THE CHOICE IS INTELLIGENCE OR PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000707350022-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 27, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 :CIA-RDP90-005528000707350022-7
~.RTICLE AP?F.E~RTD
? 0~' PAGE L'SS~
TAE REVIEW OF TAE NEws
27 oCTOBFR 1982
~'~~ ~IIFOIG~
~EE~ F~OH~A&E~~D
~~ ~ta~ia ~'esgusoni
d 1~rt:t,,.u;t:~cF professionals were
shucked recent)' when the House In-
telligence Committee released a Left?
slanted Pttack on U.S. polic}? in Cen?
:ral .4merica. The Report, written b}?
mcmhc?rs .,f the staf7 of Intelligence
Oversight and Evaluation Subcommit-
tee Chairman Charles Rise (D.-North
Carolinal, u?as immediately con-
demned h}? other members of the
Committee and the intelligence c~n-,-
munit}?..~I the same time, the Cuban
propaganda network began circulating
selected excerpts of the R~pnrt as a
part of its anti-U.S. campai;;n in Cen-,
tral America.
The House Intelligence Committee,
chaired by Represent.atire Eduard
Boland (D.?>\4assachusetts), had de-
veloped a substantial reputation dur-
ing its five years of existence as a
balanced. moderate, bipartisan con-
gressional participant in intelligence
matters. The Report by the Rose Sub-
committee staff raised images of the
discredited Frank Church hysteria of
the Seventies. One signal of the seri-
ousness with which the release of the
Report is regarded in intelligence cir-
cles was the fact that Admiral Bobby
Ray Inman- farmer deputy director of
the C.1.A. and previousl}> director of
the National Security Agency, re-
signed his position as an unpaid con-
sultant to the House Intelligence Com-
mittee. ]nman, u?ho had been appointed
to the post with much fanfare by
Chairman Boland, left because of the
slanted nature of the Staff Report
and the partisan manner in which it
was released.
Leading the congressional protest is
Representsti~?e C.~ti. "Bill" Young (R.-
Florida), u?ho called the Stafl Report
"extremei~~ biased, containing o~?er-
statemer,ts, misststement~ and sub,
jecti~?e generalities." Young pointed
maul packed with assumptions, opin-
ions, and conclusions of a political
nature. Staffers are supposed to stick
to assembling facts.
7'he Staff Report finds fault pri?
marily with the "pre~entatior." of
U.S. intelligence information, which
it contends is given t.o "suggestion of
greater certainty than is warranted by
the evidence." To justify this claim,
the Report attacks a C.I.A. secret
briefing on international Communist
support of the Salvadoran terrorists
given in March of this year. But Intel-
ligence Committee Chairman Boland
said after the briefing that the evi?
deuce ~t?as "convincing" that the Sal-
vadoran terrorists "rely on the use of
sites in Nicaragua for command and
control and for logistical support."
The Chairman continued by stating
there was "further persuasive evi-
dence" that the Sandinistas were help-
ing to train the Salvadoran terrorists,
transferring aims and financial sup-
port to them, and were providing them
with bases of operation on Nicaraguan
territon?. And, said the Chairman.
"Cuban involvement - especisll}? in
providing arms - is aLo evident."
The Rose Staff Report seeks to
discredit this briefing. and by im-
plication Chairman Boland's response,
b}? declaring that "only a very few"
ships had been traced from the Soviet
Union to Cuba and \'icaroguo carrying
arms for the te.*rorists. \ever mind
that arms for the Communist terrorist
movement are flowing from the Sovi-
et L?'nicm through other Communist
count-ies to Nicaragua where they are
gi~?ett to the terrorists ol'the Farabun-
do 14ani National Liberation \1rn?e?
maul (F.A1.L.NJ.
The Staff Report's second major
criticism is that our intelligence places
fault}- "reliance on some unquestioned
and sometimes contradicton? assump-
tions" But the only "contradicton?
assumptions" cited are those on
whether increased American pressure
on the Communist Cuban regime would
motivate it 10 "reduce tensions" or
whether it would cause Fidel Castro
"to step up his troublemaking activ-
ities." The Staff Report ignored the ?
facts that the result depends on hov,?
much pressure is applied and at What
point Castro decides the pleasure of
exporting terrorism and subversion in
this hemisphere is not worth the pain
of vastly tightened economic embar-
goes, internal unrest encouraged by the
proposed neu? L'.S. Radio A4arti broad-
ca~ts, and so forth. i
The third major unfair criticism of
U.S. intelligence w?as its alleged "ac?
cept.ance of descriptions given by the
Salvadoran government when intelli-
gence analysts recognize grounds for
skepticism." This boils down to the
fact that the Rose Subcommittee
staffers do not believe that the Gov-
ernn-,ant of El Salvador is attempting
t~ maintain discipline over its troops.
and that the only evidence that mem-
bers of the Salvadoran armed forces
invoh~ed in ahuses are being punished
comes from the Government of El
Salvador. fever mind that the Starr
Report itself cites a cable from the
t'.S. Embassy in 4an Sah?adnr Which
corroborates the ststemerts of the
Salvadoran Government. '
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 :CIA-RDP90-005528000707350022-7