ADDENDUM TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REPORTING THE FLOOR DISCUSSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 IN THE HOUSE

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• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1947
• Content Type: OPEN

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ADDENDUM TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reporting the Floor discussion on
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
in the House
and 25 July 1947
19 July 1947
ADDENDUM NO. 3 to VOLUME I
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CONGRESSIONAT_ RECOITD-ITOUSE
.I...? i .c.:-.Y?4, spend, .p,,r.d. S7)rn,-
, and it is gc,:ng to
410 1.: :,pen ?:?,::. year when the people red-
..hat h:,.-. been going on. They should
- aii d will elect a Republican President if
he ...0;,,. :d.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. P.?:CII. I yield to the gentleman
? froin Mich an.
l'Ir. I-IC,..7F1s.IAN. ?He cannot spend
any. nin,,.,, unless the Congress appro-
priates ir.
Mr. RICH. Well, we are cutting down '
on the spending in the departments of
. Government. If we had the aid of the
exes:ntive department, we could do a real
je,a. Bewise and economize.-
.1'ilRMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent to address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend
? my :marks and include a newspaper
arl:.el-e.
? 'Mc.. SPE.1.--CER. Is thei.e objection to .
tho request of the gentleman from
? Mississippi? -
There was no objection. ? ?
?
:Mr. RANKIN addressed the House.
remarks will appear hereafter in the ,
Appendix. l, .
STANDARD NEWSPRINT PAPER
Mr. KNUTSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous ccinsent for the present con-
sideration of H. J. Res. 238.
enneeeresolution. , Bloom
Bland Gross
Gwynne, Iowa . O'Hara
Norton',
The Clerk read the title of the joint
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to Boggs, La. Hall, O'Toole
Bonner Edwin Arthur Pace
the request of the gentleman from MM- Boykin Hall, ? Patinan
nesota? Buckley Leonard W. Patterson
Mr. RAYBURN. Reserving the ?right Byrne, N.Y. Harrison Pfeifer
to object. Mr. Speaker, I think I shall ? ccaeimiepr HEaavrtel
ienyi e r Powell
Ploeser
object hereafter when the gentleman Chapman Hays Rabin
a:as unanimous consent to take up "H. J. Clements Hebert
Res." There is no such thing. Cole, Mo. Hendricks
Hope
Mr. KNUTSON. . "House joint reso- Colmer
Cooley Jennings
lUtioll"; I beg the gentleman's pardon. Cotton - Johnson, Tex
The SPEAKER. Is there .objection to. Coudert , Jones, Ala.
Cox - Kee
the request of the gentleman from Min- Cravens Keefe
nesota? Davis, Tenn. Kelley
There was no objection. ? Dawson, Ill. Kennedy
Keogh
The Clerk read the joint resolution, as ? Eniingell
rksen Kilday
follows: ? 'Thomengeaux Kirwan
Tariff Act of 1930 is hereby amended to read
Klein
Resolved, etc., That paragraph 1772 of-the Douglas
as follows:
"PAR. 1772. Standard newsprint paper: For
the purposes of this paragraph paper which
is in rolls not less than 15 inches in width
shall be deemed to be standard newsprint ,
paper insofar as width of rolls is concerned."
The joint resolution was ordered to be
el..roseed and read a tird time, was read
he third time, and passed, and a mo-
tion to reconsider was laid on the table.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATION
BILL, 1948
S4.?.nae IJ
Confc.rer.ce
The SPAIl.L. . '.:ere ?,?'n 10
the rcOue.it of :h-man from W;-,s11-
ington? [Aftor a pause.] The Chair
hears none, and appoints the following
conferees: Messrs. HORAN, STEFAN,
CHURCH, STOCKMAN, ANDREWS Of Ala-
bama, BATES of Kentucky, and FOGARTY.
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND
FISHERIES
Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries may
sit during the day during general de-
bate:
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from In-
diana?
There was no objection.
CALL OF THE HOUSE
-Mr. COLE of New York, Mr. Speaker,
I make the point of order that a quorum
-is not present.
The SPEAKER. Obviously a quorum
Is not present.
Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Speaker, I move
A call of the House.
? A call of the House was ordered
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed te answer to their
names:
, [Roll No. 123]
Allen, Ill. Goff _ Morton
Bell - Gossett Muhl enberg
Mr. KORAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask,
unanimous consent to take from the
Speaker', i,oble the bill (H. R. 4106)
making ?:ations for the govern-
ment of une ...):strict of Columbia and
other activities chargeable in whole or
in part against the revenues of such Dis-
+riot for the fiscal year ending June 30;
1948, and for other purposes, with Sen-.
amendments thereto, disagree to the-.
Reed, Ill.
Richards
Riley
Rivers .
Sabath
Schwabe, MO. '
Sheppard
Smith, Ohio
Smith, Va.
Somers
Stockman
Thomas, Tex.
Thomason
Tollef son
Eaton ea Van Zandt
Feighan Lesinski Vinson
Fellows Ludlow West
Flannagan Marcantonio Whitten
Fuller Mason Wilson, Tex.
Gallagher Meade, Ky. Zimmerman
Gifford Miller, Md.
Gillie Morrison ,
The SPEAKER. On this roll call 320
Members have answered to their names,
'a quorum. .
By ? unanimous consent, further pro-
ceedings under the call were dispensed
with.
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY
? Mr. WOLCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the Committee
on Banking and Currency may sit while
the House is in session during general
debate today.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Mich-
igan?
-There was no objection.
9561
EXTENSION OF IZEMAEKS
Mr. DOLLIVER asked and was given
pi:1,:ion to extend his remarks in the
REcoaa and include a statement by
R. K. Bliss, of the extension service, Iowa
State College.
Mr. KORAN asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks in the
RECORD and include a news letter.
Mr. BENDER and Mr. FORAND asked
and were given permission to extend their
remarks in the RECORD. _
Mr. MILLER of California asked and
was given permission to extend his re-
marks in the RECORD and include an edi-
torial, ?
Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was
given permission to extend his remarks
in the RECORD And include a letter from
the mayor of Lovejoy, Ill. .
Mr. KEPAUVER asked and was given
permission tcl extend his remarks in the
RECORD and include .an editorial.
Mr. LODGE asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks in the 8-67- A9
?
RECORD and include a letter and an.
? article.
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move
that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union for the consideration
of the bill (H. R. 4214) to promote the
national security by providing for a Sec-
- retary of Defense; for 'a National Mili-
,tary Establishment; for a Department of
the Army, a Department of the Navy,
and a Department of the Air Force; and
for the coordination of the activities of
? the National Military Establishment
with other departments and agencies of
the Government concerned with the na-
tional security; and pending that, Mr:
Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all those who may -speak on the bill may
include in their remarks any relevant
material, and that all Members who so
desire may have five legislative days in
which to extend their remarks in the
RECORD on this subject.
The SPEAKER. 'Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Mich-
? igan?
There was no objection.
? Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker,
a parliamentary inquiry.
The 'SPEAKER. The gentleman will
state it.
Mr. COLE of. New York. Mr. Speak-
er, on Wednesday last, the' majority lead-
er sought the unanimous consent of the
,House for the consideration of this bill
at any time after the presentation of
that request early on Wednesday. Ob-
jection was made by me to that request
for the reason that the bill was not then
available to the Members of the' House..
. After consultation with the majority
leader the request was subsequently
made that the bill should be called up
any time after Friday. The basis for
the alteration in the request was that at
least a day would intervene between the
time the bill became available and the
time the bill was called up. I am advised
that this bill has not 'been available to
the Members until 9:30 this morning.
My parliamentary inquiry is whether it
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CONGRESSICNAL
would be in order at this time to make
a point of order against the motion upon
the ground that at least 24 hours have
not intervened between the time the bill
was available and the time the bill was
called up. .
The SPEAKER. In reply to the in-
quiry of the gentleman from New York,
the Chair would say that under the
unanimous-consent agreemetit, which
was reached on July 1,6, appearing in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at page 9270, all
points of order against the bill were
waived.
Mr. COLE of .New York. Mr Speaker,
a further parliamentary inquiry. I am
further advised that although the bill
Is available this morning, the report ac-
companying the bill is not. Would it be
in order to raise a point of order against
the motion of the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. ?HoFFivaN] upon the
ground that the report is not now avail-
able?
The SPEAKER. It would not be in
order because the same ruling would
apply. All points of order were waived
under the unanimous-consent agree-
ment.
,Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, ?
a further parliamentary inquiry. I am
informed that the report does not corn- -
ply with the rules of the House in that
It dbes not set 'forth the alterations pro-
posed by the bill to existing law. My
inquiry is whether the request of the
gentleman from Indiana, the majority
leader, that points of order against the
bill be waived also carried with it the
waiving of points of order against the
report which is supposed to accompany
the bill.
The SPEAKER. The Chair is com-
pelled to make the same ruling in this
instance also. All points of order were
waived under the unanimous-consent
agreement and, therefore, the raising of
that point of order at this time would
not, be in order.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker,,
without undertaking to dispute the de-
cision, I call you attention to the fact
that the request for waiving points of
order was directed to the bill itself.
Does the Speaker rule that the waiving
of points of order against the -bill car-
ried with it the waiving of points of order
against the report?
The SPEAKER. Yes.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER. ? The gentleman will
state it.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, would
not the recourse of the gentleman from
New 'York be to vote down the motion
to go into the Committee of Whole?
The SPEAKER. That is a matter for
the House to decide.
Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman' will
state it.
' Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, the gentle-
man from Michigan [Mr. 1-1OFFNLAN]
asked unanimous consent that all Mem-
leers might extend their remarks and
include extraneous matter in reference
to this bill. .
?
RECORD?HOUSE JULY 19
The SPEAXER. Yes; and that request
was granted. ?
Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, that seems to
be a very broad request.
The SPEAKER. The House has
.already passed on that and granted
the unanimous-consent request of the
gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, I dide_not
hear the gentleman exactly when he
made that request. It is a dangerous
'precedent.
The SPEAKER. The. gentleman from.
Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] asked unani-
mous consent that Members might be
permitted to so extend their remarks.
The question was put before the House,
and the House granted the request.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker,
a further parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman will
state it.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker,
would it be a proper course of action for
the Members to pursue who feel that
they' should be given an opportunity to
study the bill before consideration is
given to the bill by the House in Com-
mittee of the Whole to vote against the
motion offered by the gentleman from
Michigan?
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from
New York does not state a parliamentary
inquiry. The House, of course, can vote
as it pleases on all subjects.
The question is on the motion offered
by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr.
HOFFMAN].
The motion was agreed. to.
Accordingly the House resolved itself
into the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the con-
sideration of the bill H. R. 4214, with Mr.
CASE of South Dakota in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the unani-
mous-consent agreement, general debate
will continue not to exceed 5 hours, to
be confined to the bill, and the time to
be equally divided and controlled by the
chairman and ranking minority member
of the Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments.
The Chair redognizes the gentleman
from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN].
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from
-New York [Mr. WAsswormi].
Mr. VVADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman,
at last we have come to the considera-
tion of the bill known generally as the
unification bill, H. R. 4214. It may not
be a matter of surprise to many mem-
bers of this committee that I rise in sup-
port of the measure. Having been con-
cerned about the problems of our na-
tional defense for something like 25 or
30 years, I welcome this opportunity to
support a nieasure.which I am convinced
will make this Nation stronger, that will
achieve its strength with ,efficiency, and
ultimately with marked economy. It is
not my purpose at this time to engage in
a general tdiscussion, much less to at-
tempt any oratory, with respect to the
defense of our country and the present
condition of the world, but rather
thought I would impose upon your pa-
tience in an attempt to describe to you
as best I may the organizational set-up
proposed by this so-called unification bill.
It is for that reason I have had this chart
prepared. Unfortunately, some of the
print will be difficult for you to read, but
I hope, in an informal fashion, to de-
scribe just what this whole thing is.
We all know that under the Constitu-
tion of the United States the President,
in addition to his duty to execute the
laws, performs two other very, very im-
portant functions. One, he conducts'
the foreign relations of the United
States; and, two, he is Commander in
Chief of the armed forces.
In this bill we attempt to set up an ?
organization which will assist the Presi-
dent in the performance of those two '
special functions, the conduct of foreign
relations, and his function as Comman-
der in Chief of the armed forces. I,
therefore, call your attention to the fact
that at the top , of this chart there is
depicted the organization which is to
assist the President in the performance
of those functions. He is Commander in
Chief, as the chart indicates, of course;
and there is organized under the pro-
visions of this bill a National Security
Council which is to consist of the Secre-
tary of State, the Secretary of Na-
tional Defense, whose " position and
functions I will come to later, the Sec- -
retary of the Army, the Secretary of the
Navy, the .Secretary of the Air Force,
and the Chairman of the National Re-
sources Board. That is the National Se-
curity Council,, and the President is a
member of it and, if he so desires, may
preside over it.
The National Executive Council is to
have but one executive officer, the Ex-
ecutive Director, who might be described
as office manager, and he must be a ci-
vilian. It is to be noted that all of the
members of the Executive Council are'
civilians, and by reason of their respec-
tive offices:each one of them must be con-
firmed by the Senate.
The Executive Council cannot do its -
work effectively unlesS it has assistance,
and one source of assistance must be a
study to be made of the resources of this
country. The President must have the
advantage of a continued study of the -
reSourcesuf the country as well as a corn-
plete understanding of its military
strength in order that he may conduct
the foreign relations of the United States
in a proper fashion. .
The presence of the Secretary of State
upon the Council is significant. For the
first time in our history we propose that
the statutes shall provide that the con-
duct of foreign relations shall be recog-
nized as an exceedingly important part
of our general behavior before the world;
and the Resources Board is to make con-
tinuous study of the resources of Amer-
ica, its natural resources, its manpower,
anything of importance which relates to
the strength of this country or its poten-
tial strength: Oil, iron ore, electric
power, food, coal, any number of things
that are part of the natural resources of
the United States. The Resources Board
Is to make' a continuous study of that
part of the problem and make recom-
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9564 CONGRESSIOYAL RECORD?HOUSE
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
gentleman from Arkansas.
Mr. HARRIS. "... understand the Sec-
retaries of the various services do not
have Cabinet status.
Mr. WADSWORTH. The Secretaries
of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force
do not. ?
Mr. HARRIS. Are they appointed by'
the Secretary of Defense or the Presi-
dent of the United States?
Mr. WADSWORTH. By the Presi-
dent of the United States.
Mr. HARRIS. Is this bill similar to
the bill that was passed recently by the
Senate, or are there marked changes?
Mr. WADSWORTH. It is very, very
similar. In fundamentals it does not
differ, in my judgment, from the Sen-
ate bill. There are certain changes
which our committee has made which
are important in themselves, but they
do not change this set-up at all. ? ?
Mr. JARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
gentleman from Alabama.
Mr. JARMAN. Am I correct in the
assumption that these Secretaries of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Corps are
civilians under this bill? -
Mr. WADSWORTH. They are civil-
ians.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
gentleman from New York.
Mr. COLE of N.ew York. On the ques-
'ticn of whether or not the Secretaries
of the three departments should have
Cabinet status, to which the gentleman
replied that they would not, is it not
correct that the bill is silent in that re-
spect?
Mr. WADSWORTH. The bill is silent
in that respect, because no act of Con-
thority, or are they under the control
of the Secretary of Defense?
Mr. WADSWORTH. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff do not have executive authority.
It may be said that they have a certain
.degree of military authority. For ex?
ample, if the joint Chiefs of Staff propose
a certain strategic operation in time of
war and come to a decision or suggest
that such an operation should be en-
gaged in, if the President approves it,
then the joint Chiefs of Staff.- through
military channels put it into effect.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. With fur-
)
. ther reference to the question pro-
.pounded by the gentleman from New
York about the Cabinet status of the
various Secretaries, I should like to point
out that there is a statute, probably the
only one on the books, which refers to
the Cabinet members of the President.
That is the statute which fixes the
(salaries of members of the President's
Cabinet at $15,000 per year. .
Having that in mind, the committee
wrote into this bill the salaries of the
_Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy,
and the Secretary of the Air Force, at
$14,500. .
Mr. WADSWORTH. That was to make
a little distinction there.
Mr. HARNESS of .Indiana. And we
--provided for the Secretary of Defense
the salary paid to Cabinet members.
Mr. WADSWORTH. That is right.
- ? Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.
Mr. VORYS. The gentleman has men-
tioned the function of the Joint Chiefs
-- of Staff. I find nothing in the bill which
provides whether their action must be
unanimous as was the case during the
war and which caused considerable dif-
ficulty?or whether they can function
gress has ever been passed and prob- -- through a majority vote or something
ably never will be passed defining a Cab-
inet officer. 'like that.
,
Mr. COLE of New York. That is Mr. WADSWORTH. There is nothing
cor-
rect. My point is that it is entirely os-
in the bill to the effect that the Joint
sible in the future for any one or all
Chiefs of Staff in reaching a military de-
of these Secretaries of the three depart-
cision must act unanimously. It would
ments to sit in the Cabinet if the Presi- be a reckless thing for the Congress to
dent requests them to. _ - ._put any such imposition upon them.
-Mr. WADSWORTH. There is nothing Mr. VORYS. However, it is the pur-
to prevent it, and I do not believe the pose of this new arrangement to provide
Congress has the power to tell the Presi-
dent who shall be a member of his Cab-
Met. A custom has grown up, of course,
with which we are all familiar, but there
is no statute on that subject.
Mr. HOBBS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield? C
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
gentleman from Alabama.
Mr. HOBBS. Would the gentleman-
be kind enough to explain to us what
happens to /the Marine Corps? . -
Mr. WADSWORTH. The Marine
Corps under this bill is certainly amply
protected. - .
Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. Mr: Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield? ?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gen-
for machinery so that action can be
taken even though the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are not unanimous in their de-
cision?
Mr. WADSWORTH. That would be up
to the President as Commander in Chief.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York has again
expired.
Mr. MAlyASCO. Mr. 'Chairman, I .
yield the gentleman five additional
minutes.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
gentleman from Illinois.
- Mr. OWENS. Inasmuch as this is a'
new law which might require action by
the Congress at some future time, would
tleman from Nebraska. ? there be any objection to ? a provision
Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. Do the therein which would require that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have executive au- Council immediately give a copy of its
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JULY 19
,recommendations and reports to the
Speaker of the House and the President,
of the Senate as well as to the President?
Mr. WADSWORTH. Does the gentle-
man refer to the Security- Council?
Mr. OWENS. ? Yes.
Mr. WADSWORTH. Does the gentle-
man mean that the Security Council shall
report upon all, its findings and recom-
mendations directly to the Congress? ?
Mr. OWENS. Yes.
Mr. WADSWORTH. If you do that,
then you will be reporting to the entire
world.
Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will]:
the gentleman yield? '
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
zontleman from Kansas.
Mr. SCRIVNER. Occupying a rather.
uniquequestion as a member of both the
Army and Navy Subcommittee on Ap-.
propriations, even though I have not
had time to study the bill in detail or see ..
the report, a cursory study on the basis
of your remarks Would indicate that pos-
sibly at the outset there might not be
economies accomplished by the bill. But
from your explanation I would under-
stand that there should eventually be
great economies in procurement and re-
search, and in development, and much
of the work now being carried on which "
is separated in the various branches of
the military .services.
Mr. WADSWORTH. I am thoroughly
Convinced of that. Permit me to make
this observation. . When this bill be-
comes law, the man who is appointed
to the position of Secretary of Defense
cannot be expected to achieve millions
of dollars in savihgs in a week 'or two or
a month or two or perhaps even a year.
He will have a big job on his hands. He
will thave to work on this thing day after
day in consultation with others as they.
report and recommend to him. He will
have his own ideas, of.- course, but step
by step I am convinced that large sums
of money will be saved and better work
will be done.
Mr. SCRIVNER. Thus, you will avoid,
in the case of another emergency com-
ing- up; the competition, you might say,
. between the branches of the service in
trying -to obtain certain materials and
_equipment. _
Mr. WADSWORTH. That would be
his job?to prevent that competition?
and the bill, in ff , says so.
Mr, JENKINS of Pennsylvania. Mr.
? Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, a mem-
- ber of the committee.
Mr. JENKINS of Pennsylvania. Is it
- not a fact, in answer to the statement
by the gentleman from Kansas, that the
bill provides 'the Secretary of Defense
shall coordinate the budget requirements
of the three military departments, which
is the first time, as the testimony indi-
cated, in our national history that any
, one person has ever been in a position
to oversee the preparation and presenta-
tion of these budgets to the Congress,
and, therefore, that in and of itself will
lead to a tendency to avoid duplication
and cross-procurement, and so on?
- Mr. WADSWORTH. Let me say that
for the first time in our history the House
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE 9565
Cornmittee on Appropriations will get an
ovcc-: view of the budget of our
national oefense.
Mr. LYLE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. LYLE. WOuld the gentleman take
a minute to. explain the possibilities
under this measure for joint training
and joint use of facilities so that we will
not have overlapping?
Mr. WADSWORTH. Under the provi-
sions of this bill, the Joint Chiefs ,of
Staff are to plan for joint training and
joint education in the military service.
If their plan is approved by the Secre-
tary of Defense and the President, it goes
Into effect.
LYLE. This bill, as I understand
376tif explanation, will give us and give
America for the first time an opportunity
to have a military policy consistent with
our responsibilities and our resources.
Mr. WADSWORTH. This links the,
military pollev with foreign licy, all -
7-75,-Surec_t__,bv our resources and the
potentialities of other peopLe.
'Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the
_gentleman from California.
Mr. JOHNSON of California. ,Would
the gentleman explain a little more
about the National Securities Board?
-Is that only a planning board, or is the
law so written that in the event of an
emergency they Can set up these various
agencies?
Mr. WADSWORTH.. To which board
dors .the gentleman refer?
Mr. JOHNSON of California. The
National Security Resource Board.
Mr. WADSWORTH. That is purely
advisory.
Mr. JOHNSON of California. . In the
event of an emergency, we would have
to pass legislation to implement what -
they recommend?
Mr. WADSWORTH. No. The. legis-
lation is already set up. The Munitions
Board will plan the industrial mobiliza-
tion and advise the Secretary of Defense
and President, and it will be put into
effect. These are boards of students as
it were to study, our resources and make
recommendations, but not to administer.,'
Mr. JOHNSON_ of California. Under
an act which we passed several years ago,
the Munitions Board was simply em-
powered to create a stock pile.
Mr. WADSWORTH. They may rec-
ommend the creation of a stock pile, and
urge jt, but they do not have the power
to establish it. However, it can be very
influential with the Secretary of De-
fense.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York [Mr. WADS-
WORTH] has again expired.
Mr.. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I
yield the gentleman live additional
. .,nutes.
JACKSON ? of California. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.
? Mr. JACKSON of California. Would
the gentleman comment on the -Joint
Staff as to their functions under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff? The Joint Staff
has caused some concern to sanie of
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No. 139--.---8
Mr. WADSWORTH. Y. T:..2 Joint
Chiefs of Staff have az all il:acs what
might be termed a staff to help them.
It has not been a super staff, 1i-cc) that
of the Germans; not a super general
staff. Those four men on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff must have assistants. If
they come to a decision with respect to
'a strategic operation, which is planned
probably months in advance, to put it
into operation they must have the help
of men who will develop the orders that
go down through the military channels,
? and their staff is solely for that pur-
pose, just as it was during the war. It
? does not supplant the Bureau of Naval
Operations in the Navy Department or
the General Staff in the War Depart-
ment.
Mr. JACKSON of California. Would
the gentleman have any objection to -a
provision in the act which might ? limit
the tenure of officers serving upon the
Joint Staff? Not upon the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, but the Joint- Staff?the? body
which acts now as a sort of secretariat.
I think the principal matter of concern
among people who have come to know
the military is that once an- officer be-
comes ensconced in a swivel chair it is
?sometimes difficult to get. him out.
Mr. WADSWORTH. Well, you may
remember- that under the law, at least
as it applies to the Army, a man may
not serve on the Staff more than 4 years.
Then he must go back to troops or other
stations-for a period, before he can re-
sume his place.
Mr. JACKSON of California. I agree
that is an excellent provision, but would
there be any great objection to making
? ,such a provision in this measure?
Mr. WADSWORTH. That is existing
law and applies to this personnel just
the same.
Mr. JACKSON of California. It would
apply to the Navy and the Army under-
this bill?
Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. That is my
understanding. That law is already on
the statute books.
Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman,, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.
Mr. VORYS. Coming back to the Mu-
nitions Board, the gentleman said it was
advisory. It -seems to me it would have
administrative and executive functions
Similar to the War Production- Board.
Under the Secretary of Defense, is it not
proposed that the Munitions Board will
be the agency which will conduct alloca-
tions of priorities and do other things
which we had a lot of boards trying to
do in this past war?
Mr. WADSWORTH. That is true.
That is the way it will evolve. They plan
these things.. For example, they would
coordinate the appropriate activities
within the National Military Establish-
ment with regard to industrial matters,
Including the procurement, production,
and distribution plans of the depart-
ments and agencies comprising the es-
tablishment; they would plan for the
military aspects of industrial mobilila-.,
tion; they would recommend assignment
of procurement responsibilities among
the Several military services, and plan
for standardization of specifications and
for the greatest practicable allocation of
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purchase authority of technical equip-
ment; they would prepare es,i=tes of
potential production; they would deter-
mine relative priorb ies; they would make
recommendations to regroup, combine, or
dissolve existing interservice agencies;
they would maintain liaison with other
departments and agencies for the proper
,correlation of military requirements
within a civilian economy, and so forth;
but they do not take into their hands
the actual execution of those things;
the Secretary of Defense does that.
Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin., Mr.,
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.
Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin. It seems
to me from what the gentleman has said
- that the Central Intelligence Agency is
one of the very important parts of this
entire set-up. I wish to 'ask the gentle-
man if there is a definite coordination
provided for between that Agency 'and,
say, the Department of State? For I feel
- that certain information of the Agency
would affect the activities of the entire
system.
Mn i WADSWORTH. The gentleman is
correct. May I point out that under the
provisions of the bill the Central In- ?
telligence -Agency in effect must cooper-
ate with all the agencies of the Govern- ;
ment, including the State Department. I
It is the gathering point of information
that may come in from any department
of the Government with respect to the
foreign field, including the State Depart-
ment, of course; including the War De-
partment, through G-2; including the
Navy Department, through ONI. That
information is gathered into the central
? agency to be evaluated by Central Intelli-
gence and then disseminated to those
agencies of Government that may be in-
terested in some portion of it.
The CHAIRMAN. . The time of the"
gentleman fronr New York has again ex-
pired.
. Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I
yield myself 10 minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman
, from Alabama is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, the
Committee on Expenditures in the Exec-
utive Departments started hearings on
- the so-called unification bill on_aDril_2
of this year. We have been Chrged by
some -people with hurrying this legisla-
tion through without giving proper con-
'sideration to it. In the Seventy-eighth
Congress, the Woodrum committee of
the House held extensive hearings on the
necessity *of merging our armed forces.
Last year two Senate committees held
extensive hearings on the question. Our
committee?as you can see from the size
of the printed hearings held many days
of hearings.
Some people from the Navy have ac-
cuse our committee of cutting them off.
We have been accused of trying to stifle
, the Navy. The record will show, how-
ever, that we heard more Navy repre-
sentatives than we did from any other
service. I believe 'several members of
the committee who heard some of the.
testimony from representatives giving
the Navy view on this question were al-
most convinced before the hearings were
over that we should have an absolute
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9566 ? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?HOUSE
merger instead of a so-called unification
bill. It was disturbing to hear some of
the testimony and read it in the hear-
ings of the jealousies, the bickerings, the
back-biting that evidently is going on
now between members of our armed
forces. If a complete merger would
eliminate that fighting among the serv- -
ices, bring about a spirit of cooperation,
bring about a spirit and a will to be on
one team_ and fight for the best interests
of America instead of the selfish inter-
ests of a few individuals, I would vote
today, if some one offers an amendment,
for an out and out merger of our armed
forces. I think we could save millions
of dollars, yes, billions of dollars, if we
were to have an out and out merger. I
am frank to say that when I was chair-
man of this committee last year and the
bill was referred to us, I did not have
any aearings because I was opposed to
it; but the hearings this year have
changed my mind.
If you will read the hearings you will
find that our committee has tried to be
fair with everybody. There was Some
charge we were trying to destroy the
Marine Corps. No member of our com-
' naittee, no Members of this House, who'
can recall the gallant efforts of the Ma-
rines in Guadalcanal, the islands of the
Southwest Pacific, Tarawa, the -Mari-
anas, Iwo'Jima, and Okinawa would con-
sent to see that great corps destroyed or
its efficiency in any way affected.
There have been charges we are trying
to destroy naval aviation. Any person
who will read the questions asked by
members of this committee, who will
read the results of our deliberations as
found on pages 16 and 17 of this bill,
must surely know that the members of
this committee can never forget what
we owe to those men in the Naval Air
Forces who gave their lives in the battles
of Midway, the Coral Sea, the Philip-
pine seas, and the seas around Japan .
itself would want to destroy or impair
naval aviation.
There were some 'charges made that if
this bill is enacted into law it will bring
about a military dictatorship in this
country. That is the lowest type of at-
tack on the bill. The only way, in my
o-,ainion, that we will ever have a military
dictatorship, or any other kind of dicta:-
torship, in this country, is when the
American .people themselves deteriorate
to such an extent that they lose their'
desire to fight for their own liberty; then
we will have a dictatorship, and it will
not make any difference whether it is
a military, Fascist, communistic, or any
other kind of a dictatorship. That is
the only way a dictatorship will ever
come to this country. As long as the
elected representatives of the people have
control of the purse strings and carry
out their duties in an effort to preserve
our system of government, we will not
have a military dictatorship. There has.
never been a dictatorship established in
a country where the majority of the peo-
ple fought. bled, and died to keep any
kind of dictatorship down. You may
read the history of Germany, Italy, Spain,
many of the South American countries,
as well as that of the Soviet 'Union, and
Approved For Rele
I think you will agree with that con-
clusion.
It is true that the passage of this bill
may not immediately reflect any savings.
The primary objective of the legisla-
tion, of course, is to strengthen our na-
tional defense and make it possible for
us to more successfully prosecute a war
in case we are ever engaged in another
war. But we should at all times have
? economies in mind because our Nation -
cannot continue to spend more money
than it takes in and pay out enormous
sums of interest to retire the obligations
that we owe to our people Without run-
ning the risk of destruction from within.
We have many stations throughout the
United States, some of them in your dis-
trict, and, -of course, if an effort were
made to close one 'of' them because we
have another station adequate to take
care of our needs, you would be coming
in here trying to keep that station from
being closed.
As an illustration., we have warehouses
for the three services side by side in
many port areas of the country. We
have airfields side by side, and I have
heard it said lots of times that it was not
quite a good idea for the planes of one'
service to land on the fields of another.
That should not be. It should be pos-
sible to eliminate thousands and thou-
'sands of dollars' worth of annual ex-
penditures for warehouses alone. It will
take some time for these economies to be
reflected, but they will come.
Of course, you will have some people
say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will
become similar to the old German
Junker's military staff. As long as we
have Committees on the Armed Forces,
whose duty it will be to spell out the func-
tions and the duties of our armed forces,
I have no fear, of any Junker system
coming to this country,
Mr. 'Chairman, for many months we
have listened to arguments for and
against unification of the armed services.
The controversy has been long and bitter
but it has served a most useful purpose
in that it has given many of us 'a better
insight into problems surrounding na-
tional security.
Although the Secretaries of War and
Navy, and their principal military and
civilian officials, have reached an agree-
ment on the terms of this legislation, op-
position still arises from the rank and
file of the United States Navy.
Mr. Chairman, in considering this- far-
reaching piece of legislation, it is im-
portant that we understand. the back-
ground of fundamental issue's involved in
order that arguments pro and 'con will
fall into their proper perspective. .
As I see it, Mr. Chairman, true unifi-
cation as proposed under the compro-
mise plan agreed on by the Secretaries
of War and the Navy, will result in the
creation of one security organization
composed of three coordinate fighting
components; our land, sea, and air forces.
Each of these components will be organ-
ized and trained to carry out its part of
our over-all military strategy. No one
of these fighting components will be
capable of operating independently of
the others. On the contrary, each will
rely on the others and together they
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JULY 19
will form one dynamic fighting organ-
ization.
Why do we need unification? At
present, Mr. Chairman, there are two
separate and distinct , defense depart-
ments each striving to become capable
of independent military action. In each
department we have land, sea, and air
elements. Consequently, there exists a
vast amount of unnecessary duplication.
Cooperation between these two depart-
ments is almost entirely a matter of
voluntary agreement rather than pro-
cedure.
Opponents of unification support the
philosophy of maintaining two or more
each competing for money, manpower,
and materiel. This policy is directly op-
posed to the real objective of unification
and, if pursued, can only result in con-
tinued wasteful inefficiency and the re-
sultant weakening of our national
security.
Mr. Chairman, it is important that we
keep in mind the objective of this bill
and the tactics employed by the opposi-
tion to prevent it from becoming an-
effective instrument of constructive mili-
tary reorganization.
First, the opposition centered its at-
tack upon the powers of the proposed
Secretary of Defense, seeking to prevent
the establishment of effective centralized
civilian control and direction of our se-
curity forces in order to perpetuate the
independent departmental status en-
joyed during past years. This independ-
ence has permitted out services to de-
cide their own programs, build their own
forces, prepare and defend their own
budgets, irrespective of ,the over-all ob-
jective. Mr. Chairman, the authority
proposed for the Secretary of Defense is
the very cornerstone of future unification
and we must be on guard against any
move to reduce this .man to a mere fig-
urehead.
Failing in this first objective to destroy
the authority of the proposed Secretary
of Defense, the opposition has directed
its attack against the creation of a co-
equal Department of: Air. The reason
back of this is more subtle and should be ?
examined with great care.
Air power has now become a control-
ling force in modern warfare and no
military campaign, whether it be on land
or sea, can be successful until the air
war has first been won, Therefore, Mr.
Chairman, opponents of unification are
seeking to prevent the consolidation of
our Air Force by parceling it among the
surface components. This move, if suc-
cessful, will perpetuate the present in-
dependent status of Our forces rather
than integrate their common efforts.
Fia?thermore, it will vitiate the future
military potentiality of American air
power.
Under the terms of the comprornise
plan agreed to by the War and Navy
Secretaries, naval aviation is left_ with
the Navy and marine aviation is left
with the Marines. In the interest of in-
terservice harmony, I agree with this
feature of the bill. However, any fur-
ther spreading of our Air Forces among
. surface components will defeat the pur-
pose of this bill and may prove disastrous
in the event of future war.
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1947 CONGRESSIONAL -CC-2D-H3USE
If wa are faced with a war in the fu-
ture, it is altogether 'Probable that mili-
tary operations during the first year will
be predominantly air action. If our
available air resources are divided be-
tween surface components, the striking
power and flexibility of future American
air power will be lost. In fact, we may
never, under such circumstances, be able
to launch a surface operation because
the air phase of the war would be lost.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to emphasize that any bill designed
to unify our armed forces must incorpo-
rate two basic features.
First, it must establish a responsible
civilian head over our armed forces with
necessary -authority to unify their com-
mon efforts.
Ser:ond, it must create one military or-
ganization composed of three coequal
fighting components; land, sea, and air.
If these two fundamental features are
not incorporated in the bill, unification o,
of cur armed forces will exist merely in
name rather than in fact.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that further de-
liberations on this measure and further -
amendments submitted will be consid-
ered .n the light of these facts._
(Mr. MANASCO asked and was given.
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. 1110noMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. BErnizsl. ?
(Mr. BENDER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, on July
11 a local newspaper carried an editorial,
and among other things it said:
Now that unification has reached the half-
way mark, it is to be hoped that the Sen.'
ate's statesmanship will be duplicated by the
House. There, unforunately, the Committee
or. Expenditures in the Executive 'Depart-
ments, which never should have received the
hill In the first place, is still sitting tight on
It. The attitude expressed by . Committee
Chairman CLARE liorrmAN is far from encour-
aging. Mr. HorTmAN has been quoted as say-
ing that his committee will write its own
tlh
I want to stop there for a moment to
say this: Of course, this editor was not
? elected to Congress and I don't think he
attended any of the hearings on this bill.
His representative might have been there
a time or two. When the editor asks this
body to abdicate to the other body, he fs
wholly cut of order, and I am sure our
chairman is correct, if he is quoted cor-
rectly here, in taking the attitude that
this committee should write its own bill.
That is as it should be. We are not rub-
her stamps for the other body. We used
our own judginent. We acted after due
deliberation. Every possible opportunity
was given to those who wanted to be
heard on the bill. As a matter I of fact,
during the time'I have been here, I have
.-,:rn a committee that has acted
....telY, that has-considered a
:Idly than this committee
has ,YOlaSiClCi'oci. this legislation.
Mr. ELSTON. ? Mr..Chairmant. will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentle-
man from Ohio.
ELFTO:Z. cc--?ttce
dd v..1-iLe its ovs.i :7 am sulc it has
a reasen for every pro'..isio.n in he bill,
may I ask the gentlemeo why there is a
separate department for the Army Air
Forces and no provision has bcon made
for a separate department for the Navy
Air Forces?
Mr. BENDER. Since the bill was re- ?
ported out the gentleman from New York
[Mr. COLE) has requested that the com-
mittee hold a session, and he asked to
appear: I am sure the amendment he
will 'offer will be supported by an over-
whelming majority of the committee,
confining the Naval Air Force to the
Navy. The Naval Air Force will not come
under the provisions for unification of
all the air forces and under the Depart-
ment of Air. That -is the situation as
far as the gentleman's question is con-
cerned.
. This bill- came to us from the Presi-
dent asking that there be unification.
Frankly, many members of the commit-
tee had grave misgivings about this bill's
creating a military dictatorship in this?
country. Time and again this phrase
was used during consideration of, this
legislation. Your . committee has en-
deavored to write into this bill provi-
sions that would guarantee that this
not be a military dictatorship, that we
hot create a military dictatorship
through Army and Navy unification, as
we understand it. However, we have no
assurance or guarantee regarding the
administration of this bill. There is a
lot of faith, hope, and charity, regarding
what will happen. How can we tell how
, this bill will be interpreted or adminis-
tered? Many of us on the committee
still have grave apprehensions about the
bill. We hope it will work, and we want
it to work. Every member of this com-
mittee hopes and prays that this will
accomplish what the President had in
mind.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield? ?
Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentle-
man from California.
HOL.1101ELD. Is it not true that.
there wil be constant surveillance over
'the functions of this bill by the proper
committees of the Congress, and of
course by the Appropriations Committee?
Mr. BENDER. I trust that will be
true, and I believe there will be such
observation by the Congress and by the
appropriate agencies.
In this editorial it, is further stated:
The only possible result of such unneceS-
sary recapitulation would be delay?
That is, there were certain items re-
ferred to in the statement of the gen-
tleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN]
regarding this ' ?
delay that becomes ominous with Mr. HOFF-
mAN's denial that unification Is considered a
Republican "must."
Let me say regarding this being a
Republican "must" bill that this was not,
as I understand, on the Republican
"must" list early in the session. But it
Is today. In recent weeks we have been
told, that is, those_.of us on the Repub-
lican side, that Our leadership considers
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this a Republican "must" bill. Under
the circumstances. we went along .and
tried to weE the. 'o..st bill that we knew
how since the Republican leadership of
the House has joined with the Adminis-
tration in supporting the measure.
The -charge that the gentleman from
Michigan I Mr. HoFFsfswl has in any way
delayed the consideration of this bill is
wholly without foundation. The gen-
tleman from' Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN]
has cooperated fully.
Mr. McCORMACIC. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER. I yield. ?
Mr. MoCORMACK. I think that is
very clear. The Republican and Demo-
cratic members of the committee, if I
might use a strong word without being.
unkind to the editor or writer of that ar-
ticle, repudiated any such charge as that.
The gentleman from Michigan has co-
operated. He has been frank in the ex-
pression of his views, and he has never
done anything other than cooperate with
the committee in trying to have the hear-
ings expodited, and then in executive
session trying to get the marking up of
the bill completed as quickly as possible.
Mr.' BENDER. Dili% Chairman, since.
the gentleman from Massachusetts the
minority whip [Mr. McCoasiscx] is a
member of our committee, I am sure
that he is informed as to what the situ-
ation was in committee. He is absolute-
ly correct in his appraisal of the chair-
man's work and the chairman's diligence
in seeing to it that this bill was reported
out. ?
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will.
the gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER. I yield.
Mr. MANASCO. I want to say that
the' chairman of the committee has not
been using dilatory tactics. I happen to
have had the same charges made against
me last year. The gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] has done ev-
erything in his power to get the hearings
printed on time. 'It was .not his fault
that the members of the committee did
not return the copy of the transcript
which they had in their offices for the
purposes of correction. That is one of
the reasons why the hearings are not
available to everybody today. You can
not get those hearings ready in a min-
ute. The chairman even wanted to hold
night sessions to expedite the considera-
tion of, this hill. He has done everything
possible in the matter.
Mr. BENDER. I thank the gentleman
for his testimony. The gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. HOFF1VIAN] has been most
diligent and most painstaking in report-
ing this bill out as quickly as was
humanly possible. As a matter of fact,
if any charge could be leveled against
him, it would be that he was so agreeable
that he permitted it to come out too
soon.
Mr. JUDD.' Mr. Chirman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER.. I yield.
? Mr. JUDD. ? I Would like to advise the
committee that the hearings have been
here from the beginning and that the re-
ports are now here., They were delayed
in delivery, from the Printing Office, but
they are now available. '
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Mr. BENDER. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER. I yield.
Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. I think
we can agree with the gentleman from
Ohio, who is no addressing the Com-
mittee, that there has been a good deal
of apprehension about this bill. I think
it is only because we got off on the wrong
loot by statements which were made par-
ticularly with reference to the Marine
Corps that the objective of the original
bill was to reduce the Marine Corps to
the status of a police force. That is one
of the things that got us off on the wrong
foot. Personally, I feel that while the
leadership of the House has had its way
in the matter, it might have been better
if this bill had been referred to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House,
as it was in the other body, and then we
might have been able to get a little bet-
ter action on it.
Mr. BENDER. Of course, the bill was
re:erred to the Committee on Expendi-
tures in the Executive Departments be-
cause its primary purpose is to create
gi.32.6er efficiency and bring about greater
economies in the armed services. We do
no, know about economies, but we trust ?
that greater efficiencies will be accom-
plished as a result of the passage of this
bill.
I yield to the gentleman from North
Carolina [Mr. BARDEN].
Mr. BARDEN. I would like to ask the
gentleman what newspaper printed that
article.
Mr. BENDER.. This is from the Wash-
ington Post.
Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER. I yield.
M. VORYS. Referring to that edi-
torml, which speaks of this as an ad-
ministration "must" bill, and referring
to the gentleman's remarks that the Re-
pudiican leadership has made this a
"must" bill, I want to say that I am one
Republican who has been for some form
of inthication for 30 years, since the time
when I was attached to the Royal Naval
Air Force when it went into the, RAF.
I am proud that this task, which is a
dli1lcult one, which the administration
to accomplish when they had con-
trol of Congress, is being carried through
to a conclusion under Republican leader-
ship and in a Republican Congress.
Mr. BENDER. I thank the gentleman.
I will say this regarding the chairman
of this committee and his effort to pro-
duce a good bill, he has made every pos-
sible effort to do so. He has done every
conceivable thing, even though he had
grave apprehensions about this bill.
Mr. HOFF1VIAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER. Not at this time. The
gentleman from Michigan is too modest.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman,
make the point of order that the de-
bate must be conned to the bill.
Mr. MANSFIELD.' Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield? . ?
Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentle-
man from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The gentleman
from New York [Mr. Waaswowax], in re- ?
sponse to a question by the gentleman
from .Alabama [Mr. Hor,as] , stated that
the Marine Corps was amply provided
for. I would like to ask the gentleman
if, under this new' reorganization and
unification, the strength of the Marine
Corps will be maintained at approxi-
mately 20 percent of that of the Navy.
Mr. BENDER. I trust it will. I am
sure the Marine Corps and the leader-
ship of the Marine Corps is satisfied with
what is done in this bill. As a matter of
fact, they are amply protected and their
interests are protected.
Mr. MANSFIELD.. I am worried at
the statement contained in the hearings,
containing letters from General Eisen-
hower, General Spaatz, and the remarks
of General Armstrong of the Air Force,
that the Marine Corps is to be reduced to
a very minute part of the Navy.
Mr. BENDER. General Eisenhower
and General Spaatz did not- write this
bill. The committee wrote it, and I can
say, with absolute knowledge as to the
provisions in this bill, that the Marine
Corps is satisfied with what is written
into this bill.
Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentle-
man from South Carolina, a member of
the dommittee.
Mr. DORN. As far as the Marine
Corps is concerned, on page 17 of the bill,
paragraph (C) , _there is a page and a'
half; more than General Vandegrift,
Commander of the United States Marine
Corps, even asked for. It is right here
In the bill, phge 17 of the bill:
Mr. BENDER. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. BREHM. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentle-
man from Ohio.
Mr. BREHM. Who is responsible for
putting these designs up on the trestle
board?
Mr. BENDER. Just what does the
gentleman mean by that?
Mr. BREHM. Who started the idea
or the plan, as depicted by the drawings
on the easel back of the gentleman?
' Mr. BENDER. Frankly, I have not
studied that chart.
Mr. BREHM. Where did the idea ,of
a merger first originate?
Mr. BENDER. It originated in the
minds of the people generally that there
is need for unification. They de not like ,
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps bickering.
Mr. BREHM. You mean that the gen-
eral public started this idea of merging
our armed forces?
Mr. BENDER. Not this particular
Idea.
Mr. BREHM.. I just wanted to know
who "we" constitute. Various previous
speakers have said "we this," and "we
that," and I was simply trying to pin it
down and find out who the speakers are
speaking for.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Ohio has again expired.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I
- yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia [Mr. Laismaivt]. ?
Mr. LANHAM. Mr. Chairman, as a
freshman Member of this House, I have
had very little to say at, this session of
50001-0
JULY 19
the Congress, not because anyone has
imposed any degree of silence upon me,
but because I think it is probably better
for a new Member to get acquainted and
take it a little slowly.
I would not rise this morning except
for the fact that I do want to say a word
of praise for the chairman of this com-
mittee and for the subcommittee that
drafted this bill. I do not suppose there
is a man in the House that I differ with
more in political philosophy than the
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFF-
MAN], but I have come to respect and ad-
mire him a great deal for his convictions,
because he has the courage of his convic-
tions, because he sticks to those convic-
tions, because he had tenacity of purpose.
I admire him also for his sense of humor.
He never does take himself too seriously
and he does not permit any member of
this committee to take himself too seri-
ously. As a matter of fact, because of
his wit there has never been a dull mo-
ment on the committee. I want to say
that I admire him most of all because
of his fairness and especially his fairness
to the freshman members of the com-
mittee and particularly to the members
on the minority side. We had a lot of "big.
brass" before this committee, and I say
that with all respect. We had all of the
great generals and admirals and we had
Dr. Vannevar Bush, one of the most in-
teresting men who appeared before our
committee. The gentleman from Michi-
gan, instead of beginning the questioning
with the high-ranking men on the Re-
publican side, invariably began question-
ing, or permitted first the lowest-ranking
member on the minority side, to begin
the questioning of those witnesses. .He
was always patient with us and he went
'from the lowest-ranking man on the mi-
nority side to the lowest-ranking man on
the majority side. I just wanted to say
that in praise of the gentleman from
Michigan, for the way he-conducted those
hearings. They were most interesting.
I want to say the same, too, of the
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BENDER] and
the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr.
Juan] who, when they presided, did the
same thing and were just as courteous
and kindly to members of the committee
as they could be.
'Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman, yield?
? Mr. LANHAM. I yield.
Mr. BURLESON. I would just like to
observe that I am fully convinced by the
members of this Committee that it is a
good committee.
? Mr. LANHAM. I did not mean to make
this a mutual-admiration society, but I
do want to say for the members of the
Committee that we have gotten along
famously together; and, frankly, I think
" we have done a good job. As a matter
of fact we admit we have a great com-
mittee. The gentleman from Texas [Mr.
BunEsoN] will not have to prove it.
I think the subcommittee that drafted
this bill has done a fine job. There
were criticisms of the bill when we first
began hearings, but frankly I think this
bill the subcommittee has reported out
is much superior to the bill that first
came before the committee and is better
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1947 CONGRESSLO:N"AL
than the Senate bill. I am sure it is
going to mean for us. a more effective
military establishment and. in the end,
that it will mean economy.
Mr. HOFFIV1AN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Busanx].
Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, today
we are being asked to take one of the,
most important steps that any Congress
has undertaken. This bill provides for
the most drastic departure in the history
of our country from any previous posi-
tion on national defense.
I do not think we should be under a
wrong impression as to the purpose of
this bill. Although it is called the unifi-
cation bill, it reminds me somewhat of
the time in the Seventy-eighth Congress
when we had before us the Smith-Con-
nally so-called antistrike bill. Every-
body thought that just because it was
called an antistrike bill it was going to
- stop strikes. It increased strikes over
400 percent. I think our 'majority
leader, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr.
HALLEex] referred to it quite correctly
the other day when he asked unanimous
consent for this bill to come up today.
On page 9225 nf_the CONGRESSIONAL REC-
ORD of July' 16 the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Hauxac] in response to a
question from the gentleman from New
York [Mr. COLE], as to the title of the
bill replied:
This is the so-called unification or merger
bill.
This is neither a merger nor a unifi-
cation bill. We already have a War De-
partment and a Navy Department and
if the Congress passes this bill we will
still have the War Department and the
Navy Department. In addition, we will
have a new department known as the
Department of the Air Force. How can
there be a merger or unification of some-
thing by adding one additional depart-
ment? True, under the Research and
Development Tloard and the Munitions
Board it s 'riu.ded we will accomplish a
little economy, but under this super-
structure of theyational Security Coun-
cil and the new Secretary of Defense, as
he is called in this bill, we are going to
add millions and millions of dollars of
expense.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BUSBEY. Just briefly.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. The gen-
tleman made the statement that this is
going to add millions and millions of
dollars to the cost of the defense estab-
lishment. I take issue with the gentle-
man on that and I would like to have
him explain why he has arrived at such
a conclusion. '
Mr. BUSBEY. I will be happy to reply
to the gentleman. Even though I am a
member of the committee I have not?had
a chance to read the hearings. I did not
receive a copy of the hearings until late
yesterday afternoon. I think it is a
shame that any bill should come to the
floor of the ,House unless 'the Members
have had an opportunity to read the
hearings and the report. I am sure that
the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. RAE-
NE_SS: thc 11...o...ngs? will
find 1.c...1.11o.ly to the t..fft%.i. :hat it is
estimated s nnethin:.;. like :,zZC,O.C3'0,CC0
will be recr,7ired in approprit.:.ions for
this new national security sei:-up. I am
sorry I do not have the page reference
before me. If I am in error I would
like to have some one correct me.
hairman, I am particularly inter-
ested in the Central Intelligence Agency
feature of this bill. That is going to be
a very, very iinportant agency and I-
trust when certain amendments are of-
fered under the 5-minute rule the com-
mittee will consider them deliberately. .
? On page 11' of the bill I especially call
your attention to this language in line 16:
(e) To the extent recommended by the Na-
tional Security Council and approved by the
President, such intelligence operations of the
departments and other agencies of the Gov-
ernment as relate to the national security
shall be open to the inspection Of the Director
Of Central Intelligence.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the FBI, is certainly an agency of our
Government which relates to our na-
tional security. Inasmuch as the Central
Intelligence Agency deals with intelli-
gence outside the United States, I hope
that particular section will be amended to
eliminate the possibility of its going into
the ?records and books of the FBI be-
cause the FBI does not. go outside the
United States. It is only concerned with
internal intelligence and investigations in
the United States.
Another feature I have been concerned
about is the authority given the Central
Intelligence Agency in this bill. In addi-
tion to evaluating, correlating and dis-
seminating intelligence, it is given au-
thority to collect intelligence. On May
21, 1947, there appeared an article in the
New York Times entitled "Army's World
Intelligence Ring Reported Halted By
New Agency."
I have studied the directive of Presi-
dent Truman of February 5, 1946, under
which the Central Intelligence Agency,
was set up and is now functioning, and I I
find no authority whatever for this I
agency to go out and collect intelligence.
It has not only dissolved the Secret In-
telligence Department of our War De-
partment which was built up over the
past 5 years, but it has assumed the .
authority to collect intelligence.
Under section 3 (a) of the Presidential
Directive setting "up the Central Inte11i-
9569
clertake operations for the collection of in-
telligence.
lam fearful that if we permit this Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency to go out and
collect intelligence as well as evaluating
intelligence, iwe will run into such situa-
tions as those which occurred during the
war in Yugoslavia, when the War De-
partment sent a commission into Yugo-
slavia with General Mihailovich's forces.
