STATEMENT OF HONORABLE KENNETH C. ROYALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR, BEFORE THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, RES.758 CREATING A NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00610R000100090020-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 17, 2002
Sequence Number:
20
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 15, 1947
Content Type:
STATEMENT
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Tel. RE 6700
Brs. 2528 and 4860
STATEMENT OF
HONORABLE KENNETH C. ROYALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR,
BEFORE THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE
OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, RE S. 758
CREATING A NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT
Both officially and personally I favor the enactment of Senate Bill 7E8 provid-
ing for the unification of the Armed Services.
National defense is a single problem, and wider a single direction such de-
fense can in my opinion be provided more adequately, more efficiently, and more
economically.
This bill provides a plan which, I feel, is capable of accomplishing these
objectives. It is not the only possible plan. It does not meet the individual prefer -
ences of everyone. No plan of unification could possibly meet all these varied
views.
Any legislation on this subject must necessarily be a compromise. This L11 I
is a compromise, not only between conflicting views in the Army and Navy but elr;o
between similar conflicting views in Congress and throughout the count'
, To
quote the President, I believe it is a "thoroughly practical and workable corinpro-
raise.
Take for illustration the power of the Secretary of National Defense. Some
in the services -- and elsewhere -- seem to think that the power which the bill reves
to the single secretary is too great. Others -- and I believe a greater number --
thirk that the position of Secretary of National Defense should be strengthened and
the positions of the secretaries of the three services correspondingly weakened.
On this question -- as well as on others -- I believe the bill is a fair solution, ani I
hope there will be no change either way.
The fact that the Army and Navy have agreed on the bill is not, of ceurse, in
any sense binding on others. But consideration should -- and I am sure will -- be
given to the fact that after long and careful study the divergent views of men pro-
fessionally and intimately connected with this problem have been reconciled in this
present bill.
You will also recognize, I am certain, that the success of any plan of unifice.-
tion will in large part depend upon its support by the three armed services. A unifi-
cation law which does not have the support of the leaders of these services week
have "hard going" in actual operation. eii()RE
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Greater efficiency and econory arc the goals in striving tor
better integration in the application of the nation's military.
potential. .iany aspects of the problet have received -wide publicity,
but not much hc.s een said about logistics; actually, loEistics is
a vital factor in any plan for such .intecration, for logistics ay-
be briefly defined as the supply, maintenance, and resupply of he
n and material needed for thc conduct of operation.s. Courage and -,
*.? skill can Will &single battle, but logistics is the life's blood of
.campaiEns and wars. Obviously, w-ithout logistic supp'ert, a str_tegi,
? plan is only -a piece of, paper, and,. consequently., examination- of
logistical implications' will provide -a very iraportant key to a
- correct answer to the integration problem. : No plan for integration ?
is acceptable if it fails to provide a proper logistical orgt.t.niLatiot.;.,
the navy has objected to scx-ac aspects of nr.-Irger proposals on th,dso
, grounds, but we have done mare th-n that: o have developed a'
Unified Lo&:istic Support Plan For The National Defense Estabils;iment, =
and we feel tnat the Bill 5-758 meets the practical requirementJ of
,
1that
This Bill does not - nor does it need - deal directly ith
logistics in the operating theaters; existing field cora:land stractur,. s
- -a
the proposed organization -.6ppcars sound from the viewpoint of triC
are adequate. 3-758 stresses top managemerrt and policy controls and
combat forces and their loListics planners.
-
In order to see now logistics affects combat efficiency unier
any merger proposal, it is necessary .to look at the sequence of
events in providing lo-dstic support. Reduced to- its simplest rem.,
logistics is a three-phase "
(1) Statement of requirements;
(2), Procurement ?
-
, ? ,, -4 .
(3) Distribution.. :-
The r first and third phases arc chiefly military, and the second
is principally a comMercial task (performed in the Navy Departmpnt
under the direction of The Assistant Secretary of the Navy).
A
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STATEMENT OF
PEAR ADEFAL CLIFFORD A. SWANSON, MEDICAL CORPS, U.S. NAVY
SURGE:3N GENERAL, U.S. NAVY
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.
on.
S. 758,
A BILL
/6 406-7f-e
To promote the national security by providing for a National Defensf,
Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National
Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy,
and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Estab-
lishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National
Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the
Government concerned with national security.
?
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..?3
TOP SEFRET SEC
(Sender CliiInka:tItigeln on iTteetm
CENTRAL INTMLIGENCE GROUP
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP
(Revised 10 Sept 1946)
100090120-6
ROM
TO
INITIALS
ATE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR
SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ADVISORY. comm.
EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION
--CENTRAL RECORDS
SECRETARY, NIA
Cala, INTERDEPARTMENTAL STAFF
-ASST. DIRECTOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS
____
? ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION ?
)S1111
ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMNATION
CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH
, . O. . er ? a
/
?r ,e
,,
/
APPROVAL
ACTION
RECONNENDATION
SIGNAuit
INFORMATION
RETURN
DIRECT REPLY
COMMENT
PREPARATION OF REPLY FILE
CONCURRENCE DISPATCH
REMARKS: Attached herewith is the statement of General Royall, Under
Secretary of War, in connection with the unification bill.
This maybe of general interest to you. Kindly return for
our files.
