THE PROS AND CONS OF CREATING A CONGRESSIONAL JOINT COMMITTEE TO OVERSEE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200080028-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 28
• Content Type: REPORT

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?her pros and cons of creating
$ congressional joint committee
to oversee intelligence activities.
WHY NOT A WATCHDOG COMMITTBF?
John S. Warner
For the last ten years orlthere have been recurrent
calla in Congress and the press for Lthe!'establishment of a
congressional Joint Committee Loa Foreign Intelligence :to kee
P
tab on the Executive Branch's intelligence activities, and
particularly the!CIA,?in somewhat the way the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy oversees the affairs of the AEC. Through
s cessive administrations the Executive Btranch along with
some members of Congress, ;hays? opposed this proposal, Viand it
has never really got off the
y gground1 Yet many thoughtful
intelligence officers are inclined to favorLitj whether as
an independent check which they really think desirable or
merely as a buffer against public charges of free-wheeling
on the part of CIA.
The main points of the Executive Branch's position, as
officially adopted by the National Security Council in 1956,
are that such a committee would create security problems and
encroach on the Executive's responsibility for foreign rela-
tions, that it would have jurisdictional troubles because in-
telligence involves agencies other than CIA which are the
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responsibility ofiother congressional committees, and that the
four CIA subcommittees -- of the Senate and House Appropriations
and Armed Forces Committees -- which are now kept informed as
a basis for appropriations and authorizations conduct an ade-
quate review of plans and activities and could do more if
desired. The question is not so simple as that sounds, how-
ever, and the pros and cons are worth going into with some
care.
Peculiarities of the Problem
All agencies have the problem of establishing proper
relations with the Congress in order to keep it informed and
obtain the funds they require. Four aspects of this problem,
however, are peculiar to an intelligence agency like CIA and
distinguish it from that of ARC or any other agency. They
are the following:
Security. CIA must put a premium on security not only
for the protection of its own activities, sources, and
methods but also to retain the confidence of friendly foreign
governments. from which it gets invaluable sensitive material.
It is the only agency that needs to maintain secrecy in such
basic matters as personnel, budget, organization, and expendi-
tures. This secrecy tends to breed suspicion and distrust in
the congressmen who are not informed. The security problem is
thus different from that of other agencies both in nature and
in degree.
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The Intelligence Product. Finished intelligence, the end
product of the community, is meant for the policy makers in
the Executive Branch. It can be argued soundly that it is the
exclusive property of the President in view of his constitutional
responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, and thus is
serious question whether the Congress has any legitimate inter-
est in it beyond seeing that value is returned for funds
appropriated. Since intelligence is only one factor in policy
decisions, giving it to Congress could lead to serious politi-
cal difficulties between the Executive and Legislative Branches,
with intelligence agencies caught in the middle.
Committee Jurisdiction. Most agencies can deal with the
Congress from the standpoint of an exclusive range of functional
responsibility. But CIA is the focal point,of an intelligence
community comprising components of other departments and agen-
cies that have their own direct responsibility to the Congress
and are assigned to other committees. This formidable juris-
dictional problem, while it is one for the Congress to resolve,
is pertinent to our consideration of relations with the Congress.
Covert Operations. In addition to its intelligence mis-
sion CIA is charged'with the conduct of covert operations.
These operations are governed by policy directives from ele-
ments of the Executive Branch and are subject to review in
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that Branch. A congressional review would cover policy decisions
of the Executive for which CIA does not have the responsibility.
Vis-a-vis Present System
Let us look at these problem aspects as they are handled,
under the present CIA subcommittees and appraise the pros-
pects under a joint committee.
Security.. With the existing system the security of the
subcommittees has been excellent. It cannot be assumed a
priori, however, that a joint committee would be less secure.
Under some of the proposals, in fact, notably that of Senator
Mansfield, the membership of the joint committee would be pre-
cisely that of the CIA subcommittees. The more establishment
of the joint committee might have some adverse effect on re-
lations with foreign intelligence services, but this would
probably be of short duration if it could be explained.to them
that there had been no real change with respect to safeguard-
ing their secrets.
The Intelligence Product. In the matter of having to pro-
duce finished intelligence on congressional demand, there would
seem to be little fundamental difference between the present
subcommittee system and a joint committee. Though the subcom-
mittees have not raised the issue, they could at any time. A
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joint committee might be more likely to do so, but the issue,
the President's responsibility for foreign affairs, is the
same under either system. A joint committee, in fact, night
confine the problem by tending to preclude requests 'frcmx
other committees, say Foreign Relations, such as could be
made under the present system.
Jurisdiction. There are two sides to the jurisdiction
problem. On the one hand, if the joint committee is to have
jurisdiction over intelligence hatters, the-extent of the
jurisdiction it might assert over the intelligence activities
of agencies that are responsible to.other committees is a
matter of conjecture and concern. Under the present system,
on the other hand, there is the question of how many commit-
tees can properly take jurisdiction over CIA at the same time.