They sent out reports, and because. the
reports went into another branch known
as the OSS, and the men .at the head of
the OSS did not agree with the princi-
ples of Mihailovich but were favoring the
principles of Tito, the Communist. dicta-
tor of Yugoslavia today, the reports of
the War Department Intelligence were
disregarded entirely.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Illinois has expired.
Mr. HOFF1VIAN. Mr. Chairman, 'I .
yield the gentleman two additional min-
utes. .
Mr. BUSBEY. That is what you run
into, gentlemen, where you have an
agency of intelligence?collecting intel-
ligence and then evaluating its own con-
clusions. I might say I spent some time
In ? intelligence myself, and can. cite
numerous and specific instances. It is
the same situation we have had with the
National Labor '" lations Board, where
they were pro' , ,-, jury, and judge.
I hope that we will consider very seri-
ously- amending that particular section
so that we will noi; permit. collection in
this superintelligence agency. I also
hope we Will protect the status of the
FBI so that there will definitely be no
authority for Central Intelligence to go
into their records and books.
Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BUSBEY. I yield to the gentle-
" 'man from Iowa. .
Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. I had some
part in writing the report that the geri-z-----.
tleman just quoted from, and I would
like to ask the gentleman whether he
feels that the provisions for Central In-
telligence in the bill now before the
1 House 'needs amendment to bring it in
line with that recommendation? --
, Mr. BUSBEY. I certainly do. I am
not opposed .to. a central intelligence
agency, for coordinating, disseminating,
and evaluating intelligence from the
various - departments. You remember
what happened at Pearl Harbor. They
gence Agency, there appears the fol- had intelligence, but it was not corre-
lated and evaluated correctly. I hope
lowing:
Accomplish the correlation and cvalua- consideration will be given to that pro-
tion of inteiiigence relating to the national vision when we consider the bill under'
security, and the appropriate dissemination .. the 5-minute rule. , :
within' the Government of the resulting stra- ' Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I
.
tegic and national policy intelligence. In so ' yield 10 minutes to the g.,. ,,leman from.
doing, full use shall be made of the staff and Virginia [Mr. HARDY).
facilities of
ents. the intelligence agencies of your (Mr. HARDY asked and was given 'Del--
departm
mission to revise. and, extend his re-
Last year the Committee on Military ''marks.) .
Affairs went into the subject of whether Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Chafrman, I make
the Central Intelligence Agency should \? the point of order that, a quorum is not
collect intelligence. I will read you their I present.
conclusions from their report of Decefn- .. - The. CHAIRMAN. The ' Chair will
ber 17, 1946: , 'count. [After counting.] Seventy-nine
It is specifically understood that the Di- i Members are present; not a quorum. .
rector of Central Intelligence shall not un- . The Clerk will call-the roll.
/ ?
- ?
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9570 CONGRESSIONAL Ri,X0RD?HOUSE
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their -
names:
f Roll No. 1241
Allen, Ill. , Gallagher Lynch
Anderson, Calif.Gifford Mason .
Battle Gore Meade, Ky.
Bennett, Mich. Granger Miller, Md.
Bland . Gwymae, Iowa Morrison
Bolton Hall, - Morton
Bonner Edwin Arthur Muhlenberg
Buckley ; Harris ? Murray, ,Tenn.
Byrne, N. Y. Harrison . Norton
Carroll Hartley . O'Hara
Case, N.. J. Hays Patman
Celler Hebert Pfeifer
Chapman Hinshaw Ploeser
Chiperfield Hope Powell
Clements Jackson, Calif. Rabin
Cole, Mo. Johnson, TeX. Riley
Courtney Kee Rivers
Davis, Tenn.. Kelley Sanborn
D'Ewart Kennedy ?-? Sheppard .
Dingell Keogh Smith, Ohio
Domengeaux Kilburn Smith, Va.
Eaton Kirwan Thomas, N. J.
Fellows Klein Tollef son
Fletcher Lea Van Zandt
Fogarty Lodge Vinson
Fuller '' Ludlow .
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. CASE Of South Dakota, Chairman of
the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the' Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under con-
sideration the bill H. R. 4214, and finding
itself without a quorum, he had directed
the roll to be called, when 345 Members,
responded to their names, a quorum,
and he submitted herewith the names
of the absentees to be spread upon 'the
Journal.
The, SPEAKER. The Committee will
resume its sitting.
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, we are
considering today a very important piece
of legislation. - We are considering a
very important step involving the se-
curity of our country. I have the pleas-
ure of being a member of your commit-
tee which has ? had this legislation un-
der consideration. Being a freshman in
Congress, and not having had a back-
ground of previous contact with this
problem, I have attended practically
every hearing in a diligent effort to learn
as much as I. could about the' problem,
and to dig out the facts. These hearings
began in April and ended in the first
week of July.
In passing, I should like to point out
that all of the proponents of, this legis-
lation had plenty of time to prepare
their statements and present them to
the committee. It was not until the very
last week of the hearings that those per-
sons in one branch of our military or-
ganization who were opposed to this leg-
islation had the freedom to come for-
ward and state their views. Time and
again in the course of the hearings, I
asked the Secretaries of War and Navy
or their representatives, why it was that
in their huge departments there were no
officers or officials presenting to the
committee any views in opposition to
this :egislation. All I ever received were
evasive answers.
After considerable effort ra.,: commit-
tee learned that articles 94 and 95 of
naval regulations prevented naval offi-
cers from appearing before our commit-
tee to express their, honest and genuine
views. concerning this far-reaching pro-
.
posal. It was not until the very last
week of the hearings that the Secretary
of the Navy released a communication
to all Navy personnel permitting them to
freely testify. I did not learn of this
action by the Secretary until after the
committee had voted to close hearings
? on July 1, only 3 or 4 days later. Then
there was an avalanche of naval officers
eager to testify, but time was short and
there was not sufficient opportunity for
them to adequately present their views.
I never did learn whether the War De-
partment had any regulations similar to
those prohibitions imposed upon Navy
people, but I discussed certain provisions'
of the bill with several ground force offi-
cers whose views were in conflict with
those expressed by War Department rep-
resentatives. I suggested that they testi-.
fy, and in each case they were unwilling
to do so for fear of jeopardizing their
future in the service.. -
This subject of merger or unification
of the military forces is not new. It has
reared its head in the congressional
chambers from time to time during the
last 20 years. During the last 3 years
it has been under more or less constant
consideration. At no time during this
long history has there been any real
agreement between the respective serv-
ices. This current legislation?this Na-
tional Security Act of 1947?is reputed to
be, and was sent to Congress as, a com-
promise agreement between the different
elements making up the military services.
Everyone agreed it was a compromise.
. The leaders in authority in the respective
departments who owe their jobs to ap-
pointments got together and reached an'
agreement, but all the testimony indi-
cates that the agreement they made?the
so-called compromise they achieved?
failed to represent the thought of officers
and men of the Regular services, as well
as the officers and men of the Reserves.
From my personal contacts, supported by
testimony of various witnesses, it is clear
that a large majority of the Regular
officers of the Navy and of the Army
ground forces opposed certain features
of this legislation, and believe they are
contrary to the best interest of national
,,security.
During the course of the hearings, I
attempted to find out just what was in-
volved in this compromise. The results
of these efforts were not too satisfactory,
but one thing that was clear to me was
that the only service group of conse-
quence supporting a separate air force
was the Army Air Forces itself.
In any drastic remolding of our mili-
tary organization, there is danger of los-
,ing gains already won and coming out
with an organization that will not stand
the ?,upreme test of war. Our present
military establishment, composed of the
Army and the Navy and their compOnent
parts, provided this Nation with a flexi-
bility and a freedom of ?action of its
armed forces capable of achieving over-
whelming victories in two major wars.
When we entered World War II, of course
we had to make adjustrdents, but the very
flexibility of our Military Establishment
Was conducive to unifying command op-
erations under the War Powers Acts.
JULY 19
Undoubtedly, we have learned much from
our experience in the last war. We must
utilize every bit of that experience, and
in the light of changes which took place
in the conduct of warfare between World
War I and World War II, peacetime
planning of our Military Establishment
should assure the maintenance of a
flexibility which will readily permit ad-
justments to keep pace with scientific
developments. ?
In the recasting of our military or-
ganization, we should have our sights and
attention focused on the future. What
will the future war be like: What will it
involve? How will it be fought? What
form of weapons will be used? Where
will the fighting take place? What are
the objectives? What type of organiza-
tion will insure victory?
These are some of the questions which
should control the thought and action
of every person directly concerned with
this problem. They should control our
thughts and action here in this House
this afternoon. It is useless and idle
folly to spend time trying to improve
our armed forces and national security
based upon'World War II methods. For,
we have already won that war?we have
already jumped that hurdle with the
Military Organization we possess at this
very moment.
The important consideration facing us
is national security. The question be-
fore this House is whether or not the leg-
islation that we are now considering will
improve the national security. This is
the fundamental question we must de-
termine. The future of our country, and
the .future of the world, depends upon
the right answer. I say to you, we must
have the right answer. Our country
cannot afford the luxury of "a wrong
decision."
Mr. Chairman, in the most major re-
spects I think your committee has done
a splendid job on this bill. It has worked
hard and carefully weighed the testi-
mony of the witnesses', who have ap-
peared. There have been differences of
opinion on many major questions, but
there has been genuine sincerity of pur-
pose. I think the bill before you. now
is a vast improvement' over the original
bill, H. R. 2319, and a vast improvement
over S. 758. There are Sertain parts of
it?major parts?which are good, and I
believe essential, and should be enacted
into law. Everyone is in agreement re-
garding such essential improvements as
the National Security Council, Re-
search and Development Board, the Na-
tional Security Resources Board, the
Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the effort and intent to inte-
grate all of the departments and a.gen-
.cies Of Government that are involved
in national security. These are forward
steps. They will prove beneficial. They
will increase effciency and they need our
immediate attention..
I cannot concur in that portion of the
committe's report which recommends
the establishment and creation of a sep-
arate and independent Air Force. I find
nowhere in the testimony real justifica-
tion for providing completely independ-
ent departmental status for the aviar
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tion arra of the Ground Forcei of the
United States Army.
At prta:ent the Air Force enjoys a hi!;.h-
c.iaari o of autonomy within the ?'.7,-ar De-
aartmena In none of the testimony do
'1 find any basis for a contention that
the eff,ciency of our fighting force can be
:rapfovcd further separation of the
Corps 'from the surface forces. It
has been conceded by every witness that
the air arm of the Navy is an integral
part of the Navy and must remain so.
The reasons supporting this contention
appear to be logical, and it seems to me
that the same reasoning applies with
respect to the Army Air Force as _related
to the Arrm- Ground Forces.
The only substantial argument for a
further separation of the Army Air
Corps into departmental status has to
do with the morale of Air Corps person-
nel. If there is one branch of our mili-
tary establishment_ which has the least
need for improved morale., I believe it is
the Air Corps.- Various witnesses have
testified that the converSion of the Army
Air Forces into a separate department
of air would tend to weaken the morale
of naval aviation personnel. .
The three departmental organization
as proposed in this legislation is organi-
zationally unsound as it would freeze the
-aervices into the pattern of World War II
at a time when every prospect, of the
future indicates a necessity for a
simpli-
i'ad and more closely integrated struc-
ta:re. It establishes an "organization
which multiplies complications and pro-
vides for many additional administra-
tive brass hats.. Money badly needed
for real military purposes will be used.
for a greatly" enlarged departmental
structure and overhead.
Pature developments may necessitate
closer integration of air activities with
surface activities. The three-depart-
ment proposals provided in this . bill
would make closer'integration more diffi-
cult. Let us preserve the present status
sif autonomy of. the Air Corps, but I be-
lieve it unwise to provide further sepa-
ration at a time when future require-
ments cannot be foreseen.
strongly believe that no Department
of National Defense should in essence
be built around any specific weapon. If
we should proceed contrary to this prin-
ciple, we should be egually justified in a
Department of Submarines, Field Ar.?
tillery, Guided Missiles, and so forth.
While the airplane is unquestionably
one of our most dominant weapons to-
day, there is no way to know whether
it may be replaced with a more effective
weapon in the near future.
Witnesses told your committee that
the strategic bomber is not obsolete as of
today, btit that it is obsolescent as-a type.
'de were also told that air warfare of
the future will bear little or no resem-
blance to the air warfare of World
? 1- Ai.. :?71;:i ? surface
is so
es 'mitt) to ,2:-.ca at i:tai
- Pa. 1i17.tve eat Lr, there a :a many
thf igs in this bill trait I cons der are
essential. I shall stip:tart ,Iic bill. If
an amendment is offered to eliminate
those provisions with respect to a sepa-
rate Department of Air I shall support
that amendment. All through the
period of consideration it has been my
purpose to try to improve this legisla-
tion. That is still my purpose.
Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. HARDY. -I yield.
Mr. KEARNEY. Is there anything in
this bill that could not be authorized
under Executive order of the President?
Mr. HARDY. Does the gentleman
_mean with respect to the Air Forces?
Mr. KEARNEY. I mean with respect
to the entire set-up so far as it goes.
? Mr. HARDY. Under Executive order
much of what this chart shows has
already been accomplished. We now
have something of a committee system
for doing some of the same things the
bill provides. We want to get away from
'Executive orders if we can, and we have
attempted to write in this legislation
the basic provisions of existing Execu-
tive orders so that they will have a basis
in legislation rather than merely in
Executive orders issued by the President.
Mr. ENGLE of California. Mr. Chair-
man, I ask unanimous consent that the
gentleman from California [Mr. SHEP-
PARD] may be permitted to extend his
? .remarks at this point in the RECORD. ,
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
California?
There was no objection.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Chairman, as
we are about to consider the so-called
-military unification bill, I acquired some
information which I consider is quite
pertinent relative .to Navy's air record
during the war. This information was
compiled by Mr. Stuart B. Barber, resi-
dent of Alexandria, Va., and the material
was taken from the report of the Joint
Army-Navy Assessment Committee
whose duty it was to assign credit among
the several military services for the de-
struction of all Japanese naval and mer-
chant vessels sunk during the war:
The Pacific war was a sea and air war. The
major Japanese strategic target was the ship-
'ping on which the empire depended for
its industrial life. It is highly relevant,
therefore, to a study of the relative effective-
ness -of the various services' weapons in stra-
tegic warfare to study their relative achieve-
ments in the war against Japanese shipping.
The United States Navy sank 78 percent
of all Japane-Se ship tonnage lost, the Army
Air Forces, 15 percent. The' Navy sank 87
percent of all the Japanese warship tonnage
lost, the Army Air Forces 6 percent. The
Navy sank 87 percent of all Japanese tanker
tonnage lost, the Air Forces 7 percent.
War II. Forty-five percent of all Air Force merchant-
It is -my belief that our better course ship sinkings were in the last 6 months of
would embrace a -coordinated two-41e-
the war, after the Jap merchant fleet, largely
'
partment establishment with adequate destroyed by the Navy, had already, been
and positive safeguards for the Air forced back to its home waters. Most of the
Air Force tanker sinkings were in the last
-Forces of each department. Such an or- few mohths of the war when the Japanese
ganization is relatively simple and far no longer had access to their oil fields.
more economical. It would also have Most of the Navy sinkings were by subma-
the major . advantage of maintaining rines, which accounted for over half of the
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1,,nkers r..i 01 her merchnnt siiips
'20 ;:ercen't t it warships, or Speetai:lity
ior over 0C1.000 tens of Japancse vessels: it
thuif ii ,:tito neoc:;.,a7 to labor further
t. submarine contribution to the war: sink-
Ilti was tbeir jcb. and they clici it mag-
nillcently with a relative hancifnl of men.
What is more important is to compare the re-
spective contributions of naval aviation and
the Army Air Forces, to see what lessons may
be found therein.
Carrier aircraft sank, single-handed, 40 per-
cent of the Japanese Navy's tonnage. Com-
bined with other forces they sank about
875,000 tons of Japanese warships, or 48 per-
cent of the total lost. Carrier aircraft were
in on the sinking of 6 battleships, 13 cruisers,
13 carriers, 29 destroyers, and 13 submarines-.
Of these 79 major vessels the carrier planes
polished off 62 without assistance, Including
5 battleships, 10 cruisers, and 10 carriers.
Army aircraft were credited with a full or
paptial share in the destruction of 'only 22
vessels of 'the same classes; in only 8 of these
cases were they unassisted, and all 8 of these
were destroyers, the smallest of these classes
of vessels. Army aircraft did not strike the
major blow that sank a single enemy battle-
ship, cruiser, or carrier (as against 25 for*
our carrier planes), though they assisted in
5 of the sinkings of these heavy ships. Even
the Navy and Marine land-based planes had
as good a record against warships as Army
planes; they ,sank four destroyers and four
submarines unassisted, and were a major fac-
tor in the sinking of four battleships and
cruisers.
United States Navy carrier aircraft sank
76 Japanese tankers, amounting to nearly
400,000 tons. Army aircraft sank less than
one-fourth this tonnage. The carrier sink-
ings, furthermore, were concentrated in the
period from February 1944 to January 1945,
and thus exerted maximum effect on curtail-
ing the Japanese fuel supply at the time most
' critical for Japan. During this Period car-
rier planes-sank 15 times the tanker tonnage
destroyed by Air Force .planes.
It was during this same period that the
Japanese merchant marine as a whole was
taken off the high seas. It was the cumu-
lative injury suffered during this period that
induced thoughtful Japanese leaders to be-
gin work for surrender before the B-29 raids
'first began?because they saw that with
their shipping reduced to a fraction their
military and industrial machine \vas already
crippled beyond hope, of recovery. This is
attested by reports ? of the strategic bomb
survey.
In this important 12-month period the
Army Air Forces accounted for only 300,000
tons of Japanese merchant vessels, or one-
thirteenth of the total sunk by all forces.
Carrier aircraft sank 191,000 tons in 2 days
? ? at Truk, and 100,000 skins at Palau 6 weeks
; later, to equal the Air Forces year total dur-
ing the first 2 months of the 12.
It is commonly regarded that the capture
of the Philippines marked the complete mili-
tary and strategic defeat of the Japanese.
This campaign lasted from September 1944
through January 1945. During this period-'
1,975,000 tons of Japanese merchant shipping
were sunk, but only 8,percent of this by the
Air Forces.
. During this same 5-month period e'arrier
planes, alone or in Cooperation with surface
ships, sank 787,300 tons of merchant ship-
ping in the Philippines, against 105,000 tons
by Far East Air Force; 322,000 tons of enemy
warships against 32,000 tons by FEAF. The
- carrier forces sank over 100,000 tons of ship-
ping at Manila-on September 21-22 alone,
the same amount again on N 3
ber -14
Zra Januaryn
and '158,000 tons in the China
12 alone. The most credited to the Far East
Air Forces in any entire month is 57,000 tons
of merchant and naval vessels.
It is from the Far East Air Forces, led
during the war by General Kenney, that have
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9572 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
come the most strident claims of air-force
superiority in the war at sea. Let us exam-
ine the record. From the beginning of the
war through January .1945-38 months?the
Far East Air Forces were credited with sink-
ing only 330,000 tons of merchant shipping
unassisted_ plus some 40,000 tons with the
assistance of other forces. This total was
far exceeded by the carrier forces in the
3 months of September to November 1944
alone.
The Far East Air Force record against
major Japanese warships is negligible?four
destroyers sunk unassisted, seven with the
help of other forces, plus air-force assists in
the sinking of two light 'cruisers damaged
in the,Leyte battle, and a host of small patrol
craft, but no submarines.
The principal FEAF claim to fame was the
attack on the convoy off Lae in March 1943.
The whole available air force was thrown
into this battle against appL?oximately 25
-ships: most or all of which the air force
claimed to have sunk. This tonnage was far
exceeded by naval aircraft on each of over
20 different days during the war.
The lessons to be drawn from the fOregoing
are these:
1. Army Air Forces claims and statements
? may generally be taken with a large grain of
salt.
2. Navy claims, particularly aviation claims
' made through the lackadaisical surf ace-
minded Navy public-relations organization,
can safely be considered conservative.
3. Naval carrier forces, being highly mo-
tile, can penetrate deep int li enemy terri-
tory to seek out the most 'important and
vulnerable 'targets. Air Forces planes are
tied to land bases, whith Can be moved for-
ward only very slowly and with difficulty. A
major reason for the Army Air Force failure
to destroy much shipping, particularly tank-
ers, was the inability of Air Force planes?
other than heavy bombers, whose accuracy
was seldom adequate to hit targets as small
as ships?to reach this shipping. This was
particularly true in the Philippines campaign,
when Far East Air Force immobility was em-
barrassing. The carrier force had repeatedly
? to attack Japanese reinforcements en route
to Leyte, with which the Air Force could
* not cope from its limited bases ashore. This
resulted in delaying for 3 months the first
Navy attacks on Tokyo'.
4. Naval carrier planes are capable of at-
' tacking small, fast-moving targets such as
'ships with great accuracy and efficiency.
This efficiency was so great that naval avia-
tion's successful campaign against Japanese
warhips and major merchant vessels required
only 10 percent of the total attacks made by
naval planes.
; 5. These faCtors of mobility and accuracy
are applicable not only to attacks on ship-
? ping but to attacks on all types of small land
targets located on or near .coasts, including
vital strategic targets such as bridges, power
stations, rocket launching sites, and camou-
flaged or partly buried factories, which can-
not be seen or hit accurately by high-altitude
Army long-range bombers. These are the
? targets of tomorrow's war.
6. These facts are pertinent to -the uni-
? fication controversy, and to the struggle over
methods of warfare which will continue even
under unification. It is no secret that the
, Air Forces wish and intend to restrict the
development and employment of naval air-
craft, by one means or another, in directions
that will prevent the full application of their
potentialities to the strategic and atomic air
? warfare, needs of the future.
For many purposes naval planes and meth-
ods are superior for strategic attack to those
of Air Forces bombers. Naval aviators fear,
the Air Force enthusiasm in behalf of uni-
fication confirms, and the private statel.le.nts
of Army airmen illuminate.the intent, that
the present unification bill is designed as a
major means of facilitating this restriction.
Army airmen generally affect contempt for
. naval aviation. The figures quoted herein
suggest that this affected contempt may well
be sired by an Air Force feeling of inferiority
to naval aviation in some of the more im-
portant aspects of air warfare, or by an
equally dangerous ignorance of the compara-
tive capabilities of the two air services.
The reason I am presenting the above
data is predicated upon the fact there
has been considerable activity, to say
,the least, upon the part of some mem-
bers of the Army Air Corps to minimize
the necessity for a Navy and especially
its air coinponent; for example, such as
the statements made by Big. Gen. Frank
Armstrong, on- December 11, 1946, at
the Princess Anne Country Club, Vir-
ginia Beach, Va., at a chamber of com-
merce-military luncheon. There have
been inanY other instances in which
members of the Air Corps and the Army
have gone to great length through' their.
propaganda to impress the people of
this Nation and the Members of Con-
gress with the necessity for, a unification
bill and autonomy for the Army Air
Corps. In so doing, in many instances,
they have by direct expression or in-
nuendo indicated - the Navy was no
longer a military necessity in our nit-.
national-defense program. '
.1 feel the branches of our military
service are like a three-legged stood?all
-three legs must be equal to support the
load the stool. may be called upon to
carry. If one leg of the stool is weak-
ened, then the load is thrown off bal-
ance and ceases to be effective. I bor-
rowed this description from an officer
who has had long and successful mili-
tary experience?Admiral Nimitz.-
I feel this report of Navy's activities is
definitely indicative of the necessity of
Navy being maintained as an integral
"part of our military requirements if we
are to preserve our form of government
and way of living. I would not under
any circumstances detract from the re-
spective abilities of' all of our military
forces in this last war, but I do feel some
of the Army Air Corps members have
gone far beyond the acceptable in their
method of procedure attempting to gain
autonomy through the unification pro-
- posal. .
The proponents of the bill have stated
It would save money; that declaration
still remains to be proved and, person-
ally, I do not feel the enactment of this
unification bill will serve the best inter-
ests of our Nation's defense require-
ments and I am not going to support its
enactment.
Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield '
10 minutes to the gentleman from New
-York iMr. ANDREWS].
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. Mr.
Chairman, from the standpoint of na-
tional security there is under considera-
tion by the House today the most im-
portant piece of legislation that has re-
quired our attention since the cessation
of hostilities.
In these uncertain times -of interna-
tional unrest and readjustment, it is vital
that we be realistic in our approach to
the postwar world. In a word, 'We must'
keep our powdef dry.
,We are all justly proud of the splendid
record of victorious achievement of our
JULY 19
armed forces during World War II, lout
we would not be realistic if we did not
recognize that the experience of war has
indicated avenues for improvement
which it would be foolhardy to ignore.
It takes no argument at this point to
convince the most skeptical of our fel-
low countrymen that the waging of mod-
ern triphibious war is costly, complete,
and calamatous to the loser. There is a
limit beyond which our Nation cannot go
in the matter of cost of military pre-
paredness. In my opinion,, the cost of
the war just past in both human and
material loss has lowered the limit of our
capacity as a nation to carry the cost of
national security. It would, of course,
be gratifying to any potential aggressor
if because of the element Of cost?and I .
am speaking again in terms .of men as
well as material wealth?we were unable
to maintain an adequate protective sys-
tem for the country. They would. do
well to lend support to those who stand
in the way of an efficient and economical
system of national security.
Mr. Chairman, the founding fathers of
our country saw fit to charge the Con-
gress of the United States with the re-
sponsibility of providing for the common
defense, and never in our history has
this been a heavier and more awful re-
sponsibility than it is. today. We cannot
continue to survive in the modern world
with an outmoded system of -national se- ?
curity any more than we can survive if. -
we fail to heed the advance of science in
our every day domestic peadetime lives.
The patchwork of piecemeal military
legislation which has characterized our
country or the last 25 years, and the
makeshift and temporary expedients to
Which we resorted to prepare or war are
not geared to the atomic-powered jet-
propelled future. ?
The day or change is at hand and that
,change Must spell unity of effort, effi-
ciency, and economy.
There are many of our fellow citizens
who fail to realize the complexity of our
Military and Naval Establishments or
who know about the changes that have
taken place within them as a result of
the war. Victory has obscured the de-
fects that defeat would have made gro-
tesquely clear.
But there are those who from the hard
experience of war have learned where
these defects iii our armor lie. Some of
them are from military life, some are
civilian officials in executive and admin-
istrative positions of the Government,
and some, I am glad to say, are Members
of the Eightieth Congress.
Among and between this composite
group of informed citizens a firm re-
solve has taken form. A resolve to rec-
tify now, before the lessons of the war
are forgotten, the deficiencies of our,na-
tonal protective-system.
For many months the legislation which
is before you today has been given care-
ful study by committees of the Congress.
Every shade of opinion has been ex-
pressed. The whole subject has been
argued pro and con in the press and on
the public rostrum. ?
I Would not Presume upon the time of ?
the Members of the. House to discuss in%
any detail the study and the thought that
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1.(47 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
has been given to ihe subject of unifica-
tion of the armed forces or to review in
detail the provisions of the bill before
you today.
I would like) to speak briefly about the
basic principles involved in any sound
American plan for national security and
why I believe this bill will put them into
practice.
First, modern management requires a
focus -of control. Ultimately that focus
narrows down to someone who will point
the way to go. Where that direction is
indicated it should be because the director
has chosen it alter receiving the sound-
est possible advice from experts in every
field of endeavor involved.
- The direction should be down the path
that costs the least and gains the most.
Most important, all following the direc-
tion should take the same path:- ?
Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I shall be ac-
cused of oversimplification, but I feel cer-
tain that these are sound-principles for
, our armed forces and all the other agen-
des of government associated with them
in the problem of providing for the com?
mon defense. ?
It was these same principles that the
framers of the Constitution must have
had in mind When they made provision
for the President to be Commander in
Chief of our armed forces.
The principles of direction and control
under our form of government are no dif-
ferent today than they were 170 years
ago. The differencP lies in the complex-
ity and magnitude of what must be
directed.
The bill before you, Mr. Chairman,
fully recognizes these principles. It pro-
vides a Secretary of National Security as
the focus of management and control of
our National Military Establishment,
one who, as the full-time delegate of an
overburdened President, will supply the'
management the President does not have
time to exercise himself.
Expert advice is furnished the man-
agement on strategy and onmmard by
provision for the war-proven ac.. of
the Joint Chiey of Staff. Expert a,..vice
on broad policies affecting the armed
forces is furnished through the War
Council. Expert advice on munitions of
war and assignment of procurement and
logistic responsibilities is furnished by
the Munitions Board. Expert advice on
scientific r, earch and development, a
twentieth-century must, is afforded by
the Research and Development Board.
With such management acting upon
sound advice, the armed forces will be
organized for the first time, outside of
combat theaters of World War II, into a
team of land, sea, and air components
with purposeful unanimity designed to
carry out unified plans and programs.
On the next level above the National
Military Establishment, there is provided
the National Security Council with the
President as chairman, which will effec-
tively coordinate our domesi.ic and for-
eign policies in the light of sound infor-,..
mation furniShea arThe Central
Intelli-
gency. and with the knowledge
of our manpower and material capabili-
ties derived from the National Security.
Resources Board.
Thus, cur I ciman i.nc: material
resources can be accurately appraised
and weighed against cur commitments
and our military policy and strength
aditisted to keep them in balance.
Who is there to say that the applica-
tion of such modern management meth-
ods will not bring economy and efficiency,
or that adapting them to one of the most
important government functions, na-
tional defense, is un-American? I say it
is a typically American solution. All over
the world we are known for our efficiency
' and. progressiveness in business and in-
dustry. We' should be known for efficien-
cy and progressiveness in defense as well.
One principal military lesson .that was
taught by the recent war was that wars
`of the present and of the future can no
longer be neatly compartmented into
ground wars and sea wars. Wars of the
future will be total wars. No land force,
and no sea force can fight and win a war
-alone, and even the power of an air_force
is limited by the bases from which it op-
erates and the protection and mainte-
nance of its supply lines, which must be
provided by. either land or sea power or
more probably at present by a combina-
tion of the two.
The fallac, of a divided comrrfand in
the field, so vividly demonstrated at
Pearl Harbor, was recognized early in the
past war and improvised unified field
commands established in all theaters of
war. - No responsible military or naval
' expert in the country questions the abso-
lute necessity of 'establishment of such
commands in the event of war or inter-
national emergency.
Unification of the defense establish-
ment of our country on a national.scale
is a matter of even more importance than
the creation of unified field commands
in the event of emergency. The pres-
ently developed atom bomb, which can,
be delivered to targets many thousands
of miles from the base of the carrying
? aircraft within only a few hours after the
decision is reached to bomb the target,
is but the forerunner of even more fear-
some weapons that will be delivered to
targets at greater distances and at great-
er speeds than anything now contem-
plated by man.
This matter of dispatching aimed pro-
jectiles to far parts of the earth, replaces,
the mile and a half range of cannon in,
1861-65, the few miles of World War I,
and the hundreds of miles of World War
II and the thousands of miles that now
can be covered by airborne ground troops
in a day replaces the few miles that could
be marched-in a day by soldiers of only
a few years ago. Where it was necessary'
for Generals Lee and Meade to have full
command of their, respective forces at
Gettysburg; for General Pershing to'
command all American ground forces in
France; for General Eisenhower to com-
mand all land, sea, and air forces in,
-_Europe; even so in the future it will be
necessary to have some over-all con-
trolling authority to supervise the opera-
tions of the armed forces of our country
throughout the entire World. The battle
lines of the future may well be drawn
:in the air above the industrial centers of
the world,. including those of our own
9573
country. The distance across the seas
will no longer afford us the protection
to which we have been accustomed in the
past.
A matter of prime importance in 'the
preparation for war is the joint training
of units for participation in triphibious
operatons and in mutual support and as-
sistance in campaigns. Such training
wider a divided orgaization can be ac-
complished only at the times and in the
degree that can be agreed upon between
the separate ground and sea components.
A unified defense establishment would
have a primary responsibility to see that
sufficient training was held to insure
proper coordination of effort in future
operations.
Joint' training alone will produce the
teamwork that is required for victorious
action in, the field against a -major foe.
In football the training of backs, ends,
linemen in the specialties of their
own position is necessary in order to pro-
duce the basic skills for the particular
position of the player, but the training
of the team as a whole is just as impor-
tant. Both are essential to victory.
This is even more true in the serious
business of war. The special training of
the ground, sea, and air troops-, and in
fact of the specialists 'in each group is
vital to the program, but the coordinated
training -of the entire defense establish-
ment is just.as important. As in foot-
ball, both types of training are essential.
A unified organization will insure, such
training.
-
The spirit of cooperation and team-
work is an item of great importance.
Unification of the services at the top
will dramatize, the fact to the men in
the field that they. are all members of
one team, regardless of the type of uni-
form they wear and the particular name
of the service of which they are mem-
bers. They will, of course, continue to
regard themselves as primarily artillery-
men, or marines, or airmen, or members
of some other great organization,, but
will consider triernselves also as team-
mates 'and not as competitors of their
brothers in 'the other services.
There are those who say do not
break up a winning team. To them I
reply that the only way we can keep
our winning team together?keep it
from being dismembered by outmoded
peacetime laws?is start now with this
bill to build unity and teamwork into
our ground, sea, and air forces on a
permanent basis.
All of us who have studied this bill?
know that it is not perfect. No success- ?
ful, business venture is perfect at the
start. Success and-full realization is an
evolutionary process, which the Congress
is charged by law to see continued in our
national security establishment. But
there can be no evolution and no devel-
opment unless we make a start, and the
time to start is pow. -
This is a good bill, forged out of the*
best suggestions made by a host of wit-
nesses. It reflects war experience and
the experience of peace. It recognizes
-the emergence of air power as a powerful
partner of land and sea power. It takes
into consideration the- continuing ad-
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9574 CONGRESSIONAL -RECORD?HOUSE JULY 19
vance of science and its application to
national protection. It looks toward
unity of purpose and unity of action. It
frowns on duplication, overlapping, and
waste. It preserves and husbands that
which is useful and effective and elimi-
nates those practices which are costly
and dangerous to our security.
' I urge its prompt passage so that we
may gain its undoubted advantages
Without delay.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. ? I yield.
Mr. MANASCO. There has been some
suggestion that we should limit the
tenure of office of the Joint Staff and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Is that not a mat-
ter that the. Armed Services Committee
itself will consider at a subsequent date?
The Armed Services Committee should
consider the limitation of tenure of office
of the armed forces, and not the Corn-
rmttee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments.
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. Is the
gentleman asking about the tenure of
office of Admiral Nimitz?
Mr. MANASCO. No. There has been
a suggestion on the floor that we should
in this bill limit the tenure of office of
members of the Joint Staff. Personally,
I think that is a matter for the Armed
Services Committee.
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I agree
with the gentleman. Not speaking as
chairinan of the committee, I think the
Armed Services Committee is very much
in favor of the Continuance of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as an entity. ?
Mr. MANASCO. I am talking about
the limitation of the tenure of office of
the individual members of the staff.
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. Ob-
viously, that is a matter for the Armed
Services Committee to pass upon in the
proper provisions of a bill.
Mr. MANASCO. lagree with the gen-
tleman.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.
Mr. McCORMACK. The committee
that reported this bill out had in mind
that enabling legislation will have to fol-
low the establishing of organic law, in
many respects, and we were very careful
not to trespass upon the jurisdiction of
standing committees to which that legis-
lation would be referred. I think that is
a proper policy for the committee to
have adopted.
- Mr. ANDREWS' of New York. Yes.
Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, will the
- gentleman yield?
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.
- Mr. PHILBIN. Can the gentleman in-
form the House how, if at all, this
measure affects the present status of the
Marine Corps; whether or not it cripples
or impairs the Marine Corps as to per-
sonnel or functions? ?
Mr. ANDREWS of Ne* York. As 'far
as I can see, from my reading of the
new amendment of the House, and the
Senate bill?and I appeared before the
Senate committee?the Marine Corps is
amply protected for the future, not only
in this bill but through the action of the
Armed Services Committee, in increased
rank permanently.
Mr. 1-101,1:5IELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.
Mr. HOU:FIELD. As a matter of fact,
we wrote into the bill on page 17 addi-
tional safeguards for the Marine Corps,
over and above what General Vandegrift
asked.
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. That is
right.
Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. - I yield.
Mr. WALTER. Will the gentleman
explain what effect the enactment of
this legislation will have on the 'func-
tions of naval aviation?
Mr. ANDREWS of New York.., In my
opinion it will not destroy naval avia-
tion as I see it.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.
Mr. McCORMACK. In that connec-
tion I might advise the gentleman from
Pennsylvania that it is expected that
the gentleman from New York [Mr.
COLE] will offer an amendment on that
subject. I do not know of any member
of the committee who is opposed to the
amendment. I know it is very accepta-
ble to me.
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. The
members of the committee know my
views.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the bal-
ance of my time. As a matter of fact
I withdraw my remarks and ask unani-
mous consent to extend my remarks at
this point in the RECORD in a somewhat
more formal statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman
from New York yields back 2 Minutes.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr.- Chairman, I
yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. KEEFE].
Mr. KEEFE: Mr. Chairman, I was
privileged to spend some 6 months of
hard, intensive work and study as a
member of the Pearl Harbor investigat-
ing committee. I think it can fairly be
stated that the committee was unani-
mous in concluding that the evidence
revealed the complete inadequacy of
command by mutual cooperation where
decisive action is of the essence.
Both the Army and Navy commanders
in Hawaii failed to coordinate and inte-
grate their combined facilities of defense
in the crucial days between November 27
and December 7, 1941. While they had
been able over a peribd of time to con-
ceive admirable plans for the defense of
the Hawaiian coast, with the system of
mutual cooperation, when the time came
for the implementation of these plans,
they remained hollow and empty con-
tracts that were never executed.
The tendency of let George do it and
to assume that the other fellow will take
care of the situation is an inseparable
part of command by mutual cooperation.
The conduct of operations in which a
state of joint oblivion was clearly mani-
fest was possible in a command by mu-
tual cooperation. None of these faults
and unwarranted assumptions clearly
described in the testimony could have
happened under the unity of command.
Under the latter system, a single com-
mander would have been charged with
complete responsibility. All of the warn-
ings and orders would have been his to
interpret, estimate, and implement. ? In
a command by mutual cooperation there
is the unfailing likelihood of conflicting
and overlapping prerogatives. The com-
pletely ineffective liaison between the
Army and the Navy at Hawaii at a time
when the fullest exchange of intelligence
was absolutely imperative dictated that
military and Navy intelligence particu-
larly must be consolidated. Any fair
consideration of the evidence adduced at
that inquiry should convince any think-
ing person that if we are to have a proper
state of military and naval protection, .
there must be unification of command.
It is my considered opinion that the
security of this Nation demands the im-
mediate passage of this unification bill.
We of the Congress will have failed the
trust which the people have placed in our
hands if we do not adopt the measure so
vital to the security of our Nation. Ty-
ing together our armed forces into a
single team is only a small part of what
we must do to remain adequately pre-
pared and to meet our responsibilities.
Being prepared in this atomic age re-
quires a national war plan for the mus-
tering of the entire country for the com-
mon defense. Obviously, national war
plans will cut across the responsibilities
of many Government agencies and many
walks of life. These plans cannot be
undertaken unless there are agencies to
develop them. ' However, today there is
no machinery to even examine the tre-
mendous riddles posed by the need to
be ready ?for total war. If we continue
without unification, one aspect or an-
other of ow preparedness will suffer and
leave us vulnerable?unready.
Prior to Pearl Harbor we had coopera-
tive command, which failed. It was only
by unity of command that we finally
succeeded in the late war. There is no
simple scheme which in itself will give
this country the best security program
possible; rather the solution of the prob-
lem of proper national defense must be
found in the answers to a series of very
fundamental questions. Let me pose
' these questions as an indication of the
? complexity of this problem:
First. Is the Government of the United
States, acting through the legislative and
executive branches, organizing the total
human and material resources of the
JNation to provide ? national security
against total war?.
Second. Does the Government of the
United States possess conclusions which
are at one and the same time authorita-
tive, impartial, comprehensive, and up-to
date regarding the effect of modern sci-
ence on national security in the light of
the facts of the world Situation and of
the capacity of our economy?
Third. Are these conclusions' suffi-
ciently firm to 'enable the American peo-
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11)47 CONGRESS*
plc to tell what are the just demands to
be made on their money and their man-
power?
Pourth. Do these conclusions include
definite information on the following
points: ?
(a) The effect of recent scientific de-
velopments and future scientific proba-
biLties en the nature of air, ground, and
sea warfare.
(13) The most effective method fOr al-,
locating manpower as between industry,
labor, agriculture, essential scientific re-
search, and other civilian occupations on
the one hand and the armed services on
the other.
(c) The method for allocating man-.
power between , air, ground, and sea
forces.
? (d) The length of service for air,
ground, and sea forces.
(e) The most effective way to procure -
needed manpower.
(f ) The probable importance of fifth-
column activity, psychological and bio-
logical warfare in any future war.
(g) The need for underground instal-
lations.
Fifth. What is the. present ability of
the 'United States?
(a) To hold strategic.air, ground, and
sea bases.
(b) To provide immediate defense
against air and surface attacks. .
(c) To undertake counteroffensive ac-
tion of all types.
(d) To discharge our immediate re-
sponsibilities, viz, the occupation of Ger-
many and Japan, the provision of mili-
tary forces for the United Nations, the
support of American foreign policy in the
Orient and Europe, and the maintenance
of communications to Overseas bases.
(e) To mobilize rapidly.
(f ). To eliminate efficiently the dead-
wood in the personnel of the regular. air,
ground and sea services.
(g) To get quick decisions on matterS
affecting the air, ground, and sea services.
Sixth. What is the present degree- of
American supremacy in scientific re-
search and development?
Seventh. What should be done tO pro-
vide for adequate civil defense of the
United StatN?
I know that it will alarm Members of
Congress as it should alarm every
thoughtful citizen to know that these
questions have not been satisfactorily
answered. And why not. Because no
agency of the Government is charged
with over-all responsibility. Surely the
Army and Navy cannot answer these
questions unilaterally for they pose prob-
lems which cut across the functions of?
almost every other Government organi-
zation and which dip into every phase
of American life: I do know that the
War and Navy Departments each are
seeking solutions to these questions?
solutions which are naturally at variance.
The Army Air Forces, is developing an-
other set of answers, a third plan for
national security. There may be many
others. But .such variegated plans can
never be completed under existing con-
ditions because the author of one de-
pends upon the author of the others for
vital phases of any program he tries to
?
develop. Y 11% worth
while to ocr?:.och has a par :al an-
swer to the plazuing clues:don.; which
must be answered. These many solu-
tions have never been brought together
in a common harvest, never had the
chaff sifted out, and had the good
remaining grain cooked into the whole
bread of 'an adequate program.
Without unification, the country gets
none of the benefit of these multiple, in-
? complete plans. In short, the country
gets no adequate security.
With this in mind, Mr. Chairman, I
recommend prompt passage of H. R.
4214.
[Mr. JUDD addressed the Committee.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Appendix.]
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS].
(Mr. WILLIAMS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I
would support this bill if for no other
reason than that it gives long overdue
recognition. to the contributions of air
power to the preservation of our Nation
and democratic way of life. The crea-
tion of a separate air arm on a par with
our older established military units is
a step which sooner or later had to come
about, and I am glad to be able to be a
party to making it a reality. ?
I am delighted that this bill has finally
been presented to/the floor of this House
for passage. The provisions contained
in this measure will fulfill a long stand-
ing need of our armed services, and will
work toward a better coordination of
our military efforts in the event of
another war. ,
The advent of the atomic bomb and
the development of long range aircraft
have so revolutionized the art of modern
warfare as to render the weapons of early
World War II practically impotent. The
recognition of air power today as?not
? only our first line of defense?but also
?our chief striking force?is mandatory
if we are to survive another armed con-
flict such as the recent conflagration.
. My only regret is that the man who
sacrificed most that this might come
about-L--General Billy Mitchell?could not
be here today to experience the culmina-
tion of his dreams and to enjoy the vin-
dication which will be his today through
the passage of this bill.
? Not all of the combined brass hats and
gold braid of the old school can refute
the undeniable fact that this baby of
modern warfare?the airplane?has
grown to manhood, and must along with
their respective orders stand as a definite
unit and full fledged member of our
military combine. Recent history at-
tests this assertion. Schweinfurt, Ber-
lin, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagaski firmly
substantiate the demands for individual
sovereignty proposed by students of
aviation and modern warfare.
The atomic bomb?the most dev-
astating and powerful instrument of
destruction ever devised by the mind of
man?can avail us nothing without a
means of transporting it speedily to
-
0 01-0
9575.
where it will strike the most effective
blow against the enemy. The airplane
is the only effective means of transport-
ing this bomb, and men well versed in
the use of air power should supervise
that operation. An officer of the Air
Corps whose entire course of military
study had been concentrated upon the
use of the airplane as an instrument of
war would be highly pretentious in at-
teriipting to tell an infantry officer how
to deploy his men for ground action
against a landed enemy, or to tell a naval
commander how to align his fleet for a
sea engagement. By ?the same token ?
'Army and Navy officers are in no way
qualified to direct the actions of the
air arm.
Prior to World War II, the airplane was
a supporting unit for the op/erations of
the Army and Navy. It came into its
own in World War II as a unit equal in
strength and fighting potential to our
land and ,sea forces. In the next war,
air power will he the chief weapon, and
the Army and Navy will have become
supporting units. This, as I have stated
before, is an undeniable fact. -
? Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. WILLIAMS.. I yield.
Mr. LODGE. Would not the gentle-
man say, however, that with respect to
naval aviation, the officers of the Navy
wlio are in that field Would be competent
to run the naval aviation?
Mr. WILLIAMS. Certainly, to run
the naval aviation, but if the gentleman
will read Major de Servesky's book, "Vic-
tory Through Air Power," he will get
my views as well as Major de Servesky's
on land-based, long-range air power.
Mr. LODGE. I just wanted to make
that one qualification to the statement
the gentleman made.
Mr. WILLIAMS. I thank the gentle-
man.
My contention that the Air Force
should be placed on a par with the Army
and Navy is further substantiated by
statistics which were made public dur-
ing -the war, showing that Army Air
Forces personnel was greater than that
Of the entire Navy.
Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that
this bill will be passed and proper official
,) recognition given to our Air Force.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Mississippi has expired. "
Mr. LeTHAM. Mr. Chairman, yield
10 minu s to the gentleman from Indi-
ana [Mr. HARNESS].
(Mr. HARNESS of Indiana asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. HARNESS of Iridiana. Mr. Chair-
man, I feel that this legislation merits
the support of every Member of the Con-
gress who is interested in efficiency and
economy. As Members who preceded ?
me have so well pointed out, we learned,
more than a quarter of a century ago,
the absolute necessity of a single corn- .?
mand in- the field. That was demon-
strated even more dramatically in the
last war than in World WarI.-
To ignore this obvisous fact and to do
nothing toward correcting our old sys-
tem would be a tragic mistake. I served
. for 8 years, from 1939 until the begin-
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CONGRESSIONLL RECORD-HOUSE ' JULY 19
ning of this Congress, on the House Corn-
mittoe on Military Affairs.- I went
through that, period with the committee
when we were preparing for the late ,
war and while we were fighting. I, saw
something of the heartbreaking waste,
duplication, and extravagance resulting
from the .inadequacy or total absence of
coordination of the armed services. As
merely one among hundreds of examples
of dm:ilication and waste, we have had
all during and since the war two air
transport organizations, in many in-
stances paralleling each other, the Army
Air Transport Command running all over
the world, and the Naval Air Transport
Service, as .I said, in many instances par-
alleling the Army Air Transport Com-
mand. That is a senseless Waste of
equipment, manpower, and taxpayers'
money.
This proposed unification will put an
end to such things as happened in the
Il'acitc, where the Army had control of
one side of an island and the Navy the
other side, and neither service could bor-
row or use equipment and supplies of
the other. This plan will bring about a
better relationship between the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Forces. It will
end the unthinkable procurement meth-
ods under which each service designs its
ordnance and ammunition so that it can
rarely, if ever, be ,used interchangeably
by the other.
Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. ? I yield...
Mr. SHORT. And we will not have the
Army on Okinawa with surplus of Sup-
plies shipping them to China instead of
letting the Navy have them to fill their
needs.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. That is
right. I understand there were numer-
ous instances in which one or the other
service transported supplies long dist-
ances from rear areas when the other
service had ample reserves of the same
or 'equivalent supplies in the immediate
area, or convenieritly near by. .That sort
of dan7,erous waste and delay need not
and will not happen with the 'coordina-
tion proposed here.
Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. Mr. Chair- c
man, will the gentleman yield? -
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield.
Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. I wonder
why we could not go further and put them
all in the same uniform, have the same
ranks., grades, and standards? Why
could we not standardize that phase of
Army life as well as their equipment?
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. There are
some who would like to do t but that
would be a mistake at the moment.
Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. Why?
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Because
that is an unnecessary departure from
the traditions of our defense. forces. As
we get into this thing perhaps eventually
we will come to tie- ? but I think the first
step must be tow 'oasic efficiency and
economy through -iordination.
Mr. MILLER Nebraska. I agree
that it is a step in the right direction,
but they are all engaged in the same
purpose. If standardization is going to
help one phase of our defense why should
it not help all phases? ?
Mr. 1-1. of Ir.:'Iana. I do not
think we on to take t le Army, the
Navy, and the Air Fe. r,.-; miiim their
heads together and say "Yoti are going
to wear the same uniform v.'netImr you
like it or not." If we accomplish the im-
portant basic goals, the formal refine-
ments you suggest may naturally follow.
Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. If we did
that the bill would not be before us; the
Army and Navy would object too strenu-
ously.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I do not
think we would get anywhere.
Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. But does
not Congress have control over these de-
fense powers? Unless this bill provides
so much militarism that they are going
to take over the country. ?
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Congress
still has that control; and I believe it
will preserve it.
Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Chairman, will the'
gentleman yield?
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield.
Mr. STEFAN. Where is. the section
regarding procurement?
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I do not
have the bill before me, but I think the
gentleman from New York [Mr. WADS-
WORTH] sitting beside you, can point it
out to you.
Some fears -and apprehensions have
been expressed by some members of the
Navy and the Marine Corps about this
legislation with particular reference to
naval aviation. The committee spent a
good deal of time in considering the ob-
jections raised to the original legislation
by members of the Navy, especially the
naval air force. It wrote into this bill
provisions which should allay any fears
that the sea-air force will suffer if this
bill is enacted.
,? Now, a word about the Central Intel-
.
'figence .Agency. When such an organ-
ization was first proposed I confess I had
some fear and doubt about it. Along
with other members of the committee, I
insisted that the scope and authority of
this agency be carefully defined and lim-
ited. Please bear in mind that this is a
bold departure from American tradition.
This country has never before officially
resorted to the collection of secret and
strategic -information in time of peace as
an announced and fixed policy. Now,
however, I am convinced that such an
agency as we are now considering is
esS tial to our national security. ?
here has been insistence that the di-
rector of this agency be a civilian. I be-
lieve we should eventually place such a
restriction upon the authority we are
proposing to create here, although I say
frankly that I am not convinced of the
wisdom of such a restriction .at the
?9,11?tset.
Prolonged hearings and executive ses-
sions of the committee behind closed
doors lead me to wonder if we have any
single career civilian available for this
job as a few men who might be drafted
from the services for it. Understand,
please, that I want to protect this very
influential post against the undue mili-
tary influence which might make of this
agency an American Gestapo. If we can
find_a well qualified civilian carrel' man
i would. readily accede to this limitation..
Let me repeat, however, that this Nation
is without extended experience in this
? field; and that we actually have com-
paratively few men qualified by experi-
ence to head this agency. Most of these
few qualified men have gained their ex-
perience in the Army and Navy, and are
,still in service. Before we deny ourselves
of the service such military men may be
able to render the country in this ca-
pacity, let us be very sure that there are
civilian candidates qualified by training
and experience available to serve us
equally well, or better.
Again let me say that I have no objec-
tion to a restriction in this measure
which will require a civilian head in this
agency. I merely want reasonable assur-
ance that such a restriction will not deny
us of the services now of the best avail-
able man if this plan becomes operative.
It wrote into the bill provisions that
should allay any of -their suspicions or
fears as to what might happen if this -
bill is enacted into law. ,I feel their ap-
pr hensions are without foundation.
Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the.
gentleman yield?
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield to
the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. BUSBEY. The present Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency is Ad-
miral Hillenkoetter; the former head
of the agency was General Vandenberg.
They- are bothery splendid men and
have a wonderful record in their field.
But was there any testimony anywhere
as to their. experience, and ualification
in intelligence work?
Mr. HARNESS c: India a. I doubt
if you could pick out any individual,
civilian or military, who has made a
career of this work. There is no such
available American, because we have
never engaged in this type of activity
before. In 150 years the United States
has said, "We are going to keep out of
other people's business. We are not go-
ing to engage in secret intelligence."
Therefore, we have no experience in it,
we have no single career man who knows
all of the problems. We are approach-
ing this thing. more or less as an experi-
ment in the present instance.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Indiana has expired.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield the gentleman 2 additional minutes.
