COMMITTEE TO STUDY WAR DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000100200007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 6, 1945
• Content Type: MF

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6 November 194b
l IEMO11ATIDUM FOR MAJOR
GENERAL H.
A.
CRAIG, OPD
I,IAJO:1
GE IEii1L
E.
R.
QUESADA, E~AF
MAJOR
GEES-31L
I".
G.
IIYI.IAIl, AGF
COLONEL J. i i. ROAM: ER, ASF
BRIGADIER (~ aiiiRAL JOHN I;;AGRliDE -, 3SU
SUBJECT; Committee to Study War Department intellil-;ence
Activities.
1. I1r. Lovett has directed me to inform you that
the preliminary report of the Committee, dated 3 No=-emb?r,
1945, has been approved by the Secretary of Var.
2. Mr. Lovett has also advised that a net: Co.: ittes
will be appointed to consider intelligence reorganization
within the Army and War Department.
CARTER W. CLAP. MI
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS
OSD review(s) completed.
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we
3 November 1945
ILLEGIB
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to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, and formerly
Director of Intelligence, MIS). In addition, all members
of the Committee held numerous informal conversations with
ItEJdORANDUIv1 FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
SUBJi CT: Preliminary Report 'of Committee Appointed to Stud;
Var Department Intelligence Activities.
The undersigned special committee was appointed by
order of the Secretary of War, dated 22 October 1945 (T?sb L)
to advise the Secretary of War on certain intelligence natters
more fully set forth in said order, including the lormu=_ation
of a plan for War Department activities in the field of
foreign intelligence, the existing and proposed organization
of G-2, A-2 and the Strategic Services Unit, now attached to
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of /ar, and the fltture
use or disposition that should be made of all intelligence
activities within the War Department. The Corriittee was
directed to make its report not later than 3 November 1945.
In the limited time available since its appointment
the committee has made as intensive a study as practicable
of the various subjects covered in the Secretaryts order.
It has held nine meetings of the full committee. By means
of a special questionnaire it requested and secured written
reports from the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2, Assis-
tant Chief of Staff, G-2, AGF, Director of Intelligence, ASS,
Director, Strategic Services Unit and Director, Sje cial Plan-
ning Division, War Department Special Staff. Copies of these
reports are available for inspection. In addition, the
committee took the formal testimony of Major General Clayton
Bissell (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General
Staff); Mr. William Z. Jackson (formerly Assistant Military
Attache for Air in London and Chief of Secret Intelligence
Branch of G-2, ETO); formerly Chief, 25X1
Planning Group, OSS), (formerly Chief, OS-1',
European Theater) and Lieutenant Co mnander I.:i..l ton Katz
(Deputy Chief SI Branch, SSU); Mr. Lowell Wicker and r.
Kinf;ririan Douglas (Mr. Weicker served during the war as Acting
A-2 of the Eighth Air Force and Director of Intelligence of
USSTAF, and 1,11r. Douglas as AAF representative at the Air
Ministry in London); (Executive Office-- 25X1
of SSU); Colonel Gordon B. Rogers (formerly G-2, AGF);
Ltl General Stanley D. Embick (member of the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee); and Mr. Alfred I cCormack (Special Ass-'_stent
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individuals both within and without the C~'er Department
whose views were believed to be helpful on the subject_~
under consideration.
The committee invited the Director of Naval In-
telligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to appear before it as witnesses and give
the committee the benefit of their views and recont;enda-
tions. Both of these individuals, however, declined to
appear.
The committee has cone to the. conclusion that it
is not desirable to attempt to cover in this preliminary
report all of the subjects enumerated in the L,erorandun
of the Secretary of War (Tab A). 'With the approval of the
Secretary of :tar it is therefore restricting the conclu-
sions herein to the two most pressing problems that have
been submitted, viz., the question of the establishment of
a Central Intelligence Agency for the United States Govern-
ment, and the future of the Strategic Services Unit now
attached to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of V:s.r.
It is intended to supplement this preliminary report at tho
earliest practicable date with a further report of the
other subjects referred to by the Secretary.
GENERAL OBSE tVATIOINS
Prior to the outbreak of the war, this nation had
no foreign intelligence collection system worthy of the
name. It appears to have been contrary to national policy
to engage in clandestine intelligence or to maintain a
foreign espionage system. Partly as a result of this lace
of an adequate foreign intelligence system in peacetir?e,
the majority of Army Officers who otherwise possessed the
capability of. top connand did not sufficiently unders;and
the techniques and methods of utilization of foreign
intelligence.
During the course of the war, various uncoordinated
efforts were made to-compensate for this deficiency in our
system of national' defense. As might have been expected,
most of these expedients were unsatisfactory. i.uch e. fec'ive
work in the specialized field of foreign espionage and
counter-espionage was accomplished by G-2 and the Office of
Strategic. Services, but because of lack of direction, of
coordination and of cooperation among all agencies, as well
as for other reasons, even these organizations were unab_e
to fill the great need that existed for complete intelligence
coverage. However, it is not the purpose of this report
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to review in detail either the accomplishments, or lack
of accomplishments, of the units engaged in the foreign
intelligence field. It is sufficient to point. out that
there was generally a lack of harmony and cooperation, it
state of overlapping functions and confusion and a failure
to cover certain important fields, that in retrospect
appear quite extraordinary. Throughout the war there
existed, and to a large extent there still exists, a feolin
of'jealousy and mistrust among the various intelligence
organizations of the Government, and between a surprisiig
number of officers and civilians engaged in the various
intelligence activities.