In addition to the four principal subcommittees, for example,
a subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign
Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has listed
one of its responsibilities as "liaison with Central Intel-
ligence Agency"; and the Post Office and Civil Service Com-
mittees might well claim legislation affecting CIA personnel.
A joint committee could simplify the situation by taking ex-
clusive jurisdiction over CIA for everything except approp-
riations. It is true, however, that there has been no
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serious jurisdictional difficulty under the present system and
that the establishment of a joint committee would tend to raise
j*risdictional questions.
Covert Operations. Again with respect to this problem,
on the fundamental issue congressional intrusion into the
executive's responsibility for foreign affairs -- there seems
to-be little differencebetween the present subcommittees and
and the joint committee. The existence of,a joint committee,
howeydr, because the control of covert operations has been
one of the main motives behind-the demand for one, would tend
to bring the issue into focus. The subcommittees have not
seriously considered the policy directives which govern covert
operations; a joint committee could be expected to study such
matters more carefully and might well be critical of policies
or instructions or perhaps especially of limitations set by
Defense or State. The problem of such policy guidance is
delicate enoughwithout having a third party, and that a
congressional group, enter the debate. From this point of
view, therefore, the subcommittee system seems preferable.
Yet there is really nothing to prevent the problem from
arising similarly in the subcommittees.
Membership and Staff
The membership question is a serious one. Some of the
proposals have left it open how members of the joint committee
should be selected, except for the usual relationship between
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majority and minority parties; in all likelihood seniority
sk
rules would apply. Such an inflexible arrangement would in-
crease the hazards both to security and to the Executive's
freedom of action. It would be of importance to have either
a provision like the Mansfield proposal for the membership
to come frog the existing s ommittees or some .arrangements
for the informal exercise of discretion such as now obtains
in selecting subcommittee members.
Such problems as are raised by.a joint committee are
magnified by the fact that it wo> .d have its own staff. The
staffs presently supporting the aubcomsittJs have as such
work as they can handle on. legislation for. other defense
activities and tend to leave CIA alone. A staff for the pro-
posed joint committee, however, even if it consisted of one
man, would use up but a small portion of its time on the few
legislative problems CIA presents -- as contrasted, for ex-
ample, with those of AEC -- and would doubtless devote the
rest to informing itself about intelligenc.eactivities and
inquiring into substantive matters. To do its job properly
it would have to have access to the most sensitive of clan-
destine activities on an across-the-board basis, anflJaccess
which very few in the compartmented Agency itself are given.
The security problem would be further !aggravated by the normal
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turnover in a staff, leaving a train of people with broad
knowledge of secret activities.
This staff work could be expected in turn to promote the
interest of committee members in such matters, and there
would be a far more active give and take between them and CIA
officers than at present. Aside from being t me-consuming,
the detriments of this development would probably tend to out-
weigh the benefits: the increased security, exposure and the
tendency of the joint committee to interpose in matters of
foreign policy would likely be of greater consequence than
any protection it sight provide against congressional or pub-
lie scapegoating of the Agency. Nevertheless the problems
would not be insoluble if such a committee were created.
The selection of staff personnel could probably be worked
out by mutual agreement between the committee chairman and
the DCI.
Other Considerations
In addition to our own views in the Agency. and the intel-
ligence community,, we have to consider those of the Executive
Branch as a whole and of the senior members of Congress who
sit on the present subcommittees. No have noted the position
taken by the National Security Council in 1956. Further, there
are some in the White House and Bureau of the Budget who feel
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strongly opposed to the joint committee concept as inevitably
leading to invasion of the prerogatives of the Executive Branch
by the Congress. The congressional leaders on the CIA sub-
committees are also characteristically opposed. Senator
Saltonstall, for example, once said that "a joint committee
would wreck CIA," which is a good deal more than we are saying
here.
Some of the advantages claimed for a joint committee
could be obtained under the present system of subcommittees.
The subcommittees could make a more thorough substantive re-
view of Agency activities, say annually, than they have in
the past. Such a review, followed by a report to the Congress
that it had been conducted, would go a long way toward meeting
the objectives of a joint committee and alleviating the pres-
sures for one. Subcommittee members are also becoming more
active individually in dispelling syspicion and distrust of
CIA within the Congress. The lack of knowledge about the
Agency and its congressional relations was illustrated
strikingly a few years ago when certain senior congressmen
on the Armed Services committee were found to be unaware that
there was a CIA-subcommittee in existence.
In Sun
In most of the problem areas we have discussed, the same
fundamental issues arise whether the present subcommittee
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system is retained or a joint committee is created -- the
difference being that the latter would be more likely to
bring the issues to the fore and emphasize the problems.
Although some advantageS would no doubt accrue from having a
Joint committee, some of these can be secured without one,
and we conclude that on balance a joint committee would be
undesirable. We do not conclude that the establishment of
a joint committee would be disastrous. Certainly it would
create some new problems, particularly because of having a
permanent staff, but in all probability these could be
resolved.
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