TOP SECRET SECRET CONFID
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z
(1) The'? stateinent of -requir? ements is obviously a mili-tary- task:
for strategic reasons, an operation is necessary' it devolves
? ,upon the military to say what Men and mate n
rials are eeded for its
'accomplishtheritE.',.th&--Military say "what; when, and where"., 0?17
i---7-4-$7
2) 'Procurement- is the. "how" that Meets the `dem-rids of "what, when,
,and where"1 It is largely a commercial task, buy/the Jfdl itary have a
vital interest insofar as insuring that the, doom not adversely
;affect the "what" "when" or "where". Ftu-thermore,.' there are supply.-
aspects 'Of ProcUrement Which are performed by uniformed personnel, both
in the homeland and in the forward areas. '?
' ? .'!,
.44 0.4
)..-Distribution involves suCh functions as transportation,
; ?,
cirages.:and outloading in the continenta.L.United Stated, and it also
involves overseas shipping;:;oVerseag--StockPiling, :replenishment of
the.. mobile.' naval 'forces, ::: and ; the delivery of t-men : and rio.iteriali to
"overseas contingents Of all services'.:,iZ 14 r4
As a
safeguard'acalnat -ahorbitant, or ,Coriflicting military
emands?...Which could.:_ayertax, the resonrces" the..* Country, and aga4nci
;Wasteful: duplications; there been'a'very'.proper 'demand for the
best possible integration of the National Defense.':Establishmerit.:,.; ?
_ _
. ?
..Semetimee '-thee demands were - accompanied, by charges Of 14a.ste . and
- - ? . ?
inefficiency durang.the recent ,,var. ','?r-hav4 no cloutit...th4t. miiskaices
were madesc:?but"..a ' truly objective study must 'avoid 7 the assumption
the entire: World War II setup mae 'inefficient :and' wasteful.
- .
The United States Met the greatest logistical challenge: of
tame in. World, ,Tar' II;? the :shifting -Lfortunes ck,t to 7 siZien -and
radical demands from the ,field for new equipment ;Or, greater Pantities.
of equipment. ', ? These. demands ?:,:were met aMazingly. wells 85 the 'cuestion
naturally arises. ;'.11# Change. a system that. has ' proven its 1,Auricability
. .
in
war?" The Only acceptable."- answer' is :'. no obtain' greater-:efficiGsncy
and econornyi."':', That answer sounds logical, but it requires close
inspectior4,:i
,s?
Ly,
e t,e '"efficiency" and meConomy" ire meahings ver7-
feren%-crpm;thOse,'accepted in connection' withi*liar profit ;arid i.
loss, ? iii:*17C:`,.; these; VfOr4s 'carry the:,'COnnote:tion.`.t5t'achieVeinikit.Of"."'" '
national' purpose in the-'''shortesertiMe.
expenditure blood ',and treaAui.e..:,::'Bea;tase. -1)6 ;yp
Uggegtieni....:f ibbieaSed: vex:- efficiency ,-and.:War:''eCohOW''':Mifi
esubjectea- ; than.: .scrutiny in temi ofa- dol
sheet: 1r ecaniple:';,?-'sav.ing.itoney on weapons or equipmeriT(wilo EI ,po" "-
Or 'val.:4,y Coats aierican lives ,isliiieither';,?effidient, nor. zedenothic
1.
-.
Nor Is it'eithr 'effibIent or eCoiiOmiCalf to -.risk; lives by
risks inlitetting-TWeaPons,'Or- equipment to the, right place at. i} right
and.' :yet, such r1si 10 inherent :in'-?`any...s4cheme;:r*hiCh. denies ,a
respoi-tsibi.e.?service 'control...Over its SUPp
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STATEMENT OF
ASS ISTAN:T SECRETARY OF THE NAVY W. JOHN KENNEY
? BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON S. 758
(3e2:,-2.at9 46i /91z)
My statement is directed primarily towards the problem of supplying a
military establishment and the character of organization best designed to do
that -- with particular emphasis on purchasing and procurement. I am
stressing that phase of the problem of logistics bec ause of the interest that
has been evidenced in it. If the Committee desires an amplification on tae
other phases, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics, Vice Pdmiral
Carney, can explain from the military point of view how requirements
determined and how material procured is delhered to the-fleet.
S. 758 will, in my opinion, create a more efficient organization. It mak,as
possible a military establishment that is both responsive to military needs and
to the related diplomatic and industrial requirements. However, the ultimate
determination of the effectiveness of any military organization is proven-only
by its ability first to prevent war, and second if war occurs to win that war.
The procurement of material to supply a military establishment is a-function
of service and to that extent is a subordinate and ancill&ry.function. Its
importance should not, however, be underestimated as it is the foundation
on which the fighting force rests. The supply organization must be properly
related to the military establishment it supports or the efficiency of the latter
will be affected.
A supply organization must be
_
(1) to provide for expansion in time of war without disruption
of organization or reassignment of functions; . ? - -
(2) to have the flexibility to respond to operational and
technical reauirements; -
(3) to provide strategic dispersion of stocks and records
within practicable limits;
(4) to have effective coordination with all operating and
technical agencies of related organizations within and without
the governments
(5) to permit economy of operation through mobility of
support and control of material.
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