Mr. BUSBEY. I want to make the
Observation that we have had an intelli-
gence service in our War Department
and also in .our Navy Department for
a great many years.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Yes, both
military and naval intelligence have
served proficiently within their limited
scope.
Mr. BUSBEY. We have had seem, in-
telligence in the War Department that
we have. built up over the past 5 years
also..
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. True, but
what is contemplated here different in
scope and character?
There has been much objection to the
establishment 'of an air force separate
from and' independent of the regular
land and sea forces. Such objections
able and willing to handle this post, I spring, in my opinion, from the outmoded
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CONG,1.7:2
. conception of air power as a mine,: anx-
niarY of th,i land and nit-, forces. In stra-
teg:c and tiictical importance, as well as
in ncantal size, the air arm in the recent
War r.noved its right to the status this
proposes for it. There simply is no
a:an-ling the fact that warefare has moved
into a third dimenSion. There is, in fact,
no sound reason that I can conceive to
houbt that air power will be a more de-
aiolve element in any future war than in
the last.
It has been argued that instead of uni-
fying two services, this plan complicates
the problem by splitting two services into
'three. That might be true if each serv-
ice were permitted to go its separate and
independent way, as in the past. But the
spirit and entire purpose of this proposal
is a close coordination of all elements of
our Military Establishment. There is no.
good reason to believe that three coequal.
_forces cannot be qlosely coordinated hist.
as well as effectively as two. I think the
Air Forces justly should be given a sepa-
rate department, as this bill provides.
Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield to
the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. HUGH a SCOTT, JR. Admiral
Hillenkoetter'.s name has been mentioned.
1 I think in justice to him, and to keep the
1
. record straight; it ought to be said that
.. Admiral Hillenkoetter has had perhaps
as much experience in intelligence as
1
_ almost. any officer of the Navy, having
serVed in the Office of Naval Intelligence
and as naval attach?n Paris. He was
tl .the mi,..n who was responsible for our
intelligence over there during the war
i and aften,i7ards, and he has had a great
deal af experience along those lines. I
1
. do not want to go into the merits at
all, but I want the RECORD to show that. -
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. As .I said
a moment ago, really the most experi-
enced people we have seen to be the men
: w7 -.o served in the Army and the Navy,
? and to shut them out and not permit
.. them to serve in this capacity now I
.,
think might be a mistake.. -
Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. I entirely
t
agree with the gentleman on_ the point
1 he just made.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I .hope-
this legislation will be accepted by .the
Congress and that the bill will pass.
Mr. 1-IOLIFIELD. ' Mr. Chairman, I
yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. WrtsoN].
Mr. WILSON of Texas. Mr. Chair-
man, before I came to Congress in Jan-
uary I was unalterably opposed to a
merger of the armed forces as we had
formerly thought about it, having the
idea that there would be a great danger
due to the esprit de corps and the jeal-
ousies and one thing or another between
the services; that there would be a great
deal of danger in having a man ap-
pointed at the head of it who would tend
to submerge one or the other services.
I 'was appointed on this committee.
This bill was referred to it, and we had -
hearings for about 2 months, and I have
changed my mind. I am for. this bill-.
While this: is 'hot a merger bill in any
senye. el
erly denni.ita .)ii.
rather Un n. C. .-,, in
It is a bill r.?-tiires itt, iti.ot the
coordination c ctn. an-nint s. .-vi,tes do
the end, first, tintt we -t greater
efficiency and with the hop,: and ex-
pectancy that wn may get; nreater econ-
omy. .I agree with practicahy all of the
witnesses who testified, General Eisen-
hower, the two Secretaries, of the War
and of the Navy, Forrestal and Patter-
son, that in peacetime you could not say
that a certain number of dollars and
cents would be saved immediately, but
they both said, as well as other witnesses
who claimed to know anything about it,
that during. wartime billions of dollars
would be saved, and I think that is true.
This bill requires the Secretary of 'De-
fense to coordinate the activities, for
instance, of the Department of Procure-
ment for the various services.
This bill has been written Carefully,
I think. with'every member of the com-
mittee, including the chairman, being
intensely interested and being very de-
liberate, even at the expense of being ac-
cused of trying to hold up the bill. Of
course, the trouble is that a good many
folks think that you can write a bill of
this character and of this enormity by
calling in a couple of experts and then
reporting a, bill out. That, is because
they do not know the process of this
great constitutional Government. Every
man in it has a right to his say, has the
right to say whether he is for or against,
and why.- We have heard these Wit-
nesses and have heard them carefully,
as you will note from the record. of the
hearings.
There were those, not coming princi-
pally from any one of the services, but
some from the Navy who had the idea
that the Marine Corps would be de-
stroyed or would be relegated to service
as MP's aboard ship. That is impossible
and foolish. Under the terms of this
bill as written now the Marine Corps,
.with its long history of heroism, its use-
fulness and its importance to the armed
services of this country, is absolutely
protected. I for one do not believe that
any one branch of the service won this
war. I think it was the coordinated
efforts of every branch of the service and
the coordinated efforts of every civilian
at home that won this war. Therefore,
I cannot subscribe to the testimony given
before the committee by a few Air Corps
officers Who said we need no Navy, we
need no Army, because the next war will
be a pushbutton affair. The men who
know about those matters say that is
foolish in the extreme. We have not
reached the stage in the history of this
country where we can sit here in Wash-
ington and push a button and fight a
war. The infantry, the Navy, the Naval
Air Corps, the Marines, the Army, stra-
tegic bombing, and all other kinds of
bombing would be: absolutely necessary
if we entered a war within the next 5
or.1.0 years. or in the foreseeable future.
So these folks who write in the news-
papers that the next war will be a?very
simple matter of pushing a button do
not know the facts.
Z.7SE
.13'4
I think, amply prdtcets the
Navy tn: p.eteets the Army by
prostr-vnv, their stntas.
Seine ot- the v:itnesses bolero tile com-
initn a who 01)',DOCCI the bill upon cross-.
examination said they wanted one uni-
form and one service and a total, abso-
lute merger. I am unalterably opposed
to that, just as I said I was when I came
here. I do not believe that kind of sys-
tem would work. I believe the coordina-
tion that is set up in this bill and the
power that is given the Secretary of De-
fense under the direction of the Presi-
dent, just as in provided by the Consti-
tution of this country, is necessary. This
bill is not a departure from constitu-
tional methods, it merely recognizes the
fact that we must bring ourselves up to
date.
It has been said here that this is a-
piece of "must" legislation for both the
Democrats and the Republicans. I say
you can just leave out "Democrats" and
"Republicans" and say ? that this is a
piece of "must" legislation for America/
and for its future.
Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. WILSON of Texas. I yield to the
gentleman frornnSouth Carolina. ?
Mr. DORN. It' it not a fact that the
words: "Republican". and "Democrat"
were never mentioned :in all the hear-
ings before this committee?
Mr. WILSON of Texas. -This is abso-
lutely a nonpartisan measure, in my esti-
mation. It is to protect' the future of
this country so that those who are in
authority to provide the national de-
fense of this country, our homes, our
country, and our lives, shall have, the
proper authority t..) do a good job.
There is nothing new about this bill.
This coordination was used during the
war, and all through the war, by execu-
tive order. These folks were given the
same power to coordinate and unify and
have unified commands in certain terri-
tory, on land, on the sea, and in the air.
These Presidential powers, of course,
have lapsed. That is the reason if is
important that this bill be passed.
Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield? .
Mn WILSON of Texas. I yield.
Mr. BURLESON. I do not see any-
thing in the bill that has to do with the.
centralized purchasing. power of the
armed forces. I wonder if the -gentle-.
man can tell us the reason behind the
committee's action.
Mr. WILSON of Texas. ? The testi-
mony before the committee by almost all
of the witnesses was?and the bill pro-
vides, I think, plainly?that the Secre-
tary of Defense shall coordinate the.
procurement of common-use items for
the Army and Navy, Air Corps, and all
the rest.
Mr. BURLESON. Is that item 3 in
section 106? .
Mr. WILSON of Texas. I believe that
is right but I would not be positive. I
do not have the bill before me.
Mr. BURLESON. That is the Na-
tional Resources Board? -
Mr. WILSON of Texas. I, would not
be ahsoliately sure of it.
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CONGRESSICI-LL 13.ECORD-HOUSE JULY 19
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. WILSON of Texas. I yield.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think the gentle-
roan will find that on page 6, commenc-
ing at line 5.
Mr. WILSON of Texas. It has been
d.ernonstrated, and I add to what my good
friend the gentleman from Indfana [Mr.
HARNESS1 said with regard to the number
of men who constituted the Air Corps
that the Air Corps of the. Army gets 65
percent of the Army's appropriation?
that is 65 percent of the money spent by
this Government on the Army. So, I say,
nobody wants to put the Air Corps above
the other services, but the Air Corps in *
its importance in this last war and the
importance it .will have in the future in
any possible conflict that this country
might get into has attained a position
of importance equal to. the other two
services. That alone, I say, is sufficient
reason for the legislation. The Secre-
tary of Defense shall have the right and
power to coordinate the branches of the
military service anct, yet leave those three
services to maintain their esprit de corps
in 'the future just as they have in the
past with certain limitations.
Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. WILSON Of Texas. I yield.
Mr. STEFAN. Referring to the gen-
tleman's statement that 65 percent of the
appropriations for the Army goes to the
Air Corps, I. believe the gentleman may
be in error. I think it is 56 instead of
65. The gentleman may be right or .I
may be wrong.
Mr. WILSON of Texas. I said that I
would not be absolutely sure of that, but,
as I remember, it was 64 percent or 65
percent.
Mr. 'HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WILSON of ,Texas i I yield.
Mr. HARNESS . of Indiana. I think
you will find that as near as it can be
figured out it is 56 percent. But that
does not include a number of items prob-
ably that are in common use in the Air
Corps as well as in the other services.
It might run to 65 percent or even more.
Mr. STEFAN. It might be even more,
but I think we ought to have the figure'
in tie. RECORD.
Mr. WILSON of Texas. I would like
to have the correct figure in the RECORD,
but I believe it is around 65.percent.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yielc. 10 minutes to the gentleman from
? New York .(Mr. TABER].
Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, for the
first 10 years that it was my privilege
to serve in the House of Representatives
I was a member of the Subcommittee on
Appropriations for the Navy. For the
last 4 of those 10 years I also served
upon the Subcommittee on Appropria-
tions for the Army. With the exception
of such work as might have been done
in the Subcommittee on Deficiency Ap-
propriations, I think I am the onlyy one'
in the Congress who has seen service on
both committees simultaneously.
This year it was my privilege to as-
sign the gentleman from Kanas [Mr.
SCRIVNER] to both subcommittees. He ?
has been serving upon both those porn-
mitten. I 2eit, as did Martin Madden,
who was chairman o the Committee on
Appropriations at the tithe I was assigned
to both committees, that it was very de-
sirable to coordinate the work between
the two departments. For my own
part, I would like to see that done, and I
wish this legislation would accomplish
it. But this is what bothers me:
Section 307, on page 35, supersedes the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
which was designed to coordinate the
financial operations of the Government.
Section 201 thereof provided that the
estimates for expenditures and appropri-
ations should be submitted by the Presi-
dent without submitting what the de-
partment or agency submitted to him.
The practice has always been that the
President would submit these budget es-
timates 'when the Congress met, and the
Congress would consider them on their
merits. Section 307 .of this bill amends
that law and provides that there shall be
submitted to the Congress, first, what
the President in his budget shall submit;
second, what the Secretary of Defense
may submit; and, third, what tIr heads_
of the three departments themselves
should submit.
Mr. REED of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TABER. I yield.
Mr. REED of Ne v7 York. What on
earth happens to your budget system
with that set-up?
Mr. TABER. Your. budget system is
dead.
Mr. REED of New York. Certainly.
Mr. TABER. There is no budget sys-
tem. Now, what will result from this will
be that instead of having a coordinated
budget you will have all sorts of wild
items submitted by each unit concerned.
? Instead of having any screening what-
ever or any protection to national de-
\ fense, everything w-ill run wild, and in-
stead of this being a forward step, with
this section, it is a backward step.
Mr. REED of New York. And that is
exactly what the military wants.
Mr. TABER. Well, I hope not. If we
are going to have any benefit out of this
consolidation?and, frankly, I am. in
favor of a consolidation if it can be con-
structive and forward looking?but if
there is to be any benefit from it you
utterly destroy what you have set up by
this language, and you make the situa-
tion worse than it ever was.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. TABER. Yes; I yield.
Me. HOFFMAN. As I understand
your objection, it is to the provision
which permits the Secretary of the Navy,
the Secretary of War, and the Secretary
of Air to present to.Congress or the Ap-
propriations Committee their views of
what they need? You want that all
channeled through the Secretary of De-
fense, do you not?
Mr. TABER. I want it all channeled
through the budget to the President, and
by the President to the Congress .of the
United States. Unless it is, all coordina-
tion is gone.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield further?
Mr. TABER. , Yes; I yield. -
Mr. HOFFMAN. That is undoubtedly
correct, but if you adopt that policy, then
you put the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force?you close the' door to them; you
put them under this centralized author-
ity, and how are they going to know
,their needs? You will not have it either
way.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman
from Indiana.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Is that
not precisely what the situation is to-
day?. The Army and the Navy must
now go to the President of the United
States who sends the budget here?
Mr. TABER. That' is exactly correct.
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. What dif-
ference would there be if each of the
departments, the Secretary of War, the
Secretaty of the Navy, and the Air Force
were to do just exactly what they do
now?
Mr. TABER. It would be a great deal
better and there would be some protec-
tion for the people of the United States. ,
Let me tell you - this will result in.
It will result h. fire. Instead of
having a coordinated program, a pro-
gram under which you can get some
benefit to the country itself, this section
307 could utterly destroy the benefits of
this legislation and leave the situation
where you are scattering fire all over the
lot and getting nowhere. Your items for
national defense will not be effective.
All sorts of things will be brought in?here
by individual secretaries which would
not stand analysis by an impartial
analyzer, and we would have the entire
burden of analysis thrown on -us here in
the Congress.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield for a question for
information?
Mr. TABER. I yield.
Mr. 'HOFFMAN. As chairman of -the
Appropriations Committee, does the gen-
tleman prefer that these departments?
for example, the Army and the Navy and
the Air Corps?should not be permitted
to express their desires and their needs
to the Appropriations Committee? I am
just. asking for information.
Mr. TABER. In the committees there
'is no trouble about the Army or the Navy
getting an opportunity to express their
desires on anything they really need to
express them on, but this provision would
leave the thing wide open; you would
have all sorts of things presented all at
once, regardless of whether there was
any need for them or not. I' have seen
this done so many times over in the other
body, just this same performance, where
they have scattered their fire all over the
lot; and if this House had agreed to the
provisions that they presented, there
would be no national. defense, but we
would have scattered our fire; we would
`get nowhere at all.
I want to see an effective, efficient De-
partment of National Defense. I want
to see it effective and efficient,. I want
to see it in rach shape that only the
things that ,:hey really need will be
crowded up in front. I do not .want to
see the whole picture presented here on
an agitator's proposition but on a basis
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of need and real demands of national
clefenee.
HOLLFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
1Vir. TAI2ER. I yield.
I-IOLIFIELD. I would hesitate to
LT`;',13 with the gentleman on methods
cf appropriation, because I have a great
deal of resepct for his experience and
ability; but I may say that the purpose
of this Committee in this section was to
have the President submit to the Appro-
priations Subcommittee his recom-
mended budget and also include in that
budget such items as the Secretary of
National Defense might submit and such
additional items as might be recom-
mended by ? any of the other military
establishments for the Committee's. pro-
tection and consideration in order .that
certain departments might not be de-
nied funds or minimized by this Secre-
tary of National Defense in their func-
tions. That Was the purpose of the
committee.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the-
gentleman from New York has expired.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
yield the gentleman one additional min-
ute.,
Mr. TABER. If they do that the re-
sult is going -to be that you get them in
a position where they will submit all
sorts of things that they do not need
and you will have your whole national
defense picture jumbled up and not be
able to get any coordinated operation of
it. You will not have as good national.
defense and they will not have as good an
opportunity to present their case as they
Would the other way.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. We feel that if all
the information is in the Appropriations
Committee they are adequately able to
take care of any supplemental requests
of these departments.
Mr. TABER. We have trouble enough
without having this. We would nothave
all the information, it would be covered
up.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York has again
expired.
Mr. MANASCO. -Mr. Chairman, I.
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Sums].
(Mr. SIXES asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend- his re-
marks.)
Mr. SIXES. - Mr. Chairman, a great
deal of credit is due to the committee in
-'' ? ? busy time for completing the con-
-, ation of this meritorious legiSla-",
tem and bringing it to the floor.
AGAINST A SECOND BEST ARMY
Mr. Chairman, it has been said that
there is little actual need for this legis-
lation, that coordination of plans already
has been achieved, and that things are
working as well as could be desired.
This is true- only in part. It is like hav- ?
ing the second best army, or the second '
best poker hand. It is good only as far
as it goes. And it may not go far enough
to win wars in a new age when war moves
with terrific, hitherto unknown speed.
If we are to have an army, a navy,
and an air force, and if we are to mar-
shal the Nation's pot ntial behind these .
armed forces, our or6anization and our
1
C 0 t. 1Th-,
: icnt its it
can pos::?1:,, made.
This is nut um. ccndition.
,There is mud:. about the 1 forces
? that is splendidly efficient. Ent; as a
whole they are far less efficient than
they can and ought to be. It is true that
our signal vic6ory in the last war at-
tests -to the capabilities of our leaders
and the magnificent records made by
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
But _a navy second to none, or an army
with the latest in mobile transport and
mechanization, or an air force with jet-
and rocket-propelled aircraft cannot
alone nor separately make an efficient
national defense?nor offensively can
they with certainty and with a minimum
loss of life project the necessary force
for speedy victory under the military
system as it now is devised.
They must be developed within them-
selves, each a vital and integral part of
the whole, and unified under a single,
authority which will direct their efforts
with a single purpose, coordinate their
capabilities toward a common end,
wisely selected and clearly seen. Here
is the first point at which we are lack-
, ing. There is today no over-all com-
mand .which unifies our total military
effort. We are lacking in that har-
monious composition of the entire Mili-
tary Establishment which is needed to
give every element of it the support that
it needs from other elements to make it
a-symmetrical and well-balanced whole.
Let us think back to the very fresh
memories of the last war. Let us think
of the delays, the mistakes, the troops
Who trained with wooden guns, the
ships sunk off our shores, the early de-
feats, the long, hard uphill pull before
we were safely on the road to victory.
What enormous advantages could have
been obtained on the governmental, in-
dustrial, economical, andoivilian side of
the war effort had we then been pre-
pared with plans and programs of nae
tional defense which this bill makes pos-
sible. Under it the. entire national po-
tential, with its great capacity to pro--
duce and support the war effort, can be
brought together in a common effort for
a common purpose,
Turing the intervening years between
wars we have never had a proper bal-
ance between our foreign and military
policies. Each being closely related to
the other they have never been cor-
related nor have the military services
and other agencies of the Government
cooperated fully in matters invoLving
national security. We have never been
fully informed of the capabilities, poten-
tial, or intent of likely enemies, nor did
we have effective plans for use in time
of war of the Nation's natural and in-
dustrial resources for military and civil-
ian needs. This is another time when
We can well say, "Remember Pearl Har-
.1294." ? '
e We have been sadly lacking, Mr.
Chairman, in some things. And I be-
-lieve that these considerations have been
brought into focus within the provi-. ?
sions of this bill for national security.
I am strongly convinced that the bill
does meet the needs of the country for
, an effective, efficient, and economical
411OIJ:-?-3
d
"E..,:lt;lishinent and that it does
coordinate the activities of the National
Security Orrmnivation with other de-
partments and agencies of the Govern-
ment concerned with national securiLy.
Mr. Chairman, I give it as my sincere
opinion that time is of the utmost im-
portance where the enactment of this
legislation is concerned. We have al-
ready delayed too long. It may be that
time is running out on us and we are
again too late. Our military picture is
a sad spectacle compared to that mag-
nificent fighting machine we had at the
close of the war. Our occupation forces
are not equal to any demand of offensive
strength if called upon to, support this
country's policies or enforce its will in a
foreign land. Our domestic forces _ are
only a shadow which would be another
sacrifice if launched in the defense of
any kind of determined immediate effort
by a hostile force. A large proportion
of the greatest feet in the world is
bottled up and inactive, and the Air
Forces which reduced -the mighty Ger-
man war 'industries to rubble and swept
the German Air Force from the skies
have been reduced to a few groups of
largely obsolescent machines.
What price- victory, Mr. Chairman, if
all we have accomplished goes for
naught? An effective step can be taken
here to help preserve our national .life
and keep America strong through the
enactment of the National Security Act.
On this number one piece of must legis-
lation largely depends the true develop-
ment of a properly -integrated and effec--
tive national-security program. Until
?
the services are unified no well balanCed
military plans, can be assured. Neither
the Army, the Navy, nor the Air Force
can develop their specialized efforts to
its most effective degree; nor can these
great services be brought under single
direction for the best coordinated and
most useful application of their poten-
tialities. And until the enactment by
the Congress of this National Security
Act we cannot be sure of regaining for
our national-defense program those ad-
vances in civilian, industrial, economic,
and diplomatic cooperation and efficiency
which were accomplished during the war.
Mr. 110i-eteMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield
10 minutes to the gentleman from New.
York [Mr. LATHAIVII.'
Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Chairman, this is
a matter which has been long in dispute.
.1 can recall that for many years past
many of our leaders of military-thought
in this country were unalterably opposed
to a merger bill. I recall that the Sec-
retary of the Navy was opposed to it very
strenuously in principle, an,d I do not
think that the principles have changed
very much. But, the time came when
the leaders, of our military organizations -
in this country, came into agreement,
and they decided -that they were going
-to split up the military -organization
of this country into three parts, and they
sat Own and they wrote a bill.
The first bill, I believe, was written by
- an admiral and a general, very able men,
and they wrote H. R. 2319, and they
'brought this bill into the Congress and
they said, "Gentlemen/ here is our agree-
ment. This is a sacred document. You
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cannot change a single word in. this docu-
ment." The balance of the agreement
was so delicate that they said, "This
must not be touched."
But the Senate of the United States
had other ideas on the subject.' They
thought that perhaps Congress had a
right and duty to write its own legisla-
tion, so they took the structure which ;
was set forth in the agreement and they
wrote Senate bill 758, and they passed
that bill, and it came over to the House
and the House took a passing look at the
original bill written by the military, and
? then they discarded it and started to
work from the Senate bill, and they im-
proved that measure very greatly.
The bill the Senate wrote was a vast
improvement over the measure which ?
the military wrote, and the bill which
the. House committee has reported out
is, in my humble opinion, a vast improve-
ment-over the bill which the Senate wrote.
I hope that today, in the normal course
of the Democratic legislative process, that
thie bill will be further improved.
Now, there is much good that is pro-
vided in this bill: The National Security
Council, National Resources Board, Joint
Cialcfs of Staff, War Council, Munitions
Board, and Central Intelligence.. No
body quarrelriVin--Trir-orThese pe
s
7..A.'EED of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LATHAM. I yield to the gentle-
man from New York. ?
Mr. REED of New York. I have
. listened to the gentlerrian with a great
deal of interest, but it is very hard to
keep my seat when some of these things
are brcught .out. Do I understand that
the military wrote a bill and sent it to
Congress and said that it should not be
changed?
Mr. LATHAM. In substance, yes.
Mr. REED of New York. We are com-
ing to a pretty pass in militarism and
their power over the civilian population
of this country when they have such ar-
rogance and effrontery to write a bill
and send it up to the Congress and say
it must be passed without- change.
Mr. LATHAM. Fortunately the Con-
gress of the 'United States ignored that
position.
Mr. HAND., Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield? ?
Mr. LATHAM. I yield to the, gentle-
man from NeW Jersey.
Mr. HAND. One thing in the bill
which disturbs me is the Secretary of
Nai.onal Defense and his apparently
limited powers. I listened quite atten-
tively to the gentleman from New York
i-Mr. WADSWORTH] this morning in the
opening debate. I am afraid from What
he said that the Secretary could not in-
terfere with the internal affairs of the
three separate departments ,under him,
and further, if he attempted to make a
coordinating order, if that were objected
:3, he still could not do anything about
it except refer it to the President: I
make that observation to get further
clarification of the question, because it,
seems to me that the Secretary of De- /
::onse does not have as much power as
he should have to coordinate the defense
of the country,
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Mr. LATHA11:. I would say in answer
to the gcntlenian that one of the chief
objections to this bill was that he had
too much power.
Mr. HAND. Well, I do not think he
has enough.
Mr. LATHAM. You will find in the
provisions relating to the Secretary of
Defense that he has the power to exer-
cise general direction, authority, and
control, and he could not have any
greater power.
Mr. HAND. Is it not true that he
must, if there is objection, refer the
whole matter to the President?
Mr. LATHAM. If there were any im-
portant decision in dispute, I would
assume that he would, but he' has the
authority and the power under this bill.
There is no question about it. As I say,
there is much that is good in this bill.
I do not intend to speak about the very
substantial objections that were made to
it.* It is, of course, a measure of com-
promise. I do not think there was any-
one who was more vigorous than I in
his opposition to certain portions of this
bill. I opposed them not because I am
against unification. I am not, but be-
cause it is a little difficult for me to
assimilate the idea that when you take
an organization composed of two parts
and break it down into an organization
composed of four parts, that is unifi-
cation.
Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield? .
Mr. LATHAM. I yield to the gentle-
man from Pennsylvania.
Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Could not
the bill more properly be called a quad-
ruplication bill rather than a unification
bill?
Mr. LATHAM. There is no question
that there is unity at the top. The Sec-
retary of National,Defense does estab-
lish unity Of control. But at the bottom
there is disunification, multiplication,
and complexity written into the military
organization. Obviously when you take
two groups and break them down into
four that ,does not simplify them.
? The committee had certain fears about
the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is
amply protected in this bill, under sec-
tion 203, on page 17.
I think it is a fair statement also to
say that the committee intended to pro-
tect naval aviation. Unfortunately, be-
cause of a change at the later stages of
the negotiations on this bill, naval avia-
tion was not amply protected, in my
opinion. An amendment will be offered
by the gentleman from New York [Mr.
COLE] which .has, I believe, committee
support, which will eliminate that defect.
This is a measure which, g the Cole
amendment is written into it, I will'sup-
port, because of the fact that it is a
measure of compromise and in spite of
the fact that-I do not agree with all of its
provisions.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri [Mr. SHORT].
Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, it was
my privilege to serve with the distin-
guished gentleman from New York [Mr.
WADswomi] and others on the special
select committee headed by our former
- JULY 19
colleague from Virginia, Mr. Wocidrum,
which considered our postwar military
policy. After several weeks of intensive
hearings that committee reached the al-
most unanimous conclusion that unifica-
tion legislation was not merely desirable
but was necessary. For several months
the old House Committee on Military Af-
fairs, of which I have been a member for
many years now, considered this same
subject. We reached the same conclu-
sion.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SHORT. I yield to the gentleman
from New York.
Mr. COLE of New York. I dislike to
interrupt the gentleman, but I think, if
he will recall correctly, the Woodrum
committee did not make any recom-
mendations on the question of unifica-
tion although it did conduct hearings
on it.
Mr. SHORT. I say that that commit-
tee, though, was almost unanimously of
the opinion that some legislation similar
to this was not only desirable but even
necessary.
Mr. HOI:o.toMAN. Mr?Chairman; will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. SHORT. I yield to the gentleman
from Michigan.
Mr. HOFFMAN. But your commit-
tee did not report out any legislation, did
it?
Mr. SHORT. No, the committee did
not. It was only a policy committee.
We could not.
Mr.. HOFFMAN. That is what I
thought.
Mr. SHORT. That is perhaps the rea-
son this legislation was presented to the
-gentleman's Committee on Expenditures
in the Executive Department. It should
have been sent to our committee.
Mr. HOFFMAN. That is what I un-
derstand. They could not shove it '
through the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices so they put it over in our committee.
Mr. SHORT. The gentleman does not
know whether they ( could shove it
through the Committee on Armed Serv-.
ices because it was never given to us. It
was sent to the Senate Committee on
Armed Services.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Not this last time,
but it was submitted: to the Committee
on Military Affairs before, and then-.
when the Committee or. Naval Affairs
cattle with you, they thought they could
not get it through there, so they handed
it to us.
Mr. SHORT. Maybe they handed you
a hot potato. But our committee is for
this and watch the roll call.
Originally I opposed this legislation, I
was against it, but after months of hear-
ings I learned a little. Even Douglas
MacArthur can learn a little, because as -
Chief, of Staff several years ago he op-
posed this legislation, but he is very much
in favor of it now, because if this recent
global conflict in which we were engaged
taught us one lesson it was the absolute
necessity of a unified, coordinated, co-
herent, cohesive armed force to strike
quickly on land and-sea and in the air.
A unified command is essential. di-
Added command is fatal. There is
strength in unity, weakness in division.
se 2003/05/06: CIA-RDP90-00610R000200050001-0
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1947 CONGRESSIGYAI, RECORD-ROUSE 9551
The Nazis taught us a lot in the early
days of the war, but we taught them a
few things before it was over. I re-
member in Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Oki-
nawa, where we 'threw everything in the
world at those Japs ekcept the kitchen
sink, and it was only because of the um-
brella by the air armada, our bombers,
together with the Navy with every type
of vessel conceivable, that volleys of
rockets were sent in, as well as the Ma-
rines, 5,000 of whom were killed on Iwo
Jima, that we were able to really take
those islands. .
Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. SHORT. I yield.
Mr. KEARNEY. I want to recall to
the gentleman that I served on that corn-
mittee with the distinguished gentleman
from Missouri, and. he will recall that
that cOmmittee was not supposed to re-
port out legislation.
Mr. SHORT. That is correct. It was
_simply a study of ,policy that was being
made by the committee. The commit-
tee was not a legislative one. It was a
special select standing committee on
pcstwar military policy.
Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SHORT. ' I yield.
Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. I hap-
pened to be a member-of that committee
myself, and I might say also that the
committee made no effort to report out
this unification bill or any other bill.
? Mr. SHORT. I know that the gentle-
man from Massachusetts has been op-
posed in the past to this, but I do not
know now he will vote on this particular
bill.. I will continue to love him regard-
less of' how he votes.
Mr. KARSTEN of ?Missouri. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SHORT. I yield to my friend the
gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. KARSTEN of Missouri. That par-
ticular committee had no power to re- -
port legislation, but only had. the power
to recommend legislation.
Mr. SHORT. That is right.
Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman. yield? ,
eminent and lie has reec,:dcd what is
truly an inside story.
Mr. Chairman, certain passages of this
book are so QJOsely related to the prob-
lem facing us today that I will read them
at this Mine:
Fridtion between the Japanese Army and
Navy, over both strategy and division of
available material supplies, became intense.
In the fall of 1943 the Ministry of Munitions
was established in an effort to end competi-
tion between the two services for materials.
but the army and navy had been traditional
rivals and their mutual distrust had its roots
in history. Even When they appeared to have
buried the hatchet ? during the early vic-
tories, the army was building its own ship-
yards and producing its own cargo ships and
even cargo submarines. The navy, on the
other hand, proceeded to establish its own
motor corps for land transport. Each serv-
ice sought to have key factories designated
as its own so that they might count on 100
-percent of the output instead of making a
division in accordance with need. The army
and. navy even maintained separate weather
observatories, and the civilian Government a
third.
As a result of differences in strategy, there
was no unified command either in battle
zones or in occupied areas. Particular zones
were marked out for army command, and the
navy was given the others. The navy de-
fense area included half of New Guinea, the
Solomons, the Celebes, and the mandated
islands.
There is no doubt that a major portion
of the responsibility for Japan's failure at
Guadalcanal, Bougainville, the Gilbert
Islands, and later at all-important Saipan
may be traced to the failure of the army and
navy to set aside their differences when the
future of the nation was at stake, Japanese
marines were insufficient in number to de-
fend the area assigned to the navy, and the
support given by the arm was in each case
Inadequate and half-hearted.
The most serious friction between the serv-
ices arose over the allocation of aircraft and
materials for aircraft manufacture. The
traditional procedure had been to divide the
output of combat planes equally between
the two services irrespective of the strategic
,or tactical situation, but when the allied at-
tack was threatening to break through in
- the central Pacific, and the powerful Truk
base was threatened, the Navy asked for a
greater share, contending that the central
Pacific battles would decide the war and that
Japan should concentrate her .total air
strength in that area. The army insisted
that its campaigns in Burma, with Imphal
as the objective, and in China with the pur-
pose of linking Canton and ?Hankow, were
,equally important.
In defending Saipan the navy called for
army support, which materialized in disap-
pointing quantity. In my presence a high
naval officer angrily remarked that the navy
Would handle the job by itself and that Sai-
pan would become ,a navy victory.
The senior statesmen had been watching
the army-navy friction and the .succession
of defeats with growirig anxiety, but they
were like a group of court nobles who lacked
. the military strength to bring about a for=
cible change in the situation.
Mr. SHORT. I yield,
Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Has
General MacArthur made any statement
to the effect that he is for this bill?
Mr:" SHORT. Yes. I do not know
about this particular bill but he is for
unification of -the armed services.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot yield any fur-
ther, because I have something to say
here that I want to bring out for the
edification and benefit of my good friend,
the gentleman from Michigan [Mr.
HOFF M AN] . '
Mr. Chairman, although I strongly
urge the immediate passage of unifica-
tion legislation, I do not at this time in- -
tend to discuss detailed provisions of the
pending bill..
I have before me a book entitled "The
Lost War" which give a Japatese report-
er's story of the war as he viewed it from
Japan. The author, Masuo Kato, a re-
porter for the Domei News Agency, was
closely associated with many high gov-
ernment officials of the Japanese Gov-,
No. 139?.61
The author's vivid description of the
interservice rivalry and lack of unity
between the Japanese army and navy
aptly describes the condition existing to-
day in the armed forces of the United
States.
. We are all familiar with the dissension
among the components of our armed
forces. We deplore this condition. Dis-
agreements not only involve matters of
organization but even extend into the
'field of military, strategy. This condi-
tion to my mind, Mr. Speaker, constitutes
a danger to the security of this Nation
and is in itself a most compelling argu-
ment in favor of unification.
do not contend that Japan would
have won the war had her military es-
tablishment been unified. I do contend,
however, that her meager resources
would have been better employed, and
her military losses reduced through uni-
fied direction of her armed forces. ?
It is wise_Mr. Chairman, that we ex-
amine the Japanese military organization
since a system operating under the ex-
treme pressure of total war is more likely
to expose its basic deficiencies than one
which is subjected to -a lesser degree of
pressure. In defeat, the glaring defects
of the Japanese system loom large before
us, whereas the .corresponding weak-
nesses of our system have been ob-
scured by victory.
Although the United States had a bet-
ter appreciation of the proper' employ-
ment of air power than the Japanese, we
had in effect the same general type of
.military organization. Our victory was
gained not so much through the efficient
use of our resources, but by virtue of
the fact that we were eventually able to
overwhelm a nation possessing only one-
tenth of our resources. .
Opponents of unification are today
seeking to perpetuate the independent
?status no enjoyed by ? our separate de-
fense departments at the cost of the
American taxpayer and at the risk of our
national security. It 4s our responsi-
bility, 'Mr. Chairman, to prevent tradi-
tion and our past great victory from
obscuring the need for constructive mili-
tary reorganization offered by the pend-
ing legislation.
Mr. Chairman, no chain is stronger
than its weakest link. No one branch
of our armed services won this war. All
of -them did an excellent job and there
is enough credit and renown to go to
each one of them. -We should not fail
to see .the forest because of the trees.
For our future defense I think we should
place the greatest emphasis upon the
most important bratches.
Mr. Chairmancore
eil;,492.,,mt_wp
f r11 vole?a7dRitt,ate
s or our Air Corps, for OUT Ceaal?,
re.?---,x441-ChasbeenT-Irriettably
for scre-riMenfarEfrh?alid?
ganological . development. These are
the things above all others which will
guarantee our security.
Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I yield
.5 minutes to the gentleman from Penn-
sylvania [Mr. JENKINS].
Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I ,
make the point of order that there Is
not a quorum present. This is impor-
tant legislation and the Members should
be. here to listen to this debate.
?3
Mr. Chairman, two glaring deficiencies
existed in the Japanese military organ-
ization. First, there was no unity of
command either in Japan or in her sev-
eral theaters of operations. Second,
Japanese air power was divided between.
two uncooperating surface forces which
prevented the concentration of this air
power during critical phases of the Pa-
cific war.
?
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CON
.GRT,SSION L .1.-EC3-11D-HOUSE
. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will
count,. LA:ter counting.] One hun-
dred and nineteen Members aro present,
a quorum.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Jmnenus] is recognized..
Mr. JENKINS of Pennsylvania. Mr.'
Chairman, a good many years ago as a
'small boy I remember reading in the
first Jungle Book by Kipling, the so-
called Maxims of BalOo. One .pf those.
maxims, if my memory serves me cor-
rectly, went something like this: ,
"There is none like to me," saith the cub
lb the pride of his earliest kill,
But the jungle is large,
And the cub, he is small;
Let him think, and be still.
In my rather brief experience as a
junior Member of this House I have tried
to bear in mind that maxim and avoid
talking about things about. which I knew
nothing and with which I had no expe-
rience. With respect, however, to the
bill now pending before this House I
think I have some little experience
gained as a result of 22 Years in the
armed services in one- form or another,.
some 5 of them in the last engagement,
a year and a half of which was spent
abroad. As a result of that experience
I have become so thoroughly convinced
of the need for unification of the .armed
services that as a member of this com-
mittee, and as a Member of this House,
I want to add my voice to the voices of -
all the other 'people who have spoken,
to urge the House with all the sincerity
and force at inY? command to enatt this
legira hon.
I Laid I had had sonic 'experience.
There are many in this House who have
had longer and broader experience than
I, 'out I believe most of them are united
upon ehe general 'proposition that there
retie.; be unity of command in our armed
forus if victory is to be won in the case
of any other war in which we may un-
hapaily have to engage.
e:ch as been said, in the words of
some of the distinguished gentlemen
who have preceded me, of the necessity
for unified command in the field, and of
the icons of World War I and World
-War I. We did not have unification
nab coordination to begin with. The.
memory of Pearl Harbor and what hap-
Pened there is still fresh and green in
our minds. But memories, as men .grow
older, haae a tendency to fade away, to
dim out; and the memory of Pearl Har-
t; ea and the cause of the disaster of
.1-1.!:-.C-002 and the compelling urgen-
cy 7.::_at was there shown for the kind of
unification of our armed services that.
is embodied in this bill may likewise have
a tendency to fade away. We human
.lags have a tendency to put off doing
t thing we recognize as necessary un-
til a rrich?e propitious day. There will
never he a more propitious day to do the
thing that has to be done now, than to-
day, when .a.le memory' of .all that has
happened is still with us and whenothe
reasons for what has to be done are still
'aitia. us. Every one who has taken part
in.the operai.ion of this or any other con-
flict, particularly this last one, recog-
nizes the fact war and combat are no
longer confined to the, sea or the land or
Approved For R
JULY 19
the air, but thAt war has become a tri- ? /could not last 3 weeks in a war with
dimensial mater. It requires the co- America. The Government in Washing-
ordination of all three of those elements 1 ton was stunned and shocked beyond be-
of our armed forces and 'the 'use of all lief when it suddenly realized that Paris
three of those media of combat, land, and France would fall.
sea and air. An important Member of the other
Mr. Chairman, I urge the passage of body, who is still serving in that body,
this bill at this time, as I have said, with said that a few bombs on Tokyo would
all. the force which I can bring to it. tknock them out of the war. What a
The CHAIRMAN. .The time of the !woeful lack of intelligence as to the p0-
gentleman from Pennsylvania has ex- tential power of our enemies. People
pired. were saying that Mussolini would not
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, f attack; that he was only bluffing.
I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from J Around the world there was a total lack
South Carolina [Mr.' Doing]. of knowledge of those forces that were
Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, we have marshalling to destroy American democ-
spent a considerable time and a lot of
effort on this bill. May I pay tribute to
the chairman of the committee and to
those in charge of the hearings for giv-
ing the younger and the freshmen mem-
bers of the committee' every opportunity
to express themselves on this bill. We
have had that opportunity, and for my
part I certainly appreciate it. The bill
while not exactly perfect is a forward
step in the right direction in connection
with the unification of our armed serv-
ices.
Mr. Chairman, I hope you will pardon
a personal reference when I say my
mother had more sons in the service at
one time than any woman in South Caro-.
lina in World War II. They served in
most every ,branch of the service. It
was my privilege to be at the headquar-
ters in. London before the invasion of
Europe, also at General Bradley's head-
quarters in northern France, the head-
quarters of the Ninth Army. I saw uni-
fication in operation there, and it worked
beautifully. Unification of operation in
Europe was one of the first and most
essential, things that General Eisenhower
and those in command realized was
necessary for the successful prosecution
of the war. That was true not only in
Europe but in the Pacific as well.
To those who have made the charge
here today of dictatorship, I would like
to say and remind the committee that
never in the history Of the world has a
man maintained a successful dictator-
ship over any country without substan-
tial backing from the people. The only
danger under our American form of gov-
ernment for a dictatorship, and I believe
it is the only danger, is through the
President of the United States. That has
been at times and might be in the future
a real potential danger; but never from
a Secretary of National Defense as cre-
ated under this bill. He has no right,
under this bill, to go out and build up a
propaganda machine' throughout the
country and solicit popular support.
Mr. Chairman, one of the most impor-
tant features of this bill is the Central
Intelligence Agency. I would like for you
to turn back with me this afternoon to
the most terrible period preceding World
War II. Why, you had most of the news-
papers and people in this country think-
ing that Adolf Hitler was a comic char-
acter, that a war in Europe could not
last through the winter?I remember
those editorials quite well?that Ger-
many would not last through the winter
of 1939. I remember officers of the Navy
coming back from observation posts in
the Pacific and saying that tehan6if 6Abdihadgioei bad to go to the
lease 2003/05/06 : CIA-RDP - 61 -
racy. I tell you gentlemen of the com-
mittee that your central intelligence,
agency is a very important part of this
bill.
Let me say a few words about plan-
ning, development, and research. As
long as America stays. ahead of any po-
tential enemy in the field of develop-
ment and research, then you are that
much removed from the danger of a fu-
ture war. No nation will attack this
country if they know we are ahead of
them in the field of research and de-
velopment of military equipment and
future devices to be used by our armed
forces. Then, gentlemen of the com-
mittee, what about the Air Force? Let
me say this to you, that General Koller,
- the deputy commander of the air force
of Germany, after the' defeat of Ger-
many, made this most significant state-
ment. He said that the nation of the
future that has the greatest air force in
the world will dominate the seas of the
world, will dominate the land of the
world, Will dominate the air over the
world; yes, he said that the nation with
-the greatest air force will dominate the
,world. He said, "We are decimated and
eliminated, but it will be interesting to.?
watch the power politics of the future
among the great powers to see if the old
mistake will be made over and over
again." I think that is a very significant
statement and one that the gentlemen
of this Congress might heed in any fu-
ture policy toward our 'Military Estab-
lishment. Gentlemen of the committee,
the Air Force is charged with the defense
of this country; on land and sea and the
air. If they are charged with that re-
sponsibility, then why not give them the
authority to do it? This bill does not
set am a separate air force. It only
creates an air force on a parity with your
Army and your. Navy. What man in
this committee today knowe but what to-.
night or any night in the future there
might come out of the mist of the North
Sea, the North Atlantic, or over the
North Pole, where there are no railroads,
where there are no sea lanes, an attack
against our country? What defense
have we got against that attack? Only
an air force on a, parity with your other
branches of the national defense, one
that can Meet the responsibility. . Give
them the authority, gentlemen of the
committee?today.
I need not go into the situation in
Europe and the Pacific during the war;
that is history with which you are well
acquainted, but I will say this, that if.
General Eisenhower, as he testified be-
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D?HGUSE 95S3
1947 CONGRESSIC
Third Army and beg General Patton for
ane use of leis air corps, if he had to beg
General Simpson for the use of his air-
a:r nes, if he had to go to the Seventh or
,t Army, if he had to go into the other
army groups and collect his air force, he
never could have stopped the German
arive during the Battle of the Bulge. As
authority for that, go to General von
nunstedt, the commander ,f the German
1?Jrces. He said that the air force by its
concentration of poWer in so short a
while on our forces and communications
during the Battle of the Bulge was the
cause of our defeat in that great battle.
So, you see the importance of an inde-
pendent air force. An airplane in 1938,
or thereabouts, flew from Japan, non-
stop, to San Francisco, a distance of over
5,000 miles. Why could they. not do it
during the war? Because 'their Air
Force had become subordinated to their
Navy and their ground force, and they
could hot even bomb the Mariannas,
which were nearby Japan, much less San
Francisco, which was 5,000 miles off.
That. shows what subordination of the
Air Force to the other branches of the
service can mean. I need not mention
how our Air Force was subordinated be-
fore the beginning of World War II.
Yes, Mr: Chairman, if we are going ,to
prepare for the future we haVe to do it
now. Very frankly, I have to live in the
future. My life is not- behind me but
before me. I am speaking for the youth
of the United States today. We want
adequate national defense. We demand
fa of this Congress. We solicit and ear-
nestly hope for your cooperation in pro-
tecting the welfare and security of the
people of this great country. The best
way to do it is through this ,unification
bill. That is one step in the right direc-
tion. There are many other measures
of national defense that I advocate, but
I will not mention them at this time.
.Thi a one bill that is before this commit-
tee today is a step in the right direction
toward defending this country.
The industry of America is concen-
Lrated mostly in nine cities or thereabout.
Are you going to throw those nine cities
open to a surprise attack from the north
or from somewhere else, someday, and
put America at a disadvantage? Let no
one kid you, if Japan had had the same
war potential that America had, we
would have lost-the war in 30 minutes at
Pearl Harbor. If they had had the same
.ndustrial output, they' could have fol-
lowed up that initial 'advantage, and we
would have been defeated. . In the next
war we will not have that added advan-
tage of time and distance.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield
10 minutes to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. COLE).
Mr. COLE of New York. ? Mr. Chair-
man, during the nearly 15 years in which
I have served here no problem has
caused me greater concern than this
whole question of merger, unification,
and consolidation of our Military Es-
tablishment. is it has raged throughout
our country for the last 3 or 4 years?' I
am happy to observe the continued and
progressive iihprovement of the approach
to a proper solution which will give to
the count::' !lie de a ? which
o e all hoa.:
My vievson tho c:
are more fully set for.11 ia Co1:3t,zs-
SIONAL RECCaD :or June 3G uncicr the re-
marks of the gentlemrm from Michigan
[Mr. HOFFMAN].
You will recall last summer the Pres-
ident recommended a merger of the
armed services by way of a single De-
partment of National Defense. Substan-
tial objection was made to that by a large
segment of our people an'd a large por-
tion of our Military Establishment, prin-
cipally the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Subsequently an agreement was reached
between the leading officials, both civil
, and military, of the two interested De- ?
partments and the three interested serv-
ices---air, land, and naval. That agree-
ment was submitted to the Congress by
way of a draft of legislation to enact into
law the terms of the agreement. The
agreement was a vast improvement over
the recommendation of the President as
Commander in Chief a year ago.
After: consideration by the Senate the
bill representing the -agreement, of the
services was adopted in a modified form.
_ As adopted by that body, it, too, repre-
sented, in my opinion, a substantial im-
provement over the agreement. Even-
tually the bill, at least the subject matter,
came up for consideration by the Com-
? mittee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments in the House. The bill
which that committee has recommended
for our consideration today is, in my
opinion, a vast improvement over the
bill as passed by the other body.
So, in the progressive evolution of the
legislative processes, the people are
gradually exercising their will over this
vital matter. I would remind you that
the responsibility for the organization
and maintenance of our Army and Navy
is not one which the Constitution places
upon the Commander in Chief. It is one
which is imposed upon the Congress, and,
the changes which have been made by
the Senate in the agreement as estab-
lished by the representatives of the Com-
mander in Chief and the changes that
have been recommended to the House
by this committee are in the proper
exercise of the constitutional responsi-
bility of the representatives in Congress
to organize, maintain, support, and pro-
vide for an army and navy.
Little did I think 6 months ago that it
Would be possible for me to stand here
in speaking on this subject to say that
I could say "amen" to everything which
my distinguished colleague the gentle-
/ man from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH]
' has said on the subject today. However,
as I listened to him very closely in his
' opening statement, I am frank to con-
fess to you that everything he said could
be reiterated by myself with complete
sincerity.
, Unfortunately, the bill as it is sub-
mitted does not expressly state the inter-
pretation which the gentleman from New
York [Mi'. War:lawmen-11 has placed upon
the authority of the Secretary of Na-
tional Defense. If the bill did state
: that and if it wrote into statutory form
the interpretation which he has placed
upon it, I am confident that the sub-
st antial fears ant apprehensions which
the people possess, whether justified or
not, would be removed. ?
I would call to your attention on page
6 where the authority of the Secretary
of National Defense is delineated it
categorically states that he shall exer-
cise general direction, authority, and
control over such departments and
agencies.
In an interpretation of that authority,
the gentleman from New York says that
he shall have the power "to direct proper
coordination" between the branches of
the services.
Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
.
I just want to call attention to the first
part of the sentence which controls this
grant of power on the proceding page.
Mr. COLE of New York. It is true that
except in two instances, which I hope to
point out, it is apparently the philosophy
of the committee recommending the bill
that this Secretary of Defense shall be
an umpire, a man to view the whole
problem, to resolve differences and dis-
putes and rivalries and duplications, and
all that sort of thing. With that, no-
body can disagree. But a striet inter-
pretation of the authority contained on
'page 6, line 3, together with another One
which I will point out in a moment,
destroys that interpretation.
The gentleman from New York, whom
I regard and I am sure all regard as the
last word on this problem has, as he
stated, wrestled with military problems
for many years, probably for as long or
nearly as long as I have lived, which is
quite some time. He speaks as an
authority in the interpretation of this
bill. He said that this Secretary of De-
fense should "bring about a certain de-
gree of coordination.' Again he said
the Defense Secretary should "bring
about coordination." If that is what is
intended, why riot write it in the book?
He pointed out that the bill gives to
the three ,individual departments au-
thority to run their own show. He said
the Secretary of War, the Secretary of
Navy, and the Secretary of Air Force
have complete control over the person-
nel of their own departments; that they
"have the right to hire and fire." If
that were true, nobody could take ex-
ception, but, unfortunately, the bill does
not say that. On page 7, at the bottom
of the page, it says that the Secretary of
Defense is authorized to appoint and fix
the' compensation of such other civilian
personnel as may be necessary for the
performance of the functions of the Na-
tional Military Establishment.
The bill later on sets up the National
Military Establishment as being those
three departments, plus the other agen-
cies, the Munitions Board, the Joint
Chiefs of 'Staff, Research . and Develop-
ment Board, War Council, and so forth.
Those are all parts of the National Mili-
tary Establishment over which, as, this
paragraph which I have just read, the
Secretary of Defense is given authority
to appoint the personnel. ?
Mr. WAD-SWORTH. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield? "
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.
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CONGIZESS1,;N:._ ? JULY 19
Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman
brings up an interesting point with ref-
erence to the bottom of page 7. It was
nat the intention of the authors of this
ac. cr of our committee to give any such.
pewee to the Secretary of Defense. It
was intended that this power to appoint
personnel. meant personnel in his own
Office. If there is any uncertainty about
the language as presently in the bill, I
'might suggest that the gentleman offer
an amendment to strike out the words
"National Military Establishment", and
insert "functions of his office." That is.
what the committee intended. .
Mr. COLE of New York. Again I am
compelled to recognize the fairness of
the judgment of the gentleman from
New Yoraz [Mr. WADSWORTH] in his in-
terpretation of the functions of this Sec-
retary of Defense.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE]
has expired.
HOLIFIELD.? Mr. Chairman, I
yield the gentleman five additional
minutes. .
MT. Co72 of New York. Much as I
approve :t tern of unification' under
? the Sedre .r,17-y of Defense as it has been
explained by those in support of it, I
cannot let this opportunity pass without
expressing rather briefly and hurriedly
my deep feeling ori the question of the
advisability of establishing a separate
Department of Air. I doubt very much
if anybody will argue that a new civil
department of goVernment will result in
any economy. Whether or not econo-
mies are elected, to my minds, is second-
ary in importance. It would be worth.
while to spend that extra money if by
having another department our
taay efficiency could thereby be enhanced,
because the goal that we all seek is the
.absolute security of our country. How-
ever, to my mind, .our security is seri-
ously jeopardized when we set up this
new Department of Air.