The lack of trained and experienced intelligence
officers in both military services has been an important
contributing factor to the unsatisfactory situation. It
is important to note that there has never been any serious
effort to make Intelligence a career activity. Officer3
who were undoubtedly competent in the combat arms or ser-
vices, but who had had no intelligence training, were from
time to time pressed into service in intelligence roles.
The natural tendency was for them to seek to return to their
own. basic branch at the first opportunity. Changes among
the top personnel were frequent. During the war there -,-;;ere
in succession four Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, eight
.Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff-2 and five heads of 'U.1-le Office
of Naval Intelligence.
The committee wishes to stress with all of the
emphasis at its command the vital importance to this nation
of the early correction of this entire situation. In the
difficult years that lie ahead the United States must have
a national intelligence organization, competent and alert
to the extreme of possibility. It must be manned with an
adequate number of permanent personnel of the highest
caliber, thoroughly trained in the numerous specialties
that are the necessary components of a modern intelligence
system. This will require a totally different approach
to the entire subject of intelligence than has been had in
the United States up,to the present. At this particular
time the greatest pains must be taken not only to create
an organization and system that vA ll be adapted to future
growth, but also to retain for the Government the services
of the many capable individuals vh o are now available in
various departments, and who, although not yet properly
organized, have received invaluable training in the hard
school of war-time experience. Haphazard demobilization
of existing intelligence units vi 11 result in dangerous
delay in reaching the objective.
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As indicated above, the follov.ing par&Crat,hs of
this report will deal only with the questions of the
establishment of a centra intelligence organization and
the im aediato disposition to be made of the Strategic
Services Unit. The committee believes that extensive
additional study should be given to the organization and
consolidation of other intelligence functions of concern
to the I.lilitary Services.
THE ES ~'AI3LISH;E T 02 A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 0 RGA ~i
The committee has unanimously reached the conclusion
that this Government should establish as promptly as pos-
sible a National Intelligence Authority and a Central In-
telligence Agency. The cor mi ttee has considered a number
of rEcorunenda.tions, received from various sources, as to
the composition, functions and the location of such central
organizations, including those contained in the report of
the Director of the Office of Strategic Services and in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Study of September, 1943 (JCS 11SI/.i) .
The committee finds itself more nearly in agreement with the
recorrnnendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than ,,.,it-.h_ any
of the other proposals that have been advanced. In s e v ti .n-
forth below its ovm recornnendations, it will therefore ado"_
in a substantial part the language of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff memorandum, modified so as to accord with the care -t~r~ 's
views in certain particula rs.
The committee recommends the creation o f a National
Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State,
War and Navy, and a Representative of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. V+ hen and if the National Defense Organization in-
cludes a Secretary or Under Secretary of Air, the Authority
should be expanded by the addition of that individual. fro-
vision should also be made for the addition of other members
of the Authority upon the recor,vnendation of the existing
members, with the approval of the President.
The National Intelligence Authority should have con-
plete authority to formulate policies which shall be bindin?
upon the Central Intelligence Agency and all intelligence
activities in other Government departments and agencies.
The Authority should be charged with the responsibility fc>
such overall uncd intelligence-planning and development, and
such coordination of all federal intelligence activities,
as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the in-
,tellii,ence mission related to the national security.
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There should also be created a Central Intel li ;erce
Agency headed by a Director who should be appointed cr
removed by the President on the recommendation of the
National Intelligence Authority. The committee believes
that in order to insure continuity the Director should be
appointed for a long term of years, than six. The Director of the CentraleIntelligencelAgency
should be responsible to the National Intelligence Auth-
ority and sit as a non-voting member thereof.
There should be created within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency an Intelligence Board which should consist
of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, VXGS, the Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2 and. the Director of Naval Intelligence
and the Chiefs of the principal civilian intelligence
agencies having functions rel. ted to the national seca{rit-
as determined by the National Intelligence Authority. The
functions of this Board should be to assist the Director,
who shall serve as its Chairman, in the carrying out of
all of the activities and purposes of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and to facilitate coordination between the
Central Intelligence Agency and the departments and aE;enc e .
represented on the Board. The Director shall consult with
and secure the opinion of the Board on all important cues-
tions which may arise in the course of the operations of
the Central intelligence Agency. In the :event of a dif-
ference of opinion between the Director and members of the
Intelligence Board, the decision of the Director shall be
controlling, subject, however, to the right of any member
of the Board to have the question submitted for final
decision to the National Intelligence Authority. The
Director should also consult with the Board before deliv-
ering any estimates and appreciations to the President or
any member of the Cabinet, and if there shall be a dif-
ference of opinion among the Director and the members of
the Board, in any such case the differing opinions sho-{ld
accompany the Director's report.
Except for its responsibility to the National
Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelli ence Aency
C, ~J
should be independent. It should be support
ed by an in-
dependent budget, and its appropriations should be ob-
tainable without public hearings.
Subject to the direction and control of the
National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence
Agency should:
a, Operate as the sole collection agency z`or
all departments of the Government in the
foreign espionage and counter-espionage
fields.
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b. Perform for the benefit of departmental
intelligence agencies such other in--
telliggenco services of co:inon conce 'n
as the National Intelligence Authority
de,ternines can be more efficiently r