanding that that
will take place.
THE CHAIRMAN: How about that, General Vandenberg?
GENERAL VANDENBERG: The enabling act is prepared, but
we do not want to submit that until we have reason for it. "
Later, General Vandenburg reviewed for the Senate committee the
relationships which had been developed between the Director of Central
Intelligence and the intelligence community under the 22 January 1946
Presidential directive:93
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"In order to perform his prescribed functions, the Director
of Central Intelligence must keep in close and intimate contact
with the departmental intelligence agencies of the Government.
To provide formal machinery for this purpose, the President's
Directive established an Intelligence Advisory Board to advise
the Director. The permanent members of this Board are the
Directors of Intelligence of the State, War and Navy Departments
and the Air Force. Provision is made, moreover, to invite the
heads of other intelligence agencies to sit as members of the
Advisory Board on all matters which would affect their agencies.
In this manner, the Board serves to furnish the Director with
the benefits of the knowledge, advice, experience, viewpoints
and over-all requirements of the departments and their intelligence
agencies. "
Of course, the responsibility of CIG to support the departments and
their intelligence agencies was clearly set forth as a function of CIG under
the President's Directive of 22 January 1946 and were carried over into
the CIA section of the President's proposal by providing that "the functions
of the Director of Central Intelligence and the functions... of the Central
Intelligence Group are transferred to the Director of Central Intelligence
appointed under this act and to the Central Intelligence A ency respectively.
However, in keeping with the House Committee's views9 "... that it is
better legislative practice to spell, out such (CIA's) duties in the interest
of clarity and simplicity.... " The proposed act was so amended and
provided the basis for the following colloquy on the House floor:
Mr. Kersten: It seems to me from what the gentleman has
said that the Central Intelligence Agency is one of the very important parts
of this entire set-up. I wish to ask the gentleman if there is a definite
coordination provided for between that Agency and, say the Department of
State? For I feel that certain information of the Agency would affect the
activities of the entire system.
Mr. Wadsworth: The gentleman is correct. May I point
out that under the provisions of the bill the Central Intelligence Agency
in effect must cooperate with all the agencies of the Government, including
the State Department. It is the gathering point of information that may
come in from any department of the Government with respect to the
foreign field, including the State Department, of course; including the
War Department, through G-2; including the Navy Department, through
ONI. That information is gathered into the central agency to be
evaluated by Central Intelligence and then disseminated to those agencies
of Government that may be interested in some portion of it.
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The last consideration relating to structural relationships
concerned the position of the Director with respect to the National
Security Council. It is recalled that in the meeting with the White
House drafting team General Vandenberg, while strongly opposing
participation by either CIA or its Director in policy decisions, felt there
should be a provision providing for his presence at the meetings of the
Council. The drafting team felt that the position of the Director as
the intelligence advisor to the Council was inherent in the position
itself, and that it would be improper to provide by law that he head of
the Agency, under the Council, should sit on the Council. While
being present at the meetings of the Council did not necessarily constitute
sitting "on" the Council, General Vandenberg's recommendation was
rejected.
However, during a hearing of the House Committee with
Secretary Forrestal testifying the issue was raised again: 95
.13000": The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency would work under the National security Council.
SECRETARY FORRESTAL: That I. correct.
MR. BOGGS: He to not a member of the National Security
Council; he to an independent appointment of the President. but
he works under, on this chart he is not a member of the
Council, the heavy line dray here, but he to more or less an
executive secretary on intelligence matters for the Council.
.B
Qouncil.
e results of his work would be of essential importance
.,TARY .FORRE 3TAL: Well, it is obvious, :Lr.
CCs I think so, and f agree with you, but the
thought that I. have nt mind was that he should be a me ber of
the Council himself. After all. he to dealing with all the information
and the evaluation of that information, from wherever we can get it.
It seems to me that he has knowledge and information of matters
which the National Security Council would consider more inform-tation
at hand and the evaluation of that information than any other member
of that Council. He should be put on an equal basis.
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SECRETARY FORRESTAL: I think that there in always
some limit to the effectiveness of any organization in proportion
to the number of people that are on it. The services and the
intelligence information of the Director of Intelligence would be
available, and certainly no nian who is either the Secretary of
National Defense or the Chairman of the Security Council, would
want to act or proceed without constant reference to the sources
available to this Central Intelligence Director. But again. I
would not try to specify it by law, so confident ant I that the
practical workings out of this organization would require his presence
most of the time.
sus.. D00CS': I can see -- I do not know that I can see --
I can visualize in my mind, even if this bill becomes a law, as
presently set up, a great deal of room for confusion on intelligence
matters. Here we have the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, responsible to the National Security Council, and yet
the Director is not a member of that Council, but he has to get
all of his information down through the chair of the Secretary of
National Defense, and all the other agencies of Government in
addition to our national defense agencies, the Secretary of
Agriculture-, the Secretary of State, and so forth. I just cannot
quite see how the man is going to carry out his functions there
without a great deal of confusion, and really more opportunity to
put the blame on somebody else than there is now.