. It was not until this last 'war that the
use of air in military operations estab-
lished itself. I think we all agree now,
at least it is my view, that of the three
elements of the earth?land, water, and
air?air is the most effective and potent
for use in military operations. Yet here
we are taking away from our land forces
and our naval forces th. -.Ise of that ele-
ment of the earth, the use of the air, in
carrying out military operations, and
are setting it off on the side as an inde-
pendent function of the military. The
proper way to do it, in my opinion, would
be to have both the land forces and the
water forces have available to themselves
the complete and unrestricted use of air
in their military operations. The use
of air should dominate our land forces.--
The use of air shoald predominate our
naval forces. Oa 1.-x.a forces in the
fature will be supplementary to air force'
as will the use of naval forces.- Our land_
and naval forces will be used to support
and supplement what is done in the air.
The theory of this bill in taking away
from our land and naval forces the Use of
air and establishing an air force off by
itself is a tragic Mistake.
Then again, from a pi'actical stand-
point, what are we going to do with the
people who op:ran the planes of 'this
independent department of air, this in-
dependent air force? It is well kncwn
that when an aviator rL7iches the age
of 30 or 32 his usefulness as an active
aviator is terrninC,ted. Where are we
going to put them? They cannot all be
majors, colonels, or generals; they can-
not all sit arcund the council table mak-
ing policies. It must inevitably mean
that when these men reach the age of
30 or 35 thy are going to have to be
turned back to civil life either on the
pension rolls of the Government or with
a bonus of some sort to permit them to
adjust themselves into civil life.
The same thing can be accomplished
by giving recognition to the Air Force
? which its importance justifies?by weld-
? ing into our land forces the use of air
the same as the Navy has welded into its
operations the use of air during naval
.operations. I recognize, however, the
futility of trying to persuade this Con-
gress of the inadvisability of -creating a
new, department of the air. Recogniz-
ing that futility, I have then set about to
preserve, if I ,could, to the naval forces
the use of air in all aspects of naval
- operations. After consultation with the
members of the committee, they have
agreed that the Navy shall retain the-
right to use the air in all its naval aspects
and an appropriate amendment has been
prepared which will be offered for adop-
tion at the proper time. -
Furthermore, I am impelled to state
my conviction that the creation of a sepa-
? rate department of air and a separate
air force as a part of the Military Estab-
lishment of the Government is without
authority under the Constitution. Time
--does not permit an amplification of that
position at this time, but a reference to
my- statement before the Committee on
Expenditures on June 30 discloses the
reasons for my firm belief that the por-
- tion of this bill relating to an independ-
ent air force is unconstitutional.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York has-expired.
? Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield such time as he may desire to the
gentleman from New York [Mr.CHURCH].
[Mr. CHURCH addressed the Commit-
tee. His remarks will appear hereafter
in the Appendix.]
? (Mr. CHURCH asked and was given
permission to revise and _ extend his
', remarks.)
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
:yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from.
Illinois [Mr. PRICE]. '
(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman,
among the arguments that have been
advanced by opponents of the proposed
National Security Act of 1947, no argu-
ment is based on so great a misunder-
standing of the act itself or of modern
warfare as the argument that the estab-
lishment of a coequal Air Force means
disunification. It is the contention of
those, who advance this argument, that
the establishment of another depart-
ment, the United States Air Forces, would
remove from the Army a Well coordinated
and integrated unit of the Army. --
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Under this bill, we have -a splendid
team consisting of a Navy, an Army,
and an Air Force. Each of these forces
fight in a different medium, the Army
on the ground, the Navy in the sea, and
the Air Forces in the air. The Air Forces
has won its "place in the- sun," and it
must not be denied its proper recogni-
tion; back in World War 1, when military
aviation was a part of the Signal Corps,
it was used primarily for reconnaissance.
At that time, it was argued, and with
some reason, that air power must be
coordinated wi.a. and integrated into our
Army Establishment. At that time, mil-
itary aviation was locked on as a "num-
ber of airplanes." Later. development
proved that aviation was . a force and
it justly took its place with the other
forces?ground forces and sea forces.
Today, no one who has studied the-mat-
ter would contend that the air shauld
be integrated into the Army Esta"ash-
ment. This does not apply to naval
aviation. The Navy wants and should
have its carrier borne aviation. It is
a part of a very important part of the
fleet.
On the eve of World War II, it was
a proper understanding of air power
that caused our military leaders to es-
tablish the Army. Air Forces as a single
command.- This action reconciled the
differences between the General Head-
quarters Air Forces and the Air Corps;
that is, between the combat and the ad-
ministrative branches of our air arm as.
it then existed. It was an understand-
ing of air power that led the War De-
partment to state as a primary principle
h
The Army Air Forces must be provided
with the maximum degree of autonomy per-
mitted 1,y law without permitting the crea-
tion of unwarranted duplication in the func-
tions of service, supply, and administration.
The proposed National Security Act
of 1947 assures autonomy that is au-
thorized by law and is itself designed
as a law that recca nzes? the needs of
the National Defense Establishment in
this air age.
An air force is not one branch of avia-
tion, but many. It consists of strategic
units, tactical Air Force units, recon-
naissance, troop-carrier units, and air-
transportation units. The section of the
National Security Act of 1947, which es-
tablishes the United States Air Forces
does not bring to an end the excellent
cooperation between the Army and the
Air Forces. It establishes an air force
as an organization, coordinate and co-
equal with the land and naval forces.
In the European theater, General Eis-
enhower had Ground Force-commanders
and Air Force commanders. In that the-
ater, there actually existed coequal land
and Air Forces. As he testified before
the . committee, this was an ideal ar-
rangement. He did not want the air
units integrated into the various ground
commands. He wanted to us all the Air
Forces, both English and American, in
one place at one time- when the situa-
tion called for that use.
Three jobs are always present for the
Air Forces in a theater, one the destruc-
tion or neutralization of hostile air. The
destruction will give freedom of move-
ment to our Ground and Air Forces.
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1947 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-ROUSE
The second is the disruption of hostile
lines of communication, such as rail-
roads. This disruPtion of lines of com-
munication is not in direct support of
the Ground Forces, but if the enemy
runs out of food and ammunition, he is
no longer a first-class enemy. The third
is air action in the battle ?proiSer; im-
mediate and in close cooperation with
the Ground Forces.
During the invasion of Normandy,
there was splendid coordination with
ground, air, and sea power.
During that same invasion air power
was also used in coordination with
ground and sea power. Our Allied air
Power had driven the German Air Force ?
from the skies, and achieved mastery of
the air over England, over the English
Channel, and over France. We could
concentrate troops and supplies in Eng-
land, and ships in English ports, with-
out fear of having them attacked and
destroyed by German air power. Our
Allied air power flew protective cover
over the invasion armadas that crossed
the Channel, and over the ground forces
that stormed the beaches. And I would
add here that the. success of that tri-
partite operation was made possible be-
cause the principle of unification was
recognized when ? the direction of the
over-all operation was placed? in the
hands of one man, that great general,
Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Air power was used many times during
World War II in support of ground op-
erations. On D-day. plus 48, when the
spectacular break-through at St. Lo tore
a great hole in the German defenses, and
General Patton's Third Army plunged
through the gap and started its drive to
the west wall, the break-through was
covered by air power?tactical Air Force
operations?which prevented the devel-
opment of serious opposition to the prog-
ress of the armored columns, which pro=
tected the, long, exposed flank of the
Third Army, and which assisted the ad-
vance of the ground forces by direct co-
op.:ratio' ? When the German Army was
ca,12;ht a Falaise pocket, it was splen-
did air and ground cooperation that took
that army apart. True, some troops
escaped, but they lost all their equip,. ?
merit and most of the units lost their '
fighting efficiency.
Lnyone who recalls the Victories of
our armies in World War II can cite
numerous other instances of the. tactical
use of air power, in employment with
ground power and naval power, in cover-
ing invasions, . covering advances, and
softening up enemy opposition.
But it is not such tactical use of air
power that makes air power a unique
weapon, new to military' warfare and
new to history, and that justifies the?
plea of air leaders for an autonomous
air force. The use of air power that, is
unique is the strategic use, in which air
power operates alone, without ground
or naval support; and beyond these areas
in which ground or sea forces can .oper-
ate.
When our Eighth Air Force bombed
. Berlin from bases in England, when our
Twentieth Air Force burned Tokyo and
?dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki from- planes based in the dis-
tant Marianas, power was employed
strategically in a way in which no other
power has ever been used.
, Today we face the possibility of attack
by long-range bombers, carrying. atomic
weapons from bases in Europe or Asia
across the Arctic regions and the North
Pole. The routes from such bases to the
industrial centers of the United States
lead across the Arctic regions because
those are the shortest routes. But those
are routes closed to land vehicles or sea
vehicles. And they lead across regions
in which, if only air power can attack us,
it follows that only air power can defend
us.
?
Strategic bombardment by air power
is the most powerful weapon of war thus-
far produced because it operates with
freedom and with economy of force im-
possible to any other weapon. Air power
can focus its total strength, which may
be based over a wide area, with a speed
and an ease impossible to any other force.
Air power can select for destruction
those targets most vital to the enemy's
war economy, no matter, where located.
To air power the perimeter defenses of a
nation are as nothing, and are to be by-
passed or ignored, as the tactical situa-
tion warrants. Strategic air power,
striking at the very heart of an enemy
land and at the war industry of an enemy
country, does not seek to destroy an
enemy's armed forces, or to capture
enemy territory, so much as it seeks to
paralyze the enemy.. That is why air
power could so reduce the industrial po-
tential of Japan that she surrendered
unconditionally 'with her armies unde-
feated in major engagements and in
control of nearly 3,000,000 square miles of
land populated by 500,000,000 people.
Here was a defeat unparalleled in his-
tory, and for the first time in history an
invading army possessed a conquered
land without firing a shot.
The United States Air Force which the
National Security Act of 1947 would es-
tablish is an organization to employ air
power as only air power can be einployed.
Some opponents of the legislation now
under consideration raise the question
of the constitutionality of a separate
Air Force pointing out that the Constitu-
tion defines Congress' power to "raise
and support armies; to provide and main-
tain a Navy."
If the framers of the Constitution of
the United States did not provide for
such an Air Force, surely they are not to
be blamed for lack of prophetic vision,
but why should their descendant be
penalized because their forefathers
? lacked it? The National Security Act of
. 1947 seeks to give us an Air Force worthy
-to, employ the great air power that we
have developed.
The Secretary of-the Navy, the Honor-
able James Forrestal, and the Secretary
of War, the Honorable Robert P. Patter-
son, in indicating their joint endorse-
ment of the proposed legislation, sub-
mitted to the President a ? mutually
agreed draft of an executive order to be
issued concurrently with' executive ap-
proval of the proposed legislation, -if and
when passed by Congress. The proposed
executive order defines affirmatively the
intention of our military leaders to con-
50 01-0
958;
tinue the employment of air power in
ground and naval operations. Of the
functions of the United States Army the
proposed Executive order says specifi-
cally:
The United States Army includes land
combat and service forces and such aviation'
and water transport as may be organic.
therein.
Of the functions of the United States
Navy the proposed Executive order says
specifically:
The united States Navy includes naval
combat and service forces, naval aviation,
and the United States Marine Corps.
And of the United States Air Force the
same order says:
The United S6tes Air Force includes all
military. aviation forces, both combat and ?
service, not otherwise specifically assigned.
The proposed Executive order states
explicitly what is implicit in the National
Security Act. Aviation is not removed
from the Navy, but an Air Force is estab-
lished to employ air power in those ways
in which only an Air Force can use it.
Many times in recent years we have
heard the phrase "one world" and as we
have watched the development of avia-
tion make that world seem smaller, and
transportation about it grow increasingly
easy, rapid, and frequent, we must have
been struck by the fact that military ac-
tion in that world?if it still be needed?
must be conducted by one, not by three
armed forces.
World War II was the first war in his-
tory to be a global war: it was fought in
Alaska and in Australia, in Europe and
in Africa, in the Atlantic as in the Pa-
cific; and but for certain happenings
most favorable to our interests, it might
well have been fought in the United
States.
As a global war, fought on land, on the
sea, and in the air, that war was- won
by unified command in the theaters of -
operations. Sometimes the theater corn-
-mander was an Army general, sometimes
a Navy admiral, sometimes an Air-gen-
eral. Sometimes the commander was
British, sometimes American. But who-
ever he was, whatever he was, supreme
command was his, and there was coordi-
nation of operations.
What the National Security Ad of
1947 seeks to insure is administrative
unity of direction, at the' seatof our Gov-
ernment, comparable to the unity of di-
rection, in the theaters of operation, that
was necessary for the successful conclu-
sion of the war.
As such, it is administrative unity, in
the interest of coordinating the total war
effort of the Nation, because in addition
to putting an Army, a Navy and an Air
Force under the direction of a single ad-
ministrative Secretary of Defense, it
places a War Council, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Munitions Board, a Research '
and DevelopmentBoard, the Centralin-
elligence Agency, and -other such de:
p i."-f
en s n-re National Defense
Establishment. - ---
Such an act as this under considera-
tion will result in a definite, well-thought.
out procedure for the allocation of our
avdilable supply of military manpower
and military Material. It will produce
economy, in that it will eliminate dupli-
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C NixR: 3 ..i".`..?.2LA E :".)17D-1-10U SE JULY 19
cation of facilities. And it will estab-
lish an intelligent policy with respect to
our diminishing reserves of raw materi-
als of all kinds.
Such an act abolishes nothing in our
military establishment, because the pur-
pose cf the act is not a negative one, but
a positive one. It guarantees the con-
tinuation of the Navy, and *of naval avia-
tion, and of the Marine Corps. It pre-
serves the historic services, including the
United States Coast Guard, With all the
healthy rivalry that creates-,the. "esprit
de corps" that is the life of any service.
In one sense the proposed act does not
so much create an air force as to estab-
lish by congressional act the air force.
that already exis ?thanks to a patch-
work of previou., congressional action,
Executive Order, and War. Department
Circulars.
Finally, the proposed act recognizes
the principle of management, control
that is essential in the operation of any
successful modern business. Surely in
this ? war-weary world there is no busi-
ness of greater importance to the. wel-
fare of all of us than the maintenance
of an efficient military organization that
. will be strong enough to guarantee our
national security, and to preserve the
peace.
It is to increase the efficiency of the
military organization which we now have
that the National Security Act of 1947,
has been proposed.
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the Constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly
aciap-::ed' to that end, which are not pro-
hibited, but consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional,
y. Maryland (4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.
579).)
In
United States v. Stenhens (245 Fed.
955;, affirmed in 247 U. S. 504,62 L. ed.
1239, 33 S. Ct. 579), the. court said:
The power of Congress to raise armies, like
the power to declare war, is unconditional,
unqualified and absolute; and Congress is
the exclusive judge of the necessity for the
exercise of the power and of the powers and
of the means and manner prescribed by it
for its exercise.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Massachusetts (Mrs. ROGERS].
? (Mrs. ROGMS of Massachusetts asked
and was' given permission to revise and
extent: her remarks.)
Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr..
Chairman, we ? have before us a bill to
promote the national security of the
United States. We all wonder today
whether this bill will promote the se-
curity of the United States. I have'
carefully listened to the debate today.
I have followed the .debate somewhat in
the Senate, as well as in the committees
of both bodies, but, Mr. Chairman, unless
the hill- is changed, I cannot vote for it.
I speak as one, Mr. Chairman, who has
been in Washington since 1913. ?I have
followed legislation for national defense
during ''l those years,. and after coming
to Col'. ? .s in 1925, Mr. Chairman, I
have voted for every measure that I
- thought would promote national defense.
All during that time, Mr. Chairman, I
have always analyzed why measures are
-brought to the itko. 4 8apeoplikt4
analyzed .in v..ay r presented
to the mniniti,,,;,;s anti to iho 2-louse.
I remember that s:-.1-ne 20 years ago a
merger bill was passed ii: the Senate but
defeated in the House. Last year a
merger bill was introduced but not
brought to action in the Eouse. What is.
the difference, Mr. Ch-.1:man, between a
merger bill and a unification bill? - The
dictionary says that to merge is to unite,
and to unite is to merge.
Why has the Navy changed its mind?
? ? Mr. Chairman, last year the Secretary'
of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, was against
the merger bill. Admiral Nimitz was
also against the merger bill, I recollect.
Why this change of mind and thought
and heart?
There was a conference?I do not re-
member the exact date?and the Army,
the Navy, and the State Department got
together. There was a compromise, and
we know that in the House when you
have a compromise, somebody always
loses. In this instance it was the Navy
that lost. It was' .the Navy that sur-
rendered. The Navy saved nothing. I
venture to say that today many in the
Navy do not want this unification bill.
To the Navy, it is the same bill that was
called the merger bill last year. Chang-
ing the name does not change the nature
of the bill.
Let us go back into the past history of
our country and the glorious battles that
our Navy has won. It never has lost.
It never surrendered. We do not want
it to lose . a battle -ever. The House
knows as well as I do that no nation that
has a defense plan such as is before us
in this bill or a similar mode of pro-
cedure has ever won a war, and the
United States has never lost a war. The
Navy has always been our pride. It it one
' great asset we have today. No other
country has a great navy. Russia has
a great army?millions of men. Russia
has no navy. Our Navy must not be
weakened as it will be under this urn-
, fication. In all its glorious history our
Navy has never surrendered. In this
bill our Navy has surrendered. - Last
Wednesday theNew York Times Anthony
Leviero wrote that reliable reports state
-that Secretary of War Patterson will re-
sign and Mr. Kenneth Royall will be
made Secretary of War under the new
bill. Mr. Forrestal, he prophesies, will.be
made Secretary of National Security
and Mr. Stuart Symington would be.
made the head of the Department of Air
Force. All these men testified and in-
sisted that the unification be passed.
Today comes the announcement Of Mr.,
Patterson's resignation as Secretary of
War and Mr. ROyall's appointment to
that position?apparently, the first step
in the proposed. unification set-up.
The article in the New York Tunes is as
follows: ?
PATTERSON REPORTED QUITTING, FORRESTAL DUE
TO RULE Ames?WAR CHIEF IS SLATED TO
GO AFTER UNIFYING OF FORCES?NAVY HEAD'S
APPOINTMENT AS SECURITY SECRETARY PRE-
DICTED
(By Anthony Leviero)
Other reliable reports carried assurances
that Secretary of. the Navy James Forrestal
would -be elevated to Secretary of National
Security, the powerful new position which
would give him control not only of the armed
forces but of all the other war-making agen-
cies and potentials of the country.
Unification of the Army and Navy and a
new Department of the Air Force are now
accepted as foregone conclusiong by the end
of this month, and it was report&.1 that the
shuffling of key personnel was about com-
plete.
W. Stuart Symington, the Assistant Sec-
retary of War for Air, was said to he slated
to head the Department of the Air Force.
Thus he would have a stattis equal. to the
Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of
the Navy, as those posts are designated in
the unification bill recently passed by, the
Senate. -
John L. Sullivan, the Under Secretary of
the Navy, is slated to succeed Mr. Forrestal,
and it was said that Kenneth C. Royall, the
Under Secretary of War, would- move into
Mr. Patterson's position. ?
The Army Air Forces emancipated as an,
independent 'unit equivalent to the Army
and Navy, would be renamed the United
States Air Force- under the bill, with Gen.
Carl Spaatz, remaining at the top.
. It was -said that other candidates besides
Mr. Forrestal had been recommended to
President Truman for the top position in the
unified defense establishment. Two of these
were Dr. Vannevar Bush, director of the
Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment and wartime coordinator of this coun-
try's scientific efforts, including develop-
ment of the atomic bomb; and Representa-
tive JAMES WADSWORTH, Of NOW York, a man
held in high regard in all quarters for his
statczmanlike qualities and for his intense
'interest in national-defense problems.
Nevertheless there was no indicalon that
Mr. Forrestal intended to resign after 7 years
of tenure during which he has, served as
Assistant Secretary, Under Secretary, and
Secretary of the Navy. This was accepted
as additional evidence that he was the lead-
ing candidate for the high post.-
NAVY CIRCLES BACK CHIEF
The appointment of Mr. Forrestal is espe-
cially desired by those who still harbor fears
that the Navy might be relegated to a sub-
ordinate- status in the radical reorganization
of the defense system. ?
Mr. Forrestal resolutely opposed unifica-
tion legislation which the Army Sponsored,
lastiyear and which critics denounced as a
measure which would give the Army pre-
dominant influence. That bill would have
provided for a Single-Chief of Staff over all
three of the armed forces, and one Secretary.
Mr. Forrestal and other high Navy officials
agreed to the new comprothise unification
measure as one that would achiev.e coordi-
nation in the higher policy and military
levels without destroying the administrative
and operating autonomy, of the Army, Navy,
and- Air . Forces.
It Was reported that Secretary Patterson,
still called "judge" by his friends, eventually
Would receive one of the higher positions in
the. Federal judiciary; perhaps on the bench
of the United States Supreme Court when a
vacancy occurs.
PATTERSON FORMER JURIST
A Republican appointed and promoted in
*the Federal judiciary by the late President
Roosevelt, Mr. Patterson held an eminent
position on the bench of the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals in New York City. He was
called from that position '7 years ago by
WASFIINGTON, July 15.?Secretary of War ' Henry L. stimson, former Secretary Of War,
Robert P. Patterson was reported today 'to - to become Assistant Secretary of War.
have submitted his-resignation to President When the changes become effective the
Truman, to become effective as.soon as pos- . new secretary of War would have to fill the
sible after unification of the armed forces pOsition of Assistant Secretary of War, which'.
becRit . will be vacated 0-00 H C. Peters
waren on
o e as odv
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1947 CONGRESS"
ju:y 31., Mr. Petersen, who has supervised
Army occupation policy in enemy _countries,
L.nnounced his resignation yesterday, setting
in motion the changes which will occur
when the unification hill, reported out today
tho House Expenditures Committee, be-
comes law.
Mr. IVIANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from
lvlissouri [Mr. KARSTEN].
Mr. KARSTEN of Missouri. Mr.
Chairman, the question of unification of
the Army and Navy is not new. Various
merger and unification bills have been
before the Congress for many years and
the subject has been studied from time
to time. Since the conclusion of World
War II, the matter has received most se-
rious consideration by several of .the
committees of Congress.
, Perhaps many may have wondered
why a bill of this nature was considered
by th : Committee on Expenditures in the
Exec,..:Ive Departments rather than the
Committee on.Armed- Forces. Under the
Legislative Reorganization Act the spe-
cific jurisdiction of the Expenditures
Committee includes matters relating to
reorganizations in the executive branch
of the Government and the committee
has the further duty, among other
things, to study the operation of Govern-
ment activities at all levels with a view
to determining economy and efficiency.
For over 12 years I have been asso-
ciated with the Committee on Expendi-
tures in the Executive Departments. In
the many hearings and studies that have
been conducted by this committee
through ? the years, few measures have
been so thoroughly, discussed and de-
bated as the legislation we are now con-
sidering. In preparing this bill we have
had the benefit of hearings held by vari-
ous other committees and also the ad-
vantage of studying the bills that have
heretofore been presented.
Our hearings brought out three great
military lessons we learned from the re-
cent war:
First. No offensive operation, land, sea,
or air, can' be effectively and efficiently
"carried out without first neutralizing or
destroying the -- air operations of the
enemy.
- Second. There must be unity of com-
mand.
Third. Modern warfare moves at tre-
mendously high speeds. It is not static.
In dealing with these conditions it is.
toour advantage. to have a military or-
ganization of the greatest possible flex-
ibility. Our present two-department
system did not lend itself to the off en-
sive and defensive operations of the re-
cent war without substantial changes.
One of the first things we found out was
that in the execution of our military
strategy the success of a campaign can
best be accomplished where our forces
are grouped under one commander who
has the responsibility for that particu-
lar operation. At the Outset of the war,
we had two independent organizations.
As the war progressed we became in-
creasingly aware of the necessity of com-
bining the operations of both branches
to make an efficient fighting team. This
was done by a system of Army and Navy
coordinating committees. This ' struc-
ture, at best, was a makeshift one but
031aD?HOUSE 9587
the succ:.., o I.!, op. ,tocl?out
clearly c a cc.-Itral ...... !s much
better than d:vcrsifiet. inc:apendent
control.
The bill be:ore us calls for the uni-
fication of our armed services under one
Cabinet officer who will be known as the
Secretary of Defense. He will have as-
sistants in charge of air, sea, and land
forces. The most revolutionary step in
this proposal, and perhaps the most con-
troversial, is the establishment of an Air
-Force as a Division in our Military Es-
tablishment hu an equal footing with the
two other branches, the Army and Navy.
Modern warfare takes place in three
elements, the land, the sea, and the air.
'Air is an element just as much as the
sea or the land.
Before the development of air power
we had an Army for land operations and
a Navy for sea operations. Each organ-'
ization operated in its respective ele-
ment. Each became specialists of mili-
tary science as applied to that element.
I believe most of us will concede that
the airplane itself is a weapon. So is
a battleship. But each operates in dif-
ferent elements. In the development of
our Navy, it certainly cannot be con-
tended that we built that branch of the
service around a weapon. The same is
true of the Air Force.
The establishment of an Air Force is
simply the recognition that military
operations in modern warfare operate
in three elements instead of two. It also
recognizes that the branches of the serv-
ice operating in these elements should
be specialists of the highest order.
It has been contended that this is not
a Unification bill because it provides for
three fighting units to operate within the
three elements. No legislation we might
write can dissolve the functions of these
three groups into one. Our objective in
this legislation is to tie together the com-
ponent units of our land, sea, and air
forces into an efficient fighting combina-
tion under the direction of a single co-
ordinating head.
Arguments have been advanced that
the Secretary of Defense will have more
power than has ever been given to an
elected individual.
At the present time, we, have 10 ex-
ecutive departments, each headed by a
Cabinet officer. Our Military and Naval
Establishments have two Cabinet of-
ficers. To my mind, it would be just as
logical to have two Secretaries repre-
senting the Interior Department or the
Agriculture Department in the Presi-
dent's Cabinet. It takes no immigration
to realize the confusion that would cause.
The President is the Commander in
Chief of our armed forces. The defense
of our country is only one of the many of
his duties. The duty of the Secretary of
Defense will be to take over some' of the
President's work and give him more time
to spend on other obligations. The
power and duties of the Secretary of De-
fense are clearly defined in the bill. He
will be primarily responsible to the Presi-
dent, the same as any other member of
'the Cabinet. ?
It is my opinion that this bill will re-
sult in substantial savings and bring
about efficiency in the operation of our
defense establishment. It is true the in-
itial installation of this, system will in-
volve some expenditures. According to
computations I have made, the annual
additional salaries will roughly amount
to a figure below a million dollars. It
would be impossible to say exacly because
there will be variation in organization
which will determine that. Let us say
that housing will cost an additional mil-.
lion dollars. Roughly, this would in-
crease our military budget by $2,000,000
for the first year of operation.
The military budget for the current
year is approximately $10,000,000,000.
Two million dollars is two one-hun-
dredths of 1 percent of that budget. If
we can save 1 percent on the over-all
budget, and I believe the legislation will
accomplish much more than that, we
will save about $100,000,000, which...is fifty
times the initial cost.
Economies can be effected in many
ways. ?-We can begin with the elimina-
tion of _waste and the? duplication of
functions which exist all through the
service. Great economy can be b.. '
about through uniformity of equi...
Savings can be brought about' in pro-
curement, maintenance, supply and op-
erations. Further and perhaps more
important, substantial 'economies can
be effected by assuring that expenditures
.of funds are for the most modern and
effective types of equipment and by the
financing of each branch of the service
according to its value ,as an offensive or
defensive agency.
Many will say that it is not economy
we are looking for but that it is national
security. That, I agree, is the primary
consideration but we can hardly have an,
effective and efficient military organi-
zation without naturally bringing about
economies. Economy is an incidental
objective but is one that we should not
overlook.
In support of this bill there has been
an imposing array Of. Government offi-
cials and organizations, including the
President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the
Navy, the, Assistant and Under Secre-
taries of War and Navy, the Chief of
Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Commanding General
of the Army Air Forces, the Compton
Commission, the Strategic Bombing
Survey, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
special -committee to study this prob-
lem.
? The bill before us is a good one. While
it is perhaps not. the last word, I hon-
estly feel it will give us the greatest pos-
sible offensive and defensive military
power per dollar spent. It is a definite
step in the right direction and I ..ope it
will be passed without weakening altera-
tions.
Mr. HOFF1VIAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. CROW].
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I make
the point of order that a quorugi is not
present.
The CHAIRMAN (Mr. HALE) . ? The
Chair will count:
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I with-
draw the point of order.
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588
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman
from Pennsylvania [Mr. CROW] is rec-
ognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CROW. Mr. Chairman, I wish to
go an record in favor of the unification
of the armed forces bill, H. R. 4214, as
reported out of the Committee on Ex-
pen.'fiaires in the Executive Depart-
ments. I have had an opportunity to
read over the Senate bill 753 which pro-
vides for the same unification and I be-
lieve that the committee of the House
has prepared a better bill and we of the
House should pass House bill 4214.
served in the Army during the last
war and had the opportunity to observe
the need for such legislation by being
overseas early in the war and seeing with
my own eyes the lack of cooperation' be
tween the services. I arrived in the
Pacific area on March 14, 1042, about 3
months after Pearl Harbor and I served
in that area until the conclusion of the
' war. Admiral Ninaitz was assigned to
the Pacific in command of the Navy and
General Richardson was assigned in
command of the Army. The Navy had
four stars and the Army only three stars
and therefore the Navy was in command
of the operations in the Pacific area.
There was a great amount of jealousy of
command in the Pacific and the same
will continue to' exist unless legislation
of this type is adopted.
Mr. Chairman, although I was not
present in the Pacific at the time of Pearl
Harbor, I am sure that if we had been or-
ganized as set out in the unification-bill
the losses at Pearl Harbor would not have
been so great. From information re
ceived I learned that the' Navy and Army
commanders were not working together
aid information available to one was not
conveyed to the other branch. The Army'
at the time was working under an alert
that was only to take precautions against
sabotage and they were guarding their
vital installations. The fault of the
error has not 'been- definitely placed but
I am sure that had we had a joint staff
in command of the Pacific area, as is pro-
vided for in this legislation, the informa-
tion would have. been properly distrib-
uted so that a proper defense could have
been made. '
I do not see any place in this legislation ,
that would cause a,nyone to fear that
the Navy Department will be delegated
to a place of unimportance or will in any
way lose their identity 'as the United
States Navy. f also believe that the
marines are properly and adequately pro- ?
vided for so that they cannot be taken.
over by the Army or eliminated as a part
- of the Navy as Sr- people seem to fear.
Mr. Chair"--... :mow from experi-
ence that t-ic Command was of
utmost importance in the winning of the
last Great War and I am sure that the
unified command will work just as well
daring peacetime as it did during' the
war. I am not sure that any savings Will
be made by the unification of the armed
forces during peacetime?in fact it may
cost a little more?but the savings that
will be occasioned by the reorganization
being set up in case of another war will
more than offset the added expense at
this time. We are more interested M a
strong national defense than we are of
saving a few dollars at this time;
-2.13coaD?Housp JULY 19
hol.13 Mer::::e.rs of the House
will consider this bill carefully and ob-
serve -the advantages that will be derived
from the same. I urge the Members to
support this bill.
Mr. KEARNEY: Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
^ Mr. CROW. I gladly yield to the gen-
tleman from New York.
Mr. KEARNEY. I call the gentle-
man's attention to section 203, the De-
- partment of the Navy, subparagraph (c)
pertaining to the United States Marine
Corps. I was not a marine and I think
_I can ask this question in all fairness
to that great organization: Is there any-
thing in this bill that could eventually
allow the Secretary for Defense to re-
duce the Marine Corps to a skeleton or
' token force, a regiment or battalion, re-
gardless of the fact that under the law
the Marine Corps has a permanent four-
star general?
Mr. CROW. Personally, I do not see
anything in this 'legislation that would
authorize that. -What may happen in
the future I think none of us can abso-
lutely tell. I believe the general law
protects the existence of the Marines
in the future.
The CHAIRMAN. The of the
gentleman from Pennsylvania has ex-
pired.
? Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina [Mr. DURHAM].
Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise
particularly at this time to pay tribute
to a man who I believe had as much to
do with winning this war as any one
individual in America. On yesterday we
received notice through the press that he
, was leaving his post and going back into
civilian life.
For 71/2 years I had the pleasure of
? working with Judge Patterson as we Met
him in the Committee' on Military Af-
fairs. I have never in my life known
any than who took his job more seriously,
a man who devoted himself so entirely
to what he believed to be the defense
of his country.
He has my best wishes, and I believe
the best wishes of the whole 'committee.
He will be long remefribered by the men
who struggled with him in the .days that
were not so bright. The man to assume
his duties, Hon. Kenneth Royall, nomi-
nation has been sent to the Senate, a man
whom I have known all my life is equally
? as well-qualified and capable of carrying
out the responaibilities 'placed on him.
Mr. Chairman, in regard to the pending
legislation I have felt since the last
...World -War that some plan should be
evolved-that would unify the forces and
make for a more efficient national de-
fense. The idea started in the commit-
tee during the recent war by a group that
was interested in unifying the armed
forces.
We had the experience of traveling
throughout the country to the various
installations and we also had the expe-.
rience of seeing these thrown together-at
a time when we were faced with danger.
We were fully aware of the expense and
unnecessary, waste that came about. It
is therefore proper for this Congress to
begin thinking about trying to solve those
problems in a way that will not be as
wasteful as during World War II days.
I have always felt that' national de-
fense should be handled under a single
head. A'S far as I can determine, the
fear that has been expressed here today
by some that this measure will destroy
or will to some extent destroy certain
of our heretofore considered arms of our
national defense is without foundation.
I have no such fears. It is a complicated
organization and one that it is impossible-
for any committee to write the details of
so far as all of its functions are con-
cerned.
My' personal opinion is that this com-
mittee has rendered a very fine service to
the country in trying to place together
and unify our armed services. They
have done an excellent zd'a in seting
'up ale C'erifFaTIntelligence Agency, a so
the Army and Navy Munairloard
provision in the bill, section 302. That is
the one part, in my opinion, that would
do more to save and stop the unneces-
sary waste that went on during World
a War II. The provisions of this measure
-setting up a separate Air Corps is, in
my opinion, long 'overdue and I believe
this to be a wise decision. It being gen-
erally agreed now that air power is our
first line of defense, in which I concur.
It is proper and fitting that we fully
recognize this by setting up a separate
Ait Department.
(Mr. DURHAM asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. BATES].
Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. Mr.
Chairman, in the closing moments of this
discussion of what I consider to be one
of the most important pieces of legisla-
tion that has come before the Congress
over a period of years, I wish to express
my opinion as to some features of the
bill in light of the many years experience
I have had on the Naval Affairs Com-
mittee of the House and from my general
observation of things it' respect to the
operation of the armed forces. '
The questions of the merger of our
armed forces is not a new one so far as
Congress is concerned. About 15 years
ago the Congress had a bill before it,
the objective of which was to unify both
the Army and the Navy into a single
operating force. It is interesting to ob-
serve, as a prelude of what I am going to
say; what the attitude Of General Mac-
Arthur was at that tithe and his com-
ments on ? the then ionding legislation
for merging both the Army and the Navy.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur expressed his,
opinion on the measure then under con-
sideration by the Congress in the follow-
ing clear, unmistakable, and .emphatic
terms:
No other measure proposed in recent years ?
seems to me to be fraught with such poten-
tial possibilities of disaster for the United
States as is this one. '
Not only the military history of this coml.-
' try but of every country gives indisputable
?
proof of the advantages of maintainIng in
time of war the integral control of the two
great ? branches of national defense-,--the
Army and the Navy.
?
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1947 CONGRESSiON1 :RECO
I know of ,no responsible soldier or sailor
In the whole gamut of history who has advo-
csteci such a plan as is now proposed.
? ? ? such an amalgamation as pro-
posed would endanger victory for the United
States in case of war.
The super-Cabinet officer at its head could
not fail to be acquisitor of one of the largest
and undoubtedly the most powerful govern-
mental organizations the United States has
ever known. ? ? ? Rather than economy
this amalgamation would, in my opinion,
repre3ent one of the greatest debauches of
extravagance that any nation has ever known.
This bill would run counter to the ex-
perience of the world.
The pending bill provides, however,
that a separate army and navy be main- ?
tained, and provides also for a new
Department of the Air Force. It also
provides for the continuance of naval air,
and the Marine Corps as they are pres-
ently constituted. The objective, how-
ever, that was originally back of the bill
was to provide for the Merger as set forth
in the bill years ago.
Now, Mr. Chairman, the provisions of
this bill are far from being what they
were intended to be when the so-called
merger bill was under discussion a year
ago and again this year. We can get
. some idea of what the purpose of the
original bill was when we read some of
the testimony and read in the papers the.
. articles that were given by some of the
high officials in the military forces of
the country, particularly with respect to
the Marine Corps. I have a high re-
gard for the Marine Corps, but no higher
than I have for the ground forces or
the air forces or the naval forces. We
all have followed with a great deal of
interest and with great concern the tre-
mendous work that all branches of our
military organizations have carried an in
the conflict during this terrible period
that has just gone by. We followed with
grave concern the advent of the marines
and the Navy in the South Pacific in the
early summer of 1242 and then, of course,
the landings in Africa and then in the
enannel ports, and so on. We have a
high regard and cannot help but have
that high regard for the tremendous job
that the air forces of all branches of
the service did in this great conflict, but
it was the objective, and we know it now,
on the part of some of those high in the
military organization of this country to
positively destroy one of the greatest
fighting organizations that this world has
ever known, and by that I mean the
Uniteo States Marine Corps.
I am glad to know that within the
provisions of this bill the Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments has seen to it that the language
that was recommended by General Van-.
degrift, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, was actually put into this bill so
that there would be no question in the
future as to where the Marine Corps
would stand in respect to the part that
they play within the military organiza-
tion of this country. Of course, there
has been much said about unification,
but here we have a bill that instead of
unifying, we are, in another sense of the
word, decentralizing; we are establish-
ing a new corps, .the Air Corps. It is
my personal opinion, Mr. Chairman, that
1)-I-TOUSE 9589
the elimination 3: Na'. Cors)s
from the Navy v. Ould oe rI thing,
and I believe the eliminatlen ot rho Air
Corps from the g:c.i..ind forces of the Army
under the provisions of this bill will be
an unwise tiling from the standpoint of
the security of this Nation and the ef-
fectiveness of our war effort.
The Army?and I mean by that the
air forces and the ground forces?should
be under one command the same as are
the activities in the Navy, namely, sur-
face ships, air forces, and submarines,
all of them being* under one directing
head. Then you will have real unity of
command; then you will have an effec-
tive fighting organization, with all of
their actiVities coordinated under one
director or command. The trouble in
the -past, I feel, is due in a large measure
to the lack of proper recognition to the
importance of the Air Corps of the Army,
but I feel that by placing men in con-
trol with an aviation background much
of this friction of the past will be elimi-
nated. The Navy recognized this years
ago, and as a result officers with naval
aviation background have been promoted
to the highest rank within the naval
organization; therefore, there does not '
exist in the Navy the feeling that we find
in the air forces and the ground forces
of the Army.
[Mr. LYLE addressed the Committee.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Appendix.]
? Mr. HOFFMAN.Mr. Chairman, I
yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Iowa [Mr. MARTIN].
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
yield three additional minutes to the gen-
tleman from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN].
Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman,
I appreciate the time being yielded to me
from both sides because what I have to
say now on this bill is not of a partisan
nature. I want to speak particularly
regarding the so-called threat of the
General Staff and any drift into overcen-
tralization of control.
=FIG/MON?THREAT OF GENERAL STAFF
? *Mr. Chairman, several of the oprifonents
to H. R. 4214, including Rear Admiral
Zacharias and several of my colleagues,
have alleged that this pending unification
bill will permit military domination of
the United States: To -me such a fear
? is pure rubbish. I have never been able
to understand just how this domination
by the military is supposed to come about.
This bill provides for an increase in
civilian control of the military rather
.than the diminution thereof.
Opponents to unification have drawn a
? comparison between the notorious Ger-
man General ,Staff and that of our own
Army, creating the impression by in-
nuendo and inference that the present
War Department General Staff is behind
a plot to take control of the United States
Government. With all due respects to
these opponents of unification, I say that
this is absurd. The ?War Department
General Staff is nothing more than a
planning policy group for the Army. The
Navy has a similar group. So do the
-other executive departments of the Gov-
ernment. So does every large industrial
and business organization in the coun-
try. The Gcneral Staff is merely a
helper to the Chief of Staff and the Sec-
retary of War.
What is so ominous about that? What
less should a military staff be required
to do for its country than plan for its
protection? ?
? Now, I am sure that every member of
the Armed Services Committee and the
House itself will join me in my. desire
to protect our form of government. I
thing this bill protects our form of gov-
ernment both from within and without.
It retains civilian control over the Mili-
tary and thus preserves a traditional
principle of this coUntry while at the
same time it strengthens our military
posture toward the rest of the world.
A brief review of the development of
our War Department General Staff is
highly pertinent at this time.
The general staff was formed under the
impetus of Secretary of War Elihu Root
by act of Congress in 1903. It was formed
because prior to that time there was no
agency in our Army to bring into
common effort the manifold details of
supply, administration, communication,
transportation, and the like, which went
to make up the operations of even the
Army of that day. The realization of
the need for a genera] staff came from
the horrible fiasco of the Spanish-Ameri-
can War, which relatively minor under-
taking was marked with the failures and
misgivings of a War Department which
had no coordinating staff element but
was a conglomeration of antiquated in-
dependent bureaus. It is interesting to
recall that the commanding general of
the Army, Lieutenant General Miles, vio-
lently opposed the formation of a general
staff ostensibly on the grounds that it
was revolutibnary and would lead to a
military dictatorship but actually because
it would mean to General Miles that his
position of complete independence would
be altered and he would be placed under
the Secretary of War.
It should also be remembered that af-
ter World War I the War Department
was reorganized over protests of the old
diehards who were fearful of losses and
prestige similar to that of General Miles.
The War Department, nevertheless, was
reorganized, reaffirming the principle
that the general staff would be a plan-
ning and policy group for coordinating
the over-all operations of the Army.
Senator WADSWORTH well remembers the
cries of "militarism" showered on his
National Defense. Act, without which we
might indeed have lost 'World War II.
The point is that in any reorganization
there are bound to bt people whose per-
sonal positions will be effected. In the
case of the founding and continuation of
the War Department General Staff, how-
ever, it is significant to note that in its
44 years of existence, the United States
has not yet fallen victim to the danger
which the General Staff's opponents
have repeatedly expressed.
The Joint Staff provided for by the
? bill probably will become a national gen-
eral staff composed of Army, Navy, and
Air officers. If this is an objection, I
cannot see upon what grounds it is made.
'co r-19?'1l
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JULY 19
The Joint Staff is nothing more than a for this war, to develon the proper air There has been a little minor criti-
working group for the Joint Chiefs of weapons,' and to command the combat cisrn, no major criticism, and I think even
Staff whose need no one seems to deny, forces during the actual conflict, the the criticisms made by the .gentieman
I have never heard a?single man disagree _ Air Force must be on an equal footing from New Yen'. , Mr. Tanza I , and the
that there should be a joint body to de- with surface forces. Otherwise it will gentleman from New York [Mr. CoLE 1 ,
velop? plans and exercise strategic direc- never be able to secure the necessary and possibly one other, will be met by
ten over the balanced armed forces off? priorities in personnel, equipment, and amendments that will be satisfactory to
the United States. One of the- major facilities during peacetime to go into ac- the committee, and I think this .will re-
aims of unification is to insure the kite- tion at the very start of hostilities. ceive almost unonimons consent of the
grated employment of our armed forces. If American air-power is retained under Members of the House when they pass
? All this bill does is to put the existing the surface forces its ability to concen- it.
Joint chiefs of Staff and their working trate maximum force when and where I want to refer to one or two things'
? group inl . the law so that it may effec- needed will be lost. As an illustration, ' that have been said in the way of minor
-Lively prepare for any future emergency.. - Japan had no coequal air force, its avail- criticism: 'The use of the word "merger"
.Therefore, Mr. Chairman, let me im- able air strength being divided between in reference to this bill. What does
plore my colleagues to cast aside any her army and navy. Critical battles "merger" mean? Merger means "to
doubts about H. R. 4214 and vote in .its were lost to Japan because she could not cause to be swallowed up, to immerse, or
:favor without delay. bring her full air power to bear on us at 'to sink, to cause to be absorbed, sunk, or
We have a very good illustration of the the right time. This was due to the fact extinguished." This very definitely is no;
effectiveness of merging our interests in that the army and navy could not aigree that kind of bill. This is a unification
this field of national defense, and I want on the relative importance of military bill.
to especially commend the Committee_ 'campaigns. Since air power has become What does "unification" mean? It
on Armed Services for the vastly in-i- a controlling military force, we must means "the act, Cr process, or result of
proved caliber of legislation that has concentrate, rather than spread, its unifying; to cause to be ona; to make
_ come from that committee flier the striking power. . into a unit; to unify in a certain course
efforts we made in a divided jurisdiction One of the main reasons why I am of action."
in the preceding Congress. suPporting this bill is because of its pro- That is what we want. We want the
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the _ visions providing for an independent Air military an of our defense unified and
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN] has Force.
expired. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I coordinated for the one purpose of na-
e
Mr. McCORMACK: Mr. Chairman, i tional defense. W believe this is the
f yield myself 10 Minutes. . first step in that direction but not the
there is one question there is practically . Mr. Chairman, I want to pay tribute final step.
unanimous opinion on, it is the prime at this time to the chairman of our com-
and vital importance of air power. mittee, the gentle?man from Michigan The gentleman from New York [Mr.
There are few persons who will deny that [Mr. Homaar-T] whose fairness and im- COLE] said in his speech that-this bilIwas
, under present conditions and as far as partiality through all of these hearings a "vast improvement over the bill from
we can look into the future, that control has been commented upon by several the other body." He said that it showed
of air in war is essential to ultimate members of this committee.' The gen- "evolutionary development and protec-
, victory. . . . tlernan from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] tion of the different component arms of
The weapons of World War I were out and I stand together on the roll call. He our defense." I might say that evolution-
needed when World War II came. In precedes me and usually votes "aye" and ary developrnen or improvement will not
World War I, air power. played a minor .I vote "no." Or if he votes "no" I Vote 'stop with the passage of this bill, it will be
role, but the part it did play was sufficient "aye." So our political philosophy hap- a continuing process under the surveil-
to show its future possibilities.* In World .pens to be somewhat different, but I lance of this committee and the Commit-
- War II it was realized to a- dominant want to say this in all sincerity, that in tee on Armed Services which will have the
degree. . - the 5 years I have been here I have never tremendous job of passing enabling legis-
Having in .mind the part air power - served under a fairer and more impartial lation which will cause this particular
-
.. played in the last war, it is safe to pre- chairman than "the gentleman from bill to function. Tina merely establishes
diet that in event of future hostilities it Michigan [Mr. HoFFivxm]. Whether he the organization set-up. They will have
will play even a more important part, votes for this bill .or not, I would, like to make it ,function.. Ena':I?ng acts will
.2xperience in World War II has clearly those remarks to stand. . - have to be- passed by the Committee on
demonstrated that air power is now a want to read to you some of the con-
Armed Services and, of course, we are
? controlling and dominant force in mod- elusions of the Pearl Harbor Committee,, glad to yield to them that jurisdiction.
ern war. The Air Force must assume a as follows. Their conclusions were: Some concern has been expressed here
great responsibility to the Nation in or- That the Hawaiian Command failed to with respect to a separate Air Corps. l'
der to discharge this responsibility. discharge their responsibility in the light of think the statement was, made that a.
The question then ? comes as to the the warnings received from Washington, and separate Air Corps was part of. this evo-
other information possessed by them and. lutionary development. ,It has corn-
power to the maximum best Means to. develop and use our air effectiveness and the principal command by mutual cooper-a- manded the recognition -of Members of
.
whether or not 'a separate and independ- .tion. . this congress and the pecple at large by
(E) They failed 'to integiate and coordi- dominance of offense and defense ? in
. ent air department, as provided in this nate their facilities for defense, to alert prop- ' World Was II. It made us realize that
hill, constitutes that means. I strongly erly the Army and Navy Establishments in
believe that it does. , . -Hawaii, particularly in the line of warning strategic bombardment was carried for-
It is essential that the Air Force be on and intelligence available to them during the ward far inland ahead of the ground
a coequal status organizationally with period November 27 to December 7, 1941. troops and in the case of water far inland
- the Army and Navy. It is unthinkable They failed to effect liaison on a basis ade- ' away ' from the range of the heaviest
quately designed to acquaint each of them naval guns. The Army Air Force
that the service responsible for the main- _with the operations of the other, which was bombed the cities in the interior of
tenance for this air power would be sub- necessary to their- joint security, and to ex- Europe, and as far as Tokyo, Hiroshima,
or:elk:ate to any other ses vice. change fully all significanct intelligence, and and Nagasaki in Ja:pan. ? In other words,
In the joint planning for the 'national they also failed to appreciate and evaluate this parity of .power, this parity of au-
, security, the Air Forces must have a-voice the significance of the intelligence and other
driform on available to them. thority, this parity of prestig,e has been
ecenual to that of the other services. won in the bloody crucible of war. They
Unless the Air Forces have coequal status To put it shortly, the purpose of this have won their right ,to equal parity in
the military structure, it cannot en- bill is to prevent another Pearl Harbor? war through their striking power, and I
joy the pcsition in the joint planning: another uncoordinated mess like we had want to point out that the activities of
councils to which it is entitled. - .at that particular time. I think it is a the Air Force were coordinated with the
.7,1ilitary leaders agree that the initial tribute to the members of this committee Navy and with the Army in war time?
phase of any future war will be an air on both sides of the aisle that the World War II?and that this is only put-
at', because, obviously, the surface speeches you have heard today from both , ting into basic legislation that coordi-
forces cannot go into action until con- sides' of the aisle have been predomi- nation of action and of cif:hist-nand de-''
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CONni":170:C):.C.....i, Rh L'C'D?TA-i?OUS.E.:
arms of service due to the exi-
geode:, war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
made them into a coo:dinated unit and
sent them forth upon their mission.
Nitor we are not leaving it up to the whim
of a future unification to coordinate, but
we are writing into basic law that there
shall be coordination. During wartime
there were divisions, there were jea1,7
ousies. They were partly settled by th
Conceal Staff. Those are done away
wOtithy this bill. Questions of jurisdic-
tion are settled. We are now saying
that in peacetime also we are going to
have these arms of military offense and
defense coordinated. We have written
into the bill certain functions which will
be based on this act, taken from a pro-
posed Executive order, certain safe-
ttiards in the functions of the Marine
Corps, in the functionsof naval aviation,
to guard against the disintegration of
the I?ifarine Corps and. the' elimination of
naval aviation. I realize that a Navy or
ground force without air, support, with-
out air coverage over them, would be a
helpless arm to defend us.
We had testimony ". from Admiral
Bogan, who is in command of the Atlan-
tic Air Force, in which he admitted the
obsolescence of surface naval vessels as
far as their ability to defend themselves
is concerned. He rightly expressed the
concern that naval aviation, which might
be integrated into naval action, should
be left intact, and the Members who be-
lieved in a separate Air Ferce agreed with
him that he, should have a naval avia-
tion which was actually an integrated
part of naval operation. So we provided
for a strengthening of that section to the
satisfaction of those who had had doubts
in regard to the Navy.
Mr. Chairman, this debate has demon-
strated that the Congress of the United
States is going to ask for a better func-
tioning national defense in the. future
than we have had in the past. We are
going to write this into basic legislation
and make an improvement in the or-
ganizational set-up.
We are going to give it a trial. We are
going to call these people _before us as
the years go by and we are going to ask
them, What have' you done in regard to
the elimination of duplication and in line
with the overlapping functions of the
department and expenses?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from California has expired.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
yield myself two additional minutes.-
Mr..Chairman, we are going to say to
them that there is one thing that is dom-
inant to the American citizen and that is
the defense of his Nation, not the dom-
inance of the Navy, not the dominance
of the Air Force, not the dominance of
the Army Ground Force, but the domi-
nance of the defense of this Nation. We
as Meirniers are, going to see that this
function of defense is properly integrat-
ed and coordinated. We are also going
to see, and we have written in the bill this
section which is an improvement over
the bill that passed the other body, a di-
rective to the Secretary of National De-
fense that he shall eliminate overlap-
ping and duplicating functions, and he
shall perfect certain economies, and he
whl;JO C.1.: _1
till :
1;1.0)C): ve a n an a. as to
what .
I w. ih I bad a little ino:e time co go
into the Central Litellig,eace Agency. A
fear was expressed on the floor today.
Let me say that if there is any man on
the floor who is afraid of a military dic-
tatorship more than I am I do not know
who he is.%* am very zealous, as I have
said time and again, of the civil liberties
of our people, but I believe this agency
has had written around it, proper pro-
tections against the invasion of the po-
lice and the subpena powers of a domes-
tic police force. I want to impress upon
the minds of the Members that the work
of this Central Intelligence Agency, as
far as the collection of evidence is con-
cerned, is strictly in the field of secret
foreign intelligence? what is known as
P. clandestine intelligence. They have no
right in the domestic field to collect, in-
formation of a clandestine military na-
ture. They can evaluate it; yes.
