CIG ENABLING ACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000100030006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 11, 1947
• Content Type: MEMO

STANOA O noRM NO. 84 ; cPN IN~
Arpved For Release 2006/1 1 I~ I0R0001000006-4
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVER
NMENT
TO The Director.
FROM Chief , Legislative Liaison Division.
SUBJECT: CIG Enabling Act.
DATE: 112 ,:arch 947.
1. In coati ents dated 10 r ebruar^y 1947, addressed to the pro-
posed CIG Enabling Act, Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that study and
eventual legislation would be necessary in connection with cryp-?
tography.
2. The unde requested comments on this possibility
from F_ I Chief, Coiunications Division, Executive
for Personnel and Administration, a copy of which is attached
herewith.
3. Because of the extreme delicacy of the subject and its
implications, guidance is requested as to the extent it is felt
.proper to include this matter in the proposed m bling Act.
4. For the reasons set forth in Paragraph 3, it may be best
?to.include merely a short reference, as indicated in Paragraph 1
of the attached memorandum.
25)I1
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
L. ORZHEIM.
Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-R?P90-0061 OR000100030006-4
 PORN 14M 66
L.
A proved For Rele e 0 0-00610R000100
~
Ge
Al emOran um . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO = ?dr. Walter Pforzheimer DATE: 7 March 1947
FROM s Chief, Communications Division ~t" S 4. k Lct S j,.
P Ct. < C.0 P , ;Q4
1. I believe that the act as written can be interpreted to include foreigi
intelligence derived from cryptanalytic effort. However, it would probably be
better if it were spelled out to give CIG this specific authority. This could
be accomplished by merely adding words so that the proper portion of the act
would read "Foreign intelligence including that derived from cryptanalytic eflYort,
tetc.n
2. There are many arguments in favor of centralizing cryptanalytic work.
A few non-technical reasons are the following.
a., Centralized effort is more economical since it avoids all
duplication and overlap.
b. It makes the best cryptnalytic personnel in the country available
at one place to attack all problems regardless of responsibilities.
c. It accomplishes centralization of an extremely valuable source of
intelligence in CIG, thereby greatly furthering the basic purpose of estabL-,shy
CIG.
d. It is a major step in overall coordination of U.S. foreign.intelligencf-.
e. It will enable the various sections of CIG to 'work 'with. greater effect
by poling intelligence requirements and targets.
.. The centralizing of cryptanalytic work and bombining it with all other
intelligence sources will do more to prevent another Pearl Harbor than any
other single thing that the U.S. Government can accomplish'by permitting all.
foreign intelligence to meet at a common point where an.accurate evaluation
of the meaning of the intelligence can be drawn and a quick dissemination
made to responsible Government agencies.
3 There are a number of technical reasons favoring centralized cryptanalytiic
work. Without going into too much detail or being too specific., a few of these
are roughly as follows: (Note ,?however, that specific exceptions can be made to
nearly every statement that follows.)
CONFIDENTIAL
-Approved- For Release 2006'10/20 :-CIA-RDP90-006`F0R00010G0S0006-4 .
 6roved For Release 2006/10/20 ? (C
;^ pS c~xtc u,ict -
u
ecome a .
function of CIG. This is essential to afford agencies the advice
and experience of the cryptographic personnel of CIG, the one point
'where the best qualified personnel in the U.S. are concentrated.
This is further essential to avoid errors and poor judgment by nor-
nllA7 i .N AA nG>ww.,>o1
W++iavi\6u'i `y1J., uv ull L)cA[-1?? IK on seCUr1Ly.
a. Cryptographic security of U.S. agencies sho
ld b
(1) Should extend to making CIG responsible for develop 'nt,
(2) However, the prerogative of commands etc cannot tae
-
i
1n gene by other agencies vrill be restricted.
to specific cipher and means authorized by CIG. Also, CIG can
prohibit the transmission of Secret and Tap Secret material over
P
y i
n
a
to commands. But final decision rests with the commander. Excepption
transmi
ttal of CIC tzll
Of advising dangers, limitations, etc. with proxrer recorune
d
t'
ignored. Hence, in special cases CIG action should take the
o
e
".5 t311Ce acting as liaison officer, and CIG channels to and from U S.~fieldmagences
to serve the double purpose of forwarding material to CIG and disseminating
CIG high level intelligence to field agencies. For example - CIG liaison
officer would be established with major U.S. Army or combined headquarters
and like offices. His function is that of CIG advisor to the commander and
channel for the flow of CIG intelligence reports. He would maintain his -
oin cipher facilities, which may extend to operating his oven. communications
facilities.
-- ...". v., ~~.,~.iaLuu-.uu o . a
network of CIG personnel for the purpose of handli Q r
t
b. As a desirable feature to insure maximum security of intelligsnc^
and sonrres _ al+hn?-,~, ,,.,+ o,, . ,._~_ -, _ ? -
r
n
a ciphers.
oone,GSC
Chief, Communications Division
CONFIDENTIAL
061OR000100030006-4
 R D P 90-00010R0001 00 (30006-4
STRICTED UNCLASSIFIED
Tots and Bottom)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP
Revised 10 Sept 1946)
EXECUTIVE"OFFICE:'ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ADVISORY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE FOR P
CENTRAL RECORDS,
SECRETARY, NIA
Cam, IN DEPARTMENTAL STAFF
AS. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS
ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION
ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION
Cam' SECURITY BRANCH
Approved For Release 2006/10120: CIA-RDP90-0061.OR0001000
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