SE CRETARY FORRESTAL: Well. if you have an
organization, Mr. Boggs, in which men have to rely upon placing
the blame, and this is particularly true of Government, if you
once get that conception into their heads, you cannot run any
organization, and it goes to the root, really, of this whole question.
This thing will only work, and I have said from the beginning it
would only work, if the components in it want it to work.
ME. BOGGS: Right, I certainly agree with that- ... "
There was to be no further proposal to place the Director of
Central Intelligence on the National Security Council as a member, although
discussions such as that held between Mr. Boggs and Secretary Forrestal
confirmed the role of the DCI as the nation's chief intelligence advisor and
coordinator.
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(F) SUMMARY
In approving the National Security Act of 1947, Congress
ratified, for the most part, the relationships which had existed within
the intelligence community and to the policymakers under the National
Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence and the
Central Intelligence Agency were placed under the National Secuiity
Council. Congress, however, expanded,'the\Council to include the
President. ~;.
As finally enacted, the "Central Intelligence Agency with a
Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof...
was established. . . "under the National Security Council. "97 The
responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence to the depart-
ments and their intelligence agencies under the 22 January 1946
Presidential Directive were made specific duties for CIA and for the
DCI as head of the Agency "under the direction of the National Security
Council" as follows:
" (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to the national security, and provide for the dissemination of
such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate
existing agencies and facilities... .
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing
intelligence agencies, such additional services of common
concern as the National Security Council dete9rgmines can
be more efficiently accomplished centrally,
The discussions in the Congress concerning these matters helped to
publicly clarify the role of the DCI and the CIA and the nature of the
supra-departmental task facing central intelligence.
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paragraph 3 (c), the National Intelligence Authority, which was then com-
posed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the personal repre-
sentative of the President, directed the Director of Central Intelligence
to conduct all organized federal espionage and counter-espionage opera-
tions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the
national security.
This directive, which was issued on 8 July 1946, was quoted in part
in a letter from the National Intelligence Authority to Chai:.r: man Clare Hoffman
whose Committee drafted Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947.
This letter, signed by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, went on to
explain "... The Central Intelligence Group should be free to assume, under
our direction, or the subsequent direction of a National Security Council, the
performance, for the benefit of the intelligence agencies of the Government,
of such services, of common concern, including the field of collection, as
this Authority or a subsequent Council determines can be most efficiently
performed centrally.''
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Collection Responsibility
n
From the inception of Donavan's early plans for central intelli-
gence, there was a certain amount of fear within the existing
intelligence agencies that the centralized service would encroach upon
their collection, evaluation and dissemination functions. While the
22 January 1946 Presidential Directive did not specify a collection
responsibility for the DCI, it was understood as one of the functions
which the NIA could direct. However, to prevent over-centralization
and to assuage the fears of existing intelligence agencies, the Presidential
Directive stated in paragraph 6 that: "The existing intelligence agencies
of your Departments (State, War and Navy) shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence". (Underlining
supplied. )
Pursuant to its responsibility under paragraph 1 of the Presidential
Directive of 22 January 1946 for planning, developing, and coordinating
all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to ensure the most effective
accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security,
the National Intelligence Authority under date of 8 July 1946, issued the
following Directive which is quoted in part:
". . . the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby
directed to perform the following services of common concern,
which this authority has determined can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally: Conduct of all organized Federal
espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United
States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence
information required for the national security.... "
In a report of the House Committee on Military Affairs dated
days after the issuance of this collection directive by the NIA, the statutory
authorization of the NIA was strongly recommended but the Committee
would require that "It is specifically understood that the Director of Central
Intelligence (in performing functions under the direction of the NIA and
of the Congres~sl should not undertake operations for the collection of
intelligence. "'K)
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In a letter to Clare Hoffman, Chairman, House Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments, dated 26 June 1947, the
Authority cited its 8 July 1946 Directive and denied charges appearing
in the press that the CIG had usurped various departmental intelligence
functions and forced established organizations out of the field. The letter
stated:
"It has long been frlt by those who have successfully
operated clandestine intelligence systems that such work must
be centralized within one agency. As a corollary to this
proposition, it has likewise been proven that a multitude of
espionage agencies results in two shortcomings: first, agents
tend to uncover each other or block each other's funds or
similarly neutralize each other, being unaware of identi cal
objectives; second, each agency tends to hoard its own special
information or attempts to be the first to deliver a choice piece
of information to higher authorities. This latter type of competition
does not permit the overall evaluation of intelligence on a given
subject, as each agency is competing for prestige....
"... The Central Intelligence Group should be free to
assume, under our direction, or the subsequent direction of
a National Security Council, the performance, for the benefit
of the intelligence agencies of the Government, of such services,
of common concern, including the field of collection, as this
Authority or a subsequent Council determines can be most
efficiently performed centrally. "
On the following day the House Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments met in executive session to hear testimony on
whether or not the collection of information should be centralized in the
Central Intelligence 1Authority. The following comments are excerpts
from that testimony.
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