THE JOB OF SECRETARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY
IN REGARD TO CONCENTRATION OF *POWER?
MILITARY DICTATORSHIP
There have been objections raised to
the proposed unification bill because it is
alleged to concentrate in one office pow-
ers too great for any man to hold. Some
objectors to the principle of unification,
who still have faith in the democratic
processes of government, merely express
the objection that the job of Secretary of
National Defense, as proposed, is too big
for any man. Certain alarmists, how-
ever, have expressed the apprehension
that a bill which vests in one man prac-
tically unlimited military authority and
power is a bill which must inevitably
negate the Constitution of the United
States and prepare the way for the ad-
vent of a dictator, who would seize con-
trol of the entire Federal Establishment.
To the first class of objectors I would
-make the answer that in no office in our
Federal Establishment are greater pow-
ers concentrated than in the office of
President of the United States. Yet no
less than 40 different times the American ?
people have found a man who in their
opinion was qualified to perform the
duties of that high office, and no less
than 32 different men have so served. ? I
have misread American history if any
one of these 32 men has proved so in-
capable in office, so negligent of duty, or
so contemptuous of responsibility as to
have behaved in a way to jeopardize the
security of the United States or the
high position that the United States
holds in the council of nations.
To these same sincere but fearful ob-
jectors I would also point out that, as
a matter of fact, the proposed unifica-
tion of our armed services would not
create a job too big for any man to hold
but would, on the contrary, establish an
office the incumbent of which would re-
lieve the President, as Commander in
Chief of our armed forces, of the job
of resolving the differences and disputes
between the"services. The proposed Sec-
retary of National Defense, who, accord-
ing to the proposed legislation, would
be charged with the establishment "un-,
der the direction of the President" of
policies and programs for the National
Estnblirr.c.,:,-,1,, would isa an ad-
maIn ofilcor of our Government
so plated as to rend:-: the President the
moA helpful service, while botng at the
same time fully responsible to him, as to
the other body, by and with the advice
and consent of which he would be ap-
pointed.
No jab so far created in our Federal
establishment is too big for a capable,
qualified, conscientious American to fill.
In our Government of the people, the
people have created only jobs that rep-
resentatives of the people could fill.
They have created no jobs that call for
supermen.
But to the second -class of objectors
who view with apprehension and alarm
the creation of an office which would
serve?almost automatically these ob-
jectors seem to believe?as a board to
spring the incumbent of the office into
a position of supreme military dictator-
ship, I would say that never, in -the 171
years of our country, has the more power-
ful office of the President ever served
as such a springboard. Nor is it con-
ceivable that so long as the people ac-
cept the responsibility of Constitutional
government, and ins ure the continua-
tion of government by the people, that
the office of the President or any other
office in our American Government ever
will so serve as a springboard for dic-
tatorship.
I am amused to realize that the found-
ing fathers in writing that section of-our
Constitution which establishes the quali-
fications for the office of President-, were
less fearful of the future, uncertain as it,
then seemed, and less distrustful of the
people, inexperienced in self-government
as they then were, than the alarmists of
today who decry all progress as change
and all change as bad. "No person ex-
cept a natural born citizen shall be eli-
gible to the office of the President" the
framers of our Constitution wrote, add-
ing only that he must have attained to
the age of 35 years and have been for 14:
years a i?esident within the United States.
Those who established our Government
set forth no job description against
which to check the qualifications of a
Presidential nominee, no list of spe-
cific qualifications to look for in the
candidate, no system of checks and
hedges to insure his performance of
his duties according to the letter rather.
than the spirit of the law. The oath
they prescribed for him requires him
,only to execute faithfully the office of
the President of the United States and
to the best of his ability Preserve, pro-
tect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States. I repeat one phrase from
that oath?"to the best of my ability."
In the oath not one word is said about
what that ability should consist of.
The drafters of the proposed National
? Security Act have been specific, however,
. in establishing that the person appointed
to be Secretary of National Defense will
be chosen with greater attention to quali-
fications than the President of the United
States is chosen, and that he will hold
office subject certainly to as many checks
and as much scrutiny, if not a great deal
more.,
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CONGRIESSIC,,,:LT., "D01-:D-HOUSE
In the first place, the proposed act pro-
vides that "the Secretary of National
Security shall be appointed from civilian
Fife by the President, by and with the
anvice and consent of the Senate."
:erenabers of this Congress have seen
cnther Presidential nominees for Cabinet
a: other high Government rank investi-
nated by the Senate of the United States.
They have seen nominees rejected. - And
they should know that though the Presi-
dent ? nominates, it is the Senate that
confirms. I for one do not believe that
the Senate of the United States would
ever be so blind or deceived as to confirm
in office one whose -character or whose
record would suggest the possibility of
his desiring to become a military dicta-
tor, bent on destroying our demoaracy.
? The proposed Secretary of National
Defense would serve under the direction
of the President. Our American history
is not without instances of the removal
of a Cabinet officer whose service is not
acceptable to the President. Further-
more, the proposed Secretary of National
Defense would be no super-Secretary, as
-some fear and assert, because that sec-
tion of the act establishing the office
specifically states that the separate de-
partments of the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force "shall be administered as
individual units by their respective Sec-
retaries." The Secretary of National
Security is in the end no super-Secretary,_
no commander in chief possessed of
operational control of all our armed
forces, but merely an administrative
head serving under the President.
Finally, this. same section of the pro-
'posed act provides that the Secretary of
National Defense "shall submit written
reports to the President and .the Con-
gress covering expenditures, Work, and
accomplishments of the National De-
fense Establishment." So long as the
Secretary is appointed with the consent
of the Senate and makes annual reports
to the Congress, I cannot foresee the
possibility of his establishing a dictator-
ship?except with the consent and ap-
proval of a vacillating and subservient
Congress.
One further guaranty against dictator-
ship has, however, been written into the
,National Security Act. The Secretary of
? National Defense is expressly forbidden
to establish a military staff.. He can
have: an office force but not a formal
military staff. .
A civilian holding office .at the, discre-
tion of the President, with the consent
of the Senate, subject to the scrutiny of
Congress, and without military staff,- is
hardly a person in whom is- vested so
much power that he might, at his will,
become the military dictator of this dem-
-ocratic Nation. ' If the Secretary of Na-
tional Defense would be such, then to
what miracle or act of providence do we
owe our past escape from a dictatorship
established by an one of the 32 differ-
ent Presidents w:te in turn, have exer-
cised powers gra-- i.hem by the Con-
stitution as Comn-nniaer in Chief of the
Army and Navy?
Ent I, for one, have too much faith
in?;:he American people and in their devo-
tion to democratic ways?too much trust
in the President and the Members of
Congress uhooi the rcc--;10 elect?to fear
the establisInnent of a nicinnei-ship in
this country by a Secre-zary of National
Defense Or by anyone else, in or out of
office.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from California has again
expired.
(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given
prernission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. OWENS].
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, the gen-
tleman who just preceded me mentioned
that we need have no fear of a military
dictator, and one of the gentlemen who
preceded him also said it would be more
or less ridiculous to say the same, be-
cause of the fact that we shall have
civilian personnel on the board. Well,
we all know that a spider can draw many
files into its web, and you know exactly
what happens; also, that bees can create
a queen bee, and she will do the rest.
But, I am not standing here opposing the
bill at this time. I am merely doing so
to offer a suggestion.
I feel that even though we do not have
to fear a military dictatorship because of
the passage of a bill of this type and the
creatibn of a council of this kind that we
should, at least, throw every safeguard
possible around the people so that that
-' contingency might arise. I have at least
one little suggestion that might help with
respect thereto. As a matter of fact,
_during the disdussion on this bill before
the committee I understand that it was
suggested that one or more Members of
Congress be made members of this Na-
tional Security Council so that the Con-
gress would be .apprised of the action of
the Council at all times. I understand
also that that idea was abandoned be-
cause of fear that the Council might
dominate the Congress or might affect
the action of the Congress when matters
were brought before it concerning ap-
propriations. Just a few days ago I read
an article which was given great circula-
tion throughout the Nation which called
attention to the fact that the Speaker
of the House once had a great deal of
power and that it helped the people; that
it aided the common people, who were
close-to the House of Representatives and
to its Speaker. That article pointed out
that the power of the Speaker had grad-
ually waned and was only revived when
the succession bill was recently passed
by the House. My thought in. regard to
that matter is along the same line. This
bill does cover quite a number of refer-
ences to civilian affairs.
On page 13 it mentions policies to se-
, cure the most effective mobilization and
maximum utilization of the Nation's
manpower in the event of war.
On page 14 it speaks about the strategic
location of industries, services, govern-
ment, and economic activities, the con-
tinuous operation of which is essential
to the Nation's security.
On 'page 36 it refers to the fact that
this council can come directly to Con-
gress and obtain appropriations which
juLNZ 19
the President might not otherwise rec-
ommend.
On page 5 it says that?
The Council shall, from time to time, make
such recommendations, and such other re-
ports to the President as it deems appro-
priate or as the President may require.
Ills nay thought, Mr. Chairman, that
we should add to this paragraph the sug-
gestion that the same recommendations
and reports that are made to the Presi-
dent be given to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the
President of the Senate and that such
reports shall be confidential and not be
the subject of public record. I believe
then that the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the
Senate, who are close to the people,
would be able to judge for themselves
what move might be taken, if it is in
time of peace, or when Congress ad-
journs they can judge what steps would
have to be taken, should they feel that
it was serious enough for them to offer
suggestions. If it were in time of war,
the Congress would be in session, and
they, as the elected representatives of
the people, should be apprised of the
same fact, just as well as the President.
.It appears to me that inasmuch as we
are creating a council, such as that which
is advocated, that we are deviating from
a policy to which we have adhered for
the last 160 years or more:. that we
should be mighty careful, and I believe
that we shou:d, at least, effect that one
safeguard for the people of our Nation.
For that reason I am going to suggest
that amendment when the time for
amendment comes, and I hope you will
give it some consideration in the mean-
time.
(Mr. OWENS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. . HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield such time as he may desire to the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Suer-e].
(Mr. BUCK asked and was givenper-,
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman, I favor-
this legislation, and, under permission
granted me, I include the following reso-
lution of the National Aeronautic As-
sociation and brief of Lowell H. Swenson,
its executive vice president:
RESOLUTION 1 ADOPTED BY THE ANNITAL MEETING,
NATIONAL AERONAUTIC ASSOCIATION' JUNE 4,
194.7
Whereas it is the belief of the delegates to
the 1947 annual convention of the National
Aeronautic Association that in our national
self-interest, as well as in the- interest of
world peace, our defenses should ',Iways be
maintained at a level substantially higher
than those of any other nation; and
Whereas in order to attain this objective
with maximum efficiency and at a minimum
of expense' it is necessary that our armed*
forces be organized into a single Depart-
ment of Defense with co-equal .status for air,
ground, and sea forces: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved' by the ;'elegates of the National
, Aeronautic Association in its 1947 annual
convention assembled, That this association
recommend passage during this session of
the Congress of legislation to create a single
Department of Defense with a coequal
status for our Air, Ground, and Sea Forces.
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BELEF. OF LOWELL H. SWEN.SON, EitECUTIVE VICE
.PRILSIDENT, NATIONAL AMONAUTICAD ASSOCIA-.
TI0N, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JULY 1, 1947.
I feel somewhat like an old family friend
at a baptismal ceremony when I come up
here today to express our organization's
Thor:, of this. bill, The National Aeronautic
Association was the first national organiza-
tion to go on record in favor Of unification
of the armed forces. That was in 1941. NAA,
as you probably know, is made up of air-
minded citizens all over the country. It
Isn't necessarily a flyers' organization?In
fact, most of the members are not flyers.
They are civic leaders of their communities.
Year after year, these members, Just plain,
every-day American citizens, have gone on
record favoring the principle proposed in this
bill. I can truly say that the members of
NAA are happy to see the unification think-
ing progress this far and that they hope this
bill will be enacted.
As an aviation organization we naturally
favor this bill because it gives an opportunity
for greater development of military and naval
aviation along the lines believed best by
military saw.: naval airmen, While it is al-
ways distasteful to stir up dead ashes, I be-
lieve it nevectheless relevant to point out
that at the present the Army Air Forces is
only one part of the War Department; and
that the Bureau of Aeronautics is only one
bart of the Department of the Navy. And in
the past, neither has always been pernlitted
to seek funds, nor to do the things it believed
necessary for the defense of this country.
Therefore, one reason we favor this bill is
because it Will put the Air Services on the
same high level as the other branches of the
armed forces.
I am aware that at previous sessions of
this hearing, the opinion has been voiced
that the nomy Air Forces is well on the
way to becoming the top service within the
War Department. As a strong exponent of
air power, I am gratifieid to hear that. But
I do not believe that developing situation
makes this bill unnecessary. On the con-
trary, it high lights the need for this bill._
I am no military expert. I am just the
working head of an organization of Ameri-
can citizens who, through' their membership
in NAA, have had a.better than average op-
portunity to be made ?aware of the impor-
,tance of military aviation. But we do not
feel that this country necessarily needs more
of an Air Force than an Army or Navy. We
don't know about that. We are convinced
that we cannot afford to let anything stand
in the way ot the fullest development of
military aviation. You gentlemen have al-
ready been told by?General Eisenhower that
there is no such thing as a separate land,
sea, or air war. Only by developing all of
our armed forces to their maximum useful-
:3 can we have an effective national de-
. :3ut certainly no one service can de-
its Inaximum usefulness without
to the missions and capabilities of
the other services. To preserve a proper
balance and at the same tar determine the
maximum usefulness of ee,Gil service requires
an arbiter-T--the Secretary of National Defense
provided for in this bill.
A striking example is at hand. The
files of your Legislative Reference Service
contain documents submitted by the War
and Navy Departments, details of which
have been carried in the press. The way
I read these published accounts, the War
and Navy Department are each planning a
different kind ,Jf war, If war again becomes
necessary. The greatest difference of opin-
ion, apparently, is in the employment of
aviator.. Now, to me, a layman represent-
Other laymen, that just doesn't make
Somebody hess ?to determine which
way going to be.
NAA also supports this bill on the basis of
L ''USE
keep :din': e..test
reason for :eet. r, t t:. .
nautic com S C; O? 'rags
citizens. As .eucle, In, are ap.ye :e. And
're want to See 1c ;Hirt OA: G".,r ;:oing
Into national defense buy a full Meilitire.
certain amount of competition between the
services is healthy. Lut we don', think that
duplicate hospitals, duplicate transportation
systems, duplicate warehouses, and so on
down the line, is competition. That's just
waste. And there is the terrifically impor-
tant matter of procurement. In either this
time of peace or in war, the armed services are
the biggest buyers in the country. They are
buying for the same over-all purpose, de-
fense or war, and in many instances buying
the same item from the same supplier. Yet,
the Army makes one contract, the Navy an-
other, the Air Forces a third. They compete
with each other. I am not in the circle, so
to speak, yet even I have heard of Navy hav-
ing to wait until a contractor finished an
Air Force order, or vice versa. Each service,
naturally, thought Its requirements were
more pressing.
I am aware that this bill, as it stands, does
not specifically unify procurement. But the
'bill is a start, it at least sets up a frame-
work within which unified procurement can?
be detailed later for your approval. At pres-
'ent, not even the framework exists. -
Economy, naturally, does not apply only to
wise use of money. After all, there must be
a limit to our scientific and industrial re-
sources. Just as in the procurement of
goods, we cannot afford to be wasteful in the
procurement under contract of scientific or
industrial know-how. Right now, in certain
fields of military research, there is a shortage
of research facilities and personnel. The
Joint Research and Development Board of
ence of a War Council; a Joint Chiefs
of Staff to deal with strategic plans; a
Munitions Board to coordinate produc-
tion and procurement; a National Secu-
rity Resource Board to plan for indus-
trial and civilian mobilization; and a Re-
search and Development Board to pro-
vide integrated programs for research
and development for military purposes
gives us realistic implementation of a
policy of national security and for the
discharge of our international respon-
sibilities.
(Mr. JAVITS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield
the balance of the time to the chairman
of the committee and the author of the
bill, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr.
HOFFMAN].
(Mr. HOFFMAN 'asked' and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. 'Chairman, we
have been told throughout the hearings
and the debate that some bill giving uni-
fication is a necessity, that we must co-
ordinate. The first speaker on the ma-
jority side; the distinguished gentleman
from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH], who
has been fighting for legislation of this
nature since.1920, beginning in the Sen-
ate and continuing right on down to the
present moment, told us that the legis-
lation would keep in force our wartime
'boards of coordination. I think he is
the Army and Navy has been able, I un- right about that. That is one of my
derstand, to effect a certain amount of co- objections to legislation of this kind.
ordination in the placing of experimental Even though it may be necessary in
and research contracts. But the Board can wartime, when defeat threatens, I abhor
only request. Army and Navy acquiescence regimentation and dictatorship in peace-
is only voluntary. The Research and De-
velopment Board responsible only to the Sec- time.
retary of National Defense, as provided in That there may be no misunderstand-
your bill, seems to us the only way to assure ing and no charges of, shall I say, duplic-
that art services get their most pressing re- ity, let me state now that having no
search needs taken care of. choice about the matter, no opportunity
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I to prevent what I consider unsound leg-,
yield such time as he may desire to the islation, I will not oppose this bill. An
gentleman from New York [Mr. JAVITS]. attempt will be made to point out some
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I shall of the dangers which it carries.
vote for this bill. From my own military . You may think my lack of opposition
experience I consider this legislation es- strange, but as some other Members
-
seritial to the coordination of our mili- have said, having "slept ,with this mat-
tary establishment, and to the perform- ter" over the years since I have been here,
ance of our national responsibilities in I am afraid not of Russia, not of other
foreign affairs. nations across the seas, but I am afraid
- During World-War H, I was for some of what may develop here in America.
years as an Army officer on duty as the I am afraid not only of those who de-
secretary of the joint United States liberately would destroy constitutional
Army, Navy, and Air Forces committee government, but of those who unwit-
to coordinate our chemical warfare ef- tingly, by creating fear or themselves
fort with that of our allies. I worked in being afraid, insist upon legislation which
an area exactly in line with that sought will throw open the door to'a policy which .
to be covered by this bill. 'The coordi- in the end will destroy our liberty and
nation contemplated by this bill was at- freedom ani.: with it our ability to defend
tempted during the war, it worked well/. ourselves. I am afraid of a dictatorship,
, enough to win, but I felt on many oc- a military dictatorship.
casions the need for a statutory basis My reason for supporting this bill is
for ate boards and staffs engaged. This that I know the House. intends to pass,
bill will give background and substance under leadership drive and the pressure
to the joint and combined efforts which ? of a desire for adjournment not later
were responsible for our winning the than Monday and probably tonight, a
war. . . bill of some kind giving us some sort of
One further point needs to be empha- unification. In my humble judgment,
sized. The tempo of a future war will H. R. 4214, worked out by a subc,ommit-
be so highly accelerated that we must tee, adopted by the full committee, not
be completely ready with the right or- a bill drawn by either the Navy or the
ganization from the start. The peace- Army or any combination of those two
economy, and sound business principles. I time creation, functioning, and experi- services, not a bill handed to the commit-
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CONGRESS:CY.LL RECORD-HOUSE
',cc or the subcommittee by any one Mem- we come victorious, to the end of the sec-
her, but a bill -thought out first and ond great World War, the most power-
drawn, put intoWords by the subcommit- ful Nation in ,all the world, the Santa
tee and the full committee, is the best bill Claus of the world, and we are told that
we can get.at this time. It is either H. R. we must ditch it. We must discard it.
4214 or something like S. 753:--something Throw it away. Accept centralized over-
more harmful. . all command by the military forces. A
We have had unification throughout bad second best whenever, wherever it
the war. TheY- said it was necessary has come to a show down with our young
then, and no doubt it. was. No doubt men and women.
unification of command in the field will Perhaps they are right. But history
always be necessary in every war if we does not give us that conclusion.- Nor is
are to win, just the same as every foot- that all the story. The gentleman from
ball, basketball, or baseball team must New York [Mr. WAtsworem] came in
have a guiding head on the field, other- with this chart. At the top you see the
wise they lose. President of the United States; then, the
Sure, we must have coordination, but, Secretary- of Defense, and so on down
in my humble judgment, that, coordina- thr-mgh. He showed to his own satisfac-
tion which we have had during the war ticn, and, no doubt, to the satisfaction of
could be continued if the Army and the Many Members of the House, how this
Navy and the Air Force desired. But power was distributed and how the vari-
_human nature being what it is, and there ous boards and agencies were going to do
being those jealousies, which are natural, these different things. Very well. ?
and the ambition for one's service or But you can read the chart the other
one's family or odes ideas being what it way. , You can read it from the bottom
is, apparently it is necessary for the Con- up and see where all the power that be-
gress, then, speaking figuratively, to take longs in the hands of civilians is con-
the high command of these departments centrated and finally centered, not in the
and bump their heads together and, by President, because he cannot grasp and
law: compel them to coordinate. use it, but in the Secretary of Defense.
Strange indeed is it that the SecretaryAnd-the Secretary of Defense will be, if
of War and the Secretary of the :Navy not the ? unconscious tool, at least the
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Army agent, of the military staff. Which
should come to the Congress and, admit- opens the door to what? To control.
ting that they, under the President's By whom?
direction, have the power to unify and And he stresses the fact that civilians
coordinate and that they did that very are at the top in all of these agencies but '
thing during the war, yet now in, peace- one. Ah, yes. But where do the civilians
time, knowing unification and coordina- get their advice? Where do they gee-
tion to be essential?and they say it is=,- their information? ? They get it only as
they refuse to do it, ask the Congress it seeps up to them through the sub-
to write a law compelling them to do the ordinate boards over which the military
things they say. are essential if our fu- will have control.
ture welfare is to be made secure. What do these boards and these agen-
That inconsistency raises in mY mind cies do? Any one of them, each of them,
a doubt as to whether tl7ey are asking all of them?what do they do? They
for economy and efficiency, for unifica- coordinate and they plan. As the gen-
tion, or whether they are-asking for au-7. tleman from New York said, for the first
thoritY?the authority given by the Con- time you will have our foreign policy,
stitution to the Congress, formulated by the military and the State
There is a need for this kind of legis- Department. The President and the
lation and a unified centralized corn- Senate are, under the Constiution,
mend if the President will not order it? aharged with the duty and the respon-
if the heads of the departments will not sibility of planning foreign policy.
willingly practice it. But what has been I had always supposed that under the
the history of other nations where they Constitution, which, after all, has given "
have had it? What has been the result ' us all that we have?I had always .sup-
in GermanY, in Italy, what has _been the posed that it was the duty of the Con-
history in Russia?. gress to provide for national defense?
Our forefathers came here, we were not the duty of the Secretary of De-
told, to escape burdensome taxation?. fense?not the -duty of various boards
nothing political intended in that re- and agencies down below?but the duty
mark?to escape the destruction of their of the Congress. And here we are to-
personal rnd religious ? liberties. They day shirking our responsibility and turn-
came he. for freedom. They estab- ing over the performance of ? our duty
lished here a Government which we to a superorganization, if you please,
know now, which all the world ought -to which is to provide a policy for us, to
know, is the best that has ever been de- "provide for the national defense."
vised. Because of 1twe stand at the top
Then comes the argument, as it has
in everything, in military might- and always come in the subcommittee and
power, in production, in creative genius,, always in the committee, "No; they have
in liberty, prosperity, and happiness, no authority to do anything; all they do
How did we get that way? By a cen- is plan." Well, most of us have been
tralized command, through a dictator- here long enough to know and realize
ship, through regimentation? No. We that the planning agency is the agency
got that way because our people were which finally makes our policy.
independent, and v?--: had individualists Let the bureaucrats in the State De-
all working towarC c same end?the ? partment, the career men, feted and fiat-
welfare of our count:Y. tered by princes and lords, their brains
of our system,, otriA5v0,64%VisrAffire, aikfatti*AtgitMOVAlao
After we demo
JULY 19
eign policy, and we will always be en-
tangled in the affairs of other nations;
we will always be giving away the sub-
_stance of our citizenry.
Let the bureaucrats Plan our domes-
tic affairs, our economy, our production;
let them dissipate our resources, and
there will always be waste .and extrava-
gance and finally an impoverished na-
tion; always will we be committed to this,
that, or the other, and the Congress will
be charged with a lack of patriotism if it ?
- fails to follow the false teachings of the
over-educated, un-Americanized bureau-
crats, social climbers, international fi-
nanciers, and internationalists.
Recent examples: The Truman .policy
of giving to foreign nations millions in
order to do this, that, and the other
thing. I am not* discussing the merits
or the demerits of that proposition at all.
because throughout the hearings and in
the deliberations of the subcommittee
and the full committee there has never .
been any discussion on the basis of po-
litical expediency.
The proposed legislation has in the
committee ',-.?t.'en considered on its merits,
and, while I do not know what has hap-
pened in other committees, I can say I
,do not believe there has ever been a com-
mittee where the chairman has had more
consistent, faithful, and intelligent co-
operation?yes.; and may I add been more
dependent upon, has to any greater ex-
tent relied upon: the help given by the
members of the committee?than has the
chairman of this particular committee.
There has been no unpleasant disagree-4
ment of any kind?personal, political, or
otherwise.
So we will have these boards planning ,
to give us a Policy. When they give us
a policy, a complacent Congress, if the
record of the past 14 years is a guide,
will follow it. That is the easy way.
I was talking about, the Trumanf pol-
icy. I could add to 'that the Marshall
policy.- I could go back of that and refer
? to the -policy promulgated by the distin-
guished gentleman from Michigan who
serves in the other body and to that of
certain of his colleagues. They brought
it out and we followed it?a bipartisan
foreign policy.
We have given billions upon billions
-of dollars in- furtherance of that policy. '
We gave this money because we were told
time and time again that we must sup-
port the policy of our leaders, and only a
few of us?well, maybe I speak only for
myself?ignorant and dumb and stub-
born?have failed to go along.
And at last, having learned that there
is no end to that road?that the more we-
give the more we 'will be asked to give?
even those who advocated it most enthu-
siastically, those who described it as a
"great speculation," come now, as they
were forced to do, to the conclusion that
our resources are not inexhaustible?yes;
and they now propose that we take an
inven thing which many of us
advo. : when the policy was first
proposec,--which was the only sound,
sensible thing to do.
What is the net result? Billions iiipon
billions poured into !other lands?money
which we might well have used to build
up our Army and Navy and our Air
Rug kiatiliyAqt,tvRoaffsteerd bayb rwoaayd . f And
1947
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CONGRESSII)K.AL, RECOITZ,D-HOUSE
complishment, what have we in return?
What can the advocates of that policy
lay -on the line? All you can say is,
"Well, if we had not done it the situa-
tion might have been worse." Perhaps
so. No one can answer that argument.
Of one thing we can be certain, we have
weakened /ourselves, we have aided, are
aiding, potential enemies.
When you get to these boards each
and every one of them has the -power
to formulate a policy. Over what? If
It z,liplied only to the Army, the Navy,
and the Air Force I would say "Amen.
You are?right." Unfortunately, they step
down into industrial activities, into pro-
duction. They want the power to plan
priorities, to regiment industrial produc-
tion.
The CHAIRMAN-. The Chair will ad-
vise the gentleman he has consumed 10
Minutes.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman? I will
yield the gentleman part of my time.
Mr. HOFFMAN. I will try not to de-
tain you.
They go down into our civilian activ-
ities. The history of the last war?in
my. extension of my remarks I will try
to point out some examples?shows what?
I- shows that no matter how coura-
;.,00us?they are on top when it .comes
to courage and determination and ability
to fight and win?no matter how supreme
they are in possessing those qualities,
when it comes to industrial production
neither the Army nor the- Navy nor the
Air Force knows how.
It is the industrial leaders, the farm-
ers, everyone in our country who works
and produces when danger threatens
us, and under our independent system;
not under the regimented system as it is
in Germany and in Russia and in Brit-
ain who make the fighting and running ?
of wars possible. Oh, no. Under the
independence which we exercise we pro-
duce until the regimented peoples fade
out of the picture. When our?as we
are told?untrained fighting men meet
the disciplined, machine-like soldiers of
the centralized comniand, who wins?
Then, why not leave to the Congress
of the United States the duty to provide
for national defense? The Constitution
says that the Congress shall provide for
an Army and limit its appropriations to
2 years. The Constitution says that the
Congress shall provide for a Navy.' It
says nothing about an Air Force. I do
not mean that we have no authority to
provide an Air Force. Of course We have.
But is there anyone so dumb as to believe
for a moment that the Air 7orce can
fight and win a war alone? That the
Army and the Navy can do without the
Air Force?
As I said to the gentleman previously
on the floor, I agree to what we have
written intothis bill?and we have writ-
ten in provisions to protect the naval
aviation of the 1\-cvy?I agree in what
we wrote in there to -t the integrity
of the Army, the Navy, ... marines.
But if and when we have a war, whieh
God forbid, we will find these services?
the Air Force?Still with the Army and
still with the Navy, because they must be
there, just the same as the guns must be..
with the Army,1 the AlAtkilhigiibe.dritAei
the. Navy.
When, you tark about unification, no.
You have two D:partments now. This
bill adds a third, the Air Force. They
are all one great team. Separate them
by law if you wish, you cannot break
them up.
We have one-hundred-and-seventy-
odd committees, joint committees, of
Army and Navy now trying to coordinate,
trying to unify, trying to get away from
waste and extravagance which is always
present in war and which is inevitable
when either the Army or the Navy plans
a war. No one criticizes them for it.
For myself, if they ask for $5, and I am
assured that $2 of it would be wasted,
nevertheless I would vote for the five,
and so would the other Members of this
Congress, because we do not dare take
a chance, and we do not know the exact
amount they may need.
Economy? Read the record from cover
to cover, as they say, and you will not
find in it one single word which promises
any present economy. It is all a hope.
Talk about unification! You still re-
tain the Army and the Navy, and you
have added to it another department, an
Air Force, and over all a super super-
duper structure, a Secretary of Defense.
And every, Member here knows that
means a new department?additional
agencies, a host of additional employees.
The Government now gets one-third
of the taxpayer's dollar. The Govern-
ment now takes, if a man works 6 days
a week?and few do-2 days of that
work.. And of the Nation's spending dol-
lar, the armed forces now take a third.
Permit me to thank you for the at-
tention you have given. As stated in the
beginning my vote will be cast for the
bill H. R. 4214 because as I understand
it only two bills will be up, the bill from
the other body S. 758 and the bill from
the House; and when we come to the op-
portune time I shall ask that we strike
'out all after the enacting clause of the
Senate bill and substitute the House
bill.
It is my hope that, when conferees are
appointed, they will insist upon the
_House bill which, as far as language and
law can do it, does provide for the pro-
tection of the Marines, the Navy, and
naval aviation.
At the risk of 'repeating the thought
'which has already been expressed, permit
me to enlarge upon the subject.
The present unification controversy is
not new. It is but the-continuation and,
if the present legislation is adopted, the
Culmination of over 25 years of effort by .
Military elements to gain greater power
within the Government. During the past
25 years over 50 legislative proposals re-
lating to the unification of the armed
forces have been introduced have been
introduced?page 184, Report of Secre-
tary of the Navy on Unification, by
Ferdinand Eberstadt, Government Print-
ing Office, October 22, 1945.
The unification battle last year was
characterized by vigorous and effective
Navy opposition. This year there was
official acceptance' by Secretary Forre-
stal and Vice Admiral Sherman. The at-
titude of the remainder of the Navy was*
one of glum silence?for the Navy was
efis Woltatiai4 Alava e g -6
9595
June 23, when steps had already. been
taken to close hearings before the Expen-
ditures Committee.
On January 16, 1947, the White House
announced the so-called agreement be-
tween the Army and Navy relative to
unification. On February 28 I. intro-
duced, as an administrative function of
the chairman of the Expenditure in Ex-
ecutive Departments Committee, the ad-
ministration's unification bill, H. R. 2319.
In the Senate the proposal became S. 758.
The course which postwar legislation
is now following is the same pat-tern that
it followed after World War I. Now, as
then, there is a determined effort to per- .
petuate in peace the great powers the
military enjoyed in war. .
In 1919 the War Department's bill?
S. 2715?for reorganization of the Army
met immediate and tspoken opposi-
tion in Congress an he press, where
it was characterized -s a preposterous
scheme of the military to perpetuate the
present absolute control of the General
Staff over all functions of the Military
Establishment and to Prussianize the
military system of the United States.
The War Department bill was killed
in committee during the first session of
the Sixty-sixth Congress but its phi-
losophy reappeared again in 1920 in -
greatly diluted forrn, as S. 3792, spon-
sored by Senator 'WADSWORTH.
Although passed by the Senate over
a strong minority report of its military -
affairs committee, this bill never became
law. The House had initiated' its Own
bill, a strong but liberal redrafting of the -
principles embodied in the National De-
fense Act of 1916. The House bill, with ,
minor changes, was enacted into law as
the National Defense Act of 1920.
MANY PARALLELS ARE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT
BETWEEN THE 1919 CONTROVERSY AND THE
PROBLEM NOW BEFORE CONGRESS
The most objectionable section of the
1919 bill was as follows:
The President shall merge as expeditiously
as possible after the approval of this act
all now existing departments, bureaus, and
offices of the War Department into the or-
ganization herein prescribed or authorized;
and shall have authority to make such dis-
tribUtion or redistribution of the duties,
powers, functions, records, property, and
personnel of such previously existing de-
partment bureaus, and offices as he may deem
necessary for the efficiency of the military
service, and authority to prescribe the duties,
powers, and functions of officers of the serv-
ice, units, and organizations herein author-
ized or prescribed. (Prom Annual Report of
the War Department 1919, vol. 1, pt. 1.)`
The scope and intent of the paragraph
quoted above is apparent at the
first reading. It sought to have Congress
relinquish its traditional authority to
state the purpose for which it created
and supported elements of the armed
services. It was but an early aspect of .
the "roles and mitsions" controversy
which for the past 2 years has raged
over the status of the Marine Corps and
naval aviation, and which will be dis-
cussed later in more detail. But note the
effort to have Congress relinquish its
authority over such large segments of
military legislation.
'As was so-apparent to Congress and to
several leading, editors the proposed bill
would have enacted as peacetime legis-
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CONGRESSIGYAL 1;',ECORD-HOUSE JULY 19_
the President by the Overman Act. The
obvious intent of the bill was well sum-
marized as follows in the recent book,
National Security and the General-Staff,
page 277, written by the youthful general
staff publicist, Mai. Gen. Otto L. Nelson,
Jr.:
Needless to say the W'ar Department had
enjoyed the provisions of the Overman Act,
which had given the President authority to
make Such organizational changes in the
administrative set-up as the war demanded.
Th:s was the War Department's first big
taste of administrative discretion and the
General Staff wanted more of it.
Again note the similarity of that post-
World War I bill and the present bill.
The present bill originated in ? the War
Department. The big difference between
now and then is that instead of just being
restricted to relinquishing authority over
the Army, this year's bill, H. R. 2319. was
.-, total abdication by Congress of its au-
tnority over the armed forces.
Senator Chamberlain . led the fight
against the War Department's 1919 de-
fense bill. He sensed the basic dangers
of what was transpiring and analyzed
that bill with great accuracy': his de-
scription of the 1919 bill .applies with
equal accuracy to H. R. 2319: Following
is his prophetic statement?These .ex-
tracts are from his Analytical and -Ex-
planatory Statement as printed for the
use of the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs by the ? Government Printing
C.i'fice, 1919:
This bill was framed by military advisers
of the Secretary of War. * ? ? Inasmuch
as many of these proposals are radical and
even revolutionary in their nature, ? and, if
rejected now, are likely again to be urged
" upon Congress, possibly in other forms, it
seems advisable now to examine all of them
very thoroughly. The comments made here-
in with regard to them will apply to them
equally as well whenever and however they
shall appear In future.
In 1919, as now, the congressional com-
mittees were handicapped in* their at-
tempt to secure information necessary
for the drafting of an adequate bill. for.
national defense in two ways:
' First, the reluctance of witnesses to
testify freely concerning matters relating
to the reorganization of the Army:
Second, the plea of military secrecy?
present example JCS 1478 papers?used
by the War Department to suppress and
withhold information bearing directly
upon the proposed legislation.
The General Staff was accused, by ex-
Speaker Clark on the floor of the House,
of maintaining a powerful national lobby.
Congressman -Clark's . remarks are re-
ported in the: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of
May 19, 1920, volume IX, part 7.
Mr. Clark said,_ quoting from the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD: ?
I have no objection to the General Staff.
either,, except I think they ought to .attend
to their business and let Congress attend to
its business. [Applause.] They get up every
one of these Army bills substantially. It is
the sccond strongest lobby that -has been .
around here since I have been in Congress.
I think the Anti-Saloon League leads the
list in strength of the lobby and the Regular
Army officers conie second. [Applause.]
The passage of the National Defense
Act of 1920 brought to a' close the great
controversy which hat-, :aged through two
sessions of Congress. This act has been
recognized as outstanding example of'
well-written defense legislation and was
lauded by every successive Chief of Staff
thereafter from 1922 to 1939 as a model
statute--reference, Annual Repor'es of
Secretary of War.
Now, as in 1919, the War Department
General Staff is seeking again to project
into peacetime, emergency controls of '
war. The parallel is clear. The follow-
ing quotation from Senator Chamber-
lain's statement is as true today as it
was in 1919 and 1920:
The method adopted by the framers of
the bill in order to conceal this scheme and
its true inwardness, and thus to secure its
adoption by an unsuspecting Congress, was
-somewhat complicated. The whole of it is
not to be found in any one section of the
bill or in plain language anywhere. But it
is all there, nevertheless, and it can be
discovered readily enough by assembling its
ingeniously scattered parts.
The War' Departthent General Staff's
scheme, so thoroughly repudiated in 1920,
appears again on a vastly enlarged scale
in -the present unification bill. Recent
witnesses before congressional commit-
tees have scoffed and belittled the dan-
gers'of military ambition in high places,
taking the position that in the 45 years
of its existence the General Staff has
never challenged the power of Congress.
A true statement of the case would be
that the General Staff has never, at least
until the present, successfully challenged
the power of Congress.
There is no reason why Congress, par-
ticularly the House, should have an in-
feriority complex in matters of defense
legislation. There is no more reason
why this House of Representatives
should now blindly accept a military-
written bill for national defense than it
did in 1920. There is no apparent rea-
son why the present Members of the
House are not just as capable of enact-
ing good strong defense legislation as
were our 1920 predecessors. There is
no indication that we are not as fully
capable as our predecessors to pass on
requests for military legislation. Above'
all, when passing on such requests we
are no less able to give the country a
bill that provides for the organization
of the Nation's war power, but which
keeps military ,power in harmony with
our traditions of democracy.
Ever since the 1932 defeat of unifica-
tion by the Senate?until the present?
Congress had seemed to heed the advice
of one of the Nation's greatest soldiers
and statesmen, General of the Armies
Douglas MacArthur, who in 1932 stated
his opinion of unification. General Mac-
Arthur said:
No other measure proposed in recent years
seems to me to be fraught with such poten-
tial possibility of disaster for the United
Sfates as in this one. ? * * Not only the
military history of this country, init of every
country, gives indisputable proof of. the ad-
vantages of Maintaining in time of war the
Integral control of two great branches of
national defense?the Army and the Navy.
Each must be free to perform its mission un-
hindered by any centralized and ponderous
bureaucratic control. ? * * Pass this bill
and everp potential enemy of the United
States will rejoice.
So far I have spoken of the history of
unification and the similarity between
the present merger proposals and the
previous proposals which' were so de-
cisively defeated whenever they arose. -
Let us now look more closely at the pro-
posals as were embraced by H. R: 2319
and S. 753, its Senate counterpart.
The present discussions of unification,
merger, or whatever name is given to the
reorganization of the armed forces, can
never be complete until thorough and '
exhausting consideration is given to the
question?who should manage the con--
duct of a war? ?
The question of responsibility for war
management is one whose answer may .
determine the life or death of a nation.
To many the obvious answer is?the
military.
This same too obvious answer is the
one reached by the military men who
drew Up the prewar industrial mobiliza-
tici.n plan. This plan, drawn up during
the years of peace by uniformed military
men, placed on paper a scheme for an
industrial czar with 'enormous powers.
This czar would have headed a machine
whose controls were in the-hands of the
military.
The official Government?Bureau of ?
the Budget?report on war administra-
tion, The United States at War, criti-
cizes the plan as scarcely meriting the
build-up it had been given; it was a docu-
ment dealing only in generalities with
the problem of governmental organiza-
tion for war and it 'was formulated for
conditions unlike those which actually
arose. Further it would have consti-
tuted virtual abdication by the President
and would have made it difficult for the
President to control the board strategy.
of 'defense preparation and -foreign eco-
nomic policy. Moreover the plan carried
with it potentialities of far greater
military influence in the management of
governmental affairs than appeared
either desirable or politic.
The document is prima facie evidence
of charges .made by Donald M. Nelson
in his book, Arsenal of Democracy, that
top echelon of Our military men had a
lack of understanding of our national
economy and psychology. It might even
. be considered. to show a studied disre-
gard for our constitutional form of gov-
ernment. ?
Even a casual reading of the official
report on war administration, The
'United States at War, reveals that mili-
tary management of the late war would
have beena hideous blunder, and further
that our prior defense planning would
have been more realistic if the plans
prepared by the military had had civilian
criticism and supervision. Indeed; there
was great truth in Clemenceau's state-
ment that war is too important a matter
to be left to the military.
War extends from the sowing of se.-d,
the growing of crops On up through a
thousand operations to the finished sup-'-
ply item and weapons, and the military
mind is not trained to grasp and solve
the problems.
The record is plain for all to see. War
is too important a matter to be left to
the military. No 'other interpretation
can be made by anyone interested in pre-
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1947 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-H.073SE
serving the Nation and its democratic
form of government. The complex ma-
chinery of our industrial economy, the
delicate negotiations of foreign policy,
the abstruse maneuverings of interna-
tional finance and economic warfare,
must be left to those competent to un-
derstand them, to those with experience,
the civilians, and the military confined
to their narrow technical field, the prep-
aration for, and the conduct of ,battle.
' At the same time, the record Clearly
shows that the military must advise the
civilian rulers as to the technical re-
quirements and capabilities of the armed
forces, while the civilians must keep the
military plans wit' the bounds of our
national resources.
And, finally, it is crystal clear that the
military monkey wrench must be kept
out of the national war machine in what-
ever design of governmental organiza-
tion for war management is adopted.
For to permit immediate or gradual
growth of military control of war man-
agement is to follow the path of mili-
tarism?to disaster.
HOW TI-IE LIMITARY INFLUENCE IS EXERTED IN
THE ,CURZENT MERGER PROPOSALS
While there are innumerable devices
planted throughout H. R. 2319 and S.
758, and to a lesser extent in H. R. 4214,-
far the exercise of military influence in
the management of the Nation, two of
them deserve special mention: First, the
device of the interlocking directorate;
and second, studied provisions whereby
boards which are nominally civilian in
character are required to rely upon sub-
ordinate bodies which are military in
character.
The interlocking-directorate device
appears throughout H. R. 2319, S. 758,
and H. R. 4214. By this device the
higher level supposedly civilian agencies
such as the National Security Council
and the National Security Resources
Board can be swayed by the preponder-
ant and continuous influence of the.
War Council and Munitions Board, their
lesser military counterparts. This effect -
is ranch more obvious in the National .
Security Council and may be shown as
forlows :
The Secretaries of National Security,
Army, Navy, and Air are on the 'War
Council. There, in a military atmos-
phere, a ad with their military ad-1
viserS, could come to conclusions
on industry,. foreign affairs, labor and
manpower, education, and public infor-
mation. These conclusions could reflect
ptrely the military viewpoint.' Then as
members of the National Security Colin-
cal, the four military Secretaries would
have a preponderant voice, as they would
hold four out of .seven votes.
This preponderance, it is true, could be .7
ignored by the President when his views
coincided with the minority represent-
ing purely the civilian side of 'govern-
ment. The decision in any event is the
President's. But he could not consist-
ently ignore the views of the majority
of the Counpil that would represent the
military. This is the basis of the Un-
favorable comment made by the Chris-
tian Science Monitor when its, editorial
of May 26 objected to the military domi-
nation of .,hc National Socurity Council.
These objections cannot be b:ushed
aside by the mere statement that the
men selected for these important posi-
tions would be unlikely to form such a
cabal. Democratic governments of and
by civilians are not wise to set up ma-
chinery which would permit and assist
the use of such devices. The historical
fact remains that men have done such
things.
The interlocking directorate is less
apparent in the bill's provisions for the
National Security Resources Board. But
it is there, and probably of greater po-
tential danger because of the devious
approach.
These bills fail to specify the congres-
sional intention as to the minimum
membership on the Security Resources
Board of interested departments and
agencies. This leaves the way open for
intrigue as to members to be named.
Certainly it would be possible to name as
members of the Security Resources Board
the same Under or Assistant Secretaries
who are the prescribed members of the
Munitions Board. It is significant to
note that the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Mr. Kenney, has publicly expressed
an opinion that there are times when it
would be desirable "to, have the same
individual serve as chairman of both
boards." Thus the preponderant mili-
tary voice in c the National Security
Council would be duplicated in the Na-
tional Security Resources Board.
The dangers of this interlocking di
rectorate influence upon the National
Security Resources Board should be ob-
vious. The raw resources and the indus-
try of a nation are the measures of its
war-making potential.
Senator Chamberlain's prophecy that
the objectives and devices of the War
Department's 1919 bill "will appear in
the future," has come true. The same ob-
jectives are being sought by the same
devious means, and they are still as ob-
-jectionable from either the viewpoint of
maintaining democratic government or
of assuring an understanding and ef-
ficient mobilization of a nation's re-
sources for war.
This Issue of military control over ci-
vilian economy was well summarized by
the editorial More Than a Merger, ap-
pearing in the May 26, 1947, Christian
Science Monitor. It is printed herewith,
marked exhibit A as is an editorial on
H. R. 4214:
But if history teaches anything at all, it
teaches that the military do not understand
the workings of industry nor the needs of
civilian economy. It teaches that the di-
rec' Ion of top national policy must be wholly
free from military domination.
The other major device by which the
military will exert its 'influence over the
management of national affairs, partic-
ularly the national economy, is the care-
fully planned reliance which the Na-
tional Security Resources Board is re-
quired to place , upon the Munitions
Board.
While H. R. 4214 does make some pro-
-vision for a staff for the Resources
No. 139-12
?r 97
J
Board, it makes no provision, or even a
mention of any civilian counterparts of
tile IN.DarlitiOnS Board. It leaves a com-
plete vacuum to offset the military influ-
ence of the Munitions Board.
THE JOINT STAFF
The provision for a Joint Staff is a
crucial portion of H. R. 2.:0, S. '758,
and?I am sorry to say?H. R. 4214, for
it marks a departure from congressional
precedent. In 1916 and 1920 Congress
prescribed definite restrictions on the
War Department General Staff. The
argument may conle up that this Joint
Staff is not a National General Staff.
The fact is that it can be a National Gen-
eral Staff in all but name, and the Di-
rector ,can become a National Chief of
Staff. Since a National General Staff
was the goal of the War Department's
high command in supporting last year's
merger bill, it would not be realistic to
believe that the War Department Gen-
eral Staff will not take full advantage
of the blank-check provisions of this
section pertaining to the Joint Staff. k"
If the, history of militarism teaches
anything it is that militaristic forces
within a great nation are dynamic, and
military elements will take not only what
powers as are given-, but will seize or
usurp whatever additional power that is
not prohibited to them by positive law or
action.
The dangers of the Joint Staff are not
mere imagination. General Edson felt
so strongly on this issue of -militarism
that he risked the ire of his superiors to
speak upon this matter. Said General
Edson, one of our Nation's most distin-
guished soldiers and holder of the Con-
gressional Medal of Honor for heroism'
on the field of battle:
- In my opinion, one of the most dangerous
and least understood provisions in this en-
tire legislation is that which sets up the
Joint Staff. It must be understood from the
outset that regardless of what it is called,
this Joint Staff is in fact a National General
Staff?the "Oberkommando" of the Prussian
military system. It is this body of per-
manent General Staff officers which will
formulate the policies of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and will be, in fact, the military ad-
visers of the Secretary of the National Mili-
tary Establishment.
Congress should recognize this fact, and,
as it has done in the past when dealing with
the War Department General Staff, should
carefully delineate and circumscribe its
, powers and functions. Also, in my opinion,
Congress should limit the tenure of duty of
its members, and provide for equitable, ro-
tation of the office of Director among 'all the
services. Only by so doing can Congress
prevent the growth of a military clique
which will inevitably extend its influence
into every department of government?civil-
ian as well as military. We have only to'
search the records of history to realize the /
truth of this statement.
This warning was reiterated by Ad-
miral Zacharias and Captain Karig of
the Navy.
There is not a sufficient understand-
ing among Members of Congress as to
the true implications of the section on
the' Joint Staff. For instance, the re-
port of the Senate .Unied Services Com-
mittee, commenting on' the Joint Staff,
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CONGRESSIGN2,i, Rz,coaD?HOUSE JULY 19
minimized the grave warnings with the
statement:
The Joint Staff as proposed in this bill has
in itself no command authority. (P. 14, Re-
port of Senate Armed Services Committee
on S. '758.)
That statement is in itself true, but
it is false in its inference that in this
respect the Joint Staff differs from any
other staff. The fact is that no staff
has in itself any command authority.
Staff officers exercise their power in the
form of delegated authority from their
superiors. Paragraph 6, United States
Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Officers'
_ Field Manual.
It is the imperceptible, gradual, and
constant accumulation of more author-
ity in carrying out the policy of their
so-called superior authorities that na-
tional general staffs became a dominant
force in their government. Again it is
well to emphasize that while this section
does not make it mandatory that the
Joint Staff shall become a National Gen-
Staff, the section, by its lack of re-
strictions, opens the door to such an
eventuality. Not even the great German.
General Staff had in itself command
authority. Von Moltke, at the pinnacle
of his power as chief of staff?military
ruler of that nation, had, in himself, no
command 'authority, as he issued orders
in the name of his superior, the Ern-
' paror?data from Whitten's Von Moltke,
a biography.
Congress has never previously per-
mitteC the fact that a "staff in itself
has no 'command authority" to deter it
from prescribing the most definitive re-
sixictions on the War Department Gen-
eral Staff. The Defense Act of 1916
placed definite restrictions on the War
Department General Staff, restrictions
designed to keep that staff from accumu- ,
lating increasing authority even 'within
the War Department.
Congress was even more insistent in
controlling the ambitions of the War
Department General Staff, and specified
detailed General Staff restrictions in the
National Defense Act of 1920.
Thus, this Congress in authorizing a
National General Staff is giving such a
staff a completely free hand at the
highest national military level, whereas
it has been the historic sense of Con-
gress to impose most specific restrictions
on General Staff influence within even
the relatively restricted sphere of the.
War Department.
The mere fact that the military resists
congressional efforts to put- restrictive
provisions on the Joint Staff is prima ,
facie evidence of the fact that those who
sought an outright authorization of a
National General Staff in last year's
unification bill fully intend to use the
Joint Staff in this year's bill as a medris
of attaining their nefarious objective.
Congress should consider well the in-
herent dangers of the section of the bill
pertaining to the Joint Staff before giv-
ing it the effect of law. U the section
as written is passed it will mark the vic-
tory of General Stnff influences over
Congress, which for 44 years has fought
to restrain such. inthiences within our
Government.
DCONOMY
Innumerable claims have been made
by proponents of this legislation that
great Savings will resul?c, from its enact-
ment through the elimination of waste
and duplication. These claims are in-
variably couched ii- generalities, and in
spite of repeated demands from commit-
tee members that concrete facts and
figures be produced to support these
claims, no such facts and figures have
been forthcoming. The reason for this
is probably a realization on the part of
the bill's sponsors that if they cited a
specific instance of waste and duplica-
tion that would be eliminated on passage
of the bill, the question would immedi-
ately be asked: "Why do not you do it
now?what prevents you?". The answer
is, of course, that nothing in the present
system stands in the way of the elimi-
nation of waste and duplication.
The fact should not be overlooked, in
connection with any possible economies
which might result from merger, that
there is a point of diminishing returns in
the growth of any organization. When
this fact is coupled with the fact that
the chief partner in the proposed merger
Is notorious for its inept and profligate
management of its business affairs, the
specious claims of economy may well be
questioned.
Neither the Marine Corps nor naval
aviation was adequately protected in
either S. 758 or in H. R. 2319.
Provisions which I think were neces-
sary and which may be adequate to pro-
tect the integrity of the marines, of naval
aviation, have been written, first, into
H. R. 3979 introduced by me, and later
into H. R. 4214, which is now before the
House.
. The representatives of the Joint Staff
have insisted from the very beginning
until the last day this bill was under
consideration that there should not be
written into it the roles and functions of
the component parts of our armed forces.
Their very evident and apparent desire
is to retain in their own hands supreme
power.
FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMED SERVICES
The matter of legislative delineation of
the roles and functions of the armed
services is one of the chief issues in the
unification controversy.
If the basic functions of all services
were clearly defined, the apprehensions
a the Navy for its air component and
the apprehensions of the Marine Corps
for its effectiveness would disappear?
and with them much ,of the present
The War Department is urgently de-
sirous of excluding the roles and missions
of the armed services from law, since
such an omission will permit the gradual
reorientation of our military power in
the direction of the ground arm. Every
bill that the War Department has had
a part in framing has avoided mention of
roles and functions, and War Depart-
.ment spokesmen have fought against
statutory enactment.
When closely examined, War Depart-
ment witnesses admit the unquestion-
able right of Congress to establish the
basic functions of any agency it creates,
Yet it is claimed that roles and functions
are constantly changing and are thus not
suited to legal expression. This is spe-
cious reasoning.
The fears of naval aviation and the
Marine Corps are based on the strongest
of written evidence?the following state-
ments:
General Spaatz, commanding general,
Army Air Forces:
recommend therefore that the size of
the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily
available, and lightly armed units, no larger
than a regiment, to protect United States
interests ashore in foreign countries and to
provide interior guard of naval ships and
naval shore establishments.
General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff,
United States Army:
I therefore recommend that the above con-
cept be accepted as stating the role of the
Marine Corps and that marine units not
exceed the regiment in size, and that the
size.of the Marine Corps be made consistent
with the foregoing principles.
Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, in reply to the above:
The basic and major issues ? ? *
comprise a proposal on the part of the Army
(a) to eliminate the Marine Corps as an
effective combat element, reducing it to the
status of a naval police unit.
General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff,
United States Army, also wrote:
1. That the Marine Corps is maintained
solely as an adjunct of the fleet and par-
ticipates only in minor shore combat opera-
tions in which the Navy alone is interested.
3. That it be agreed that the Navy will
not develop a land army or a so-called am-
phibious army; marine units to be limited
In size to the equivalent of the regiment,
and the total size of the Marine Corps there-
fore limited to some 50,000 or 60,000 men.
In addition to General Eisenhower,
others expressed their willingness to see
the basic functions written into law.
Why, then, was a meaningful section on
the subject not included in 5, 758?
There are two reasons:
First. The War Department didn't
want it.
Second. It was part of the agreement
not to have it.
The question may well be raised, if Sec-
retary Forrestal, Admiral Nimitz, and
? General Vande,grift have all declared
that S. 758 provides adequate protection
for the Marine Corps, what further ob-
jection could there be? In answer to
this it must first be recalled that the
principals in this controversy have been
under continuing, and understandable,
pressure to reach a compromise.
Second, and most significant, it must
be realized that no individual primarily
involved has been a free agent as to tes-
timony, the Cabinet officers because of
their administration affiliation and the
military personnel because of the official
gag, which, most significantly, was not
raised until June 23, after all chance of
effective testimony was past.
H. R. 4214 is a superior bill to S. '158 in
that it prescribes the general functions
of the armed services. It does not legis-
late tactics, and its provisions ar ? suffi-
ciently broad so as not to freeze progress.
But at the same time it is sufficiently
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definite to prevent the recurrence of such
ut 7' :,unate interservice disputes as that
which raged over the Marine Corps and
naval aviation for over 2 years.
Ett, while the representative of the
Joint Staff, General Norstad, appearing
as late as Thursday afternoon before
members of the subcommittee, insisted
that the Congress should not write into
the act provisions which some members
of the committee believed were neces-
sary if the integrity of naval aviation and
the Marine Corps was to be protected,
when confronted by the provisions of the
Constitution, it was admitted that the
Congress had the unquestioned right to
write legislation such as that embodied
in H. R. 4214. ?
In all humility, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that H. R. 4214 will more ade-
quately protect and make efficient the
armed forces of the Nation than will
S. '753 or any similar bill.
At the same time, I cannot again avoid
calling to the attention of this Congress
the provisions of the Constitution and the
fact that legislation of this kind is a
right-about-face and a retreat from the
theory of government established there-
in. .
Our forefathers, burdened by excessive
and oppressive taxation, deprived of their
personal and their 'religious liberties,
came to this country and they here es-
tablished a form of government then new -
to the world.
They established a system of checks )
and ci iDalances.
They provided that the Congress shotild
provide for the national defense.
In the Constitution they sought to im-
plerhent that defense by providing that
the Congress should establish and main-
tain an army, appropriations for which
were limited to a .2-year period. That
limitation was undoubtedly written into
the Constitution because its authors
feared military authority, feared a dicta-
torship.
The Constitution provided that the
Congress should establish and' maintain
a navy.
Now, because of the fear brought about
by propaganda, the military seeks to,
and apparently will be successful in in-
ducing the Congress to abdicate its au-
thority, to shirk its responsibility, and to
turn over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
to a supernallitary organization imposed
upon our armed forces, the duty of pro-,
viding a. national defense.
This bill does not provide for unifica-
tion. It adds to the Army and the Navy
provided for in the ?.:onstitution a third,
department?the Al ? Lq'orce.
No one is so dumb as to believe that
the Constitution bars the use of any and
all methods of defense or offense which
would add to our national safety.
Few, indeed, are those who believe that
either the Army or the Navy could in
these days provide national defense with-
out adequate air forces.
Few, indeed, are those who believe that
the Air Force alone or any outfit advocat--
ing the efficiency of a p-,.?,h-button War,:
could carry on without the aid Of both
the Army and the Navy and all their com-
ponent parts. ?
For more than 150 years, under the.
principles prescribedWre itoatipipok.
and 1:.'sr.'; z'.C.VOCC.tcd by the
leaders of 011f aimed forecs, ti-hs Nation
has successfully cl,ifended
The last two world w: rs e demon-
strated beyond any argument that our
fighting forces are superior, when backed
by our production methods, to that of
any one or all other armed forces now
or heretofore in existence.
Other natidris have followed their mili-
tary leaders in their unification and cen-
tralization schemes, giving power to mili-
tary leaders. Hitler tried it. Mussolini
tried it and Stalin has used it: Yet,
every time it has failed when confronted
and put to the test by the so-called
wasteful, inefficient 'methods of the
United States of America.
Unification, centralization, in the
hands of the military authorities has
been one of the major causes of the
downfall of every nation which has
adopted it.
It is difficult to understand why we,
successful as we have been under our
constitutional methods of fighting and
winning wars, should adopt, embrace
and follow the methods of the losers.
My vote will be cast for H. R. 4214
because and only because some legisla-
tion on the subject is to be adopted by
this Congress and that bill is the least
harmful.
Were it in my power, I would refuse
to legislate on this subject ,at this time;
recommit the bill to the committee, with
instructions to its sponsors to lay on the
line 'some assurance that they are not
seeking regimentation, a dictatorship,
and that their proposals would give us
some economy, some greater efficiency.
EXHIBIT A
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Boston,
Mass., of May 26, 19471
MUCH moan THAN A MERGER BILL
The so-called merger bill is turning out
under close inspection to be something quite
different?something much broader and more
far-reaching. To put it differently: There
is another, less obvious side of the bill which
is neither being headlined nor discussed.
Audit is time the American people are told
what this measure really means.
This bill does more than draw a blueprint
of unified direction and better teamwork for
the military and naval services. Of much
deeper significance, it is a piece of basic
legislation which establishes how and by
whom national policy and the civilian econo-
my shall be controlled in any prospect of
war.
We have supported the general provisions
of the merger, particularly coordination of
foreign policy, military policy, and industrial
potential. But because this bill originated
In the thinking of military men, the power
It assigns or permits to the military over
national policy and civilian affairs is very
great?much greater, we think, than the
American people would knowingly choose.
Here are some of the provisions of the
National Security Act which we question in
this regard:
? 1. On the National Security Council, which
should not only coordinate but also keep in
balance foreign policy, military policy, and
national production and resources, the Sec-
retary of State and the Chairman of the
-National Security Resources Board face not
Only the Secretary of National Defense, but
also the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. The ratio thus is weighed 4
01-0
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vii-ory duties only and concerned with broad
':-...eparedness policy. The Munitions Board,
however, is placed wholly within the Depart-
ment of National Defense and staffed with
top officials of the three military depart-
ments. This Board is given the kind of
functions which could mean actual control
and direction of the civilian economy by the
military in case of war: to determine prior-
ities, to supervise subordinate agencies, and
to "make recommendations to regroup, cons-
bine, or dissolve existing interservicc agen-
cies operating in the fieldS of procurement,
production, and distribution."
3. The wording of the act not only permits,
but actually encourages, interlocking direc-
torates as regards the Munitions Board, the
Resources Board, and a third, the Resources
and Development Board. Representatives,
and perhaps the same representatives, of
the military departments could domindte all
three.
4. The act permits, in fact suggests, that
the Director -of the Central in: ;ence
Agency serving the state as well De-
fense Departments, be an officer of one of the
armed forces rather than a civilian.
5. In somewhat oblique but nonetheless
definite language the act perpetuates. cer-
tain of the war powers of the President
notwithstanding the expiration provisions in
the laws which established them. It hands
over to the Secretary of National Defense
the blanket authority which hitherto in
peacetime has traditionally rested with Con-
gress.
We do not impute to the generals and ad-
mirals any plot to set up a military dictator-
ship. Their training and professional ex-
perience have simply made them pattern this
legislation by military standards.
But if history teaches anything at all, it
teaches that the military do not understand
the workings of industry nor the needs of
civilian economy. It teaches that the di-
rection of top national policy must be wholly
free from military domination.
What to do about this Security Act of
194'7? The essential basis of the merger
compromises between the armed services,
perhaps, should not be disturbed. But the
broader objectives of the bill need study
and public discussion before anything be-
comes law.
EXH/BIT B
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Boston,
Mass., of July 10, 194'71
THAT HISTORIC EQUILIBRIUM
The Gurney bill providing for merger of
the armed forces has just been passed by the
Senate with but slight lendment. It now
goes to the House of Representatives where
its counterpart is still in committee, together
with an alternative bill introduced by Repre-
sentative CLARE E. Hor.FmAx, of Michigan.%
The Senate bill is backed ,by the adminis-
tration, and is the one now being publicly
disCussed.
This newspaper approves and has sup-
ported the general framework and the broad
objectives .of the adminikation measure.
We believe that the conduct Of this country's
military and foreign policies and the develop-
ment and mobilization of its industrial po-
tential and natural resources must be co-
ordinated closely at the highest levels. We
are in agreement that grand and lesser -
Strategy', must be planned and executed with
all the service branches working as members
of one team. We are persuaded that this can
be done without loss of the esprit de corps
and the specialized know-how of each of these
branches or of constructive rivalry between
them. We are sure that existing duplica-
tions can be greatly reduced in the interests
of efficiency and economy.
All of these things the Gurney bill sets
to 2 in favor of the armed forces. . out to do. With certain exceptions, it is
2. The National Security Resources Board, so framed, in our opinion, that it should
an indlotilsylobty,- 6fAalitiFyga baci6locke,,m?,h itA5puopov. But. these excep-
UUZOUU 0 ? ?
o r e ease - - 0 0 -
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lions have a momentous bearing on the
American way of life.
They have little or nothing to do with the
military aspects of the merger. They do not
pertain to unified command, to task-force
strategy, or teamwork between the fighting
arms.
These exceptions are provisions in the
Gurney bill which would weight the top co-
ordination of the armed forces, State De-
partment, and industrial potential much too
heavily with the military view. They would
set, up a Central Intelligence Agency, with
no restrictions against possible evolution into
some sort of -a superpolice force within the
United States.
They would place military chiefs on the
hignly important war Council to sit RS co-
equals with their civilian Secretary superiors.
They would locate too much of the job of
industrial mobilization wholly within the
new military department. These are some
examples.
Fortunately, Congress has specific ,correc-
tion right at hand for these dangerous de-
fects. It is in the form of certain provisions
of the Hoffman bill (H. R. 3979), which has
taiten account of testimony given at House
committee hearings.
We cannot go along with Mr. Homame in
his weakening of the Secretary of National
Defense by making him a coordinator instead
of a true department head. Other than
that, his bill appears specifically and effec-
tively to counteract the military overloading
inherent in the Gurney bill.
We urge that these corrections be written
into the Gurney bill and the amended bill
enacted. Americans want true unification of
all of their instruments of national defense.
They want also preservation of that historic
quilibrium between /civilian and military
ec.ntrol. If Congress is alert, they can have
both.
The CHAIRMAN. There being no fur-
ther requests for time, the Clerk will
read.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that the bill be con-
sidered as read, that it be printed at this
point in the RECORD, and be open to
amendment at any point.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Alabama?
There was no objection.
(The bill reads as follows:)
Be it enacted, etc., That this act may be
cited as the "National Security Act Of 1947."
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
TITLE I-.-COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
Sec. 102. Secretary of Defense.
Sec. 103. Military assistants to the Secretary.
Sec. 104. Civilian personnel.
Sec. 105. Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 106. National Security Resources Board.
TITLE II-THE NATIONAL MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT
Sec. 201. National Military Establishment.
Sec. 202. Department of the Army.
Sec. 203. Department of the Navy.
Sec. 204. Department of the Air Force.
Sec. 205. United States Air Force.
Sec. 206. Effective date of transfers. .
Sec. 207. War Council.
Sec. 208. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Sec. 209. Joint Staff.
Sec. 210. Munitions Board.
Sec. 211. Research and Development ....0ard..
TITLE III-MISCELLANEOUS
Soc. 301. Compensation of Secretaries:
Sec. 302. Under Secretaries and Assistant Sec-
retaries.
Sec. 303. Advisory committees and personnel.
See. 304; Stain:, of traneferred civilian per-
Sec. 305. Saving provisions.
Sec. 303. Transfer of thuds.
Sec. 307. Buget estimates.
Sec. 308. Authodzation for appropriations.
Sec. 309. Defini?;ions.
Sec. 310. Separability.
Sec. 311. Efl'ective date.
DECLARATION OF POLICY
SEC. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is
the intent of Congress to provide a compre-
hensive program for the future security of
the United States; to provide for the estab-
lishment of integrated policies and proce-
dures for the departments, agencies, and
functions of the Government relating to the
national security; to provide three military
departments for the operation and adminis-
tration of the Army, the Navy (including
the naval air force and the United States
Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their
assigned combat and service components; to
provide for their authoritative coordination
and unified direction under civilian control
but not to merge them; to provide for the
effective strategic direction of the armed
forces and for their operation under unified
control and for their integration into an
efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.
TITLE I-COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SEC. 101. (a) There is hereby established
a council to be known as the National Se-
curity Council (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the "Council").
The President of the United States shall
?preside over meetings of the Council: Pro-
vided, That in his absence he may designate
a member of the Council to preside in his
place.
The function of the Council shall be to
advise the President with respect to the in-
- tegration of domestic, foreign, and military,
policies relating-to the national security so
as to enable the military services and the
other departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment to cooperate more effectively in
matters involving the national security.
The Council shall be composed of the Pres-
ident; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of
Defense, appointed under section 102; the
Secretary of the Army, referred to in section
202; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary
of the Air Force, appointed under section
204; and the Chairman of the National Se-
curity Resources Board, appointed under
section 106.
(b) In addition to performing such other
functions as the President may direct, for
the purpose of more effectively coordinating
the policies and functions of the departments
and agencies of the Government relating to
the national security, it shall, subject to the
direction of the President, be the duty of the
council-
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives,
. commitments, and risks of the United States
in relation to our actual and potential mili-
tary power, in the interest of national se-
curity, for the purpose of making recom-
mendations to the President in connection
therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of com-
mon interest to the departments and agencies
of the Government concerned with the na-
tional security, and to make recommenda-
tions to the President in connection there-
with. ,
(c) The Council shall have a staff to be
headed by a civilian executive secretary who
shall be appointed by the President, and
who shall receive compensation at the rate
of $14,000 a year. The executive secretary,
subject to the direction of the Council, is
hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service
laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as
amended, to appoint and fix the compensa-
tion of such personnel as may be necessary
JULY 19
to perform such duties as may be prescribed
by the Council in connection with the per-
formance Of its functions.
(d) The Council shall, from time to time,
make such recommendations, and such other
reports to the President as it deems appro-
priate or. as the President may require.
SECRETARY OF DM7ENSE
Sm. 102. (a) There shall be a Secretary of
Defense, who shall be appointed from civil-
ian life by the President, by and with the
advice and consent Of the Senate: Provided,
That a person who has held a commission in
a Regular component of the armed services
shall not be eligible for appointment as Sec-
retary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense
shall be the principal assistant to the Presi-
dent in all matters relating to the national
security. Under the direction of the Presi-
dent and subject to the provisions of this
act he shall perform the following duties:
(1) Establish general policies and programs
for the National Military Establishment and
for all of the departments and agencies
therein;
(2) Exercise general direction, authority,
and control over such departments and
agencies;
(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate un-
necessary duplication or overlapping in the
fields of procurement, supply, transportation,
storage, health, and research;
(4) Supervise and coordinate the prepara-
tion of the budget estimates of the depart-
ments and agencies comprising the National
Military Establishment; and supervise the
budget programs of such departments and
agencies under the applicable appropriation
act.
Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of
the Air Force from presenting to he Presi-
dent or to the Director of the Budget, after
first so informing the Secretary of Defense,
any report or recommendation relating to
his department which he may deem neees-
sary: And provided further, That the De-
partment of the Army, the Department of
the Navy, and the Department of the Air
Force shall be administered as individual ex-
ecutive departments by their respective Sec- ?
retaries and all powers and duties relating to
such departments not specifically conferred
upon the Secretary of Defense by this act
shall be retained by each of their respective
Secretaries,
(b) The Secretary. .of Defense shall sub- -
mit annual written reports to the President
and the Congress ? Covering expenditures,
work, and accomplishments of the National
Military Establishment; together with such
recommendations as he shall deem appro-
priate.
(c) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a
seal of office to be made for the National Mili-
tary Establishment of such design as the
Presid...t shall approve, and judicial notice
shall be taken thereof.
MILITARY ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY
SEC. 103. Officers of the armed services may
be detailed to duty as assistants and person-
al aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he
shall not establish a military staff.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEa,
SEC. 104. (a) The Secretary of Defense' is
authorized to appoint from civilian life not
to exceed three special assistants to advise
and assist him in the performance of his du-
ties. Each such special assistant shall re-
ceive compensation at the rate of $10,000 a
year.
(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized,
subject to the civil-service laws and the Clas-
sification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint
and fix the compensation of such other civil-
ian personnel as may be necessary for the
performance of the functions of the National
Military Establishment.
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CENTP.AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
105. (a) There is hereby established
uri..ier the Ieational Security Council a Cen-
tral Inti.11igence Agency with a Director of
Central Intelligence, who shall be the head
thereo2. (The Director shall be appointed
by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, from among the com-
missioned ofi-ic:ers of the armed services or
from among individuals in civilian lif.e) The
Director shall receive compensation at the
rate of $14,000 a year.
;O) (1) If a commissioned officer of the
armed services is . appointed as Director
(A) in in the performance of his duties as
Director, he shall be subject to no supervi-
sion, control, restriction, or prohibition (mil-
itary or otherwise) other than would be op-
erative with respect to him if he were a civil-
ian in no way connected with the Depart-
ment of the Army, the Department of the
Navy, the Department of the Air. Force, or
the armed services or any component there-
of; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any
supervision, control, powers, or functions
(other than such as he possesses, or is au-
thorized or directed to exercise, as Director)
with respect to the armed services or any
component thereof, the Department of the
Army, the Department of the Navy, or the
Department of the Air.....force, or any branch,
bureau; unit or division thereof, or with re-
spect to any of the personnel (military or
civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) ,
the appointment to the office Of Director of
a commissioned officer of the armed services,
and his acceptance of and service in such
office, shall in no way affect any status, office
rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the
armed services, or. any emolument, perqui-
site, right, privilege, or benefit incident to
or arising out of any-such status, office, rank,
or grade. Any such commissioned officer
shall, while serving in the office of Director,
receive the military pay and allowances (ac-
tive or retired, as the case may be) payable
to a commissioned officer of his grade arid
length of service and shall be paid, from any
funds available to defray the expenses of the
Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal
to the amount by which $14,000 exceeds the
amount of his annual military pay and allow-
ances.
(c) Nothwithstanding the provisions of
section 6 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37
Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other
law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, ^
in his discretion, terminate the employment
of any officer or employee of the Agency
whenever he shall deem such termination
necessary or advisable' in the interests cr.,
the United States, but such termination shall -
not affect the right of such officer or employee "
to seek or accept employment in any other
department or agency of the Government if
declared eligible for such employment by the
United States Civil Service Commission.
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the
intelligence activities of the several Govern-
ment departments and agencies in the inter-
est of national security, it shall be the dut
of the Agency, under the direction of the -Na-
tional Security Council?
(1) to advise the National Security Coun-
cil in matters concerning such intelligence
activities of the Government departments
and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the Pres-
ident through the National Security Council
for the coordination of such intelligence
activities of the departments and agencies
of the Government as relate to the national
security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence within , the Governm,- at using
where?appropriate existing agencies and facil-
ities: Proricica, Th:,t the .,`,:,oncy ?have
no police, subpena :ow-enforcement powers,
or internal-security funcimis: Pr Defded
further, That the responsi:nlity and 0.Athor-
ity of the departments and other a7,en7ieS of
the Government to collect, evaluate, corre-
late, and disseminate departmental intelli-
gence shall not be affected by this section:
And provided further, That the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the exist-
ing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the
National Security Council and approved by
the President, such intelligence operations of
the departments and other agdaie-S?Or`the
Government as relate to the national security
shall be open to the inspection of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, and such
Intelligence as relates to the national security
and is possessed by such departments and
other agencies shall be made available to
the Director of Central Intelligence for corre-
latio and dissemination.
1, , ive when the Director first ap-
poin.ea under subsection ? (a) has taken
office? .
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11
Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1496) shall
cease to exist; and
(2) the personnel, property, and records
of the Central Intelligence Group are trans-
ferred to the Central Intelligence Agency,
and such Group shall cease to exist. Any
unexpended balances of appropriations, allo-
cations, or other funds available or author-
ized to be made available for such Group
shall be available and shall be authorized
to be made available in like manner for ex-
penditure by the Agency.
NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD
SEC. 106. (a) There is hereby established
a National Security Resources Board (here-
inafter in this section referred to as the
"Board") to be composed of the Chairman
of the Board and such heads or representa-
tives of the various executive departments
and independent agencies as may from time
to time be designated by the President to
be members of the Board. The Chairman
of the Board shall be appointed from civilian
life by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and shall receive
compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.
(b) The Chairman of the Board, subject to
the direction of the President, is authorized,
without regard to the provisions of the civil-
service laws and regulations and the Classifi-
cation Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint'
and fix the compensation of such personnel
as may be necessary to assist the Board in
carrying out its functions.
(c) It shall be the function of the Board
to advise the President concerning the co-
ordination of military, industrial, and civil-
ian mobilization, including?
(1) policies conceraing industrial and
civilian mobilization in order to assure the
most effective mobilization and maximum
utilization of the Nation's manpower in the
event of war;
(2) programs for the effective use in time
of war of the Nation's natural and indus-
trial resources for military and civilian needs,
for' the maintenance and stabilization of the
civilian economy in time of war, and for the
adjustment of such economy to war needs
and conditions;
(3) policies for unifying, in time of war,
the activities of Federal agencies and de-
partments engaged in or concerned with
production, procurement, distribution or
"11
9601
transportation of military or civilian sup-
plies, materiels, and products;
(4) the relationship between potential
supplies of, and potential requirements for,
manpower, resources, and productive facili-
ties in time of war;
(5) policies for establishing adequate re-
serves 'of, strategic and critical material,
and for, the conservation of these reserves;
(6) the strategic relocation of industries,
services, government, and economic activities,
the continuous operation of which is es-
sential to the Nation's security.
(d) In performing its functions, the Board
shall utilize to the maximum extent the
facilities and resources of the departments
and agencies of the Government.
TITLE Il?THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISH-
MENT
ESTABLISHMENT OF TT - MILITARY
SECTION 201. (a) Then.: is hereby estab-
lished tilt Natiohal Military Establishment,
and the Secretary of Defense shall be the
head thereof. '
(b) The National Military Establishment
shall consist of the Department of the Army,
the Department of the Navy, and the De-
partment of the Air Force, together with all
other agencies created under title II of till;
act. ?
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SEC. 202. (a) The Dpartment of War
shall hereafter be designated the Depart-
ment of the Army, and the title of the Sec-
retary shall be changed to Secretary of the
Army. Changes shall be made in the titles
of other officers and activities of the De-
partment of the Army as the Secretary of
the Army may determine.
(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and
other actions relatirig to the Department
of War or to any officer or activity whose
title is changed under this section shall, in-
sofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this act, be deemed to relate
to the Department of the Army within the
National Military Establishment or to such
officer or activity designated by. his Or its
new title.
(c) The term "Department of the Army"
as used in this act shall be construed to
mean the Department of the Army at .the
seat of government and all field headquar-
ters, forces, Reserve components, installa-
tions, activities, and functions under the
control or supervision of the Department of
the Army.
(d) The Secretary of the Army shall
cause a seal of office to be made for the
Department of the Army, of such design as
the President may approve, and judicial no-
tice shall be taken thereof.
(e) In general the Up_ited States Army,
within the Department of the Army, shall
include land combat and services forces and
such aviation and water transport as may
be organic therein. It shall be organized,
trained, and equipped primarily for prompt
and sustained combat incident to operations
on land. It shall be responsible for the
preparation of land forces necessary for the
effective prosecution of war except as other-
wise assigned and, in accordance with in-
tegrated joint mobilization plans, for the
expansion of peacetime components of :the
Army to meet the needs of war.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SEC. 203. (a) The term "Department of the
Navy" as used in this act shall be construed
to mean the Department of the Navy at the
seat of government; the headquarters, United
States Marine Corps; the entire operating
forces of the United States Navy, including
naval aviation which shall hereafter be des-
ignated the naval air force, and of the United
States Marine Corps, including the Reserve
components of such forces; all field activities,
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headquarters, forces, bases, installations, ac-
tivities, and functions uncl.a? the control or
supervision 'of" the Department of the Navy;
and the United States Coast Guard when op-
erating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.
(b) In general the United States Navy,
within the Department of the Navy, shall in-
clude naval combat and service forces and
a. ? :lotion as may be organic therein. It
organized, trained, and equipped
pri-
for prompt and sustained combat in-
cident to operations at sea. It shall be
responsible for the preparation of naval forces
necessary for the effective prosecution of war
except as otherwise assigned, and, in accord-
ance with integrated joint mobilization
plans, for the expansion of the peacetime
components of the Navy to meet the needs
of war.
(c) The United States Marine Corps,
within the Department of the Navy, shall in-
clude land combat and service forces and such
aviation as may be organic therein. The pri-
mary mission of the Marine Corps shall be
to provide fleet .marine forces of combined
arms, together with supporting air compo-
nents, for service with the fleet in the seizure
or defense of advanced naval bases and for
the conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval
campaign. It shall be the duty of the Ma-
rine Corps to develop, in coordination with
the Army and the Air Force, those phases
of amphibious operations which pertain to
the tactics, technique, and equipment em-
ployed by landing forces. In addition to its
primary mission, the Marine Corps shall pro-
vide detachments and organizations for serv-
ice on armed vessels of the Navy, shall pro-
vide security detachments for the protection
of naval property at naval stations and bases,
and shall perform such other duties as the
President n-?'..y direct: Provided, That such
additional duties shall not detract from or
interfere with the performance of the ,pri-
mary mission hereinbefore set forth. The
Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accord-
ance with integrated joint mobilization plans,
for the expansion of peacetime components
of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of
war.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
SEC. 204. (a) There is hereby established
an executive department to be known as the
Department of the Air Force, and a Secre-
tary of the Air Force, who shall be the head
thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall
be appointed from civilian life by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice ad consent of
the Senate.
b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is
amended to include the Department of the
Ar Force and the provisions' of so much of
title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or
hereafter amended as is not inconsistent
with this act shall be applicable to the De-
partment of the Air Force.
?
(c) The term "Department of the Air
Force" as used in this act shall be construed
to mean the Department of the Air Force at
the seat of government and all field head-
quarters, forces, Reserve components, instal-
lations, activities, and functions under the
control or supervision of the Department of
the Air Force.
(d) There shall be in the Department of
the Air Force an Under Secretary of the Alt
Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the
Air Force, who shall be appointed from ci-
vilian life by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
(0) The several officers of the Department
of the Air Force shall perform such functions
as the Secretary of le Air Force may pre-
scribe.
(f) So much of the functions of the Sec-
retary of the Army and of the Department of
rho Army, including those of any officer of
such Department, as are assigned to or under
the control of the Commanding General,
briny Air Forces? or as are deemed by the
Secretary of Dea -frie to be necessary or de-
sirable for the operations of the Department
of the Air Force or the Uniced States Air
Force, shall be transferred to and vested in
the Secretary of the Air Force and the De-
partment of the Air Force: Provided, That
the National Guard Bureau shall, in addi-
tion to the functions and duties performed
by it for the Department of the Army, be
charged with similar functions and duties
for the Department of the Air Force, and
shall be the channel of communication be-
tween the Department of the Air Force and
the several States on all matters pertaining
to the Air National Guard: And provided
further, That, in order to permit an orderly
transfer, the Secretary of Defense may; dur-
ing the transfer period hereinafter pre-
scribed, ? direct that the Department of the
Army shall continue for appropriate periods
, to exercise any of such functions, insofar as
they relate to the Department of the Air
Force, or the United States Air Force or their
property and personnel. Such of the prop-
erty, personnel, and records of the Depart-
ment of the Army used in the exercise of
functions transferred under this subsection
as the Secretary of Defense shall determine
shall be transferred or assigned to the De-
partment of the Air Force.
? (g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall
cause a seal of office to be made for the De-
partment of the Air Force, of such device as
the President shall approve, and judicial
notice shall be taken thereof.
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
SEC. 205. (a) The United States Air Force
is hereby established under the Department
of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the
Air Corps, United States Army, and the Gen-
eral Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Com-
bat Command), shall be transferred to the
United States Air Force.
(b) There shall be a Chief of Staff, United
States Air Forces, who shall be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for a term of 4 years
from among the officers of general rank who
are assigned to or commissioned in the United
States .Air Force. Under the direction of the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force, shall exercise com-
mand over the United States Air Force and
shall be charged with the duty of carrying
into execution all lawful orders and direc-
tions which may be transmitted to him. The
functions of the Commanding General, Gen-
---eral Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Com-
bat Command), and of the Chief of the Air
Corps and of the Commanding General, Army
Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief
of Staff, United States Air Force. When
such transfer becomes effective, the offices
of the Chief, of the Air Corps, United States
Army, and Assistants to the Chief of the
Air Corps, United States Army, provided for
by the act of June 4, 1920, as amended (41
Stat. 768), and Commanding General, Gen-
eral Headquarters Air Force, provided for by
section 5 of the act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat.
1525), shall cease to exist. While holding
office as Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force, the incumbent shall hold a grade and
receive allowances equivalent to those pre-
scribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United
States Army. The Chief of Staff, United
States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations,
and the Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force, shall take rank among themselves ac-
cording to their relative dates of appoint-
ment as such, and shall each take rank above
all other officers on the active list of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force: Provided, That
nothing in this act shall have the effect of
changing the relative rank of the present
? Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the
present Chief of Naval Operations.
(c) All commissioned officers, warrant of-
ficers, and enlisted men, commissioned, hold-
ing warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps,
United States Army, or the Army Air Forces,
JULY 19
shall be transferred in branch to the United
States Air Force. All other commissioned
officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men,
who are commissioned, hold warrants, or are
enlisted, in any component of the A::
the United States and who are under ,me
authority or command of the Commanding
General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued
under the authority or command of the
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and
under the jurisdiction of the Department of
the Air Force. Personnel whose status is
affected by this subsection shall retain their
existing commissions, warrants, or enlisted',
status in existing components of the armed'
forces unless otherwise altered or terminated
in accordance with existing law; and they
shall not be deemed to have been appointed
to a new or afferent office or grade, or to
have vacated their permanent or temporary
appointments in an existing component of
the armed forces; solely by virtue of any
change in status under this subsection. No
such change in status shall alter or prejudice
the status of any individual so assigned, so
as to deprive him of any right, benefit or
privilege to which he may be entitled under
existing law.
(d) Except as otherwise directed by the
Secretary of the Air Force, all property, rec-
ords, installations, agencies, activities, proj-
ects, and civilian personnel under the juris-
diction, control, authority, or command of
the commanding general, Army Air Forces,
shall be continued to the same extent under
the jurisdiction, control, authority, or com-
mand, respectively, of the Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force, in the Department
of the Air Force.
(e) -For a period of 2 years from the date
of enactment of this act, personnel (both
military and civilian), property, records, in-
stallations, agencies, activities, and projects
may be transferred between the Department
of the Army and the Department of the Air
Force by direction of the Secretary of De-
fense.
(f) In general the United States Air Force
shall include aviation forces both combat and
service not otherwise assigned. It shall be
organized; trained, and equipped primarily
for prompt and sustained offensive and de-
fensive air operations. The Air Force shall
be responsible for the preparation of the air
forces necessary for the effective prosecution
of war except as otherwise assigned and, in
accordance with integrated joint mobiliza-
tion plans, for the expansion of the peace-
time components of the Air Force to meet the
needs of war.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFERS
SEc. 206. Each transfer, assignment, or
change in status under section 204 or section
205 shall take effect upon such date or dates
as may be prescribed by the Secretary of
Defense.
WAR COUNCIL
SEC. 207. There shall be within the National
Military Establishment a War Council com-
posed of the Secretary of Defense, as Chair-
man, who shall have power of decision; the
Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the
Navy; the Secretary of the Air Forces; the
Chief of Staff, 'United States Army; the Chief
of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force. The War Council
shall advise the Secretary of' -)efemse on mat-
ters of broad policy relatin :0 the armed
forces, and shall consider and report on
such other matters as the Secretary of De-
fense may direct. ?
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SEC, 208. (a) There is hereby established
within the National Military Establishment
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist
of the Chief of Staff, United States Army;
the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of
Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief
of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there
be one.
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CONGRESSI.:1
(b) Subject to the authority and direc-
tion of the President and the Secretary of
Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint:,
Chiefs of Staff?
(1) to prepare strategic plans and to pro-
-vide for the strategic direction of the mili-
tary forces;
(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to
assign to the military services logistic re-
sponsibilities in accordance with such plans;
(3) to establish unified commands in
strategic areas when such unified commands
are in the interest of national security; ?
to formulate policies for joint train-
ing of the military forces;
(5) to formulate policies for coordinating
the education of members of the military
forces;
(6) to review major material and per-
sonnel requirements of the military forces,
In accordance with strategic and logistic
plans; and
(7) to provide United States representa- ?
tion on the Military Staff Committee of the
United Nations in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Charter of the United Nations.
(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as
the principal military advisers to the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Defense and shall
perform such other duties as the President
and the Secretary of Defense may direct or
as may be prescribed by law.
JOINT STAFF
Sze. ,209. There shall be, under the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not
to exceed 100 officers and to be composed
of approximately equal numbers of officers
from each of the three armed services. The
Joint Staff, operating under a Director there-
of appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
shall perform such duties as may be directed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director
shall be an officer junior in grade to all'
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
MUNITIONS BOARD
Sze. 210. (a) There is hereby established
in the National Military Establishment a
Munitions Board (hereinafter in this sec-
tion referred to as the "Board").
(b) The Board shall be composed of a
Chairman, who shall be the head thereof,
and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secre-
tary from each of the three military depart-
ments, to be designated in each case by the
Secretaries of their respective departments.
The. Chairman shall be appointed from
civilian life by the President, by and with
she advice and consent of the Senate, and
shall receive compensation at the rate of
$14,000 a year.
(e) It shall be the duty of the Board Un-
der the direction of the Secretary of Defense
and in support of strategic and logistic plans
prepared by she Joint Chiefs of Staff?
(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities
within the National Military Establishment
with regard to industrial matters, including
the procurement, production, and distribu-
tion plans of the departments and agencies \
comprising the Establishment;
(2) to plan for the military aspects of in-
dustrial mobilization;
(3) to recommend assignment of procure-
ment responsibilities among the several
military services and to plan for standard-
ization of specifications and for the greatest
practicable allocation of purchase authority
of technical equipment and common use
lte.ma on the basis of single procurement;
(4) to prepare estimates of potential pro-
duction, procurement, and 17, :rsonnel for use
in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of
strategic operations;
(5) so determine ;:elative prioritie& of the
various segments of the military procure-
ment programs;
(6) to supervise such subordinate agencies
as are ? or may be created to consider the
subjects falling within the scope of the
Board's responsibilities;
F:11:::0-1-TOUSE 9603
(7) to roz,,:e race innen,,, to 1?1---,.oup,
combine, or Lie?olve e:.,
agencies opera,:ini; in the alcIs of p.'ocure-
ment, production, and in such
manner as to promote zfiic:nic-s- and economy;
(8) to inaints;n liaison with other de-
partments and asencies for the proper cor-
relation of milli;ary requirements with the
civilian economy, particul'.rly in regard to
the procurement or disposition of strategic
:and critical material and the maintenance
of adequate reserves of such material, and
to make recommendations as to policies in
,connection therewith;
(9) to assemble and review material and
personnel requirements presented by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented by
the production, procurement, and distribu-
tion agencies assigned to meet military needs,
and to make recommendations thereon to
the Secretary of Defense; and
(10) to perform such other duties as the
Secretary of Defense may direct.
(d) When the Chairman of the Board first
'appointed has taken office, the Joint Army
and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to
exist and all its records and personnel shall
be transferred to the Munitions Board.
(e) The Secretary of Defense shall pro-
vide the Board with such personnel and
facilities as the Secretary may determine to
be required by the Board for the performance
of its functions.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
SEC. 211. (a) There is hereby established in.
the National Military Establishment a Re-
search and Development Board (hereinafter
in this section referred to as the "Board").
The Board shall be composed of a Chairman,
who shall be the head thereof, and two rep-
resentatives from each of the Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to be desig-
nated by the Secretaries of their respective
departments. The Chairman shall be ap-
pointed from civilian life by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and shall receive compensation at
the rate of $14,000 a year. The purpose of
the Beard shall be to advise the Secretary
of Defense as to the status of scientific
research relatiye to the national security,
and to assist him in assuring adequate pro-
vision for research and development on scien-
tific problems relating to the national se-
curity.
(b) It shall be the duty of the Board,
under the direction of the Secretary Of
Defense?
(1) to prepare a complete and integrated
program of research and development for
military purposes;
(2) to advise with regard to trends in scien-
tific research relating to national security and
the measures necessary to assure continued
and increasing progress;
(3) to recommend measures of coordina-
tion of research and development among the
military departments, and allocation among
them of responsibilities for specific programs
of joint interest;
(4) to formulate policy for the National
Military Establishment in connection with
research and development matters involv-
ing agencies outside of the National Military
Establishment;
(5) to consider the interaction of research
and development and strategy, and to advise
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection there-
with; and
(6) to perform such other duties as the
Secretary of Defense may direct.
(c) When the Chairman of the Board first
appointed has taken office, the Joint Research
and Development Board shall cease to exist
and all its records and personnel shall be
transferred , to the Research and Develop-
ment Board.
(d) The Secretary of Defense shall pro-
vide the Board with such personnel and
facilities as the Secretary may determine to
be required by the Board for the performance
of its functions.
TITLE 111?MISCELLANEOUS
CORIPESATION OF SECRETARIES
SEC. 301. (a) The Secretary of Defense
diali receive the compensation prescribed b:
law for heads of executive departments.
(b) The Secretary of the Army, the Sec-
retary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the
Air Force shall each receive compensation at
the rate of $14,500 a year.
UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES
SEC. 302. The Under Secretaries and Assist-
ant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force shall each receive compensation
at the rate of $10,000 a year. and shall per-
form such duties as the Secretaries of their
respective departments may prescribe. ,
ADVISORY COMIVIITTIZES AND PERSONNEL
SEC. 303. (a) The Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board, and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence are authorized to appoint such ad-
visory committees and to employ, consistent
with other provisions of this act, such part-
time advisory personnel as they may deem
necessary in carrying out their respective
functions and the functions of agencies un-
der their control. Persons holding other
offices or positions under the United States
for which they receive compensation while
serving as members of such committees shall
receive no additional compensation for such
service. Other members of such committees
and other part-time advisory personnel so
employed may serve without compensation
or may receive compensation at a rate not
to exceed $35 for each day of service, as deter-
mined by the appointing authority.
(b) Service of an individual as a member
of any such advisory committee, or in any
other part-time capacity for a department
or agency hereunder, shall not be considered
as service bringing such individual within
the provisions of section 109 or 113 of the
Criminal Code (U. S. C., 1940 ed., title 18,
secs. 198 and 201), or section 19 (c) of the
Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the
act of such individual, which by such section.
Is made unlawful when performed by an
'individual referred to in such section, is with
respect to any particular matter which di-
rectly involves a department or agency which
such person is advising or in which such
department or agency is directly interested.
STATUS OF TRANSFEREZD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
SEC. 304. All transfers of civilian personnel
under this act shall be Without change in
clasification or compensation, but the head
of any department or agency to which such ,
a transfer is made is authorized to make such
changes in the tiles and designations and
prescribe such changes in the duties of such
personnel commensurate with their classi-
fications as he may deem necessary and ap-
propriate.
SAVING PROVISIONS
SEC. 305. (a) All laws, orders, regulations,
and other actions applicable with respect to
any function, activity, personnel, property,
records, or other thing transferred under this
act, or with respect to any officer, depart-
ment, or agency, from which such transfer
Is made, shall, except to the extent rescinded,
modified, superseded, terminated, or made
inapplicable by or under authority of law,
have the same effect as if such transfer had
not been made; but, after any such transfer,
any such law, order, regulation, or other ac-
tion which vested functions in or otherwise
related to any officer, department, or agency
from which such transfer was made shall,
Insofar as applicable with respect to the func-
tions, activity, personnel, property, records,
or other thing transferred and to the extent
not inconsistent with other provisions of this
act, be deemed to have vested such func-
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CONGREssols
ton in or relate to the officer, department,
or agency to which the transfer was made.
(0) No suit, action, or other proceeding
lawfully commenced by or against the head
of any department or agency or other of-
ficer of the United States, in his official ca-
pacity or in relation to the discharge of his
offic:al duties, shall abate by reason of the
taknag effect of any transfer or change in.title
under the provisions of this act; and, in the
case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or
other proceeding may be maintained by or
against the successor of such head or other
officer under the transfer, ba" if the
court shall allow the same t' :tined
on motion or supplemental filed
within .12 months after such transfer takes
effect, showing a necessity for the survival of
such suit, action, or other proceeding to
obtain settlement of the questions involved.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the
second paragraph of section 5 of title I of
the First War Powers Act, 1941, the existing
organization of the War Department under
the provisions of Executive Order No. 9082
of February 28, 1942, as modified by Execu-
tive Order No. 9722 of May 13r 1946, and
the existing organization of the Department
of the Navy under Executive Order No. 9635
of September 29, 1945, including the assign-
ment of functions to organizational units
within the War and Navy Departments, may,
to the extent determined by the Secretary
of Defense, continue in force for 2 years
following the date of enactment of this act
except to the extent modified by the provi-
sions of this act or under authority of law.
TRANSFER OF FUNDS
SEC. 306. All unexpended balances of ap-
propriations, allocations, nonappropriated
funds, or other funds available or hereafter
made available for use by or on behalf of the
Army Air Forces or officers thereof, shall be
transferred to the Department of the Air
Fore.., for use in connection with the exercise
of its funcdons. Such other unexpended
balanct:s of appropriations, allocations, non-
appropriated funds, or other funds available
or hereafter made available for use by the
Department of War or the Department of
the Army in exercise of functions transferred
to the Department of the Air Force under
this act, as the Secretary of Defense shall
determine, shall be transferred to the De-
partment of the Air Force for use in con-
nection with the exercise of its functions.
Unexpended balances transferred under this
section may be used for the purposes for
which the appropriations, allocations, or
other funds were originally made available, or
for new expenditures occasioned by the enact-
ment of this act. The transfers herein au-
thofized may be made with or without war-
rant action as may be appropriate from time
to time from any appropriation covered by
this section to any other such appropriation
or to such new accounts established on the
books of the Treasury as may be determined
to be necessary to . irry into effect provisions
of this act. -.
BUDGET ESTIMATES
?
SEC. 307. (a) So much of the annual budget
transmitted to the Congress by the Presi-
dent as contains the estimates of appropria-
tions for and expenditures by the National
Military Establishment and the departments
therein shall be so arranged as clearly to
(1) with respect to each item for which
the President recommends an appropriation
or expe:icliture, a statement of the nature of
511011 itC:m and of the amount recommended
by the Presider:I, the Secretary of Defense,
and the head of the department -concerned,
respectively; and
(2) with respect to any Itemi for which
'Cho President does not recommend an appro-
p.ffitioit or expenditure but for which a bud
get estimate for inclusion in such budget
was submitted by the Secretary of Defense
or by the head of a department therein, a
statement of the nAtioprovaipbnrailletifease"Riaans:ioaa
117,0011D?HOUSE JULit 19
the ainount recemmende..1 by the Secretary
of Delonss nnU the head of iiw t;cpartment,
respectively.
(b) Each supplemenia or deficiency esti-
mate for appropriations or expenditures
transmitted to tile Congress by the President
which contains any item recommending.on
appropriation to -of an t?xnencliture by the
National Military Es tablishmeht or ally de-
partment ',therein shall be so arranged as
clearly to show with respect to any such item
a statement of the nature of the item and
of the amount recommended by the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of Defense, and the head
of the departmi It, respectively.
AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 308. There are hereby authorized to
be appropriated such sums as may be neces-
sary and appropriate to carry out the pro-
visions and purposes of this act.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 309. (a) As used in this act, the term
"function" includes functions, powers, and
duties.
(b) As used-in this act, the term "budget
program" refers to recommendations as to
the apportionment, to the allocation', and
to the review of allotments of appropriated
funds. ?
SEPARAI3IBITY
SEC. 310. If any provisions of this act or
the application thereof to any person or cir-
cumstances is held invalid the validity of
the remainder of the act and of the applica-
tion of such provision to other persons and
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 311. (a) The first sentence of section
102 (a) and sections 1,2, 308, 309, 310, and 311
shall take effect immediately upon the enact-
ment of this act.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a),
the provisions of the act shall take effect
on whichever of the following days is the
earlier: The day after the day upon which
the Secretary of Defense first appointed takes
office, or the sixtieth day after the date of
the enactment of this act.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentle-
man from Michigan (Mr. HOPPlvIAN] de-
sire to offer any committee amendments
at this time?
Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman,
I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Committee amendment offered by Mr.
HOFFMAN: Page 37, after line 22, add the
following new section:
"SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY
"SEC. 312. Paragraph 1 of subsection (d)
of section 1 of the act entitled 'An act to
provide for the performance of the duties
of the office of President in the case of the
removal, resignation, death, or inability of
both the President and Vice President,' ap-
proved July 18, 1947, is amended by strik-
ing out 'Secretary of War' and inserting in
lieu thereof 'Secretary of National Security'
and by striking out 'Secretary of the Navy'."
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent to modify the
amendment by striking out "Secretary of
National Security" and inserting in lieu
thereof "Secretary of Defense."
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
? ' The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HOFFMAN, Mr. Chairman, I
offer a committee amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Committee amendment offered by Mr.
HOFFMAN: Page 2, at the end of the table
of contents, add the following:
the Presidency."
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HOFF:v:AN. Mr. Chairman, I
offer a committee amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Committee amendment offered by Mr.
HOFFMAN: Page 14, line 3, strike out the
comma after "of" and in line 4, strike out the
comma after "for."
. The committee amendment was
agreed to.
Mr. HOFFMAN. - Mr. Chairman, I
offer a committee amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Committee amendment offered by ' Mr.
HOFFMAN: Page 32, line 5, strike out "(c)"
and insert "(e)."
The committee amendment was
agreed to.
The Clerk read as follows:
Committee amendment offered by Mr.
HOFFMAN: Page 18, line 7, after "established",
strike out "an executive". and insert "a
military."
The committee amendment was agreed
to.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that if on the read-
ing of the bill we discover other typo-
graphical errors they may be corrected
by the legislative clerk.
. The CHAIRMAN'. Without objection,
the Clerk will be authbrized to correct
typographical errors.
. Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an
amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
'Amendment offered by Mr. Juno: Beginning
on page 8; line 10, strike out all down to and
including line 18 on page 9 and insert in lieu
g thereof the following:
"(b) If a commissioned officer of the
regular establishment of any of the armed
i services is nominated by the President for
appointment as Director and his nomination
,., for such appointment is confirmed by the.
1,. Senate, he shall be ineligible to accept such
appointment until he has resigned his com-
mission or has been retired. Any such com-
missioned officer nominated and confirmed
i
i for appointment as Director shall be entitled,
, at his own request, to be retired from the
; armed service of which he is a member and
: to have his name placed upon the retired
' list of such service in the grade of major
t general or rear admiral (upper half), which-
ever may be appropriate, or in any higher
grade in which he may be entitled to be
. retired under other provisions of law. Any
g commissioned officer retired under the provi-
sions of this section shall be entitled to re-
ceive retired pay at the rate of 75 percent
of the pay of the grade held by him on the
, retired list. While serving as Director he
'shall receive his retired pay and shall be
paid, from any funds available to defray
the expenses of the agency, annual com-
pensation al: a rate equal to the amount by
which $14,00, exceeds the ;amount, of his
annual retired pay."
-- - -
Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, this
amendment was submitted in the com-
mittee before I got it worked out in per-
fected form with the help of the legisla-
tive counsel. It was voted down there by
/a small majority. I can explain briefly
what it does.
? **Long the line of the remarks just
.imade by the chairman of the committee,
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
HorFivs.AN1 there is a, legitimate fear in
this .country lest we develop too much
military control of any agency which has
great powers arid operates in secret.
his central intelligence .agency is sup-
00020005pooi-o ,.
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1947 CONGRESSIO.,
posed to collect military intelligence
eieoeci; but we want to be sure it cannot
strike down into the liveo of our own
pecp-le here. So we put in a provision
"the agency shall have no police,
aw-enforcerne.nt
nal-security functions." o make
i j)rers, or
ii more certain that no would-be mili-
tary dietaeor could ever use it as a gestapo
inany of us feel the director should be a
civriane."Much of the testimony before
us :rom people with a great deal of ex-
perience in this field - was to the effect
that the director should be a civilian.
On the other hand, the committee did not
think it ought to exclude a man who is
now or at some later time =ay be in the
itary service from being , rpointed as
director of the Central Intelligence
Agency if he should be the best man for
the job. it was agreed that he should
not have the job unless he first becomes
a civilian so that he wili have no divided
loyalties, will not be standing with one
foot in the civilian trough and one foot
in the reiiitary trough.
Under the present language of this bill
whica the committee has drawn up, it'
was trying to accomplish the same thing
am after, but, I do not believe it goes
far enoreria. On page 8, line 10 is the
following:
If a commissidned officer of the armed:
services Is appointed as director then?
(A) in the performance of his duties as
or, he shall be subject to no super-
vision, control, restriction, or prohibition
(n-:i'n-,:ary or otherwise) other than would be
operative with respect to him if he were a
civilian in no way connected with the depirt-
raent of the Army, the department of the
Navy, tho department of the Air Force, or the
armed se:vices or any component thereof.
Now, that sounds all right, but all of
us, being human beings, surely know that
if a one-star general is Director of Intel-
ligenee, and a two-star general or a
three-star general talks to him, it is
wholly unrealistic to imagine that they
wiii net have an influence over him,
despite the law.
Tee man who had charge of our secret
intelile-ence in Germany during the war
was a eniiiian, Mr. Allen Dallies- He did
such an einceaordinary job that he was
in contact with the top men in Hitler's
secret service. Hitler had to execute his
-ton -Eve men because they were double;.
cressie g him and playing ball with our
peoeni.:=? Mr. Dulles told us that the man
that rakes this job ought to go into it
as ea men who goes into a monastery. He
oueht to take it as J. Edgar Hoover has
taken the 17-Elf job?make it his life's
He certainly ought to be cut coin-
re:ete?Iy loose froM. any ties or respon-
sieintles or connections with any other
beene.h of the Government?civil or mill-
niey?excent the President e.ncn the Na-
.el Security Council.
aril this amendment does is to provide
shot if a commissioned officer of the
:Med serviees is nominated by the Presi-
...net end confirmed by the Senate as
.sI32 of Intelligence, then he shall be.
?eigible to accept such ? appointment
take office until he has either re-
:nen his commission or has been re-
tired. The amendment provides further
No. 139-13
939:5
/ that he can at his o reereau rtired ofilcer, if one is appointed because he is
en order to accept this ape,: r- but thought to be the best man for the job.
his retirement rights are Ineterneci .i hope the Committee will support ;lec
that when he is through ae Eiecc. or of an_endment.
;4 Intelligence he will have the same per- . MANASCO. Me. ' :irmen, I rise /
quisites and retirement beneffe. as does in opposition to the asnr .inene.
; a major general or rear ad-- 'al, tipper ., Me. Chairman, this section on central
half. 'intelligence was given more study ay our
\'4 Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chair- subcommittee and 'iv the full committee
man, will the gentleman yield? ; !'? than any other section of the bill. It
Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman was a :nost difficult sect:on to write. All
from Indiana. of us had the same ohjective in view, yet
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Does the we had different ideas on it. I think
gentleman think that you can legislate d' personally that the compromise we
relative to the heart and the mind of an reached adequately protects the position.
individual? Eventually I certainly trust that the
Mr. JUDD. No indeed. head of this intelligence agency will be a
civilian who is trained in the agency. It
1
,
- . Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Does the 1
gentleman think it makes any difference
whether he is retired or whether he has
not retired?
Mr. JUDD. Yes, I do.
Mr. HARNESS o? Indiana. His sym-
pathies and his heart will be with what- I
ever branch of the service he was con- '
nected with. .
Mr. JUDD. Ceftainly, his heart will
always be with that branch, but his or-
ganic connection with it will be broken.
In no sense will he be under its control or
-influence. Under the bill as it is written
now he is always tempted to regard him-
1 self as what he still is, an officer of the
armed forces. When he gets through as
Director of Intelligence, or if he does not
like the work, or does not do too good a
job and is let out, well, never mind, he
can always go back to ? active military
service. To do that, he has to keep his
bridges intact, his military fences in good
repair. That is, his mind may not be
single because his interests are divided. .
We do not want that. -
Under the amendment he will still 4
I
have his retirement rights; his family I
will be protected, and yet he is retired
and completely separated from the mill-
tary service, free from any possible in-
fluence so that he Coes not need to con-
sider what might happen if the time
should come that he wanted or needed to
go back into the military service. ?
. ' Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chair-
man, if the gentleman will yield further,
.; the bill itself says: -"In the performance
i of his duties as Director he shall be sub-
the gentleman from Califorind [Mr.
1 ject to no supervision, control, restric- .
:. . Ilow.niztnl, the gentleman from New
1;tion or prohibition, military or other-
York [Mr. LATHAM], and the gentleman -
'4! wise."
, from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN]. We did
Mr. JUDD. That is correct..
I our best to work out language here that
k Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Now, how i
takes. yeaes to train _that_tYPe of marl"
Some will tel you that . the present
director is not adequately train, that
is true. We do not have any man in the
United States who hasNadequate training
today to do this kind of work because
unfortunately the United States has
never gone in for the right kind of in-
telligence. If we had had a strong cen-
tral intelligence organization, in all prob-
ability we would never have had the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor; there might not
have been a World War 1.1e-Mariy wit-
nesses appeared before our committee.
We were sworn to secrecy, and I hesitate
to even discuss this section because I am
afraid I might say something, because
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is a public
record, and divulge some information.
here that we received in that committee
that would give aid and comfort to any
potential enemy we have. For that rea-
son I am even reluctant to mention the
testimony. I hope the committee will
support the provision in the bill, because'
the future security of our country in a
large measure depends upon the -intelli-
gence we get. Most of it can be gathered
without clandestine intelligence, but
some of it must be of necessity clandes-
tine intelligence. The things we say here
today, the language we change, might
endanger the lives of some American
citizens in the future..
0.1 think you can rely on thepatriotism
\of men like the gentleman from New
York [Mr. WAnswoternl, the gentleman
from Massachus& s [Mr. Mor-
much stronger can you make it? The
only .way you can change it is to say,
Mr. JUDD. The only way to make it 41
e? "You are going to have a civilian."
stronger is to have the man resign or
retire. I do not want to make him re-
,sign and lose the benefits accumulated
during his military life. I want him to 't
retire so he can go, as it were, into a ?
monastery; but at the same time to pre-
serve what he has earned as an officer
in the armed services so he and his"
family have that security. It seems to 4,
me that this is the middle ground be-
tween the two extremes. It will give us
civilian-directed intelligence, and at the
same time will protect any commissioned
would protect that position and keep
from building up a so-called military
hierarchy. A bill will be introduced soon
after this legislation becomes law that'
will be referred to the Committee on
Armed Services, where more study can.
Ice given to this most important subject.
I sincerely trust that the amendment)
will be voted down. .
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chaii'madih
the gentleman yield? ?
Mn': MANASCO. I yield to the gentle-
man from Michigan.
Mr. HOFFMAN. I note the gentle-
man's statement that the subcommittee
did its best. Yes, we did our best, but
we had a great deal of- doubt when we
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CONGRESSIONAL RECOICD?EIGUS.L] tiULY 19
iiniehed -;'ether we were right or not.
Does the nontleman recall that?
Mr. I\IANASCO. We did, and still have.
Mr. HOFFMAN. We are not seeking
to impose our judgment on-the Members
ef the House.
Mr. MANASCO. That is right. I am
just trying to show that we were all hon-
est in our efforts to accomplish the same
objcetive.
Mr. HO-LI-AEU:\ Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
l).TANASCO. I yield to the gentle-
man from California.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. If the Members read
this section carefully they will see that
uici everything possible to divorce any
inilitary person from this position with-
out taking away from him his prequi-
sites, emoluments, pension .expectations,
and so f.erth, and also the rights of his
family0 I do not believe the amendment
cc-red by the gentleman from Minnesota
[Mr. Juan] will cover particularly the
family rights of the indiyidual. At the
present time we have Admiral Hillen-
koetter in there. It seems that he is
the best man for the job at the present
time, I favor a civilian director in this
nosition, but there is certain intelligence
vork in which Admiral Hillenkoetter is
engaged at this time, he has the. back-
ground of certain information, he is en-
gaged in putting forward certain plans
's fend, and so, in the wisdom of the
cenemittee, it was decided that he should
tier be interfered with at this particular
tinne:
.'Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move,
to strike out the last two words.
11112 . Chairman, I trust the committee
will give the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Jump]
vary careful consideration, because I
think it is extremely inn . neint. There
was considerable discussMn in the com-
mittee, and by a very, very narrow vote
it was decided not to include the amend-
? in the bill as reported by the corn-
naltrnea.
I call the attention of the committee
to one t'ning that I -believe the gentle-
men from Minnesota [Mr. Juni)] failed
to emphasize due to the fact that he did
not have enough time. This agency has
been running less than a year and a
haif. We have had three directors of
the Central Intelligence Agency in that
time. No one is criticizing Admiral Hil-
lenlmetter, the present director of the
;.e.oncy, but there is nothing in the world
io prevent him from being removed next
reek or next month -and replaced with
Forneone from the War Department or
th Navy Department. The main point
ni the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Minnesota [Mr. JuDD] is per-
:Ilene-nu and the effort to-work toward a
civilian head who is not influenced by any
department of our Military Establish-
ments.
It is true that you can refer to the lan-
zsuage of the bill where it states he is re-
lieved from this and he is relieved from
that, but you cannot write into legisla-
tion that human element which enters
nto, the Military Establishment of our
country of a subordinate officer fearing
that some day he might come under the
! That is what the ainandinene of the
gentleman from IvIinneseta rent. Jima]
will correct. I think it eis ;voey impor-
tant that the corzeilttee adopt this
i amendment. It provides for all retire-
ment pay and other provisions for a mili-
tary man so he can afford to separate
i himself completely from the military
and make intelligence his life work.
The gentleman from Alabama [Mr.
; MANASCO] said that we could not find a
I
I man trained for this job. I believe it
I would be more correct to say that no
! attempt has been made to find a civilian
; to fill this particular job in the Central
\t,
I.iltelligence Agency.
The committee as a whole was agreed
ithat it would be fine to have a civilian
head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
I But they did not want to Include a quali-
fied military or naval man from occupy-
ing such a position. The amendment
offered by the gentleman from Minnesota
corrects this situation, and I hope the
Committee will adopt it.
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BUSBEY. I yield, ..
Mr. HARDY. Under the present lan-
guage of the bill, assuming that the ad-
miral now in charge continues in his
present position, he would still be in the
Navy, would he not?
Mr. BUSBEY. He would absolutely be
In the Navy, and he could be transferred
at any time.
Mr. HARDY. That is my point. He
certainly could be transferred, and he
could work it out with the Navy Depart-
\;ment and get any other assignment that
he wants.
Mr. BUSBEY. 'Absolutely. He is still
, a naval officer.
1 Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will
\the gentleman yield?
Mr. BUSBEY. I yield.
; Mr. HOLIFIELD. I know the gentle-
mean wants to be fair. Section (A), page
i 8, line 12, continuing to line 19, and then
in section (B), expressly states that no
I superior officer of any of these depart-
ments shall have any control over the
t gentleman once he is appointed by and
with the consent of the other body. He
could not be shifted or given a tour of
I duty. There is absolutely no control over him. The gentleman knows that that
' language is in the act. .
Mr. BUSBEY. I am sorry, but the
igentleman, I believe, did not understand
Irriy reference to human nature when it
;comes to military officers.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I
;move to strike out the last word.
1 (Mr.. McCORMACK .asked and was
,;given permission to revise and extend
1 his remarks.) .
; Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman,
iin an effort to help the Committee, I have
a few observations to make on this very
; important question. I want no member
; to underestimate the importance of this.
Whatever action the Committee of the
Whole takes will be most agreeable to me
because if we were not confronted with
a very practical situation, in the subcom-
mittee and in the full committee, I would
have voted to provide for the appoint-
ment only of a civilian. I would have
direct comthand of a superior officer taken that action at the outset. But we
somewhere alonApp roves 41 f br ReleaLser20:03/05t06 nVIAIRDP30143011,0 0 tii3 20005(kitp the method we ern-
Sc LI.-.0A ion whel:e the present director is
an oliicee hi.1;,; Uaited Stants ,1:\l'avy with
the eenK of rear admiral." "
nisI see it, the emendment offered by
the m;nnernian from Minnesota [Mr.
Juen3 has this weakness as compared
with the provieions of the bill: Suppose
a man is 51 years old and he is an Army
or a Navy officer. I think the' admiral
who is Director now is not much older
than that. Immediately upon being
[ appointed under the Judd amendment
he will take three-quarters pay as re-
tirement and in the next highest grade.
/ Then, if he remains as Director for 2 or
3 or 4 years?and there is no term of
tenure in this bill?if he were to be sepa-
rated in 3 or 4 or 5 years, he is still a
Young man and he still would have
three-quarters retirement pay, with the
Agrement age at 62.
We on the subcommittee tried to meet
:the practical situation so that whoever
i is appointed, if a commissioned officer,
; he would not be serving in a dual capac-
ity. We put language in there just as
strong as can be expressed by the human
I mind, that while Director he is serving in
a civilian capacity. If he is removed,-
he is still young enough to continue in
I the service and, if he desires to do so,
he does not get his retirement but he
goes back and serves his time in the
Army or Navy until he has earned his
retirement. However, while he is in
there the emoluments of the office that
would accrue to him for retirement pur-
poses and rank purposes would accrue to
him.
A ?
';;?* It seems to me if we are going to keep
any language in here, the language con-
tained. in the bill is preferable to that
proposed by the gentleman from Minne-
sota, Dr. JUDD. I agree that whoever
is appointed should be permanent. But
\, what is permanency, unless it is appoint-
?ment for life, with removal as provided
;for in the case Of judges? We cannot
give any man any assurance of perman-
ency as far as an administrative posi-
tion is concerned. ,The nest we can do is
Ias in the case of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover: A
iman by his personality, a man who fm-
/presses himself so much upon his fellow-
men that permanency accrues by reason ;
of the character? of service that he ren-
dens. But J. Edgar Hoover has no ten-
ure for life. He has earned It because !
, of his unusual capacity. ,or. remember in ;
1933 I was one of those who advocated ;
his reappointment by the late President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. A distinguished
former member of the House from Ala-
bama, Mr. Oliver, and I went to the Pees-
. ident on three different occasions urging
' the reappointment of J. Edgar Hoover.
It Was something I was proud to do, be-
cause he was the man for the job. But
we cannot provide a permanent tenure.
In fact, after this bill passes, enabling
I legislation must be enacted with refer- t
ence to this and other agencies affected !
by -this bill.
; We felt also that the basic question of
whether or not one should he a civilian
should lie with the standing committee,
the regular committee of the House to
which the bill will be referred. In the -
stop-gap situation?and that is what
,
?
?
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1947 CONGFLE,`?3-S;I,JI.
ployed was the best that could be adopted
undar the existing circumstances.
The CHatIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
'aloCoreav.cri] has expired.
? ? Mr. BIZOWN of Ohio. Mr. Chair-
man, I eifer a substitute'. amendment
which I have sent to the desk.
The Cleik read as follows:
Substitute amendment offered by Mr,
2nawN of. Ohio: On page 8, strike out lines
5 to 52, both inclusive; on page 9, strike
out linas 1 through 18, both inclusive, and
inzer,; in lieu thereof the following: "head
t:f.t;:eof. The Director shall be appointed
frc;in eivili?,n life by the President, by and
the advice and consent of the Senate.
Dtrcotor shall receive compensation at
rate of- $14,000 a year."
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman,-,
this amondment is a simplifying amend-
ment. This amendment is offered for
the purpose of settling the differences be-
tween the members of my committee, the
Committee on Expenditures in the Ex-
ecutive Departments. It simply elim-
inates any Quarrel or discussion about
just how we take care of the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency if he,
tihoult: be a commissioned officer by pro-
viding very simply that the Director shall
be a civilian. Then as a result you can
strike out all of subsection (b) and on
down to line 18 on page 9.
Mr. .DD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
BROWN of Ohio. I yield. ?
itt. JUDD. I may Say to the gentle-
man from Ohio and the Committee that
I myself prefer his amendment and have
from the beginning. I have one exactly
like it which I intended to offer if the
one I have offered were to be defeated.
In it I was trying to go halfway between
re,-,iiring that ,the man to be appointed
be wholly a civilian, and giving a. chance
for men now in the military service to
take the job as civilians, but without los-
inn their retirement rights. ?
Mr. BROWN.. of Ohio. I remind the
gentleman from Minnesota that at times
one conies : he place where one has
to go all ne. ..:ay, where one cannot go
halfway.
In my the people are afraid of
just one thing in connection with this
bill and in connection with many other
matters that have come before this Con-
gress in recent months and recent years,
and that is they are at: lid of a military:
2:overnment, ? some sort; of a super-
dictatorship which might arise in this
conntry. They are afraid, in this par-
inotance, over the possibility that
there might be some sort of Gestapo
set up in this country.
I will agree and I will admit to you
very frankly that it is en 'ely possible
you might have a rithitary officer
who would like to do that; but I know one
thing, that if you rent:ire a civil:. . to be
the head of this-agency then you 'dill not
have any danger within the agency' of
military influence or military dictator-
ship. I do not believe;the present occu-
pant of that office would ever abuse it; I
have the highest conf.dence in him, but
I do no; know who :nay succeed him.
We have had three different military of-
ficers in charge of this central intel-
ligence .group or agency in the last 15
- Approved For Rel
nionnis :tll.
to you U. we need a
of J. L., anoover enn. ;.y1,;,".;
of an
agency li.ie it:. , and t,a anita, of
a eivilinn wou.cl at itest he a partial
guaranty to tlie pee ,tof tne United
States that ?his agency is not ?oing to
be usurpen by any branch of -the armed
services at any time. *? **
Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield again?
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I yield.
Mr. JUDD. And is it not true that
under the lannuage of the gentleman's
amendment a military man could become
the head of this unit .if he first became
a civilian?
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Certainly, if
he becomes a civilan first.
Mr. JUDD. The only thing is that
you require him to resign.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. That is right.
Mr. JUDD. Whereas under my origi-
nal amendment he would be permitted
.to retire and keep his perquisities as a
retired officer while serving as a civilian
as Director of Central Intelligence. It
is my belief that a man of sufficiently
great ability and interest in the field of
intelligence to merit. this appointment
would be willing to resign, despite the
sacrifice of retirement rights. I remind
the committee that he would receive
$14,000 a year, far above his salary as an
officer. I approve the gentleman's sub-
stitute amendment.
,...Mr. BROWN of Ohio. A resigned
military officer is no longer under the
Icontrol or direction of the military
_ branch. A retired military officer is sub-
ject to recall in time of emergency, still
has to take certain orders and instruc-
tions from the military branch of the
Government. - The gentleman from
Minnesota [Mr. Juan] in his provision
to permit a military officer to hold the
post, set up certain safeguards. My
amendment goes the whole way..'
Mr. MacIONNON. There is a differ-
ence between one who resigns and one
who retires; is that not right?
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Yes; the re-
tired officer is under the control of the
'Army. A resigned officer becomes a civil-
ian and is -no longer under the control
of the Army.
Under my amendment you do not have
to figure . out what commission he
should have v:hen he retires, what per-
quisites he should have, and so on. It
seems to me this is a very simple solution
of the problem but it is also a- very im-
portant angle of this bill and I hope that.
the substitute will be adopted.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has ex-
pired.
? The question is on the substitute
amendment offered by the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. BROWN].
. The substitute amendment was agreed
to.
The CHAIRMAN. The question now
occurs on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Juna],
as amended by the substitute offered by
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BROWN]:
The amendment as amended was
agreed to.
Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an
an, '
r.
0.12.1
amendment.
ase 2003/05/06: CIA-RDP90-0061
9607
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. juDD: Page 11,
line 18, strike out the words "and othar agen-
.2ies", and in line 22, at the end of the sen-
tence, add the words "of the Government."
, Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I
ask unanimous consent to entend my re-
marks at this point in the RECORD.
The CHAIRMAN. Is then: objection
to the request of the gentleman from
1 Connecticut?
There was no objection.
.! Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I
should like to direct myself now to sec-
!' tion 105 concerning the Central
? fence Agency, to which section ,my pro- -
posed amendment relates. The amend---
ment, in effect, provides that a civilian
P, shall head this Intelligence Agency rath-
er than allowing ?? --hoice of a civilian or.
1
a military man. ,n, elso provides.that the
powers granted the Central Intelligence
group under the President's Executive
order shall pass on to the National Secu-
rity Council as was designated in the bill
which passed the other body on July 9.
The amendment further provides that
the authority and functions of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency shall be those
which were designated under the Presi-
dent's Executive order. As this section is
now constituted, the Director of the In-
-i telligence Agency to be chosen by the
President, with the consent of the Sen-
ate, may be either -a civilian or an officer
of the ?armed services. I feel that it is
extremely undesirable to have as head of
this agency, in a position which makes it
incumbent upon him to coordinate intel-
ligence reports from the Various services,
a member of one or the other services.
A civilian in this position .would%not be
subject to a 'cry of discriminatiori or fa-
voritism and would, therefore, ? be in
much better position to be completely ob-
jective in his discussion. The portion of
this amendment which relates to the
granting of powers under the President's
Executive order to the National Security
i Council retains at least a semblance of -
i power within this agency tof effectively
g correlate, evaluate, and disseminate in-
formation which is gathered by other
intelligence services.
i'?
By confining its powers to this au-
thority we, therefore, effectively deny to
4 the Central Intelligence Agency the
1
power to interfere with the work person-
ally being done by established services _
1 in this field.
o . .
1 I refer you, Mr. Chairman, to House
i Report No. 2734 of the Seventy-ninth
i Congress, which is a report on the intel-
ligent section of our national war effort
? and which includes recommendations
made by the, House Committee on Mili-
tary Affairs at that time. While the
mistakes of World War II are still fresh
1 in our minds, the committee ,undertook
i a survey to determine what cur poll ? on
national intelligence should be. 'their
recommendations are not wholly carried
out in the measure here corecmplated;
but the gains made since their report
would be consolidated by adoption of
this amendment.
I feel, Mr. Chairman,. and I cannot
-stress it too strongly, that what is needed
is an independent intelligence agency.
working without direction by our armed .
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services, with full authority in opera-
tional procedures.
However, it seems impossible to in-
corporate such broad authority into the
bill now before us?so consequently I
support the amendment which has now
been offered. To do less than this would
be to wreck what little has been done
to strengthen our intelligence system. I
feel that it is very important for the
security of our Nation, at a time when
our security is more and more threat-
ened, to grant adequate authority to the
Central Intelligence Agency.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I do
want to commend the gentleman from
Michigan f Mr. HOFFM!VN] and the other
members of his committee for their
ardent work and fairness in reporting
--Tin JUDD. Mr. Chairman, to reas-
sure the committee let me say that this is
?a! only other amendment I shall offer,
I present it now because it also has
do with the Central Intelligence
Agency. If the members of the commit-
tee will look on page 1-1 of the bill, line
IS, subsection (e), and follow along with
me. I think we can make it clear quickly.
The subsection reads:
(e) To the extent recommended by the
National Security Council and approved by 4
the President, such intelligence operations
of tho departments and other agencies of I
the Government as relate to the national
security shall be open to the inspection of thei
Director of Central Intelligence.
The first half of the amendment deals!
with that. It strikes out the words in!
line 18, "and other agencies." Why? I-
Painaarily to protect the FBI. I agree!
that all intelligence relating to the na-
tional security which the FBI, the Atomic
Energy Commission, and other agencies?
uith secret intelligence activities develop
should be made available to the Director.
of Central Intelligence for correlation,
cValLiatiOn, and iation. The sec-
ond half of my provides that
their intelligence must be made available
to the Director of Central Intelligence.
But under the amendment he would not
have the right to go down into and in-
spect the c;e operations of agen-
cies like the FE. s he would of the de-
parniaents. I do believe we ought to
give this Director . Central Intelligence
power to reach into the operations of
J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI, which are
in the domestic field. Under the Ian-
gauge as it now stands he can do that.
The Director of Central Intelligence
is supposed to deal with all possible
threats to the __country from abroad, "
tnrough intelligence activities abroad.
liut without this amendment he will have
pot only the results of the FBI's intel-
Agenda activities here at home, but also
the power to inspect its_operations. I do
not believe that if we had realized the full.
impo!?1-, of this language when we were
studying it in committee we would have
allowed it to stand as it is. Surely we
want to protect the Atomic Energy Corn-
miss on and the FBI from the Director
3f Central Intelligence coming in and
eindnia- out who their agents are, what
and where their nets are, how they oper-
ate, and thus destroy their effectiveness.
Mr. BUSBEY. - Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yieldApproved For Relea
IVir J
1frorn ?
Mr. . aesent
lan-
guage of is I 't.lw gentle-
man's judninent that the. Cent ' Intelli-
gence Agenay as the rigilt, the power,
and the authority to go down and inspect
any records of the FLI. which deal with
internal security, whereas the Central
Intelligence Agency deals only with ex-
ternal security?
Mr. JUDD. Yes; not only inspect its
records but also inspect its operations,
and that includes its activities and its
agents. We do not for a moment want
that to happen. I hope the members of
the committee will accept this amend-
ment.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman
froth Alabama.
Mr. MANASCO. If you do not give the
Director of Central Intelligence authority
to collect intelligence in this country and
disseminate it to the War Department
and Navy Department, the Air Force, and
the State Department, why not strike
the entire section out?
Mr. JUDD. We do under this amend-
ment. give him that power. We say:
"Such intelligence as relates to the na-
tional security and is possessed by such
departments, and other agencies of the
Government"?that includes the FBI and
every other agency?"shall be made
available to the Director of Central In-
telligence for correlation, evaluation, and
- dissemination."
Mr. MANASCO. If the FBI has in-
telligence that might be of benefit to
the War Department or State Depart-
ment, certainly that should be made
available.
Mr. JUDD. Under this amendment
it will be made available. ?I do not strike
that part of the section out. All the
intelligence the FBI has and that the
Atomic Energy Commission has must be
available to the Director of Central In-
telligence if it relates to the national -se-
curity. But the Director of Central
Intelligence will not have the right to
inspect their operations, which is quite a
different thing. I do not think we ought
to give the Director of Central Intelli-
gence the right to go into the operations
of FBI.
- Mr. STEFAN. ? Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield? ?
Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman
from Nebraska. s
Mr. STEFAN. In setting up the Cen-
tral Intelligence group it was agreed that
the FBI was a part of the organization.
Now, what would the gentleman's
amendment do?
Mr. JUDD. Does the gentleman state
that the FBI is a part of the Central
Intelligence Agency?
Mr. STEFAN. Certainly. As I under-
stand it, as it was explained to our com-
mittee, the FBI, information would be
part of the information secured by the
. CIG.
Mr. JUDD. That is right. The FBI
information would be available to the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, but under
my amendment the FBI operations
I yield to
deman
JULY 19
: tellipance as they would be under the
present language of the bill.
1?In'. STEFAN. But the CIG could
draw any information from the FBI it
wanted? a.
Mr. JUDD. Yes, it would be made
available, if a:elating to the national se-
curity.
Mr. STEFAN. But what would the
gentleman's amendment do other than
what this is doing?
? Mr. JUDD. It would Merely withdraw
the right of the Director of Central ttri?-
' telligence to inspect the intelligence op-
erations of the FBI. It would still make
available to him the intelligence de-
1 velopen by FBI.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Minnesota has expired.
Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that the gentleman
; be permitted to proceed for 2 additional
minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Nebraska?
There was no objection.
Mr. STEFAN. Does the gentleman
feel that this section on Central Intelli-
gence makes it possible for the Director
it of the GIG to go into Mr. Hoover's office?
Mr. JUDD. That is right.
Mr. STEFAN. And supersede his di-
rection of FBI operations? .
Mr. JUDD. Well, it .says plainly that
"Such intelligence operations of the de-
partments and other agencies of the
Government as relate to the national se-
curity shall be open to the inspection of
the Director of , Central Intelligence.
("Other agencies" certainly includes the
FBI.
Mr. STEFAN. And the gentleman
!objects to the inspection of it, does he?
! Mr. JUDD. The inspection of its op-
erations; yes.
Mr. STEFAN. I agree with the. gen-
tleman.
Mr. JUDD. Then- the gentleman will
support my amendment.
Mr. STEFAN. I certainly shall.
Mr. JUDD. Under, it, the information
is all available, but the operations are
? not open to inspection.
Mr. ,JOHNSON of California. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman
from California. -
Mr. JOHNSON of California. I want
to get this straight. If the FBI has in-
formation about fifth-column activities
? and subversive information affecting the
national defense, would that be open to
the Central intelligence Agency?
Mr. JUDD. Yes. It must be made
available under this subsection, but the
Director of Central Intelligence under
niy amendment could not go in and in-
spect J. Edgar Hoover's activities and
work. Central Intelligence is supposed
to operate only abroad, but it will have
available all the pertinent -domestic in-
formation gathered, by the FBI. It
should not be given power to inspect the
a operations of the. FBI,
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. 'JUDD. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman
4v216631/646P:a6kAl:F8PW-todeli realizes that the limitations in .the first
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:lass wou:d limit his ability to go in and
ineleat any operation.
r. JUDD. That true. ?
M. HOLIFIELD. I do not think it
is necessary for him to inspect the opera-
tion; in- order to set up his own intelli-
gence unit in the way that he wants to,
and I point .out that the National Security
Council is composed of the Secretaries
of State, of National Defense, of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and
the National Security Resources Board,
and the Central Intelligence Agency, so
it seems to me that the protection of the
National Security Council is a check
and the President is a check. I hardly
thik that she man could exceed his
au tel ori ?..
Mr. .. . Well, I believe the FBI
operatiens snould be protected . beyond
aue.stion. It is too valuable an agency
to be tampered with.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Minnesota has again
Iexpired.
Mr. THOMAS of New Jersey. Mr.
Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that
' the gentleman may proceed for two ad-
ditional minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
New Jersey?
There was no 'objection.
Mr. THOMAS of New Jersey. I want
? to say to the gentleman from Minnesota
?sat I am wholeheartedly in favor of his
?? amendment. -If we open the doors to the
Central Intelligence Agency to go in and
inspect the operations of the FBI, you
aro starting to do the thing that is go-
ing to be the end-of the FBI in time, be-
cause you will open it to this agency and
then you will open it to somebody else.
I think we will make a great mistake
unless we accept the amendment offered
by the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. JUDD. I thank the gentleman.
I think we will all agree he knows what
he is talking about. ?
Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. JUDD. I yield to the?gentleman
frond Illinois.
Mr. BUSBEY. In reference to the
gentleman from California [Mr. H0f:f-
a-rani:1, when he states that we can as--
'state that this National Security Agency
do this and do that, I just wish to
remind the membership that the trouble.
in the past with legislation has been that
we have not taken the time to spell out
these little details. It is these assump-
tions we have had that have gotten us
into trouble. I think it is very impor-
i tent that the gentleman's amendment
; ,be adopted.
Mr. JUDD. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. AUGUST H. -ANDRESEN. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. JUDD. f yield to my colleague'
from Mi-nnesota.
Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. Is
there anything in here that -Permits the
FBI to inspect the personnel of the
Central intelligence?
Mr. JUDD. No; there is not.
Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. I un,
derstand that some of the men in Cen-1
tral Intelligence at the present time
minin reed stienc insimanion, and Choy
hold some ina'y imports :.t positions with
Central Inteiligence.
Mr. JUDD. I have had no informa-
tion on that, as c way or the other. I
must assume the Director of Central In-
telligence is going to exercise utmost care
in choosing his personnel. I hope this
amendment will be adopted because I
cannot see how it can hurt the Central
Intelligence Agency in the slightest and
it certainly will protect the intelligence
operations of FBI and the Atomic Energy
'Commission. /
.! The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
!the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Minnesota [Mr. juanl.
1
1...The amendment was agreed to.
MC. TABER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an
amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. TAgER: On page
35, beginning in line 18, strike out all of
section 307.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman
from Alabama.
Mr. MANASCO. I am prepared to Say
that the members of the committee on
; the minority side are willing to accept
the amendment.
Mr. TABER. I wonder if we may have
an acceptance from the majority side?
If so, I would not care to speak on the
amendment.
Mr. HOFFMAN. ,Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman -
from Michigan.
Mr. BOFFIN/IAN.. May I ask the gen-
tleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KEEFE], who
is on the Committee on Appropriations
with the gentleman from New York
[Mr. TABER], to express his opinion on
the amendment to strike section 307, on
page 35? I should like to have the Com-
mittee have the benefit of the opinion
of the various members.
Mr. ?KEEFE. If the gentleman will
yield, may I say that I have carefully
examined these provisions in section 307,
and in my humble judgment that whole
section can just as well be stricken out
of this legislation. It will not cause one
bit of difficulty. I think the committee
ought to accept the amendment offered
by the gentleman from New York. The
_fact of the matter is that what you have
sought to do the chairman or any mem-
ber of any subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations can do by ask-
ing any Navy or Army officer that
comes before the committee the ques-
tion-, "What was your request of the Bu-
reau of the Budget? What did you ask
for?" and they will tell us what it was.
That is all there is to it.
,Mr. TABER. There is a little more.
? It is spread out, and the whole budget
will be made up originally on a propa-
ganda basis. That is where the trouble
is with the language.
Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. TABER. I yield to the- gentleman
from Minnesota.
--Mr. JUDD. I think it ought to be said
in explanation of the action of the coin-
are certain, foreign-born persons who mittee that this section was put in the bill
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at a time when there were not as yet in
the. bill any provisions dealing specifi-
cally with she Marine Corps and naval
aviation. It was put in primarily to pro-
tect their right to appeal to lie-Congress,
over the head of the Department or of
the Bureau of the Budget or even of the
President. They were afraid they might
be frozen out and not given any or ade-
quate funds. With the amendments that
are now in the bill, with officially defined
status given to the Marine Corps and
naval aviation, they will have greater
security than they have now or ever had
before, and this section is not necessary.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, un-
less some member of the committee ob-
jects, and they are all here and on the
job, I will accept the amendment in be-
half of the committee.
The CHAIRMAN.. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York [Mr. TABER].
The amendment was;?-agreed- to.
Mr. COLE of Now York. \Mr. Chair-
man, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
? Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New
York: On page 3, line 2, after the word "in-
cluding", strike out the words "the naval air
force" and insert "naval aviation."
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield..
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, the
committee will accept that amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
? Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New
York: On 'page 6, line 3, after "general";
strike out "direction, authority, and control:
,over" and insert "authority for the integra-
tion, coordination, and supervision of."
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
/ man, I do not believe that any explana-
tion whatsoever is necessary, but in or-
der that it may be understood this
amendment is offered for the purpose of
clarifying the authority and power given .
to the Secretary of Defense. It amends
subparagraph 2) to conform more
nearly with the expressions that have
been made by the proponents of this bill
as to the authority of the Secretary of
Defense. It will read as amended:
- The Secretary of Defense shall exercise au-
thority for the integration, coordination, and
supervision of such departments and agen-
cies.
I have submitted the amendment to
the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Wripsworam] , who, insofar as I know,
his interposed no serious objection to it.
Mr. HOFFMAN-. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.
Mr. HOFFMAN. This is not the
amendment which you submitted to the
subcommittee yesterday afternoon.
Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLE of Now York. I yield.
Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, I
hope there is no misunderstanding be-
tween the gentleman from New York
[Mr. COLE] and myself ,on this particular
amendment. It is true that he and I have
discussed it, but I have been unable thus
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aDHOUSE jULY 19
ascertain just what he is driving
The language of the bill reads that
tin. Secretary shall exercise general di-
rection, general authority, and general
control over such departments and agen-
cies. I think that is proper language.
The language of the gentleman's amend-
ment strikes out the word "general"; it
strikes out the word "direction"; it
strikes out the word "control"; and it
leaves just the word "authority."
Mr. COLE of New York. That is not
correct. If the gentleman's interpreta-
tion of subparagraph (2) taas he has just
expressed it, I would have no objection,
and those who are apprehensive about it
would have no objection. If the au-
thority of the Secretary were to exercise
general direction, general authority, and
general control, there would be no objec-
tion. Rut the bill does not say that. The
bill says he shall "Exercise general di-
rection, authority, and control over such
departments and agencies."
Mr. WADSWORTH. Does not the
word "general" qualify the words "au-
thority and control"?
Mr. COLE of New York. Who is going
to interpret it? I think the Congress
should say what is meant by it. I do not
believe the Congress intends that this
Secretary of Defense shall have absolute,
arbitrary, and complete and unlimited
control over all the departments.
Mr. WADSWORTH. He cannot have
ic under this law anyway because on this
very same page at the bottom it says,
"That the Department of the Army, the
Department of the Navy, and the De-
-in-rent of the Air Force shall be ad-
miscered as individual executive de-
partments by their respective Secretaries
and all powers and duties relating to
such ,departments not specifically con-
ferred upon the Secretary of Defense by
this act shall be retained." There is no
specific authority in subparagraph (2).
It is general. I think the language of
the bill provides three departments
and also guarantees that the Secretary
shall have the necessary general direc-
tion and authority to accomplish the
puracases o: the act.
Ma. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gendeman yield?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.
Ma. JUDD. If the Members will turn
to the preceding page and look on line 21,
tliey tM ace the rest of this grant of au-
thority. It is "under the direction of the
i-).csidcrac and subject to the provisions
of this act" that the Secretary of De-
i'enaci shall exercise general direction,
authority, and control. It is only with
respect to carrying out the unification
and reorganization provisions of this act
that the general authority can be exer-
cised, and even then only with t'a e con-
sent of the President. So there are., re-
strictions and limitations both at the
beginning and at the end of the grant of
power. Is that not true?
Mr. WADSWORTH. That is true.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York [Mr. WADS-
\vorm-il has expired.
Mr. MoCORMACK, Mr. Chairman, I
:nova to strike out the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman
from New York [Mr. COLE] had-better
give further consideration to his amend-
meat. Dc: those who want unification as
distinaaisluid. fa ::an merizer?wo arovided
for unification an this bid?if you want
merger, then yon had baiter vote for the
Cole amendment. That amendment is
more authoritative in its directions than
the provisions of the bid. The commit-
tee recommendation as contained in the
bill is to exercise general direction. My
friend from New York says, "exercises
authority."
Mr. COLE of New York. No. The
amendment does not say that. The au-
thority would read that the Secretary
shall exercise general authority for the
integration, coordination, and supervi-
sion of the departments and agencies.
Mr. MoCORMACK. The gentleman
leaves the word "general" in there?
Mr. COLE of New York. Yes.
Mr. McCORMACK. Under those cir-
cumstances, it seems to me that the lan-
guage of the.committee is certainly as ef-
fective as that offered by the gentleman
from New York. We say, "exercise gen-
eral direction, authority, and control."
The gentleman says, "exercise general
authority for the integration, coordina-
tion, and supervision of such depart-
ments and agencies." It seems to me
that both would confer substantially the
same power. As between the amendment
offered by the gentleman from New York
[Mr. COLE], and that which was care-
fully worked over by the committee, it
seems to me the committee's provision
should be retained. I urge that the gen-
tleman's amendment be rejected and
that we keep the language in the bill as
recommended by the committee.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York [Mr. COLE].
The question was taken; and on a
division (demanded by Mr. COLE of New
York) there were?ayes 36, noes 190.
So the amendment was rejected. ?
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr: Chair-
man, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New
York: On page 6, insert the word "general"
before "authority and control."
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, I, offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
' Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New
York: On page 7, line 24, after the words
"functions of", strike out the words "Na-
tional Military Establishment" and insert .
"his office."
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, an explanation of this amend-
ment?
Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, ---?,?
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.'
Mr. WADSWORTH.. While the gen-
tleman from New York was addressing
the House during general debate earlier
this afternoon he mentioned this very
language on the bottom of page 7 and
I took it upon myself with great im-
pertinence to say at the time I could not
see any objection to making this change
as it was really the intent of the bill and
the intent of the committee. .
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from New York.
The amendment was agreed to.
t Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
i. ma,n, I offer another amendment.
71 The Clerk read as follows: ,
Pt' Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New
t ;York: Page 10, line 22, after the word "intel-
ligence", insert the words "and his evaluation
, thereof."
1 .
i Mr. COLF, of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, just a brief explanation of this
i
.. amendment, and it is rather a minor
one. I am reluctant to impose on the
; Committee for any extended period of
i time since we have been discussing the
bill for many hours.
Under the obligations of the Central
Intelligence Agency its duty, as expressed
in the bill is "to provide for the proper
dissemination of such intelligence," that
is the intelligence which the central
agency gathers; and yet the Central In-
telligence Agency is also obligated to.
evaluate the intelligence.
The effect of this amendment is to
require the Agency when it disseminates
the intelligence which it has gathered to
dissiminate not only the information
which it has received but also its inter-
pretation and its evaluation of the in-
formation.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield? .
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.
Mr. MANASCO. Do I understand the
gentleman is striking out the word
"evaluated" in line 20 and inserting it
in line 22?
Mr. COLE of New York. No.
?Mr. MANASCO. What does it do?
, Mr. COLE of New York. In line 22,
i after the word "intelligence" it inserts
' the words "and its evaltfation thereof."
Mr. MANASCO. Does not the lan-
guage in lines 20 and 21 provide for the
same thing the gentleman has in mind?
Mr. COLE of New York. Let me read.
, it. I think I can explain it. Subpar-
agraph 3 reads that the ? central
agency--.?
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield? . ?
Mr. COLE of New York. I _yield.
OR000200050001-0
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, the Clerk did not report the amend-
ment correctly. It is on page 6, line 3, in-
sert the word "general" before the words
"authority and control."
Then the authority of the Secretary
would be to exercise general direction,
general authority, and general control
over such departments; and that com-
plies as near as words can comply with
the statements made by the gentleman
from New York as to what this authority
should be.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield? ?
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.
? Mr. MANASCO. Does no.; the lan-
guage contained in the bill now mean
that?
Mr. COLE of New York. If that is
what is meant, let us say so.
Mr. MANASCO. I am mat an -expert
on grammar and so forth. he gentle-
man from Minnesota [Mr. JuDD] is our
man on that.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on'
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York [Mr. COLE].
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Mr. HOFFMAN. - Does not line 20 cor-
relate and evaluate intelligence relating
to it? What does the gentleman want
to do now? Evaluate the dissemination
of it or what?
Mr. COLE of New York. If the gentle-
man will Let me explain what I have in
mind. Section 3 reads in part "and pro-
vide for the appropriate dissemination of
such intelligence within the Govern-
mean" My amendment would have him
disseminate not only such intelligence
but his evaluation of the intelligence
within the Government, and so forth.
Mr. WADSWORTH. Already evalu-
ated.
Mr. COLE of New York. The amend-
ment simply provides for what I am
assured is already being done. It is that
the dissemination back* to the source
agency or to other agencies shall be
not only of the intelligence which the
central agency has received but also its
evaluation of the intelligence.
Mr. :HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.
Mr. HOFFMAN. In other words, if
:he intelligence mentioned in line 20
is worth F. cents then you want to make
it absolutely certain that the intelligence
is c,,sc, worth a nickel.
Mr. COLE of New York. The gentle-
man is a bit flippant. As the subsection
reads now it contains absolutely noth-
ing which requires the agency to send
back to the agencies of the Government
its evaluation of the intelligence, the
interpretation which the agency places
upon the information it has gathered.
The amendment I have offered imposes
upon them that obligation.. -
Mr. HOLlietELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield to the
gentleman from California.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Does the gentleman
mean to say that the word "intelligence"
in line 22 does not refer back to the "in-
teliigence" in line 20 which, has ? been
gathered and evaluated?
Mr. COLE of New York. It does not
say SO.
HOLIFIELD. Then I do not
uncMrstand any of the language.
Mr. COLE of New York. An agency
Is obliged to correlate and evaluate the
intelligence, but it is not obliged to pass
back to the other agencies of the Gov-
ernment the interpretation, the corre-
lated intelligence, the evaluated intelli-
gence.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. What words would
the gentleman's amendment substitute?
Mr. COLE of New York. Line 22, after
"such intelligence"' insert the words.
'and its evaluation thereof" so that the
agency would be obliged to provide for
the appropriate dissemination of such,
inttlligence and its evaluation thereof,
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think the gentle-
man's purpose and the purpose of the
eemmittee is the same. The word "in-
telligence" in line 22 clearly refers back
to the word "intelligence" mentioned in
the other line.
Mr. COLE of New York. But what is
the intelligence to be disseminated? I
shall not undertake to belabor the mat-
tee, it is not of great importance. I un-
v
de.citand t I the nractiee of the
agency, roe :-.ce no reason to not write
it into the act.
Mr. Ili011Tnne,N. Charman, I
rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentleman from New York.
If the Members will take the bill and
refer to page 1.0 they will find that this
agency is charged with the duty of col-
lecting and evaluating intelligence, and
then it is disseminated. What is the use
of rewriting it again in the next line?
If we are to go over this bill and change
every comma and period and put it
three words down or three words ahead,
we will be here all night.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. CoLal.
The amendment was rejected.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New
York: Page 16, lines-13-14, after "Naval
aviation", strike out "which shall hereafter
be designated the Naval Air Force."
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman,
there is no objection to that amendment.
, The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read asffoliows:
Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New
York: On page 17, after line 5, insert the
following:
"All naval aviation shall be integrated with
the naval service as part thereof within the
Department of the Navy. Naval aviation,
both combat, service and training, shall in-
clude the entire aeronautical organization
of the United States Navy; all laud-based
naval aviation; ship-based aviation; naval
air-transportation services; fleet air forces;
carrier forces; all aviation components. of
the United States Marine Corps; and all
other aviation, air weapons, and techniques
involved in the operations and activities of
the United States Navy, together with the
personnel necessary therefor.
"The Navy shall be generally responsible
for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine
warfare, and protection of shipping. Mat-
ters of joint concern as to the air aspects of
those functions shall be coordinated between
the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, in-
cluding the development and procurement of
aircraft and air installations located on
shore, and use shall be made of personnel,
equipment, and facilities in all cases where
economy and effectiveness will thereby be
increased. Subject to the above provision,
the Navy will not be restricted as to types of
aircraft maintained and operated for these
purposes.
"The Navy shall maintain the air trans-
port necessary for essential naval operations
and for air transport over routes of sole in-
terest to naval forces where, the requirements
cannot be met by normal air-transport fa-
cilities.
"The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons,
tactics, technique, organization, and equip-
ment of naval combat and service elements;
matters of joint concern as to these func-
shall be coordinated between the Army,
the Air Force, and the Navy."
Mr. COLE of New York, Mr. Chair-
man, this amendment has-been submitted
to the members of the committee and
has been accepted by them.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike out the last word to make
the observation that the gentleman from
9611
Members. In my opinion, the amend-
ment is a very pi.oper one and, speaking
for myself, it is agreeable. I just want
to make that observation to confirm what
the gentleman has said.
Me. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman,
I move, to strike out the last two words.
Mr. Chairman, for the information of
the House let me say that the House bill
differs from the Senate bill quite mate-
rially in this zog,afcl. In the House bill
there is inserted a provision reciting the
?roles and missions o; the Army, the roles
and missions of the Navy, the roles and
missions of the Marine Corps and the
roles and missions of the Air Force. For
the first time in our history we are at-
tempting such legislation. The amend-
ment offered by the gentleman from New
YorlK [Mr. COLE] in which the naval avi-
ation personnel are deeply interested, is
to add to the list of those branches of the
service whose missions and roles shall be
frozen into law.
Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. VvADSV.TORTH. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Ohio.
Mr. VORYS. Does this provide for a
separate procurement for naval avia-
tion?
Mr. WADSWORTH. It does not, Mr.
Chairman. As a matter of fact, in .each
of the instances in this bill where we
are reciting the roles and missions of
the branch of the service, we have para-
phrased the language contained in the
Executive order of the President which,
it was agreed, among all the services con-
cerned, would be isued to the services
in the event of the passage of this bill.
We have simply taken from the Executive
. order, the tentative one which has been
agreed upon by all services, and para-
phrased them properly in a legislative
sense and inserted them in the bill, and
the language which the gentleman from
New York [Mr. COLE] has propoSed, is
Parallel with the language of the Execu-
tive order.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike out the last word.
(Mr. HOFFMAN asked and was given
permission to revise' and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, when
this bill came before the subcommittee,
the same question which is now up was
raised. There is no question on the
record but that it was the Ipurpose of
the staff?I think they called it the Joint
Chief of Staff?to practically get rid of
and reduce to the status of a police force
the Marine,?Corps. Then there arose the
question about naval aviation and there
was the thought in the minds of some
of the ie,rnbers of the committee that an
effort was being made to do that, or at
least, there was a fear in the minds of
the high-ranking officers of the Navy,
especially those who were on the ships
where the battles on the sea were fought,
the admirals and the captains who, if
they lost their ships went down with the
ships, unless they were lucky enough to -
be among the fortunate few who ? were
saved, that aviation was to be taken from
the Navy and they objectedn Then there
came this question raised by the gentle-
New York has consulted myself and other man from New York [Mr. WADswormi]
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9312
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CO.NGRESSION.L.L REcoaD?I-IGUSE jULY 19
as to whether or not we should depend
upon some Executive order to be issued
in the future to protect the marines and
naval aviation, and the subcommitee de-
cided that they would write into the law,
not tactics, not specification, but a gen-
eral over-ali policy. We concede that
to .oe our duty. That question came up
again when the gentleman from New
York [Mr. COLE] brought this to our at-
tention and to the attention of the mem-
bers of the subcommittee yesterday af-
ternoon. That conference was attended
by a representative of the Navy and a
representative of the Army, the ones who
chatted this bill, and it was finally de-
cided unanimously, except for the oppo-
sition of the gentleman from New York
I Mr. 'WAnswoRrill and if I am wrong,
correct me. The rest of those present
decided that they. would accept this
amendment.
Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. ? Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOFFMAN. Am I wrong? ?
Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman
from New York agreed to it.
Mr. HOFFMAN. The gentleman
means he did?
Mr. WADSWORTH. This gentleman
from New York agreed to it.
Mr. HOFFMAN. I understood he
opposed it in the subcommittee and was
oenosing it now.
Mr. WADSWORTH. I am not. I am
describing what it does.
Mr. LIOFFIVIAN. E?e:::ently then, while
.: was referring to e original Cole
amendment, the gentleman was referring
to that amendment as subsequently
amended by the gentleman from New
York [Mr. COLE] before it was today pre-
sented. That being the situation, permit
me to add that I sent a copy of the pres-
ent amendment to each member of the
committee. Having heard no opposition
from committee members the commit-
tee accenn; the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man tram New York [Mr. COLE-]. .
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHA:RMAN. The Clerk will re-
port the next amendment.
ThteClerk read as follows:
iimenchnent offered by Mr. COLE of New
I,?ige 23, line 19, after the. word "as-
signed" strikc out the period and insert "by
this act."
O'ir. COLE of New York.' Mr. Chair-
man, ,just a very brief explanation or
he amendment. This language is
found on nage 23, line 17, in which it
Cu general the Unite States Air Force
shall hiciude aviation forces both combat
::!id service not otherwise assigned.
What does that mean? Not other-
wise assigned where? Not otherwise'
assigned ay whom? I insert the words
-not otherwise assigned by ',kis act." so
that there is a direct reference back to
the amonament relating to naval avia-
'non which. has just been adopted. I feel
euite cm in it was the intention of the
authors or tine bill that the United States
Air Force should have the functions not
oth; :vise reigned by the act. If I am
in error, ..uld be happy to have some
Mr. Wr',..D37.77.07,TH. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentlemen yield?
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield to
the gentleman from New York.
Mr. W.ADSWORTI-1. The gentleman
apparently suspects the use of the words
"unless otherwise assigned." nTo one
can tell tonight where some special mis-
sion of the Air Corps' will be required;
They might be otherwise assigned, for
example, to the international force under
the Charter of the United Nations. No
one can tell. So in all of these provi-
sions for the roles and missions of the
several branches we have put in that
phrase, "unless otherwise assigned."
Otherwise you might get into a situation
where the assignment to something not
recited in the law, being absolutely neces-
sary, could not be made.
Mr. COLE of New York. I call the
gentleman's attention to the fact that
this provision authorizes the United
States Air Force to include aviation
forces, both combat and service, not
otherwise assigned. -This act, by the
amendment offered by me and just
adopted, would assign certain aviation
forces, both combat and service, to the
Navy. Is it the intention that the United
States Air Force can be assigned avia-
tion relating to the Navy, in contraven-
tion of the amendment that has just been
adopted?
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLE of New York. I yield to the
gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HOFFMAN. If I thought the
gentleman's amendment would prevent
the assignment of our forces of any kind
to the United Nations I would be whole-
heartedly for it. The difficulty of this is
tic A in all of these provisions relating to
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force
we have these same words, and if we
put the gentleman's words in here, it
would appear that the Naval Aviation
could not `be assigned to help out the
Army or the Navy itself, or the Marine
Corps.
Mr. COLE of New York. The gentle-
man's understanding of the purpose of
my amendment is entirely in error. My
point is that by the amendment regard-
ing naval aviation Which has just been
adopted certain "aviation forces" have
been assigned to the Navy. If it is
meant that those forces which by the act
have been assigned to the Navy cannot
be later assigned to the United States
Air Forces, I would be quite happy and
content, but I want to make sure that
that will be the result, that, having
written that amendment into the bill, it
is not intended that later on by some
executive order aviation forces assigned
to the Navy by the act will be assigned
to the United States Air Forces. If that
is the understanding, then I withdraw
the amendment.
? The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentle-
man from New York withdraw his
amendment?
Mr. COLE of New York. Upon recon-
sideration I do not, Mr. Chairman; let us
have a vote on it.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, sincerely trust that
gentleman explain it. the committee will reject this amend-
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ment because that language appears in
_many, many places in the bill, and this
is the first time anyone has ever objected
to the language. If we amend it here,
we should stay here another 3 or 4 hours
and go beck through the -bill and amend
it properly in all the other section. I
suggest that we vote down the amend-
ment.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentlem h yield?
.
Mr. MANASCO. I yield to the gentle-
man from Massachusetts.?
Mr. McCORMACK. I thoroughly agree
with the gentleman. Further, the gen-
tleman from New York himself has clear-
ly evidenced his uncertainty by express-
ing a willingness to withdraw his amend-
ment and then insisting upon a vote.
The words the gentleman has suggested
be added will disturb the whole set-up
throughout the bill. We have done
something in this bill that has not been
done in the Senate bill. We put in the
general functions, leaving the specific
functions for executive order or for the
standing committee that will consider
legislation later on.
If the words in the gentleman's
amendment are included, it will be a
serious limitation upon the Department
of Air, the separate and independent
Department of Air that this bill es-
tablishes.
Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MANASCO. I yield.
Mr. DORN. May I say to the members
of the committee that an amendment like
that would restrict the operations of
the whole Air Force and if inserted in
other sections might restrict the Marines
or the Navy. I think this amendment
should be voted down.
Mr. HALLECH. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MANASCO. I yield.
Mr. HALLECK. Reference has been
made to the attitude of the gentleman
from New York [Mr. Croix] when it was
suggested by him that he might with-
draw the amendment. My understand-
ing from what he said and from the ob-
servation that he made was that the
explanation of the intendment of the lan- ?
guage as it is contained in the bill ap-
parently is in line with what he thinks
would be accomplished by his amend-
ment. Therefore, the matter, being
finally a matter of interpretntion of that
language which will ultimately be in the
law, the amendment is not of that degree
of importance that ? it might have been
heretofore except for the discussion that
we have had on the floor in respect to it.
? Mr. MAcKINNON. Mr. Chairman, I
offer a substitute amendment for the
amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York [Mr. COLE]:
- The Clerk read as follows:
Substitute amendment offered by Mr. MAC-
KINNON for the amendment offered by Mr.
COLE of New York: Page 23, line 19, after
"assigned" and before the period, insert a
, colon and the following: "Provided, That it
shall not include aviation forces otherwise
assigned by this act."
Mr. MAcKINNON. Mr. C... airman, I
offer this in the hope that the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH]
and the committee can accept it because
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1947
I think that this more clearly sets out
exactly the intent that is sought to be
expressed by the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Coul and it still leaves open
"the forces not otherwise assigned" for
the legitimate purposes for which the
gentleman from New York stated that
they probably wished to leave this open.
Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. IVIACIKINNON. I yield to the gen-
tleman from New York.
Mr. COLE of New York. My under-
standing of the substitute amendment
offered by the gentleman from Minne-
sota is that it accomplishes the same
purposes as the amendment which I
sought to have adopted, and the substi-
tute therefore is entirely agreeable to me.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will
the . gentleman yield?
Mr. M.AcHINNO:11 I yield to the gen-
ileman from Alabama.
Mr. MANASCO.. I am just wondering
where in this act we assign the Air
Force. We leave the'assignment of the
Air Force to the Commander of the Air
Force.
Mr. MacKINNGINT. The bill most cer-
tainly assigns those components of avi-
ation that are assigned here by legisla-
tion.
Mr. MANASCO. I do not know that
we assign any air forces.
Mr. MKKINNON. You just adopted
some amendments to that effect a while
back when by adopting the Cole amend-
ment you assigned naval aviation to the
Nay Department. ?
yield to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. WADSWORTH].
WADSWORTH. The gentleman
is very courteous to yield to me. But this
bill does not assign any element. It de-
scribes the roles and missions. The -as-
signments are made by the Commander
in Chief.
Mr. MacKINNON. Mr. Chairman, I
contend that when you place naval avi-
ation in the Department of the Navy,
that amounts to an assignment of naval
aviation to the Department of the Navy.
I think that is just as clear as a bell. Of
course, if. .it is the general understand-
ing that naval aviation is definitely as-
s?me-el to the Navy Department, and as
such not subject under any possible con-
tingency to being assigned to the United
States Air Forces, then this amendment
would not be necessary. Under the
statements of the gentleman from Ala-
bama [Mr. Maxasoo] and the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH]
the amendment would only be a clarify-
ing one. These men are both members
of the committee and their statements
as to the construction of the language,
as negotiating any such future assign-
ment of naval aviation to the United
States .-Vr Forces are enti::ed to great
weight. Their statements might make
the adoption of this amendment unnec-
essary.
The CHAIRMAN. The queition is on
the substitute amendment offered by the
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MAC-
KINNON].
The substitute amendment was re-
jected.
No. 139-1:
_:,_20311.D-I-13-?SSE 9613
The The vote now re-
curs on the anlchdricht afZ01.-:-: by the
gentleman frorn New York [Mr. CoLzl.
Tele Linemeirient was rejected.
Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Hr. Chair-
man, I offer an amenement, which is at
the desk.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendments offered by Mr. CASE of New
Jersey:
On page 12, strike out all of line 18 after
the word ''Board", all of lines 19 and 20, and
the words "of the Board" in line 21, and
insert in lieu thereof the following: "; an
Assistant or Under Secretary from each of
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,:
Interior, and Labor; the Chairman of the
Civilian War Agencies Planning Commission
appointed under section 106A; the chairman
of the Munitions Board appointed under sec-
tion 210; the Chairman of the Research and
Development Board appointed under section
211; and such other members as may be des-
ignated by the President from time to time."
On page 14, immediately after line 8, insert
a new paragraph, as follows:
"(d) The Board shall supervise and direct
the execution of such policies and plans re-
lating to military, industrial, and manpower
mobilization as may be approved by the Pr.'
ident, and shall perform such other
tions, not ineonsistent with law, concerning
the coordination of military, industrial, and
civilian mobilization as the Presdent may
direct."
On line 9, change "(d)" to "(e)."
On page 14, immediately after line 11, in-
sert a new section, as follows:
"CIVILIAN WAR AGENCIES PLANNING COMMISSION
"SEC. 106A. (a) There is hereby established
a Civilian War Agencies Planning Commis-
sion (hereinafter in this section referred to
as the "Commission") to be composed of the
Chairman of the Commission, who shall be
appointed from civilian life by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate; and such additional civilian members
as the President may designate.
"(b) It shall be the duty of the Com-
mission? ?
"(1) to investigate and appraise the
Nation's requirements for civilian agencies of
the Government to operate under the direc-,
tion of the National Securitiy Resources
Board and to be charged with preparing plans
for the civilian aspects of industrial and
manpower mobilization for war and with
supervising the execution of such plans in
time of war or national emergency; and
(2) to recommend to the Congress, not
later than 1 year after the date of enact-
ment of this act, the permanent establish-
ment under the National Security Resources
Board of such civilian war agencies as in the
opinion of the Commission are essential to
the national security.
"(c) The Chairman of the Commission is
hereby authorized, subject to the civil-serv-
ice laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as
amended, to appoint and fix the compensa-
tion of such personnel as may be necessary
to perform such duties as may be prescribed
by the Commission in the perfoDnance of its
functions.
"(d) The members of the Commission,
while actually so serving, shall receive com-
pensation at the rate of $50 a day, but not
to exceed 914,000 in any one year.
"(e) The Commission shall cease to exist
9; years from the date of enactment of this
act, unless sooner terminated by joint reso-
lution of Congress."
Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. Chair-
man,,since I have amendments to two
different sections in this amendment,
I ask uanirnous. consent to -proceed for
an additional 5 minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
New Jersey?
There was no objection.
Mr. HOFF.MAN. Mr. Chairman, I
ask unanimous consent that the debate
on this amendment, and any amend-
ment in substitution therefor, be limited
to the 10 minutes which the gentleman
has been allowed.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. Chair-
man, that is either a great compliment
or the worst insult I have ever had.
Mr. Chairman, before discussing the
amendment, I want to make my general
position on this subject very clear. I
support completely the proposition that
the security of the United States and the
hope for the establishment and mainte-
nance of a peaceful world require
our military strength be developed to
the highest possible degree'. I have sup-
ported and will continue to support all
measures designed to further that ob-
jective. For example, I have come,
though with considerable reluctance, to
the conclusion that compulsory military
training is necessary and I intend to
support it. I believe that unification of
our armed services is essential and I
support this bill. ?
I have no interest in whatever latent
rivalries may still exist between the Army
and the Navy. Nor have I sufficient ac-
quaintance with the matter fr6m the
technical standpoint to know whether,
under this bill, the necessary degree of
healthy competition between the services
to keep .each of them at its peak of ef:=-,,
ficiency will be encouraged. As to such'
matters, I must and do accept the judg-
ment of the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Wabswonni and others- whose ex-
perience is far greater than mine.
But there is a feature of this bill, not
related to unification, not related to
merger of the services, which leaves me
greatly disturbed.
Who will prepare'in time of peace the
plans for industrial mobilization, man-
power utilization, and the like, which will
be put into effect if war comes?
This question is more vital than it has
ever been before.
If and when the next war comes, there
will be no time to make these plans. No
period of trial and error through which
we have always gone in the past, before
settling on methods for industrial and
manpower mobilization?before deter-
mining who shall do the job.
. General Eisenhower has told us that
the next war will be won or lost within
60 days. When the next war comes, we
must be able immediaL:ly to put into ef-
fect mobilization plans which will work.
? I am convinced that if the peacetime
planning for our industrial and economic
mobilization is not done by civilian agen-
cies, but is rather done by the military,
the result will be completely unworkable.
The provisions of the pending bill, I am
convinced, will result- in such planning
being done by the military.
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My fears as to this were confirmed by
the explanation of the bill so fairly and
clearly made by the gentleman from New
York this morning. He stated, and I
think that I am quoting him correctly,
that the Munitions Board would have
the function, among others, of constantly
studying our industrial capacity, arid of
making recommendations and plans for
industrial and economic mobilization to
be put into effect on the outbreak of war.
If you will turn to section 210 of the
bill, commencing on page 26, you will
fina in paragraph 2, on page 27, that the
Munitions Board has the duty, among
others, "to plan for the military aspects
of industrial mobilization." And, in
paragraph 3, on page 23,- it is directed
"to maintain liaison with other :depart-
ments and agencies for the proper corre-
lation of military requirements with the
civilian economy."
- Obviously, the proper performance of
.its duties in these two respects will re-
quire the Munitions Board to plan for the
mobilization of our entire economy as in
wartime every aspect of our economy
will necessarily be a military aspect: #
The Munitions Board will consist of a
chairman, appointed from civilian life,
and of an Under Secretary or Assistant
Secretary from each of the three military
departments. Now, these Secretaries will
be nominally civilians, but it is obvious
train our experience during the past war
alone, that they will be imbued with and
will express the military point of view.
It is inconceivable that the plans pre-
pared by the Munitions Board will not be
products of the military mind.
Is it
necessary for me to recall our ex-
perience in the last war?
:".t the outset the military plans for in-
austrial and manpower mobilization had
to be discarded completely. These plans
yen will remember, had. been prepared by
tha. _army and Navy Munitions Board, of
which, as the gentleman from New York
stated, the Munitions Board provided by
this bill will be the successor. Our in-
dustrial and economic mobilization had
to it:. planned all over again, from the
ba :rig. Countless weeks and months
of a_ mus time?time which we will not
have again?were wasted until finally,
through trial and error, our economic.
mobilization was effected, under civilian
auspices.
16 it neussary to recall the struggles
thaoueliout the war, between the mili-
tary and civilian agencies as to who
should direct the wartime economy?
The military mind simply does not un-
aers.and that the- most effective mo-
bilization of our economy cannot result
:.vain. the methods to which it instinc-
tevely turns.
I am sure that nearly all of us agree
Mat plans for the mobilization of in-
dastriel power ? and our resource& gen-
erally should be made by civilians, in ad-
dition to being carried out under civilian
control and by civilian agencies.
Urn:ler the bill, the National Security
Rescurces Board is created. Its func-
tion is to advise the President concern-
ing the coordination of military, indus-
trial, and civilian mobilization. It is
merely an advisory agency. It should,
I submit, -be made the agency charged
..'7017t1'9-HOU S juLY
with the actual preparation in . detail
of the plans whieh we must have ready
when war cornet for our industrial and
economic niobilization.
The amendment which I have offered
is intended to baing that about and I
believe that it would do so.
The amendment has two parts?first,
it would make specific the composition
of the membership of the Board. Un-
der the bill, as introduced?section 106
on page 12?the Board would be com-
posed of a chairman, appointed by the
President from civilian life and "such
heads or representatives of the various
executive departments and independent
agencies as may from time to time be
designated by the President." Under
my amendment, the other members of
the Board, in addition to the Chairman
appointed by..the President, would be an
Assistant or Under Secretary from the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
Interior, and Labor, the Chairman of the
Munitions Board already referred to, the
Chairman of the Research and Develop-
ment Board provided for by another sec-
tion of the bill, and such other members
as the President may designate:
The naming, as members of the Na-
tional Security Resources Board, of the
Chairman of the Munitions Board and
Chairman of the Research and Develop-
ment Board, both of the latter boards
being dominated by the military depart-
ments, carries with it the implication,
and is so intended, that no other repre-
sentatives of these military agencies
should be appointed to membership on
the National Security Resources Board.
It is essential to maintain the civilian
character of the National Security Re-
sources Board.
The second point of my amendment
is that it creates, as a temporary body,
a Civilian War Agencies Planning Com-
mission, consisting of a chairman, ap-
pointed from civilian life by the Presi-
dent, and such additional civilian mem-
bers as the President may designate.
The Planning Commission would investi-
gate the Nation's requirements for per-
manent civilian agencies, to operate un-
der the direction of the National Security
Resources Board and to be charged with
preparing plans for the civilian aspects
of industrial and manpower mobilization
for war and with supervising the execu-
tion of such plans in time of war or na-
tional emergency. The temporary Com-
mission would be directed to recommend
to Congress, within 1 year, the permanent
establishment, under the National. Secur-
ity Resources Board, of such civilian wan:
agencies as the Commission deems es-
sential.
The Commission, as I stated, would be
a temporary body and would cease to
exist 2 years from the date of enactment
of the act, unless sooner terminated by
joint resolution.
The purpose of this part of the amend-
ment is obeisus. Nowhere in the bill is
there clear provision for the preparation,
in peacetime, by civilian agencies of in-
dustrial and economic mobilization plans.
My amendment recognizes that principle
and provides a method by which it may
be made effective.
I hope that the committee will see fit
to adopt it. If it is adopted, it is my
intention to suggest a further amend-
ment to the section of the bill relating
to the Munitions Board. So that the
committee may have a complete picture
of my purpose, I would briefly explain my
Munitions Board amendment:
It would substitute for paragraph 2 on
page 27, which now charges the Muni-
tions Board with planning for the mili-
tary aspects of industrial mobilization, a
provision making it the duty of the Mu-
nitions Board to advise the National Se-
curity Resources Board of military ma-
teriel and manpower requirements in or-
der that they may be integrated into the
over-all plans for national industrial and
manpower mobilization plans which, un-
der the amendment now pending, would
be made by the National Security Re-
sources Board and its subordinate civil-
ian agencies. I said earlier that I was
convinced that the great majority of the
Members of the House believed deeply
in the principle that the economy of the
country, in wartime as well as in peace-
time, must be controlled and directed by
civilians. I have attempted to point out
that under the pending bill there is at
least great danger that this would not
follow. I-believe that it is more than a
danger and would be the certain result,
and I am not alone in my. fear.
The Christian Science Monitor which,
like me, supports the principle of unifica-
tion, has clearly expressed the same fear
in a number of its recent editorials.
Thus, on May 23, it stated:
This bill does more than draw a blueprint
of unified direction and better teamwork
for the- military and naval services. Of
much deeper significance, it is a piece of basic
legislation which establishes how and by
whom national policy and the civilian econ-
omy shall be controlled in any prospect of
war.
The editorial continues:
We have supported the general provisions
of the merger, particularly coordination of
foreign policy, military policy and indus-
trial potential. But because this bill orig-
inated in the thinking of military men, the
power it assigns or permits to the military
over national policy and civilian affairs is
very great?much greater, we think, than the
American people would knowingly choose.
I am sure that a number of the mem-
bers of the committee very honestly be-
lieve that my fears in this connection
will not materialize. It is my own equal-
ly honest and deep conviction that the
situation presents very great danger.
Should we not take a course which
would eliminate any possibility of results
which we all would deplore?
My amendment offers a way to avoid
that risk.
I believe that it is well drawn, and I
can say so without embarrassment be-
cause it is taken very largely from the
carefully prepared bill, H. R. 3979, intro-
duced on June 25 by the distinguished
Chairman of the Committee. But, even
if there should be imperfections in it, in
detail, that should not deter anyone from
supporting it,since any such defects can,
and of course would, be eliminated in
conference with the other body, to which
this bill, of course, will go in any event.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman. yield?
Mr. CASE of New Jersey. I yield.
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1947
Mr. HOFFMAN. -I may say to the
gentleman from 1\fc?.7' -soy that I tried
that same thing in .iammittee and
the committee ani -.....et get anywhere.
Mr. CASE of New Jersey, May I say
that this amendment is exactly the
amendment which the gentleman tried
to have approved by the subcommittee
:- ad the committee; and I am embold-
?11 to repeat the attempt here because
. hie success we have had with some-
-, hat similar amendments offered to, the
.emnittee this afternoon.
The National Security Resources
Board, a civilian agency, is the outfit
that, under this bill, should have the full
power to prepare all plans for industrial
and manpower mobilization and for
organizing our natural resources.
My amendment would provide for the
creation of a temporary commission to
decide what agencies, subordinate to the
National ? Security Resources Board,
should be included as a part of the
permanent structure and be charged
with, that particular duty.
Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CASE of New Jersey. I yield to
the gentleman from New York.
Mr. WADSWORTH. The National
Resources Board to which the gentleman
has just referred, is charged with some
of these very duties, to fix policies con-
corning industrial ar. -I civilian mobiliza-
tion in order to s:.; the most effective
mobilization and - -dmurn utilization
of the Nation's manpower in the event
of war, and determine the relationship
:,,e?tween the potential resctii.ces and po-
tential requirements for manpower, re-
sources, and productive facilities.
Mr. CASE of New Jersey.. Mr. Chair-
man, I would first of all point out to the
gentleman from New York that it is the
function of the board, the National Se-
curity Resources Board, to advise con-
cerning these various matters. I find
nothing in the bill under consideration
that authorizes the board to prepare
and make those plans. But in the bill
there is an express provision that the
lNyfunitions Board shall have power to
make plans. It looks very much to me
as if it had been deliberately planned
that the military board will make the
plans and this civilian commission will
merely advise the Presider' .dut them,
and I think that is the coffntietely wrong
approach. I would be glad for further
enlightenment and further instruction.
from the gentleman.
Mr. WADSWORTH. I read such an
interpretation of the functions' of the
Resources Board es the gentleman
from New Jersey, bee,.... it has the duty
to advise; and, of course, to advise they
would have to plan?to advise the Pres-
ident about industrial and civilian mobi-
lization and manpower problems.
`...'ne gentleman's proposal, as I recall, -
was rejected. by the committee.
CASE of New Jersey. That is cor-
rect.
Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman
gives the Power of execution to a board,
and all through this bill we have de-
clined to give powers of execution to these
boards.
few ? state
to the gt ih. _ha War
D.7.
have e.ated -the.: purpose
under 'an fx::: ',ion UT:T:6 cu tion
the plans should he eat by civilian
agencies simi.e.r to the War Manpower
Commission, the Office c,f; Defense Trans-
portation, and the like. I would not
willingly accept management of our econ-
omy in wartime or peacetime by the mili-
tary. I believe that in both wartime
and peacetime it should be managed by
civilian agencies, and I am very much
afraid that will not be the result under
this bill.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New Jersey [Mr. CASE].
The amendment was rejected.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, I
offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. MITCEELL : Page
26, line 12, strike out the period and insert
the following: "and shall be chosen in rota-
tion from the three armed services, pro-
vided that the total service of any officer
as Director of the Joint Staff shall not exceed
4 years in all: Provided. further, That the
combined service of any officer or Director
or member of the Joint Staff .shall not exceed
8 years in all."
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, one
point in connection with the joint staff
which we are setting up under -section
209 is the vagueness of that section's
language.
For example, Mr. Chairman, I note
that it fails to specify the qualifications,
tenure of duty, or methods of rotation
of officers on the joint staff. These are
extremely important matters in connec-
tion with a general staff. You all know
of the rise of the Prussian General Staff,
and I might add that one of the most
potent factors in that rise was the fact
that its officers and its directors were
allowed to remain undisturbed on gen-
eral staff duty year in and year out,
working, planning, studying, and con-
triving to dominate the nation.
Between 1857 and 1906, Mr. Chairman,
the period in which Germany forged the
iron spells which ripped our world apart,
there were but three directors of the
Prussian General Staff: Generals Von
Moltke, Von Waldersee, and Von Schlief-
fen. Of these three, Von Waldersee was
unimportant, holding office but 3 years.
Two ruthless, brilliant, and aggressive
military intellectuals, Moltke and Schli-
effen, actually effected the transition of
Prussia into the agressive, war-monger-
ing state which we have unhappily
learned to know too well, and it was their
descendants in office who. made World
War II a reality.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MITCHELL. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Alabama.
Mr. MANASCO. I think that is a
matter that requires consideration, but I
understood the chairman of the Armed
Forces Committee to say today that his
committee is going to study this ques-
tion. It is a matter we did not feel was
in the jurisdiction of our committee be-
cause it should be left to the Armed
Forces Committee. I think we can as-
sure the gentlemen that study will be
made at another date. .
Mr. MITCHELL. I thank the gentle-
man, Out I certainly would like to see
this spelled out in the present bill inas-
much as you provide for it substantially
in section 206 and I cannot see where
the addition of my amendment is going
to do any harm and it might possibly be
a very important stop-gap.
In contrast to that, Mr. Chairman,
this House has always carefully limited
the scope, tenure, and rotation of Gen-
eral Staff officers in every previous piece
of such legislation that has come before
us on the subject, in 1903, 1916, and 1920,
to name the most notable occasions.
I suggest, therefore, if we are to have
our Joint Staff, as a matter of legisla-
tive consistency and in keeping with our
American tr... Lions, that at least we
write into section 209 the normal pro-
visions for tenure, rotation, and scope
of duties which we have always set forth
for the War Department General Staff;
and I so offer amendment to accomplish
this purpose.
Mr. SMATHERS. _Mr. Chairman, I
rise in support of the amendment of-
fered by the gentleman from Indiana.
A moment a: the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. i.--IOFFMAN] made a -very
wise observation when he said that the
staff would do the principal work for
all the Secretaries and Chairman of the
Board. I think it is acknowledged that
here the Joint Staff will do most of the
work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If
such is the case, while the Joint Chiefs
of Staff may change and rotate, at the
same time there is no provision, as has
been pointed out by the gentleman from
Indiana, for the rotating arid the chang-
ing of the members of the Joint Staff.
It is possible that the Director of the
Joint Staff might be an infantryman
and he could slant and direct all tactics
along infantry lines. The result would
be, whether his policy was right or
wrong, we would pursue that policy ir-
respective of what the Joint Chiefs of
Staff thought.
We know that we need new blood, and
if we adopt this amendment and rotate
the members of the Joint Staff, there is
no danger of us making the mistake that,
was made by the Joint Staff in France
when they set up the Maginot Line and
did not know anything about aviation'
or anything of that kind. So I heartily
endorse the amendment.
Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMATHERS. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Alabama.
Mr. MANASCO. It is my understand-
ing that the promotion bill passed by
the House a week or two ago, that came
out of Armed Services Committee, does
contain a provision or rotation of of-
ficers. I am not a member of that com-
mittee, but I would be glad to have them
answer that question. I think that is an
important matter.
Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMATHERS. I yield to the gen-
tleman from North Carolina.
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CONGRESSIONAL .1-7LC,,J-:I'D-I-IOUSE
Mr. DuRHAM. It certainly was the
intention of the committee to set up tins
promotion list in the bill we passed a few
weeks ago. Whether or not it cures the
]iertieular point under discussion here,
em not in a position to say, but cer-
tainly that was the intention of the
Armed Service .Committee. I see the
chairman on the fioor at the present
tile, who can probably enlighten us on
that subject.
Mr. SilliATHERS. In any event, Mr.
Chairman, everybody agrees that there
should be rotation, so in order to be safe,
let us adopt this amendment, and then
if the Armed Services Committee wants
to make further changes, they can do so,
but let us adopt this amendment and
assure ourselves of rotation.
Mr. HOLTFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I*
rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield at this time to
the Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee on that point.
Mr. 'ANDREWS of New York. I have
no idea of c.isagreeing to the amendment,
except that any study of the promotion
bill passed b.7 the House for .the Army or
the Navy, or the present set-up, you
understand, is a matter purely within
the province of the rules and regulations
of the Department that pass through the
Armed Services Committee.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. HC):LIFIELD. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Indiana.
Mr. MITCHELL: The gentleman says
he has no objection to the amendment.
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. It is a
matter, as I see it, not within the prOvince
of this bill. That is a matter for legis-
: -non by the Armed Services Committee
tir:.cin the direction of the Department,
anci that is the sort of legislation we are
reia:hrig ail the time.
MIITCHELL. It pertains particu-
iarly to section 209. It prevents the per-
a' eh ency of holding ofice. That is the
thing I wanted to get away from.
Mr. ANDREWS of New York. That
Is prevented automatically.
Mr. MITCHELL. Then what is wrong
Ivith writing it in this bill?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, we
have been very careful on the Committee
on Expenditures of the Executive De-
partments not to go into the field of the
Armed Services Committee regarding
tcirornotions, tours of duty, pay, and so
forth. All of those questions come With-
in the province of that committee. I
Id-- ? --- eers of the committee are
in sy,.....eithy with the purposes of the
gentleman's . amendment, but I submit
eh:at this particular subject should be the
shbject of inquiry by the Armed Services
Committee and hearings should be held
on it, and that it should be given that
attention by the committee which they
normally would give. -
I ask that the amendment be voted
down.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask
i.c.nimous consent that all debate on
ins amendment and all amendments
znereto do now close.
Tile CHAIRMAN. Ti... .7.:e?..titei is en
the amendment, on:ercei by the gentle-
man from iMr.
The question was taken; and on a
division (deerane.eti by Mr. MITCHELL)
there were?a:leis 37, noes 117.
So the amendment was rejected.
Mr. CLASON. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment ()tiered by Mr. CLASON: On
page 31, strike out all of line 2 and insert
"the compensation prescribed by law .for
heads of executive departments."
(Mr. CLASON asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
ask unanimous consent that all debate
on this amendment and all amendments
thereto close in 7 minutes, 5 minutes to
be allotted to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. CLASON].
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. CLASON. Mr. Chairman, the
purpose of my amendment is to give to
the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary
of the Navy, and the Secretary of the
Air Force the pay of $15,030 a year. At
the present time we have two incum-
.bents, one of whom may move up or both
oy whom may not move up. Each of
them is a very well qualified man and
is more than earning the $15,000 a year
he is receiving.
On page 30, section 301 (a), it is pro-
vided:
The secretary Of Defense shall receive the
compensation prescribed by law for heads
of executive departments.
Each one of these other Secretaries is
the head of an executive department,
by the provisions of this bill.
On page 6 it is stated:
That the Department of the Army, the
Department of the Navy, and the Depart-
ment of the Air Force shall be administered
as individual executive departments.
On page 18 it is provided:.
There is hereby established an executive
department to be known as the Department
of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air
Force, who shall be the head thereof.
On page 30 we provide that the Secre-
tary of Defense shall receive the com-
pensation prescribed by law for heads of
executive departments. According to
this bill, each one of the other Secretaries
Is the head of an executive department.
I feel that each one, even though he is
not to have the Cabinet position, and
even though by this bill, Under an amend-
ment thereto that was adopted this after-
noon, he is no longer in the line of suc-
cession, is certainly entitled as the head
of one of these three great departments,
which are going to be so important in the
lives of every one of us, to receive the
pay of the head of an executive depart-
ment inasmuch as they hold that job un-
der this bill.
Under this provision on page 31, the
The CH_LiIRMAN. Is there objection compensation they are now receiving as
to the -request of the gentleman from the Secretary of War and the Secretary
Michigan? of the Navy will be cut from $15,000 to
There was no objection. $14,500 a year. I am sure every per-
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JULY 19
son Lore will agree with me that Secre-
tarY Pattersen, Secretary Forreste.1, and
Scene:my Royall, or any of the persons
who have been occupying those positions
or will occupy them in the future, are
entitled to be considered as heads of
departments and to receive the pay
thereof. All I am asking is that they be
acknowledged as having the right to the
pay of the head of an executive depart-
ment, as provided on pages 6 and 18 of
this bill. In fairness to them, I think.
they ought to get $15,000. I do not want
to be one of those to cut the pay of either
Mr. Forrestal or Mr. Royall, for I feel
each of them is entitled to every cent he
is getting and a whole lot more.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr.
HARNESS].
Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chair-
man, I hope this amendment will be
voted down. We are not legislating here
for any particular individuals who may
be in office. After all, the two Cabinet
members, the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy, are urging us to
adopt this legislation. The committee
gave careful consideration to reducing
the pay from $15,000 to this figure of $14,-
500, for the sole purpose of distinguishing
between Cabinet members in the execu-
tive department and the heads of the
my: Departments of War, Navy, and Air.
There has been some question raised
here as to whether or not these three new
department heads would become mem-
bers of the President's Cabinet. This, in
itself, answers that euestion. Five `nun,
dred dollars a year is not the thing that
is involved. It is not a question of money.
It is a question of establishing a policy.
I hope the members will stand by the
committee's bill.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Massachusetts [Mr. CLASON].
The amendment was rejected.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered Cy Mr. OWENS: Page
5, line 12, after the period, insert "That
such recommendations or reports shall, upon
request, also be made to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the Pres-
ident of the Senate; provided that said in-
formation shall be confidential and not of
public record."
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. OWENS. I yield.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that olc7-..7 te on this
amendment and all amend there-
to, and substitutes therefor, hese in 5
minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. OWENS. Mr Chairrrian, I had
not intended to take but a moment to
explain the amendment. But I under-
stood the amendment was acceptable.
They told me when I submitted the
amendment that it would be acceptable. _
Mr. Chairman, you have heard- quite
a few remarks about amendments to
change commas and words, and so forth.
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I am not asking you to do that. I am
pointing cut that this bill would create
a council such as we have not had in the
history of our Government. There has
not been one word said about the Con-
gress, the representatives of the people
themselves, having one word to say about
the plans that are being made 1 year or
2 or 3 or 4 years ahead. By this amend-
ment I say that the recommendations
and reports that are made to the Presi-
dent shall, upon request of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives or the
President of the Senate, be forwarded
to them, and it shall be confidential and
not of reeord.so that they will at least
have the information and be able to act
upon it should it be necessary. That is
really a safeguard which the people need
in a bill like this. As I said when I gave
it to the committee members of each
body, they agreed readily to the amend-
ment because they could see the sense
of the amendment. I was not even pre-
pared to argue it, but I now ask you to
use your good judgment in having the
same information which is given to the
President; given..to our Speaker and the
President of the' Senate when they make
request for the same.
Why should such an amendment be
defeated? I ask you to vote for it.
The CHAIRMAN. _ The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Illinois [Mr. Ownivs].
The amendment was rejected.
Mr. GOFF. Mr. Chairman, I think
it has long been the hope of the majority
of our citizens that we should have a
unification or merger of our alined serv-
ices. Unfortunately, the bill before us
.falls far short of a true unification,eand
when analyzed, does not, except in small
measure, accomplish that purpose. One
weakness is that it actually creates a
whole, new separate department, with
a new Secretary for Air, and superim-
poses a new ? super secretary with his
staff over our already complicated estab?
lishments to maintain the security of
our country. It is hard for me to see
how it can be called unification, when it
provides for four secretaries, instead of
two, and when it adds an entirely new
department. The bill merely compli-
cates our present arrangement and
makes it cost more. As I say this, I am
fully aware of the tremendous contribu-
tion to victory made by the Army and
Navy air arms. The coordination of the
air and ground units of our Army and
Navy was the major factor in our victory,
and I cannot see why we should jeopard-
ize that close coor7-ration by deliberately
providing for a .-ation, when we have
the lessons of N.VOrld WE:: II so close at
hand. Remember that the Germans had
a separate air force, and it seems to me
we are taking. a step backward rather
than forward if we destroy the close
unity between our own air and land arms
as is provided in the committee bill.
Certainly, such an arrangement cannot
promote econof-..-..y, and there is no use
spending more to provide a less efficient
organization simply because we have let
our admiration for the great seratce ren-
dered by our aviators run away with our
more sober judgment.
Economy alone- should not, of course,
a oih.. vc means to guai?-
antee our security. But Ida not
sec how '.]13 of ell:: .2,fense
can be iaa:.?,at:oc. by sottiz.??:-:
up a new and separate department, with
all its compl...cated sa 32,';anization, and
distinctive uniforms for the members of
this new agency. You cal: be sure that
one of the first steps taken by this new
department will be to prescpibe an en-
tirely different uniform from that: used
in the Army or the Navy, with new titles
for the different grades, similar to what
has been the case in the Roy.ti Air Forces
of the Britisa Commonwealth. If it is
wiser to leave the air arm of the Navy as
a part of the Navy, then why should we
divide the two highly effective parts of
our Army which brought victory by their
unified command and close cohesion
when launched against our late enemies?
I would not have you think that I do
not fully appreciate the importance of
the air arm in the situation that faces
the security of this country today. In
evaluating our national defense estab-
lishment, we must come down to the
practical business of analyzing just what
enemy we are likely to fight, should the
great tragedy corne of our being forced
into another war. I think all of us
have to agree that there is but one nation
from whom we may have any cause to
anticipate an attack. That attack is
bound to come by the air, for compared
to ours, it has no navy in size even to be
thought of as a threat, and navies are not
built in the matter of a few months or
could Jae, in the case of Russia, in a mat-
ter of years. I say again that the at-
tack, if it comes, will be by air, over the
polar cap, and that is why I spoke so
strongly for an increase in the House
appropriation for the construction of
planes, when the War Department ap-
propriation bill was before this body.
In my view, for the next two decades
war with Russia will almost entirely de-
pend on whether We maintain an air-
striking force superior to that of Russia.
It will be far cheaper for this country to
spend the major part of its defense funds
for planes and guided missiles in the sure
-hope and expectation that they will
never have to be used and, from time
to time, be discarded as obsolete. We
will have no war if we can maintain air
superiority over the Russians until by
education and agreements sincerely en-
tered into on both sides, war is at last
abandoned as a method of settling dis-
putes and uniform disarmament becomes
possible.
We should not forget, when we are
thinking about setting up a separate air
force, that there is ample basis for the
-belief that the real striking force in the
future war will be by guided missiles or
by planes which fly without human pilots.
The planes in which human pilots sit at
the controls may come to be only troop-
carrier planes, in which our forces will
be transported, to follow up and complete
the full exploitation of the devastating
effects of an aerial bombardment.
I hope this House will not vote to
create a separate air force. However,
if it should do so, I intend to vote for
the bill, but this only because of the hope
that in case of war the new Secretary
9317
able enough, and our President will be
strong and able enough, to force a uni-
fication which is lacking by the terms
of the bill that we now have before us.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
move that the Committee do now rise
and report the bill back to the House with
sundry amendments, with the recom-
mendation that the amendments be
agreed to and the bill, as amended, do
pass.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the Chair,
Mr. CASE of South Dakota, Chairman of
the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under con-
sideration the bill H. R. 4214, directed
him to report the same back to the House
with sundry amendments, with the rec-
ommendation that the amendments be
agreed to and that the bill as amended
do pass.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move
the previous question.
The previous question was ordered.
The SEE;AKER. Is a separate vote
demanded on any amendment? If not,
. the Chair will put them en gross.
The amendments were agreed to.
The SPEAKER. The question is on
the engrossment and third reading of the
bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time, and was read the
third time.
The SPEAKER. The question is on
the passage of the bill.
The bill was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
The SPEAKER. Under the order of
the House, the Clerk will report the Sen-
ate bill, S. '758.
The Clerk read the title of the Senate
bill.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, pur-
suant to the unanimous-consent agree-
ment, I offer an amendm:ent to the bill
S. 753, to strike out all after the enact-
ing clause and insert the provisions of
H. R. 4214, as passed by the House.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. liorrivinisr:
Strike out all after the enacting clause of
S. '758 and insert the provisions of H. R. 4214,
as amended.'
The amendment was. agreed to.
The Senate bill was ordered to be read
a third time, was read the third time, and
passed, and a motion to reconsider was
laid on the table. ?
The title was amended so as to read:
"To promote the national security by
providing for a Secretary of Defense; for
a National Military Establishment; for a
Department of the Army, a Department
of the Navy, and a Department of the Air
Force; and for the coordination of the
activities of the National Military Estab-
lishment with other departments and
agencies of the Government concerned
with the national security."
Mr. HOFF.7a.i.AN. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that in engrossing
the bill, H. R. 4214, the Clerk may be au-
thorized and instructed to make the nec-
be the major consideration, for what we of National Defense will be strong and esaary corrections in page numbers, sec-
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CONGRT,S,S.:
on numbers, subsection numbers, and
ccirrect typographical errors.
The ST.:?EAXER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Mich-
There was no .objection.
LI1TRNSION OF REMARKS
Mr. DUCK.. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan-
imous consent to revise and extend the
rame.rks I made earlier today in the C.
mittee of the Whole and to inclucia
therein extraneous matter.
Mr. =ARNEY asked and was given
Itern-nsison to revise and extend his re-
. D.,,TTERSON asked and was given
?permission to extend his remarks in the
Appendix of the RECORD and include an
Zrticie from the Saturday Evening Post
of July 19, 1947.
Mr. CASE of New Jersey and Mr. MAC-
.1--.15.\;:cON asked and were given permis-
sion to revise and extend the remarks
they made earlier in the day in the Com-
mittee of the Whole: - ? .
Mr. IVIE=T asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks in the Ap-
periclix of the RECORD and include a news-
paper editorial.
1.,:r.'1.-IUGH D. SCOTT, JR., asked and
was given permission to extend his re-
marks in the Appendix of the RECORD
and include an editorial from Newsweek
under date of July 21.
Mr. DAVIS of Georgia asked and was
given permission to extend his remarks
in the Appendix of the RECORD and in-
clude a resolution.
Mr. BUCHPiNAN asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks in the
of the RECORD and include an
editorial from the New York Times en-
titled: "Gambling With Securities."
Mr. EVINS asked and was given per-
mie.sion to extend his remarks in the Ap-
pen.elix of the RECORD and include an
article.
Mr. l3.1,ATNIK asked and was given
perri:ission to extend his remarks in the
Appendix of the RECORD and include two
al61311S
Mr. :,OHVY...ai.BE of Missouri asked and
??!as given permission to extend his re-
::.arks in the Aftenclix of the RECORD
in two instances.
Mr. 3R.ADLEY asked and, was given
permission to extend his remarks in the
Appendix of tha RECORD and include an
artiale from cite Press Telegram.
Mr. OFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-
nous consent to extend my remarks in
the RECORD with regard to the unifica-
tion bill just passed and that they may
appear in the RECORD 'just prior to the
motion t1:-.t the Committee rise.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of :the gentleman from
Idaho?
There v.,as no objection.
1"-..:RI,:ISSION TO FILE REPORT
Hai:Tx:I:AN. Mr. E':-.?eaker, I -ask
uns,ni.nous ce.:,ient- to filL, supplemental
report No. 953, part 2, on the bill (S. 364)
to expedite the 'disposition of Govern-
ment surplus airports, airport facilities,
and equipment and to assure their dis-
position in such manner as will best en-
caaran*e and foster the development of
civilian aviation and preserve for na-
, JULY 19
tional .2 .5 :1) OS
ficiont, an c.
wide systcs.n c.. public )62 L3, aaa for
other pu po
Tho Is th,_ e ?ttion th
the request of the gon;le-,.---am from
Michigan?
There was no (:1:,ject:on.
CONTINUATION OP li1017,:ATOR1Uivl
STATIYI
Mr. MICHENER. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent for ?,..a immediate
Consideration of S. 1503, to amend the
act entitled "An act to express the intent
of the Congress with reference to the
regulation of the business of insurance,"
approved March 9, 1945 (59 Stat. 33).
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Michigan?
There being no objection, the Clerk
read the bill, as.follows:
Be it enacted, etc., That the act entitled
"An act to express the intent of the Congress
with reference to the regulation Of the busi--
ness Of insurance", approved March 9, 1915,
is amended by striking out the words
"January 1, 1948", wherever they appear in
such act, and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "June 30, 1948".
Mr. MICHENER. Mr. Speaker, this
bill passed the Senate on July 3, and
came to the House. It is simply a con-
tinuation of the moratorium statute.
That statute expires on the 1st day of
January, 1948, and this continues the
life of the present moratorium statute
until June 30, 1948.
I have polled the members of the Judi-
ciary Committee to which the bill was
referred. They are unanimous in favor-
ing the report except three who are out
of the city. The gentleman from Penn-
sylvania [Mr. WALTER], a member of
the minority, is here, and is prepared to
make_ any statement required. I have
also consulted with the majority leader
and the minority leader.
The bill was ordered to be read a third
time, was read the third time, and passed,
and a motion to reconsider was laid on
the table.
INTERIOR DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION
BILL, 1948-PERMISSION TO FILE CON-
FERENCE REPORT
Mr. TABER. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the managers
on the part of the House may have until
midnight tonight to file a conference re-
port and stateinent on the bill (H. R.
3123) making appropriations for the De-
partment of the Interior for the fiscal -
year ending June 30, 1948, and for other
purposes.
The SPEAKER.
the request of tile
York?
There was no o
The conference
follow:
Is there objection to
gentleman from New
bjection.
report and statement
CONFE:IENCE RE2011T
The committee of conference on the dis-
agreeing votes of the two Houses on the
amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R.
3123) making appropriations for the Depart-
ment of the Interior for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1018, and -for other purposes,
having met, after full and free conference,
have agreed to recommend and do recom-
mend to their respective Houses as follows:
t the Ssnate recede from its amend-
14, hi, 33, 97, 93, 103, 117,
118, 1i1, 120, 123, 126, 127, 155, 160, 173, 174,
and its.
That the IIcfc,,c recede from its disagree-
ment to the amendments of the Senate num-
bered 1, 2, 4, 5. 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 23,
32,
33, 35, 36, 37, 13, 40, 12,
13,
40, 47, 43, 50,
51,
52, 53. 54, 55, 51, 37, 58,
53.
60, 61, 02, 63,
66,
67, 70, 71, 73. 74,
75,
70, 77, '79, 80,
80, 99, 1(;3, 106, 107, 110, 111,
112,
115, 1.16, 131,
122,
131, 112, 131, 131, 13'3,
139,
142, 17, 150,
130, 157, 158, 150, 101,
163,
165, 170, and 172, and agree to the same.
Amendment numbered 3: That the House
recede from its disagreement to the amend-
ment of the Senate numbered 3, and agree
to the same with an amendment as follows:
Restore the matter stricken out by said
amendment amended to read as follows:
Provided further, That not to exceed
$50,000 of this appropriation may be used for
the Division of Power under the Office of the
Secretary"; and the Senate agree to tb.e. same.
Amendment numbered 9: That the House
recede from its ;disagreement to the amend-
ment of the Senate numbered 9, and agree
'to the same with an rfinendment as follows:
In lieu of the sum proposed by said amend-
ment insert "81,000,000"; and the Senate
agree to the same.
Amendment numbered 13: That the House
.recede from its dis.greement to the amend-
ment of the Senate numbered 13, and agree
to the same with an amendment as follows:
In lieu of the sum proposed by said amend-
ment insert "$8,596,400"; and the Senate
agree to the same.
Amendment numbered 19: That the House
recede from its disagreement to the amend-
ment of the Sent numbered 19, and agree ,
to the same with amendment as follows:
Restore the matter stricken out by said
amendment amended to read as follows:
"Construction: The funds appropriated for
the fiscal year 1947 (Interior Department
Appropriation Act, 1047),, are hereby con-
tinued available during the fiscal year 1948
to meet obligations incurred in contract or
contracts duly executed and in force on or
before June 30, 1947; for administrative ex-
penses connected therewith; including pur-
chase of five, and hire of passenger motor
vehicles; for temporary services as author-
ized by section 15 of the Act of .:',.'ag,ust 2, 1946
(Public Law 600), but at rates not exceeding
$35 per diem for individuals; printing and
binding; for the purchase. or acquisition of
necessary lands for rights-of-way and neces-
sary engineering and supervision of the con-
struction under said contracts; and for the
construction of necessary interconnecting
facilities incident to and connected with the
construction of the Denison-Norfork trans-
mission line."
.And the Senate agree to the same.
Amend.. rt numbered 20: That the Rouse
recede fi disagreement to the amend-
ment of ?;,n3 Senate numbered 20, and agree
to the same with an amendment as follows:
In lieu of the sum proposed by said amend-
ment insert "81,175,000"; and the Senate
agree to the sarae.
Amcmdrnen." _limbered 29: That the House
recede from its disagreement to the amend-
ment of the Senate numbered 29, and agree
to the same with an amendment as follows:
In lieu of the sum proposed by said amend-
ment insert "$3,500,000"; an.d the Senate
agree to the same.
Amendment numbered 30: That the House
recede from its disagreement to the amend-
ment of the Senate nuiiabered ao, and agree
to the same With an .ndment as follows:
In lieu of the. sum prc .,J3ec.1 by said amend-
ment insert "$11,139;700"; and the Senate
agree to the same.
Amendment nurnlirred 31: That the House
recede from its disagreement to the amend-
ment of the Senate numbered 31, and agree
to the same with- an amendment as follows:
In lieu of the sum proposed by said amend-
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JULY 25, 1947
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
,
dination of the activities of the National"
. Security Organization with other de-
-?
tments and agencies of the Govern-
at concerned with the national se-
.... arity, and I ask unanimous consent that
the statement may be read in lieu of the
report.
Nhaps later in the day the Chair may be
able to, but not now.
Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is my
hope that during the time of adjourn-
ment the vacation of Congress, so-called,
which is _always to the individual Mem-
bers a period of extra work and over,'
time, you all will have a pleasant time
with the folks at home.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation, which is
H. R. 4214, under the number S. 758, to
my mind, is as important as any that
could come before the Congress. There
Is no question but that we need unifi-
cation. All admit that in all prepara-
tions for national defense or for war
there has been inexcusable duplication
and waste. War is waste and destruc-
tion:
My reluctance to vote for legislation
of this kind grows not out of the fact
that it is not needed but that for some
25 , years certain individuals connected
with the Joint Staff have been seeking
?not only to "give the Nation unity in its
preparations for defense and for war
and greater efficiency, but that some of
those pushing it seek to open the door
. to the establishment of a military dic-
tatorship. Not only does the General
Staff want to give us greater efficiency
but as indicated by the terms of this bill
they want the power to plan our domestic
as well as our foreign policy. When you
read the bill you will discover that that
is the fact. All too often these planners
become the ones with authority and
carry out their plans as distinguished
from the plans of the Congress.
And so there may arise in your minds
the question as to why I support it, and
I can only repeat what I said in the be-
ginning when this bill was before us for
the first time. It is the lesser of two
evils. Apparently we are going to pass?
I ,may say it is evident we are going to
pass?some legislation on this subject,
and may I respectfully submit to you
and to your judgment that the bill that
your committee brought back, the bill
,just returned by the conferees to this
ji-Iouse, is a great improvement over the
original bill, and the best we can get at
this time. That is why the conferees
bring it back for your consideration.
In this bill you will find provisions that
make it necessary that future Congresses
will be required, if our liberty is to be
preserved, to guard against the planning
of the State Department and the mili-
tary in this country with reference to
foreign policies, with reference to do-
mestic economy, with reference to the
? dissipation- of our resources and our pro-
duction, our industrial plants, because,
as we all know, in these days the plan-
ning is more than half the -battle; and
when they bring planned or- planning
legislation here to Congress?when it re-
lates to foreign policy or, domestic policy
the Congress has been all too willing, for
what reason I know not, to accept, adopt,
and carry it out.
Now to touch the provisions of this
bill,-the points on which your conferees
could not Carry out your wishes to the
extent which they desired. - Distin-
guished gentlemen from the other end
Ctr"
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Mich- ?
igan [Mr. HOFFMAN] ?
There was no objection.
The Clerk read the statement.
? (For conference report and statement,
see proceedings of the House of July 24,
1847.)
Mr. HOFFMAN (interrupting the
? reading of the statement). Mr. Speaker,'
ask unanimous consent that further
reading of the statement .be dispensed
with.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request .of the 'gentleman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN]. is recognized
for 1 hour.
CALL OF THE HOUSE'
Mr. RIZLEY. Mr. Speaker, I make a
point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER. Obviously no quorum
is present.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I move a
call of the House.
A call of the House was ordered.
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their
'names:
Barden
Bell
Bland
Bloom
Buckley
Bulwinkle
Butler
Cannon
Carroll
Case, S. Dak.
Celler
Chelf ?
Clark
Clements
Cole, Mo.
Cole, N.Y.
Cox
. Dawson, Ill.
Dawson, Utah
Dingell
Domengeaux
Durham
Elsaesser
Fellows
Fernandez
Fuller
Gathings
? Gifford
Gore
Gossett
, Gregory
[Roll No. 131)
Hall, Edwin
-
Edwin Arthur O'Toole
Harness, Ind. Pfeifer
Hart - Philbin
,
Hartley Phillips, Calif.-
Hays Poulson
Hebert Powell ?
Heffernan Rabin
Hendricks . Rayfiel
Herter Reed, Ill.
Jenison . Rooney
Jenkins, Pa. Sabath
Johnson, Okla. Sadowski
Jones, N. C. Sarbacher
Jones, Wash,. . Smith, Ohio
Kee ? Somers -
Kefauver . . Stigler '
Kelley ??? Taylor
Kennedy Thomason ?
Keogh Toilet son
Klein Trimble
Lesinski _Vail
Ludlow Vinson -
Lynch - Welch
McCowen Williams
McDowell Wood
Macy Worley
Marcantonio Youngblood -
Mason Zimmerman
Meade, Md. -
Norrell
The SPEAKER. On this roll call 340
Members have answered to their names;
r
a quorum is present.
BY unanimous consent, further pro-
*
-:c:ings under the call were dispensed
..1., .th ?
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
, Mr. HoFFi'..-AN. Mr. Speaker, I yield
myself 5 minn'tes and ask unanimous
consent to revise arid extend my remarks.
The SPEAKER. The Chair cannot
entertain that request IA this time. Per-
No.
10271
of the Capitol had something to say
about it. They had quite a lot, to say
about it.
'lou will recall that when the House
passed ori this legislation it amentlf C. the
bill H. R. 9214, which th& committee re-
ported, with reference to the Central In-
telligence Agency. The committee had
written into the bill a provision that the
head of that agency might be a civilian
or a man from the armed services. The
House amended the bill to provide that
he shall be a civilian. ,During the debate
the . gentleman from Minnesota [Mr.
Juan] offered an amendment which pro-
vided that if a man from the armed serv-
ices was appointed he should be required
to relinquish his rank and his authority
In the Army.
The SPEAKER. The time of t4)6). gen-
tleman from Michigan has expired.
Mr. HOF'FMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield
myself five additional minutes.
Mr. Speaker, when we went into con-
ference, the conferees for the other body
flatly refused to accept that amendment.
They had made certain concessions to
which your attention will be called later
on, but on that one they stood pat. They
refused to accept the House amendment
to the committee bill so your conferees
compromised by accepting the language
of the' bill, 4214, as reported by your com-
mittee to the House,. thus discarding the
amendment written into the bill by the
House which would have- required that
the head of that agency be a civilian. My
own choice, and I think the choice of six
of the seven members of the House sub-
committee who were conferees, was that
the head of that agency should be a ci-
vilian, but we could not get it, so we went
along with that compromise. It-seeks to
divorce the head of the.agency, from the
armed services 'if a man in the service is
appointed. ? ? ?
It will be recalled also, if you have read
the hearings, that there was a deliberate
effort on the part of the Army part of the
Joint Staff to reduce the marines to the
status of a police force. Your committee,
and the House sustained its action, wrote
into the bill certain provisions which pro-
tect the marines. You may just as well ,- ?
talk about stopping the sunrise or the
setting of the sun as to think that the
people of this country are going to permit
the Congress to vote to get rid of the
Marines. The marines have fought their
way into the hearts of all the people, and
the conferees who, were opposed- to the,
provisions which protected them could
get nowhere. In my humble judgment,
this bill protects to the fullest extent the
marines, their activities, their role, their
missions, their rights to develop the kind
of warfare and weapons they, think are
necessary or of advantage to the
Country.
There was fear on the part of some who
had been in the Navy as to certain omis-
sions in the original bill as sent up by the
administration. You will recall that the
men who fought as admirals, vice ad-
mirals, rear admirals, men who fought in
the last_ war as captains, and officers of
lower rank, some of them having had
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Approved For Release 2003/05/06 : CIA-RDP90-00610R00020b0001-0
CONGRESSIONAL RECORDI-HOUSE
their ships blown out from under. them, ?
did not get an opportunity to appear
before the committee to express their
thoughts and their ideas as to what the
legislation should be. You will recall
that 4 or 5 days before the hearings were
ended, and they were closed in spite of
ray protest, there were two orders of the
Navy, 94 and 95, which prevented the
fighting men and officers in the Navy, ex-
cept as their views were channeled
through the Secretary of the Navy from
expressing their opinions. That gag was
only removed a few days before the hear-
ing ended. It was then impossible to call
those witnesses. So there was a justifi-
able fear on the part of the enlisted men
in the Navy and on the part of the officers
of the Nayy that an attempt was being
made to take from them naval aviation.
The gentleman from New York [Mr..
COLE], offered an amendment in the
House, and it was adopted, which in our.
opinion and apparently in the opinion of
, the Members of the House Protected the
Navy by permitting it to continue to have
naval aviation.
We had to ffiake some changes in the
phraseology of that amendment as
written in by the House. But again, in
my judgment, there is no change in the/
basic thought; there is no change in the
language that will prevent the Navy from
carrying out to the fullest extent its de-
sire to be adequately protected in time
of war by naval aviation and to de-
velop before war comes naval aviation.
Those were the three more important
points in the legislation as it went to
conference.